B. Barua, M. Matinmikko-Blue, Y. Zhang, A. A. Abouzeid and M. Latva-aho, "On Contract Design for Incentivizing Users in Cooperative Content Delivery With Adverse Selection," in IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 17, no. 12, pp. 8418-8432, Dec. 2018. doi: 10.1109/TWC.2018.2877322
On contract design for incentivizing users in cooperative content delivery with adverse selection
|Author:||Barua, Bidushi1; Matinmikko-Blue, Marja1; Zhang, Yanru2;|
1Centre for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, 90014 Oulu, Finland
2School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
3Department of Electrical, Computer and Systems Engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180 USA
|Online Access:||PDF Full Text (PDF, 2.6 MB)|
|Persistent link:|| http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi-fe201901041417
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
|Publish Date:|| 2019-01-04
Cooperative content delivery using multiple air interfaces (CCDMI) is a powerful solution to mitigate congestion in cellular networks. In CCDMI, the operator distributes content to selected users that further distribute it locally among its nearby users. However, a user that is capable of contributing to CCDMI might act selfishly and refuse to participate. Although the operator can encourage user participation by offering incentives, it has incomplete information about the users’ willingness to participate. In order to overcome this problem of adverse selection in CCDMI, we propose two contract-based methods under information asymmetry. In both methods, the operator designs a performance-based contract set for the users that are capable of local content distribution. Using a mathematical analysis, we show that the optimal contract under information asymmetry achieves close to optimal utility for the users and the operator, compared with the information symmetry case. Moreover, the users with high willingness to participate get positive utility and the users with low willingness get zero utility. Hence, by assigning contracts, the operator can motivate user participation, despite the information asymmetry between them. Our results verify that the proposed methods improve the system performance in terms of the utility of the operator and the users.
IEEE transactions on wireless communications
|Pages:||8418 - 8432|
|Type of Publication:||
A1 Journal article – refereed
|Field of Science:||
213 Electronic, automation and communications engineering, electronics
222 Other engineering and technologies
This work was supported in part by the Academy of Finland through the 6Genesis Flagship under Grant 318927 and in part by the Business Finland in Multi-Operator Spectrum Sharing (MOSSAF) Project.
|Academy of Finland Grant Number:||
318927 (Academy of Finland Funding decision)
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