University of Oulu

T. H. T. Le, N. H. Tran, P. L. Vo, Z. Han, M. Bennis and C. S. Hong, "Contract-Based Cache Partitioning and Pricing Mechanism in Wireless Network Slicing," GLOBECOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference, Singapore, 2017, pp. 1-6. doi: 10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254699

Contract-based cache partitioning and pricing mechanism in wireless network slicing

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Author: Le, Tra1; Tran, Nguyen1; Vo, Phuong2;
Organizations: 1Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, Kyung Hee University, Korea
2School of Computer Science and Engineering, International University - VNUHCM, Vietnam
3Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77004-4005 USA
4Centre for Wireless Communications-CWC, University of Oulu, Finland
Format: article
Version: accepted version
Access: open
Online Access: PDF Full Text (PDF, 0.3 MB)
Persistent link: http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi-fe2018073133195
Language: English
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2017
Publish Date: 2018-07-31
Description:

Abstract

In the commercial caching system, both Infrastructure Provider (InP), who owns the infrastructure and wireless network resource and Service Providers (SPs), who provide service to its users based on the virtual resource provided by the InP, are beneficial in leasing and renting the cache space. By partitioning the cache space at the BS into slices and leasing each partition to the SPs, the InP can receive a payment. Meanwhile, the SPs can serve their users with faster download service with local caching. However, both SPs and InP are selfish and want to maximize their own benefits. In addition, in practice, there is asymmetric information between SPs and InP. Thus, some SPs may declare inaccurate private information to get more cache space or less payment. To deal with these problems, in this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on contract theory, in which the InP, the employer, who designs and offers contracts to SPs, the employees. In particular, SPs are specified into types based on their valuation parameters and request rates. Different from the traditional contract model with two feasible contract conditions, we impose cache capacity constraints, which induces the interaction among SPs and makes the contract design more complicated. We propose an algorithm that achieves the optimal contract so that the InP can motivate SPs to participate into renting caching space while maximize its utility. Simulation results show that the proposed approach not only ensures no SP has incentive to select another contract but also outperforms the baseline allocation algorithm.

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Series: IEEE Global Communications Conference
ISSN: 2334-0983
ISSN-L: 2334-0983
ISBN: 978-1-5090-5019-2
ISBN Print: 978-1-5090-5020-8
Article number: 8254699
DOI: 10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254699
OADOI: https://oadoi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2017.8254699
Host publication: 2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM) Proceedings : Singapore 4 – 8 December 2017
Conference: IEEE Global Communications Conference
Type of Publication: A4 Article in conference proceedings
Field of Science: 213 Electronic, automation and communications engineering, electronics
Subjects:
Funding: This research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education (NRF-2016R1D1A1B01015320).
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