Realism without representationalism
1University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland
|Online Access:||PDF Full Text (PDF, 0.2 MB)|
|Persistent link:|| http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi-fe202002276774
|Publish Date:|| 2020-02-27
Scientific realism is a critical target of anti-representationalists such as Richard Rorty and Huw Price, who have questioned the very possibility of providing a satisfactory argument for realism or any other ontological position. I will argue that there is a viable form of realism which not only withstands this criticism but is vindicated on the antirepresentationalists’ own grounds. This realist position, largely drawn from the notion of the scientific method developed by the founder of philosophical pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, will further be compared with the accounts of truth and objectivity proposed by the contemporary pragmatists, Rorty, Price, and Robert B. Brandom.
|Type of Publication:||
A1 Journal article – refereed
|Field of Science:||
Open access funding provided by University of Oulu including Oulu University Hospital.
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