B. Lorenzo, I. Kovacevic, A. Peleteiro, F. González-Castaño and J. C. Burguillo, "Joint Resource Bidding and Tipping Strategies in Multi-Hop Cognitive Networks," in IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 301-315, Sept. 2016, doi: 10.1109/TCCN.2016.2604838
Joint resource bidding and tipping strategies in multi-hop cognitive networks
|Author:||Lorenzo, Beatriz1; Kovacevic, Ivana2; Peleteiro, Ana1;|
1AtlantTIC, University of Vigo, 36310 Vigo, Spain
2University of Oulu, 90014 Oulu, Finland
|Online Access:||PDF Full Text (PDF, 1.8 MB)|
|Persistent link:|| http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi-fe2020060540783
IEEE Communications Society,
|Publish Date:|| 2020-06-05
In multi-hop secondary networks, bidding strategies for spectrum auction, route selection, and relaying incentives should be jointly considered to establish multi-hop communication. In this paper, a framework for joint resource bidding and tipping is developed where users iteratively revise their strategies, which include bidding and incentivizing relays, to achieve their quality of service requirements. A bidding language is designed to generalize secondary users’ (SUs) heterogeneous demands for multiple resources and willingness to pay. Then, group partitioning-based auction mechanisms are presented to exploit the heterogeneity of SU demands in multi-hop secondary networks. These mechanisms include primary operator (PO) strategies based on static and dynamic partition schemes combined with new payment mechanisms to obtain high revenue and fairly allocate the resources. The proposed auction schemes stimulate the participation of SUs and provide high revenue for the PO while maximizing the social welfare. Besides, they satisfy the properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational tractability. Simulation results have shown that for highly demanding users the static group scheme achieves 150% more winners and three times higher revenue for the PO compared to a scheme without grouping. For lowly demanding users, the PO may keep similar revenue with the dynamic scheme by lowering 50% the price per channel as the number of winners will increase proportionally.
IEEE transactions on cognitive communications and networking
|Pages:||301 - 315|
|Type of Publication:||
A1 Journal article – refereed
|Field of Science:||
213 Electronic, automation and communications engineering, electronics
This work was funded in part by Táctica, COINS (TEC2013-47016-C2-1-R), Grant IJCI-2014-20611 and Grant EUIN2015-62758, MINECO, Spain, and by the University of Oulu through the NET Support/24000710 Project.
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