University of Oulu

M. Hupez, J. -F. Toubeau, I. Atzeni, Z. D. Grève and F. Vallée, "Pricing Electricity in Residential Communities Using Game-Theoretical Billings," in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2022, doi: 10.1109/TSG.2022.3206912.

Pricing electricity in residential communities using game-theoretical billings

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Author: Hupez, Martin1; Toubeau, Jean-François1; Atzeni, Italo2;
Organizations: 1Department of Electrical Power Engineering, University of Mons, Belgium
2Centre for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, Finland
Format: article
Version: accepted version
Access: open
Online Access: PDF Full Text (PDF, 0.9 MB)
Persistent link: http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi-fe2022112166291
Language: English
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2022
Publish Date: 2022-11-21
Description:

Abstract

By sharing common assets such as the power grid, prosumers are closely interrelated by their actions and interests. Game theory provides powerful tools for increased coordination among the prosumers to optimize the energy resources. However, depending on the prosumer profiles and the market rules, the individual bills may notably differ and prove to be unfair. In this work, we analyze the outcomes of three relevant game-theoretical billing methods, which are innovatively transposed to the day-ahead scheduling of energy exchange within a liberalized residential community dominated by distributed energy resources. The first two approaches rely on a (static) daily billing scheme, while the third considers a multi-temporal (continuous) billing. The Nash equilibria are computed using distributed algorithms, hence ensuring individual decision-making and avoiding third-party dependencies. The cost distributions are assessed using both a qualitative and a quantitative comparison based on various prosumer profiles in a modern smart grid. It is shown that, depending on the billing option, either the contribution towards the entity (i.e., the ability to improve the global solution) or the individual empowerment (i.e., the ability to bargain) can be preferentially incentivized.

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Series: IEEE transactions on smart grid
ISSN: 1949-3053
ISSN-E: 1949-3061
ISSN-L: 1949-3053
Volume: In press
DOI: 10.1109/tsg.2022.3206912
OADOI: https://oadoi.org/10.1109/tsg.2022.3206912
Type of Publication: A1 Journal article – refereed
Field of Science: 213 Electronic, automation and communications engineering, electronics
Subjects:
Funding: The work of I. Atzeni was supported by the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA-IF 897938 DELIGHT) and by the Academy of Finland (336449 Profi6).
EU Grant Number: (897938) DELIGHT - Device-Centric Low-Complexity High-Frequency Networks
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