University of Oulu

Barua, B., khan, Z., Han, Z., Abouzeid, A., Latva-aho, M. (2016) Incentivizing Selected Devices to Perform Cooperative Content Delivery: A Carrier Aggregation based Approach. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 15 (7), 5030-5045. doi:10.1109/TWC.2016.2551741

Incentivizing selected devices to perform cooperative content delivery : a carrier aggregation-based approach

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Author: Barua, Bidushi1; Khan , Zaheer1; Han, Zhu2;
Organizations: 1Department of Communications Engineering, University of Oulu
2Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Houston
3Department of Electrical, Computer, and Systems Engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Format: article
Version: accepted version
Access: open
Online Access: PDF Full Text (PDF, 0.7 MB)
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Language: English
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2016
Publish Date: 2018-09-28


In a cooperative content distribution (CCD) using multiple interfaces, a smart wireless device receives content from a base station (BS) on its cellular interface, and it broadcasts the same content through another wireless interface, such as WiFi. However, different users can experience different link qualities, and users with slow wireless links can be a bottleneck in terms of CCD performance. To address this problem, we propose a device selection method, which leverages multiple interfaces of the selected devices to perform CCD. Our proposed method takes into account the link quality of both primary (cellular) and secondary (WiFi/short-range) interfaces of the devices, and selects the devices with the best link quality for CCD. To analyze the stability of the proposed CCD method against selfish deviators, we model the problem as a repeated CCD game. We show that although the proposed method yields significant gains in terms of energy and frequency carrier savings, it is vulnerable to selfish deviating users. To address this challenge, we propose a carrier aggregation-based incentive mechanism. The analytical and simulation results show that the proposed mechanism maximizes individual and network payoffs, and is an equilibrium against unilateral selfish deviations.

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Series: IEEE transactions on wireless communications
ISSN: 1536-1276
ISSN-E: 1558-2248
ISSN-L: 1536-1276
Volume: 15
Issue: 7
Pages: 5030 - 5045
DOI: 10.1109/TWC.2016.2551741
Type of Publication: A1 Journal article – refereed
Field of Science: 213 Electronic, automation and communications engineering, electronics
Funding: This work was supported by the Academy of Finland (Grant 268997 and Grant 268830), the Tekes FiDiPro grant and in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant CNS-1456887, Grant CNS-1422153, Grant ECCS-1547201, Grant CCF-1456921, Grant CNS-1443917, Grant ECCS-1405121, and Grant NSFC61428101.
Academy of Finland Grant Number: 268997
Detailed Information: 268997 (Academy of Finland Funding decision)
268830 (Academy of Finland Funding decision)
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