Abstract

The only observable outcome of the audit process is normally the issued audit report, which, at least in its standard form, does not contain much information about audit quality (Balsam et al. 2003). Auditor quality is multidimensional and inherently unobservable, and there is no single auditor characteristic that can be used as a proxy for it. In the absence of direct measures for quality, audit consumers must assess the quality by using quality surrogates, or the overall reputation of an auditor (e.g. Shapiro 1983, Riley 2001).

The purpose of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of the determinants and implications of quality-differentiated audits through four inter-related essays. The findings of the essays shed light on the various ways in which client firms strive to signal high audit and consequent earnings quality. From the supply-side perspective, the essays of this dissertation provide evidence how some (individual) auditors have been able to establish a reputation higher than the generic reputation.

Importantly, this dissertation adds to the ongoing debate about the regulator changes and initiatives in the European Union and the U.S.A. requiring disclosure of engagement partner identity. The rationale behind such a requirement is that it could bring within investors’ reach greater transparency and accountability in the auditing process thereby helping to restore investor confidence in the capital markets. Consistent with this rationale, the results of this dissertation support the view that audit markets (and/or firm insiders) infer audit quality, at least to some extent, from the characteristics of the individual audit partner in charge.