Abstract

In Paul Hirst’s later writings, he states that his earlier idea that ‘a good life is one of rational autonomy is both inadequate and mistaken’. Instead of rational autonomy, he argues that the main constituent of the good life is the satisfaction of needs and interests in relevant social practices; therefore, the main aim of education should be initiation into social practices. I concur with Hirst regarding the problematic nature of views that take the individual, rational, autonomous moral subject as their educational starting point. Furthermore, like Hirst, I see that the problematic separation of moral thinking and action is embedded in these views. However, I disagree with Hirst regarding the justification of Aristotelian theory, on which he bases his new account. Instead, I defend a pragmatist justification for what I see as the most important dimension of Hirst’s later shift in thinking in his moral theory. Utilizing resources from such pragmatists as Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, Israel Scheffler, and Nicholas Rescher, I outline an account in which there is no dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason: both reason and emotion belong to nature and work in collaboration, and moral thinking and action can be learned and improved in responsible social practices.