NATIONALISM AMONGST THE TURKS OF CYPRUS: THE FIRST WAVE

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Abstract

The rise of competing nationalisms in Cyprus first drew world attention in the 1950's, yet the origins of nationalism in Cyprus can clearly be traced to the closing stages of Ottoman rule on the island during the nineteenth century. While the earlier development of nationalism in the Greek Orthodox community of Cyprus is commonly acknowledged, the pre-World War II evolution of nationalism amongst Cyprus' Moslem Turks is consistently overlooked or misrepresented. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this work contends that Turkish nationalism in Cyprus did not first emerge in the 1950's, but instead grew gradually from the late nineteenth century onwards; that nationalism amongst the island's Turks was first discernible in a 'civic' form founded on Ottomanism which was gradually, though progressively replaced by Turkish ethno-nationalism; and that while both British colonial policies and especially the threat perceived from the rise of Greek nationalism on the island may have helped spur nationalism amongst the Turks, the continued cultural and political interaction with Ottoman, and even non-Ottoman Turks, and later with the Turkish Republic was at least as influential in fostering nationalist sentiments and prompting their expression in political actions. While particular note is made of the often neglected impact of the Young Turk movement in the early twentieth century, this study acknowledges and seeks to elucidate a complex assortment of variegated stimuli that ranged from international developments, such as the recurring crises in the Balkans and President Wilson's speech on the 'Fourteen Points', to the personal attitudes and attributes of British administrators and domestic inter-ethnic relations, and local and international economic trends and developments. Together, it is maintained, these influences had made Turkish nationalism a perceptible phenomenon amongst the Turks of Cyprus by the time of the October Revolt of 1931.

Keywords: colonialism, Cyprus, ethnicity, Greece, Greeks, Islamism, Kemalism, millet system, national identity, nationalism, nations, Ottoman Empire, Ottomanism, Ottomans, Pan-Turkism, Turkey, Turkish, Turkism, Turks, young Turks
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Note on transliteration

In light of the complex assortment of languages and dialects, and “devious” use of spelling in the sources consulted, it has been particularly tricky to devise an all-embracing system of transliteration that would be uniformly applicable and appropriate throughout the text. Indeed, the effort to standardize excessively would probably have resulted in doing more harm than good. Thus, while generally choosing to follow the Latinized form used in most contemporary Turkish sources, (that is including the letters ç, ğ, ı, ö, ş and ü in addition to the 26 letters found in the English alphabet), especially for place and personal names, import has also been attached to following the most common usage. Though somewhat arbitrary and eclectic, and naturally imperfect, this method has, I believe, produced relatively satisfactory results. On the other hand, a more systematic approach has been adopted in relation to the various calendars that were commonly in use in the region during the period under study, namely the Julian, Gregorian, Rumi and Hicri calendars. In this case a lack of standardization would have made it virtually impossible to track the historical progression of events, and so all dates referred to in this dissertation are given in the Gregorian format with which readers will be most accustomed.
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1 Introduction

At the time of writing, Cyprus, once again, stands at the proverbial “crossroads”; an island scarred by protracted political conflict has again borne witness to renewed efforts to achieve reconciliation, rehabilitation and re-unification. Though the causes of past discord are complex and contentious, any thorough analysis of what led to the current impasse, and thus by implication of what, if any, counsel might be sought in endeavours to overcome existing political predicaments and avert their recurrence in the future, cannot but help include a study of the role of the phenomenon of nationalism. While history may never literally “repeat” itself, bitter political experiences have too often illustrated the detrimental consequences of the failure to take heed of what has passed, and of how what has passed is presently interpreted.

Nationalism, all agree, contributed to some extent at least to the conflict that wrought such havoc on the island during the twentieth century. It was not, however, a constant feature in this Mediterranean isle’s history, nor did it emerge as an axis of tension in a sudden instant. Notwithstanding misconstrued appreciations of the nation as a virtually eternal entity, a fuller understanding of how and why rival Greek and Turkish national identities with conflicting political ideals evolved in Cyprus can only be acquired if the roots and evolutionary progression of these adversarial nationalisms are identified. In the words of Paschalis Kitromilides, such an issue, “can be treated adequately only in terms of historical studies that trace the gradual evolution of communities over time.”1 Pollis’ caution also rings true, that: “Viewed from a historical perspective there was no preordained necessity and inevitability leading to the existence of two nationalities on Cyprus. To understand the historical developments that brought division, one must view them as the historian Teggart would, in terms of the processes of change – “how things have come to be as they are.”2 This is not to deny the value of other non-historical approaches to nationalism in illuminating the nature of the phenomenon in Cyprus, as in other territories, but only to emphasize that in approaching the question of what caused it to develop in any particular context of time and place, we must rely heavily on historical inquiry.3

1. KITROMILIDES 1990, 3.
It is not that there is an absence of historical study regarding Cyprus. Numerous such historical works have been published to-date. Yet even a cursory glance at much of this material serves to remind us of the crucial distinction to be made between “history-as-event” and “history-as-account”, or “historye” and “historyn”. In particular it helps us recall that historyn, our accounts of past developments, can never fully represent the reality of the happenings themselves. This is all the more true in such emotionally charged cases as those to be encountered in investigating the modern political history of Cyprus. Here we are struck by the fact that writers and commentators have all too frequently been prone, wittingly or unwittingly, to shape their portrayals of bygone times with little effort to restrain their prejudices, or even worse have manipulated their work to serve contemporary political objectives. Too often accounts of the past have become so warped as to hardly shed the barest glimmer of light on “history-as-event”.

By basing its findings on the investigation and analysis of primary material, a good deal of which is being academically scrutinised for the first time; by attempting to discern and refrain from duplicating the prejudice and inconsistencies that riddle many works related to the subject, and by upholding the requirements of logical and academic consistency it is believed that this dissertation can help to provide a sounder understanding than hitherto proffered of both how and why nationalism evolved in Cyprus amongst the Turks as and when it did. In so doing, it is expected that it may also serve to highlight some of the almost mythical, yet often widely held and propagated beliefs that are so commonly professed in error: That the Greeks and Turks of the island have been eternal enemies, that nationalism was always evident amongst the island’s Turks, that it was the “artificial creation” of Britain or of Turkey, that it held no sway amongst the masses in the pre-World War II era, and on…

That prejudice is commonplace in historical studies relating to nationalism in Cyprus is indubitable. This is as true of scholarship relating to Greek as well as Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Yet, there is an additional feature of scholarship regarding the latter that requires particular recognition, which is that historians have generally treated it only superficially, and as such this topic has received comparatively little in-depth academic consideration. It is in an effort to help redress this inadequacy that this dissertation will focus on the early rise of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus as its primary concern, rather than as a secondary consideration peripheral to the rise of Greek nationalism. The emphasis placed on the “early rise” of such nationalism is intentional also. Too many observers presume that nationalism amongst the Turks was in fact only evident in the post-World War II period, as calls for enosis, (or, the Union of Cyprus with Greece), became more forceful on the island during the 1950’s. What this study tries to do is to identify and examine the rise of a first wave of nationalism amongst the Turks of the

3. Smith argues that, “The concept of the nation refers to processes that admit of degrees,” and that, “it must be a matter of judgement as to whether or when we can speak of a collective cultural identity as a nation.” [SMITH 2000, 64]. The identification of nationalism is likewise contingent upon our theoretical preferences and approaches, yet in all cases it is only through historical enquiry that we can resolve both the chronological timing and the particular developmental characteristics of the various cases of both phenomena.

4. The terms “history-as-event” and “history-as-account” are as used by Stanford. STANFORD 1996, 1–2.

5. Panayiotou makes the same assertion in what is for Cyprus an unusually candid evaluation in his appropriately titled review essay, “History Without Taboos”. PANAYIOTOU 1994, 91.
island that began to develop well before the Second World War, and that was in many ways distinctive to the second wave that later succeeded it.

Though the first wave of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus became most pronounced during the 1920’s, it had itself evolved to an observable critical mass over several decades. A thorough understanding of its genesis requires us to appreciate developments in the overlapping eras of late Ottoman and early British rule in Cyprus. It was in the final stages of Ottoman rule that Greek nationalism, which consistently provided fuel for the later development of nationalism amongst the Turks, first emerged; that an Ottoman national identity began to be proposed as a counter to the threats that ethnic nationalisms were posing for the Ottoman state’s territorial integrity, and; that the first Turkist tendencies appeared within the reformist “Young Ottoman” movement.6 Such tendencies were strengthened during the first years of the British administration that began in 1878. It was then that the Young Turk movement, that had supplanted the Young Ottomans, slowly and incrementally began to place greater emphasis on Turkish identity and to the fostering of Turkish national consciousness.7 By the onset of the twentieth century such proclivities were being increasingly reflected by adherents and sympathisers of this movement amongst the Turks of Cyprus. With the success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the gradual adoption of Turkish nationalist policies in the crumbling Ottoman Empire, open support for Turkish nationalism in Cyprus began to spread from the generally weak and often irregular pronouncements of a limited number of Ottoman dissidents, to increasing numbers of the urban, literate intelligentsia, and eventually to the Turkish Cypriot populace at large.

As will be illustrated then, the roots of Turkish nationalism pre-dated the First World War, and evidence will be submitted to confirm that at this juncture it had also its adherents in Cyprus. It is in the aftermath of this war, however, that dissemination of nationalist ideals and sentiments to the populace at large really gained momentum; then that we can identify the sharpest rise of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus. Undoubtedly, developments related to the establishment of the new Republic of Turkey played a critical role in this respect. Yet relations between Turkey and Cyprus were more confused, intricate and inconsistent than often realized, and the role of the Turkish state and its leaders only one of the factors involved in heightening Turkish nationalism on the island. This study inquires not only into the impact and policies of the Turkish Republic in respect to Cyprus and its Turks, but also into other features of the post-World War I era, including the stratagem and tactics of Britain, which all together had important implications for the proliferation of nationalist sentiment in the Turkish Cypriot community.

6. The movement assumed the name of “Young Ottomans” in the 1860’s, following the example and model of other European movements of earlier on in the century, such as the “Young Italians”. ZÜRCHER 1984, 6; MARDIN 1962, 22–23 and 44–45; For a more detailed introduction to the origins of the movement see MARDIN 1962, Chapter II passim.

7. Many observers and authors have used the terms “Young Turk” and “Young Ottoman” interchangeably, but though there is significant continuity between the ideas they championed, the movements were of distinguishably different periods, generally epitomized and led by different cadres. While the Young Ottoman movement had essentially come to an end in the mid 1870’s the Young Turk movement that emerged at the end of the following decade, was to survive into the first decades of the twentieth century. For a brief introduction, see ZÜRCHER 1984, 1–18.
1.1 Approaches to the Nation and Nationalism

It is not the objective of this thesis to impart novel theoretical explanations of nationalism, but the case of nationalism in Cyprus certainly provides ample material to illustrate, and sometimes with which to evaluate existing theoretical approaches to the nation and nationalism. Moreover, in order to accurately identify and examine what is asserted was the first wave of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus, it is paramount that the phenomenon of nationalism is itself first elucidated. Accordingly, before undertaking the central task of studying the rise of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus, we must outline what exactly it is we wish to identify.

Scholars of the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century are often criticized for having written little of substance about the “nation” or about “nationalism”. To the extent that many academics failed to fully appreciate their significance such complaints are perhaps justified. Yet, the complex nature of nations and nationalism should be taken into consideration as mitigating factors when passing judgment on those who have tried but failed to satisfactorily comprehend and explain them. What is more, though there has since the 1960’s been an increased academic interest in attempting to understand both nations and nationalisms, it would be misleading to assert that those who have dealt with these topics in recent decades have eliminated conceptual ambiguity. Indeed, the difficulty of explaining the nation is such that it has led one noted, but exasperated scholar in this field to openly declare his belief that no scientific definition of the nation could be devised. Though progress has been made, as Walker Connor frankly admits in his book “Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding”, (itself the product of almost a quarter of a century of research), as far as nations and nationalism are concerned, “The quest for understanding is far from fulfilment.”

All too often, as Connor points out, we continue to observe that both academics and laymen are still prone to misuse the terms due to the absence of precise definitions and to confusion between these terms and other commonly used words such as, in particular, “state” and “nation-state”. It is not just for want of trying that these concepts still do not receive the precise use that their importance would suggest they deserve and demand. Rather a history of misuse has led to the erroneous use and acceptance in everyday language of terms like the “United Nations”, which is composed of member-states not nations), and “international relations”, (a field of study that has more frequently been concerned with the study of inter-state relations than of relations between nations), and has compounded difficulty resulting from the elusive character of the nation and nationalism themselves. It is best to recognise from the outset, then, that comprehending nations and nationalism is no easy task, and though we may be capable of eliminating much blatant misuse of terminology, (for example, referring to a nation when we are plainly actually talking about a state), defining the nation or nationalism in a water-tight manner that

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8. See, for example, HOBSBAWM 2002, 1–4.
9. In Connor’s words, we must grant that, “while it is a major contributing element to the ambiguity surrounding nationalism, careless terminology is also a reflection of nationalism’s intangible nature. CONNOR 1994, 112.
10. SETON-WATSON 1977, 5.
12. See CONNOR 1994, 39–42 and also chapter 4 of the same volume.
encapsulates their essence succinctly without allowing for any unwarranted encroachment into the realm of other phenomena is a truly arduous endeavour, one that arguably has not to-date been successfully accomplished.

On the whole existing definitions of the nation can most productively be placed into one of two categories which are often labelled the “objective” and the “subjective”. These labels refer not to the calibre of the individual doing the defining or to the quality of his or her definition, but to the nature of the characteristics according to which the nation is being defined. Objective definitions focus on relatively tangible characteristics like a common language, or culture, or geography, or religion, and try to identify nations by grouping together those who share the particular defining characteristics. Different scholars may bring to the fore a range of different defining characteristics, (often in the form of a defining “set” of characteristics), but all objective definitions ultimately use the same basic formula. Perhaps one of the most memorable objective definitions of the nation was that formulated by Joseph Stalin. Stalin defined the nation as: “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in common culture.”

Subjective definitions on the other hand, hold that the essence of nationhood, is not an easily distinguishable and distinctive characteristic among a given population such as sharing of a common language or culture, but is instead a common sentiment, a feeling or emotional bond among a certain group of people. Subjective definitions of the nation are, therefore, largely reliant on a group of people willing the nation to exist through their senses and emotional desires rather than the nation being constructed automatically as a result of the possession of a number of objectively assessable key features. Thus Ernest Renan spoke in his famous conference at the Sorbonne, of the nation as being, “une âme, un principe spiritual.” It was he pronounced, “un plébiscite de tous les jours,” this definition of the “daily plebiscite,” implying that the nation exists when, and only so long as, people will it to exist.

Max Weber also adhered to the subjectivist school as far as explaining the nation is concerned. “If the concept of ‘nation’ can in any way be defined unambiguously,” he maintained, “it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation.” Instead he posited, “the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that it is proper to expect from certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups.” He saw the nation as a community of values and sentiment. In a similar vein, Benedict Anderson has argued that the nation is an “imagined community”, one that is, “conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship.” To leave Anderson’s definition in such a compressed form would however be an injustice, for though he does emphasize the need to “will” this community in order for the nation to

13. Hobsbawm, [HOBSBAWM 2002, 5], and Haas, [HAAS 1983, 712], evaluate Stalin’s definition as based on objective criteria whereas Hutchinson and Smith evaluate his definition of the nation as, “a mix of subjective and objective elements,” [HUTCHINSON - SMITH 1994, 15]. Here I would basically agree with the former two authors as Stalin’s definition makes no direct reference to human sentiments, and instead emphasizes certain more tangible criteria for the nation such as common language and territory.
15. RENAN1882.
exist, he also acknowledges the role of a common culture, in particular of language, in making people feel, or will, or imagine the existence of the community. Hence, while Anderson’s explanation of the nation highlights its subjective foundation, it aptly acknowledges the importance of objective features in forging it as well. It is essentially this understanding of the nation that has been adopted in this present study also.

Yet, there is often difficulty in judging which groups based on commonality of feeling should qualify as nations and which should not. What is to distinguish say a tribe or religious sect from a nation, or the sense of shared humanity we may feel for all other human beings from the more specific feelings we may have for those we perceive to belong to the same nation as us? Here, it may at first glance appear that a repeatedly quoted definition, that of Rupert Emerson, is of use. Emerson specifies the nation as being:

[T]he largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands man’s loyalty, overriding the claims both of lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society.\(^{18}\)

This may seem to assist us in the task of establishing to which nation people belong, according to Emerson’s understanding the group to which we feel greatest loyalty. In reality the feat is not so simply accomplished and the above definition, whilst drawing attention to the importance of subjective features in a practical manner, is inadequate. People have multi-faceted identities and can feel loyalty towards several human collectivities at once. More importantly, the degree of loyalty they feel to respective collectivities can in many circumstances be hard to decipher, and often they themselves may have internal conflicts as to which community they owe greatest allegiance to. To illustrate, an inhabitant of northern Britain may simultaneously feel that he or she possesses a Scottish and a British identity without necessarily clearly demarcating the boundaries of each or prioritising between them. Similarly, an individual living in the northern corner of Africa may at once feel a sense of commonality and community with other Egyptians, with other Arabs, with other Africans or with other holders of the Moslem faith.\(^{19}\) It is the difficulty of assessing and distinguishing between the multiple, commonly overlapping and often unprioritised collective identities and loyalties that people possess that may be seen to constitute a fundamental element of the elusiveness of a clear, undisputed definition for the nation. This conundrous situation can be partially remedied, however, by introducing the notion that a qualification for nationhood is the existence of the belief that a particular collectivity should have meaningful political autonomy.

Consequently, to establish who constitutes the nation it is not enough to have established the existence of a collective group identity, (be it based on a sense of common language, religion or ethnicity or any other feature). Nor is it sufficient that the group just become conscious of its separate identity. To qualify as a nation, those who share a particular group identity, and are conscious of its differentiation from other such identities, must also demand for that group to have at a minimum political autonomy.\(^{20}\) In practice the demand for political autonomy of nations has habitually been translated into a demand

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19. For a succinct example of the overlapping identities referred to, see Breuilly, who actually gives the case of a famous early Egyptian nationalist by the name of Mustafa Kemal, who championed both Egyptian nationalism and pan-Islamism. BREUILLY 1995, 152–155, 273–275 and 283–285.
of the nation for its own independent state. Alternatives though are possible. The nation, Hans Kohn argued, when unable to achieve the ultimate goal of its own sovereign state, “satisfies itself,” at least temporarily, “with some form of autonomy or pre-state organization.” As will be illustrated, this was essentially the character of early Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, constricted as it was by both the competing nationalism of the island’s Greeks, and the political obstacle of British colonial rule. Those who have denied the existence of Turkish nationalism on the island during the first half of the twentieth century for the sole reason that there was not always an emphatic demand for incorporation into a Turkish nation-state have done so unduly. Indeed, nations and nationalists may even, if they perceive it as in their national interest to do so, be willing, for example, to countenance political alliances with other nations that result in some form of federation, or which in some other way curtail the absolute sovereignty of the nation.

Can we then necessarily or automatically imply, as does Emerson, that the individual’s most powerful or overriding identity is his or her national identity? No. For in fact non-national identities may be more powerful than national ones. Being a Moslem may for the individual be more important than being Egyptian, but the lack of a desire to associate this collectivity, (which here would represent the most important component of the individual’s identity), with a separate “political” autonomy, frequently expressed as a call for statehood, would preclude, according to our criteria, the Moslems from forming a nation. People have in fact always had loyalties for and close attachments to different groups of various sizes. What truly distinguishes the nation from other such collectivities, and what makes the nation an essentially modern occurrence is the belief that this collectivity should have political autonomy.

In accordance with the above, we can define the nation as a human collectivity, a significant number of whose members share the belief that they have the right as a group to political autonomy. This is an essentially subjectivist and voluntarist definition as it depends on the will of the people to have political autonomy. Nevertheless, it does not deny that the sharing or perceived sharing of common objective features plays a crucial role in the creation of this desire. In line with Kohn’s position then, it is a definition which recognises the “great importance” that objective factors have in the formation of the nation, but denies that any particular objective factor is, “essential to [its] existence or definition.” It is a definition which posits that above all, “the most essential element is a living and active corporate will.”

While the above evaluation may suffice for our purposes, in the final analysis, though, we must concede that the complete elimination of confusion is still not made possible even by the addition of the criterion of people wanting collective political autonomy. People may even possess overlapping/multiple desires for statehood, (or less rigidly for political autonomy), for different collectivities to which they belong. Though not often the case, this is still theoretically, and sometimes in practice, possible. Nor should we ignore the fact that human beings do not always behave as rational actors. A Welshman might wish at once for political autonomy of the Welsh, British and Europeans, vis-à-vis

20. I use the term “autonomy” instead of “sovereignty”, (which is more commonly employed), as national political demands do not in my opinion necessarily require full sovereignty.
22. Ibid., 13–15.
other human collectivities, without necessarily contemplating the feasibility of maintaining such overlapping political autonomies. In addition, what constitutes a “significant number” as far as concerns the “conscious” membership of the nation is rather arbitrary. We might take a majority as the benchmark, but there would be nothing to preclude higher or lower qualifications for recognising the existence of the nation.

What of the origins of nations? Nationalists typically allege that nations have been existent for hundreds, usually thousands of years though more often than not they are claimed to have been idle, or sleeping since some mythical “golden age”. In other words, then, the nation has continuously existed since ancient times, but without national consciousness. Of course, this belief contradicts our previously stated explanation of the nation being dependent for its existence on the belief that a particular community should have its own political autonomy. If there is no such shared belief, no conception of popular sovereignty, then there is no nation to speak of, and it is really only in the last few centuries that such a belief has spread, at least amongst the masses. In practice too, the nationalist idea that nations have existed from time immemorial is also not borne out by historical research, which invariably shows up the weakness of the purported demographic link between the “claimed” nations of the past and those of the present.

Arguments about the beginnings of the nation are varied. There are those who focus on the state playing a central role in developing for itself, sometimes it is argued creating for itself, a nation, whereas others emphasize that the emergence of the nation is more of a spontaneous process. In this context, Hugh Seton-Watson makes a distinction between “old” and “new” nations. Old nations were those, he says, “which had acquired national identity or national consciousness before the doctrine of nationalism.” By 1789 these consisted of the English, Scots, French, Dutch, Castilians, Portuguese, Danes, Swedes, Hungarians, Poles and Russians. New nations, on the other hand, developed after the French Revolution, once the doctrine of nationalism had already been formed, and in these cases elites, often in control of states, tried to “implant” national consciousness rather than awaiting the unprompted growth of a nationalist predilection. Seton-Watson maintains that the actual process of the development of old nations was “spontaneous” and that by the seventeenth century it was possible to take, for example, French and English nations as “important realities,” where: “Englishmen and Frenchmen recognised themselves as such; accepted obligations to the sovereign, and admitted the claim of the sovereign on their loyalty at least in part because the sovereign symbolized the community as a whole.”

23. As even Gellner accepts, this does not mean that historical exceptions might not be found to the general rule, exceptions where perhaps there was indeed displayed the, “power of cultures to inspire political action and loyalty in the past,” and where we might identify, for example, some national sentiment amongst a community demanding political autonomy as a result of shared cultural characteristics. GELLNER 1998, 96.

24. Smith, for instance, notes the often-invoked example of the flaws in the claims of modern Greek and Egyptian nationalists that the ancient Greeks and ancient Egyptians were in effect their forefathers, that there was a clear continuity of the nation from ancient times. [SMITH 1994, 28–29]. Of course it is not only the members of these national groups who have expounded such views. In the case of the Greeks they have been often outdone by their philhellenic advocates. Dawkins, for instance, echoes the official Greek nationalist position that as far as concerned the Ottoman era, “For long the Greeks were ready for something new, but the nation lay always in chains.” DAWKINS 1953, xxviii.

25. SETON-WATSON 1977, 8.
Though he says that the origins of the old nations were “obscure”, Seton-Watson recognises that social and economic developments, standardization of English and French language, and improvements in communication all contributed to a growing national consciousness.\(^{26}\) Seton-Watson grants that there were exceptions to this national consciousness even within the purported early nations he identifies, but perhaps underestimates them. Some recent evidence is said to contradict the assumption that there was even among the people of these regions a common identity of being French or English at such an early date, let alone of being a French or English nation in terms of desiring political autonomy for that collectivity sharing French or English identity.\(^{27}\) Any sense of national identity in the medieval era still was probably itself the exception rather than the rule, that while it may have pervaded some of the upper-echelons of society, did not yet incorporate the masses. And, we cannot really talk of the nation existing, as a mass phenomenon rather than an ideal, until it is perceived to do so by the multitudes in general.

Ernest Gellner is another eminent scholar of nations and nationalism who, from a different angle, has argued that nations can develop independently of the state and of state elites. Gellner’s thesis is that the nation develops not as a result of the state per se, but as a result of the fundamental historical shift from agricultural to industrial societies. He contends that industrial societies required communications networks encompassing more or less the whole of society, which in turn entailed the need for the relatively standardized training of the populace, what he terms “generic training”.\(^{28}\) Such societies, he contends, obliged virtually the whole population to share certain key qualifications, such as common literacy and numeracy, and familiarity with basic technical skills. The standard training and education of society led, he argues, to a, “kind of cultural homogeneity,” which thereafter overrode local and primordial ties and culture. “It is not the case, as Elie Kedourie claims,” wrote Gellner, “that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.”\(^{29}\)

The nation, Gellner asserts, is established by the sense of mutual rights and obligations that is fostered amongst those who have passed through the same educational system and thus share the same culture. Those who do not partake of this common training and education will suffer economically as their skills will be insufficient for industrial production, hence there will be a tendency for voluntary assimilation of local culture-groups. Where they can not be assimilated due to fundamental conflict between their characteristics and those demanded by the new “national” culture, (or because they resist such change), and where their number is large enough to maintain a separate educational system, the tendency will be towards the creation of a new nation in reaction to exclusion.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.

\(^{27}\) For example, referring to research conducted by Eugen Weber’s, suggests that widespread French national consciousness was barely coherent even at the beginning of the twentieth century, let alone in the Middle Ages. CONNOR 1994, 220–221.

\(^{28}\) This is in contrast to the case of pre-industrial agricultural societies where what formal training of the population that existed was limited to a small literate class; See GELLNER 1998, 28–30.

\(^{29}\) GELLNER 2002, 39; Nonetheless, Gellner, in later work, did not rule-out the potential for primordial elements of culture to be incorporated, in some cases, within the modern “national” culture demanded by industrialization. He recognises that at least, “some nations possess genuine ancient navels,” bringing him into closer alignment with Anthony Smith’s point of view. See GELLNER 1998, 93–96.
It could be surmised from Gellner’s arguments that a state is necessary to provide such training and education for society, and that in this sense the state precedes the nation. However, as implied above, he obviously does not dismiss the desire or ability of nations to establish their own states, especially when they feel threatened and excluded from sharing rights equal to others in society whose culture predominates in the industrial era.

Anderson also stresses the importance of modern economic development in the initial emergence of nations, in particular the critical role played by print-capitalism. He argues that the modern printing-press standardized languages. Standard vernacular languages were developed as printing for different dialects was not an economical prospect, and through the effect of common media such as the newspapers and novels those who shared a common language began to “imagine” themselves as being collectively the “nation”. This process of national integration was to be further accelerated by the later development of telegraph and telephone and transportation networks.

Qualitatively, however, the existence of groups who shared a common identity and who felt an emotional bond was not something new. What is fundamentally new about the nation, then, is the belief of such groups that they should have political autonomy, commonly expressed through the call for the existence of their own state. The idea of popular sovereignty is a demand that begins most perceptibly to emerge in the wake of the French Revolution, and it is the wedding of this idea with a common group sentiment and emotional bond based on the sharing, or perceived sharing, of an assortment of common characteristics such as language or culture, or religion or belief in common descent, that leads to the formation of the nation. We can not retrospectively evaluate precisely when this idea of nationhood was first held by the majority of a group believed to constitute the nation, but we can take the French Revolution as a critical, if not definitive, turning point as it was only after this date that support for the idea of popular sovereignty began to spread.

We can thus contemplate the emergence of the nation in two stages: Firstly we have the establishment of a common group identity based on the sharing, (or at least perceived sharing), of certain common characteristics among a group of people which distinguish them from others; and secondly we have the group developing political demands for autonomy. It is only at this second stage that we can finally talk of the existence of the nation. Factors such as industrialization, and increased social mobilization and the development of print-capitalism can, I would argue, lead to the establishment of common group identities based largely on common cultural foundations; such groups, however, though they may well often have been smaller in size, also existed quite commonly in the pre-modern

30. In fact, Gellner maintains that the state, though not a necessary feature for agricultural societies, can and does exist in many societies in the agricultural stage of historical development, whereas nations and nationalism only develop later in the industrial stage. GELLNER 2002, 39–40.
33. The acceptance of the Dual Monarchy by the Hungarian nation within the Austrian Empire can however be considered a nineteenth century example of how the political demands of nations can be limited to something less than absolute political sovereignty, in practice as well as in theory.
34. There has been a protracted debate in the literature as to whether in fact nations and nationalism/s are perennial or modern occurrences. For a useful critique of the various positions on the matter, see SMITH 2000, Chapter 2.
era. What potentially, (though by no means always), transforms these groups into nations is the adoption of the belief that they should have as a group the right to political autonomy. This is the essence of their transformation into nations.

The meaning of nationalism is no less disputed than that of the nation, in fact sometimes more so. The cause of confusion surrounding the concept of nationalism lies largely in the absence of standard usage of terminology to distinguish between different forms of phenomena which are all grouped together under a single heading. We commonly find three usages of the word nationalism, each of which is referring to a related though distinguishable phenomenon: nationalism as a sentiment/feeling; nationalism as an ideology/doctrine and; nationalism as a political movement.\(^{35}\) It can become futile, however, to consider these three interrelated phenomena separately when a comprehensive attempt to explain nationalism is being made, let alone to contemplate entering into what are often pedantic disputes as to which of the above-mentioned occurrences is the “real” nationalism. In historical studies a holistic explanation encompassing their mutual relationships is usually much more meaningful. As Breuilly concludes, “Approaches which insist that nationalism, as a whole, is ‘really’ the product of intellectuals, or cultures, or political activists simply do violence to a complex subject.”\(^{36}\)

Though the primary intention of this dissertation is to address the rise of Turkish nationalism as a sentiment in Cyprus, our inability to directly gauge the past feelings of those members of the general public who are, on the whole, no longer with us, means that we must rely largely not only on second hand reports, but also on the use of the indirect evidence of the propagation of nationalist doctrine and especially of the activities and pronouncements of organized movements as incidental indicators of the spread of related sentiment. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, I prefer to reserve the term “nationalism” to describe principally the emotional bond that those who feel themselves to be part of a collectivity that should have political autonomy feel for each other, and the strong emotional attachment that they have for the political institutions that represent their political autonomy. In the case of those collectivities that have still not established or taken control of such institutions, but believe they are their right, the feeling of attachment to the political institutions is substituted by the yearning for the fulfilment of their right as a nation to have such institutions.\(^{37}\) As the importance in terms of human history of the ideology and of the movement is largely dependent on the strength of the sentiment, it is perhaps also appropriate that the term “nationalism” is used to describe this emotional state of being.

\(^{35}\) Classifications can of course have a different number of categories. Smith, for example, identifies five broad usages of the term, and explains that these are only the most important. Nevertheless, I find that a three-fold categorization is sufficient, any further dissection being superfluous for the purposes of this dissertation. SMITH 2001, 5–6.

\(^{36}\) BREUILLY 1995, 404–405; On this front, perhaps most warranted criticism has been directed at one of the pioneers of the study of nationalism, Elie Kedourie, who begins his classic study “Nationalism”, with the emphatic declaration, “Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century,” and gives no quarter to alternative approaches. [KEDOURIE 2000, 1]. Gellner vehemently, criticizes his supposition that nationalism was somehow, “utterly contingent, an accidental invention, a by-product of the scribblings of a set of thinkers in one particular historic situation.” GELLNER 1998, 10.

\(^{37}\) This explanation corresponds relatively closely to Gellner’s categorization of “nationalist sentiment” which he describes as, “the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle (that political and national units should coincide), or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. GELLNER 2002, 1.
For the ideology or doctrine then I prefer to simply use the term “nationalist ideology” or “nationalist doctrine”, and for the movement, “nationalist movement”.38

The content of nationalist doctrine consists, according to Kedourie, of three major principles: (1) that humanity is naturally divided into nations; (2) that nations are known by certain characteristics that can be ascertained and; (3) that, the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.39 Kedourie’s classification of this core doctrine is broadly acceptable, and later works that classify the central propositions of nationalist doctrine are not on the whole, much different.40 Kedourie traces the origins of this doctrine to the thoughts of Kant, Herder and Fichte, and laments its “invention”, blaming nationalist ideology for so much of the misery and bloodshed witnessed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His error, however, is to see nationalism and the nation as purely and purposefully invented, as consciously and deliberately formulated man-made constructs that by their very nature of divisiveness are bound to cause conflict between competing groups claiming to form distinctive nations and to therefore have distinctive national rights.41 As such Kedourie, like Hobsbawm falls into the trap of regarding nations simply, “as social constructs and cultural artefacts deliberately engineered by elites.”42

Kedourie plainly wishes that nationalism had never been devised as a doctrine and that states which did not legitimise themselves on a national basis had prevailed. He insinuates that once the “wicked” idea of nationalism had infiltrated multi-ethnic states, (such as the Ottoman and Habsburg), the different ethnic groups, (now, according to our definition, transformed into nations), began to clamour for their own independent states and in the process created political turmoil and human misery. This eventually led to the collapse of these non-national states and to the formation of states claimed to be legitimised by the right of the nation to have its own state, but in reality now containing several national groups, only one of whose goal of having its own state could feasibly be satisfied. As such, legitimising the state by this principle of “national” self-determination was bound to lead to escalating struggle and strife amongst people within the new supposedly “uninational” state.43 Kedourie contends that, “Far from increasing political stability and political liberty, nationalism in mixed areas makes for tension and mutual hatred [for] if a doctrine such as nationalism does capture the intellectual and political leaders of one group, and they proceed to act according to its tenets, then the same doctrine must spread to other groups, who will feel impelled, in the face of threatening claims, to adopt it for their own use. ... It is a chain reaction, a vicious circle.”44

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38. In one of his more recent definitions of nationalism, Smith in fact incorporates both dimensions. Nationalism, he proposes, is, “an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.” SMITH 2000, 3.

39. KEDOURIE 2000, 1; For a similar outline of basic tenets of nationalist ideology, see SMITH 2000, 72–73.

40. See, for example, BREUILLY 1995, 2–3.

41. KEDOURIE 2000, 1.

42. See SMITH 2000, 52–54.

43. See KEDOURIE 2000, 108–112.; “Experience – bitter experience – has shown,” Kedourie was to write, “that contrary to the dreams of Mazzini and President Woodrow Wilson national self-determination is a principle of disorder, not of order, in international life.” KEDOURIE 2000, xvi.
Undoubtedly, once outlined the ideology of nationalism was widely used as a programme for the attempt to create nations, but distinguishing to exactly what extent national consciousness was actually already present when the ideology was first coherently espoused or to what extent it was fostered by the introduction of the ideology is an extremely complex and difficult undertaking that requires detailed analysis of relevant indicators, the historical records of which are in many cases simply not available. My proposition is not to deny outright, for all instances, Kedourie’s position that the ideology precedes national sentiment. This may in many cases be true, (such as in the numerous examples of state-sponsored nationalism to be seen in a wide array of post-colonial states). I would argue, however, that this ideology could not easily gain force and widespread support without the prior existence of an emotional bond among a group which believed that it collectively shared the right to political autonomy. This emotional bond did not, and does not simply develop over-night as the result of the introduction of the ideology. Rather factors already mentioned, such as the requirements of industrialization and development of standardized vernacular languages, as well as the challenges of modernity to traditional group identities, such as those of religion, or of the village, created the environment in which nationalist ideology could flourish.45

It is also a fair point to make that doctrines which have no social, cultural or economic basis are doomed to irrelevance. It is only those which can appeal in some way to people’s existing sentiments, predilections or interests, or which are introduced into a milieu where such sentiments or interests can be fostered that will leave a firm imprint on history. Therefore, it was only once the nation had become a potential reality that nationalist ideology made sense, and gained ground. Thereafter, however, it is true that the apparent success of movements espousing this ideology in achieving their goals of national self-determination meant that the spread of the ideology gained a momentum of its own through the demonstration effect, even in states where there were no “nations-in-waiting”. If, for example, others had not already been successful in achieving their nationalist goals, and if also, as Mayall points out, the principles of nationalism had not become institutionalised in international fora, it is unlikely that nationalist ideology would have held such an appeal for so many anti-colonial leaders.46

As to comprehending nationalist movements, nationalist political movements are simply those political movements that adhere to nationalist doctrine and/or are inspired by nationalist sentiment. For example, the Kemalist movement in Turkey was clearly nationalist in terms of its program, justifying the Turkish state in terms of its representing the sovereign will of the Turkish nation and, ultimately incorporating nationalism as a basic tenet of the Turkish state by including it under Article two of the constitution of the Republic of Turkey.47 The fact that a nationalist movement manages to get mass support is also often an indication that there is as well a strongly held nationalist sentiment, or

44. Ibid., 111; Indeed, this is one of the few areas in which we find Kedourie and Gellner in open agreement. Gellner declares: “‘The right of nations to self-determination’ sounds like a principle which could be implemented, and generate unique and hence uniquely binding solutions in diverse concrete situations. But this is rubbish. Various procedures involved in applying the idea cut across each other: is it demography, history or geography which is to prevail?” GELLNER 1998, 104.

45. For a brief discussion of people’s needs to identify with group causes and the relationship this has with nationalism see BREUILLY’s analysis of psychological accounts of nationalism, BREUILLY 1995, 414–418.

46. MAYALL 1990, 48.
nationalism, among the population. The movement has either managed to harness an already existing emotional disposition, or it has been successful in establishing one. In many cases, in fact, it may well be a combination of the two. Here, we must be clear, though, that by “creating” nationalist sentiment, or nationalism, we are not suggesting that cultural, or linguistic, or historical ties around which the idea of being a nation is formed are themselves necessarily artificially created by the leaders of nationalist political movements or by governmental authorities, though this may sometimes be the case, at least to a partial extent. Instead, we are saying that the belief that those who share such characteristics should have political autonomy or sovereignty is being consciously fostered among the general population by a nationalist elite.

What then led to the emergence and spread of nationalism, and nationalist ideology and movements during the late eighteenth century and thereafter, until today their impact has been felt in practically every corner of the globe? Obviously the idea of the nation has proven to be a powerful motivational force for people, one that those administering or wishing to administer states have often tried to promote and cultivate amongst the masses so as to make it easier to employ their efforts in the name of the state. Yet often this attempt occurs before there is any significant degree of industrialization or even a developed communications network, before, in fact there is a suitable “proto-nation”, (of closely attached people with potentially common political goals), existing that has the latent capacity to be mobilized by the state. It is in such cases especially that state elites may see it as appropriate to forge a nation through indoctrination and propaganda; a nation based on few commonly shared objective features amongst its members, and instead heavily dependent on the psychological perception, or illusion, of similarity. The fact that they are sometimes successful in their endeavours can be considered as evidence that a truly homogeneous ethnic group is not a must for creating a nation. Other elites who are in competition with those dominating the state may then find it to their own advantage to attempt to infuse nationalist passions to another mass group, one which may well already resent the state. It is thus that they can gain their own “national” ally against the incumbent state elites.

Alternatively, nationalism may occur more spontaneously when a group that shares various characteristics, or genuinely believes itself to share certain characteristics, begins to call for the rights of that group to have political autonomy, or more specifically often the right to national self-determination. Aside from the French Revolution, this demand for the collective political autonomy of the nation can also be linked to other historical developments in Europe such as the Reformation and the Enlightenment. The Reformation ended the overarching dominance over all potential European nations of the Church and so opened the way for sub-religious groups to call for separate political sovereignty. The Enlightenment, on the other hand, led to greater emphasis on rational thought and

47. For an introductory point of reference to the Kemalist movement and its relationship to nationalism, see SHAW - SHAW 1977b, 375.
48. Of course their attempts may backfire if they themselves are challenged by other leaders who are seen as better serving the “nationalist” interest.
49. Hobshawm himself refers to the “proto-national” as being, “the bonds based on, “certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate, as it were, potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modern states and nations.” These “bonds”, he argues, were, “in many parts of the world,” mobilized by, “states and national movements.” HOBSBAWM 2002, 46.
hence on the ability of people to take their own destiny into their own hands. It led further to the elimination, eventually, of the belief in the Divine Right of Kings to Rule, thereby opening the way for the idea of popular sovereignty to gain mass support. Thus, in the words of Alfred Cobban, “the theory of the Divine Right of Kings, which had been the chief political gospel of the early modern period... was replaced by the Divine Right of the People.”

We might usefully distinguish between two forms of nationalism, one instigated from above, often by ideologically inspired political movements led by state elites or by their rivals, and geared to mobilizing the population; and the other, more spontaneous or reflexive, developing from below as a result of the interaction of the group’s consciousness and recognition of shared characteristics, (often characteristics which themselves are the result of the standardizing effects for communities of industrialization), with the proliferation of the belief in popular sovereignty that followed the French Revolution.

Another beneficial distinction between types of nationalism has been made by Anthony Smith who has distinguished between what he calls “territorial nationalism” and “ethnic nationalism”. The former, he argues, is based primarily on a civic conception of the nation and is often targeted to integrating a variety of ethnic groups living within a defined territory into a new nation. The latter form of nationalism, on the other hand, has a fundamentally ethnic understanding of the nation, seeing it as an essentially cultural group of “kinsmen”, whose destiny should be to live together within their own ethnically homogeneous state. As their understanding of the nation will, however, rarely be congruent with existing state boundaries, ethnic nationalisms will often tend to be irredentist and pan-nationalist. Nevertheless, Smith rightly disagrees with those who have championed the civic as opposed to the ethnic variant of nationalism as being by its very nature more liberal and tolerant. We can not claim he asserts, “that civic and political forms of nationalism are necessarily more open and tolerant than ethnocultural forms. Despite their fraternal rhetoric, they are capable of imposing an uniformity every bit as draconian and exclusive as those nationalisms that espouse genealogical criteria of membership.”

Further, he has also ruled out the idea of these categories being anything but ideal types. “No nation, no nationalism, can be seen as purely one or the other, even if at certain moments one or other of these element predominates,” he maintains. Indeed he points for illustration to both, “the role of ‘sacred ethnicity’ in the rituals and ideals of the French Revolution and the elements of pan-Turkist historicism in secular Turkish nationalism,” as evidence of the false simplicity of such rigidly dichotomous distinctions.

There are those who discriminate also between cultural nationalism and political nationalism, the first relating to the demand of the nation solely for cultural autonomy and the second being the demand for political autonomy/sovereignty. Such a distinction, however,
is of limited use. Differentiating cultural from political demands in such a manner is gen-
erally not feasible, as exacting cultural autonomy is invariably bound to have political, as well as economic, implications. As Deutsch remarks:

It seems therefore utopian to imagine a blissful state of “cultural autonomy” where “culture” will be carried on detached from real life, where schools will be detached from taxes and students from the need for jobs, where families and businessmen need not worry about tariffs or government controls, nor office workers about employment or promotion. All these problems can be dealt with and are being dealt with in many countries; but they cannot be dealt with completely apart from the problems of culture and nationality on the one hand, and of political and economic life on the other.55

Typologies of course are simplifying tools and there are no doubt numerous other ways in which we could categorize nationalism and nationalist movements, to help enhance our understanding of variations within the same phenomenon.56 No typology, though, no matter how many categories it may establish, will perfectly account for all variations of nationalism. To comprehend why we must remember that in the final analysis the nation comes into existence only through the will of the people. What makes people “will” the nation, however, may vary greatly, and even if, (by some miracle!), we were able to account for all objective factors which to-date have made people will the nation, it would not preclude other factors from in the future forming the basis of this collective desire to have political autonomy. So, whilst we can profit from the analytical assistance provided by such typologies, we must not fall into the trap of seeing them as fully exhaustive.

As we have defined it, nationalism, or the emotions of being connected to other members of a group who see themselves as jointly having the right to political autonomy because of certain features that they share, is an integral part of the existence of the nation. The nation is in essence “born” of the development of this sentiment, and without the will of the people there is no nation. For example, if those who speak French, or share French culture do not feel a close attachment to each other and a common political goal of collective political autonomy, that is if there is no French nationalism, then we can not speak of the existence of a French nation, only conceivably of a French ethnic group. We can, however, say that though a nation cannot exist without nationalism, nations and nationalism can exist without explicit nationalist ideology or nationalist political movements. Nationalist ideology and nationalist political movements will most likely, but not always, be absent or less pronounced when nationalist sentiment is satisfied sentiment, that is, more specifically when the nation’s desire to have political autonomy is satisfied.

It is also plausible, and often found that nationalist ideology and nationalist movements can be present without nations sharing the nationalist sentiment that they claim to represent actually existing. It may be that political movements at a later date succeed in creating a national consciousness and nationalism for a substantial proportion of the group to which they appeal, in which case the nation must now be accepted as existing. There are, however, plenty of examples of failed nationalist movements; failed not always just in the sense that they have failed to reach their political objective of political autonomy for the nation, but also sometimes failed in the sense that they have not managed to create a sense of nationhood itself in their targeted population. So, to summarize, nations

55. DEUTSCH 1966, 106.
56. See, for example, BREUILLY 1995, 9 and GELLNER 2002, 88–109.
cannot exist without nationalism, but they may exist without nationalist ideology and nationalist movements, and nationalist movements and nationalist ideology likewise may occur without nations or nationalism.

The study that follows relates to the range of issues outlined above as far as they concern Turkish Cypriot history, investigating both failed and more successful nationalist doctrines, movements and nationalisms and their various interrelationships. Yet, the process of investigation and analysis undertaken is fraught with difficulties, prior consciousness of which is invaluable in adequately appraising relevant topics and forming dependable conclusions.

1.2 Methodological Concerns and the Study of Turkish Cypriot History

The study of history need not be particularly demanding if one’s objective is solely to provide an account of the past. Only once the historian’s effort incorporates the use of the canons of proper historical methodology, in particular an ethical concern to at least do justice, as best it can be done, to Ranke’s exhortation to show “how it actually was”, the difficulty and complexity of reaching our objective is seriously compounded. Burdens are multiplied in the case of study in, and study of societies where history is an especially emotive subject in terms of the legitimisation of contemporary elites and their political objectives. If the venture is on top of this also one that pertains to particularly sensitive issues, matters that have been ignored or twisted by the orthodox history of the dominant political and social classes, then the task can become truly daunting. Such is the nature of the challenge of the historical study of the rise of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus, an island where efforts to write in good faith “how it actually was” face the predicament of being perceived as a threat to the narrow interests of political elites and/or to the more general demands of “national unity”. Thus while the study of nationalism both its theory and practice is fraught with difficulties, the case of studying the historic rise of nationalism amongst the Turkish Cypriots aggravates these general difficulties with specific difficulties of its own. Manifest consciousness of the impediments and pitfalls involved can, however, serve to ease the passage of the historian as s/he seeks to broaden historical knowledge.

As the historian Hajo Holborn succinctly puts it, the fundamental problems of historical knowledge, “hinge upon the fact that an objective knowledge of the past can only be obtained through the subjective experience of the scholar.”57 Yet, though it is true that accounts of the past are selective, dependent on the authors’ assumptions, values, and judgements, and prone to contain inaccuracy, how else could it be? No matter that it should be the goal, to expect a perfect recantation and objective analysis of things past by the historian is to expect the impossible. The historian’s resources and sources are both finite and as a mere mortal he or she could never provide an immaculate interpretation devoid of all traces of error and prejudice. After all, as Michael Stanford eruditely observes,

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57. HOLBORN 1972, 79.
“Scholars are not infallible, but where, this side of Judgement Day, shall we find a better
guide to historical truth than historical scholarship?”

Extrapolating from this fundamental concern regarding objectivity and truth in history
to draw lessons for the writing of Turkish Cypriot history, we can require only that histo-
rians put all possible effort into avoiding prejudice and rendering a balanced portrait of
what went before that depicts the Turkish Cypriots’ past conduct in both its negative and
positive dimensions, and that they do not wittingly try to misrepresent historical happe-
nings in order to accomplish any ulterior motives. Were this basic standard to be met we
could reasonably ask for little more. Here, however, lies the crux of the current problem.
Not only are historical accounts of Cyprus and its Turks frequently contradictory and ina-
ccurate, but it is apparent that they also often display a tendency to avoid challenging orth-
dox versions of events. Sensitive issues are, for instance, typically either sidestepped or
recanted in ways that do little more than echo official state positions. Obviously this is not
a feature that is peculiar only to the Turkish Cypriots and historians of their past, but it is
one that due to the circumstances of the environment within which they function has spe-
cial import in their case.

There is no “history” of Cyprus, there are “histories”. That is to say there is no singular
angle to understanding and writing the political history of the island, but rather there are
varied approaches whose descriptions and contentions are clustered around divergent
perspectives of times gone by. Most prominently, and consequentially, there exist two
dominant, competing official histories, that of the Greeks and that of the Turks. There is
then, a tendency towards what Nergis Canefe has cleverly labelled a, “‘bi-polarisation’ of
national history.” The picture is arguably complicated a little further by the presence of
a third pole, albeit less structured than the first two, but all the same critical as much of
the academic work on the history of Cyprus has been written under the influence of this
perspective. This third is not quite “official”, but all the same is perturbingly susceptible
to its own partiality, especially as far as concerns the colonial era. We may call this the
British, (or more broadly, “western”), history of Cyprus. Each of these versions of
Cypriot history is plagued by selectivity and skewed interpretation.

For example, from the first of these perspectives, as Bryant argues, there is, “a com-
mon assumption even among Greek Cypriot leftists that the Ottoman centuries were the
‘black centuries’ (oi mávroi aiônēs), the period of enslavement (dhoulía or sklaviá).” Loizos
explains, that while Greek official history, “stresses conquest by the Turks, subju-

58. STANFORD 1996, 158.
59. CANEFE 1998a.
60. BRYANT 2001a, 914; To illustrate, the opening sentences of an article relating to Cyprus’ role in the Greek
War of Independence reads:
For over four hundred years the Greeks had endured the rule of their Ottoman masters, and social and
political oppression and humiliation. These were years of trial and terror. Indeed, the history of the Greeks
in the decades following the fall of Constantinople (1453–1821) is a melancholy one. It is a record of phy-
sical captivity and cultural limitations. Yet the Greeks and Hellenism survived those centuries. They sur-
vived because they were nurtured by their faith. However orthodoxy, the Church survived because it was
saved by Hellenism. During all those years of captivity the Greeks unceasingly hoped and planned for the
day when they would be free again, and be masters in their own land: It was now time for the Greeks to
liberate their land, throw off the Ottoman yoke, and regain their freedom and identity; it was time to rees-
tablish freedom in the birthplace of the ideals of democracy.
gation and humiliation of Greeks, their forced conversions, experiences of rape, torture,
[and] martyrdom for their religion,” it, “passes silently over long periods of peaceful coe-
xistence within the cool, stabilised Ottoman Empire,” an empire which, “offer[ed] them
imperial peace and religious autonomy.”61 As Loizos points out, the Greek nationalist
history does not teach, “the whole story,” of the past, “only the excesses of Turks against
Greeks.”62 In recent times, however, especially since 1974, there has also been a new
strand of writing found amongst Greek authors, one apparently partially sanctioned by the
Greek Cypriot authorities. This revised approach attempts to construct the story of a fully
integrated Cypriot society, devoid of any national, ethnic or even religious tensions until
the self-interested, divisive policies of foreign states, (primarily Britain and Turkey, as
well as in later stages the United States), disrupted this serene, fully harmonious scene.
Perhaps most representative of this neo-official perspective is the work of Costas Kyriss.

In one of his most frequently referenced works Kyriss opens the volume by pronoun-
cing that “Turkish propaganda … is doomed to fail,” because while, “for obvious political
reasons [it aims] to persuade world opinion,” that relations between Greeks and Turks
were not in fact peaceful, this contention is utterly baseless. Kyriss himself, however, pro-
ceeds over the next 180 pages, to provide a highly subjective, and exceedingly selective
series of examples to “prove” how harmonious Greeks and Turks in Cyprus have always
been, ostensibly, it seems, to recreate what he calls, “Memories of those idyllic times.”63
These were times which, he asserts, remained undisturbed, “until the imported fanaticism
and elite nationalism of Ankara in the mid-forties and mid-fifties and especially in the
mid-sixties led to gradual segregation.” 64 Many, if not all the examples are valid as evi-
dence, yet there is virtually no mention of tensions or even differentiation between the
island’s two main communities, except till it was fostered by external interference. The
fact that Kyriss was associated with both the Greek Cypriot Public Information Office and
a research centre, “legally instituted by the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber,” in 1964
and later, “actually [brought] under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education,” the
Cyprus Research Centre, and that this particular volume was actually published by the
Greek Cypriot Public Information Office only serves to set-off the alarm bells as to his
true intentions in producing his works.65 In light of such examples, one might contend, in
line with Papadakis’ arguments, that the Greek Cypriots’ defence of the re-unification of
Cyprus in the post-1974 years has required them, “to present the situation as solely an
international problem,” and even that recognition of the force of autonomous Turkish
nationalism amongst “Cypriots” in the pre-1974 period might “undermine their case.”66

Little more accurate is the diametrically opposed picture portrayed by official Turkish
history, which likewise tends to distort the truth, at times to such a degree that it is of little
better qualitative value than pure fabrication. Thus, for instance, based on a single histori-
sical source, giving a single estimate, (itself of questionable accuracy), for a single year in

61. LOIZOS 1988, 642.
62. Ibid., 652.
63. KYRISS 1977, 28.
64. Ibid., 35.
65. Ibid., 5 and passim; See also foreword by Constantine Spyridakis, Minister of Education and President of
the Administrative Committee of the Cyprus Research Centre, (for which Kyriss has worked), in PAPA-
66. PAPADAKIS 1998a, 71; See also CONSTANTINOUM - PAPADAKIS 2001, 140.
the three centuries of Ottoman rule, the Turkish Cypriot Public Information Office “reveals”, in a clear effort to fortify Turkish association with the island that, “During the greater part of the Ottoman period 60,000 Turks and 20,000 Greeks lived in Cyprus.” The absurdity of the claim is made all the more pitiable by the subtitle on this “informative” page on, “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus”, which reads, “Greek Cypriot Propaganda” and below which is written, “Greek Cypriot allegations regarding the demographic structure of ‘Cyprus’ are false and designed to mislead world public opinion.”

Official Turkish history in Cyprus is one that has related to school children in their history classes that their, “ancestors never attacked others unless they themselves had met with wrong or aggression. The sole reason why they won great wars was that they always had right on their side.” In particular, this perspective denies any positive Greek association with the island and totally rejects attributing any faults to the constantly emphasised, continuously lauded and sometimes over-exaggerated Turkish association. Tachau goes as far as to suggest that from its defenders’ perspective, “the Greeks had no business meddling in the affairs of Cyprus, simply because the island had never belonged to Greece.”

A Turkish journal claimed at the height of tensions in the late 1950’s that in its special issue it would, “explain and prove with mathematical certainty why there was no other option but for the whole island to be returned to its rightful owner Turkey,” on premises that included the “facts” that, “Our Cyprus … never had any connection with the Greeks, [and] in terms of history, geography, land, nationality, population, and hinterland is solely Turkish.” The island throughout its history, it is held, was ruled by an array of invading external powers, but over time the population on the island began to think of itself as Greek because of the introduction of Hellenic culture and the adoption of the Orthodox Christian faith. Racially, however, they have shared no affinity with the Greeks of Greece. Rather, “the Cypriot Greeks,” are in reality, “the remnants of the invaders.”

After several centuries of persecution the Ottoman conquest liberated the local population. The Ottomans showed the island’s existing inhabitants extraordinary tolerance, allowed them complete freedom of religion and ended their subjugation as serfs. Thus, according to information emanating from the Office of the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, (TRNC), “After the oppressive Latin occupation, it was the Turks who established for the first time … a civil administration based on self-rule & free elections. Turkish rule immediately ended the humiliation, slavery & poverty of the Greek people & they were given freedom & full citizenship rights.” Bryant terms this the, “idealized version of the Ottoman model of toleration,” which she perceptively records is a trait that has been common to Turkish Cypriots. Later periods, however, are treated equally one-sidedly.

67. s.n. s.a. (d).
68. HODGE - LEWIS s.a., 46.
69. TACHAU 1959, 268.
70. Introduction to Türk Düслиncesi 1958, 1, and see also Safa’s article in the same issue. SAFA 1958, 3.
71. s.n. s.a. (e).
72. Ibid.; While generally less prone to partiality in his historical analyses, Beratlı’s assertion that in the post-Tanzimat era the Ottoman administrative system in Cyprus was one of, “complete democracy”, is also a rather naive evaluation of the true impact of the liberalizing, yet certainly not fully democratic reforms. BERATLI 1999, 69.
73. BRYANT 2001a, 906.
From the perspective of official Turkish history, from the day Greek nationalism emerged, it became inevitable that, “there would sooner or later be a Graeco-Turkish conflict in Cyprus.” Implicitly, at least, it tends to, “attribute an unchanging evil intention to the other side,” one that essentially, “emerges out of the enemy’s character,” and, in Papadakis’ words, “is interpreted as a key interpretive code of history, which denies contingency, and in effect, history itself.” There is much truth in Constantinoù and Papadakis’ contention that Turkish writers tend typically to, “officially emphasise past animosity and stress the need for the people to remain as far as possible separated in the future.” As a result there is rarely acknowledgment in the dominant nationalist discourse of any inter-ethnic cooperation and integration, of cultural symbiosis or of the fact that amicable personal relations between Greeks and Turks continued to be the rule, if decreasingly so, even after the rise of nationalism on the island. Instead, the prevalent practice has been to collectively demonise the other without exception.

As to the British perspective... On the whole British historians writing in the years before independence tended to exaggerate the “progress” brought by the British to the island and maintained that the populace in general, excepting more marginal elements, was as a result content with colonial rule. Throughout their rule the British perceived the main threat to their control of Cyprus to come from the demand for enosis. “Patriotic” British historians, therefore, often inclined to downplay the significance of expressions of this desire. Frequently they made a point to dismiss or deprecate any racial, ethnic or “genuine” national link between the Greeks of Cyprus and of Greece. Archaeologist Michael Given goes so far as to accuse British rulers and their collaborators in academia of the “invention” of a new ethnic group, one which they called the “Eteocypriots”, for this very purpose. “The British colonial rulers of Cyprus were exploiting ancient history & archaeology to combat Greek nationalism,” he argues, for, “By encouraging the creation of an ‘authentically’ Cypriot ethnic group which pre-dated the Greeks, the British colonial regime denied the Hellenic character of ancient & modern Cyprus.” It was partly in order, “To address these claims,” that Greek Cypriots began to write their own spurious historical works, “proving their Greekness and continuity as a self-conscious actor who always resisted foreign domination.”

74. ISMAIL 1997, 2.
75. PAPADAKIS 1998a, 73.
76. CONSTANTINOÙ – PAPADAKIS 2001, 141.
77. Even the eminent historian Arnold Toynbee fell into this trap when writing about the October Revolt of 1931, the first major mass uprising of the island’s Greeks in the cause of enosis. Trying to downplay the strength of pro-enosis sentiment amongst the Greeks, Toynbee reiterated the official British governmental position by emphasising that barely a third of the villages inhabited by the Greek-Orthodox had actually participated in the disturbances. This number could, however, be interpreted more appropriately as a highly significant one considering that in most such villages there were no British symbols of note that could be targeted; that in some of the villages alluded to there was actually a Turkish/Moslem anti-enosis majority and; that numerous villagers in closer proximity to the main urban centres were likely to have participated in protest in these towns. TOYNBEE 1932, 366–367
78. Note though that at times opposing tendencies were also displayed as a result of philhellene sympathies.
79. Sir George Hill, for example, refuted this connection outright, though unlike many others he did wisely accept too that it was the subjective belief in such an affinity that was most important. HILL 1952, 488–489.
80. GIVEN 1998, 3.
British appreciation of Turkish Cypriot history was no less flawed. A particularly patronising tone has typically been employed by many British historians and observers regarding the Turkish Cypriots. Nearly all known written contemporary analyses of the Turkish Cypriot community in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were those of western travellers or of colonial officials. The first Ottoman book concerning the history of Cyprus was only published in 1895, and only a handful of other such works related to the Turkish Cypriots were to be published by Turks prior to the Second World War. Yet the accounts of western observers were highly susceptible to the incorporation of prejudice in evaluating levels of development and sophistication of almost all colonial peoples, not to mention the particular intellectual burden borne as a consequence of persistent negative stereotypes of “the Turks”. These shortcomings were not only a result of conditioning resulting from socialisation in their own communities, but also arguably from a need to justify, at least indirectly, the continuation of imperial rule by their home states. As a result any form of antagonism towards the status quo amongst the Turkish Cypriots, including that born of nationalist sentiments and movements was liable to be disregarded, belittled or, especially in later stages when it had become impossible to totally ignore, portrayed as the self-interested efforts of discontented individuals to opportunistically utilise nationalism as a tool to enhance their personal power.

These characteristics were especially obvious in the case of records kept by colonial officials because the recognition of Turkish nationalism implied also a failure of their own actions and policies, whereas putting the blame on “troublemakers”, or “scoundrels”, or “provocateurs” was more likely to absolve them of charges of incompetence. Unfortunately many historians chose to take their observations and testimonies at face value. No less renowned an authority than Sir George Hill, for instance, parroted the denigration of an early Turkish Cypriot nationalist, Misirlizade Mehmet Necati Özkan, meted out by British colonial officials. Without furnishing any evidence, he slanderously described him as, “a puppet whom the Greeks, thanks to the intrigues of the Turkish Consul Asaf Bey, had got elected to the Council.”

Leaving to one side for the moment the quagmire of the uncorroborated relationships alluded to in Hill’s statement, the main implication of Hill’s charges was that Özkan’s views were not representative of the ordinary Turk. Like many others, Hill, was failing to acknowledge that Özkan and others sympathetic to Turkish nationalism had by 1930 gained a momentous electoral victory in the face of colonial impediments, a victory which should instead have been acknowledged as a patent sign of considerable public support for the nationalist platform on which they stood.

Nevertheless nowadays, as the historical issues addressed are no longer of such primacy or sensitivity in non-Greek/Turkish milieus, it has become much less arduous to

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82. Many of these accounts have been collected in Cobham’s still invaluable compendium “Excerpta Cypria: materials for a history of Cyprus”.
83. Hill, who is regularly viewed as the doyenne of Cypriot history, seems here to give fuel to the criticism of another famous historian of the region, the eminent scholar of the Ottomans, Halil İnalcık, who states: “The true history of the last four centuries of Cyprus has not yet been written. The last great work was written by Sir George Hill on the history of the island, in which, although he tried to give impartial judgement, he was unable always to remain objective. Because his main sources were works or memoirs full of the crusading spirit.” [İNALCIK 1964, 44]. In some ways İnalcık might even be considered to have been quite lenient on his fellow historian, though it must be said that he himself could be accused of being more than a tad partial in the very same article in which he accuses Hill of subjectivity.
challenge official or dominant versions of Cyprus’ past in Britain and other states. For the Greeks, and even more directly for the Turks, researching Turkish Cypriot history is still, however, wrought with significant dangers and difficulties. Comprehension of these pitfalls has relevance for the present study on two levels: firstly because it draws attention to the types of selectivity and prejudice that will necessarily plague the sources that might be used in an effort to uncover the Turkish Cypriot past, and; secondly, because it alerts us to the intellectual straight-jacket to which academic historians in particular social contexts are expected to conform and which they often contravene at their own peril.

As far as the first level is concerned, we must frankly concede that much of what is contained within the orthodox historical discourses of the British, Turks and Greeks is not fabricated falsehood as such. As a study of history books used in Greek and Turkish schools found: “There is little that is demonstrably false and yet, clearly, two differing views of the world and of the past are presented.… Evidently in neither case do we have scientific, balanced, scholarly, ‘objective’ history at all: it is simply a matter of selecting events or quasi-events from the past and then arranging them so as to glorify a particular nation.”84 There do exist then within each orthodox historical discourse many kernels of “truth”. The gulf that separates them is mainly a consequence of selective representation of the past, one that portrays the “in-group” in a positive light and the “out-group” in a negative one. This feature is evident not just in more recent secondary sources, but also in many of the first-hand commentaries and reports of the past. As a result, while not dismissing such sources out of hand, the conscientious historian of today must at all times be alert to the proclivity of his/her sources to inequitably justify one or other of the official histories outlined above.

If the first importance of an understanding of the official histories of Cyprus is to draw our attention to the skewed nature of the representations of the past that might be garnered from available sources, the second is that it indicates to us the fault lines beyond which the practicing historians associated with different national groups will have difficulty traversing for psychological, social, political or even economic reasons. Thus, even if today’s historian succeeds on a scholastic level in recognising the bias and prejudice of his/her sources, s/he then faces more practical obstacles in reflecting his/her more enlightened understanding in his or her work. Official histories are the blueprints to which historians of Cyprus, more often than not, are expected to conform, and knowledge of these contrasting discourses warns us of where potential self-censorship may be a danger to the historian’s efforts to divulge a more “truthful” and representative rendition of the past. As far as general complications in this context are concerned we can identify at least four main dangers for the scholar: those of mental conditioning, together with its nemesis “over-compensation”; the threat of stigmatisation and ostracism; the corollary fear of a loss of patronage, and last, but not least; limits to academic autonomy.

The vast majority of existing and prospective Turkish and Greek historians grew up and were educated in separate Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Turkish or Greek institutions of learning. Most continue to live in Cyprus, Greece or Turkey where through both the media and normal societal interaction the indoctrination of official history that they lived through during their years of academic learning is continuously reinforced. As such, from a very young age they have generally become accustomed to a set, standard version

84. HODGE - LEWIS s.a., 9–10.
of events regarding the Turkish Cypriot past that has not for many been intellectually easy to breach. It often takes, therefore, a great leap of faith, or more appropriately faith(lessness), for them to evade the pitfall of habitual compliance with the official version of events that a lifetime of socialisation has engendered. It is not, thankfully, impossible to take the jump into the abyss of questioning what Papadakis terms the, “discourse of ‘self-righteousness’,” a discourse that is imbued by one’s own community’s official history. It is by no means effortless, however, and even those who do manage to initiate the jump will often relapse into compliance, particularly when dealing with the subjects of greatest taboo.

There is of course another type of related problem that can arise from what we might call, “over-compensation” or “over-balance”, and possibly it may even be described as a kind of “intellectual appeasement”. Essentially what is being suggested here is the danger of trying to be too conscientious, too even-handed, of being unwilling to make assertions regarding former times, even though they may actually be appropriate and well-founded, for fear of appearing biased or of further enhancing prejudice. Not all would argue this were a bad thing. In fact, some might hold that such conscientious self-censorship is an ethical necessity that Cyprus could do with more of if reconciliation between Greeks and Turks is to be effected. Stanford, by implication at least, comes close to giving his support for such a policy when he posits the question, “Should history, however technically correct, leave the reader with a rooted prejudice for or against a particular group or nation?” and then proceeds to list cases of such scholarship under his category of “abuses of history”. Then again, he does seem to come round partially when he goes on to add the caveat, “On the other hand, can this be avoided without doing violence to the truth?”

The point then is that no matter how virtuous the intentions of the historian maybe, any such over-balance smacks of “historical engineering”, and is certainly a distortion of the available facts. In line with Connor’s opinion regarding, “the fear that ethnic nationalism will feed on publicity,” I would likewise argue that the analyst’s predisposition, “for total disregard or cavalier dismissal of the undesired facts,” may be considered, “justified for the policy-maker, but not for the scholar.” It may also, more sinisterly, be indicative of its own less than pure motives.

It could, for instance, be advocated that some of the domestic assaults on the dominant version of Turkish Cypriot history may have their own ulterior political motives. Tosh rightly explains that, “the ruling groups in society have an interest in promoting mythical pasts which serve to legitimise their power or win support for particular policies,” but this is unfortunately not a fault monopolised solely by ruling groups. Not all those who do

85. One common negative outcome of the socialisation process for historians is that of anachronism, what Black and MacRaid define as, “the imposition of contemporary ideas and agendas upon the past.” [BLACK - MacRAILD 2000, 117]. Thus, for example, much Turkish Cypriot history is plagued by the spurious projection of the more recent and intense inter-ethnic tensions and conflict well back into the past, despite the fact that this assertion regarding such times of old is frequently contested by the historical records.
86. PAPADAKIS 1995, 125.
87. STANFORD 1996, 46.
88. Ibid.
89. CONNOR 1994, 57.
contradict the conventional histories of their own societies are necessarily innocents, not all are themselves without fault. Leaving to one side the intrinsic value of their arguments and purported “evidence”, they commonly carry their own, barely hidden political agendas for which historical accusations are often merely convenient political tools with which to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling elites. As such, they too can often be considered in a parallel light to rulers who wish to manipulate history. For both, then, history may be seen not as a means to seek and reveal the truth about the days of yore, but rather as a means to mobilise the support of the masses, albeit for differing political purposes.

Despite the admitted existence of unofficial, unconventional approaches to the history of Cyprus, they have clearly not been predominant, for even when mental conditioning can be overcome and the historian can conced the weaknesses of his own side’s contentions, as well as the strengths of those of the “other”, there are further considerations that encourage him or her to uphold the historical status quo and either consciously or unconsciously can lead to self-censorship. Of these, perhaps the most powerful is the fear of negative political stigmatisation.

There is for most individuals a powerful drive to be accepted by the group. Historians, not being superhuman, are also liable to be affected by such considerations, often despite their own best intentions. Neither state in Cyprus is a totalitarian colossus, and legally speaking there is little impediment to the making of assertions contravening the dominant national history of the respective Turkish and Greek societies. Nor, are such challenges wholly unheard of. However, historians, (professional and lay), who may have contemplated challenging these orthodoxies, have at times faced the danger of social ostracism and, at a minimum, of verbal persecution at the hands of the nationalist political elites and their supporters in the media. They have carried the risk of being branded traitors and of treatment as social outcasts, and in the case of Cyprus, (both North and South), where societies consist of barely a few hundred thousand souls, there has often been little space for dissidents to seek solace in the ranks of their own substrata. Thus, as a consequence of historians’ not being immune to the concern for social acceptance, many areas of Cypriot history have been under threat of remaining permanently in the dark, or at best being banished to the shadowy realms of the twilight zone.

Connected to the troubles of stigmatisation and ostracism is a more blatantly self-interested apprehension concerning the loss of patronage from the adherents of dominant histories, particularly from those administering the state apparatus. This has probably been more apparent in the TRNC where a disproportionate number of people are dependent on state largesse, if not directly on state employment, for their economic well-being. Historians are often employed by the state and/or rely on the state or other semi-official agencies to publish their works. It is no coincidence that several prominent Turkish Cypriot historians who have been, or are still employed by the state, are key defenders of conventional national history.

Finally, there is in this category the general problem of academic autonomy. In both halves of Cyprus, if especially in the North, there are vibrant tertiary education sectors that could potentially be a source of much more objective and scholarly historical research. However, universities in the island are all still in their early, formative stages and the culture of academic autonomy has still to be institutionalised. For example, Nicolas Papamichael, the rector of what is at present the only university in the South, the University of Cyprus, not so long ago resigned his post in protest at what he deemed to be politically
motivated changes to university regulations that would diminish professors’ autonomy.\textsuperscript{91} In the main English-language daily published in the South he was reported as stating that, “He hoped his resignation would convey to the political leadership the critical turning point in the university’s development, whose success depended on respect for academic autonomy – not political intervention.”\textsuperscript{92}

Of the five universities in the North, the oldest and largest is the Eastern Mediterranean University. Here too, however, academic autonomy is no less contentious an issue. The university was founded as a “vakif”, (trust-endowed foundation), but the highest authority in the administration of the university is the vakif board of governors that is composed chiefly of government appointees. Though in practice their role has often tended to be largely ceremonial they do have an indirect capacity to interfere in academic matters through their power over key university appointments and decision-making. Maybe, though, the greatest impediment to a secure environment for academics is the failure to institutionalise the convention of tenure, with virtually all academic staff having instead part-time status or contracts of only one, two or three year durations.

Of the remaining four universities in the North, three are privately owned and run. This might at first sight appear a cause for optimism, the hope being that private ownership might act as a shield to state interference. In reality, however, this set-up carries its own risks. The entrepreneurs involved in the establishment, (and in most cases in the day-to-day running), of these institutions have other business interests too, investments covering areas as diverse as banking, construction, tourism and the retail sector. In a state where a weak private business sector itself has little autonomy, where it depends heavily on state contracts and patronage, the scope for these privately owned universities to maintain their independence is also therefore diminished.

Nonetheless, having noted the potential deficiencies of the academic sector in breaking the stranglehold of official history, it deserves recognition that the higher education sector has made at least some progress in this direction. There is an atmosphere of relative intellectual toleration in the universities and a greater willingness to acknowledge the inconsistencies of sanctified truths and of “approved” histories. Furthermore, though still quite limited, there has been some epistemological interaction between academics resident in opposing sides of the island. For example, Greek Cypriot academics have on occasion participated in conferences in the North, including conferences directly related to the Cyprus dispute and its past, and Turkish Cypriot academics have written on similar matters in scholarly journals published in the South.\textsuperscript{93} Many academics have participated together in conferences and workshops organised by third parties, and some, have of late jointly expressed explicit political positions regarding efforts to reach a settlement to the Cyprus dispute.\textsuperscript{94} While the record as far as joint research is concerned is still barely discernible, some light does nevertheless shine at the end of the tunnel, and even if still pre-

\textsuperscript{91} Though there are several other institutes and colleges of learning in Southern Cyprus, the University of Cyprus is the only one to currently hold university status. It is expected that the Greek Cypriot government will soon give permission for the establishment of others.

\textsuperscript{92} Stefanos Evripidou reporting in the Cyprus Mail 15\textsuperscript{th} June 2002.

\textsuperscript{93} It is worthy of note that co-operative academic efforts are growing in scope and number between scholars in Greece and Turkey.

\textsuperscript{94} For example, Greek and Turkish cypriot academics published a joint statement in support of the Annan Plan in November of 2002. For the English text of their statement see, ANAGNOSTOPOULOU et. al., 2002.
cariously so today, there is reason to hope that the years ahead could be much more pro-
ductive on this front. Thus the further consolidation and institutionalisation of an acade-
mic environment in the North and South of Cyprus, and the enlargement and develop-
ment, (currently being contemplated), of the tertiary education sector in the South are
likely to have an increasingly beneficial impact on the accumulation of scholarly histori-
cal endeavours. Undoubtedly, recent political developments, and potential reconciliation
on the island may also bode well for future opportunities for scholarly cooperation bet-
ween Greek and Turk.

Each of the difficulties discussed in the section above has relevance for study of the
history of the Turks of Cyprus, and more comprehensively for all the historiography of
Cyprus. Yet the study of particular areas or periods within the overarching framework of
the history of Cyprus can reveal also more specific hindrances that do not necessarily
apply across the board. It is to the special additional difficulties incurred in one such area,
that of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus, to which attention is now turned.

1.3 Studying Nationalism of the Turks of Cyprus: Trials and
Tribulations

There has been a fair degree of discussion concerning Turkish nationalism in Cyprus in
the interval between the end of the Second World War and the independence of Cyprus in
1960. There is little dispute that during these years there arose a potent nationalist move-
ment which began to espouse the well-defined ideal of incorporating the Turks of the
island within the Turkish nation-state and which was broadly supported by the masses. Yet,
there is also less worked evidence, frequently entirely overlooked, concerning ear-
lier Turkish nationalists with comparable ideals, evidence that will be evaluated in this
thesis. Furthermore, if we base our definition of nationalism on the existence of senti-
ment in favour of exclusive political rights, (primarily for political autonomy or indepen-
dence), for all those sharing or believed to be sharing certain characteristics, (in the case
of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus that would then primarily be the sharing of ethnic
background), then even greater care must be taken to avoid dismissing outright claims of
early Turkish nationalism. 95 If our search for nationalism is primarily a search for senti-
ment, then coherent movement or ideology are not anyway prerequisites for, “they do
not,” in Smith’s words, “necessarily go together.” As he aptly observes, “One can … pos-
sess considerable national feeling in the absence of any symbolism, movement or even
ideology on behalf of the nation.” 96 Moreover, if our definition of nationalism, (as oppo-
sed to that of the nation), does not require these feelings to be held by a critical proporti-

95. Anthony Smith makes a similar point in relation to the role of individual judgement in assessing whether or
not a nation exists when he says that: “The concept of the nation refers to processes that admit of degrees,
such as territorialization, myth-making, memory formation, cultural unification, legal standardization and
the like, that in their nature fluctuate and take new forms; and it must be a matter of judgement as to
whether or when we can speak of a given collective cultural identity as a nation, and indeed when sufficient
members and perhaps their neighbours deem that they constitute a nation.” Such arguments can be equally
applied to the related concept of nationalism. See SMITH 2000, 64.

96. SMITH 2001, 6.
on of the population, say a majority, then the likelihood of early identification is even further enhanced.

Though research in this area is still sparse, there are already some indications in uncovered records of the existence of such nationalist feelings in the late nineteenth century. It is known that Turkish nationalist sentiment was then beginning to develop in at least some restricted circles of the Ottoman Empire and that there were some active Young Turk groups, and newspapers in Cyprus from whose statements such subjective feelings could be inferred to be present on the island too. As Bernard Lewis has explained, Ali Suavi, a pioneering leader of the Young Ottoman group calling for the reform of the Ottoman Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, had already begun by the second half of the 1860’s, “to express, for the first time, the idea of a Turkish as distinct from an Islamic or Ottoman [political] loyalty.”97 He was a decade later to be hanged for his efforts, “to incite Istanbul’s population for the sake of Turkism,” and thereafter to become a symbol of heroism for the pan-Turkists.98 There is no reason to automatically discharge the possibility that his ideas and sentiments, or those of the likeminded who thereafter followed, might have infiltrated the minds and hearts of Turkish citizens of the Ottoman Empire in Cyprus, let alone to rule out early support in Cyprus for the more prevalent territorially based, or civic nationalism embodied within the Ottomanist movement. Yet, at this juncture, in initiating efforts to reveal evidence of such nationalist sentiments, we are confronted by particular difficulties concerning the study of the emergence of nationalism amongst the Turkish Cypriots. In terms of the difficulties that may be faced in the use of sources pertaining to the rise of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus there are three distinct issues that must be addressed: too much evidence of the past; too little evidence of the past, and; problems related to language.

Even for the late nineteenth century, let alone the twentieth, there is a plethora of evidence available that could be related to the historical development of nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot community. Both in Ottoman records in Istanbul and Kyrenia, Northern Cyprus, and in British archives located in Kew, England as well as in British colonial records housed in the southern half of Nicosia, there are countless documents which when sifted through could produce valuable indication of the genesis and progress of the phenomenon in question. The archival materials that have survived to the present day are an undeniable treasure trove for historians, yet their abundance is at the same time awkward. The physical demand of analysing all the available material requires substantial effort and time, leading many historians to understandably select only a portion of the available sources as material for their research. But which portion? Which materials should we choose as worthy of our deliberation? What of evidence we discard, is it necessarily irrelevant to our topic?99

Ironically, a second obstacle that may confound the historian seeking the origins of nationalism amongst the island’s Turks, that of not having enough evidence regarding the

97. LEWIS 1968, 155.
98. LANDAU 1995, 30.
99. Finley explains the general dilemma well in the following passage: “The past is an intractable, incomprehensible mass of uncounted & uncountable data. It can be rendered intelligible only if some selection is made, around some focus or foci. In all the endless debate that has been generated by Ranke’s wie es eigentlich gewesen ist (‘how things really were’), a first question is often neglected: what ‘things’ merit or require consideration in order to establish how they ‘really were’?” FINLEY 2000, 13.
issue being studied, or more precisely, not having enough relevant evidence, exists simultaneously with the first. Mile upon mile of shelf-space in Ottoman and British archives devoted to documentation of the years under consideration in this thesis do not always willingly yield evidence that reveals in particular the sentiment of nationalism amongst the island’s Turks. The papers in these archives often tend to relate to administrative and economic matters, dealing much less with social issues unless they were considered at the time to be a poignant threat to the political order. In addition, the further back in time we delve the more likely it is that relevant evidence has been destroyed, either wittingly or unwittingly. Georghallides, for instance, points to the loss of many valuable colonial records pertaining to Cyprus, and we can only speculate as to whether or not such lost records may have included precious evidence for ascertaining the origins of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. In some areas, in fact, there is even the danger pointed to by Carr that, “time has reduced the evidence to manageable proportions by a process of selection and attrition which in no way guarantees the survival of the fittest.” It could be possible, then, that failure to identify the nation and nationalism is not indicative of their non-existence, but instead, “a reflection of the paucity of relevant sources.”

Newspapers might be seen as alternative sources here to compensate the dearth of evidence we might face. However, there were no Turkish Cypriot newspapers or journals published in Cyprus until the end of the 1880’s, and for decades they continued to be of greater relevance in highlighting, (where and when British censorship was not an impediment), the interests and sentiments of the urban, literate elite. It is problematic, if not without some benefit, to use such material as sources for comprehending the emotional standpoint of a largely illiterate and generally rural community. Newspapers too, therefore, may also not be by themselves wholly ideal repositories of evidence regarding early nationalist sentiment amongst the Turkish Cypriot masses.

A more contemporary and novel avenue of historical enquiry might be to utilise oral history. It could be hoped that by looking at the evidence of the spoken word one might side-step official histories altogether and get a better grasp of the common man or woman’s sentiments that are less likely to be reflected in written records that more typically are kept by, or refer to, the elite and more powerful persons. Of course, this technique is usually more appropriate when the stories being recounted to the historian are within the living memory of the interviewee. But, only a handful of a population of 200,000 in the TRNC today, are able to recall first-hand experiences of the 1920’s in Cyprus, let alone of earlier times, and even then their memory may be liable to fail them. As a substitute we could potentially try to benefit from “oral tradition”, which Tosh distinguishes from first-hand oral history as being, “the narratives and descriptions of people and events in the past which have been handed down by word of mouth over several generations.”

Yet, both identifying such oral traditions and accounting for their validity is complicated

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100 GEORGHALLIDES 1983, passim; Though obviously a great loss to the historian, such destruction should not by default be considered to be part of a political cover-up. Georghallides notes that for long, “The prevailing attitude [of colonial administrators in Cyprus] was that files and records could not demand the attention of senior policy-makers. Consequently the disposal of records was usually made under conditions of force majeure, when, that is, cupboards and offices overflowed with paper.” Ibid., 234.
101 CARR 1969, 6.
102 SMITH 2000, 44.
103 TOSH 2002, 206.
in the Turkish Cypriot case. As Tosh readily acknowledges, “In those parts of the world which have known near-universal literacy for two or three generations, oral tradition has practically died out.”  

This observation is to an important extent now applicable to the Turkish Cypriot case. Rates of schooling and literacy for the Turkish Cypriots have been relatively high for quite a long duration. Furthermore, as Canefe suggests, it is often not possible to “reconstruct” the Turkish Cypriot past through the use of oral history in general, and oral tradition in particular because accounts of times gone by are so closely framed by the themes of official history. She argues that, “the reliability of individual accounts have to be assessed within their own framework,” and rightly stresses that, “it is a dangerously isolationist approach to assume that framework to be ‘disaffected’ by larger political discourses and in particular by nationalism.”

All in all then, though oral history might form a valuable corroboratory source for some purposes, particularly for collecting accounts of more recent times, it is not, for the purposes of this thesis, to be seen as a major means of overcoming the academic pitfalls of relying on existing written sources, especially of archival material.

Finally, there has been what we might call the “physical obstacle”, a consequence of the political division of Cyprus. Though it can be surmised that at least some valuable archival material exists in both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot repositories, such material has not been readily accessible to researchers from the “other” side. It has for decades been in practice virtually impossible for a Greek Cypriot/Greek historian to access archives under Turkish control, and, likewise, for a Turkish Cypriot/Turk to utilize Greek administered facilities. Happily, the easing of crossings between North and South that began as of the 23rd of April 2003 has brought with it new openings for Greek and Turkish Cypriot researchers, and as a Turkish Cypriot living in the North of the island this author too, albeit at an advanced stage in researching this thesis, has been privileged to be one of the first researchers to benefit from these new opportunities.

As far as concerns the dilemma of language, any fully comprehensive study of Cyprus that encompasses both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries requires a working knowledge not just of English, Turkish and Greek, but also of “Osmanlıca”, the official state language of the Ottoman Empire that was to an important extent an amalgamation of Turkish with the Persian and Arabic languages and made use of the Arabic rather than Latin script. Furthermore, at least if covering the early nineteenth century, it is ideally needed to have full command of the local version of the Greek language used in Cyprus, which according to Pollis was at the time still highly distinctive and differentiated from that used in mainland Greece. Few, if any, living or deceased historians have possessed fluency in all these languages or idioms, meaning that many of the relevant sources have remained beyond their full reach. Though some consolation could be sought in the fact that many Greek and Turkish scholars had in the past at least a good knowledge of each

104. Ibid., 219.
105. CANEFE 1998a.
106. For basic information on the major holdings of the Greek Cypriot National Archives see, GEORGHALIDES 1983, passim, and for some details of Turkish Cypriot archives see, ALTAN - JENNINGS - McHENRY 1977, passim.
107. POLLIS 1972, 585–586; As is argued later on in this thesis, her further conviction, (apparently based on research into Greek sources alone), that Turkish used in Cyprus was likewise also, “largely incomprehensible,” in Anatolia does not appear to be fully warranted. POLLIS 1979, 53.
other’s everyday languages, over the intervening decades fewer and fewer opted or had the opportunity to learn the language of the “rival” nation. Such deficiencies can be partially remedied by the use of translations, where they are available or can be acquired, but in using such remedy, Schlabach argues, historians are allowing themselves, “a huge short cut.”108 This is a liberty that has been taken in the preparation of this study, for despite the potential deficiencies associated with the use of intermediaries in this manner, the likelihood of discovering invaluable evidence far outweighs reservations related to the use of translation.

Being bi-lingual in English and Turkish, use of materials in these two languages has not been a hindrance. Owing to the subject matter, Greek language sources have less relevance for this thesis. Nevertheless many useful works which help illuminate and clarify key issues have been published by Greek Cypriots in the English language, and colonial files often contain translations of Greek memorials, petitions, newspaper articles and the like. The most problematic language in the preparation of this dissertation has undoubtedly been Osmanlıca. In order not to be deprived of the wide array of material in this language, I have taken advantage both of published translations and of official translations available in British records, as well as of the invaluable services of proficient and professional translators with years of experience working in Ottoman and Turkish archives.

1.4 Status of Research and Literature, and Sources Used

To-date academic research related to the island of Cyprus, especially that concerning the role of nationalism, has tended to focus disproportionately on the island’s Greeks. This is particularly true for the period under study. Being more numerous and more manifestly politicised, it is perhaps not surprising that the political dispositions and endeavours of the Greek Cypriots’ should have received greater attention, nor is it wholly unjustified. Yet, it is fair to say that Greek Cypriot efforts to achieve their nationalist objectives, the position and policies of the British in Cyprus and the political and military conflict that eventually ravaged the island in the second half of the twentieth century can not be fully comprehended without due attention being paid also to earlier than recognised developments concerning the island’s Turkish component. The unfortunate reality, then, is that much of the generally English-language literature covering the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries pays only cursory attention to developments in the Turkish community, with little or no mention of Turkish nationalist phenomena. The tendency is often either to view the Turkish Cypriots en masse as stooges of the British colonial officials within the context of their policy of divide-and-rule, and/or to focus on the Turks as a purely religious, traditional community untouched by the forces of modernity or nationalism until the post-World War II epoch. Such approaches do not do justice to the realities of the past.

Two academic studies worthy of mention which thankfully do not adopt such superficial approaches are James McHenry’s “The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919–1939,”

108. SCHLABACH s.a.
and Daniel Wosgian’s unpublished thesis, “Turks and British Rule in Cyprus.” A handful of works concerning developments related to the Turkish community in Cyprus during the colonial era have been published in Turkish in the past two decades though they have tended to be flawed by inconsistency in argumentation or notation and have shown a propensity to fall under the rubric of “official history”. Notwithstanding such deficiencies, however, some of these works can still serve as valuable sources of information. Thus, for example, Ahmet An’s, “Kıbrısla Türk Liderliğinin Oluşması, 1900–1942”, (“The Formation of the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, 1900–1942”), Mustafa Haşim Altan’s, “Atatürk Devrimlerinin Kıbrısla Türk Toplumuna Yansıması,” (“The Impact of Atatürk’s Reforms on the Turkish Cypriot Society”), and Hüseyin Mehmet Ateşin’s, “Kıbrısla Müslümanların Türkleşme Serüveni, (1925–1975).” (“The Turkification of the ‘Moslems’ of Cyprus”), are all useful secondary sources. Together with Meltem Samani’s “Kıbrıs’ta Türk Milliyetçiliği,” (“Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus”), they provide some informative introductory insight into the major political developments related to the Turkish Community during the time-frame under consideration.

Hill’s History of Cyprus, (Volume IV), is also an essential aid... though the common urge to defer to Hill on all matters should be resisted, particularly as evidence exists that Hill was indisputably partial as far as concerned matters relating to the British administration of Cyprus. Indeed, while certainly a remarkable scholar, Hill did not refrain from complaining to authorities as to the presence of pictures of “foreign” leaders in Cypriot classrooms, and “anonymously” and personally funded the printing of portraits of the British sovereign to be distributed and hung in Greek and Turkish schools. 109 Alostos Doros also provides a general work of noticeable merit on Cyprus’ history along similar lines to Hill, though at times, if infrequently, he lets slip certain prejudices of his own. 110 Another useful source concerned with the island’s political history during the colonial period, though unfortunately not translated into English, is Şükrü Sina Gürel’s “Kıbrıs Tarihi, 1878–1960: Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika”, (“The History of Cyprus, 1878–1960: Colonialism, Nationalism and International Politics”). As regards political developments during the more limited period from the end of the First World War to the October Revolt of 1931, Georghallides’ exceptional and meticulously scholarly tomes, dealing with the “Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918–1926” and the “Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs”, remain unsurpassed in terms of the thoroughness of research conducted and the wealth of information conveyed.

109. Hill to Dawe, 25th September 1934. CO 67/258/6, 56–57; See also HILL 1952, 492n where Hill states: “In 1934 an anonymous donor provided a consignment of 1050 of portraits of King George V and Queen Mary which was sent out to Cyprus for distribution among the schools. Subsequently such portraits were provided also from Government sources as well as by private donors”. Hill’s correspondence with Dawe leaves us in no doubt that the “anonymous donor” was Hill himself!
110. Alostos Doros was the pseudonym of Evderos Joannides, a Greek Cypriot settled in Britain.
As far as nationalism in particular is concerned, certain works on its particular import in Cyprus have been published by amongst others, both Michael Attalides and Niyazi Kızılyürek. Generally speaking, however, these academic efforts have not given adequate consideration to the political transformation that the Turkish Cypriot community underwent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though it must be stated that Kızılyürek’s most recent work has been more appreciative in this context.  

Concerning Turkish nationalism in general, there are several indispensable works that have been of great use: these include Bernard Lewis’ classic, “The Emergence of Modern Turkey,” Jacob Landau’s reputed “Pan-Turkism”, Kushner’s “The Rise of Turkish Nationalism” and Ali Engin Oba’s “Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu”, (“The Birth of Turkish Nationalism”). Kemal Karpat’s various studies on Ottoman and early Turkish society; Şerif Mardin’s classical volume on the Young Ottomans; Masami Arai, Erick-Jan Zürcher, and especially Şükrü Hanioğlu’s more recent path-breaking investigations into the Young Turk Movement and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) have also been crucial for comprehending the intellectual and organizational foundations and background of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Finally, in terms of both their more balanced approach and novel ideas, the theses and articles of a new generation of anthropologists have shed new light on the study of nationalism in Cyprus. The illuminating research of younger academics such as Yiannis Papadakis and Rebecca Bryant, and the not quite so youthful but equally thought-provoking Professor Peter Loizos, are treading a path that more will hopefully aspire to follow.

As expounded, the history of the Turks of Cyprus in the late Ottoman and early British eras is an area that has received negligible serious attention by academics; most have focused their energies on the study of other dimensions of the island’s political history. And, the origin of nationalist sentiment within this community during these years is a topic that has been dwelt upon little, but for interpretations of secondary sources and the unsubstantiated claims of political elites. The goal of this thesis is, therefore, to give due consideration to a historical exploration of the rise of Turkish nationalism in the early decades of the twentieth century, rather than in the aftermath of the Second World War, not as a subsidiary issue, but as the chief cause of concern, based on primary sources and in an academically consistent manner. The central objective, and thus primary research question of this thesis is to ask to what extent we can identify nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus during the period under study. Concomitant to this fundamental objective the research also aims to address the following questions: What were the causes of this nationalism? To what extent was it the result of developments external to the island, especially in the wider Ottoman Empire and later Republic of Turkey? In what measure was it the product of British colonial policy and in particular of a strategy of “divide-et-impera”? Did it become a mass phenomenon, or was it restricted to a narrow elite?

111. It should be recorded that Kızılyürek has of late appeared more receptive to the suggestion of a first wave of Turkish nationalism. His more balanced suggestion in recent years appears to be that in the post-World War II period Turkish nationalism in Cyprus “spread” and “gained momentum”. As such, rather than denying its prior existence he is only attributing it greater force in this period, though he does not quite seem to have wholeheartedly acknowledged its full significance. See, for example, KIZILYUREK 1998, 36.
Adequately addressing such questions has necessitated the analysis and interpretation of a wide array of sources both "official" and "unofficial". Traditional archival sources have been extensively scrutinized, though uncommon to most studies in related domains, both British and Ottoman/Turkish records have been benefited from. Foremost amongst these are the British colonial records available at the Public Records Office, (PRO), in the United Kingdom. Their vast extent provides an abundance of information from which significant inferences regarding the thesis topic can and have been made. Of greatest value has been the documentation available in the archival series CO 67 and CO 69, pertaining to the original correspondence and sessional papers from the Colonial era, though Foreign Office files have also been utilized to an important extent. The papers available in this repository permit an extensive evaluation of the attitudes and policies of British administrators and Colonial Office officials, as well as priceless information, (if sometimes excruciatingly hard to pin-point), as regards political developments in the Turkish Cypriot community.

In addition the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul, Turkey and the Republican Archives in Ankara, Turkey have been profited from. They have not only helped to clarify the circumstances and viewpoints that were developing amongst the Turks of Cyprus, but also the stance of the Ottoman/Turkish authorities vis-à-vis the island and its inhabitants. The consular papers of the American Consulate in Cyprus, (1835–1878), now available on microfilm, have contributed to a more thorough understanding of the background situation of the isle’s Turks just prior to the British takeover. Finally, as mentioned earlier, recent political developments have made it also possible for me to profit from archival material in South Cyprus, most importantly the records of the Colonial Secretariat kept in Nicosia. From these, many detailed sources, seldom transmitted to London, (and therefore not all available in the PRO), have been of special import in unravelling the nature of previously obscure political developments.

The Turkish Cypriot National Archives in Kyrenia, North Cyprus, have also furnished an array of official British documentation, (mostly published sources such as the Cyprus Gazettes and Cyprus Blue Books), as well as a number of personal records of individual Turkish Cypriots. Probably most importantly, however, the Turkish Cypriot Archives have allowed access to a range of Turkish Cypriot newspapers pertaining to the years under study. Of these, use is made of Mir’at-ı Zaman (1908–9), Seyf (1913), Ankebut (1920–23), Doğru Yol (1925), Hakikat (1923–26 and 1931–33) and Söz (1929–1932). In addition, Volkan, a newspaper published by a Turkish Cypriot in Turkey (1908–09) which is now available in the form of a single transcribed volume, has been utilized, as have issues of the Masum Millet newspaper published by Con Rifat and transcribed into the modern Turkish script by the historian Harid Fedai. Issues of Kbrs (1893–4), Kokonoz (1896–97) and Akbaba (1897) newspapers have been inspected from the personal collection of Mr. Mustafa Kemal Kasapoğlu. Kbrs’ 1895–96 issues were examined from the collection of the Kardeş Ocağı Club in Nicosia. The archives of the latter have also been investigated extensively for assessing how nationalism spread through Turkish social organizations in Cyprus. Minutes of the meetings of the club executive have been employed as have other materials therein available such as photographs and membership rosters.

Further to the aforementioned sources, the personal papers, memoirs and/or recorded interviews of or with some of the leading political figures in the Turkish community of
the times have been put to use, as have the memoirs of a few who were less politically prominent at the time. Of such material, the most important have been the unique recordings of an extensive, unaired interview with Necati Özkan made shortly before his death, the only aging copy of which was made available to me by the Necati Özkan Foundation.

As can be understood from the above, the thesis focuses primarily on the traditional field of political history using the commonly emphasized material of colonial despatches and official reports. Yet, at the same time an effort has been made to look concomitantly at the background social and economic status of the island as it related to the Turkish Cypriot people. To this end some analysis of socio-economic indices available in the Cyprus Blue Books, censuses and other colonial reports, such as those relating to education, has also been made. While profiting too from the contemporaneous accounts of travellers, consuls and the like regarding the socio-economic condition of the masses, some supplementary effort to look at “history from below” has been made through study of and reference to folk stories, ballads and poems.

Before concluding, it should also be added that an appreciation of developments, in both theory and practice, of a similar nature concerning the Greek Cypriots has allowed an element of comparative history to emerge in this thesis, which makes the ultimate picture regarding the Turks of the island more comprehensive and meaningful. The evolution of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus displays many parallels to, and is unmistakably intertwined with, that of the Greeks, though while identifying the relationships between the two processes, care has been taken not to fall into the alluring trap of adjudging the relationship in a facile manner.

Undoubtedly all of the above-mentioned authors, and still others, have made important contributions to the understanding expounded within the following dissertation. Though I have benefited incalculably from their research and analysis, my findings and evaluations have often been at odds with previously stated positions. Thus, while the accumulated knowledge and insight of numerous works do form an indispensable foundation for this present study, it is believed that the re-evaluation of the period under consideration that follows, with the use of new sources and approached from new angles will make its own original contribution to the cumulative knowledge that has preceded it. The chapters that follow should help those seeking a better, more comprehensive understanding of Cypriot political history, more specifically of the progress of nationalism in Cyprus, and particularly of the rise of Turkish nationalism.

112. In this respect, Canefe makes an important point by challenging the deficiencies of conventional arguments emphasizing, “the separation of Turkish modernist/nationalism and Balkan civilizational-cum-national revival movements.” This she asserts, “obscures important commonalities that lie beneath the facade of Europeaness of the Balkans and the Middle Easterness of Turkey.” Instead she insists greater account must be taken of the common, “regionally defined politico-cultural heritage that effected the appropriations of nationalism both in the Balkans and in the remaining landmass of the Ottoman Empire,” and that, “despite the anti-Greek legacy of the Turkish Independence War, the case of Greek nationalism constitutes the nearest possible comparative example for Turkish national revolution.” CANEFE 1998b, 348 and 355.
2 The Ottoman origins of nationalism in Cyprus

Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was not the natural outcome of the Ottoman Turkish settlement of the island after 1571. Nor was it simply a reaction to Greek nationalism, a consequence of British intrigue, or the result of the manipulations of Turkey. Yet the literature, and even more so the common parlance, related to the history of the Turks of Cyprus abounds with such simplistic argumentation. Countless authors and commentators, as a result of the secondary importance they have attached to the study of the island’s Turks, or of academically improper efforts to definitively “prove a point” have implied, or advocated outright that Turkish nationalism on Cyprus was the consequence of an incontestably clear and singular cause. The historical evidence points to a much more complex picture, a picture which can be drawn by no one factor alone, but which instead can be accurately shaped only with reference to a wide range of interrelated historical processes and events that together made Turkish nationalism on the island an unmistakable reality by the first quarter of the twentieth century.

In respect to the above, the Ottoman conquest of the island has two key lasting implications for the study of the rise of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Firstly, and most fundamentally of all, it led to the introduction of a new and substantial ethnic group on the island, the Turks. It was largely on the basis of this ethnicity that Turkish nationalism was eventually to emerge on the island. Secondly, the Ottoman system of government that was established was to set the framework within which emerged the inter-ethnic relations that by the close of Ottoman rule were gradually becoming politicised by nationalist passions.

While Greek nationalism was evident on the island in the early stages of the nineteenth century, it is only towards the close of the century that we can identify, and then only hesitantly, the first stirrings of a Turkish nationalist sentiment on the island. Though the ascent of the former is not the focal point of our study, the fact that Turkish nationalism on the island was in part, (though by no means wholly), a reaction to its development requires us to consider its primary features. Chronologically the theoretical roots of Tur-

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113. For an example of commonly held beliefs on the latter two contentions see ATTALIDES 1981, 59. Here Attalides claims that the origins of ethno-political cleavage between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, “lie partly in British colonial policy and partly in the expansionism of neighbouring Turkey.” Beratlı, meanwhile, appears to attribute somewhat excessive import to the argument that “Greek nationalism created its own antithesis on the island.” BERATLI 1999, 62.
kish nationalism lie heavily in the years of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Britain had already taken command of the island. However, as they too developed within the framework of the decline of the Ottoman Empire rather than as a consequence of British rule in Cyprus, they are dealt with in this rather than the next chapter. Hence, this chapter examines the Ottoman conquest and settlement of Cyprus; the relations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots under Ottoman rule; the early rise of Greek nationalism on the island, and; the theoretical development of Turkish nationalist ideas that in the early phases of British rule were to begin to leave their mark on the Turks of Cyprus.

2.1 Conquest, Settlement and the Origins of the Turks of Cyprus

Strategic considerations were at the forefront when the Ottoman campaign to conquer the island was initiated in 1570. Having already wrested control of the surrounding coastlines of North Africa and the Middle East, Cyprus by the sixteenth century stood as a serious Venetian thorn in the side of the Ottoman Empire. 114 Cyprus, moreover, was a thorn that regularly threatened Ottoman shipping by providing harbour to the numerous pirate groups that sailed the eastern Mediterranean. 115 Despite its tremendous strengths, the Ottoman conquest, though, was to be no easy affair. Taking over a year from the initial launching of the Ottoman fleet to the final defeat of stiff Venetian resistance in Famagusta, the Ottomans lost tens of thousands of men and expended staggering resources in pursuit of their objective. 116 Yet, numerous sources are agreed that it was not the Cypriot population itself that was the obstacle to an easier victory for the Ottomans, and that there had even been efforts made in the 1560’s by Cypriot emissaries to convince the Ottomans to occupy the island. 117 While some Greeks are said to have, “fought gallantly side by side,” with the Venetians, and while many were killed, perished or taken captive during the war, it is clear also that in most parts of the island they refused to defend Latin rule. 118 There are even reports of the invading Ottomans being aided by members of the Orthodox community. 119 The explanation, as many have acknowledged, was that the prospect of Ottoman rule could well be regarded as more appealing than that of the continuation of the Venetian yoke.

114. Fernand Braudel has made a persuasive case that as a consequence, “the Turkish attack on Venice had been in the air for some time.” [BRAUDEL 1973, 1060]. In addition, however, Braudel also offers the explanation that, “custom demanded,” too, that the coming to power of the new Ottoman sultan, Selim II, “be marked by a brilliant victory, the profits of which would enable him to construct and endow the mosques traditionally required of a new sovereign.” Ibid., 1073.

115. Itzkowitz points in particular to both the resultant vulnerability of Ottoman lines of communication with Egypt and to the threats to voyaging pilgrims. ITZKOWITZ 1980, 66; See also, for example, ALASYA 1988, 25–26 and JENNINGS 1993, 345–346; As Braudel notes, however, Ottoman conquest by no means terminated piracy in the Mediterranean, which from 1574–1580, “increased its activities even further.” BRAUDEL 1973, 865, and more generally 865–891.

116. Purcell claims that 80,000 Ottoman troops died in the siege of Famagusta alone and that the Ottoman losses, though they did not prevent the eventual submission of the island, were significant enough to have, “relieved pressure on central Europe for another twenty years.” PURCELL 1969, 165.

117. See, for example, DOROS 1955, 230–231.

118. Ibid., 258 and 260.

119. See, for example, GÖYÜNÇ 1971, 105–106.
Doros writes that during the first feudal era under the Lusignans, and then under the Venetians: “It appears that the Barons were only denied the ‘legal’ right to wound arbitrarily their serf and slaves, or impose the death penalty upon them. But they could and they did treat them as chattels; they could punish them, sell them or exchange them for animals, falcons, dogs or horses (this, however, was abolished by Venice in 1493 which decreed that a slave could only be exchanged for another human salve) and work them to exhaustion.” The famed wealth of the Latin epoch brought little solace to the common inhabitants of the island. As Braudel puts it: “The wealth of the island under Venetian rule had been the vineyards, the cotton plantations, & the fields of sugarcane. But whose wealth? It had belonged to a Venetian & Genoese aristocracy … certainly not to the natives of the island, Orthodox Greeks.” As Kyprianos, the Archimandrite of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus was to grant several centuries later, under the Venetians the Orthodox peasants were, “slaves of the chiefs and upper classes.” In his words, they, therefore, “never ceased to help the Turks, for they hoped under their yoke to find freedom and rest.” Braudel concurs, stating that, “at the time of invasion, the Venetians were abandoned by the Greeks both in the countryside and the towns.” Michel also declares that, “At the time of the Ottoman invasion, hatred of Venetian rule led many of the Cypriots to sympathise with, and even perhaps aid the invaders as deliverers, the prospect of Turkish rule appearing preferable to that of the rival Christian power.” Thus, though the Greek Orthodox Cypriots may not have gained their freedom in the contemporary sense of the word, with Ottoman rule an end was brought to the practice of serfdom under which a great proportion of the peasants had hitherto been bound. Further, the Orthodox Church, from its earliest days a central institution in the life of the native populace, was to be restored to the position of prominence and power that had been wrested from it by the Latins. It was a fact that many years later, notwithstanding the arrival of the age of nationalism, some Greek Cypriots were still willing to recognise.

Though revisionism was by then rapidly entering the Greek Cypriot appraisal of Cyprus’ Ottoman past, Legislative Councillor Kyriakides was at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the delight of his Turkish colleagues, to have openly declared:

120. DOROS 1955, 160.
121. BRAUDEL 1995, 156; Doros also emphasises this reality alluded to by Braudel concerning the Latin rule of the Lusignans that preceded the Venetian era, arguing that too many historians of the Latin period of rule in Cyprus, “have been so engrossed in its surface ebullitions and so dazzled by its glitter … that they have failed to see the realities of the situation.” The “brilliance” of the era that these historians describe, Doros says, “in such arresting superlatives, is the civilisation of a transplanted ruling class maintained by tribute – a brilliant, colourful, unstable and sterile civilisation which disappeared, leaving nothing behind it except a few, albeit imposing, monuments, and a number of words which have found their way into the Greek Cypriot vocabulary.” DOROS 1955, 155–156.
122. PURCELL 1969, 345.
123. BRAUDEL 1995, 156.
124. MICHEL 1908, 753.
125. According to Jenness, about 85 percent of the population under the Venetians, “were either serfs (parici) or free peasants (francomati), the latter being half as numerous again as the serfs.” [JENNESS 1962, 44]. Doros, on the other hand, suggests that the majority were, in fact serfs, at least until towards the end of Venetian rule. DOROS 1955, 226.
126. For a short exposition on the position of the Orthodox Church during this era, see DOROS 1955, 178–185.
The Greek population has nothing against the Moslems of Cyprus and the Turkish Empire and that from a historical point of view Cyprus and Greece are grateful to the Turkish Empire. When Franks and Catholicism threatened to strangle the Greek nation by twisting round its neck like a snake, Providence has sent the Turks who have saved us. … without the Turks the Greek nation would have been swallowed by the Franks and Catholicism.\(^{127}\)

Four years later he again warmed the hearts of the Turks when during another debate he stated that:

\[B\]ut for the appearance of the Turks in the East, Greece and the Greek religion would have disappeared and had they come to Cyprus but fifty years later, the Honourable member himself would not have been a Greek and the Greek Church in Cyprus would not have been in the honoured position which it now held.\(^{128}\)

If the restoration of the Orthodox Church was one factor realised by the Ottoman victory that was to have political salience in the nationalist commotion of later centuries, another was undoubtedly that of the Ottoman programme of settling large numbers of inhabitants from Anatolia on the island. Politically charged controversy, however, surrounds the details of this policy and frequently too of the origins of the Turkish population in Cyprus, (though the ancestry of the Greeks in Cyprus and their relationship to the ancient Hellenes has itself also been much questioned).\(^{129}\) In particular, it is charged that the Turkish Cypriots of today are not of Turkish stock, but rather are descendants of Greeks compelled to convert.

For our purposes, the significance of such arguments lies in the fact that common Turkish ethnic origins shared by a substantial proportion of the population of the island could form a powerful basis on which to later form the “imagined community” of the Turkish “nation” in Cyprus. True, as Connor insists, concerning the issue of common ancestry, “it is not what is, but what people believe is that has behavioural consequences,” but some, albeit inconsistent and partial objective foundation can, I would maintain, strengthen the myth of uniform and unbroken ancestral links of the community as a whole.\(^{130}\) This would not be to deny membership in the Turkish nation to those in Cyprus whose racial or ethnic roots may not have been wholly Turkish even within the shorter time-frame of living memory, for their beliefs and feelings, rather than any objective racial or ethnic characteristics would determine their nationhood. However, if we can attest that a significant proportion of the non-Greek Orthodox population of the island shared some common

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\(^{127}\) Minutes of the Legislative Council, 18th June 1903. CO 69/17, 347.
\(^{128}\) Minutes of the Legislative Council, 20th February 1907. CO 69/21, 68.
\(^{129}\) In fact, ever since the early nineteenth century studies of the German academic Jakob Fallmerayer the genetic as well as cultural links of the modern day Greeks of Greece to the ancient Hellenes have been strongly disputed. This matter is clearly one that Turkish nationalist historiography takes much pleasure in dwelling on. [See, for instance, ALASYA 1988, 10]. Panayiotou is one of the few forthright Greek Cypriot authors to acknowledge how revisionist Greek historians diverge radically from the views of their predecessors. He explains: “The contrast of the new historians with the old ones represented by medieval historiographers (like Maheras) or even modern ones, like Kyprianos (1788), is impressive. On the crucial issue of identity, the pre-nationalist historians don’t even consider the afterwards commonplace thesis that Cypriots are descended from ancient Greek settlers. On the contrary, Kyprianos puts forward the since then suppressed thesis that the early Cypriots were a distinct ethnic group of their own – ‘divine’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘noble’.” [PANAYIOTOU 1994, 97n]. For a brief discussion of the relationship of the histories of ancient and modern Greece and Greeks, see DAKIN 1972, 2–9.

\(^{130}\) CONNOR 1994, 75.
Turkish ethnic heritage that had been passed down over the generations, then this might help to explain why they were to develop a communal political identity in the face of challenges, (real or perceived), to their ethnicity and why, in particular their communal political identity was later to take the form of *Turkish* nationalism.\(^\text{131}\)

Arguments and counterarguments on the question of ethnic origins were frequently made and utilized as political tools by nationalists in Cyprus from the nineteenth century onwards. Indeed such claims still constitute central contentions of many Greek and Turkish Cypriot historians even today. As Constantinou and Papadakis describe it, while these historians tend to present the self, their own community, “as natural and historically given,” they represent, “the other as historically ambiguous and ethnically impure.” Their fundamental premise is that: “our own continuity and tie to territory has been historically and scientifically proven whereas the others’ is fictitious, mythical, and a product of propaganda.”\(^\text{132}\) With the literature plagued with discourse of this kind, there is, therefore, some value in considering the available evidence regarding the ethnic origins of Cyprus’ inhabitants a little further. At a bare minimum it indicates the degree to which constructed nationalist narratives have diverged from the ascertainable facts, and how these narratives have become a part of mainstream histories of Cyprus.

Nonetheless, several other authors have likewise implied that there was substantial conversion under the Ottomans that accounts for the bulk of the presence of a “Turkish” population in Cyprus. However, they too overlook the well-documented fact that numerous people were brought to settle by the Ottomans, the regions and tribes from which they were transferred and the language they maintained on coming to Cyprus all suggesting that they were predominantly of Turkish ethnic origin.\(^\text{133}\)

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131. In this respect, my argument converges with that put forward by Karpat who argues in the following passage that, “Although the modern sense of Turkish identity was created in the nineteenth century by the interplay of a variety of developments not associated with political nationalism, there was, nonetheless, in the Ottoman setup an authentic ethnic Turkish basis.” This he explains as follows:

The Turkish tribes that began coming to Anatolia in the eighth through tenth centuries had their own ethnic identities rooted in soy (lineage), folk culture and religion, and various Turkish dialects. Moreover, they retained these identities throughout the duration of the Ottoman state, and their Turkish folk culture, while condemned to remain localized and regionalized, still had the potential to become the source of national culture if the state decided to create such a culture. The new Turkish identity shaped by the events of the nineteenth century coalesced around the existing ancient Turkish ethno-tribal identity to which it grafted the Ottoman and Islamic political ingredients.

KARPAT 2000, 22.


133. Beckingham contended that even in the 1950’s in many of the, “Turkish villages the people still know from which part of Anatolia their ancestors came.” One must of course treat such claims based on the villagers’ own statements with some caution unless their accuracy can be attested to by other means also. BECKINGHAM 1956, 126–127.
There is no doubt that conversions did occur, but in actuality there is no firm or conclusive evidence provided that there was widespread conversion. In what is otherwise an exceptional article on, “The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” Professor Paschalis Kitromilides asserts, while claiming he has no intention, “to question the Turkish Cypriots’ Turkishness”, that, “a great part of the Moslem rural population [in Cyprus] was created by the Islamization over time of Christian village communities.” His supposition, for which he provides little evidence, would be more worthy of respect if it were coupled with at least an acknowledgement of the Ottoman policy of settling families from Anatolia. Nor, as Kyriss suggests, is there any notable premise for the theory that those transferred were on the whole Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, as Jennings reveals, the available data indicates that virtually all those transferred were Anatolian Moslems. He reveals also, for example, how the Porte thrice ordered the district of Cania, “to provide Muslim Turkish brides for some unmarried Ottoman soldiers.” Considering that there is broad agreement that those settled were from provincial areas of the Empire and mostly peasants and craftsmen, one wonders how, if as Kyriss claims those settled included “only a few Turks” it was possible that the Turkish language managed to make such headway on the island?

Most sources do, in fact, concur that within a few years of their triumph the Ottomans had settled tens of thousands of people from Anatolia into the sparsely populated island. Basing his numbers on original Ottoman documents, Örğunl cư discloses that 8,000 families were brought over during the first decade of Ottoman rule, and that such transfers continued sporadically thereafter. Çevikel also finds from the court records of the late eighteenth century that population transfer continued and that amongst those coming to the island were people exiled to Cyprus by the Ottoman authorities. Jennings has gathered some even more specific evidence that amongst those settled soon after the conquest were groups of Alawite Turcoman’s. Berati, in fact, contends that these Turcoman clansmen constituted the greater part of the population initially transferred, and that there was a second wave of such transfers that began in the early eighteenth century.

134. Perhaps some of the most significant scientific evidence that may point, albeit imprecisely, to levels of conversion in the early Ottoman decades of rule in Cyprus is that collected by Jennings. From the District Court records for Nicosia and its environs for 1593–1595 he finds that a third of Moslem males named as legal agents or witnesses were most probably converts. He makes this legitimate assumption on the basis of the surname, (or more precisely father’s name), “Abdullah” used to record these persons. “Abdullah” was akin to a generic, substitute name for all those converts whose fathers were not originally Moslem. Within four decades, however, the proportion referred to by Jennings had fallen to just over one in ten. Though Jennings does provide important evidence of conversion, these proportions can only be considered tentative considering the limited nature of his samples. As he himself grants, “the level of conversion cannot be measured precisely,” and it may be, for example, that Nicosia, containing a higher proportion of persecuted Latin overlords and notables than other regions of the island, would be more prone to have higher than average rates of conversion. JENNINGS 1993, 29–30 and 137–138.

138. Ibid., 215; Beckingham also defends a realistic position on this issue. BECKINGHAM 1955, 133.
139. Kyriss 1976, 244.
140. ORHONLU 1971, 73–77; Oakley too argues that during the seventeenth century there was further immigration of, “Turkish-speaking Muslim settlers, who were, “mostly artisans and peasants from southern Anatolia.” OAKLEY 1993, 89.
141. ÇEVİKEL 2000, 178.
142. JENNINGS 1993, 232.
In addition, it is known that thousands of Ottoman soldiers involved in the campaign of conquest were encouraged to remain and settle in Cyprus. Newman gives the number of the Ottoman soldiers who stayed on as 30,000 and Kyprianos narrates that, “about 20,000 Turks remained as settlers.” Neither, however, indicates the grounds for their estimates, and a more accurate number, based on archival research, may well be that of Cengiz Orhonlu, who believes that the total lies much lower at around 4,000. This itself is not an insignificant number, particularly for a quite sparsely populated island, and as troops in the Ottoman army they had, by definition, to be non-Christians. Conversion may have occurred prior to the Ottoman occupation, but these soldiers were most certainly not Christians when they set foot in Cyprus.

For sure, there is no scientific basis to conclude that all the Ottoman emigrants were, “of pure Turkish stock.” Çevikel properly resists the temptation and even points out cases of the immigration of individuals with origins as far apart as Venice, Alexandria, Salonica and Tripoli. Still, keeping in mind the genuine proximity of the island to the Anatolian coast, one can not but presume that the much greater part of population exchange was between Cyprus and the Anatolian mainland rather than with such more distant locations. Further to recorded immigration, there is likely also to have been a continuous flow, in both directions, (though depending on conditions, in one more than in the other), of people from Anatolia to Cyprus, and vice versa, that was not registered or chronicled, the result, as Terlexis terms it, of, “private initiative.” Indeed, as St. John-Jones has contended the island’s physical location meant that both population and cultural exchange between Cyprus and the Turkish mainland was still even during British rule much more to be expected than between the island and Greece. As he puts it, for the early decades, at least, “taking a small boat to Mersin ... was probably easier than going from Paphos to Nicosia.” Again we can not conclude that all unrecorded entrants to the island were Moslems, let alone Turks, but we can, based on the known demographic characteristics of Anatolia, assume that they were more likely to be Moslem Turks than to be Orthodox Greeks. A simple mathematical approach would suggest, therefore, ceteris paribus, that there would be a tendency through such flows of population groups to-and-from the island under Ottoman rule for the proportion of Moslem Turks on the

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143. BERATLI 1999, 60–61; See also BERATLI 1991, 29.
144. NEWMAN 1953, 173; COBHAM 1986, 345; Doros, apparently following Kyprianos’ lead, states that there were after the conquest, “20,000 odd Turkish settlers, mostly campaign veterans.” [DOROS 1955, 262]. Taeuber also seems to too readily accept Kyprianos’ figure, though she also provides no explanation as to the foundations for the validity of this estimate. [TAEUBER 1955, 7]. Oakley, on the other hand matches the even higher figures of Newman. OAKLEY 1993, 89.
145. ORHONLU 1971, 100.
146. MANIZADE 1993, 625.
147. ÇEVİKEL 2000, 178.
150. McCarthy’s study of Ottoman census records indicates that in the early twentieth century, prior to the population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey in 1923, the Greeks constituted about seven percent of the seventeen and a half million plus total population of Anatolia, the Moslems a little over eighty percent. Of the latter category there is no precise ethnic breakdown till the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Nevertheless, McCarthy concludes that, “Except in the southeastern Kurdish areas ... Turks were the majority in the Muslim community.” On such calculations the ratio of Greeks to Turks stood, at most at about one Greek to six Turks. Allowing even for wildest inaccuracy and fluctuation over time, it is hard to imagine that the Greeks were, based on proportions of population, more likely than Turks to have emigrated from Anatolia to Ottoman Cyprus. McCARTHY 1983, 7 and 110–111.
island to increase whilst that of Orthodox Greeks decreased as the predominantly Moslem and Turkish population of Anatolia mingled and exchanged persons with the predominantly Orthodox Greek, but smaller population of Cyprus. It is a thought also to be borne in mind when considering the arguments made in the debate elaborated below.

In the context of deliberation regarding Orthodox conversions, it is commonly held that the generally excessive tax-burden placed on the Cypriot population during much of Ottoman rule tended to fall more excessively on the members of the Orthodox community and that the Moslems had some, largely symbolic, advantages. This might logically give cause for suspicion of an inclination among oppressed Orthodox Greeks to convert. Yet, there are countless depositions attesting to the fact that what oppression or misuse there was under the Ottomans in fact applied virtually equally to both Christian and Moslem subjects alike. Turner remarked that in Cyprus he had seen the Turks to have “no greater privileges” than the Greeks, while Kinneir reflected on how, “the Turks would labour under the same grievances as the Christians, were not the latter, in addition to the demands of the government compelled to contribute towards the support of a number of lazy and avaricious monks.” Hamilton Lang, (who served in a consular capacity for Britain towards the end of Ottoman rule), on the other hand, observed that: “The Mohammedan inhabitants suffered as well as the Christian, neither race nor religion finding favour in the eyes of the venal horse-leeches, who never ceased crying ‘Give, give,’ ” while Ali Bey, (a pseudonym used by the Spanish traveller Don Domingo Badia-y-Leyblich), went as far as to claim that the Turks of the island, “would be happy if they were not worried by the government which treats them worse than it does the Greeks.”

Paul Sant Cassia injects another dose of welcome realism concerning conditions for the Greek Cypriots under Ottoman rule:

[I]n the post-Ottoman nationalist period, Greek-Cypriot historiography, heavily influenced by the Church’s role in education, has presented the “Turcocratia” as a period of religious persecution as well as emphasizing the Church’s role in keeping alight the flame of Hellenism. To what extent was this correct? The question is of more than academic interest for the way that the past was viewed decisively influenced subsequent relations between the two communities.

There is no doubt that Cyprus suffered serious decline during the Ottoman period ... Violence was common, life insecure especially for the Greeks. Yet this was not primarily a religious persecution; indeed these conditions were common to most Ottoman-controlled territories, Christian and Islamic ... Oppression was arbitrary, discrete and individual ... [and due] to the contradictions of Ottoman administration, the Greeks were as likely to have been oppressed by their Churchmen as by the Turks.

151. Not all agree that Ottoman taxation was particularly excessive. Basing his assertions primarily on original sources, İnalck makes a case that the tax-burden falling on each Cypriot Christian was no more, in fact in most cases less, than had been the case before the change of rule had occurred. [İNALKIÇ 1971, 66–77]. Yet, as Jenness argues, it was probably the corruption related to the collection of taxes that created an often unbearable burden, rather than official taxation rates. [JENNESS 1962, 103]. Significantly, though, Doros explains that this characteristic was not peculiar to Ottoman rule and had been similar under the Venetians too. [DOROS 1955, 330]. As to advantages bestowed on the Moslems, they were allowed, for instance to ride on horse-back and to bear arms, whilst their Christian compatriots were banned from doing so and were forced also to abide by certain distinguishing dress codes. See YA VUZ 1991, 65.

152. COBHAM 1986, 414 and 427.

153. LANG 1878, 188; COBHAM 1986, 404.
Hill too would have broadly supported this evaluation, concurring that:

There was no evidence [that the Greeks] ... had been singled out for special ill-treatment. The Turks also had suffered from the outrages of disorderly society. If the Greeks suffered most, it was because they were the richer. The tax-farmers in nearly all cases were Greeks. That the Greeks as Greeks had not suffered persecution was a conclusion supported by the state of the Greek Church, which was known to be very rich and to take offerings from the poor. If the Greek peasant had been ground down by taxation, the Church always found that he had something left which would yield revenues to religion.155

Under such conditions the incentives for conversion of the Greek Orthodox are on the whole likely to have been much more marginal than sometimes suggested.156 More so when the likely negative social and psychological implication for converts are kept in mind, and when it is granted that forced conversion was not a sweeping policy generally attributable to the Ottomans, and instances where it may have occurred often received the wrath of higher authorities, including those in Cyprus.157 Hence, recalling as does Farr

154. SANT CASSIA 1986, 26; It is almost amusing to compare counter-assertions to the Greek-Cypriot literature on the matter. One nationalistic historian from the Turkish Cypriot community has charged that it was actually the Greeks, taking advantage of their superior numbers and the power of the Church and Dragomans, who actually oppressed the Turks of Cyprus during Ottoman rule. [İSMAIL 1997, 19]; Though it does not change his fundamental point as to the arbitrariness of oppression, it should be noted that Sant Cassia’s contentions as to the onset of economic decline and serious violence are not fully corroborated by other sources. If the Greek peasant had been ground down by taxation, the Church always found that he had something left which would yield revenues to religion.155

155. Hill calculates that the authorised tax-burden which officially fell upon each individual was actually, “surprisingly small.” “The cause of the distress,” he argues, “lay in the additional illegal exactions.” [HILL 1952, 267]. This is borne out also by a revealing letter sent by the Bishop of Kitium only months into the British occupation, within which the Bishop states of the people of Cyprus under the Ottomans that, “They have been fearfully oppressed, contrary to orders issued by the Imperial Government, and in defiance of existing laws, by selfish officials.” [Enclosure in Dilke to Bourke, 19th June 1879. FO421/32, 54; Bishop of Kitium to Colonel Warren, 7th December, 1878. For further confirmation of the oppressive role of Greek tax-farmers, see also KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 50]; Though at times voicing his apprehension as to the potential for severe racial oppression, the American consul for Cyprus, John Judson Barclay, had also granted, in the mid-nineteenth century that, “the laws of the Empire are, as far as I can learn impartially and fairly administered.” See Barclay to Cass, 20th May 1959, 16th July 1860 and 23rd August, 1860. NARA/MD/7463 (Roll No. 1).

156. One of the most detailed studies of the historical populations of Cyprus was that carried out and published by Theodhoros Papadopoulos in the 1960’s. On the surface it appears to be worthy of much respect, especially due to its rather comprehensive scope and the academic “style” employed by its author. Yet, as some at least have recognised, this work also is heavily, if in some places relatively subtly, biased in its approach and findings. While sources from which conversion can be inferred, or which indicate greater proportions of Orthodox Greeks are given great credence, the author disparages, and does his best to discredit other contradictory sources suggesting the opposite is really the case. Hill, for instance, notes the case of how the Ottoman Governor Ismail Adil Pasha, “reprimanded the Molla for accepting a female convert to Islam without the proper formalities.” [BRYANT 1998a, 127n–128n.]

157. Hill, for instance, notes the case of how the Ottoman Governor Ismail Adil Pasha, “reprimanded the Molla for accepting a female convert to Islam without the proper formalities.” [HILL 1952, 189–190.]
that, “the Ottoman policy of ethnic Turkish settlement on the island never had as its goal the ‘Turkification’ or religious conversion of Cyprus,” it is a gross misrepresentation of reality to portray the Turkish Cypriot people of today as the converted descendants of oppressed Orthodox Greeks. In particular, as Stavrinides, a Greek Cypriot scholar, puts it, “some writers are prepared to argue that the present Turkish population of Cyprus are the descendants of Greeks who accepted Islam during the Ottoman occupation, to avoid certain discriminations against them.” However, as he wisely notes, while, “Such cases of change of religion may indeed have occurred ... there is no evidence this was widespread.”

In fact, there are indications that by the onset of British rule at the end of the nineteenth century the advantages of holding a Christian identity began to outweigh those of being Moslem and that there was actually some conversion of Moslems to Orthodox Christianity. Loizos makes the case that though, “the two religious groups were then placed on equal footing before the law ... the Christians, as co-religionists, could indeed be conducted into the pre-Ottoman relationship of Turks and Moslems with Cyprus. Notwithstanding certain completely unfounded claims, such as that pointed to by Wosgian, that the island’s first inhabitants, eons before the Greeks, were in fact Turks(!), there is certainly much more exciting research that could indeed be conducted into the pre-Ottoman relationship of Turks and Moslems with Cyprus. WOSPİAN 1963, 194. For a fuller account of the early Moslem relationship with the island see, ATESİİN 1996, 37–56.

158. FARR 1997, 40; There is, in fact, some evidence of a small pre-Ottoman Moslem population that undoubtedly contained at least some Turks, who may well have been forced to adopt the Orthodox religion. Beckingham explains the matter in the following manner: “Needless to say there was no settled Muslim population in the island before the Ottoman conquest, but there must have been some descendants of captives of Turkish origin. About 1400, Cypriot ships often raided the Asiatic and Egyptian coasts and carried off prisoners, some of whom accepted or were forced to accept baptism, and there were also numbers of unconverted slaves in the island. In 1425 the invading Mameluke army gained access to the castle of Larnaca through the help of Muslim slaves ... There must therefore have been some Cypriots, at least nominally Christian, who were of Turkish, Arab, or Egyptian origin.” [BECKINGHAM 1957, 171]. In fact we hear of specifically “Turkish” slaves being brought to Cyprus as early as the 1360’s from the Chronicle of the Cypriot Leontios Makarios. [DAWKINS 1932, 125 and 177]. Makarios also records that there were at this time also Turks coming to the island to trade. [Ibid., 143]. There was of course an Islamic association with the island prior to Ottoman rule, and some relatively minor interactions of Turks too, but they must be evaluated in context as in practice their impact on modern Turkish nationalism in the island was minimal. Yaşın points to the fact that the Mameluke sultan who initiated the onslaught on Cyprus, Barsbay, (or “Baybars”) was of Turcoman origin, and that the Turcoman soldiers under the command of Tanrıverdi actually captured part of the island in 1422. Yaşın asks why this has been overlooked by not only Greek sources, but even those of the Turks. Could it be, he sarcastically posits, that leftist supporters of the “Cypriotization” thesis prefer to ignore this, or that rightist supporters of the Anatolian approach to Cyprus do not want to reveal the fact that the first Turks came to the island via Egypt, not Anatolia? [YAŞİN 1999, 57]. Actually the most significant attack appears to have come in 1426, (following which the Lusignans were forced to pay an annual tribute that was after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt to be transferred to the Ottoman Sultan), rather than in the attack of 1422 which was more in the form of a raid. See, DOROS 1955, 203–205 and 234]. The Ottomans, as Braudel points out, had certainly not denied pre-existing associations with the island prior to their conquest, as only weeks before their campaign was launched it had, “become public knowledge in Constantinople ... that the Turks intended to demand the unconditional handing over of Cyprus, in the name (even at this early date) of the historical rights of Turkey.” [BRAUDEL 1973, 1079].

While Yaşın makes a convincing case, it is equally interesting that one of the most prominent Greek historians of the nineteenth century, Alostos Doros, while giving details of the Mameluke assaults, and clearly being familiar with Makarios’ chronicle, makes no mention of any “Turkish” soldiers. [DOROS 1935, 202-203] Makarios, in fact, records that the Mameluke army commanded by Tanrıverdi in 1426 was composed of, “five hundred Mamelukes and two thousand Turkish sergeants and six hundred Arabs.” He gives evidence too that amongst captured slaves who had been baptised in Cyprus during the Latin era there were not only Moslem Saracens but also Turks. [DAWKINS 1932, 175, 633, 653 and 663]. In fact, the Ottoman Turks had themselves initiated raids on the island, decades before their eventual conquest, and as Doros himself states, had in May of 1539, “landed in Limassol and destroyed the town”. [DOROS 1955, 234]; Notwithstanding certain completely unfounded claims, such as that pointed to by Wosgian, that the island’s first inhabitants, eons before the Greeks, were in fact Turks(!), there is certainly much more exciting research that could indeed be conducted into the pre-Ottoman relationship of Turks and Moslems with Cyprus. WOSPİAN 1963, 194. For a fuller account of the early Moslem relationship with the island see, ATESİİN 1996, 37–56.
were somewhat favoured in fact if not in theory.\textsuperscript{160} In a related vein, Pollis reasons that, “The traditional Islamic disdain,” for merchant and trading activities, “created [in Cyprus] a merchant and trading class of non-Muslims. Particularly under secularised British rule, conversions back to Christianity toward the latter part of the nineteenth century were thus in part a consequence of the sanctions that Christianity provided for such economic activity.”\textsuperscript{161}

That the truth regarding conversion in Cyprus, (as well as intermarriage, immigration and emigration), was more complex than, than many have recognised is colourfully illustrated by an interesting telegram sent by the British High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1916, in which the former recorded:

Cypriot Turk named Salih, son of Pasto Hassan, marries Christian girl Aristoklia Costandi of Zakopetria, becoming Christian and assuming name Dimitri. Afterwards left wife reverting to Islam & quitted Cyprus for Adalia [Turkey] 3 or 4 years ago.\textsuperscript{162}

In sum, we can state that there is no conclusive evidence to suggest truly extensive or all-encompassing religious conversion during, or after, Ottoman rule, and while religious identity was undoubtedly the predominant form of collective identification for the individual, the two main religious communities on the island seemed, through particularly their language, to show sufficient indications of possessing identifiable cultural characteristics of the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups.

\textsuperscript{159} STAVRINIDES 1999, 18; Another Greek author, Pantazis Terlexis had taken an even more categorical position, pronouncing that, “There was no evidence of forced conversion or assimilation practiced by the Ottomans.” [TERLEXIS 1968, 38, and see also pages 58–59]. From this angle both Stavrinides and Terlexis bravely confront the more conventional Greek stance of even such respected Greek authors as Michael Attalides and Kourvetaris. Attalides asserts that, “Evidence has been offered of a substantial number of conversions from Christianity to Islam during the Ottoman period,” though he fails himself to state what this evidence is. In a similar fashion, Kourvetaris claims that there were, “many forced conversions of Greek Orthodox Cypriots to the Moslem religion,” without properly justifying his claim. [See ATTALIDES 1977a, 75 and KOURVETARIS 1988, 188]; One of the few to attribute a figure to the level of conversion is Vergi Bedevi. His claim, purportedly based on the Şeri court records, is that the number of Christian converts to Islam during Ottoman rule in Cyprus was around 400. Unfortunately he provides no precise source for this contention, and as were this number to be correct it would amount to on average only about one conversion a year, I find it hard to consider this as realistic. [BEDEVİ 1978, 32]. Çevikel’s study of the late eighteenth century court records uncovered 67 conversions of Christians to Islam in a 31 year period. [ÇEVİKEL 2000, 242]. If generalized to the 309 year time-span of Ottoman rule this would amount to a little over 650 conversions in total, on average just over two a year. Such numbers, though, must be handled with utmost care. How accurate the records were is virtually impossible to determine, and any generalization over a three century long age, (one that incorporated periods with significantly different characteristics that may well have been reflected in different rates of conversion), is bound to be highly questionable.

\textsuperscript{160} LOIZOS 1974, 116.

\textsuperscript{161} POLLIS 1976, 59; Even today, despite the much harsher lines of segregation between Orthodox Greek Cypriots and Moslem Turkish Cypriots, we see that conversion has not totally ceased, and that economic prospects may well play a role in the decision to convert. Soon after moving to the Greek Orthodox dominated South of the island, “not happy with conditions in the north,” and apparently seeking employment, it was reported by the Cyprus Mail that a young Turkish Cypriot couple were baptised and the following day got married according to Orthodox rights. “Baptism and Orthodox wedding for Turkish Cypriot couple,” Cyprus Mail 4\textsuperscript{th} March 2003.

\textsuperscript{162} Telegram from Clauson to Secretary of State, 20\textsuperscript{th} July 1916. CO67/181, 280.
This is not to deny exceptions, which there plainly were, or to imply that every single member of the modern Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus were ethnically or, especially, racially “pure”. Generalizations such as those of Frank Tachau, who considers that, “there appears to be no doubt regarding the ethnic character of the Turks of Cyprus,” and more specifically that they have always, “refrained from intermarriage with their Orthodox neighbours,” overlook important historical evidence to the contrary and are just as misleading as those which propagate a picture of wholesale conversion or unbounded intermarriage. Likewise, any assertion of the total racial purity of the Greeks of Cyprus is also preposterous, even in the pre-Ottoman age. It has been attested, for example, as to how Moslem and Turkish slaves had been brought to Cyprus and forced to convert to Christianity prior to the Ottoman conquest. Thus any effort to achieve objectivity, avoiding nationalist rhetoric, must recognise that while most Ottoman settlers were probably of Moslem Turkish origin and while a general distinction could clearly be made between the ethnic origins of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, some non-Turks and Christians may well have settled both during and after the sixteenth century influx from Anatolia, and some intermarriage and conversion must have occurred.

From the above discussion it should be apparent then that Ottoman rule did lead for the first time to the presence of a large ethnically Turkish group on Cyprus, one that was large and coherent enough to, over time, even absorb and assimilate non-Turkish and non-Moslem elements. Yet this fact cannot independently explain the appearance of either Greek or Turkish nationalism on the island. For answers as to how the island’s Greek Orthodox and Moslem Turkish population groups were transformed into rival national groups, for why they did not merge over the centuries to develop a common identity that could later perchance have been the basis of a singular nationalism, and for why it was amongst the Orthodox Greeks rather than the Moslem Turks that nationalism first emerged, we need to

163. For an example of such contentions relating to the island’s Turks, (and simultaneously refuting the Greek origins of its Christian inhabitants), see, for instance, SARPER 1958, 32–33 and SAFA 1958, 3. Much more subtly, than the previous references, (perhaps even subconsciously), though still on similar foundations, Salih writes, “The Greek Cypriots identify themselves with the Hellenic past, and the Turkish Cypriots are direct descendants of the Ottoman Turkish conquerors.” [My emphasis. A.N.] [SALIH 1978, 25]. Spyridakis, on the other hand, made a point of emphasising that ever since, “The first settlement of the Greeks in Cyprus,” the island’s Greeks had, “maintained their national consciousness ... in spite of all the unfavourable historical adventures of the Island,” and their attachment, “to the rest of the Greeks and more especially to the Greeks in Greece itself,” was, “not simply sentimental,” but also was, “the outcome of common blood.” [MANGOIAN 1947, 26a]. Abominable though is the following categorical contention of Professor of Medicine Manizade. Citing “evidence”, he claims that the island’s “Greeks” are not “true Greeks” as they have blood group “A”, (like, he says, the Turks of Anatolia and Cyprus), while the Greeks of Greece have blood group “B”. According to this “scientific” explanation, the Turkish Cypriot author of this thesis is thus a Greek! MANIZADE 1993, 626–627.

164. TACHAU 1959, 262; Another such example could be given from Sabahattin Ismail, who while “proving” that the roots of the Greek Cypriots are not actually “Greek”, contends, without any shred of doubt or exception, that the Turks of Cyprus are descendants of the Turkish people of Anatolia. ISMAIL 1998, 2–3.

165. For early research enquiring as to racial origins in Cyprus, see Buxton’s article on, “The Inhabitants of the Eastern Mediterranean,” where he concludes that the inhabitants of the region must be considered, “a mixed race”. DUDLEY BUXTON 1920b, 109.

166. Even the eminent philhellene, R. M. Dawkins indirectly conceded this in what otherwise was a strikingly bigoted article where he has no qualms contrasting “Greek ingenuity,” with, “Turkish stupidity,” and reflecting that the Greeks, “superior cleverness in outwitting the dull and heavy Turk consoled them.” [DAWKINS 1933, 248, 251 and 256]; Arbel, on the other hand, tells us of the records of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Limassol, whose inventory for 1365 included, “inter alia, two slaves: ‘Dimitri the Turk’ and ‘Dimitri the Greek.’” ARBEL 1993, 162 and passim.
167. One further corollary issue should be addressed, that of relative proportions of population. With the rise of Greek nationalism on the island, it became ever more popular to view the Moslems/Turks as an insignificant minority and suggest that Enosis was a right supported by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population of Cyprus had always been Greek. Yet the evidence here too makes even the idea of a constant Greek majority questionable, let alone the political rights that this is supposed to confer. Despite the tendency for highly contradictory estimates of the relative numbers of Orthodox Greeks and Moslem Turks on the island, there is evidence from observers of the eighteenth century that the Moslem Turks actually formed a majority, making highly questionable the claim that Greeks have historically always predominated on the island in terms of numbers, (if not in terms of political control). Thus, though unfounded claims have often been made, including those of scholars such as George Kourvetaris who asserts that, “the Greek Cypriots were the majority throughout the Ottoman period,” and Georghallides who states that, “the Turks of Cyprus [were] never more than a small minority.” [GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 53]; Much evidence from eighteenth century literature contradicts them. Kyprianos, for instance, reckoned the population of Christians in 1788 to be 37,000, and that of Turks to be 47,000, and the British Consul for Aleppo and Cyprus, Michael de Vezin, gives an estimate two years later of 66,000 Turks and 20,000 Greeks. Contemporary research by Cevikel also indicates a significantly larger Moslem population at the end of the eighteenth century, though his estimates are based on rather limited premises. [See COBHAM 1986, 367–368; ÇEVİKEL 2000, 219–222]. St. John-Jones, it should be noted, disputes such figures, on the basis that, “No explanation of such a claim is known,” but while there are some relatively tentative explanations that can and have been posited, (such as a new wave of Turkish emigration in the eighteenth century), he more importantly overlooks the fact that explanations for virtually all the claims as to population shifts during the Ottoman era, and even in the British are frequently not fully satisfactory. As such, it is hard to accept his curt dismissal of the estimates given by Kyprianos and de Vezin, while he so readily feels that, “it seems safe to agree today with Luke in concluding ‘with comparative safety that at no time were the Turks in Cyprus superior in number to the Christians.’” [ST. JOHN-JONES 1983, 31].

On the other hand, Professor Manizade’s contention that in the 1860’s the Turkish Cypriots constituted a two-thirds majority is just as unfounded as many of the Greek claims. [MANIZADE 1965, 63]; Equally wrong was the assertion of twentieth century nationalist leader Alparslan Türkeş, who with no justification at all claimed the Turks to have been in a majority still at the outset of British rule. [TÜRKES 1975, 114]; The same suggestion of a Turkish majority at the outset of British rule was made more recently by Turkish journalist Emin Çolaşan in his popular column in the Istanbul daily Hürriyet. (That he opens his column with a brief tirade against the Turkish education system for, “not teaching us true history,” can be viewed from one of two perspectives: Either Çolaşan is inappropriately blaming the education system for faults that do not lie in that quarter, or his own inaccurate assertions of what “true” history is actually prove his initial point as the (flawed) system!). [See Çolaşan’s column in the Hürriyet of the 10th May 2003]. Figures from the Ottoman archives suggest, in fact, that the Moslems constituted 34.4% of the population as opposed to 65.6% for the non-Moslems. [YILDIRIM et al, 2000, 93.] The American consul, Barclay, in 1863 also put the proportion of Moslems at one third, Christians at two-thirds, with an overall total of, “about 200, 000”, and noted further that there had been a doubling of population since 1840 due to the, “disappearance of the plague which was always, a cause of great mortality in Cyprus,” as well as to, “The introduction of vaccine and consequent comparative freedom from smallpox – and the justice and more equitable system, which has replaced the rapacious and arbitrary system pursued previous to this period.” [Barclay to Secretary of State Seward, 20th September 1863. NARA/MDT/463 (Roll No.1)]

These latter relative proportions given by both the American consul and Ottoman records are hard to explain in light of the roughly inverse figures proffered by observers half a century earlier. Whatever the exact figures may have been, however, it does appear that there was a steady decline in the proportion of the Moslem population during the nineteenth century and it would probably be a worthwhile exploit for interested researchers to delve into the issue of what had led to such a significant reduction in the number of Moslems by the time of the first official British census of 1881 when they constituted less than a quarter of the total population. Pollis’ argument regarding conversion of Moslems may be a partial explanation, as might inaccuracies of initial estimates in the eighteenth century, but it appears that the phenomenon was so powerful that it can not be explained by these variables alone. [See also HILL 1952, 31 and 34–36; KOURVETARIS 1988, 183]; We know also that about three hundred Turkish prisoners held on the island were forcibly sent to Asia Minor once the British arrived, and that many of them had, “mothers, wives, sweethearts”, living on the island. We can therefore presume that many, if not all, were inhabitants of the island before being incarcerated. Their departure, perhaps followed by that of their kin, may have contributed to some degree to the reported decline. [SCOTT-STEVENSON 1880, 197]. A useful tabulation of estimates of population ranging from the Ottoman conquest to the twentieth century is given by Dudley Buxton. See DUDLEY BUXTON 1920a, 193.
examine the historical circumstances of these two communities under the Ottoman system of government.

2.2 The Ottoman Empire and its Turks

To understand the birth of Turkish nationalism, both within and beyond the shores of Cyprus, we need first to appreciate the oft-confused Ottoman socio-political environment within which it emerged. In this respect, the degree to which the Ottoman Empire is still associated with the Turks, especially in western circles, is striking. Often the words Turk and Ottoman are used interchangeably, as are the terms Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. In fact, there is an important distinction, a distinction to which it is critical that reference is made if our goal is to assess how Turkish nationalism grew as a force within this Empire.

Historically, the Ottomans were only one of several ethnically Turkish dynasties to move westwards from the plains of Central Asia. Admittedly they proved to be the most successful, and as is well known, managed to finally take over Istanbul from its Byzantine masters in the fateful year of 1453. In the process of their conquests the Ottomans established their political dominance over other groups in Asia Minor, (including other Turkish dynasties), as well as pushing even further west into the Balkans. At its height in the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Empire had come to encompass not only all of Anatolia, but much of the Balkans, the northern coast of the Black Sea, the coastal regions of northern Africa and much of the Middle East.168

However, despite the fact that the Ottomans were originally the descendants of Turkish tribesmen from Central Asia, and in spite of the fact that Turkish was essentially the “lingua franca” of their Empire, the Ottomans soon abandoned their Turkish identity in favour of an overriding Islamic identity. Lewis ascribes this development to three key factors: to the Ottomans’ realization that they had an Imperial as opposed to a simply tribal mission after the conquest of Istanbul; to their conflict with the Turkic but Shiite dynasty in Iran that had blocked their interaction with Turks further to the East, and; to the, “burden of an Islamic Imperial heritage and mission,” which was shouldered with the taking of the Islamic holy sites in Syria and Egypt in 1516–17 and in Iraq in 1534.169

Moreover, as Güvenç illustrates, on continuing westwards from the Central Asian planes the Turks had integrated to an important degree with the pre-existing cultures in the lands in which they arrived, thereby taking on elements of culture as wide-ranging as that of the Hittites, Capadocians, Hellenes, Arabs and Persians.170 Racially too they had mingled with their newfound neighbours, especially with others who adopted Islam and who thereby had become co-religionists. Consequentially, as Sabahattin Eyüboğlu beautifully phrased it, the Turks were, “both the conquerors, and the conquered.”171

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168. For a more thorough English-language exposition of the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire see for example, SHAW - SHAW 1977a and 1977b, passim.
169. The Ottomans, unlike the Safavids were upholders of the Sunni branch of Islam rather than the Shiite.
170. GÜVENÇ 1997, 78.
171. As quoted in GÜVENÇ 1997, 121.
By the time they conquered Cyprus the Ottoman Dynasty no longer identified itself as “Turkish”. In fact, whilst in the West they were commonly referred to as “the Turks”, the Ottomans themselves used the word “Turk” infrequently, and then only either as a derogatory term to refer to the peasants or nomads of Anatolia, or sometimes, alternatively as an all-encompassing term for all the speakers of the Turkish language, irrespective of their ethnic background. Being Turkish was not regarded as either a privilege or cause for pride. Indeed, Lewis recounts the wonderfully illustrative anecdote of Halet Efendi, who on coming to Paris at the beginning of the nineteenth century felt shocked and insulted when referred to as the “Turkish ambassador”. As lamented by the famous Turkish nationalist, Alp Tekin, the Ottomans essentially disavowed the history of the Turks before their own rise to prominence. It was almost as if they were consciously and purposefully denying their Turkish identity. As Tekin attests, “Not only did the Osmanli Turks not wish to make their history go back beyond Osman’s tribe, but also they did not wish to be confused with other peoples of the same race.”

Islam, then, was to be for the Ottomans the overbearing element of their identity, and the only real form in which they managed to contribute to, “the preservation of the Turkish character of their State was making Turkish the official language of the Empire.” Even, here, however, a distinction needs to be made between the vernacular Turkish of the commoners in Anatolia, (which had itself been greatly influenced over the years by other languages), and the much more formalistic form of Turkish, (if indeed it should still be called that), spoken by the Ottoman elite in Istanbul and the higher-level bureaucrats throughout the Empire. The latter, in particular, had absorbed significant elements of the Arabic and Persian languages, so much so that it was difficult for the common Turk to comprehend. In fact Jacoby claims that, “The importance of keeping official records in Islam combined with an emphasis on rhyme and allegory had by the eighteenth century led to a written state vernacular so embellished with classical Persian and Arabic vocabulary and convoluted with stylistic flourish as to be generally unintelligible to the Ottoman masses.” Even so, the pivotal status of the Ottoman Turkish language in the Empire, did not really cause it to be dominated by the Turks, as the top bureaucratic positions were open not just to Turks but to anyone who learnt the language. Ethnicity was not, therefore, really an issue, with many of the highest officials originally being, for example, Albanian or Arab. Until the final era of the Empire, being Moslem was a notable requirement for high office, but this too did not preclude many Christian and Jewish converts from holding key positions of power.

In light of the above, then, accusations of attempts at “Turkification” under the Ottomans, at least until their final years when most of the empire had already been lost, are unfounded and meaningless. True there was a degree of Islamization, encouraged to some extent perhaps by incentives such as lower taxation for non-Moslem subjects who converted to Islam, but adoption of the Ottomans’ religion did not automatically encompass...
becoming a “Turk”. In fact, even excessive Islamization would have been hard consider-
ing the loss of revenue that would be entailed, and attempts to compel the conversion of non-Moslems were ultimately condemned by the “Seyh–ül Islam”, (the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire), as being contrary to Islamic law.\textsuperscript{178} Sanctioned and unsanctioned exceptions to such rulings did occur, but it can fairly be said that essentially the Ottomans followed non-assimilative policies regarding their subjects.

For, the Turks, as for the Ottoman dynasty that ruled over them, it was the Islamic part of their identity which dominated and of which they were most conscious. With their language and culture and historical roots, they could still be considered a distinct ethnic group within the Empire, even one with historical and linguistic centrality to the foundations of the Empire, but there was no political significance attached to this. They were not a nation making political demands for their ethnic brethren; they were instead first and foremost Moslems whose primary loyalties were to Islam and to the Ottoman Sultan.\textsuperscript{179} Thus, as Lewis ably sums the situation, “Among the different peoples who embraced Islam none went farther in sinking their separate identity in the Islamic community than the Turks. Though ... some traces of Turkish group self-awareness remained, the Turks retained but few memories of their pre-Islamic past and raised no racial barriers between Turk and non-Turk.”\textsuperscript{180}

We must recognise then that it was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century that things began to change as far as politically significant loyalties of the Empire’s Turks were concerned, and then too only at snails pace. An early indication of this transformation identified by Lewis is that of a prominent Young Ottoman exiled in France, Ali Suavi, who at the end of the 1860’s undertook to publish a journal “Ulum”, (or, Science), in which, as noted earlier he began to champion a Turkish identity and loyalty.\textsuperscript{181} Even his credentials as a Turkist have been questioned, however. “It is tempting,” says Şerif Mardin, “to classify Suavi as the first ‘Turkist’ because of his repeated use of the term ‘Turk’ and because of the attention he gave to the central Asiatic problem.” Ultimately though, Mardin concludes that, “Suavi was still too much interested in all of his Islamic brethren to be labelled a ‘Turkist’ although ‘Turks’ were given greater importance in his writings than heretofore.”\textsuperscript{182} Yet, even if we recognise him as the first Turkist, several more decades would pass before Turkish national sentiments became common amongst the Turkish intelligentsia, many more before they predominated amongst the Turkish masses.

To administer their vast empire the Ottomans used a scheme known as the “millet” system. The population of the Empire was accordingly divided into different communities on the basis of religious affiliation. There were, for example, Orthodox Christian and Jewish millets each with its own religious leadership, and with a large degree of internal autonomy regarding social, cultural and legal affairs. As Poulton explains, the Ottomans actually encouraged the development of strong and autonomous, “internal structures and

\textsuperscript{178} See OBA 1995, 40–41.
\textsuperscript{179} With the Sultan being also Caliph, or religious leader, these two major loyalties to religion and to political authority were actually intertwined.
\textsuperscript{180} LEWIS 1968, 329; In fact, in line with Lewis’ analysis, Kemal Atatürk was later to lament that Islamization had actually weakened the national ties and emotions of the Turks. See TEZCAN 1997, 18–19.
\textsuperscript{181} LEWIS 1968, 155.
\textsuperscript{182} MARDIN 1962, 371–372.
hierarchies,” for the different millets, “by dealing exclusively with their heads rather than individual members.”183 The millet system was in effect a means of indirect rule that was not only a system of governance compatible with the prevalent interpretation of Islam, but was also found to be beneficial to the maintenance of Ottoman rule.184

In terms of membership of these millets questions of race, language-group or ethnicity were irrelevant, on account of which Greeks and Serbs could form part of the same Orthodox millet, whilst Gregorian and Catholic Armenians were considered parts of different millets.185 It was not that there were no ethnic groups to speak of, there clearly were. But, as Karpat points out, despite examples of ethnic solidarity and emotional partiality for place of birth or mother-tongue, there was no political import to this ethnic identity until the end of the eighteenth, and beginning of the nineteenth century.186

Religious community, then, rather than ethnic group was for a long time the primary focus of effective attachment and identification for all Ottoman subjects. It was the breakdown of the primacy of these religious groupings, or millets, within the prevailing social and administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire, that was to contribute to the decline of the Empire, to the coming to the fore of ethnic identities, and eventually to the politicalisation of ethnic groups, usually in the ultimate form of nationalist demands for political independence.

2.3 Ottoman Administration of Cyprus and the Greeks

The most basic features of Ottoman rule in Cyprus were not tellingly different to those in other parts of the empire. As in other realms then, the Ottomans governed Cyprus through the “millet” system. The Ottomans were to acknowledge the Orthodox as a separate “millet” within Cyprus and to recognise the Orthodox Archbishop as the “Ethnarch”, or political leader, of this community. He was as a result both spiritually responsible for his flock, and politically responsible to the Ottomans for their conduct. Though there was an Ottoman-appointed governor he was, more often than not, to rely in administering the island on the cooperation of the Archbishop and other leading figures of the Greek Orthodox community.187 His sometimes virtual dependence on them rested partly on the fact that he was not a permanent figure, usually only in place for a few uncertain years at most, and he therefore was liable to depend for the fulfilling of his chief mission, that of extrac-

184. For an explanation of how the “millet” system complied with Islamic jurisprudence, see LEWIS 1968, 328–329; Karpat outlines the advantage to the Ottomans of these autonomous religiously designated millets as follows:

[They] enabled the government elites to avoid interference in the religious and cultural affairs of the population. The heads of the millets also provided useful channels for implementing government decisions among the non-Muslim raya, and, by insulating the Sultan, played the vital role of preventing friction between him and his non-Muslim subjects. KARPAT 1973a, 31.

185. See LEWIS 1968, 329.
186. KARPAT 1973, 8–9.
187. Though throughout this study I use the term “Governor”, there were at different times in the three centuries long rule of the Ottomans different names given to, and different procedures for the appointment of, administrators of Cyprus. As, however, the details of these variations have little bearing on the thesis they have been omitted here. For further detailed information see chapters 3–6 in Hill.
ting revenue from the population, upon the good-will and assistance of the Orthodox hier-
archy. Consequently, as, “a result of practice and custom rather than legislation,” the
Archbishop became also, “ex-officio member of the Great Council which shared in the
administration of the island and the bishops were ex-officio members of the District
Councils.” The Archbishop of Cyprus then, during much, though not all, of the Otto-
man era had power over the island rivalling, sometimes purportedly even exceeding that
of the Governor. As attested to by numerous foreign observers, he was certainly a pri-
me source of political power.

Ali Bey denoted the Archbishop simply as, “the real prince of the island.” Turner
assessed the power of the Archbishop quite straightforwardly, stating that, “Cyprus,
though nominally under the authority of a Bey appointed by the Qapudan Pasha, is in fact
governed by the Greek Archbishop and his subordinate clergy.”

The Archbishop of Nicosia, who had the title of ri’aya-vekili as representing the
Christian subjects of the Porte had annexed pretty well the whole administrative
authority, and not only made himself independent of the Muhassils, [i.e. Ottoman
governors], but generally determined on their appointment and recall … and all the
inhabitants, Turks and Greeks alike, looked upon him as the real Governor, and
grew accustomed to take no notice of the Muhassil.

As Lacroix indicated, the Archbishop’s influence was felt not only on the island, but also
at the core of governmental power in Istanbul, the Porte, or Office of the Grand Vizier.

Nor even was the Archbishop the sole wielder of power emanating from within the
Greek Cypriot community. Another, the Dragoman, accompanied him. The Dragoman’s
role was not, as is sometimes thought, that of a simple, “lowly” translator. He dealt not
only with the governors’ personal linguistic requirements, but had great political and eco-
nomic influence over the island’s administration. Besides his role as governmental trans-

188. JENNESS 1962, 100.
189. PERSIANIS 1967, 243; Representation on these bodies, was to lose much of its meaning after reforms
introduced by the British, “restrict[ed] the previous rights of the Councils to formal duties connected almost
exclusively with the levying of certain taxes.” GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 60.
190. Luke explains the situation in the following way: “During the Ottoman régime in Cyprus the Archbishop
represented to his own flock on a smaller scale that which the Patriarch of Constantinople represented to the
generality of the Orthodox in Turkey. That is to say, he was not only the spiritual chief of the Cypriotes; he
became the ethnarch, the political and national representative of his people in its relations with the Ottoman
Government. He became even more. By an astonishing reversal of fortune the Archbishops of Cyprus
whose office had been recreatted by the Turks after lying dormant for three hundred years, secured in the
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the supreme power and authority over the island, and at
one period wielded influence greater than that of the Turkish Pasha himself.” [LUKE 1973, 79]; Persianis
maintains that, “The most important characteristic of the Cyprus Orthodox Church was the temporal autho-
rit of the Church leaders which arose as a result of history,” and further describes how; “the temporal aut-
hority of the Archbishop increased considerably,” during Ottoman rule. [PERSIANIS 1967, 241–242];
Çevikel also acknowledges the power wielded by the bishops in Cyprus, particularly in the late eighteenth
century, arguing that at the imperial centre in Istanbul this was appreciated as a means of balancing the
power of the island’s governors. ÇEVÝKEL 2000, 121–122.
191. ALI BEY 1993, 265.
192. COBHAM 1986, 447.
193. Ibid., 463.
194. In this respect the position and power of the Dragoman compared to that of the Phanariote Greek official
translators of the Porte who, while, “known as translators … in reality … managed the empire’s foreign rela-
lator, the Dragoman was also, throughout most of the span of the Ottoman period, the official most involved in financial affairs and in the vital function of the assessment and collection of taxation from the islanders. Though the Dragoman was almost without exception appointed from the ranks of the Orthodox Greek community, he was at times to have responsibility too for the collection of taxes from the Moslems.\textsuperscript{195} The crucial financial function of the Dragoman was recognised by the fact that he was granted the right to go above the head of the Governor and Archbishop and communicate directly with the Sultan.\textsuperscript{196}

As to the appointment of the two powerful posts of Dragoman and Archbishop, the Ottomans, “either through indolence or out of genuine consideration for their subjects,”\textsuperscript{197} left the matter essentially to the Orthodox community, with the Dragomans customarily chosen by the Orthodox notables and bishops, and only confirmed by the Sultan, and the Archbishop likewise being elected, “by the suffrages of the Orthodox population,” and his appointment, “confirmed by a berat from the [Ottoman] Government, which was sent on receipt of a request from the Holy Synod and the representatives of the Orthodox population.”\textsuperscript{198}

Thus, leaving to one side the fact that the Ottoman appointed governors were not themselves by any means necessarily always of ethnic Turkish stock, there is little justification for the impression sometimes portrayed of “the Turks” relentlessly oppressing “the Greeks” during Ottoman rule in Cyprus, or of the Greeks, “exclusion from any share of power.”\textsuperscript{199} Greeks themselves played a key role in ruling the island and were, in fact, quite often more directly responsible for the subjugation of their own people, (even on occasions in opposition to the wishes and commands of the Ottomans), than were the Ottoman imperial rulers themselves.\textsuperscript{200} In the light of the available evidence, Spyridakis’ generalisations, that, on the one hand, “the Turkish rulers repressed and persecuted the Greek people of the island,” while on the other, “The efforts of the Archbishops were directed to defending the position of the Christians against Turkish exploitation and towards making their burdens as light as possible,” and that these latter, “always offered inestimable services to the Island and especially to the Greek population in it,” might almost be amusing were it not for the weight they have been given.\textsuperscript{201}

What seems to have helped play a role in changing the Greek Cypriot people’s perception of the Church in Cyprus as “protector” of the Greek nation during Ottoman rule was the temporary persecution of the Church hierarchy in Cyprus during the Greek Revolution

\textsuperscript{195} KYRISS 1976, 253 and 259.
\textsuperscript{196} HILL 1952, 17; Tofallis indicates the power of the Dragoman with the example of Hajigeorgiakos Kornesios, who held this post from 1779–1809, and whom he describes as being, “in sole control of the economic life of the island.” TOFALLIS 2002, 70.
\textsuperscript{197} HILL 1952, 16.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 315; See also, PERSIANIS 1967, 242 and SCOTT-STEVENSON 1880, 306–307.
\textsuperscript{199} GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 56.
\textsuperscript{200} It should be realised that the structure and system of Ottoman administration in Cyprus did not aim to smother or devastate its Orthodox Greek community. Undoubtedly this was sometimes the outcome of the policies of local administrators, but not a general scheme that could be attributed to the Ottoman Government. Hill puts it well when he says that, “Nothing could be more praiseworthy than the declarations of the Government that the rayahs should be treated with justice and moderation.” Yet he acknowledges that, “by contrast, the failure of the administration to exercise these virtues was [therefore] the more lamentable.”
\textsuperscript{201} SPYRIDAKIS 1964, 57 and 62; MANGOIAN 1947, 26d; Thankfully I am not alone in such criticism of Spyridakis’ assertions. One exasperated Greek historian has been bold enough to describe him as an “Enosis propagandist.” TERLEXIS 1968, 45.
of 1821. The fact that it was most dramatically the Church leadership that was persecuted at the time of the Greek War of Independence allowed those nationalists who chose to do so to portray the Church as having been the eternal champion of the Greek nation in Cyprus, and Church leaders, thereafter, the opportunity to claim authority in directing the nationalist cause.

2.4 Limits of Ethnic Convergence in Ottoman Cyprus

Notwithstanding occasional reports of quarrels and squabbles, there is little of substance that could lead us to intimate that there was any persistent, widespread conflict between the two main communities on the island during Ottoman rule, even towards its more insecure end. There were of course exceptions, and the Christians were probably more often than not the most wronged of the parties, such as in an intriguing case recently uncovered by Çevikel, where in 1798, frustrated by Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, some of the Moslem inhabitants of the island assaulted their Christian neighbours. Nevertheless, much more apparent is the relative tranquillity of intercommunal relations, numerous references being made to the peaceable relations between Christian and Moslem, Greek and Turk. It is interesting that despite his evident prejudices, the American Consul, John Judson Barclay was, for instance, able to report as late as the mid-nineteenth century that, “The Mussulmans have little of the fanatical spirit and bigotry of the Arab Mussulman. They live in harmony with their Christian neighbours in town and country.” Yet, though interethnic and religious relations were generally amicable, and though there is some indication of a creeping cultural and social convergence between these groups, it would be inaccurate to describe Cyprus under the Ottomans as being a socially integrated island, as some authors have done. Recognition of this and comprehension as to its causes is crucial for understanding how two competing nationalisms could and would later emerge in Cyprus.

The sharpness of modern day lines of demarcation between Greeks and Turks that have been identified in the context of the “Cyprus Dispute” should not lead us to project the same lines retroactively into the past and thereby overlook an undeniable element of socio-cultural exchange and political cooperation. Nor, however, should we fall prey to romantic interpretations of an idyllic past in which the omnipotent peace, harmony and unity of the Cypriots was cruelly and artificially torn apart by exogenous actors. Cyprus under the Ottomans was neither an island of persistent interethnic hostility, nor one of political, social and cultural uniformity or integration. What needs to be evaluated is the degree of cooperation that was to be found between Orthodox Greeks and Moslem Turks and the limits to the integration and convergence resulting from their centuries long interaction.

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202. ÇEVİKEL 2000, 239–240; Çiçek also has unearthed evidence of certain similar cases, some with quite grave consequences, and not all being matters in which it was the Christians who were wronged. As he himself rightly asserts, however, there is no proof of such behaviour being systematic. Çiçek 1993, 53–59.

203. U.S. Consul Barclay to Secretary of State Seward, 20th September 1863. NARA/MD/T-463 (Roll No.1).

204. See, for example, POLLIS 1976, 45, and for similar remarks, see YAVUZ 1991, 61.
As far as political cooperation between the two ethnic groups on the island is concerned, it can be observed both in efforts to maintain political authority and also, on a different social level, in challenges to that very same authority. Certainly there was on the whole general political cooperation at the elite level of the administration of the island, it being viewed as in the interest of both the ruling Greek and Turkish elites to maintain their authority and exact as much economic surplus as possible from the common people.\textsuperscript{205} Moreover there was on more than one occasion observable political collaboration between the Orthodox and Moslem masses, illustrated by several joint efforts, often in the form of insurrections, to resist the injustices of the administrators from which they too shared a common interest of being relieved. Kitromilides, for instance, makes note of a series of revolts from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, “in which Christian and Moslem peasants joined forces, “to struggle, against oppression from above.”\textsuperscript{206} Perhaps the most notorious of these revolts was that led against Chil Osman, the new governor appointed in 1764, who was to pay with his life when Greeks and Turks together attacked his palace following the imposition of unbearable financial burdens upon the population and the Governor’s attempts to eliminate all opposition.\textsuperscript{207}

As Oakley explains, “In practice, the divisions between land-owners and officials on the one hand, and the peasantry on the other, were often more important determinants of rights and obligations, so that Muslims and Christians of different classes shared common interests, particularly in the matter of taxation.”\textsuperscript{208} As argued by Pollis, “The social structure of Cyprus was such that all classes were composed of both Muslims and Christians. The distinctions and behavioural consequences of religious differences were minimal by comparison to those of class.”\textsuperscript{209} Neither ethnic nor even religious background was therefore a serious impediment to common political action during most of Ottoman rule for, as Vural has explained, even recognised differences in cultural identity were not at this stage the source of divergent political ambitions.\textsuperscript{210} Nevertheless, not all political action or revolts during Ottoman times were the result of joint intercommunal action, such as when the Turks revolted in 1804. They were, it appears, especially unhappy with the governor, “who, they suspected, was being too subservient to the Greeks.” The Dragoman seems to have, “persuaded the Sultan to dispatch troops,” and so, as expressed by Doros, there was to follow, “a suppression of a Turkish movement by Turkish troops at the behest of the Greeks.”\textsuperscript{211}

Before the century was out, the signs of more radical political divergence were becoming apparent was reflected in Mr. Liassides’ statement in the Legislative Council in 1897. He pronounced that he, “disclaimed any idea of divided action as between the two portions of the population,” and declared that, “Save as regards religion and political aspirations, they were as one fraternity.” But, it was the very difference of political aspirations

\textsuperscript{205} Katsiaounis relates how this elite-level cooperation continued into the mid-nineteenth century. KAT-SIAOUNIS 1996, 15–16.
\textsuperscript{206} KITROMILIDES 1977, 40; Hill refers to evidence of, “many discontented Moslems, who joined the Greeks in raising the standard of revolt,” at as early a date as 1578. HILL 1952, 39.
\textsuperscript{207} See, for example, DOROS 1955, 275.
\textsuperscript{208} OAKLEY 1993, 97.
\textsuperscript{209} POLLIS 1979, 49–50.
\textsuperscript{210} VURAL 1996, 57.
\textsuperscript{211} DOROS 1955, 285–286.
that he referred to which was to have growing bearing upon the course of the island’s politics.212

In the social sphere the practice of intermarriage is regarded by some to provide confirmation of the fusion of Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. Though this practice did continue well into the twentieth century, the reality again is not as clear-cut as some imply it to be. Most importantly there is no reliable and precise quantification as to what proportion of marriages were of such a nature, making it misleading to assert that they were widespread. Several commentators who were present in the Cyprus of the past did point out the phenomenon, but this in itself does not indicate that it was a common practice. On the contrary, the novelty of the practice, particularly in an age when such unions were commonly frowned upon, may well be the reason why it was frequently drawn attention to.213 All the same, it did occur, and, as Asmussen suggests, “it is most likely that many of those marriages occurred in mixed villages.”214

It is true that as Yavuz describes, intermarriage could in some cases be an avenue of social mobility, particularly for Orthodox peasants marrying with high-ranking Moslems.215 It is highly probable also, as Sant Cassia says, that most intermarriages were in the form of unions between Orthodox women and Moslem men for, “Common Law insisted on the Orthodoxy of both partners,” while, “Islam permitted men to take non-Muslim wives so long as the male progeny remained Muslim.”216 Rizvi’s contrasting position that, “There has been virtually no intermarriage between the two communities,” is certainly too rigid, even conceivably tainted by a contemporary perspective of Cypriot ethnic and social relations.217 All the same there is considerable reason to believe that the floodgates to extensive intermarriage were essentially closed, if not securely sealed, due largely to social and religious sanctions. Endogenous marriage has been the traditional norm for most cultural and religious groups, marriage with “outsiders” exceptional and frequently an object of disdain. There is little reason to believe this was not so in the case of Cyprus.218 In fact, there are some grounds to believe that even when intermarriage did occur, it could, at times, contribute to ethno-religious tensions rather than to harmonious relations. Thus, when in the Legislative Council debates of 1906 Şevket Bey, “pointed out that under the Mahomedan law a Mahomedan was permitted to marry a Christian woman,” the Bishop of Kitium made clear his opposition to such unions. He argued that they should not, “encourage Mahomedans to deceive young Christian women and marry them – and it was to the interest of the Moslem members to discourage such unions as

213. Jennings is one who appears to attach disproportionate weight to such reports, and though his own work does provide irrefutable evidence of the practice from judicial registers, it does not allow us to reliably gauge its extent. See JENNINGS 1993, 29 and 36.
214. ASMUSSEN 1996, 103.
215. YAVUZ 1991, 64.
216. SANT CASSIA 1986, 22; Sant Cassia further indicates that there may also have been some special economic incentive for this type of union as a result of differences in social customs. Whereas in Greek Cypriot marriages the father of the bride was expected to provide a considerable dowry, little economic contribution was typically expected to be brought to the partnership by women in customary Turkish Cypriot marriages. [Ibid., 22–2]. Her assertions appear to be supported by Kitchener’s article published in 1879, where he stated, albeit a little too categorically: “A Turk marrying a Greek girl is very rare. ... The reverse never happens.” KITCHENER 1879, 153.
they were not calculated to encourage domestic peace.” 219 As Sant Cassia’s research reveals, “interethnic marriage ... could cause conflict where women were secluded and honour values highly prized,” as indicated by, “Many villages [in Cyprus that] have myths linking the two communities in conflicts over women, especially over Turk capture of Greek brides.” 220 Folklore provides similar evidence. Known by the title of, “Poem of the two Lovers Christofis and Emine,” one anonymous folktale has for many generations, told of the tribulations caused by the efforts of the two lovers of different faiths to unite. 221 According to at least one recorded version of this poem, the communal origins of which are not known, Turkish youths were infuriated by this relationship and sought retribution for the offence they perceived to have been committed to their honour. 222 That intermarriage occurred can only be denied by those who refute readily available historical evidence, yet a more subtle form of religious integration was at work also, one that may well be associated with the heated discussion surrounding religious conversions. As far as that debate is concerned, a fascinating and oft-mentioned phenomenon in the literature is that of the “Linobambakoi”. This peculiar “sect” is claimed by many to affirm the religious persecution and forced conversion of the Orthodox, though it may actually, in part at least, reflect a much more gradual and peaceful process of religious convergence. “Linobambakoi” means “Flax-cottons” or “Linsey-Woolseys”, indicating, it has been said, the duality of, “the public adoption of Islamic practices whilst following Christian rites in the secrecy and privacy of their homes.” 223 It has been referred to as a form of “crypto-Christianity”, the implication frequently alluded to being that Orthodox members of Cypriot society were forced under the Ottomans, at least outwardly, to become Moslems. Yet, there are strong alternative explanations to account for this phenomenon and no apparent reason why they could not be at least as valid as that given above. Both Hill and Luke, for example, make the case that the Linobambakoi were, in fact, “originally Latins who thought at the Turkish conquest to conceal their origin in a compromise between Christianity and Islam by bearing their names and keeping the feasts – and fasts – of both religions.” 224 Considering the relatively relaxed atmosphere in which the Orthodox were allowed to practice their religion, (in contrast, to be sure, to the remaining Latins who were initially, “forbidden the possession of any church”), this latter theory appears the more plausible. 225

In one of the earliest attempts to study the sect from an academic standpoint, Michel stated: “There can be little doubt that the origin of this peculiar sect is to be traced to the days that followed the Turkish conquest of Cyprus in 1570. No doubt,” he says, “a deadly terror must have been inspired in the minds of many Cypriots by the terrible fate that befell some of their compatriots.” 226 While this may in the case of the Latins be true, it is

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219. Minutes of the Legislative Council 1906, 118.
220. SANT CASSIA 1986, 23.
221. Kyriss claims that “Emine was obviously a Crypto-Christian girl,” but provides no evidence for this, apart, apparently from his supposition that she was so as a consequence of her urging her lover not to renounce his religion. While Emine may have urged such in the version read by Kyriss, no mention is made of such behaviour, and it can not be inferred that she was here a Crypto-Christian in the version I accessed.
222. YAŞİN 1999, 225–228.
223. SANT CASSIA 1986, 21–22.
224. LUKE 1973, 147; See also HILL 1952, 305 and DAWKINS 1933, 255–256.
225. For information as to the oppression of the Latins, see HILL 1952, 305.
226. MICHEL 1908, 752.
much less certain that there is justification for this assertion in the case of the Orthodox Greeks. Were they to have had a high propensity to convert one would have imagined that many more would have done so under the Latins, when religious persecution was at its height, rather than under the more tolerant religious attitude towards the Orthodox Church that followed. True, there were, as Michel indicates, no doubt Orthodox Cypriots who were also to suffer the wrath of the Ottoman invading forces. Yet, there is nothing that has been revealed to-date that proves significant proportions of the Orthodox community to have been forced to adopt Islam en masse. As a matter of fact, there are even grounds for suggesting a third approach, that those classified as “Linobambakoi”, or at least some of them, were neither Orthodox nor Latin in origin, but in fact Moslems. This at least was apparently suggested by the esteemed nineteenth century explorer Sir Samuel Baker in his personal account of his travels in Cyprus in 1879. “These people,” he imparted, “are said to be converts to Christianity.”

The truth is that the general historical foundations of the curious social occurrence of the Linobambakoi are obscure, but it is in fact possible to speculate that it might to some extent have been a progressive outcome of an indisputable element of creeping religious syncretism similar to that which Kitromilides argues, “characterized the rural life of Ottoman Asia Minor from the late Middle Ages.” Amongst others, Attalides and Pollis both refer to such a process of religious syncretism in Cyprus, with Pollis noting that, “many observers were struck by the indifference with which Muslim and Christian used each other’s places of worship and the extent to which ostensibly religious holidays were intermixed.” Beckingham too illustrates how, “the practice, formerly so common in many parts of the Levant, of venerating Muslim and Christian shrines indifferently,” was little discouraged till the mid-twentieth century. He also defends the view that to the people of Cyprus, as with others in the eastern Mediterranean and many parts of the Ottoman Empire, Islam and Christianity, “did not present themselves as two mutually exclusive systems of belief, but rather as two ways of conciliating supernatural forces. The Orthodox Cypriot did not become a Muslim when he prayed at the shrine of the forty (Kirklar, Ayii Saranda) at Tymbou … nor did the Cypriot Muslim become a Christian when he sought the aid of the Holy Cross at Stravrovouni, or of St Andrew at his monastery on the extreme eastern promontory of the island. They were simply testing the efficacy of another means of getting a good harvest or curing an illness. In this religious climate it seems to me rash to take the Linobambakoi seriously as a sect.”

Kyriss himself gives wonderful evidence of the overlap in intercommunal religious practices on the island, and grants, without finding the need on this occasion to attribute the matter to forced conversion, that,

227. Ibid., 753.
228. BAKER 1879.
229. KITROMILIDES, 36; Dawkins too entertains the possibility of this idea, stating that it might be, “that some of these Cypriots are people who cling to both faiths from the idea of getting the best from both sides.” [DAWKINS 1933, 255]; In fact, the geographical scope appears even wider. Braudel, in reference to the Mediterranean in the late sixteenth century, suggests that there were already by then, “growing numbers of that hybrid race, half-Christian, half Moslem, living on the borders of the two worlds in a fraternal alliance that would have been even more evident if the states had not required appearances to be preserved.” BRAUDEL 1973, 889.
230. POLLIS, 1972, 585–586, and see also ATTALIDES 1977a, 75.
231. BECKINGHAM, 1957b, 81.
232. BECKINGHAM 1957a, 173; His argument on this point appears to be confirmed by the personal observations of both Samuel Baker and Sir Harry Luke. BAKER 1879; LUKE 1973, 145–147.
“Such intercommunal cults and practices were frequent in several mixed villages and should become the object of special research.”

At Rhizokarpasson, at times of drought, the inhabitants made a procession with B. V. M.’s icon, singing hymns and praying, from their village to the Turkish village of Galloporna (=Galinoporni) nearby to the Chapel of Ayia Anna; the procession was headed by priest holding the Gospel. At the entrance of Galloporna, the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants, headed by their hodja holding the Koran, were waiting for them; both groups walked in procession to the chapel of Saint Anna, where they prayed together to God, the Greek Rhizokarpassiotes in Greek and the Turkish Galinoporntes in Turkish, to send rain and make the fields and gardens produce. After the common prayer was ended, The Turkish women of Galloporna burned olive leaves in fumigators in honour and for the protection of the Rhizokarpassiotes – a Christian religious practice – and offered the fresh home-made bread, olives and Cypriot cheese.233

Countless “amusing stories” concerning the Linobambakoi were still being recounted at the beginning of the twentieth century. Michel narrates that: “At a remote village it has happened that a Greek bishop arrived in the morning, and all the flock attended to pay their respects. Towards evening a Turkish official happened to arrive, and the villagers hastened to entertain him hospitably, as faithful Mohammedans!”234 The realities of flexible religious attachments and shifting professions of faith often led to confusion in other areas, including in the legal field of inheritance. Michel gives example of one particularly complicated legal dispute where one party ultimately tried to prove he was a Christian by “proving” he had not been circumcised, but to no avail since he lost the case. Michel indicates that this and similar cases might have, “turned on the question of circumcision” leading many a Linobambakoi man to seek minor surgery!235 Michel’s series of comical illustrations provide yet more evidence of the complex nature of religious associations involved:

On another occasion the Kadi of the chief town of a district complained to the local authority that a Muslim girl had been buried in a Christian cemetery. A Mudir (sub-district administrator) was sent out to investigate, and report. His inquiry showed that the girl’s father, Omar (alias Constantinos), declared that he was a Christian. His wife, on the other hand, stated that she was a Musluma. ‘But,’ said the latter, ‘my daughter, who had been a Musluma, became a Christian, and was baptised a few days before her death, taking the name of Pelagia.’ This settled the question, and the Kadi was so informed. The father, by the way, was a man not only of doubts but of diplomacy; one who had drifted hither and thither. The wife, still a staunch Mohammedan, after various controversies, only consented to remain with her spouse on certain conditions: e.g. that she should be left in peace in respect of her creed, and that Omar should not eat swine’s flesh at home. Elsewhere he was known to indulge in that luxury, but he was careful to perform unusually elaborate ablutions before returning home. The wife had frequently threatened to return to her co-religionists in another village, and on these occasions ‘Omar’ energetically protested his adherence to eI-Slam. An example of his ingenuity was shown when, being called upon under a recent law to pay school fees in support of the Muslim village establishment, he declared emphatically for Christianity. Being subsequently taxed as a member of the Orthodox Greek community, he pleaded exemption on the grounds that he was a devout follower of the Prophet.236

234. MICHEL 1908, 755.
235. Ibid., 758–759.
Another humorous piece of evidence relating to the religious syncretism, (or, depending on perspective, impact of conversion), that developed on the island is found in the shape of a folkloric tale related in Yaşın’s anthology of the old verse of Cyprus:

There once was a little sparrow living in the church yard
It used to drink water from the trough underneath the bell tower,
Then shit on the bell.
Once twice three times…
The priest who was watching this was very saddened,
He emptied the water and in its place put wine.
The sparrow that now drank the wine
Continued to shit on the bell.
Eventually the priest could restrain himself no more:
“Hey brother sparrow,
You shit on the bell when there was water in the trough
I filled it with wine, and you continued to shit again.
Seeing as you shit on the bell you’re not Christian,
But seeing as ya drank wine you’re not Moslem either.
I can’t understand, what are you?”
“I am Cypriot,” [came the reply].

Intermarriage also is sure to have played a part in contributing both to the ranks of the Linobambakoi and to religious syncretism in general. As Michel suggests, many Christian women who married Moslems, (or in his words were “possessed” by Turks), maintained their religion, either freely or in secret, and might have tried, “to undermine that of their consorts; or to bring up their children in the ways of their own people.” Even more probable than Michel’s portrayal in this instance of such religious behaviour as almost covert military action, would be that beliefs of husbands and wives to some extent may have more naturally merged and been transmitted as such to their offspring.

The evidence concerning the Linobambakoi does not appear to be conclusive, but, whatever the cause or causes, whether it be the result of some form of compelled conversion or of gradual socio-religious integration, the realities of the Linobambakoi must be considered in proper perspective. The Linobambakoi were the exception, not the rule, their numbers limited to at most a small minority of the population. Dawkins recognises this when he states that: “they were never very numerous and even under the Turks were decreasing. At the time of the British occupation in 1878 they were estimated at 1200 only.” The rough accuracy of this figure is supported by Baker’s account. He professed a figure of, “about 1,500”, in 1879. Untenable, then, is Kyriess’ unsupported claim that even until the final quarter of the twentieth century, “many if not the majority of Moslem ’Turks’” on the island were, “appearing Moslem in daytime and practising Christianity in secret at night and whenever they were in a trustworthy Christian environ-

236. Ibid., 758.
237. YASIN 1999, 222; See also GÖKÇEÖ GLU 1992, 48–49.
238. MICHEL 1908, 753–754.
239. DAWKINS 1933, 255; MICHEL 1908, 754; Perhaps their numbers had been greater earlier on. Though there is little numerical evidence to go by, this is suggested by Michel who states that prior to British rule, “there had been a gradual and fitful decrease from year to year, due to various causes, especially the increasing preponderance in numbers and prosperity of the Greek element.” MICHEL 1908, 754.
240. BAKER 1879.
Preposterous is his further contention, a few pages on in the same article, that, “Until 1923 when Turkey renounced its rights on Cyprus by the Treaty of Lausanne and two years later when the island’s status was erected to that of a Crown Colony, most Linobambakians, who were the vast majority of the ‘Moslem Turkish’ community of Cyprus, out of fear that Turkish rule might be re-imposed had chosen Islam.”242 In fact, making his observations in the early twentieth century, Michel posits the opposite, stating that despite uncertainty as to the permanence of British occupation, British administration increased further an already existing tendency of Linobambakoi, “waverers to declare more boldly for the Church,” and concluded that as a consequence of recent trends, within a short period of time it was to be expected that, “The majority will become Christians; but not quite all.”243 The hastening demise of this sect was indicative of the wider trend of the bi-polarization of ethnicity in Cyprus; the middle ground was no longer to be tolerated.

A further related question that deserves mention is that of the relationship between religion and language in Cyprus. Religion and language did not fully overlap, as evidenced, for example, by villages, in which Moslems spoke Greek as their first, if not only language. Barclay observed that Moslems were generally conversant in Greek, and commented, “there are villages in the island, where even the Mussulmans are totally unacquainted with the Turkish language.”244 Even more specific was the case of Kaleburnu, a village in the Karpaz (Karpas) peninsula, about which in his contribution to the British Annual Report for 1879 Commissioner Inglis was to remark, “It is curious to note that some Turks speak nothing but Greek. In a Turkish village in Carpas, Kalebouron, they all speak Greek. They could not tell me how it was.”245 Some have proposed that such cases too are proof of the conversion of Greeks during Ottoman rule, the implicit argument being that these converts had retained their original language.246 But, matters, once more, must be viewed from a representative vantage point. The mother-tongue for the overwhelming proportion of Moslems was undoubtedly still Turkish. Even at the turn of the twentieth century, when the Moslem population is known to have been on the decline and when proficiency in Turkish was most likely less of an advantage than it had been during Ottoman rule, the number of Moslems professing Greek as their mother-tongue was only 2,278.247 Though the census-takers appropriately referred to this as, “The most striking feature,” of the relevant table in their report, it should not be overlooked that this figure still constituted less than five percent of the total Moslem population.248 Moreover, it should be remembered not only that there were some cases of the opposite being true, i.e. Orthodox Greeks speaking Turkish, (notably a common occurrence in Anatolia), but...
also that there are likely to have been explanations of a more practical nature than that of conversion at work in many instances.\textsuperscript{249} For instance, being much fewer in number in a Greek Cypriot village, with no means of modern communications and poor transportation capabilities meant that the Turks in these villages would be largely isolated from other members of their own ethnic community and their interactions would be invariably with Greek-speakers, which could in some cases at least have made it, preferable, if not imperative that they spoke the language of the majority.

Whatever the case, it must be recognised that language and religion clearly did not coincide perfectly, and further that the case for linguistic integration is strengthened still more by the considerable convergence between the use of the Greek and Turkish languages, particularly in terms of shared vocabulary. Pollis actually makes the bold assertion that the inhabitants of the island could have ended-up speaking the same Cypriot dialect were it not for the British colonialists’ development of formal public education that became heavily influenced by language forms transferred from Greece and Turkey. She contends that:

By the medieval period, the Cypriot dialect with its Greek roots had developed quite distinctively, largely due to isolation from mainland Greece. It was influenced in addition by the languages of the various rulers of the island, especially Turkish. By the 19th century, the language bore little resemblance in terms of comprehensibility to either demotiki or katharevousa. There was no logical, rational reason why the Cypriot dialect [spoken by both Moslems and Christians] could not have developed into a language of its own.\textsuperscript{250}

Yet though Pollis makes a thought-provoking suggestion, it does seem to presume a much higher degree of linguistic convergence than that which existed to surmise that a common “Cypriot” language could be developed with such ease. The dialects of Greek and Turkish on the island were still considerably distant, their vocabularies were by no means identical and each used different scripts in their written forms. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that print-capitalism had begun to be developed in the Ottoman Empire and in Greece many decades before the British influence on the education system of Cyprus could have been felt in the population at large.

While Dedeçay reveals that there were Turkish Cypriots publishing articles and poems in the Ottoman press as early as the 1860’s, the first locally established Turkish newspapers had begun to run off the presses by the end of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{251} Most sources mistakenly identify “Saded”, printed first in 1889, as the first Turkish-language newspaper of Cyprus, when in fact, (though there are no known-of surviving copies), there is

\textsuperscript{249} The census for 1901 admittedly enumerates only 29 such cases, but notes that 10 years earlier their total had been 165. We may presume that this proportion was probably higher during Ottoman times, especially prior to the Tanzimat reforms, partially as a consequence of the added advantage that knowledge of the then officially dominant Turkish language could confer. Naturally, under British rule such an advantage had expired. Ibid., 19.

\textsuperscript{250} POLLIS 1972, 586–587; In a rather technical article, worth consulting, Yiannis Ioannou makes apparent significant divergence that already existed between the dialect of Cyprus and other Greek-speaking regions, (even prior to Ottoman rule), but does not corroborate Pollis’ position. IOANNOU 1991, 35–36 and passim.

\textsuperscript{251} Dedeçay states that a certain Turkish Cypriot by the name of Vann Efendi published a poem in the Tercüman-ı Ahval of Istanbul in 1863. [DEDEÇAY 1989, 19]. This newspaper, established in 1860, was the first Turkish newspaper published through private initiative in the Ottoman Empire and was to become a locus for the transmission of Young Ottoman ideas. For further information see GIRGİN 2001, 29–36.
evidence of a newspaper in Turkish being published there almost a decade earlier, under the name “Ümid” (or, “Hope”). 252 The Ottoman Archives in Istanbul hold interesting communications related to this newspaper and its editor, Aleksan Sarafyan, dated the 17th of February 1880. From this correspondence it is clear that the paper was not appreciated by the Ottoman authorities who called on the British to prevent it from being sent to the Ottoman Empire and to despatch Aleksan to Istanbul, presumably to receive his comeuppance. 253 No record of this newspaper is found in the Blue Book of statistics for the island, hinting that the British, (at the time still somewhat sensitive to Ottoman complaints), may have brought some pressure to bear. Aleksan, however, does not appear to have left Cyprus, and apparently played some further journalistic role on the island in later years. 254 From the editor’s Armenian name it can be presumed that though Ümid was in Turkish it was not brought-out on the initiative of the Turks of Cyprus, and this may be related to why it has been largely overlooked by nationalist historiography. For our current purposes, however, what is most significant is that this newspaper’s distribution, as with other later Turkish-language, and Turkish-run newspapers published on the island, was not confined to Cyprus. 255 As a result, these journals were bound also to use a comparatively standardized version of language in their print so as to be comprehensible to overseas readers, the wider Turkish-speaking audience.

These characteristics of print-capitalism were responsible for a reverse process of divergence between the Greek and Turkish dialects on the island, and their progressive fusion instead with the increasingly standardized vernaculars of the Greek and Turkish-speaking markets. Not only were the two dialects on the island too distant to form a single viable print-language, but they were also representative of too small a market, (both jointly as well as separately), to successfully maintain their own particularistic print-form. Anderson explains the general logic of the process of vernacular standardization through print-capitalism, the development of which he rightly argues helped in time to build-up national consciousness, in the following manner:

In pre-print Europe, and, of course, elsewhere in the world, the diversity of spoken languages … was immense; so immense, indeed, that had print-capitalism sought to exploit each potential oral vernacular market, it would have remained a capitalism of petty proportions. But these varied idiolects were capable of being assembled, within definite limits, into print-languages far fewer in number. … Nothing served to ‘assemble’ related vernaculars more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars and syntaxes, created mechanically reproduced print-languages capable of dissemination through the market. 256

252. See, for example, ÜNLÜ s.a., 15, KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 67 and AN 1997b, 2–3.
253. Letter from the British Embassy in Istanbul to the Office of the Sultan, 17th February 1880. BOA-Y, PRK.HR.-2214; Ismail refers to the possibility of this newspaper having been published in 1881, but notes that there is no conclusive evidence to prove this. ISMAIL 1997, 45.
254. AN 1997b, 2–3.
255. As is discussed further below, early Turkish newspapers were clearly intended for wider dissemination largely as a consequence of restriction on the publication of Young Turk journals within Ottoman administered territories. As such it can no doubt be intimated that much of the impetus for the initial establishment was related to external factors. Nevertheless, analysis of their content, which is oriented primarily, if not wholly to local Cypriot affairs suggests that their primary market was still intended to be Cyprus. It is interesting to note from Katsiaounis that the initiative for the first Greek newspaper published on the island also came from outside the island. KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 95.
256. B. ANDERSON 1992, 43–44.
As Anderson further maintains, “Certain dialects inevitably were ‘closer’ to each print-language and dominated their final forms.” As a result, “Their disadvantaged cousins, still assimilable to the emerging print-language, lost caste, above all because they were unsuccessful (or only relatively successful) in insisting on their own print-form.”

In Cyprus too, it was the forces described by Anderson, rather than British intrigue pointed to by Pollis which were more responsible for impeding the further convergence of Greek and Turkish Cypriot dialects.

The considerations addressed in the preceding pages should begin to caution us against being hastily led to the conclusion that the Turks and Greeks on Cyprus were anywhere near an indistinguishable, integrated whole until the advance of nationalism, or Britain or Turkey, or both or all forcefully tore them apart. For sure, especially to the unfamiliar ear and eye, it may sometimes have been difficult to distinguish between them. For those foreign to Cyprus, subtle but significant differences in dress or the use of colours, were often hard to identify, differentiating between groups of Greeks and Turks not always easy, but for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots these differences were unmistakable. Real and ideal cultural differences, beyond even the more apparent religious, did exist.

One final area worth looking at, which is too often misleadingly portrayed relates to settlement patterns. The physical segregation of the two communities was, though by no means absolute, still ascertainable after centuries of Ottoman rule, if by nothing else then by the presence of date-palms, “the presence of these graceful trees being a sure sign of the preponderance of Turks in the population.” In an account of the situation in Cyprus the American consul was to remark in 1863 that, “The whole number of towns and villages in the island is 605, of which 118 are Mussulman 248 Christian and 239 mixt.”

Even in the settlements that were ethnically of mixed composition, (such villages, from

257. Ibid., 45.
258. Volkán’s observation as to the situation during the British period applies in similar ways to the Ottoman era also. He states that:

[D]uring British rule in Cyprus, and even into the early years of the republic, it was customary for Greeks and Turks to take evening strolls in Nicosia and elsewhere. The sidewalks that lined the main streets in front of cafés and pastry shops were favorite gathering spots, and although the two groups usually congregated separately according to ethnicity, both could be found here. To a stranger, even after the ethnic tensions began, the crowd of Cypriot Greeks and Turks appeared to be a homogeneous group of Mediterranean people dressed alike and taking pleasure in the cool evening air. But to the islander, minor differences among members of the crowd were obvious and important. Cypriot Greeks and Turks could distinguish each other at a glance by such seemingly insignificant details as the brand of cigarettes they carried. Greeks usually preferred those packaged in blue and white, the Greek national colors, a suitable good reservoir of externalization for their group. Turks smoked brands packaged in red and white, the Turkish colors. In the villages, where the usual masculine farmers’ dress consisted of baggy black trousers and shirts, the Greeks wore black or blue sashes and the Turks red …. In “normal times,” a breach of this color code might be tolerated, but when ethnic relations were strained and group cohesion (and therefore individual identity) was threatened, a Cypriot Turk would rather die than wear a black or blue sash, and a Cypriot Greek would be just as adamant in his refusal to wear a red one.

259. See, for example, NESİM 1990a, 31 and 33; See also CATSELLI 1979, 86–88. While Catselli makes note of certain cultural differences recognised by Turkish sources also, it is interesting that she, like certain other Greek authors, charges that the Turkish women, unlike their chaste Greek counterparts, had loose morals.

260. BAKER 1879.
261. Barclay to Seward, 20th September 1863. NARA/MD/T-463 (Roll No.1); The new consul, Cesnola, reported almost identical figures 3 years later. Cesnola to Seward, 25th August 1866. NARA/MD/T-463 (Roll No.2).
the above figures, themselves being notably only a minority), let alone in the towns, there were invariably distinguishable quarters inhabited virtually exclusively by Turks and Greeks respectively.\textsuperscript{262} To illustrate, at the turn of the nineteenth century Ali Bey articulated this feature in the cases of the villages of Episcopi, “composed of Turks and Greeks, who each have their separate quarter,” and Togni, which he remarked, “stands on the declivity of two hills; on the one are the dwellings of the Greeks, and those of the Turks on the other. Between them runs a small brook ... .”\textsuperscript{263} For sure, some neighbourhoods were during Ottoman rule largely integrated, many others undoubtedly contained at least some inhabitants from the “other” community, but this was not, however, the predominant pattern of settlements.\textsuperscript{264} Kitchener indeed observed at the end of the 1870’s that, “Though Greeks and Turks may live together in the same village in their lives, they associate very little together. Generally the village is divided into quarters – the Greek houses in one part, and the Turkish houses together in another.”\textsuperscript{265} Çiçek’s suggestion that Moslem or Christian majorities in particular areas was “coincidental,” is stretching even his own original research too far.\textsuperscript{266} The evidence, then, certainly does not support the unfounded and clearly politicised contemporary thesis championed by Pollis that, “separate residential areas did not exist,” that is, “until recently, most dramatically since 1975 with the ‘exchange of population’ agreement, a form of ethnic cleansing, which followed the division of Cyprus, whereby Greek Cypriots living in the north fled or were forced south and Turkish Cypriots living in the south fled north.”\textsuperscript{267}

A much more impartial approach to the matter is that adopted by Çevikel. Based on his research of primary sources, he finds that while it may not be possible to distinguish purely Turkish/Moslem or purely Greek/Christian residential areas, there were significant and identifiable concentrations of one or other group in particular areas and quarters.\textsuperscript{268} Such a position is supported by Charalambous, who in a novel article expounding her findings regarding the relationship between “ethnicity and space” in Cyprus, says that, “In the mixed villages, the two communities seem to occupy either two completely different areas or different neighbourhoods with a scattering of ethnic elements within the villages.”\textsuperscript{269} What are particularly novel are her findings as to the socio-cultural differences

\textsuperscript{262} This assertion is supported also by Oakley. He contends too that, “Even in mixed settlements, each group had its own ‘quarter’ and remained socially largely separate from the other despite the evolution of a common core of Cypriot custom and some degree of neighbourly co-operation.” OAKLEY 1993, 91.

\textsuperscript{263} ALI BEY 1993, 263–264 and 289.

\textsuperscript{264} See JENNINGS 1993, 135–137 and ÇİÇEK 1993, 42; For an explanation as to the foundation of ethnic segregation in the capital Nicosia, see ATTALIDES 1981, 98–99.

\textsuperscript{265} KITCHENER 1879, 153.

\textsuperscript{266} Çiçek studied the records of the Şeri courts spanning a twenty-eight year period during the eighteenth century. He notably found that of 79 transactions related to land 21.7% were conducted between Moslems and Christians, as were 33% of the 185 transactions related specifically to buildings. Though this powerful evidence certainly does point to the fact that there was undoubtedly, therefore, no absolute segregation, it also shows that the great majority of such transaction continued to be conducted within a single community in the form of Christian purchasing from Christian, or Moslem purchasing from Moslem. Considering that these records seem to have been primarily related to Nicosia, where the two populations appear to have been relatively balanced in number, one would expect that, if Çiçek’s contention were in fact correct, roughly half of all such transactions would be intercommunal. It must also be kept in mind that purchases of property do not automatically mean that residences were intermingled. In other words, the owner of the property can not automatically be considered to have inhabited the particular property he was buying. ÇİÇEK 1993, 42.

\textsuperscript{267} POLLIS 1996, 70.

\textsuperscript{268} ÇEVİKEL 2000, 223.
between the two communities with regard to both the locational distribution of houses within their communal neighbourhoods, and to the planning and use of space as far as concerned particular houses. These latter differences, she suggests, are partially at least related to religious values. Charalambous’ pioneering work most certainly calls for a re-evaluation of Kyriss’ contention that, “especially in villages it was, until 1974, impossible to distinguish between Greek and Turkish Cypriot houses.” Differences may often have been pretty faint, but they were nonetheless present and more importantly indicative of socio-cultural divergence.

One reason why the integration of the two main communities in Cyprus did not advance further could be found in the millet system itself. This could be seen as a barrier to further integration, as it was by design meant to distinguish communities according to their religious backgrounds. It has even been argued, with some justification, that when the time came the millet system itself thereby increased the potential force of nationalism. This assertion seems to hold especially true in the closing decades of Ottoman rule. According to Kitromilides:

The attitude of the Ottoman state to intellectual movements and cultural communities, constitutes a critical parameter of the whole process of the implantation of nationalism. This attitude was shaped by the traditional policy of toleration toward the ‘religions of the Book’ (Judaism and Christianity) [eventually further] reinforced by the new climate of the reform of the Tanzimat era. Especially after the Crimean War official toleration of non-interference in the educational and cultural life of the subject nationalities allowed space for the initiatives which led to nationalist ferment.

It could be regarded as ironic, therefore, that the very “official toleration” of the Ottoman Empire referred to by Kitromilides was to facilitate its own downfall by easing the passage of rising nationalism. In the end, in Kedourie’s words, “The millet system broke down because such limited autonomy could not satisfy nationalist ambitions, while at the same time, limited as it was, it came to seem to the ruling institution dangerously disruptive of the Empire.”

To sum, despite identifiable exchange and convergence in linguistic, cultural and even religious domains, despite plentiful instances of political cooperation, the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, within a fundamentally compartmentalizing millet system, did maintain a separate, distinctive communal existence throughout the Ottoman epoch. Though their lines of distinction and separation were admittedly not always lucid; though there was undoubtedly some conversion, there were common religious rituals and shared vocabulary, the fact remains that Moslem Turks and Orthodox Greeks in Cyprus could, from the beginning to the end of Ottoman rule, and thereafter, be considered distinguishable groups. As Joseph has said: “Despite four centuries of coexistence and considerable physical intermingling, the two communities remained separate and distinct ethnic groups.”

270. Ibid., 90–91, 97, 101 and passim.
271. Ibid., 102.
272. KYRISS 1977, 15.
273. KITROMILIDES 1990a, 9.
274. KEDOURIE 2000, 112.
To avoid misunderstanding, we should reiterate that “peaceful coexistence” and cooperation was the norm between Orthodox Greeks and Moslem Turks in Ottoman Cyprus. Even in the tumultuous year of 1821 there is evidence that cooperation could still occur even under the most precarious of circumstances. Undoubtedly such was still generally the case even at the outset of British rule with, for instance, Commissioner Inglis noting at the time that, “Turks and Christians seem to live amicably and harmoniously together.” All the same, “coexistence-even when peaceful—should not be construed as proof of a single nation.” This was assuredly not the case in Cyprus, where, indeed, 1821 can, in some ways, fairly be regarded as a landmark, both in terms of the rise of Greek nationalism and of the partially concomitant rise of ethnic tensions; as a turning-point both in terms of the level of “peaceful coexistence” and, more critically, in terms of the national bifurcation of Cypriot society.

2.5 1821: A Watershed in Graeco-Turkish Relations in Cyprus

Even in Greece the independence war of 1821 was not one in which the nationalist sentiments of the masses played any notable part. Much of the fighting against the Ottoman forces was carried out by irregular bands of outlaws known as “Klephts”, (literally “the thieves”), whose primary goal was not national salvation, but rather self-interest. In the words of one well-known historian of Greece, “the Kléphtes were a law unto themselves. They fought when they pleased and obeyed no man. If they chose not to fight, they readily made accommodations to the point of treachery. But this was in part because none of them yet felt themselves to be Greeks in a national sense.” The Church hierarchy too, if anything, appears to have tried to discourage the uprising rather than lead it. Thus, Greek nationalist sentiment in Greece was clearly initially limited to a select group, mainly members of the clandestine Philiki Etairia (or, “League of Friends”), organization, which had itself been founded in Odessa by expatriate Greek merchants.

Not surprisingly, the same general absence of nationalist feelings was also evident amongst the Greeks of Cyprus at the outset of the nineteenth century; nationalism was both an idea and sentiment that had simply not yet flourished on the island and being so distant from the Greek mainland it should be of little wonder that the Greek nationalist movement’s progress was to be relatively slower in Cyprus than in many other Greek-inhabited locations. There is nothing to support the contention of one nationalist

276. Hill, Doros and Koumoulides, for instance, all note how despite grave danger to themselves, some Turks were even at this dangerous juncture willing to assume substantial risks to help protect the Greeks from the wrath of the Governor and his lieutenants. HILL 1952, 130; DOROS 1955, 291; KOUMOULIDES 1974, 63.

277. Inglis, in Cyprus Annual Report for 1879, 80.

278. CONNOR 1994, 52.

279. WOODHOUSE 1998, 137.

280. According to Clogg, “Grigorios V and the Holy Synod, composed of the senior metropolitan of the Orthodox Church, had issued encyclicals vigorously denouncing Alexandros Ypsilantis, Mikhail Soutsos and the Greek insurgents in Moldavia as rebels not only against the Ottoman Sultan but against God’s divine will. The patriarch was executed nevertheless, for in Ottoman eyes he had failed to observe the implicit contract whereby in return for religious freedom the patriarch was expected to act as the guarantor of the loyalty of the Orthodox pliroma, or flock.” CLOGG 1999, 36.
Turkish Cypriot author that there was at this stage, “very widespread sympathy and excitement aroused amongst the Greek Cypriots,” as a consequence of the activities of the propaganda activities of the Philiki Etaireia. On the other hand, it is also inaccurate to depict developments in Cyprus as being wholly unassociated with nationalism and the Philiki Etaireia.

As with the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul, the Archbishop of Cyprus was, together with many other prominent Greek Cypriots, to brutally lose his life in the wake of the Greek uprising. Yet, the oft-repeated contention that there was no nationalist conspiracy against the Ottomans in Cyprus in 1821, that the Archbishop like the Patriarch was devoid of all blame, and that all those executed and persecuted were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing toward their Ottoman rulers is too simplistic. Yavuz, amongst others, claims that the Governor used developments in this fateful year simply as a pretext to rid himself of the Archbishop and Dragoman whose power rivalled and constrained his own, and further, that there was, “no national dimension in Cyprus,” to the incidents of 1821. Yet, the testimony of several observers seems to contradict claims that the Ottoman wrath in 1821 was directed at a completely non-existent threat, and was based purely on barbarous, vengeful and self-seeking premises.

It is known that in a meeting with members of the Philiki Etaireia Archbishop Kyprianos did declare that the Etaireists should not expect Cyprus to participate in an uprising and that such a revolt in Cyprus, on which the Ottomans justified their later actions, was probably never planned. True also that the Ottoman action of executing hundreds of supposedly implicated leading Greek Cypriots including the Archbishop, was reproachable, particularly by the moral standards of today. Still, that all those accused were wholly innocent of charges of subversion and free of any nationalist motivations should not be accepted as a foregone conclusion. A closer look does reveal indications that by 1821 we have at least the first affirmation of an emerging Greek nationalism on the island, as indicated by involvement of certain leading Greek Cypriots, including the Archbishop, with the Philiki Etaireia and, even with the Greek War of independence itself.

An Archbishop, who is claimed by many to have been totally innocent and loyal to the Ottomans was in fact supplying funds to the insurrectionist Etaireists, (which no less a personage than Ypsilantis himself gratefully acknowledged), and declaring his support for their goals. What is more, the Archbishop had actually been inducted into their organization. According to Koumoulides, who is supported in this assertion by Hill, the Archbishop was initiated into their clandestine brotherhood in October of 1818, by one Demetrios Hypatros of Metsovo, who himself had been appointed the tenth apostle of the Society for Egypt and Cyprus. Another apostle of the Philiki Etaireia who was simultaneously both the Cypriot Archimandrite and the Archbishop’s nephew, Theophilos Theou, was discovered to have distributed in Cyprus revolutionary literature sent by Ypsi-
lantis. Though Theseus was to manage to evade capture and the island unscathed, it would be understandable that such incidents roused Ottoman suspicions of the intentions of the Church leadership.  

Koumoulides provides still further validation of Cypriot complicity in Etairist activities in the following manner:

On 1 June 1821, the Greek admiral, Constantinos Kanares, sailing from Egypt, reached a small harbour on Cyprus near the village of Agios Sergios ... Kanares and his men were met by leading Cypriots, among whom was Haji Nikolas Lavrentiou Protosygelou, a man of “great wealth and prominence” and a member of the Philike Hetaireia. Despite the apparent dangers the Cypriots gave a cordial welcome to Kanares and provided him with money and 3 shiploads of sheep, cattle, corn, barley and other supplies, while a number of young Cypriots joined the admiral’s naval force.

Hill mentions there having been only a “few volunteers” from Cyprus who participated in the Greek War of Independence and, it is in fact an almost unanimous view that the role of Cypriot volunteers was not particularly remarkable. Koumoulides, however, disagrees. He claims that, “young Cypriots from every corner of the island founded a phalanx under the able leadership of Haji Christos Boulgaris who later on became an aide-de-camp of King Othon of Greece,” and that, “From the beginning, jointly or individually, the men of Cyprus rushed to Greece and joined the naval and land forces, fighting and dying for the eventual freedom of their motherland.”

Actually, Koumoulides appears, subconsciously perhaps, to have tried to defend what Spyridakis tries to justify explicitly, when he holds that, “Cyprus was entitled to such incorporation [into the Greek state] because a great number of Cypriots fought and fell during the war.” Koumoulides’ and Spyridakis’ romantic portrayals are challenged also by Pollis who argues that in fact the, “Individual Cypriots who had fought in or defended the Greek War of Independence in 1821 were few and seemed to be “mercenaries” rather than nationalists.” Later on, however, the author does adopt a more conciliatory tone, that sounds more likely to approximate the truth, when she declares that the motives of such men, “undoubtedly were varied: profit, adventure, glory and perhaps occasionally commitment to Greek nationalism.” So, though the tone of Koumoulides’ depiction is maybe skewed in an effort to highlight the contributions of the Greeks of Cyprus in the War of Greek Independence, the very fact that at least “some” men from Cyprus, (the number he notably does not attempt to give), were willing to fight for Greece can be considered a supplementary confirmation of the existence of nationalist sentiment and aspirations in Cyprus. If we have knowledge of leading Cypriots, including Kyprianos, already having been inducted into the Philiki Etairia several years before 1821, we may well presume that there were also others unnamed who shared their sentiments at the outbreak of the War.

So, for the first time in 1821 we do see clear demonstration of the presence of Greek nationalism in Cyprus; sentiments that were unlikely to have developed overnight, but
which we could well speculate were a result largely of contact with the Etairists and other such groups. Though there is nothing to attest to the fact that Greek nationalism was yet a mass sentiment among the Orthodox community on the island or that the contribution from Cyprus to the Greek War of Independence was anything but marginal, (rather than the “major role” attributed by Koumoulides), and though there is nothing to support Dakin’s statement that the Cypriots, “had risen in sympathy with the Greeks of the Morea,” we can say, in contrast to Yavuz and others, that Greek nationalism had, in fact, made its first hesitant marks on the island by 1821. 

As has been recognised by several authors, the brutal, repressive measures of the Ottomans in 1821 could have served only to strengthen future support for the nationalists and their standard-bearers among the Greeks of Cyprus. Indeed, as Stamatakis writes, “The shadow of the hung Archbishop Kyprianos seems to have dominated [Greek] Cypriot national feelings ever since.” These people had seen their communal and religious leader, revered despite the oppressive role of the Church in society, callously executed together with hundreds of other prominent members of their community. Unquestionably it must have fostered at least seeds of doubt about the long-term position of the Orthodox Greeks within the Ottoman Empire, and maybe led to resentment against their Moslem compatriots whose communal leaders were not only spared the wrath of imperial might, but actually, in the short-term at least, profited from the weakening of the Christian elite. It is in the decades that followed that we begin to hear the first reports of serious tensions developing between Greeks and Turks on the island.

Yavuz insists that such early conflict in Cyprus did not stem from ethnic cleavages, “but from inequalities in the distribution of economic wealth and political power;” Pollis that, “During Ottoman rule ... cleavages between the ruling elite (both Muslim and Christian), the peasantry (both Muslim and Christian), and a limited middle sector of local tax gatherers torn between the two were more basic than the institutional and religious differences between Muslims and Christians,” and; Sant Cassia that, “the major cleavages in Cyprus were mainly intraethnic rather than interethnic.” There is much justification for each of these related claims, (particularly until the final years of Ottoman rule), but as the events described above, and those to be discussed below, illustrate, a politicized, ethnic dimension to conflict was emerging even by the middle of the nineteenth century.

As Hill illustrates at length, general economic and administrative conditions in Cyprus appeared to have improved considerably in the decades following 1821, particularly, according to Jenness, after the introduction of administrative reform in 1838. This is substantiated also by primary sources such as by American consular despatches, which, though frequently referring to the unfulfilled potential of the island under the Ottomans, also refer in the second half of the century to the adoption of, “important measures of internal improvement,” including roadworks and the laying of telegraphic cable. These positive developments are reiterated and others described also by even the notoriously prejudiced consul Cesnola. His friend, Hamilton Lang concurred, stating that by

296. HILL 1952, 379.
298. JENNESS 1962, 63 and 114–115.
mid-century, “A considerable amelioration,” in conditions had been witnessed, “and prosperity reawakened.” Ironically, just as the final curtain for Ottoman rule in Cyprus was in the process of falling the island in 1878 was being hailed by him in the following manner: “Of all the Turkish provinces perhaps Cyprus was the best administered.” All the same, improving, though by no means ideal, economic conditions were not to hinder the genesis of Greek nationalist sentiment in growing numbers of the Orthodox population, so that by the time the Ottomans transferred the administration of the island to the British in 1878 there was already a palpable basis of national consciousness amongst the Greek Cypriots.

We see then from 1821–1878 a series of incidents indicating the progressive escalation of the force of nationalism as a mass sentiment amongst the island’s Greeks. We should be clear, however, that this nationalist affection was not autonomous in the sense of being separate from that in other geographical locations. It was not related to an aspiration that sought the overthrow of the Ottomans so as to achieve independence for the Cypriots per se, but rather one that primarily sought union with Greece, or Enosis. The Cypriot territory had political meaning only in so far as it was a part of the national territory of Greece and of the Greek nation. This reasoning was to be paralleled later in the case of the island’s Turks who sought union with Turkey, rather than their own separate nation-state. As Stavrinides declares, “The crucial point ... is that the two main ethnic groups which are to be found in the island are thought of by their members as being not ‘self-contained’ Cyprus-based nations, but integral parts of larger nations.” There was no single Cypriot identity, certainly no final fusion of ethnic and religious groups, most importantly no common political objective shared by a unified people of Cyprus upon which that people might have developed perhaps a common Cypriot nationalism.

The primary import of the emerging force of Greek nationalism, is, as far as we are concerned, the fact that it was closed to the island’s Turkish community, it resulted in an oversight, even oblivion of the Turkish Cypriot community.” As such it could well be expected to lead to their willingness to search for a political destiny divergent to that of the Greeks. Tracing the early stages of development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus serves, then, both as an example with which the latter nationalism can be compared and contrasted, and to highlight one of the main causes for the later appearance of Turkish nationalism on the island.

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299. See, for example, Barclay to Seward, 20th September 1863. NARA/MD/T-463 (Roll No.1), where the consul notes also of Cyprus that, “good Government alone is required to improve the advantages which nature has bestowed upon her.” See also Barclay to Seward, 20th September 1863. NARA/MD/T-463 (Roll No.1) and Barclay to Seward, 11th January 1864. NARA/MD/T-463 (Roll No. 2).

300. Cesnola, who had no qualms about referring to the Turks as “semibarbarous”, all the same interestingly noted that works undertaken to dry the swamps near the towns were having a positive effect on ending the spread of fevers, a matter that the Ottoman administration is quite frequently criticized for having done nothing about. See Cesnola to Seward, 25th August 1866, and Cesnola to Fish, 30th March 1870. NARA/MD/T-463 (Roll No. 2).

301. LANG 1878, 190.

302. STAVRINIDES 1999, 8. Some may object that Stavrinides’ statement is not valid, basing their arguments on the less well-defined goals of nationalisms in Cyprus today. At the time under consideration, however, and even at the time of Stavrinides’ writing in the mid-1970’s, Stavrinides analysis holds up well.

303. KIZILYÜREK 1998, 35.
Swift on the heels of the tragedies of 1821 came the Marseilles Manifesto, the first available authentication of a concerted attempt to formalize Greek Cypriot nationalist demands for liberation from the Ottomans. It was a call made by prominent Greek Cypriots, including the Etarist Archimandrite Theophilos Theseus and his brother Nicolas, as well as other leaders of the lay community who had fled the island in 1821 and had eventually gathered in Marseilles. Issued on the 6th of December 1821, the Manifesto called for the raising of a military force. With the anticipated assistance of sympathetic European leaders, this force would wage war against the Turks and free the island from their rule so that it might be reunited with Greece. The manifesto’s importance lay in its representing early nationalist feelings and forming an embryonic effort to form an effective nationalist movement, but it was to have little consequence in practice. In Hill’s words, “The manifesto fell absolutely flat, so far as immediate action in Cyprus was concerned.”

Pleas for external assistance were also made along similar lines to Ioannis Kapodistrias, who became the first president of the new Greek state in January of 1828. Koumoulides writes that, “In August 1828, Archbishop Panaretos of Cyprus, the bishops of Paphos, Kition and Kyrenia, and several Cypriot laymen wrote to Ioannes Kapodistrias, requesting that he should include Cyprus as part of Greece in his future negotiations with the European governments.” A further such attempt was made in 1830 by the Greek Cypriot agent Paul Vondiziano, “who was sent from Cypros to Capo d’Istria to persuade him to annex the island to Greece.” This was in Hill’s terms, “a curious anticipation of the modern Enosis movement,” and he designates these developments as the, “first symptoms,” of the, “Hellenic idea.” Kapodistrias is said to have been positively inclined as far as the incorporation of Cyprus in the new kingdom was concerned. Indeed, in late 1827 and again in 1828 Kapodistrias had made this desire known to the representatives of the Great Powers supporting Greece. Yet clearly, with the foundations of the Kingdom of Greece unsettled and Greek-inhabited territories in much closer proximity still under Ottoman rule, the peripheral case of Cyprus could not have been a priority. In Hill’s words, “the President was not likely to be tempted into an adventure so far beyond the scope of his newly born state, and Vondiziano’s mission bore no fruit.”

Notwithstanding claims that the Greeks on the island had openly revolted in the cause of enosis in 1821, for which there is no proof, the first occasions on which it could be claimed such insurrections took place appears to have been in 1833. The first of two such revolts came in March 1833. Initially the insurgents appear to have been reacting to the increase of financial exactions on the Cypriot population, but when the leadership of the
movement was taken over by Nicolas Theseus, who had by now returned to the island, the movement’s objectives seem to have broadened to encompass also the goal of enosis. With the Governor’s timely decision to rescind the new financial burden, however, the revolt soon petered out, and Nicolas was once again forced to flee the island.310

Though there is some dispute as to the nature of the second such revolt of 1833, it has been claimed that a monk, known as Ioannikos of Elias, (who it is purported had earlier fought as a volunteer in the Greek War of Independence), led an uprising calling for enosis that began in July in the Karpaz region of Cyprus. Ioannikos’ revolt does not appear to have been greeted with broad-based enthusiasm, or to have caused undue trouble for the maintenance of Ottoman rule and it was quashed within the space of a few days. It was, though, one more indication that Greek nationalism was laying down its roots in Cyprus and that some nationalists, (wrongly, as they were to their dismay to discover), were beginning to be convinced that the masses were now willing to rally to this cause. It suggests, at a minimum, that Ioannikos felt sufficiently confident that there were grounds to believe nationalist sympathies were held by a significant enough number of his compatriots to allow him to initiate a revolt espousing enosis.311

There is still further corroboration of the build-up of Greek nationalism in Cyprus before the British period in the reaction of Cypriot Greeks to international developments. Many sources make note of a nationalistic response to the expansion of the Greek Kingdom. Initially only a rump state in the southern regions of present-day Greece, the kingdom grew to incorporate more and more of the Orthodox Greeks who had at the outset been left outside of its jurisdiction. One important addition that was to heighten hopes and endeavours amongst nationalists in Cyprus, in fact the first incorporation of territory since independence, was the British transfer of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864. Many were encouraged to believe that after a temporary stay on the island the British might do the same for Cyprus, returning her from the Ottomans’ clutches to the bosom of “mother” Greece.312

There was also by the second half of the nineteenth century related celebratory public sentiment regarding the difficulties encountered by the faltering Ottoman Empire, even where they did not relate directly to Greece and the Greeks. The prospect of Ottoman defeats, particularly at the hands of the Greeks’ Orthodox “cousins”, the Russians, awakened nationalist hopes of salvation from Ottoman fetters and of the accomplishment of enosis. Gazioğlu notices how the Crimean War in particular became a, “cause of communal tension and anxiety in the early 1850’s.”313 Hill also deals with this matter in some detail. He explains that, “the Crimean War stirred the whole island into a fervour of excitement,” comments on how, “open expression was given to seditious sentiment – cries of ‘long live the Emperor Nicolas’ and ‘Down with the Sultan’,” could be heard; how revolutionary pamphlets secretly imported from Greece were distributed, and how, “in a Greek café there were exhibited pictures of the Emperor Nicolas and of a Greek waving a Greek flag and trampling on the Crescent.”314 That all was not well was signified further when in 1867 the Ottoman governor of Cyprus sent a despatch to the Porte calling for

312. See, for example, PURCELL 1969, 204.
313. GAZIOĞLU 1990, 115.
reinforcements to be sent to the island due to the increased risk of popular unrest resulting from the growing threat of Greek nationalism. Hill also refers to “increased tension” between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots following the news of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and notes the British consul’s report that in the furore at least one Greek muhtar, (village headman), was killed by a Turkish official. Nor did the Greek Cypriots’ hopes for Russian assistance and patronage end with British rule, it being reported that one schoolmaster had gone so far as to state that, “The English were dogs (skilos), and the slaves of the Russians, who would soon come and liberate Cyprus and the Holy Church.”

If the Greek Cypriots held warm feelings as regards Russia, it is evident that those of the island’s Turks were inversely hostile. Scott-Stevenson, recounting the feelings of the Turkish police at the outset of British rule, declared that, “nothing would give them greater pleasure than to be let loose amongst the Muscovite hordes.” She further intimated:

Their hatred of the Russians is very remarkable: they look upon them as their inveterate and deadly foes. Every man amongst them has some separate deed of the butchery and treachery of their detested enemies to relate. It is curious to watch the quiet, sleepy Turk rouse up when Russia is spoken of; to see his eyes flash and his hands tremble with rage; the intense excitement that pervades his whole body at the idea of being led against them.

2.7 The Tanzimat Reforms and Their Consequences

Meanwhile, as Greek nationalism began to gain some ground on the island in the mid-nineteenth century, the island’s Moslem Turks, though concerned and prepared at times to voice their concern, continued to languish without any coherent or popular political programme to counter demands for enosis. Gradually, however, developments in the Ottoman Empire were to lead them too to adopt new doctrines designed to maintain the integrity of the Empire. Yet it was only after successive, overlapping stages of Ottomanism and Islamism that the Turks of the Empire, those in Cyprus included, finally abandoned the goal of upholding a multi-ethnic empire and instead turned gradually to a nationalism based largely on ethnic Turkish foundations.

It is not the object of this study to analyse the causes of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, so much as to say simply that a variety of factors such as economic mismanagement, social unrest and hostile neighbours are likely to have contributed. On top of this, by the nineteenth century the first seeds of nationalism had also been sown and were sown and were

316. HILL 1952, 26. At the outset of British rule, Scott-Stevenson reports that, “the previous year a serious riot had taken place between Moslems and Christians,” and it is quite possible, whatever the specifics of the matter she was referring to, tensions regarding the political developments at the time were playing their part. There is little basis to conclude that enosis was then a pressing danger for the Turks, though Dakin does mention a tentative plan to incite revolt in, amongst other areas, the island of Cyprus. DAKIN 1972, 129.
317. SCOTT-STEVENSON 1880, 304–305.
318. Ibid., 80.
319. Ibid.
320. For a thorough appraisal of the causes of the decline, especially in its internal social and economic dimensions, see İNALCIK - QUATAERT 1994, passim.
beginning to sprout within the Empire, potentially capable of destroying its social foundations. By the middle of the nineteenth century the idea of the nation and of “national”, (as opposed to religious), autonomy was beginning to shake the foundations of the Ottoman Empire. Transylvania and Greece, (albeit still territorially limited), were lost already, and Serbia was well on the way to full independence. The weakness of the Empire was blatant and its rulers were coming to realize that reform was increasingly urgent if the empire was to be preserved.

Early attempts at reorganization came under Selim III, (1761–1808). In a programme called simply the, “New Order”, he sought, “to restructure the state’s administration and military organization,” and very significantly initiated a, “new Western orientation of the empire,” as a consequence of which, “Young Ottomans were trained in French, and permanent diplomatic missions were opened in the main capitals of Europe.” It was, as Itzkowitz asserts, to be a means through which, “Western ideas would filter into the empire and help transform it in the nineteenth century into a more modern state.”

Mahmut II, (1785–1839), after the short-lived reign by his half-brother Mustafa IV, was in 1808 to take-up the reformist path initiated by his uncle, Selim. He introduced changes designed to spread education, modernize the army and combat feudalism. Reform entered a more radical and dramatic phase under his son and successor Abdülmecid I. It was under him that the first of the great reforming edicts issued in the final century of the Ottoman Empire, which are together referred to as the “Tanzimat”, (meaning “Reorganization”), was proclaimed.

The Imperial Rescript of Gülhane, (“Hatti-I Şerif of Gülhane”), was promulgated on 3rd November 1839, barely a few months after Abdülmecid had come to power. It was fundamentally a liberalizing edict partly directed at impressing the western powers and gaining their support, and partly at genuinely addressing the weaknesses of the Empire. It called amongst other things for the further rationalization of the armed forces and firmer guarantees for the security of the life and property of subjects. Most critically, however, it demanded the equal application of the law to all persons in the Empire, whatever their religious background might be. Socially this amounted to a revolutionary development. The Imperial Rescript of Gülhane thereby countered the politically and legally sanctioned segregation of the religious communities, which had allowed the Moslems in the Empire to claim a higher status to the “infidels”, and conversely had allowed the Christians to avoid being subjected to the will of the Moslems in internal community affairs.

Further edicts were promulgated over the following years, key amongst them being the Imperial Rescript of 1856, (“Hatt-I Humayun”). This Rescript communicated even more categorically the completely equal status of all Ottoman subjects irrespective of their faith. Coming on the tails of the Crimean War and prior to the Congress of Paris, it was in some ways an attempt to enter the good books of the western powers. The economic and military difficulties of the Ottomans meant that they increasingly felt dependent on the financial and military largesse of the West, particularly on Britain and France and as a result felt compelled to bow to their demands for “liberalization”.

322. For a discussion of this Rescript, and of French and British pressures for its adoption, see LEWIS 1968, 115–117.
With much justification, Rustow, in fact, argues that all three of, “The major reform proclamations of the nineteenth century – the edicts of 1839 and 1856 and the constitution of 1876 – were all timed or even conceived so as to gain maximum support from Europe at times of major foreign crisis.”

We should not, though, be misled to believe that the nineteenth century reform process was simply or solely a means of placating the West through liberalization. Serious and specific reforms, usually of a centralizing, westernising and modernizing nature were undertaken in areas such as education, finance, legal affairs and the armed forces. Ultimately, however, the underlying goal being pursued by the Ottomans was that of checking the progress of growing ethnic nationalism, (at this stage largely restricted to the western dominions), by fostering a common sense of Ottomanism among all the subjects of the Empire irrespective of their religious or ethnic background. Essentially the Ottoman political elite was trying to combat the challenges of particularistic ethnic nationalism by giving its support to an inclusive and civic concept of an Ottoman nation while concomitantly reforming and modernising the state.

Their goal, as Breuilly puts it, was, “to reform indigenous society along modern lines ... and to link both a reformed and independent state and society to a sense of national identity,” and hence he includes the efforts of the reformist Ottoman elite within his category of “reform nationalism.” Davison similarly asserts that the leading Ottoman statesmen believed, “that to save the empire, a new egalitarian citizenship and concept of patriotism, Osmanlılık or ‘Ottomanism,’ had to be created.” Ze’evi argues that what was being witnessed, “was, in fact the birth of official nationalism. The ruling elite’s modernizing thrust was in fact an attempt to take the enormous mammoth-like dynastic empire and redefine it as a homogeneous social and cultural system, or, in other words, an Ottoman nation.”

Though apparently genuine in their intentions of introducing the doctrine of equal Ottoman citizenship, and fostering Ottomanism, Ottoman statesmen faced an uphill task. For many peoples of the Empire, even equality was no longer a satisfactory concession. What they were increasingly already demanding when the reforms were introduced was separation from the Empire. In Davison’s words, as far as concerned the Tanzimat, therefore, “many of the Christians wanted it to fail.” As to the Moslems, they too were by no means all keen to embrace the reforms. There was strong resistance to accepting the Christians as equal. Having for long felt a sense of superiority, they had in recent times been aggravated both by Christian communities’ independence movements and the interference of the Christian Great Powers.

As Attalides reveals, there was in Cyprus too some initial resistance to these changes among both Orthodox and Moslem religious

323. RUSTOW 1973, 110.
324. In the words of Masami Arai: “The most crucial point for the issue of ‘nationality’ or Ottoman patriotism was the affirmation of the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law regardless of religion. This innovation of the Ottoman government that had been indifferent to the domestic affairs of non-Muslim subjects under the ‘millet’ system had a great effect on the Ottoman community; together with a new idea of French origin, the concept of nation, it prepared a new principle of Ottomanism. The principle aimed at creating a free and equal nation like France.” ARAI 1992, 2.
325. BREUILLLY 1995, 230 and 244; For a useful comparison of reform nationalism in China, Japan and Turkey, see also Ibid., 230–253.
326. DAIVISON 1954, 853.
327. ZE’EV1 1996, 195.
328. DAIVISON 1954, 853.
329. Ibid., 854–858.
leaders. Resistance, however, was not restricted only to the Cypriot elite. As Katsiaounis, for instance, indicates, the threat perceived by the Moslem labouring class of being relegated to the bottom of the social scale, of now being equally inferior with the “infidel” labourers, was also to constitute, “a serious obstacle toward any co-operation with their counterparts in the Christian Millet.”

Hence, as touched upon earlier, the case has been made with some justification that the Ottoman strategy of liberalization and equalization did not just fail, it actually hastened the very destruction of the Empire it was seeking to uphold. For Karpat: “The centralization policy pursued through the Tanzimat reforms started as a search for means to create one unified Ottoman nation & ended by stimulating the national awakening of all religious & ethnic groups, including the Turks & Arabs.” He outlines well also how introducing the concept of equal Ottoman citizenship status for all people in the Empire, was essentially depriving the overarching Orthodox “millet”, “of its formerly legal aspect and reducing it to a mere religious affiliation.” Through the Tanzimat, legal, cultural and educational functions of the “millet” were now to be taken over by the state. This process was augmented by the fact that by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the number of millets had been increased, with the Orthodox millet being broken up along more ethnic lines. There were now separate Greek, Serb, Bulgarian, and eventually Romanian Orthodox Churches recognised by the Ottomans. Inadvertently, the Ottomans were thereby strengthening the individual Orthodox citizen’s capacity to conceive of him, or herself, along ethnic lines. Furthermore, by reforming the millets and reducing the power of the clergy over their “flock” they, “destroyed an important channel of influence through which the Ottoman administration had maintained its power over the non-Muslim population.” In sum: “the millet reform, aided by other developments, destroyed or undermined this major and last traditional form of organization, liberating the individual to seek membership and identity in a new form of political association – the nation. From now on, one is faced not with religious communities but with nationalities.”

2.8 Ottomanism: Its Nature and Its Failure

In analysing Ottomanism we must be careful to distinguish between the political loyalty that had already been present for the House of Osman for many centuries amongst the majority of its subjects, (whether they be Jew, Christian or Moslem), and the new “national” identity of being “Ottoman” that the Ottoman leadership was by the mid-nineteenth century attempting to foster. Ottomanism, then, was by no means simply a matter of

330. ATTALIDES 1979, 39.
331. KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 40–41.
332. KARPAT 1973, 86; Oba basically concurs here with Karpat, stating, “In a way the ‘Tanzimat’ assisted the collapse of the Ottoman state, by failing to satisfy the peasantry and contributing to their development of national consciousness. The new order which it brought hastened nationalist developments among the Christian populace.” OBA 1995, 178.
334. The official Ottoman policy of recognising their independence was resisted, to no avail, by the Ecumenical Patriarchate which fought to preserve its jurisdictional autonomy. PAPADOPOULOS 1967, 206.
335. KARPAT 1973a, 91.
loyalty to imperial masters. It required the people to feel that they too had a stake in the future of the Ottoman state. A leading Turkish nationalist Yusuf Akçura, correctly identified the essence of Ottomanism in 1904, comparing it to the sense of being American in the United States. The aim, he said, was:

… to create an Ottoman Nation (“Osmanlı Milleti”) a new nationality united in a common country similar to the American nation in the United States of America by blending and assimilating to each other the above mentioned peoples in spite of the religious and racial differences [existing] … among them. The ultimate result of all these difficult processes was to be the preservation of the “High Ottoman State” in her original external form, that is within her old boundaries.336

Ottomanism as championed in the second half of the nineteenth century was fundamentally different to the elitist Ottoman identity that had hitherto existed amongst high-level bureaucrats and many well-to-do inhabitants of Istanbul. It was now to be a mass phenomenon. In Bernard Lewis’ words:

The idea of Ottomanism … as a nationality in the European sense is a product of nineteenth century liberal reformism. This was the concept of an Ottoman identity and loyalty embracing all Ottoman subjects irrespective of religion or of ethnic origin in a single Ottoman nation inhabiting the Ottoman fatherland.337

If one man in particular is to be chosen as representative of Ottomanist thought, then probably the most obvious candidate would be the renowned Young Ottoman writer, Namık Kemal who was in the early 1870’s to be banished to Cyprus for taking his ideas for constitutional reform too far. Kemal does not appear to have been particularly popular amongst the Turkish Cypriot community during his enforced stay on the island.338 Even so, with national consciousness on the island gradually surfacing, his past presence on the island eventually began to be transformed into a symbolic association by Turkish nationalists there as attested to by the numerous references made to him in later years. What may also at first seem strange about this choice is the fact that the writings of Kemal have been utilized by Turkish nationalists, westernizers and Islamists as well, and he would probably have claimed to have seen the possibility for amalgamating all these strands within an Ottoman political framework. Today, it is easy to question Kemal’s lack of realism by asking, for example, how he hoped to maintain the support of the Christians in the Empire for Ottomanism if he were at the same time calling for a re-emphasis of Islam, or even of the Moslems when he so passionately glorified the Turks.339 Nonetheless, it was Kemal, as Mardin maintains, who was most responsible for popularizing the notion of “vatan”, or “fatherland”, “as being not only a geographical unit, but also an emotional bond in which the memories of ancestors, the recollections of one’s own youth and earliest experiences all had a place.” Mardin certainly does not dispute the lack of clarity as to what exactly Kemal’s definition of the fatherland consisted of. He concedes that Kemal used various words, including “ümmet”, (“community”), “Osmanlı”, “Türk”, “kavm” (“tribe”) and “mezheb”, (“denomination”) often interchangeably, yet contends, all the same, that, “Every one of these words was used by Namık Kemal at one time or another to denote the

337. LEWIS 1980, 28.
338. See, for example, KORKUT 2000, 116; See also ATEŞİN 1996, 87–89.
339. MARDİN 1962, 331.
focus of national allegiance.” And, while he did use the term “Ottoman”, “as a name to describe all the citizens of this ideal empire,” he also sometimes used it to refer to the pre-Ottoman heritage of the Turks.”

Theoretically too, though he was clearly more of an Ottomanist than a Turkist, it could be argued that he contributed at least indirectly to the emergence of Turkish nationalism by helping to popularize the idea of the nation, albeit an Ottoman, rather than a Turkish nation that he was conceptualizing. Deringil has argued that though Namık Kemal, “represents a more ‘Ottomanist’ perspective and straddles the space between Pan-Islamism and Turkish nationalism,” he nevertheless is one of, “the direct parents of Turkish nationalism.”

Ottomanism was not, however, something that emanated from the people, but rather a phenomenon that emerged largely from above, in line with Hugh Seton-Watson’s theoretical explanation of “new” nations, those where elites try to create national consciousness in the people where it does not exist. As Seton-Watson indicates, however, these elites often fail, and this was attested to also in the case of the attempt to create an Ottoman national consciousness. Why then did Ottomanism fail? The answer could perhaps best be summarized as “too little, too late”. By the time the idea of Ottomanism began to be spread the idea of nationalism in other guises had already caught the attention of much of the Empire, (particularly the western, predominantly Christian regions), and compared to these alternatives Ottomanism now held little sway. With the Christians rebelling, Ottomanism came to be seen as a questionable concept to many of the Moslems of the Empire too. After all why should they be standing-up for the unity of the Empire, and the equality of the Christians when these “infidels” wanted nothing to do with them or with the Empire? The upsurge of nationalism in the Balkans and the consequent breakdown of the Orthodox millet, then, were central to the collapse of Ottomanism.

Having lost territories in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, and, more relevantly here, the feasibility of implementing the idea of Ottomanism was to really lose out as a result of the consequences of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin that followed it in 1878. These were to result, amongst other things, in the autonomy of Bulgaria and the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, as well as in Russia receiving Ottoman territory in Bessarabia. The loss of these long-standing Ottoman domains had severe demographic consequences for the Empire. The proportion of Moslems to Christians remaining within the Empire changed noticeably as the Christians by-and-large stayed within their newly independent states, whilst many millions of Moslems began to emigrate eastwards towards the remaining territories of the Empire. According to Karpat’s research, “By 1880 the Anatolian peasantry was already 80 percent Muslim, and this percentage increased steadily thereafter.”

340. Ibid., 326–328.
341. DERİNGİL 1993, 170.
342. As noted earlier, Seton-Watson’s counterpart to the “new” nation is the “old” nation, where national consciousness develops spontaneously amongst the people as, for example, he argues, was the case with the French and English. For his arguments on this issue see SETON-WATSON 1977, 8–9.
343. For Lewis: “[W]hen the national idea conquered them, they began to think of themselves not as Ottomans, but as Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars and Armenians. Against these heady visions the pallid doctrine of Ottomanism, so dubiously supported by the Turks themselves, had little chance of success.” LEWIS 1968, 340.
344. It was to an extent this latter belief that increasingly made Pan-Islamism more appealing an option.
345. KARPAT 1985, 55.
2.9 Islamism and the Integration of the Empire: Another Failed Alternative

There is some dispute as to when the new sultan Abdülhamid II, (1876–1909), actually shifted from an Ottomanist to an Islamist outlook. The common perception is that he was an Islamist, more-or-less from the start, though it would be wrong to consider that he ever wholly abandoned the notion of common Ottoman patriotism, as throughout his reign there were still substantial numbers of non-Moslems living within his Empire. It can justly be said, however, that in the wake of the Berlin Congress the Sultan greatly altered at least the emphasis of his political statements and policies. He now, “accepted the concept that the Ottoman state had a predominantly Muslim majority and that the Islamic characteristics of its culture should prevail. Consequently, he began to identify himself with the religious sentiments and political aspirations of Muslims throughout the world by making wide use of his title as Caliph.” This policy allowed the Sultan and his administrators to assimilate with greater ease the incoming Muslim immigrants from lands lost in the Balkans and to the Russians. Very critically, it also assisted him in maintaining the loyalty of the Arabs, who now constituted, with the loss of Christian population and western territory, an even more substantial and critical element of the Empire.

Other domestic and external circumstances which Abdülhamid found himself confronted by when he came to power were also highly relevant to this change. The uprisings of the Christians had caused a backlash among the Moslems of the Empire. So too had the relative secularisation brought about by the Tanzimat and regular interference of Western powers in defence of their economic and strategic interests and their client Christian populations within the Empire. Concerning Cyprus, Barclay, for example, recorded difficulties with the local Ottoman authorities that arose, “from their hatred to American and European influence in this place.” All these factors, together with further Russian encroachments on Moslem-controlled lands in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and by the British in India gave the Sultan a potential basis upon which to build-up support as the champion of Islam. In the process the autocratic Abdülhamid could also use Islamic legitimacy as a means to subdue his internal opponents.

The external dimension to Abdülhamid’s policy of Islamism often leads to the term Pan-Islamism being employed. In his role as Caliph he was seen by many the non-Ottoman Moslem world as being the upholder and temporal head of Islam and, as a result, “he might hope to rally an important body of Muslim opinion to his support, and by creating difficulties for the Imperial powers in their Muslim territories, forestall possible action against Turkey.” Karpat argues that Abdülhamid used the policy, “adroitly as threat to forestall Europe’s interference in Ottoman domestic affairs,” and Lewis contends that it was a “remarkably successful” strategy. Nonetheless, Karpat asserts also that the sultan,

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346. See OBA 1995, 197. Here Oba argues that Abdülhamid can not be properly attributed Islamist credentials until about 1890.
347. KARPAT 1973a, 107; See also, KARPAT 1985, 75.
348. In fact according to Zeine, they were probably the largest group. ZEINE 1966, 100. This assertion, however, is not backed by any hard evidence and would probably be disputed by others.
349. Barclay to Cass, 25th July 1859. NARA/MD/T-463 (Roll. 1).
351. LEWIS 1968, 342.
“never gave serious consideration to panislamism, that is, to the political unification of all the Muslims in the world,” rejecting, “Cemaleddin Afghani’s plans for a worldwide Muslim political organization,” and doing, “his best to contain the popular Islamic fundamentalist movements.”

Perhaps then, as emphasizes by Zeine, it was the internal achievements of Islamism that were most pronounced. Millions of Moslems throughout the remaining empire, including significantly the vast majority of the Arabs, remained loyal to Abdülhamid throughout his reign. In this his policies of placing special importance on the appointment of Arabs to the highest state offices and of treating Arab dignitaries with utmost respect and extravagant hospitality, no doubt played a key supporting role. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it was only after the so-called “Young Turk” Revolution of 1908 and the consequent deposition of Abdülhamid that the Arabs began to revolt en masse.

The division of the “ummah”, (or “community of Islam”), in particular the split of the Arabs, doomed Islamism as a viable policy. Even before the actual physical separation of key Arab provinces during World War I, however, the Young Turk regime had begun to discard this policy, reverting largely to Ottomanism, and beginning also to introduce a new ideology of Turkism. Accordingly, nationalism amongst the Moslems, “born first as a reaction to the economic domination of the West and its intermediaries in the Ottoman state … later developed according to the ethnic and linguistic affiliations of the main groups.” Eventually it became the turn of the Moslems as a corporate group, “to disintegrate only to re-emerge in a series of distinctive national states: Albanian, Arab and Turkish.”

2.10 The Early Turkists: Pioneers From Within and Without the Empire

By the end of the nineteenth century a Turkish nationalism of sorts was hesitantly beginning to surface within the Empire. External developments related in large part to the “Outside Turks” were in this respect critical. Landau outlines the role of many Pan-Turkists originating from Russian territories, who as a result of Russian expansion, or of the pressures of Russification and Pan-Slavism, developed in response their own identity of Turkishness and imbued it with political mission. Many of these were to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire where they propagated their views in wide-ranging circles, especially after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 had freed them of the censorship that had existed under the Hamidian regime.

Oba also points to the similar consequences of Pan-Slavism in the Balkans and the related independence of states such as Greece, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria. With ever more territory being irretrievably lost the remaining Turkish inhabitants within the Empire began to question, as had the Greeks and Slavs before them, who they actually

355. Ibid., 93.
were. Moslems who had lived in these regions and now emigrated to more eastern regions of the Empire, most, though certainly not all of whom were ethnically Turks, brought with them tales of how they had been mistreated as a result of their being Turkish.357 The massive loss of territory that the Ottomans faced in the early twentieth century following the Balkan Wars, and the consequent, “mass emigration of most of the remaining ethnic Turks from the Balkans,” was to compound these effects even further, though by now the seeds of Turkish nationalism had really already been shed.358

Another group of non-Turk emigrants from central Europe may, over the longer duration, have also contributed to the growth of Turkish nationalism by diffusing nationalist ideas. These were the nationalist exiles from Poland and Hungary who had sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire following the failure of their revolutionary uprisings of 1848. These exiles brought and diffused the ideas of romantic nationalism to the Turkish populations amongst whom they now lived.359 Mardin, for example, records how the Young Ottomans, “frequented the bookshop of a certain Roth whose partner, a Hungarian refugee of 1848 by the name of Daniel Szilagi, provided young Turks with the latest political pamphlets and treatises to appear in Europe.”360 Lewis also points to the importance of the increasing number of student missions sent from the Ottoman Empire to European academic institutions from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. These too, he legitimately claims, served to transfer the idea of nationalism from Europe to the Turks.361

Finally, we have the very consequential effects of the increased interest in Turkish studies in Europe. By the 1860’s and 1870’s more and more European Turcologists were showing interest in the pre-Ottoman, and even pre-Islamic history of the Turks. Mardin mentions how the Young Ottoman Ali Suavi had been, “stirred,” by J. S. Bailly’s, “acknowledgment of the Turkish contribution to civilization,” which he proceeded to use, “to bolster his statements about the outstanding qualities of his people.”362 By 1870 the first ever Chair of Turkish studies had been set-up at Budapest University.363 Whatever the academic value of many of these European Turcologists’ works and studies may have been, the effects on the Turks themselves were substantial. Akçura’s words illustrate the point well:

We did not learn the ideals of nation and fatherland from our schools, but by chance from foreign books that we happened to come across, or from the activities of foreign nations living within or around us. Even if what I say is painful to accept, is it not true?364

Of these Turcologists perhaps the most influential was Arminius Vambéry, (1832–1913), who wrote extensively on the history of the Turks and interacted with many Turk-
ish intellectuals whilst living in Turkey. That Vambéry was a Hungarian scholar was not much of a coincidence when it is taken into account that Hungary could at the time be considered the centre of Turcological studies. Turcology was particularly strong here largely as a result of the theory that the Magyars and Turks, as well as peoples such as the Finns, Estonians and Mongols shared common origins as a group of peoples (and languages) known as “Turani ans” and originating from a mythical Central and South-East Asian land to the north-east of Persia. As Demirkan explains, though this belief was to have its most pronounced impact on Turkish political life, it was a passionate group of Hungarian intellectuals who first propagated it. Ultimately other non-Turks also championed the view that their peoples were related to the Turks, Suistola, for example, pointing out that, “the eminent men of the Finnish national awakening, Castrén, Lönrot and Snellman were strongly in favour of the view that Finns and Turks are related to each other.”

It is true that despite gaining many adherents, especially in intellectual circles, Pan-Turanism was never to be adopted as the basis of a triumphant political movement. Yet its political impact on the Turks in particular was quite substantial and many, including “non-Turani ans”, clearly believed it had the capacity to achieve greater heights as a political force. During World War I British War Office officials were to go so far as to determine it as a “danger” and to, “put forward the scheme of Kurdish nationality as a counterweight against Pan-Turani anism,” believing that the Kurds, “could be utilized to drive an important wedge into the Turanian line.” Their “national spirit”, it was proposed, should, therefore be worked on, “by promises of autonomy,” and propagandist appeals to this national spirit in order to, “prevent the Turks from connecting up the links of their Turanian chain.”

As has been mentioned, many of the early Turkists were actually immigrants who had been affected by the ideas and practical consequences of Pan-Slavism. There were also others, however, who were to emerge from within the ever-narrower confines of the Ottoman Empire. Here, where, “a Turkic-speaking, Islamic core in Anatolia was surrounded by Arab, Armenian, Greek Orthodox and other ethnie,” it had been, “difficult for Ottoman elites to envisage a ‘Turkish’ nation, at least until the empire had shrunk considerably and the territorial national ideals of the French Revolution had penetrated the social consciousness of rulers and intelligentsia.” That time had now come, and a burgeoning nationalist intelligentsia, from within and without the Empire, was now to make a progressively more coherent contribution to the construction of a theoretical basis for Turkish nationalism, and, as a result, to the emergence of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Cyprus did not itself produce any famed Turkist theorists, though each of those mentioned in the section that succeeds can be considered to have played a part in shaping nationalist thought among the Cypriot Turks, with some actually having certain intriguing associations with and effects on Cyprus’ Turkish nationalists.

365. It is likewise interesting to note that amongst more practical motivations held by the Hungarians in establishing a close association to the Turks was that they hoped for the establishment of common cause against the Slavs. On these issues see LEWIS 1968, 340–341.
366. DEMIRKAN 2000, passim.
369. SMITH 1994, 143.
İsmail Gaspralı, (1851–1914), (also known as Ismail Bey Gasprinskii or Gasprinsky), was a Crimean Tatar most notable for pioneering the use of a simplified form of Turkish amongst all Turks and Moslems throughout the Russian Empire. His most famous motto espoused, “Unity in language, thought and action,” and in the words of Landau, “Gasprinsky’s basic approach in advocating pan-Turkism was to work for a union of all the Turkic groups in Russia, under the spiritual guidance of Turkey, based on a culture rejuvenated by a common language.” Gaspralı’s greatest practical contribution to the dispersion of Turkist ideas and sentiment undoubtedly came with his publication of the Tercüman Newspaper, which he finally received permission to publish, (in both Russian and Turkish), in 1883. It was to be the first Turkish daily published in Russia and was to remain in circulation until 1918. By the standards prevalent at the time, Tercüman was read widely in many Turkic regions, including the Ottoman Empire. In fact, it was actually read more than many papers published in Istanbul. Not only did the newspaper play a major role in the development of national consciousness amongst the Turkic peoples of Russia, but it also, through its wide circulation, had influence throughout the Turkish world. Gaspralı also maintained contact with Turkists in Istanbul and contributed frequently to their journals. We know that during these decades the Turkish Cypriots were keeping track of the overseas Turkish press. That this was true also in the case of Gaspralı’s Tercüman is corroborated most powerfully by the leading editorial in the first issue of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Doğu Yol published at the close of the World War I. Here it was proclaimed that the paper would follow the example of, “the late Ismail of the Crimean, the father of Turkish journalism.” His work thus appears not only to have been known of in Cyprus, but to have been a profound inspiration for leading Turkish Cypriot journalists and, true to its word, the Doğu Yol was to become a significant vehicle for the dissemination of Turkish nationalist thought in the years that followed.

Hüseyinzade Ali, (1864–1941), was another Tatar, this time from Azerbaijan, where he edited and published various journals in which he outlined his Pan-Turkist ideas. Notable amongst these was the Füyuzat, a journal which he founded in 1906, and whose pages he was more than willing to make available to the propaganda of the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in an effort to achieve his ultimate goal of the political union of the Turks. According to Swietochowski, “The group of writers who gathered around the magazine initiated a trend, called at first the Füyuzat literature, more detailed study of the life and work of Gaspralı see DEVLET, passim.

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370. This was to be based on a modified version of Crimean Turkish that was on the whole comprehensible to most Turkic groups.
373. Ibid., 151.
374. This interaction was facilitated by the fact that he was related by marriage to Yusuf Akçura. For a further, more detailed study of the life and work of Gaspralı see DEVLET, passim.
375. See, for example, Volkan 12th December 1908, where Derviş Vahdetî notes how Young Turk journals were read in Cyprus during the 1890s.
376. Doğu Yol 8th September 1919.
377. HANİOĞLU 2001, 158–159; The original Committee of Union and Progress established towards the end of the nineteenth century, and soon after to be based in Paris, was to merge with other Young Turk groups within the Ottoman Empire in 1907. Though after the merger the name Committee of Progress and Union, or CPU, was adopted officially, the original order of the words Progress and Union was eventually restored. Throughout sympathisers and members were referred to as “Unionists”. [See TUNAYA 2000, 27]. To avoid confusion and because the organization is conventionally referred to as the CUP in all stages of its existence, I too have employed the term CUP throughout this text.
which, as it grew, later came to be described also as neo-romanticism.” These neo-romantics derided the influence of alien cultures, and displayed, “a pronounced consciousness of Turkism.” Remarkably, amongst the non-Azeri Turks who belonged to the “Füyuzat group”, and wrote extensively for the journal, was a Turkish Cypriot intellectual by the name of Ahmet Raik (see below).

Hüseyinzade contributed too to journals published within the Ottoman Empire, and is said by Oba and others to have been one of the greatest influences on Ziya Gökalp. Landau communicates that he outlined in 1907 the three elements of Turkish nationalism as being “Turkism, Islamism, and Europeanism”, with his emphasis unmistakably being on the first of the three. He eventually emigrated to Turkey where he contributed to Turkist journals and served on their editorial boards together with other Russian émigrés such as Ağaoğlu and Ağuçura. Hüseyinzade Ali is known also to have contributed to the Hungarian-based Journal “Turan”, where he expressed a passion for the Pan-Turanian ideal and emphasized that religious differences could not be accepted as a barrier to the unity of the Turanian peoples.

Ahmet Ağaoğlu, (1869–1939), (sometimes known as Agayev), was like Hüseyinzade Ali an Azeri who also helped to spread Pan-Turkist ideas in Azerbaijan. Initially, after returning from studies in St. Petersburg and Paris, he focused on trying to bridge over the Sunnite – Shiite rift within Azeri society. Ağaoğlu, however, was soon to write several books related to pan-Turkist themes, and published a newspaper in Azerbaijan disseminating nationalist views. After a Russian crackdown on nationalists in 1908, and with enthusiasm over the opportunities created by the Young Turk Revolution, he emigrated to Istanbul where he continued to champion Pan-Turkist views within the Empire.

Ağaoğlu was one of the few who at an early date quite unequivocally rejected the idea of Ottomanism. Arai narrates his literary conflict with an ardent Ottomanist named Sîleymân Nazif who argued that an Ottoman nation could be formed, and who gave Britain, France and Germany as examples of how ethnic mingling had taken place leading to the establishment of national unity. Ağaoğlu’s response was to stress that in six hundred years there had been no such ethnic mixture within the Ottoman Empire, nor had an Ottoman national consciousness been formed. It was only fantasy, in fact, to think this possible. As will be discussed in later chapters, Ağaoğlu is known in his capacity as a member and administrative officer of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to have communicated with Turkish nationalists in Cyprus.

379. OBA 1995, 154;
380. Swietochowski also notes how this slogan was actually adopted in an adapted form within the Ottoman Empire by Ziya Gökalp. [See, SWIETOCHOWSKI 1985, 59 and also LANDAU 1995, 13]; One of Hüseyinzade’s main concerns appears to have been to dissuade the Azeris from developing what he saw as an ill-fated, particularistic nationalism that would prevent them from union with the Ottoman Empire. He called on the Azeris to: “Rise, rise above and step out of the narrow circle of nations [millât] and nationalism. Do not allow yourselves to be turned into submissive subjects of particularistic petty nations.” SWIETOCHOWSKI 1985, 59–60.
381. On this matter see LEWIS 1968, 349–350.
383. LANDAU 1995, 36.
385. Remzi to İsmet Paşa, 21st May 1927. 30.1.0.0-10.59/BCA-A5-6.
Yusuf Akçura, or Akçuraoğlu, (1876–1935), together with Ziya Gökalp, is perhaps one of the two most important figures associated with the initial theoretical foundations of Turkish nationalism. Though Gökalp might have been a more influential figure in terms of the practical politics of the day, it was Akçura who was really the more radical and clear-cut Turkist theorist. Akçura was yet another Pan-Turkist Tatar who originated from the Russian Empire, but who was while still in his youth to come to live in the Ottoman Empire. Like several other prominent Turkists he was to receive an education in France, where he too may well have shaped many of his nationalist ideas. Akçura’s most distinguishing quality was his ability to argue that a definite choice had to be made between competing forms of loyalty, and that at the end of the day, Turkism should take pride of place ahead of Ottomanism and Islamism. Critically, he, unlike most of his contemporaries, including most notably the more acclaimed Ziya Gökalp, was able to foresee from the first years of the twentieth century the future existence of a strong Turkish political unit beyond the confines of what was clearly by now an increasingly dilapidated Ottoman Empire. Akçura boldly pronounced that the Turks if necessary, could do without the Ottoman Empire as revealed in the following extract of his work:

> Even if an accident, God forbid, befalls the Ottoman State, the Turkic nation will still survive; it is necessary for you, beginning now, to endeavour to prolong the nation’s life, to make it progress and rise, and afterward, to regain its independence. 386

Akçura’s most definitive and influential work was without a doubt, “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset”, (“Three Kinds of Policy”), which he sent from Russia to a Turkist journal named “Türk” that was published by Turkish exiles in what was by then British controlled Egypt. Hanoğlu describes the publication of this journal as, “a cornerstone in the molding of Turkish nationalist ideology,” due to, “its strong focus on nationalism and race.” In Hanoğlu’s words, the journal, “promoted an extreme Turkish nationalism.” 387 Initially printed in 1904, Akçura’s seminal article was later reprinted as a pamphlet and distributed in Istanbul. 388 In his article, he outlined the three policies of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism and ultimately declared that, “a political Turkish nation based on race” was the best, and most viable alternative of the three. 389 Despite this, he realistically recognised the gravity of the task at hand, and especially that the low level of existent Turkish national consciousness could be an important impediment to unifying the Turks politically:

> No matter that under the influence of the west nationalist ideas have begun to spread among the Turks … this is still a very recent development. Ideas of Turkishness, Turkish literature, the dream of the unification of the Turks is still a newborn child. That powerful organization, that living and excited feeling, in short, those elements and preparations which create a solid unity among Muslims are almost completely absent in Turkishness. Most of the Turks today have forgotten their past!” 390

François Georgeon has described Akçura as the, “forgotten man” of Turkish nationalism and to a large extent he is right in noting the lack of emphasis that has been placed on him. His suggestion that this may well be an outcome of Akçura’s heavily Pan-Turkist

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386. As quoted in ARAI 1992, 64–65
388. AKÇURA 1904; See also LEWIS 1968, 326.
389. AKÇURA 1987, 18.
390. Ibid., 8.
leanings is most plausible. Such ideas did not go down too well in Atatürk's Republican Turkey, and are still generally frowned upon as adventurist today.

Less radical perhaps, but more prominent and politically influential than Akçura was Ziya Gökalp, (1876–1924). It may at first glance seem ironic that perhaps the most famous exponent of Turkish nationalism was very probably Kurdish. Born in Diyarbakır, in south-eastern Turkey, it seems that at least his mother’s family was Kurdish. This, however, would probably have had little bearing on the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, for one of his most important and lucid arguments was that to be Turkish was not a matter of race, geography or even ethnic group, but of cultural upbringing. In his words:

[G]oalp’s Turkish nationalism was, to begin with, largely cultural in emphasis, calling in particular for reviving the Turkish language through its simplification. He believed, (like Gaspıralı before, and Atatürk after him), that a regeneration of the Turkish language could help “reawaken” the Turkish nation. Unlike, Akçura, however, Gökalp, at least until his later years, was not as forthright in stating his political preference for Turkism over other alternatives for the Ottoman Empire. His writings on nationalism displayed a somewhat, “paradoxical synthesis,” revealing as they did, “elements of both a cosmopolitan French nationalism and an organic, anti-Western and anti-enlightenment German nationalism.” Some contend that he was really initially an Ottomanist, and his early writings certainly do seem to suggest this. One extract states:

Within this humble set of people, the Turks say, “we are Ottomans first, and then Turks,” the Arabs say, “we are Ottomans first, and then Arabs,” the Armenians say, “we are Ottomans first, and then Armenians”, the Greeks say, “we are Ottomans first, and then Greeks”… The Ottoman Empire is a free and advanced America of the East.

Under the influence of political developments, however, Gökalp changed his tune. A poem from 1915, when Turkist ideas were now more in vogue, wrote the lines:

Do not ask me my tribe or the branch of my race,
I have been living as a nation for five thousand years,

Do not say Oğuz, or Kayı, or Ottoman to me,
I am a Turk, this name is greater than any other title.
There is no Özbek, Nogay, Kirgiz or Kazak,
The Turkish nation is an indivisible whole.

By the outbreak of World War I then, he appears to have started more forcefully adopting the Turkist credentials for which he is most well known. Many of Gökalp’s later

391. GEORGEON 1996, 3. Georgeon provides a thorough and most useful treatment of the life and works of Yusuf Akçura that can be considered the classic academic work on this pioneer’s life.
393. GÖKALP 1959, 137.
394. Ibid., 129.
396. Quoted by FEYZIOĞLU 1985, 364.
397. Quoted by EROĞLU 1992, 55.
writings exhibit some of the realism that is to be found in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s conception of Turkish nationalism. By 1918 he was pronouncing that the initial goal should only be to unite Turks on the cultural level, and even this, he conceded, would only be achieved to begin with amongst the Öğuz Turks, (i.e. those in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran and Khwarizm). Such limitations are what made the use of his ideas as a theoretical basis for Kemalism so much more acceptable than the more exuberant pan-Turkism of Akçura.

Gökalp acted as an ideologue of the Young Turk movement, in which he was, like other such theorists very active, and his ideas are said to have impressed and influenced Atatürk quite early on. It is for these features, perhaps more than for his early theoretical statements that he deserves attention. Gökalp is known to have left a marked impression on a notorious Turkish Cypriot journalist and political activist Derviş Vahdetî. Vahdetî, who spent time together with Gökalp while both were exiled to Diyarbakır for their seditious “crimes” against the Hamidian regime, was to express unbounded respect for Gökalp and to describe him as a mentor. In fact, it has been said that the name Vahdetî was actually a pen-name adopted by Derviş which originated from the nick-name, “Lahufî”, (or “Angel”), bestowed upon him by Gökalp. Gökalp actually contributed to early issues of Vahdetî’s own Istanbul-based journal “Volkan”, probably as a personal favour to Vahdetî. Considering the unstable ebb and flow of the intellectual and political activities and associations of Vahdetî, however, more significant for us was the more consistent propagation of Gökalp’s views in the Turkish press in Cyprus.

Alp Tekin, (1883–1961), is probably one of the most fascinating characters amongst the early Turkish nationalists. He was a Jew from Salonica who went by the name of Moïse Cohen, until he adopted the pseudonym under which he wrote his books and articles, Alp Tekin. He was, however, an ardent Turkist who lambasted the Ottoman establishment for ignoring their Turkish origins and for attempting to destroy Turkism and Turkish identity. Expressing disdain for the policy of Ottomanism, he declared that:

[T]he chimera of Ottomanism, attempt[ed] to melt down the various elements of the empire in the Ottoman crucible and to create out of these heterogeneous elements a single unified nation. It was not negligence or forgetfulness that Turkism was not then being spoken of; rather, the very name wherever it might have by accident figured was being obliterated, with a zeal worthy of a better cause.

Tekin contributed regularly to nationalist journals published in the Ottoman Empire and later in republican Turkey, and had a pronounced impact in western circles where many of his works were translated and used as a basis for foreign comprehension of Turkish nationalism. We know also that his ideas reached the Turks of Cyprus. In 1928 an inscribed copy of his book “Turkification” was dispatched to Nicosia via Remzi Doğan, a

398. In one of his most famous works, however, the conceptual confusion still exists. Though he systematically outlines the “three currents” within the Ottoman Empire after the French Revolution as Islamization, Modernism and Turkism, he ends up declaring that there is no incompatibility between them and that all three need to be defended. GÖKALP 1959, 76.
399. See HEYD 1950, 129.
400. Ibid., 169.
402. See Volkan 16th March 1909.
403. LANDAU 1995, 34.
Turkish Cypriot working in Ankara. Doğan declared the book to be, “a modest gift to the library of the Nicosia-based Turkish club, the “Birlik Ocağı”. Amongst other sections this work included chapters entitled, “The Duty of Turkification”, “The Method of Nationalization”, “The aim and Value of Turkification”, “who is the Turk?”, “What is the Nation?”, and “The Attraction of Turkishness.” These were titles for which there had developed in Cyprus by the 1920’s an expanded and much more receptive audience.

That there is an overlap in terms of the Ottoman and British periods in terms of the rise of nationalism in Cyprus is indubitable. Though Greek nationalism was to reach unprecedented heights under the British occupation, it was already being cultivated under the Ottomans; concomitantly, though Turkish nationalism on the island can only be ascertained in any tangible sense during the British administration, its rise too can only be properly comprehended with reference to the pre-British era. In terms of the administrative setting too, there is much to be said for the characteristics of continuity between the Ottoman and British epochs; much more than is typically recognised, especially as relates to the early decades of British rule. Nevertheless, each era had also its distinct features; each was witness to different historical events that would play upon the advance of nationalism on the island, and, last, but not least, each imperial power had its own interests, cultural characteristics, and systems of government to which nationalist forces responded and reacted. It is, therefore, to analysis of the characteristics of the new era that dawned with the occupation of the island by the British in 1878 that we now turn.

405. LANDAU 1995, 35; This is supported by British documentation. See the confidential handbook, “The Rise of the Turks – The Pan-Turanian Movement,” February 1919, 18. Enclosed in FO 373/5/7.
406. See the first two pages and back cover of the copy of Alp Tekin’s “Türkleştirme” originally published in Istanbul in 1928 available in the archives of the Kardeş Ocağı Club, Nicosia, North Cyprus; Polat reveals that it was the same Remzi who the previous year had donated his collection of Birlik newspapers to the library of the Ministry of Education in Ankara. POLAT 1999, 445.
3 Early British rule and the genesis of Turkish Cypriot national sentiments

For Cyprus no less than for other former colonies, authors from all quarters are apt to lay the blame for ethnic rivalries and nationalist conflict on the colonial policies of divide-and-rule. In this contention at least, Singhalese and Tamil, Yoruba and Igbo, Greek and Turk, as well as many contemporary western scholars frequently concur. Yet they tend to do so with an inclination to give disproportionate weight to this policy as the fountain of nationalist discord in the former colonies, and argue that one or other, or both or all parties to this discord were the “artificial” product of the scheming British strategy of “divide-et-impera”. In the case of Cyprus, Greek authors especially tend also to additionally point the finger at Turkey. In summarizing the origins of political divisions between Greek and Turk in Cyprus, Attalides for example claims that, “They lie partly in British colonial policy and partly in the expansionism of neighbouring Turkey.”407 In support of his proclamations regarding British Imperialism, he professes that that, “the British policy of explicitly separating the two ethnic groups is apparent in the setting up of separate Greek and Turkish schools, and in the separate representation of Greeks and Turks in the Legislative Council.”408 Kyriiss alleges that, “British agents” were responsible for, “methodic instigations” of racial discord.409

Yet, as we saw in the previous chapter, Greek nationalism had already appeared in Cyprus before the British Occupation began, and before the British had even established any system of administration, the political dimension to cleavage between the island’s Orthodox Greeks and Moslem Turks was already emerging. Furthermore, though it is true Turkish nationalism cannot be identified in any meaningful sense until after the British occupation, this does not by default lead to the conclusion that it was a product of British colonial politics. As to the role of Turkey… Turkey as a state was not itself established till 1923, by which time Turkish nationalism was already evident in Cyprus. This republic’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, was disinclined, till its final days at the very least, to encourage Turkish nationalism, even in territories over which it had full authority, and the

408. Ibid., 53; Turkish authors are by no means all averse to apportioning significant blame to the British policy either. See, for example, SAMANİ s.a., 26.
409. KYRISS 1977, 35.
Kemalist ideology upon which the Republic of Turkey was itself founded, repudiated any encouragement of nationalist irredentism. Only at a much later stage did the Turkish state actually begin to play a substantial role in supporting nationalism and nationalist cadres in Cyprus. As we will see in later chapters, its policy, and that of its officials in the interwar years, did not fully embrace the strengthening of Turkish nationalism on the island, and at times can in fact be considered to have actively discouraged it! Nonetheless, Turkish nationalism did emerge in Cyprus, becoming evident well before the post-World War II period.

Thus, while not wanting in any way to unduly absolve British imperialism of its responsibilities for colonial and post-colonial conflict, or to exonerate it unduly of Machiavellian intentions, this chapter aims to assess more accurately the true level of its impact on nationalism, most particularly on Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. In so doing it recognises forthrightly, where some have failed to do so, that the onset of British rule did not lead to an absolute and immediate transformation for the Island’s inhabitants. Consequently, the effects of British rule on the rise of Turkish nationalism were gradual and only partial; the Turks of Cyprus continued also to interact with the Ottoman Empire socially, economically, politically and intellectually; the evidence shows that they were not isolated either from developments in the Turkic areas beyond the rapidly constricting confines of Ottoman administration, or as wholly ignorant of international developments and British politics as to be as unknowing and as easily malleable and manipulable a community as they are sometimes portrayed to have been.

The chapter by no means ignores, in fact acknowledges, the novel impetus of British administration on the emergence of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, although it does so with reference to trends and forces that pre-dated colonial rule, and analyses other independent historical forces and processes which were over time to lead to the transformation of a subject Ottoman community dominated by its Moslem identity, to one that was increasingly recognizant of the modern concept of nation, and that gradually pushed to the forefront its Turkish identity as the foundation of its national consciousness and basis of its nationalist sentiments. It does not deny, but rather confirms continued interaction between the island’s Turks and the Ottoman Empire; but it does not in any way support the thesis that they were in any active or substantive way encouraged to develop a Turkish nationalism by the ruling authorities of that Empire.

Tracing the early rise of such sentiments, the chapter examines the implications of the transition from Ottoman to British rule, the nature of British administration, the political outlook of both the Turkish Cypriot elite and commoners, and the increasingly negative political interaction that they had with the island’s Greek Cypriot community. It concludes with an exposition and analysis of the dramatic developments and sensational statements witnessed in Cyprus in 1907 and early 1908 which preceded the watershed of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

3.1 From Ottoman to British Rule: New Masters and Old

In 1878, with the Ottomans having suffered yet another heavy defeat at the hands of Russia, a deal known more formally as the Cyprus Convention, was struck between the Porte
and Britain whereby the British would be given the right to occupy and administer Cyprus in return for backing the Ottomans in the face of future Russian encroachments. In reality the Ottomans had little choice but to depend on the British who had provided them with support during and after the war and brought pressure to bear upon the Russians, and the price of continued British support was Cyprus. Though they were to maintain their suzerainty over the island and, in theory, to receive an annual “tribute”, in practice, the transaction regarding Cyprus brought few financial gains to the Ottomans, and it was initially considered by many in the British Government of the day to be an important strategic coup. Not only had they gained a place d’armes from which to resist further potential Russian expansion, but critically, as emphasized by Prime Minister Disraeli himself, they had also gained a base from which to guard the gateway to the newly opened Suez Canal, their “passport to India.”

Despite the real transfer of power, the Ottoman connection with the island was not as fully terminated as some appear to assume. In theory, if not in practice, they did maintain their sovereignty and were due an annual rent. More effectively, the Convention stipulated also that much of the traditional Ottoman institutional infrastructure related primarily to the island’s Moslems would be retained, with the Ottomans continuing to be involved in the appointment of officials to these institutions, including, amongst others, the Kadi of the Şeri, or religious, courts, (essentially the chief administrator of religious law), and one of the two delegates to the Evkaf, (the pious foundation, that was in Cyprus the greatest source of accumulated communal wealth, having control of vast resources of land and property charitably donated over the years by members of the Moslem community). Furthermore, it is attestable, from British as well as Ottoman sources, that the Ottoman authorities did maintain a close interest in social and political developments on the island. As their critics have complained, they may not have been effective or particularly forceful in defending Turkish Cypriot rights, or for that matter those given to the Ottoman Empire by

410. For the texts of the Convention of 4th June, its annex of 1st July and additional article of 14th August, see HILL 1952, 300–302.

411. The tribute, which never actually went to the Ottomans’ coffers, ended-up, to their anger, in the Bank of England as compensation for past loans made to the Ottomans. Heavily dependent on the British, the Ottomans protested to no avail and the matter was finally settled with the Treaty of Lausanne. More important for our story than the Ottoman resentment regarding the fate of the tribute, was the resentment the tribute was ultimately to cause on the island itself, as it was not paid directly by the British but from a special levy placed on the island’s inhabitants. [For a thorough exposition of the issue of the tribute see Chapter XII, “Finance and The Tribute”, in HILL 1952, 463–487]; In a secret despatch to the first High Commissioner of Cyprus, Colonel Biddulph, the Marquis of Salisbury emphasized that in taking over the government of Cyprus, “The aim of the English policy is in the first instance strategic.” Marquis of Salisbury to Biddulph, 4th July 1879. FO 421/32, 37.

412. Thereafter, from time to time, the worth of Cyprus for the British was questioned. However, the continued presence of sovereign British bases on the island into the 21st century does seem to attest to the fact that, at least from the point of view of dominant policy-makers, the island has over the long run retained its strategic value. For a succinct appraisal of early British interests in acquiring the island, see McHENRY 1987, 14–19, and for a more thorough exposition of the debate and developments surrounding the island’s transfer, see Dwight E. Lee’s extensive research on the matter. [LEE 1934, passim]. Lee separately reveals the apparent importance in the British decision to choose Cyprus as a base, (as opposed to other alternatives), of the evaluation of Colonel Home of the War Office Intelligence Department, who prepared a memorandum on the matter. Particularly striking was Holme’s appraisal as to why Crete was not a suitable alternative. The people of Crete, he said, “have always sought a union with Greece,” and therefore, “an occupation of Crete would infallibly produce political trouble and be a cause of weakness rather than strength.” The Memorandum, found in the private papers of General Sir John L. A. Simmons, was published for the first time by Lee in June 1931. LEE 1931, 240.
the Cyprus Convention.\footnote{See, for example, BERATLI 1999, 89.} Even so, we can not equate such failure, or political weakness with complete disinterest in the island. For example, Yusuf Kamil Paşa, the Ottoman Grand Vizier for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and himself a native of Cyprus, took a personal interest in the situation of the Turks living there, being up-dated, amongst other, usually more formal, channels, by news received from his kinsmen.\footnote{See, for example, Minute of 16\textsuperscript{th} December 1887. CO 537/23, 436; In 1902 Kamil Paşa also personally intervened in the sentencing to death of one Derviş Hasan in Cyprus, making an unsuccessful appeal to the British Prime Minister for a stay of execution. The Ottoman state generally also showed interest in Cypriot affairs by tracking reports in the international press regarding the island’s affairs. [See, for example, the translation of an extract from the Russian newspaper “Moskovskadiy Domosh”, of the 8\textsuperscript{th} of January 1889 available in Ottoman files. BOA-Y.PRK.TKM-39/14]. Kamil Paşa himself was born in Cyprus in 1832, his father reputedly having been amongst the soldiers sent from southern Anatolia to quell any potential uprisings during the political upheavals of 1821. BAYUR 1954, 47.} According to his son, Hilmi Kamil Bayur, he not only sustained an emotional attachment to the island, but did his best to utilize his good relations with the British to assure that they did not renege on the Cyprus Convention and transfer the island to Greece.\footnote{Ibid., 172–173 and 302–303.}

From both the Ottoman and the Turkish Cypriot standpoints, British rule in its early decades was not acknowledged as permanent, the belief that Ottoman Turkish rule would, or at least prospectively should one day be restored, was widespread. Even in 1910, over three decades into British rule, the High Commissioner noted that any, “suggestion that the Island, under the protection and administration of Great Britain, is no longer to be regarded as a Turkish possession … would occasion deep offence to the hyper-sensitive Turks.”\footnote{High Commissioner King-Harman to Secretary of State, 21st October 1910. CO 883/7, 122.} Turkish Cypriot nationalist leader Rauf Denktaş has recounted his grandfather saying to him as a child, that though the Turks had relinquished control of the island, they would one day return.\footnote{DENKTAŞ 1993, 8.} The Turkish Cypriots continued under the British to refer to the Ottoman Empire as, “our eternal Ottoman state,” the Sultan as their Sultan, and to emphasize that Cyprus was still Ottoman territory.\footnote{See, for example, Kübrı 13\textsuperscript{th} March and 31\textsuperscript{st} July 1893. Numerous other issues of this journal adorned their front pages with celebration of the sultan’s accession to the throne and other such anniversaries. [See, for instance, Kübrı 6\textsuperscript{th} March and 4\textsuperscript{th} September 1893, and 26\textsuperscript{th} February 1894]. That the Turkish Cypriots continued to celebrate such days well into the twentieth century is reflected in an interesting article in Mir’at-ı Zaman in 1907, which notes that while the island’s Greek Cypriots mourned the anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul, the Turkish Cypriots celebrated. Mir’at-ı Zaman 11\textsuperscript{th} June 1907.} Contrary to Georgallides’ assertion that, “the Sultan gave no evidence of being interested in Cyprus,” from the Ottoman side, there was in fact, a discernable effort to uphold the special rights accorded to them as a result of the Convention, to stay informed of developments regarding both the island as a whole, and more particularly of the position of the Turkish Cypriots.\footnote{See, for example, letter from Kadi of Cyprus, enclosed in Ministry of Internal Affairs to Office of the Grand Vizier, 23\textsuperscript{rd} April 1904. BOA-Y.MTV-46/259, where the Kadi reports to Ottoman authorities on developments in the Legislative Council; See also, letter from Ministry of the Interior to Office of the Grand Vizier, 9\textsuperscript{th} June 1907, in BOA-Y.MTV-157/298.} Amongst other things, they continued to provide funds and assistance for Turkish Cypriot education, albeit insufficient and sometimes irregular.\footnote{Thus, for example, the Cyprus Blue Book confirms that at the turn of the century 13 of the Moslem schools on the island were still being maintained by a “Constantinople Grant”. Cyprus Blue Book, 1900–1901, 292; See also WEIR 1952, 72.} At times they also interceded with the British on
behalf of the island’s Turks. In 1895, for example, Said Paşa, informed the British ambassador to the Sublime Porte that the Ottoman government had learnt, “both from the Moslem inhabitants of the Island and from the Greek press, that there is a good deal of effervescence and excitement in the Island,” stating that the, “Moslems have complained that the attitude of the Christians is very menacing, that they are using insulting language towards the Moslems, and that the latter fear that there will be some attack on them ... [and] that many Moslems are, in consequence, obliged to leave the island.”

All the same, even though links with the Ottoman Empire were clearly not severed, the impact of British rule was unquestionably significant enough to warrant noting change as well as continuity in the communal affairs of the Turks of Cyprus. If changes were gradual and limited, they were changes nonetheless.

Much is made of remarks that the first British High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, was greeted on arrival in Cyprus in July 1878 by Church leaders who appealed for British assistance in achieving enosis. Though there is some confusion surrounding the details of such representations, and though in fact the key representation attributed to Archbishop Sophronios is suggested by Katsiaounis not to have occurred, but rather to be the work of revisionist historians, it is still hard to refute the central idea that the onset of British rule was met with hope amongst many Greek Cypriots that it could act as a catalyst for enosis. For those stressing a British role in instigating nationalist conflict on the island, such truths may be conveniently overlooked, but the reality is that the very fact that Britain took over control from the Ottomans, rather than any specific policy they thereafter employed, encouraged what was an already present nationalist desire for enosis.

With the beginning of British rule in 1878 the island was, from the standpoint of official Greek history, liberated from the “terrible Turk”, though the expectation that this would only be a transitional stage, which would shortly result in Britain facilitating the transfer of the island to its rightful owner “mother” Greece, was soon to be dashed. This expectation is reflected well in the words of Greek Cypriot member of the Legislative Council of Cyprus, George Chacalli, written less than a quarter of a century after the British administration began. He reported that, “The Greeks of the island … hailed the English occupation with heartfelt joy & with tears thanked the Almighty God, because they considered the English Occupation as the precursor of the long cherished liberty & felt confident that the noble & generous English nation would, as soon as circumstances would allow it, hand over the island to Greece.”

421. Enclosure No. 1 in Sendall to Marquis of Ripon, 21st May 1895. CO 883/5, 5; See also Executive Council Minutes for 22nd April 1895, which stated that the Greek Cypriots had been summoned by their newspapers to assemble in the various towns to advocate enosis, indicated the involvement of the Greek Consul, Mr. Philemon in raising tensions, and noted that, “a deputation of leading moslems of Nicosia and other places headed by the Mufti,” had attended the meeting and had, “begged His Excellency to take some steps to prevent these meetings being held,” on account of, “the feeling aroused in their community.” [Executive Council Minutes, 22nd April 1895. CO 69/8, 14–15]. Nor did the Turkish Cypriots appear to tire of appealing for Ottoman support. See, for example, Hamir bin Salih to Office of the Sultan, and enclosures therein. BOA-Y.PRK.AZN-54/6.

422. See KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 25–28; Katsiaounis gives the text attributed to Sophronios as follows: “We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is nationally connected.” Ibid., 25; Hill also supports the thesis that the Bishop of Kitium delivered this address. HILL 1952, 297–298n.

423. As Loizos explains, it is actually common in the nationalist terminology that, “Greece is spoken of as Mother Greece (Mitera Ellada) and Greek soil as patriðha, the fatherland.” LOIZOS 1988, 649.

424. CHACALLI 1902, 42.
On such matters British accounts also provide much testimony. Indeed, in a secret despatch of 1879, Disraeli’s Foreign Secretary, the Marquis of Salisbury, made note of how the island’s first High Commissioner, “Sir Garnet Wolseley was strongly impressed with the danger of an Hellenic propaganda,” a danger which had, he discloses, been little suspected. “It is an apprehension,” he continues to explain, “which the history of the Ionian Islands naturally fosters.”\textsuperscript{425} Not too long after the coming to power of the Gladstone government, a confidential telegram to the Colonial Office, (which in 1880 had assumed responsibility for Cyprus from the Foreign Office), revealed a concerned High Commissioner warning that rumour had been spread in Cyprus that Britain was to cede the island to Greece, and that the island’s “Greek Club” had telegraphed Lord Gladstone, “to thank him.”\textsuperscript{426} No doubt the philhellenic sympathies of Gladstone had encouraged such hopes, but while it was during the lifetime of this government that the elected Legislative Council was constituted, neither this, nor his later ministries were to be due such thanks.

Commonly it is held that the Moslem Turks were also happy to come under British rule, and it is implied thereby that they felt no attachment to the Ottoman state, and, like their Orthodox Greek compatriots, were perfectly content in welcoming their new British masters who it was believed would bring them greater prosperity and justice. But is this depiction accurate? The British themselves were to acknowledge the distinct disadvantage which their administration brought upon at least the class of Moslem officials, stating: “[I]t cannot be denied, and the fact should not be lost sight of, that the British occupation has very greatly injured one class, viz., that from which the former Government obtained the majority of its public employés,” and that, “To the Moslem officials,” British rule, “was soon shown to be a gradual, if not a sudden, ruin,” as a result of the fact that they were being replaced by members of another creed.\textsuperscript{427} For sure there was no revolt, or any effort to resist the transfer of power amongst the Turks of Cyprus, nor any wholesale, mass effort to flee the island. Yet there are some signs that they were more apprehensive of the end of Ottoman administration than the Greeks. The Annual Report for 1879, while registering that, “the bulk of the subordinate officials accepted the situation,” observed also that, “Many of the native officials were at first indisposed to place the whole of their knowledge of current affairs at the disposal of the British Government,” and that, “A few who were discontented resigned their posts.”\textsuperscript{428} And, while observing enthusiasm on both sides, a year into the Occupation Kitchener discerns that, “The Greeks are naturally more enthusiastic than the Turks in their expression of devotion to the Government of the Queen.”\textsuperscript{429}

A greater state of anxiety amongst the Moslem Turks might well have been understandable in light of the political tensions that had been witnessed over the preceding decades on an island in which the Orthodox Greek population significantly outnumbered them. In the past, the Turkish Cypriots had been able to rely upon the support of the Ottoman administration in such conflict, but under the British they were now largely alone. Surely some were also aware, (or soon became so), of the supportive role the British had played.

\footnotesize{425. Marquis of Salisbury to Biddulph, 4th July 1879. FO 421/32, 37.  
429. KITCHENER 1879, 154.}
in the gaining of Greece’s independence, of Britain’s role in transferring the Ionian Islands to Greece and the like, compounding even further their sense of insecurity.

Even if indications of Turkish Cypriot displeasure with the island’s transfer are not evidence of any violent reaction or mass protest, they still should be evaluated in the context within which they occurred. If the reactions of the Moslem Turks were restrained this was understandable too. Physically their numbers could not have allowed them to have realistically resisted the transfer of power, and most critically the transfer was one that was sanctioned by the sovereign to whom they owed allegiance, the Sultan. To resist, would be to disobey, and after all was not this also perceivable as only a temporary change, was not the Sultan to maintain his suzerainty and the Moslems of Cyprus their traditional rights. They were in essence resigned to their fate.

3.2 The Legislative Council and Divide-and-rule: Myths and Misconceptions?

As was illustrated in the previous chapter, the full integration of society in Cyprus under the Ottomans was curtailed in important ways. Both substantial and symbolic cleavages between Orthodox and Moslem communities were already palpable when the British arrived. Now under the British being recruited to the police force, the Greeks, for example, “objected to wearing a white turban round their fez, declaring that it turned them into Turks!” Taking first a fundamental issue such as education we see that, in what little of it there was, institutions attended by the Orthodox Greeks and Moslem Turks were invariably divergent. Meted out either by the priest or the hoca, education until the nineteenth century was confined for the large part to religious teachings. Thereafter more secular topics such as geography, history, geometry and the like, did gradually begin to be taught, but even then largely only in the Christian schools. At the outset of British rule, with the verifiable exception of the more advanced Rushdie School, in Nicosia, they appeared still essentially absent from Turkish curricula, even though in theory even elementary schools were supposed to tackle such subjects as Turkish history and geography. By the 1890’s however, twenty-one new Rushdie schools had been established in different towns and larger villages of the island. The Turkish Cypriot press had begun also to actively champion the need of all Turkish Cypriot schools to reform their curricula in line with the changes that had already been observed in Greek Cypriot educational establishments. In particular, the press was emphasizing the need to focus institutional efforts less on religious instruction, and more on teaching the basics of reading and writing, the sciences, and on subjects like geography, history and geometry. Furthermore, those who sought to advance their studies, depending on their religious affiliation, had traditionally gravitated either to Athens or to Istanbul, a practice that to a significant extent continued during

430. SCOTT-STEVENSON 1880, 78.
431. See, for example, Cyprus Annual Report 1879, 80, 111–113, 245 and 253–254; WEIR 1952, 68.
433. Kibris 4th December 1893.
434. Ibid., 11th December 1893.
British rule. This too undoubtedly contributed to the adoption of polarized political positions.

When the British arrived nationalism had already, to some extent, at least for the Greek Cypriots, begun to be disseminated through educational channels. Persianis asserts that in the decades following 1821, the Greek schools established in Cyprus, “cultivated the Great Idea assiduously,” and other sources too attest to the fact that even at the beginning of the twentieth century, (when Ottoman authorities were much more wary of such proselytizing), Greek teachers even in districts that were still under direct Ottoman control continued to secretly cultivate the Great Idea amongst their charges. Katsiaounis notes a report of 1878 by Theodoros Peristianis, Greece’s vice consul in Cyprus in which he recognises that though religion was still the main source of division on the island prior to British rule, “The spread of education had been beneficial and elements of national identity were beginning to be detectable.”

In light of the evidence, however, the charge that the British intentionally created division in the education of the two communities, that they successfully “imposed” in this respect too the necessary, “structures designed to pit the two communities against each other,” is seriously flawed. Persianis argues that, “The roots of the problem were there long before the British arrived, because Greek culture and nationalism had been strengthened between 1830 and 1878.” A revealing despatch of 1882 from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State appears instead to point to resistance on the part of the two communities themselves, and to real practical difficulties. He writes here that:

The experiment of having one central board at Nicosia for both Christians and Mahometans, in order to regulate the grants in aid, as suggested by your Lordship, may very fairly be tried; but there is a strong indisposition on the part of the leading members of either community, to interfere in any way with the schools of the other community. The example quoted by your Lordship from England seems hardly to apply to Cyprus, where the religious barrier extends absolutely to schools to such a degree that in no case that I ever heard of do Mahometans and Christians frequent the same school, except in the case of the English school lately instituted by this Government. Indeed, the fact of the diversity of language is alone sufficient to prevent such a course being adopted.

What is more incontrovertible than the claim that Britain segregated education as part of a divide-and-rule policy, is that a massive advance and spread of education did occur during the British era, and that it was primarily through this channel that the masses were eventually to become “nationally” socialized. From a confidential “Report on the Hellenic Propaganda in Elementary Schools” we see that the infiltration of nationalism into

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435. An editorial in Kibris in 1893, for example, noted the great pride of the community in Turkish Cypriot students who, with their hearts filled with loyalty to the motherland, had returned from their studies at the great Mülkiye school in Turkey. Ibid., 21st August 1893.
436. PERSIANIS 1967, 244; See also, for example, PECKHAM 2000, 91–92; Secrecy was now all the more vital, (in the example given by Peckam the Greek geography teacher locked the door), in that since the late 1880’s the education of the Greeks remaining within the empire had come under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman education ministry. KARPAT 2000, 8.
438. POLLIS 1996, 76.
439. PERSIANIS 1967, 265–266.
440. Biddulph to Earl of Kimberley, 11th March 1882. CO 883/3, 157; See also enclosure No. 2 in Biddulph to Earl of Kimberley, 31st December 1881. CO 883/3, 87.
these schools had progressed considerably by the beginning of the twentieth century and that this education had a strong anti-Turkish slant.441

British sources, at this stage, may have little to say about the role of education in the early nationalization of the Turkish community, but there is evidence that by the early twentieth century, Turkish educators were starting to leave an important impression in this field too. Students were reciting nationalist prose, and teachers were preaching to the public on the virtues of the Turkish nation. Compared to the Greek Cypriot educational establishment, that of the Turkish Cypriots might have been relatively delayed in efforts to implant a national consciousness amongst their community, but not perchance as tardy as many perceive. Certainly this development was incontestable by the 1920’s. It is no coincidence that countless prominent Turkish nationalists of the latter half of the twentieth century who were educated in Cyprus, including amongst their ranks Dr. Fazıl Küçük, Rauf Denktas and Alparslan Türkeş, (later, after migrating, to gain lasting fame for his leadership of the pan-Turkist political wing in the republic of Turkey), recount the prominent role of their teachers in imbuing them with national consciousness. 442 Amongst those whom the latter was to pay special tribute to for having helped foster his nationalist sentiments was Faiz Kaymak.443

If education was one prime area in which the segregation of the communities was already institutionalized, the economy was another, albeit by no means as sharply divided. There is strong evidence that there was abundant trade between the two communities, that they sometimes formed business partnerships and that they even employed each other in their enterprises.444 Similar conclusions are reached by Çevikel, who further reveals that members of the two communities frequently borrowed considerable sums of money from each other.445 Loizos uncovered an interesting case from the village of Kalo in 1916, where he says both Greek and Turkish villagers joined together to form a company to utilize underground water resources for their parched fields. 446 Sharecropping was another agricultural area in which economic interaction was significant.447 Further, Greeks and Turks would often work for each other in agriculture also. We learn indirectly from an article in the Vatan, albeit relating to intercommunal disturbances in 1912, that several hundred Greeks were being temporarily employed at the time by the Turkish landholders

441. Enclosure No. 5 in Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 30th August 1902. CO 883/6, 242–245; An article published in the Evagoras of 29th April 1904, entitled, “Honour to the Hellenic Schoolmasters,” praised the work of the Greek teachers in the following manner:

To inflame and strengthen the national aspiration in the minds of the peasants they caused to have upon the belfry of each church and upon the roof of every school the Hellenic standard, and have made it the revered symbol of the Hellenic inhabitants of the island. In their daily teaching they transmit to the children of Hellas the most sacred and life giving streams of Hellenic education, and inspire into their simple hearts the enthusiastic love of a united and great Hellenic fatherland, of which renowned Cyprus forms a distinguished part.

[Enclosure No. 3 in Rees-Davies to Lyttelton, 17th June 1904. CO 67/138, 523]; High Commissioner Haynes-Smith’s appreciation was not much different when he reported a few months later that, “The Greek Elementary Schools aided from the public revenues are being openly used as a political organization to foster the agitation for union with Greece, and to excite opposition to the British Administration.” Haynes-Smith to Lyttelton, 15th August 1904. CO 67/139, 198.

442. See, for example, DENKTAS 1993, 6 and 15.
443. TURGUT 1995, 8–9 and 15.
444. ÇICEK 1993, 43–47.
446. LOIZOS 1975, 27.
447. ATTALIDES 1979, 81.
of Gönyeli to help reap the harvest, and no doubt there were many examples of Turkish labourers working for Greek landholders.448

Yet, politics could also become embroiled in economic relations. The Vatan newspaper reported with indignation how in 1912 a Christian shopkeeper renting a shop in the Moslem quarter had refused to allow a string upon which Ottoman flags would be drawn to commemorate the ascension to the throne of the Sultan to be attached to his shop, because he said that he feared being boycotted by his own community. The newspaper however, argued that the real cause was that he himself did not want the string attached due to his personal animosities and reminded him to recall that not only was he renting Moslem property, but that also the great majority of his customers were Moslems, insinuating that it was their boycott that he should really fear.449 Soon after, when there was apparently a wider trend to boycott Turkish tradesmen, the Vatan newspaper, albeit with limited economic understanding, complained that while ninety-five percent of the island’s Turks purchased goods from Greek merchants, the Greeks themselves, (with the exception of meat products and dried fruits), already avoided buying from the Turkish tradesmen and artisans, hence any reciprocal boycott would only end up hurting the Greeks.450

In the budding labour movement that gradually developed in the post-World War I era Greeks and Turks, especially it seems in the Limassol district, were becoming active in joint trade unions and in a body formed in 1924 known as the Limassol Labour Centre. Michaelides refers to, “a progressive Turkish Cypriot named Mustafa, who had a good knowledge of Greek,” as having translated the Centre’s constitution into Turkish, though unfortunately he gives no figures to indicate the level of Turkish Cypriot participation in this and other such workers’ enterprises.451 Yet, even if there was a degree of interaction between Greeks and Turks in the workers’ movement that might through the strengthening of cross-cutting cleavages have helped mitigate potential ethnic dispute in the political field, it was nonetheless limited by the fact that the movement itself was at this stage still in its infancy. Further, the existence of this movement does not appear to have played any significant role in eliminating the duality of ethnic political allegiances, and when it started to take a more pronounced stand on political matters in the 1940’s, Turkish members rapidly began to split away to form their own separate unions and organizations.452 It is notable, that the above-mentioned Mustafa, associated with the Limassol Labour Centre, can not be considered by default to have been devoid of Turkish national sentiment. Michaelides himself records that, “Following the emergence of Kemal Ataturk he moved to Turkey where he worked for some years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”453

448. Vatan 3rd June 1912.
449. Ibid., 13th May 1912.
450. Ibid., 27th May 1912; Three years earlier Mir’at-i Zaman had applauded the news that a boycott was being placed on Greeks in another part of the Ottoman Empire, though without explicitly calling for similar action in Cyprus. Mir’at-i Zaman 5th July 1909.
453. MICHAELIDES 1993, 35.
It is also noteworthy that there was some tendency to distinguish specified fields of trade and economic activity on the basis of ethno-religious affiliation. Though, as Çevikel illustrates, differences in this area do not seem to have been of staggering proportions, they were identifiable. He himself notes how certain professions were closely associated with, if not wholly dominated by, the island’s Christians, amongst them being those of carpenters, lock-smiths, knife-makers, sailors, and, probably most importantly, tradesmen. There were still areas in which the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities each dominated at the time of British conquest, and even after. Butchery, tanning and quilt-making, for example constituted traditionally Turkish trades, not to mention the recently rediscovered differences in the patisserie trade! Even as late as 1937 Turkish Cypriot complaints that, “all masons employed were Orthodox-Christians and so far the teaching of the art of masonry is denied to Moslems,” were still being relayed to London.

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454. ÇEVİKEL 2000, 268 and 287; Though Mardin bemoans, “the convenient fiction, sedulously fostered by those who prefer clichés to the study of fact, that economic activity in the Ottoman Empire was the monopoly of the non-Moslem while the Moslem preferred war or administration as an occupation,” research such as that conducted by Çevikel and by Katsiaounis does show that while certainly not a monopoly, the relative proportions of Moslems in Cyprus involved in manual manufacturing activities and commerce was lower than that of the Orthodox millet. MARDIN 1962, 167; KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 39–40.

455. See, for example, Ibid., 41. Here Katsiaounis argues that the Turkish control of butchery and tanning was a consequence of the sharp instruments employed in these industries, which meant that when required by the Ottoman authorities, the presumably more reliable Turkish, “members of these two trades … could be mobilised to uphold the prevailing political order.” This, however, conflicts not only with his own findings that, “the trades working in metals,” were, “manned … almost exclusively by Greek artisans,” but even more specifically with Çevikel’s findings that knife-making was largely the preserve of the Christians. [Ibid., 48; ÇEVİKEL 2000, 268.] Indeed, it may well be that another overlooked factor was being overlooked in Katsiaounis appraisal, the difference of religion per se. Moslems might well have been concerned that Orthodox Christian butchers could contaminate their meat with the impure blood of the pig, and, more fundamentally, they had to have meat of animals slaughtered according to the correct religious rules, that is the meat had to be “ḥalāl” meat. As a consequence, while Christians would have no religious qualms with consuming meat butchered by Moslems, the Moslems would only consume meat butchered by fellow Moslems. One might argue therefore, that there was at work a cultural “trade barrier” one that worked to the advantage of Moslem butchers.

Other distinctions in terms of professional activities also existed, distinctions that are hard to hypothesize as having been related to any religious foundation. Plümer recalls from his childhood in the post-World War I era how Greek Cypriots still flocked to his father’s quilt-making shop as this community had no quilt makers of its own. [PLÜMER 2001, 1]. Korkut also attests to the preponderance of Turks in particular crafts. [KORKUT 2001, 120–121]. With the re-establishment of relatively free movement between the North and South of the island that began in 2003a more brisk trade in the syrupy sweet known as “ekmek kadayf” occurred as Greeks from the South carried back kilos of this sweet that has traditionally been produced by the island’s Turks only. Another such sweet that was sold by the Turks was “şamiş”. In fact the latter formed the basis of the term “şamişici” or, “şamiş maker” that was sometimes used in a derisory manner to taunt the island’s Turks. One who recounts being taunted in this manner as a child, was none other than Rauf R. Denktaş. D. DENKTAŞ 1993, 17.

As to the administrative apparatus under the Ottomans, both Greeks and Turks could, as we have seen, hold positions of privilege, particularly at the apex, but different classes of status tended to be held, if not always exclusively, then at least overwhelmingly by different ethno-religious groups. Thus while, even after the Tanzimiat, the central bureaucracy was largely staffed by Moslem Turks, tax collectors around the island were invariably Greek Orthodox, while the Zaptiehs, (or, policemen), who accompanied them were Moslem Turks.457

As far as political representation was concerned, even here, in what was to become a most controversial area under the British, there was already communal division between the two main communities under the Ottomans. No matter how rudimentary or even corrupted elections may have been, no matter their powers were limited, representative institutions and elections were instituted under the Ottomans, not introduced, as is sometimes thought, by the British.458 The general provision was that Moslems elected Moslem representatives, while Christian representatives were elected by the Christian community on a separate basis.459 In fact, only three days after it had been proclaimed to the Cypriots that he had been appointed the island’s first High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley recorded in his journal entry for the 25th of July 1878 the following lines:

At present affairs of each Keimaklianate are managed by two councils, one of which looks after the administration, the other the legal and judicial affairs. I shall try and rid myself of these councils by degrees. I want to have as little laws as possible: in fact it is to avoid the mistakes made in the Ionian islands where a sort of parliament was initiated which was the bane of all good government.460

On the 31st of August 1878, Wolseley further revealed his pleasure with the content of the correspondence he had just received from the Foreign Secretary, the Marquis of Salisbury, asking him his views as to the constitution of a proposed Legislative Council. “He is, I am delighted to hear” Wolseley gleefully wrote, “most averse to introducing any elected element into it. As long as this can be avoided we shall have peace and quiet.”461 As will

457. Cyprus Annual Report 1879, 25; See also, KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 50–51.
458. In fact, in a speech during the Legislative Council debate of the Muhkstars Bill the Bishop of Kyrenia in 1891 berated the British for their policies on the matter. He complained that the Government, “sought to assume to itself the power of appointing muktars & to deprive the people of their rights in the matter.” He was then followed by Mr. Rossos who, on the other hand, “referred to the improvement that had taken place in the matter of the Judges now they were appointed by the Government as compared with the state of things before when they were elected by the people.” [Minutes of the Legislative Council, 15th April 1891. CO 69/6]; See also GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 244–245 for further details as to the election of village authorities.
459. Unlike some, Katsiaounis recognises that electoral politics were introduced in Cyprus after the Tanzimat reforms, noting that, “The franchise was extended to Ottoman subjects who were older than 18 and paid a minimum of 50 piastres in vergi (property tax),” while, “Candidates for office had to be at least 30 years old and pay a minimum of 100 piastres.” [KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 62]. A similar tax threshold was maintained during the British era, though it was clearly not excessively limiting. Kitromilides informs that, “the suffrage was enjoyed by the great majority of the island’s male population over the age of 21, specifically by all payers of some form of property or income tax.” [KITROMILIDES 1980, 188]. The numbers don’t quite corroborate Kitromilides’ statement that the electorate included the “majority” of adult males. Thus, for example, in 1925 and 1930 the total electorate numbered around 40,000 while the male population of the island for the same period was several times more numerous. The electorate might nevertheless be regarded as a considerable proportion as opposed to being a highly selective proportion of the populace.
460. WOLSELEY 1991, 14–15; Two weeks later Wolseley wrote also that he was “determined that Cyprus shall never be turned into a second Malta,” Malta being another British administered Mediterranean island whose people had, according to Wolseley, too much power over their island’s affairs. Ibid., 40.
461. Ibid., 69.
be seen, many British officials were later to wish that sufficient heed had been taken of Wolseley’s original sentiments.

Hamilton Lang discussed the changes that had been brought about in the mid-nineteenth century to the pre-existing administrative system, “by the establishment of the Vilayet system with liberal and representative institutions,” though he added also that they had been done so, “a century in advance of the civilization in the midst of which it was to work.”

Kitchener explains how at the time of the arrival of the British, even at the level of the villages, the Greeks elected Greek muhtars and Turks elected Turkish muhtars, unless a large majority in a mixed village was of one creed. In the İdare Meclisi, (the Central Administrative Council), too, there were seats reserved for the two communities chosen by their separate constituencies, and even in the civil law courts each community would have its own quota of elected judges, “two Mussulmans and two Christians, elected by the people.”

Britain it is said, divided, and ruled. It designed its institutions in such a way as to create artificial division between the people of Cyprus that would allow it to maintain its rule, they, “institutionalized and intensified ethnic differentiation.” Former General Secretary of the Communist Party of Cyprus, Plutis Servas, for example, highlighted long-standing friendship and cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and argued that from the moment they occupied the island, the British used this policy of divide-and-rule as a weapon to prevent the common struggle of the Cypriots. Perhaps as a dedicated Marxist he felt an obligation to defend the togetherness of the Cypriots and stress that it was British imperialism that destroyed it. The truth is, however, that communal and institutional division was already an established fact before the British occupation. Essentially what the British did was not so much to divide, but to perpetuate and, at times, manipulate division. That Cyprus was by no means the only territory where the British conveniently pointed to social divisions as an obstacle to furthering “responsible government” is attested to by numerous sources.

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462. LANG 1878, 189.
463. KITCHENER 1879, 153; This is supported also by Gazioglu, who notes that: “In each village the Government’s agents, the ‘mukhtars’ (headmen), and others in authority were either Turks or Greeks according to the race and religion of the inhabitants of the village. In mixed villages there were separate ‘mukhtars’ with their ‘azas’ [assistants] who each dealt with their own people. A Turkish ‘mukhtar’ did not interfere in the affairs of Greeks and vice versa.” [GAZIOGLU 1990, 101]; See also Scott-Stevenson, who while stating that the muhtar was “elected annually” indicates that separate Greek and Turkish muhtars, even in the larger villages, was not an absolute rule. [SCOTT-STEVENSON 1880, 75]; It is worth mentioning that it was actually under the British that the practice of electing muhtars was brought to an end in 1891.
464. Ibid., 74.
465. KYRISS 1977, 42.
466. ERVAS 1999, 27.
467. One of the rare cases of a Greek researcher explicitly acknowledging this is Terlexis, though in my view he actually goes too far by asserting that, “any policy of integration,” would therefore be, “impossible even if the British had attempted to follow a different course of action.” TERLEXIS 1968, 40.
468. One such report on the colonial constitution for the island of Ceylon was to state that a key obstacle to the grant of fully responsible government was the lack of racial unity amongst the island’s populace. SIMMONS s.a., 218–219. The same was argued in a House of Commons debate on India by Lord Balfour: We all admit that representative government, government by debate, is the best form of government where it is suitable, but it is only suitable, really I think everybody must admit, where you are dealing with a population in the main homogeneous, in the main equal in every substantial and essential sense [...] if the substantial basis of common agreement were not incomparably greater in this House than it can ever be in a community like India, our debates would be perfectly useless, government would come to chaos, and administration would be impossible. SIMMONS s.a., 197–198.
On arrival Britain maintained much of the administrative institutional framework of the Ottomans, only gradually remoulding certain elements. Ottoman courts, for instance, for long remained largely intact, the school systems were not integrated, representation continued to be on a communal basis, and the like. Essentially, even if it were inclined to do so, Britain did not need to “divide”, for division already existed. Admittedly such divisions were not as highly politicised at the commencement of British rule compared to when they departed, but even their heightened politicization in the intermediate years cannot be solely attributed to British machinations. In fact, it should be acknowledged that in some areas the British actually began to enhance integration, introducing, for instance, large numbers of Christians to the civil service ranks and the police force. The recruitment of the latter, in particular, is often a controversial issue in terms of the historiography of Cyprus, it frequently being posited, (probably as a result largely of post-World War II developments), that the British purposefully created a police force dominated by Moslem Turks as part of its divide-and-rule strategy.

Horowitz documents the consciously employed British policy of differential hiring for imperial security forces in many parts of empire, based partly on political expediency, partly on discernment of superior, “martial characteristics.” He notes also the particular preference in several cases for the hiring of Moslems. He relates, for instance, that, “Muslims outnumbered Hindus, and the Punjab alone contributed as much as 54 percent of the men of the Indian army in the pre-World War II period.” Yet, while reference or allusion to the martial characteristics of the Turks is to be found, evidence, (explored further below), does not give sufficient support to the thesis of the British, in the pre-World War II era at least, having used the police force as a tool of divide-and-rule. Indeed as a report on the history of the Cyprus police force explained, it was with the British occupation that, for the first time, “Admission to the force was thrown open to Christians, instead of being, as hitherto, confined to Mahommedans only.”

Yet integrative measures did not necessarily remove the foundations of nationalist discontent. It might be noted, for example, that growing integration in public service employment did lead to a sense of resentment amongst the Turks, who protested frequently about real or perceived injustices concerning the employment of members of their community in the government service. As early as 1884 the minutes of the Legislative Council record that, “Petitions were presented by Rashid Effendi for the employment of Turks more generally in the government service.”

469. See Cyprus Annual Report 1879, 25–26, and Biddulph to Stanley, 18th December 1884. CO 883/4, 23.
470. See, for example, POLLIS 1998, 94; Indeed, some Turkish sources have also pointed to this matter. Beratlı, for instance, notes how in 1883 there were only 79 Greek as opposed to 639 Turkish policemen, and hints that this constitutes evidence of the British divide-and-rule policy. [BERATLI 1999, 107–108]. What he, and many others, are overlooking, however, is that there were no Greeks in the police ranks at the time of the British takeover, and that their representation in the police force increased steadily thereafter. On the other hand, to his great credit, Beratlı was one of the first Turkish Cypriot intellectuals to recognise that the “British imperialism” could not be considered to have been the primary source of political divisions between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. See BERATLI 1991, 24–25 and 49.
471. HOROWITZ 1985, 446–449.
472. Though the report did continue to state that, the Moslems, “nevertheless, seem to have formed the majority of those enrolled.” This is later explained by the fact that there were a large number of good potential recruits from amongst the ranks of those Turkish soldiers who had been discharged upon the island’s transfer to Britain. Staff Captain’s report on Cyprus Military Police, 13th May 1899. WO 32/7519.
Another interesting example that counters the claims that Britain persistently created institutional divisions between the two communities relates to the position of the Muhtars. When in 1901, in line with historical practice, the Moslem members of the Legislative Council unanimously called for separate Moslem and Christian Muhtars with equal powers, (rather than the purely religious roles that the other members were prepared to accept for the “supplementary” Moslem Muhtars), the British rejected the idea and sided instead with the Greeks on the matter.474 The Chief Secretary, chairing the session, repeated more than once during debate words to the effect that, “it was not advisable to divide the two communities of a village.”475

In some economic areas too British initiatives can be considered to have been beneficial to enhancing positive interaction and collaboration. Not least of these was the aptly named “Cooperative Movement.” According to Asmussen, “The earliest Agricultural Association was formed at Famagusta in December 1883 by Greek and Turkish landowners under the supervision and on the initiative of the District Commissioner Arthur Young.”476 As Kyriss marks, others were likewise soon after formed in Nicosia and Kyrenia.477 The movement, designed to, “share and buy agricultural machines, to carry out common cultivation of the land and to sell the products,” continued to grow in strength well into the twentieth century, particularly after the establishment of an agricultural bank in 1925, though by mid-century there was a growing tendency to form separate Turkish societies.478

Socially relations between Greeks and Turks were on the whole cordial during by far the greater part of British rule. Greeks and Turks would of ten frequent the same coffee shops, celebrate together at weddings, and more generally establish enduring inter-ethnic friendships. Yet, while the social boundaries between the two communities were permeable, they were nonetheless not absent. Manifest hostilities between the two sections were exceptional, but progressively evident as the decades past was a certain reservedness in fraternization and interaction with the “opposing” community, that was ultimately to lead to the sorry state of the labelling of such behaviour as “traitorous”. One might have hoped that elites, who had themselves historically never recoiled from cooperating and fraternizing with persons not of their own ethno-religious community, might have led the way in assuring the maintenance in Cyprus of such relations. Yet, while on occasion they did make such efforts, and did themselves sometimes continue to fraternize with members of other faiths and ethnic groups, they did not, it must be said, live up to their potential to

473. See CO 69/1; That the issue of what were regarded as inadequate proportions of Turkish Cypriots in the Civil Service continued to provoke anger, was evident, with Mir’atı Zaman in 1906, for example, accusing the British administration of favouritism towards the Greeks on this matter. [Mir’atı Zaman 17th December 1906]. In fact, the following year they were to print an article criticising not only favouritism towards the Greeks, but even more vehemently the employment of unqualified young Brits, when better qualified Turks, with full command of Turkish, Greek and English languages were passed over. Mir’atı Zaman 25th November 1907.
475. Minutes of the Legislative Council 17th June 1901. CO 69/15, 177; This contrasts with Pollis accusation that actually the British cunningly supported separate authorities in the villages. POLLIS 1996, 70 and 76. See also POLLIS 1979, 54.
477. KYRISS 1977, 71.
contribute to social harmony and avert the bigotry, prejudice and hostility that finally triumphed on the island.479

479. One such little considered area where the elites’ own institutionalized interaction might have been expected to have had a greater positive influence on intercommunal relations was within the Masonic movement. Cyprus long history of association with freemasonry was revived by the establishment of the first Masonic Lodge by British servicemen in 1888. British personnel stationed on the island, as well as native Greeks and eventually, (though precisely when is unclear), “many eminent and distinguished Turkish Cypriot Brethren,” were thereafter to be inducted into a growing number of lodges. By the late 1920’s the number of Freemasons on the island were said by Christoporous G. Toraritis, the Grand Inspector General for the Island of Cyprus, to number around 600. [Information received in e-mail communication from District Grand Secretary of the Cyprus Freemasons, Merv Mathews to author, 24th March 2004, TORARITIS 1929, and historical information available on the official website of the District Grand Lodge of Cyprus. See s.n. s.a. (g)]. With Freemasonry’s proclaimed universalistic outlook and emphasis on inter-faith understanding it could well have been expected to have promoted greater tolerance between the main elements of society. In fact, Kyriss proffers Turkish Cypriot participation in Masonic Lodges as further evidence to support his thesis concerning intercommunal coexistence in Cyprus. [KYRISS 1977, 143.] While the documentation proffered by Kyriss does show Münir Bey to have been a Mason, it does not give a date for his initiation and, as the above explanations show, certainly does not support Ateşin’s “charge” that Münir and his brother-in-law were among the founders of the first Masonic Lodge in Cyprus. [ATEŞİN 1996, 255]. Though the closed nature of the movement means that available information as to its activities has been scant, what information there is at present available in the public domain suggests that at times the Masonic movement may have served or been hijacked as a vehicle for the propagation of nationalist agendas. Whether or not this is true, (and further research clearly has to be conducted), it is common knowledge that amongst those who spearheaded the twentieth century nationalist movements of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots there have been included prominent Masons. Indeed, Katsiaounis has asserted of the Greek Cypriot freemasons that they, “made their greatest impact in Cypriot society through their political orientation toward Greece. Their ranks kept throwing up radical nationalist leaders; all freemasons were ardent nationalists and most leading nationalists were freemasons. [KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 191, and more generally, 189–191; See also GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 415–417].

While the island’s Greeks had established separate lodges that were to come under the Grand Lodge of Greece as early as 1893, some pro-Unionist Turkish Cypriots are likely to have been first initiated into the Masonic craft while studying in Turkey. The association of the CUP with the Masonic movement is well known and many of the leading Turkish nationalists of the early twentieth century, including, for example, Ziya Gökalp, are also known to have been members. One leading light of the Turkish Masonic movement who was to come to Cyprus was none other than Kemal Nami, who arrived as head of the Lycée in the mid-1920’s. [See, for example, the history of Freemasonry available on the official website of the Free and Accepted Masons Grand Lodge, Turkey. See, s.n. s.a. (f)]. Korkut makes a rather obscure reference to a certain relative named Hasan being publicly labelled a Mason in the opening years of the twentieth century [KORKUT 2000, 20], and Said Molla seems to indicate that at least the Turkish Consul was an active Mason in the mid-1920’s, when Kemal Nami was also resident in Cyprus. On the other hand, Toraritis made no mention of any Turkish members or participants in the Lodges of Cyprus in his address on the history of Freemasonry in Cyprus, delivered in 1928. [See KORKUT 2000, 20; Attachment to M. Stevenson to the Secretary of State, 13th January 1926. CO 67/216/3, 12–14; TORARITIS 1929].
Yet, even if we accept conclusively that Britain employed a policy of divide-and-rule, we must recognise that there is no automatic link between this and the rise of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, (or for that matter of Greek nationalism), for it is certain that they did not encourage the Turkish nationalists as a counterweight to the Greeks. On the contrary, as Turkish nationalism of the first wave began to rise, the British were to attempt to suppress it by giving backing to “Moslem traditionalists”. As Worsley perceptively explains, “It is common enough to attribute the emergence of two hostile nationalisms to British imperialist manoeuvres,” but such reasoning, “probably attributes more cunning to the British than they seemed to have possessed.”

Notwithstanding inescapable social turmoil involved in the immediate aftermath of the transfer, that the British did not upon arrival institute sweeping changes must surely have been of some reassurance to the Turkish community. Nevertheless, that the transition might not have been as smooth as they had initially hoped soon became apparent, not only in the growing frequency of enosis agitation, but also, more pointedly, when in 1882, the British attempted to introduce their first major political reform, the establishment of a new, primarily elected Legislative Council.

Immediately on coming to the island the British had established a Legislative Council. The İdadı Meclisi, which they also maintained, employed as we have mentioned, the principle of communal representation, and, in a similar vein, this new legislative assembly, which held its first meeting on the 9th of December 1878, initially contained one Orthodox Greek and one Moslem Turkish member. In this respect, it conformed to the practice prevalent in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, where representation in such bodies was on an equal basis for each community, irrespective of their relative numbers. The newly designed Legislative Council introduced a few years later, however, was to be constructed upon certain novel lines.

The introduction by the British of such a partially representative body which included elected membership was not in itself extraordinary. In many ways it appeared to be modelled upon the Grand Council, that had been established earlier by the Ottomans, and which in the latter part of the nineteenth century was meeting at least once a week and, “occupied itself with all questions of public utility and general administration.” The Council’s composition apparently varied over time. According to Lang it, “was composed of the Mufti, or highest Mussulman religious authority, the Greek Archbishop, the Mubasebegi, or Financial Agent, the Evcaf-nazir, or administrator of Mussulman religious property and three Mussulman and two Christian notables,” while Georgallides contends that there were in addition to religious functionaries and officials, four elected members.

480. WORSLEY 1979, 8.
481. At the outset there were actually three unofficial members, Mehmet Fuad Efendi, a Turk, Mr Glykys a Greek, and Mr. Richard Mattei, “an Italian long resident in the island,” who had worked closely also with the previous Ottoman administration. [See Minutes of the Legislative Council, 9th December 1878. CO 69/1; WOLSELEY 1991, 155; HILL 1952, 417]. Mattei’s seat was apparently not filled during the interim between his death in 1882 and the first session of the “New Legislative Council” in 1883. There is some dispute as to whether, in light of the above there was actually equal representation, Greek authors referring to the presence of two Christians, Turks of the equality of Greek and Turks, with Mattei even when he was alive not being of the Orthodox religious millet anyway. This disparity is not particularly significant for our story. What is important is that the Turkish Cypriots at the time were themselves satisfied with this arrangement as maintaining the traditional numerical equality of the communities in the councils.
482. LANG 1878, 269–270; As Georgallides points out, it was therefore more of an executive rather than legislative body. GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 63n.
two each from the Moslem and Christian constituencies. There was, then, some
balance, if not absolute equality, in communal representation. Nevertheless, as Lang
attests, ultimate power resided in the Governor. Similar councils existed too in the
island’s districts, and it was in fact an adaptation of this model that Lang proposed only a
few months into the British Occupation, “might be profitably adopted by the British
Government.” Considering that he had served that Government in a consular capacity
on the island not long before, his advice may well have been influential. He suggested
that:

Substituting British for the Turkish functionaries, who are ex officio members of the
Councils, eliminating the ecclesiastical members, both Mohammedan and Christian, and
giving Mussulmans and Christians equal representation, there would be the elements of a
very desirable Council, containing a highly civilised element, in whose hands would be all
the initiative, and a less advanced section, possessing local knowledge and practical experi-
ence of the country. The evils of a too personal government would be avoided, and the
people would be gradually trained to take an interest in the administration.

Neither was Cyprus the first, nor either the last of the British territories in which it
introduced such an institution. However, Cyprus was not even a colony yet when the body
was introduced, the British had only taken over the administration of the island a few
years before. In most instances where the British instituted such bodies they did so much
later into their rule, sometimes to quell the public pressure for greater representation. In
Cyprus there appears to have been no important pressure of this kind and the move seems
to have been made more in accordance with the more liberal traits of British politicians,
believing also that the people of the island were a fairly “civilised” one for whom such
structures were appropriate. As Mayall fairly points out, “The most powerful imperia-
lists, Britain and France, were also the countries in which liberal constitutionalism was
most securely anchored. ... From the start there was a contradiction between the political
values of liberal democracy and the idea of a nationally, and ultimately racially, defined
imperial order. This contradiction could be resolved, at least in the minds of liberal impe-
rialists, so long as it was still possible to conceive of the world as divided between civi-
lised powers and barbarians. But since liberal values were ultimately grounded in the
Enlightenment discovery of universal human rights, this distinction could no longer be
regarded as part of the natural order. Consequently, it was necessary to envisage a pro-
cess whereby barbarian states could graduate into ‘civilised’ international society after a
period of enlightened education and preparation for self-government.” The fact that a
noticeable philhellenism was evident amongst many of the top British officials made the
island’s Greek ethnicity an important basis of justification for much more liberal and less
domineering policies than typically seen in other colonies. In the face of increasing
agitation for enosis one ministerial official in London commented at the beginning of the
twentieth century:

483. Ibid.; LANG 1878, 269.
484. Ibid., 271.
485. Ibid.
486. MAYALL 1990, 45–46.
487. RIZVI 1993, 64; STAMATAKIS 1991, 68.
I rather doubt the wisdom of Sir J. Anderson’s suggestion to adapt certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code to Cyprus, with the intention as I understand him of making it an offence punishable with fine or imprisonment to advocate union with Greece.

A similar law passed in Fiji was disallowed although owing to the ignorance of the natives there was far more ground for protecting them from agitators.

It does not seem to me to be practicable to adopt the legislation suited to India, an Asiatic country conquered and held by the sword, to a European community like Cyprus. In that Island ¾ths of the population are Greeks and hence by language and traditions attached to liberal institutions. This attachment is indeed a sentiment which the Cypriots hardly ever realised in practice till they were permitted to do so by the British Government, but it is a sentiment which it is impossible to ignore, if only on account of the corresponding sentiment which would be evoked in this country by any attempt to ignore it.488

Lang himself had cautioned: “There is a vast gulf between the natives of Cyprus and the natives of India, which we must not ignore, and our rule will be an utter failure if we apply to it, without important modifications, our Indian notions of government.”489 Georghallides has explained the relevance of developments in the following manner:

[In recognition of the fact that in Cyprus 80 percent of the population were heirs of a great European civilisation and members of an ancient Church, the Gladstone Government in 1882 gave Cyprus a representative Legislative Council. This gesture effectively put Cyprus in an intermediate position between the colonies of British settlement and the African and Asian ones where such powers would never have been given so soon after a British occupation.

The establishment of a Legislative Council in which there was a majority of locally elected members with the right – subject to the Secretary of State for the Colonies’ disallowance – to enact the annual budget and all laws – though the crown could exceptionally impose laws by imperial Orders-in-Council – was the single most important reform which Britain introduced to Cyprus.490

Cyprus, thus, was given a “head start” on the attributed civilizational continuum of societies along which other British imperial possessions had to travel. It is notable though, and largely a consequence of perceptions of strategic interest, that while the British ultimately bowed to Indian demands for independence in the aftermath of the Second World War, they resisted doing the same for Cyprus and its more “civilised” Greeks.

Some, apparently, were also pleasantly surprised by the fact that the island’s Moslems were not as base as might have been expected of heathen Turks. Writing to her mother in 1879, Esmé Scott-Stevenson, wife of the newly appointed Commissioner for Kyrenia, Andrew Scott-Stevenson, opined: “I, myself, like the heathens, as some people are audacious enough to call the Mahommedans, far better than the Cypriote Christians; but this is only my own idea.”491 She, did assert in the conclusion to her book, however, that there had developed, “decidedly a strong feeling in favour of the Turks among the English officials in the island; though of course justice is dealt impartially to Christian and Osmanli alike.”492 In a report of 1888 where he compared the Turkish Cypriots to the Greek

489. LANG 1878, 272.
491. SCOTT-STEVENSON 1880, xi-xii.
492. Ibid., 298.
Cypriots, the High Commissioner noted that the Turkish Cypriots, “Ottoman in race and Mahomedan in religion are far fewer in numbers; but they are more masterful in character and physical strength and still possess many of the qualities which mark the members of a ruling race and which more than make up for inferiority in numbers.”493 In such circumstances, the British seem to have felt it appropriate to grant the involvement of the local populace in administering the isle, albeit with the reservation of the right to legislate by “Order in Council” when at odds with the Council’s decisions. The British were painfully aware, however, that once the principle of granting decisive voice to native opinion had been granted, this power of veto could not be overused.494

In the twentieth century many colonial officials were to regret their decision, claiming that they had been too hasty and liberal and in particular had erred in allowing an unofficial majority in the Council.495 At this stage in the history of the British Empire this was not common practice. In a memorandum on the “Report of the Committee on Indian Reforms”, of March 1907, Lord Minto still warned that, “the predominant and absolute power,” of an official majority, “can only [be] abdicate[d] at the risk of bringing back the chaos to which our rule put an end.”496 In fact, most Asian and African colonies did not have unofficial or elected majorities until the post- World War II years, by which time colonialism itself was drawing to an end.497 By elected, unofficial majority is meant that the numbers of elected “native” members in the Council exceeded those of the official, appointed British members, in the case of Cyprus this being until 1925 in the ratio of 2:1. Yet the mathematical formula according to which the British constituted the Council was no coincidence, and has relevance to our story in two important ways. Firstly, it was to be a matter of angst for the island’s Turks, and secondly it was to be represented as an illustration of the British policy of divide-and-rule.

The island’s Moslem Turks showed no opposition to the new Council per se. Yet, while the Archbishop and other, “leading members of his community,” paid a visit to the High Commissioner, “to express the gratitude of the Greek community for the manner in which their wishes had been met,” the Müftü, (communal leader of the Moslems with responsibility for interpreting religious laws and issuing appropriate fatwas), “express[ed] the dissatisfaction of the Mahometan community with the decision arrived at by Her Majesty’s Government.”498 What they appeared to strongly resent and fear was the relative composition of the said Council, so much so that they threatened to boycott it.499

494. See SIMMONS s.a., 135, where Earl Grey informs the Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia regarding the “House of Assembly” there in the mid nineteenth century that, “In exercising, however, this power of refusing to sanction measures which may be submitted to you by your Council, you must recollect that this power … depends entirely for its efficacy upon its being used sparingly and with the greatest possible discretion.”
495. In fact, a Colonial Office memo of 1887 had seriously contemplated giving the Cypriots internal self-government, but noted that though this would free the British of important financial responsibilities, it was likely to be objected to by the Sultan who, “might justly complain of the abandonment of his Mohammedan subjects in the island to the mercies of their Greek fellow subjects.” Memorandum on Future Government of Cyprus, 14th May 1887. CO 537/23, 30.
496. SIMMONS s.a., 218–219; Lord Balfour also supported Minto’s position. Balfour, in Ibid., 199.
497. See JEFFRIES 1956, passim; Even where majorities were elected, however, the scope of the electorate was so miniscule as to make the elective nature of the councils, in the words of one frank British official, little but a “farce”. See Minute of 28th March, 1904, initialled by W.D.E. CO 67/138, 37.
499. Turkish Cypriot notables to the Office of the Sultan, 27th March 1882. BOA-Y.EE-98/78.
Though, as before, the Council in its composition maintained the principal of communal representation, representation of the communities was to be proportional to the overall population of the Christians and Moslems, meaning that for the nine members that the Christians were to have, the Moslems would only be allotted three. To the Moslem Turks of Cyprus, this came as the first rude shock of British rule, and they have arguably been trying to defend the principle of equal as opposed to proportional representation of the two main communities of Cyprus to this very day. On this matter the Müftü and others wrote to the High Commissioner stating:

With regard to this proposal we beg to point out that no provision or authority exists in any of the laws or regulations of the Ottoman Government for the election of Moslem and non-Moslem councillors in proportion to the respective numbers of the two communities, and it is owing to this that in Roumelia and Anatolia all tribunals and councils are composed of equal numbers of Moslem and non-Moslem members even where nine-tenths of the whole population consists of Mahometans only.

This was to be, as Crawshaw has recognised, the first in a series of, “demand[s] for parity ... that recurred in subsequent years.”

The leading Turkish Cypriot notables appealed also to the Sublime Porte to prevent such a development. They did so in vein, however, for though the Ottoman authorities did raise the matter with the British, the British stood firm, assuring them that the rights of the Turkish Cypriots would not be injured. Their assurance reflected the crucial fact that aside from the nine elected Christian and three elected Moslem members, the Council was to have in addition six appointed British members, raising the total membership to eighteen. This meant that the Greek Cypriots would not have a majority in the assembly. When coupled with a deciding vote for the High Commissioner in the event of numerical deadlock, the British reassured, this guaranteed that the elected Christians would not be allowed to impose their will on the Moslems. Yet, as a result, the Turks had, from the outset, been made institutionally somewhat dependent upon British support for furthering their goals and curtailing those of the Greeks. This they on occasion openly

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500. Nearly thirty years on, even though there was no prospect of his wish materializing, Şevket Bey stated in the Legislative Council that he: “was of opinion that the Council should not be composed of Members in proportion to the community that they represented, but that each section of the community should have an equal number of representatives,” [Minutes of the Legislative Council, 8th April 1910, 13. In CO 69/24]; Indeed, in negotiations regarding a resolution to the Cyprus dispute conducted over the past three decades, equal representation has been a key, persistent demand of Turkish negotiators.


503. Turkish Cypriot notables to the Office of the Sultan, 27th March 1882. BOA-Y.EE-98/78.

504. CO 883/3; Katsiaounis notes how the Turkish Cypriots were for some time more successful on this front in the municipalities of Paphos and Nicosia, where, “the Turks, who formed a sizeable proportion of the population, utilised the provision in the law according to which an elected council ceased to exist if one third of its members resigned.” Under these circumstances the government for many years was forced to appoint commissions, “consisting of one member from each community and a usually British president.” KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 83–84.

505. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 27th October 1881. CO 883/3, 149; In Gazioğlu’s words, this casting vote was to act as, “the ‘Sword of Democles’.” GAZIOĞLU 1997, 216.

506. ARMSTRONG 1925, 157.
acknowledged. (Concomitantly, however, and as the British were to later lament, the British themselves also depended on the Turks for guaranteeing a majority when the Greeks voted as a block against government measures).

The British had clearly tried to construct a built-in balancing mechanism into the Council to prevent it from getting out of hand. Having only one third of the membership of the Council, the British could nevertheless, it is argued, maintain their rule over the body by utilizing in particular the Turkish members’ votes when necessary. They could play one side off against the other in the knowledge that each depended upon British support to get its way in the Council. In the High Commissioner’s speech to the inaugural session of the Council, he advised: “I trust you will remember that you are here to represent not any particular class or community but to represent the general interests of the people of Cyprus. Of those people you are the representatives, and not the delegates of any particular section.” In light of the numerical equation the British had devised, however, it is difficult not to be cynical about such comments, which, even if genuinely well-meaning, are at the very least paradoxical.

Yet despite this, and though rarely represented as such, the record proved actually more complex than might have been expected. It most definitely did not match the following picture inaccurately drawn by Doros in 1955:

The alliance between the Turkish and British Members kept the representatives of the Greek majority “constitutionally” in check and the Legislative Council permanently divided into an Anglo-Turkish ‘front’ always occupying the Government benches and a Greek ‘front’ always in opposition. Whatever happened the Anglo-Turkish combination was always certain of having its own way. Nothing could alter that relationship whatever and how many elections there might be.

The fact was that being in a minority meant also that the British members of the Council could be outvoted by a combination of Greek and Turkish members, and the record does show, that contrary to common perception, voting did not always run along communal lines. The only members who (almost always) voted as a block, were the British! In fact, only ten days after the establishment of the first Legislative Council under Sir Garnet Wolseley’s administration, the High Commissioner logged in his journal, “Passed four new Ordinances, one of which, preventing foreigners from purchasing land in Cyprus, all three unofficial members voted against. Fuad Effendi had, I think been bought over by the other two, to vote against it on condition that they would help him in leaving the proposed ‘Bedel Eskerie’ modified.”

There were, then, many more cases of cooperation in the Legislature between Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives than the few dramatic instances usually acknowledged. Infuriated by the very failure that he laments, the High Commissioner reported in 1901 that, “The Constitution of the Legislative Council was based on the idea that there would be a proper balance of parties in the island, because when the Turkish members agreed with the Government the two would form a majority.

507. See for example, Mir’at-i Zaman 30th December 1907, which explicates that devious Greek Cypriot plans in the Council were quashed by an alliance of the Council’s Turkish Cypriot and official British members.
508. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 21st June 1883. CO 69/1.
509. DOROS 1955, 325.
510. WOLSELEY 1991, 158.
This safeguard has not worked in practice.”511 Two years later, in June 1903, the same Turkish members of the Legislative Council, despite their differences with their Greek colleagues, jointly protested to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, “the conduct of the Government who conduct every question before the Council with systematic obstinacy.”512 They continued to appeal for, “the appointment of a Commission to enquire into the complaints of the country as to its maladministration.” Yet cooperation between the members, especially where they found common grievance on financial issues, continued even after others had replaced the particular Turkish members who had aggrieved this particular High Commissioner.

To imply, as is often the case with Turkish, as well as non-Turkish authors, that the Turkish representatives in the Legislative Council were simply the tools of the British is misleading. Taking the year of 1913 as a specimen, one finds for example, Dr. Eyyub Nemeeddin sponsoring, “a petition from the inhabitants, both Christian and Moslem, of the villages of Pano and Kato Polemydia praying for the construction of a bridge over the river ‘Garillis’.”513 Mr. Economides seconding Turkish members in their demand that statutes should be re-printed not only in English, but also in Turkish and Greek, and for-

511. He proceeded to say:
The Turks have fallen into the power of the Greek-speaking usurers, and the Turkish members are of no use whatever to the Government, and seem totally blind to the dangers which threaten to wipe them out. The Turkish members are – a gentleman who was removed from the headmastership of the Idadi school, a Turk who has been deprived of all his honours and his civil status by the courts of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and sentenced to imprisonment for life with confiscation of all his property; and the third is a gentleman, who has been shot at and wounded for alleged oppression by his debtors, and whose brother was murdered for some agrarian dispute.

[Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 28th November 1901. CO 883/6, 360–361]. Though managing to uncover little about the allegations regarding the third of these members, it is clear that in his anger the High Commissioner was unaware, or, more likely, chose to overlook several important facts. Firstly that all these three had been newly elected and, in the cases of Ziyaeddin and Derviş Paşa, (the first and second members mentioned), not for the first time either! True, Ziyaeddin had not continued to be headmaster of the highest Moslem school when it had been transformed from a Rüşdiye to an İdadi school, but this appears to have been essentially because of his more traditional, theocratic academic background, being considered unsuited to the more modern educational system employed by the İdadi. [BRYANT 1998a, 212–218]. In fact, according to Bryant, the very support that existed amongst Turkish Cypriot modernizers for such reforms was a consequence of their belief that this was, “one of the last hopes for maintaining the integration of Cypriot Muslims into the Ottoman Empire.” [Ibid., 215]. Further, while Ziyaeddin was removed from this post, he continued to maintain a powerful and prestigious, albeit sometimes controversial, position amongst the Turkish Cypriot community. He was later not only to himself become the Müftü, and in this office to gather the first “National Congress” of December 1918, but he was also to be the prime rival of a later pro-British member of the Council, İrfan Bey. As to Derviş Paşa, it was true that he had lost the title of paşa awarded to him by the Sultan and was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment. This was not, however, because of any immoral actions on his part, but rather because articles of a Young Turk slant, challenging certain Ottoman ministers had been published in the newspaper “Zaman” of which he was proprietor. [For the Ottoman decision in 1901 to try Derviş Paşa for the “traitorous” articles in his newspapers, see Ministry of Justice to the Office of the Sultan, 6th April 1901 in BOA-Y.PRK.AZN-78/21]. Notably, the same year the Young Turks Riza and Tevfik were likewise sentenced to life imprisonment for their writings in the Mir‘at-i Zaman. [See, BOA-Y.PRK.AZN-8/22].

The reason for the High Commissioner’s derogatory remarks about these legislators, (a practice that was to be repeated in the case of others who did not bend to the British will appears to lie more in the frustration laid bare by his next sentence from the extract above where he states: “I understand that the line they are taking up is that the tribute ought to be paid to the Sultan, but that it should be wholly paid by the British Government, and that no portion should be paid by the Island.” Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 28th November 1901. CO 883/6, 361.

512. Telegram from Elected Members of Legislative Council to Chamberlain, 21st June 1903. CO 67/137, 263.

cing the reluctant government to compromise;\textsuperscript{514} Greeks and Turks combining to outvote the government on a resolution proposed by Mr. Theodotou;\textsuperscript{515} and; a combination of the three Turkish members accompanied by four of the Greeks, voting together against a majority composed of the six official members supported by five of the Greeks.\textsuperscript{516}

In 1911, when the government’s wishes were overruled by a resolution reducing the financial provisions in the budget for the District Administration by the calculated absence of one of the Turkish members who supported the reduction, the exasperated High Commissioner wrote to London:

\[ \text{[T]he attitude of the Moslems is an entirely uncertain factor. Indeed the constitutional system in Cyprus is at present revolving round the inscrutable springs of action of Mehmed Ziai Effendi, a hodja of limited education and oriental cast of mind, who pleaded to me the other day at Government House in the morning for protection of the Moslems against insults from Greeks processions, and in the afternoon in the Legislative Council left the Government to be defeated on an amendment aimed at the elimination of English Commissioners.} \textsuperscript{517} \]

To this despatch Mr. Cox of the Colonial Office minuted: “I am sorry to be parting from Cyprus just when the fun is about to begin. The situation promises to be identical with that in Malta which led ultimately to the reduction to a minority of the elected members.”\textsuperscript{518} The thoughts of both High Commissioner Clauson and Cox were to be repeated in similar contexts with increasing frequency and force in later years.

Shortly later in the same year’s proceedings, the Turks in fact voted together with the Greeks against the government. In his despatch describing the situation, Clauson, though noting the difficulties created, cautioned however against drastic constitutional change. He stated:

\[ \text{The patently unworkable constitution of 1882 with its unofficial majority of 12 to 6 has been made to work for thirty years by the exercise of common sense and the force of local circumstances; and such crisis as that of 1911 have occurred at intervals, as in 1884, 1886 and 1902. …} \]

\[ \text{As it exists at present the Council affords, in my opinion, invaluable opportunities for the ventilation of grievances and for intercourse between Government officials and representative Cypriots, and while it is to be regretted that legislation in some directions is almost impracticable and that some of the discussions as developed in the local newspapers tend to weaken authority and to produce local discord, I am yet of opinion that it would be exceedingly difficult to modify the constitution or to limit the powers of the Council, and I see no pressing need for change. Cyprus belongs geographically, and to a large extent ethnologically, to Asia, and the forces which appeals to its people are not those of the legislature, but are those of a paternal executive and an even-handed judicature.} \textsuperscript{519} \]

In fact, all Turkish legislators, at one time or another voted against government-supported positions, some on quite a regular basis. To portray them as being constantly at the colonialists’ beck and call is, at a bare minimum, a misrepresentation. For sure the Bri-

\textsuperscript{514} Ibid., 1\textsuperscript{st} April 1913. CO 69/29.
\textsuperscript{515} Ibid., 12\textsuperscript{th} May 1913. CO 69/29.
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid., 16\textsuperscript{th} May 1913. CO 69/29.
\textsuperscript{517} Clauson to Harcourt, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 1911. CO 67/162, 254–260.
\textsuperscript{518} Minute by Mr. Cox, 8\textsuperscript{th} May 1911. CO 67/162, 247.
\textsuperscript{519} Clauson to Harcourt, 29\textsuperscript{th} June 1911. CO 67/163, 302–303, 306.
tish were on average more likely to rely on Turkish rather than Greek support in the Council, but this was not guaranteed or unconditional. Moreover, the Turkish members appear as well to have been sufficiently politically refined to develop also other novel, more subtle tactics that allowed them on several occasions to stop the avidly annoyed British from getting their way, without even having to openly vote against them. One favourite method that British records refer to was for one of the three Turkish Cypriot members to fail to attend the vote, thereby meaning that while the other two might outwardly appear to be supporting a British measure, this would be only a ruse. Unable to form a majority, the British measure, unless supported by Greeks, was doomed to fail. In 1904 High Commissioner Haynes-Smith reported on his Legislative difficulties and registered this practice in the following way: “There appears therefore to be little prospect of the Elected Members dealing with the pending legislative business. The action of the Turkish Elected members will probably be to vote alternately with each side on different questions. … A favourite arrangement with the Greek Members is for one of the three Turkish Members to leave the Council, when votes are being taken, and then the remaining two can vote with the Government. By thus facing both ways, the majority of the Greek Members is not affected, and the Government are left in a minority.”

In fact, the opening years of the twentieth century seem to have been fraught with tensions between the Turkish members of the Council and the government. When in one debate in 1902 an angry Derviş Paşa, (who, “consistently described himself as the people’s representative,” and who has himself been described as a “Young Ottoman”), claimed that, “during the last elections Government Officials took part in persuading people to vote against him,” and complained that, “Representatives of the country did not receive sufficient respect at the hands of the officials,” the King’s Advocate curtly responded that there was nothing unlawful in their actions so long as, “undue influence” had not been employed. He granted though that such action might be considered, “improper.” Later on in the session another Turkish deputy also berated the government on account of its interference in elections, arguing that he too had faced government-sponsored opposition in his efforts to be elected and complaining that, “The Govt supported ‘mean & low’ persons who represented the minority.”

Kitromilides argues that:

British administrative practices not only contributed to the gradual destruction of an integrated society in Cyprus but by preserving and politicising traditional power structures, most notably the Orthodox Church and its civil functions, provided the leadership to potential ethnic conflict. The immediate benefits of this policy consisted in the manoeuvrability it allowed the colonial administration in playing one group against another and thus keeping ultimate control to itself.

Interesting as his arguments are, however, Kitromilides, like others fails to recognise certain critical points. Though the British may at times have benefited from political divisions amongst the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, generalizations and oversimplification

520. Haynes-Smith to Lyttelton, 24th February 1904. CO 67/138, 228; For reference to the same phenomenon in 1910, see also King-Harman to Secretary of State, 20th May 1910. CO 883/7, 101.
523. Ibid., 20th May 1902. CO 69/16, 51–53.
524. KITROMILIDES 1977, 45–46; See also KOURVETARIS 1988, 190.
need to be avoided in arguments related to the British impact on the development of nationalist rivalry in Cyprus. It is too simplistic an argument to claim that these divisions were solely the result of British actions, or that a well-defined policy of “divide-and-rule” was from the outset consciously designed and implemented so as to generate rival nationalist passions amongst the Greeks and Turks, and prevent the formation of a common Cypriot national identity upon which joint “Cypriot” national objectives could be founded.

Firstly, we must recognise that much of the segregation that the British are accused of institutionalising, was actually institutionalized under Ottoman rule. Polis insists that, “the British took apolitical religious differences in Cyprus between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox and through indirect rule politicised them into nationality groups.” However, indirect rule was a significant characteristic of Ottoman rule, and, as Yavuz points out, religious differences had begun to be politicised, especially amongst the Orthodox, well before the advent of British rule. The Orthodox Church had political as well as economic responsibilities under the Ottomans, and political segregation drawn along religious lines can be seen at a lower level too. Joseph too acknowledges at least that, “ethnic, administrative and political separation,” had in fact been, “inherited from the Ottoman period,” even if he does go on to accuse the British of having “stirred” antagonism between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Secondly, as has already been illustrated, nationalism, at least its Greek variant, was present on the island and gaining in strength well before the British took-over control. As Nesim insists, it is absurd to suggest that the British created Greek and Turkish ethnically conscious groups on the island. Suggesting that the British were the primary locus responsible for infusing nationalism into these groups runs counter to the evidence. Here also, Yavuz’s point that, “The implications of the Tanzimat Edict undermines the arguments of Pollis, Attalides and Cassia that ethnic revival was an outcome of the colonial policies,” is justified too.

Thirdly, there is no evidence of any notable incipient Cypriot nationalist movement up to World War II. To the contrary, the demand for enosis that had already grown amongst the Greek community when the British arrived was exclusivist. It was not a vision that incorporated the Moslem Turks as anything but a tiny minority within a Greater Greece. As Papadakis correctly states, “Greek Cypriot political rhetoric was dominated by the notion of enosis, the culture, language, and historical narratives of Cyprus have been presented as integral parts of the broader whole of Hellenism in order to justify the demand for enosis. No efforts were then made to create uniquely ‘Cypriot’ cultural or historical symbols.”

As far as concerns the Turkish Cypriots, then, enosis was not an objective which they could have shared and championed, particularly as the fate of those Turks coming under the control of the Greek Kingdom became increasingly apparent. As Rizvi puts it, “In

525. POLIS 1976, 54.
528. JOSEPH 1997.
529. NESIM 1990a, 5.
530. YAVUZ 1991, 66; As Yavuz notices, a fundamental flaw in Pollis’ otherwise often perceptive work is her belief that, “The process of transformation of Cypriot society began with the imposition of British colonial rule.” POLLIS 1979, 51.
531. PAPADAKIS 1998b.
these circumstances any attempt to alter the status quo in Cyprus was bound to arouse the hostility of the Turkish community,” irrespective of British machinations.532

Thus, it could conceivably be more accurately charged that Britain did not proactively foster a common “Cypriot” national identity. With the resources and power at their disposal they surely could have tried more. Perhaps, as Rizvi suggests, they could have encouraged the two communities to work together and thereby helped to build bridges by making an earlier effort to gradually transfer greater authority to the island’s natives.533 Yet this does not change the fact attested to by Kızılyürek that there has never been a serious effort by the Cypriot elites themselves to develop a common identity, that there has historically been no notable effort to ideologically justify living together.534

To be fair, there is, in fact, some infrequently noted evidence that the British seriously contemplated breaking down, at least partially, even the political segregation of the two ethno-religious groups in Cyprus. In a confidential despatch regarding the establishment of the new Legislative Council, the Earl of Kimberley had said:

I understand that it is the usual practice in the Ottoman dominions where elections take place that Christians and Mahometans vote only for the representatives belonging to their own creed respectively, but it seems to be undesirable that such a wall of demarcation should be set up between members of the same community in the election of a representative body, whose powers will extend to all classes of the population alike.535

He did however add the following caveat that appears to have been heeded. “Unless,” he argued, “there exist any special reasons for such a restriction in Cyprus, Her Majesty’s Government would not think it advisable that the Turkish precedent be adhered to.”536 In response High Commissioner Biddulph argued that under a proposal such as that made by the Earl, “the minority would not be represented at all, since the numbers, whether Christian or Mahometan, would be elected by the majority, who in this case happen to be Christian.” He did suggest instead, however, that the Government’s apparent hope, “that we may in time see the inhabitants cemented together as a homogeneous population with identical interests and aspirations,” would be best served by simply enacting that the Christians and Moslems would each elect a certain number of members, but, “without placing any restriction on the religion of the members so elected.”537 And, after much deliberation as to whether or not the Commissioner’s proposal would guarantee political representation for the minority, the Earl of Kimberley decisively, if begrudgingly, pronounced:

On reconsideration of the question whether Christians and Mahometans shall vote indiscriminately or only for the representatives belonging to their respective creeds, I have come, not without reluctance, to the conclusion that in order to secure an effectual representation of the minority of the population the latter system must be adopted, at all event for the present, in Cyprus.538

532. RIZVI 1993, 62.
533. Ibid., 66.
534. KIZILYÜREK 1993a, 13.
536. Ibid.; In light of his statements, it seems that unless the Marquis was later convinced of the error of his argument, the likely cause for the maintenance of the traditional electoral practice was the need to placate the already alarmed Turkish Cypriots and their Ottoman champions.
Undoubtedly, such extracts do not by themselves exonerate the British of having attempted to manipulate division amongst the island’s populace for its own political purposes; but they do illustrate that the evidence on this matter is not entirely incriminating, that divide-and-rule was not as predominant a strategy or motivation as it has at times been represented to have been. Georghallides summed it up well when he wrote: “[N]otwithstanding the good intentions which in 1882 the British Government expressed for the adoption of policies favourable to the idea of unity between the Greeks and Turks, such policies were not clearly enunciated or energetically pursued. The authorities’ inertia may in part have been due to the absence of any urgency in taking steps to improve what were already good Greco-Turkish relations. However, increasingly with the passage of time, some of the British officials did not resist the temptation of dabbling in local politics and, on occasion, of playing the all too easy, though dangerous, game of setting the one community against the other.”

Moreover, even if we rightly accept that Britain did at times try to politically manipulate divisions for her own ends, it must be observed that she was not always successful. Greek and Turkish legislators could and did work together for their mutual benefit. In the civil service, in commerce, in social affairs too the island’s communities still could and did interact, and on the whole did so harmoniously, albeit decreasingly so.

However, the rise of Greek nationalism, now released from the constraints of Ottoman rule to the relative indifference, or sometimes even sympathy of British occupation and officials, was increasingly diminishing prospects for political cooperation. Purcell and Hill both detail how the Greek Cypriots displayed their support for Greece as the Greek armies prepared for war in 1880, shortly before the cession of Thessaly. Greek officers bought over a hundred mules from Cyprus, almost as many were donated as a gift by the Greek Cypriots, 150 volunteers left the island to become volunteers in the Greek army, and Archbishop Sophronios sent a letter to King George of Greece declaring the solidarity of the Greek Cypriots with their “mother” Greece. In correspondence with Foreign Office in 1895, Edward Fairfield, while recognising “the position of the Moslem community amongst whom a certain disquietude has been aroused by recent events,” and acknowledging the role in this of public expressions of the desire for enosis, counselled that, “the maxim of colonial policy holds good that it is best to ignore words, which it is not attempted to translate into action, and which do not in themselves tend to bring about a breach of the peace.”

When coupled with supplementary insecurities created by the end to the relatively privileged societal position that the Moslem Turkish elite had previously maintained, and combined with the gradual introduction of Ottoman and later Turkish nationalist sentiment, the rising tide of unfettered enosis agitation served to gradually strengthen lines of political opposition between the two communities around national issues. The basis for political cooperation was diminishing.

In a protracted dialogue with a leading Greek Cypriot newspaper, Foni tis Kiprou, the Turkish Cypriot journal Kbris and the said Greek paper did try to call for greater coope...
ration between the two communities. But they were doing so from incompatible premises. Kibris was calling for the Greek Cypriots to accept and rejoice in their status as Ottoman subjects; exhorting them to work together with the Turkish Cypriots to end the British rule under which they commonly laboured and to restore the island to the just and equitable control of a rapidly developing Ottoman Empire. On the other hand though, Kibris flatly rejected the nature of the Greek paper’s calls to work together to rid the people of the tribute. These were unacceptable, Kibris insisted, for they amounted to a rejection of Ottoman rights over the island. What was lacking then was common cause, or at least the perception of common cause.

Is this just evidence of rivalry between the literate, upper strata of society? Could this perception of a lack of common cause, as many have argued, have been restricted solely to the level of the elites? Were the masses as yet unperturbed by the coming reign of nationalism?

### 3.3 “Re-Connecting” the Elites: Wider Society and the Turkish “Resistance”

Undoubtedly the Greek and Turkish representatives in the various Legislative Councils constituted during British rule were as individuals, (whether Greek money-lenders or clergymen, Turkish hocos or landowners), more prosperous and powerful than the masses whom they were elected to represent. Even so, when argumentation is provided that they, together with other members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites held and utilized nationalist sentiment and opinion purely out of regard for their own personal interest, when they are charged of being in this respect out of touch with the masses, particularly in the rural areas, the matter must be approached with caution.

The uneducated, illiterate masses, it is frequently suggested, particularly those living in the distant rural areas, shared little of the elites’ enthusiasm for nationalism. They were content to live together, had no quarrel with members of different ethno-religious communities, no concerns regarding the achievement or lack of achievement regarding enosis. Such views when propounded by contemporary scholars echo the analysis of colonial officials of earlier times, albeit with generally different premises. For the British officials playing down the scope of nationalist feelings was an effort to justify their rule, to defend the contention that the masses were satisfied, only troublemaking elites discontent. (Or, alternatively it was pure misconception). The scholars’ frequent underlying motivation, on the other hand, appears almost to be to absolve the poor, “innocent” commoners of any complicity in, or responsibility for the catastrophic nationalist conflict that later emerged.

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543. See front-page editorials in Kibris of the 9th, 16th and 23rd of July, 1894.
544. High Commissioner Sendall’s confession that: “Making every allowance for the sentiment of nationality, I have always found some difficulty in understanding how any well-informed and thoughtful Cypriot could look forward, as a thing to be desired, to union with a country in the financial condition of Greece; and I have occasionally expressed some scepticism as to the sincerity of this cry of ‘Enosis’,” illustrates well the difficulty that colonial administrators had in grasping the true hold of nationalism. [Sendall to Marquis of Ripon, 15th May 1895. CO 883/5, 3]; Coufoudakis is one prominent scholar who appropriately recognises how British officials underestimated the scope of the enosis movement, [COUFOUDAKIS 1976, 33]. Yet it is largely overlooked that the British showed the same tendency, at times an even greater tendency, to play down the strength of Turkish nationalist sentiment.
While not wanting to question the fact that economic, administrative and intellectual elites pioneered nationalist movements both amongst the Greeks and the Turks, a more careful re-evaluation suggests that they were not in their actions or sentiments so distant from the masses as sometimes thought. In fact, at times at least, it was they who struggled to quell unruly nationalist forces from below; they who were themselves forced by public pressure to take a more nationalist stance than originally intended.

In this respect, High Commissioner Haynes-Smith makes an interesting revelation concerning the situation at the beginning of the twentieth century. Noting how the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council took advantage of the absence of Turkish Cypriot members to raise the issue of enosis, he remarks: “The Moslem members ought to have been more vigilant and more punctual in attendance at the Council; but their laches only makes the Moslem community more anxious that action should be taken.

Three years ago the Moslem members were roughly handled by Moslems in the mosques, who thought the members were not sufficiently active in opposing this matter,” he informs, and reveals that now the, “Moslem members are driven by the Moslem community to bring forward the resolution expressing the views of the Moslem community at the insertion in the address of the Council of a declaration that the people of Cyprus desire union with Greece.”

It might be submitted that colonial administrators actually goaded on the Turkish Cypriots to react to Greek Cypriot agitation for enosis, as part and parcel of their policy of divide-and-rule, but there is nothing to substantiate that Turkish reactions were invariably anything but spontaneous. In fact, there are even grounds for arguing that, at times at least, the British tried to restrain Turkish reactions, such as when in 1904 the High Commissioner purposely placed the Moslem legislators’ potentially problematic resolution against enosis agitation so low on the agenda for the Council that it could not be debated in the session.

Statements to the effect that the Turkish Cypriots were at this stage still “unconcerned” by, or unaware of the enosis movement are simply not borne out by the evidence. In a memorial of 1882 to the Earl of Kimberley, Turkish community leaders had already protested: “The fact that by the establishment of clubs, by seditious assemblies, and by acting together, the Greeks in all parts of the world aim at reviving Greece.” The memorial proceeds to pronounce, “We believe that Her Majesty’s Government are aware that the fact that the Greeks are so much intoxicated, as stated before, with the idea of pan-Hellenism that they would wish to see nothing but Hellenism on the face of the earth, and are disposed to be satisfied with no other Government except that of Greece; and it is owing to this belief that we have till now abstained from making any demonstrations suggestive of complaint.” Referring to themselves as “Turks” and “Ottomans”, the memorialists declare

545. It is worth recording also from this despatch that the High Commissioner expresses what appears to be a genuine concern, “to allay racial hatreds, and prevent disturbances.” [Haynes-Smith to Lyttelton, 28th April 1904. CO 883/6, 45]; Turkish Legislative Councillor Derviş Paşa was to state that an official of the Evkaf, which had opposed their election, “had caused the agitation” by misleading the people into believing that he and his Turkish colleagues had acceded to this resolution. Hacı Hafız Ziyaeddin was to point the finger at İrfan Bey and the Acting Müftü. Yet, even if the intentions of the alleged agitators were related to internal communal politics, it does not detract from the fact that the Turkish public were so sensitive on the matter.


547. For an example of such argument, see SERVAS 1999, 57.
that, “No community can in any part of the world enjoy safety of life, property, or honour under the rule of the Greeks, so arrogant are they in consequence of the glory of the achievements of their ancestors.” To conclude, the memorialists had declared that if representation equal to that of the Greeks were not granted to them, then in light of the accounts of, “the revolutionary acts of the Greeks (of the Island),” they would be eventually forced to flee their native land.”

Defence of Ottoman rights over and in the island was persistent and expressed often, such as when in 1903 the Moslem members of the Legislative Council moved that, “the Island should be returned to the Imperial Ottoman Government, its lawful owner, when the proper time arrives.”

Even when it was the elites who politically led, rather than followed their communities, which was admittedly more typically the case, it is important to recognise that they were capable of mobilizing increasingly large numbers to the “nationalist cause”. Rapidly developing channels of education and communication during British rule quickly served to add velocity to the diffusion of nationalist sentiment. True, levels of education and literacy had been very low when the British took-over, but they were already beginning to climb by the end of the century, with both Moslems and Christians expressing strong desires for improvements in this area.

A Turkish editorial of 1893 reasoned that it was a matter of patriotic duty to reform existing Moslem schools in Cyprus and to establish new schools in the villages. And a few weeks later another editorial in the same journal, implored that this was critical to the task of preserving the “Ottoman sentiments” and Islam, and demanded urgent progress in the field of Turkish Cypriot education, without which, it said, the Turkish Cypriots would be forced to leave their children ignorant or to send them to Greek Orthodox schools where they would lose their identity.

Even the illiterate who could not directly absorb the nationalist emotions expressed in the press should not be considered to have been free from “contagion”. It was common

549. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 7th May 1903. CO69/17, 43.
550. See Cyprus Annual Report 1879, 23; Thus while noting the generally poor quality of Moslem schools in Nicosia, District Civil Surgeon, G S. Irving reported that: “many of the leading Moslem gentlemen, Fuad Effendi, Hilmi Effendi, and many others have spoken to me on the state of their schools, and one and all are more anxious that they should be thoroughly reorganised, and brought on to an equality with other schools in Europe. They are desirous that really useful subjects should be taught, and the moral standard raised. This, I believe, is the general desire of most of the Moslem population in Nicosia.” Cyprus Annual Report 1879, 245.
552. Ibid., 31st July 1893; As seen in this editorial, there were exceptions to the general rule of separate schools for the two communities, the most famous product of which was none other than Kamil Paşa who according to Kyriss studied at a Greek Gymnasium, [Kyriss 1976, 261]. Vahdettî also makes it known that once he had completed his primary education Kamil had indeed received part of his education at a Greek school, as also, he says, did Kamil’s three brothers. It is revealing, however, that he recorded that the brothers had been sent to the school, “despite the fanaticism of the time,” at the behest of their father, suggesting as it does that this was not common practice. [Volk 12th December 1908]. Thus, there were then at times clearly some cases of Turks educated in Greek schools, most probably as a consequence of the higher standards that parents may have associated with these schools as well as with the more practical question of proximity. This was all the more likely in the mid-nineteenth century when Kamil was receiving his education due to the very limited number of schools at the time. All the same, the educational exchange was not solely one way, and there were, as Catselli observes Greek students who also studied at Turkish schools. CATSELLI 1979, 83 and 110.
practice for important articles, telegraphs of news and developments to be read out in the coffee shops and clubs, and thereby disseminated. In the villages, let alone the towns, there was by the onset of the twentieth century typically at least one literate schoolmaster who could orally diffuse such news, and in some villages teachers were nov even holding evening classes to teach illiterate adults how to read and write.553 Nor need the physical isolation of the rural areas be over-exaggerated in intimating that this was an almost insurmountable barrier to the infiltration of nationalism from the urban centres. Cyprus was no vast expanse, and though interaction between town and country was definitely hampered by the primitive condition of transport and communication, both steadily progressed under British rule. Moreover, villagers frequently had family or commercial contacts with town-dwellers (and vice-versa), and even during the early decades of the British period it is clear that inter-ethnic dispute tainted by nationalist passions was indeed spreading to the villages. In this respect, it should not be forgotten that both Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalist elites were to make increasingly proactive efforts to spread their messages in the villages, the efforts of Necati Özkan and his colleagues in this respect probably having been highly influential in his eventual election victory.

That the villages were by no means devoid of inter-communal and even nationalistic tensions is illustrated by a despatch from 1904 wherein the High Commissioner reports on how in the village of Kalavasso, under the instigation of their Greek schoolmaster, “children were paraded through the streets of the village with Greek flags, singing songs against the Turks and chanting “the heads of the Turks must be cut and their bodies must be thrown into filth.”554 He enclosed too the protest of the Moslem villagers against this and similar provocations, calling for action to be taken against this schoolmaster, “who since his appointment, always inspires animosity amongst the Moslems and Christians, and instigates the Christian community to cause various troubles.”555 It should be recognised, though, that the Turkish Cypriots were themselves capable of similar provocative actions. Mir’at-ı Zaman, for instance, haughtily reports how in 1907, after the delivery of nationalist speeches at a school ceremony, Turkish Cypriot schoolchildren marched through the Greek quarter of Larnaca, Ottoman flags in hand, chanting “Long live the Sultun”556. The picture, then, of a handful of literate, urban, elite individuals with nationalist leanings, disconnected from a general population devoid of any nationalist sentiment until the post World War II period is without a doubt false. It is plain that by the inter-war period the masses, Turkish, as well as Greek, had been well infiltrated by nationalism, as a result of processes going back more than a century in the case of the Greeks, and at least a half that long in the case of the Turks.

The mounting difficulties of the Ottoman Empire could not have done much to quell Turkish anxiety regarding British occupation, insecurity that over time was to be accentuated by the lack of clarity regarding British intentions. Less than a year into the British Occupation, the “actual fear” of the Moslems in the face of Greek agitation was registered and it was warned that, “A clamorous meeting, or some childish exhibition of “spirit” near a Turkish house, may bring about a catastrophe. The Turks are not at all prepared to let the Christians have it all their own way.”557 Whether the masses or even elites would...

553. Mir’at-ı Zaman 8th February 1909.
554. Haynes-Smith to Lyttelton, 8th June 1904. CO 883/6, 79.
555. Enclosure No. 4 in Rees-Davies to Lyttelton, 8th June 1904. CO 67/138, 527–528.
556. Mir’at-ı Zaman 15th July 1907.
all have concurred with the tone of all the language contained in a series of telegrams sent to the Minister for Colonies in June 1902 may be debated: One of several, from the representatives of the Moslems of Paphos, appealed:

Should this Island be handed over to an uncivilised and unjust Government, the evil methods of the Cypriot Greeks, which are known to you, will increase, and the catastrophe of the Moslem is ensured certain. We hope that a just Government such as the British will not abandon a love (law) abiding people to a nation of savages. Should you deem it necessary to hand over Cyprus to another nation, we pray that it may be returned to Turkey, whose right is indisputable, and thus our honour will be preserved.558

Leaving to one side the historical hyperbole, there is nonetheless little genuine reason to doubt that the words in the opening sentence of the telegram sent on the same day by former Legislative Councillor Ahmed Raşid of Limassol, stating: “The feeling that the Mohammedans will not agree to the Administration of Cyprus leaving the people to Greece is unanimous,” must have been very close to the truth.559 Notably, petitions of this kind were forwarded also to the Sublime Porte.560

Within the space of a few weeks matters seem to have escalated even further: Protest meetings held by the Greek Cypriots expressing continued desire for enosis in response to British statements that enosis could not be foreseen, “roused the Moslem community,” who themselves now, “held meetings to oppose any such movement,” and forwarded an unprecedentedly large petition to the Secretary of State for the Colonies of over 600 signatures on this matter. Noting that the Greek Cypriots desire for enosis was wholly unacceptable and would lead to, “the annihilation of the Moslem community,” the petition concluded: “In case of it being deemed necessary by the illustrious British Government to abandon the Island, we all pray and solicit, in the name of justice, that by way of protecting our properties, lives and honour, the Island may be restored to our august Sovereign, our illustrious Caliph and Monarch of the everlasting Ottoman Empire, who is the lawful owner of the Island.”561

It was not really that the Turks were anymore “satisfied” with British rule than the Greeks. Both clearly were quickly disappointed when the British promises of prosperity failed to materialize. Both were disillusioned when traditional and customary advantages began to be endangered by the more rational, less paternalistic system of government the British progressively introduced. Thus, for example, the Bishop of Kitium, himself a Legislative Council member, argued against hasty British efforts to change existing Ottoman law;562 he drew attention also to the fact that unlike the British, “the Sultan forgave many taxes,” and that, “The sale of immovable property for the recovery of taxes was unknown during the Turkish administration.”563 The Church more generally resisted

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557. Enclosure in Greaves to Marquis of Salisbury, 18th June 1879. FO 421/32, 54. It is interesting that Greaves apportions blame for intrigue and mischief on the “real Greeks” whom he distinguishes from the local Orthodox population, indicating already the politically active nature of a Hellenic Colony in Cyprus.
558. Telegram from representatives of the Moslems of Paphos to Secretary of State, 22nd June 1902. CO 67/133, 502–504.
559. Telegram from Rashit to Colonial Office, 22nd June 1902. CO 883/6, 409.
561. Enclosure No. 2 in Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 30th June 1902. CO 883/6, 415.
562. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 2nd June 1883. CO 69/1, 10.
563. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1899. CO 69/12, 18.
strongly the removal of its historical tax privileges.\textsuperscript{564} Less than a year after the assumption of power by the British, Samuel Baker was to assert that:

The unflinching determination to administer the laws without fear or favour to all classes had infringed upon the assumed immunities of the Greek Church, which had always received deferential consideration from the Turkish government, and although actually liable to taxation, the right had never been enforced. This is a curious contradiction to the vulgar belief in Mussulman intolerance and bigotry; the Greek Church not only enjoyed a perfect freedom under the Turks, but the bishops were assisted in obtaining a forced tribute from their flock by the presence of Turkish zaptiehs (police), who accompanied them during their journeys through the diocese.

An interference with Church property or established rights is certain to create a buzzing of the ecclesiastical bees, who will swarm against the invader with every sting prepared for action.\textsuperscript{565}

Baker’s prophetic prediction soon assumed force. In the opening session of the Legislative Council in 1886 the Greek Orthodox members demanded the maintenance of, “[T]he special jurisdiction of the Spiritual Heads of the Church, as contained in the Imperial Berats, by which from time immemorial the Church has fulfilled its multifarious duties to the Orthodox Christian community.” The Berats, they stated, “provided the means by which the Church was sustained, and the acknowledgment of these provisions by the Government is considered necessary for the well-being of the Church.”\textsuperscript{566}

Even into the twentieth century, there continued to be expressions of regret from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots of the fact that British economic policy was not as considerate of the people as had been that of the Ottomans. In 1879 Scott-Stevenson had written and pondered: “I must say, however, to the honour of the Turks, that in very bad years they have always given seed-corn to the poor gratis. I wonder if our own Government will be equally generous?”\textsuperscript{567} Less than a quarter of a century later, in 1903, the answer to her question became plain. The unofficial, elected members of the Legislative Council derided the government for not helping the people of the island during the ongoing economic crisis, comparing the British administration unfavourably to that of the Ottomans, which had been more ready to extend an arm of assistance in order to avoid the destitution of the people.

\textsuperscript{564} Greaves to Marquis of Salisbury, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 1879. FO 421/32, 54.
\textsuperscript{565} BAKER 1879; Baker further reported:
I have myself witnessed an altercation between the monks and shepherds on the mountains upon a question of cheeses and goats, which the former claimed as annually due to the monastery; it appeared that prior to the British occupation they had been able by threats to extort this demand, but the shepherds had now determined to free themselves from all payments beyond those which the law compelled, and they resisted the priestly authority, before which they had hitherto remained as slaves. This spirit of independence that has been so quickly developed by the equity of British rule will probably extend, and may seriously interfere with the revenues of the Church, should the population determine to abide by their legal status and refuse the ordinary fees. It cannot be expected that either bishops, monks, or priests regard this change with satisfaction, and in their hearts they may sigh for the good old times of a Turkish administration, when the Greek Church of Cyprus was an imperium in imperio that could sway both the minds and purses of the multitude, untouched by laws or equity, and morally supported by the government.
Ibid.
\textsuperscript{566} Cyprus Gazette 6\textsuperscript{th} March 1886.
\textsuperscript{567} SCOTT-STEVENSON 1880, 258.
people. As irate British members looked on, Greek Cypriot member of the Legislative Council Kyriakides pronounced that:

[I]t was impossible not to compare the steps taken between the Turkish Government in 1870 and the British Government in 1903. The Government in 1870 suspended the collection of all taxes as soon as the pressure commenced and granted seed corn to the people not on loan but gratis and imported large quantities of flour which it distributed amongst the people. The taxes which had been suspended were still due when the occupation took place and the honourable member believed that those taxes had been recovered by the British Government by the methods which the British Government knew so well to exercise. ...

In 1870–73 although those years had been worse than 1903 the country had been able to hold out better, and a proof was that none had left the country in those years, whilst last year hundreds had been obliged to leave the island in search of their daily bread.

Soon after, we also see Mir’at-i Zaman lamenting the dire straits of the poor under the British administration, and looking back fondly to the days gone by when the poor had been protected by the Ottoman imposition of price controls on foodstuffs.

Official rates of taxation might not have been any more substantial than those under the Ottomans, but the efficiency and zeal with which the British intended to collect such taxes, meant that greater sums were to be extracted. Biddulph’s remark that one such tax was, “cheerfully paid by both Mahometans and Christians,” should not be taken as being representative of the general response towards taxation under the British, who if they had checked up on the Ottoman history of the island would have soon realized what a politically sensitive issue this could be. They had, in fact, been promptly warned by one of the first British civilians to visit the island after the British occupation began. He had cautioned: “There are no people more affectionate in their immediate domestic circle, or more generally courteous and gentle, than the Cypriotes, but like a good many English people, they have an aversion to increased taxation.”

Both communities too, (though more vehemently and consistently the Greeks), argued at times against the excessive burden of maintaining British personnel in the top posts of colonial administration, a feature which though typical of colonial rule, nevertheless added further to budgetary difficulties. The Turks also resented the increased costs of administering the Evkaf incurred following the involvement of British officials in its running.

Though the early years of British rule undoubtedly brought economic difficulty for both communities, it is probably fair to say that it weighed more heavily upon the Turks.

568. See, Elected Members’ reply to the High Commissioner’s opening speech for the Legislative Council session, Cyprus Gazette 22nd May 1903, and again the following year, in Cyprus Gazette 26th April 1904.

569. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 5th May 1903. CO 69/17, 11.

570. Mir’at-i Zaman 24th December 1906.


572. For Biddulph’s comments, see Cyprus Annual Report 1879, 13.

573. BAKER 1879.

574. Though it should be noted that not all British politicians were happy with such a policy. As early as 1833 one such liberal political, Thomas Babington Macaulay, argued in a House of Commons speech that such a policy was unjustifiable. SIMMONS s.a., 81–84.

575. The Delegates of the Evkaf recognised themselves that, “the administration provided for by the Convention necessarily involved increased expenditure compared with that of the purely Turkish Administration from Constantinople which it replaced.” The Evkaf Office in Nicosia to Chief Secretary, 28th March 1907. SA1/907/1907, 24.
One such sign comes from a report of 1885, which acknowledged that, “the Christian Cypriot is gradually shouldering the Mahometan out of the Island … and one by one the properties of the Mahometans are going into the market.” The British blamed this on the laziness and lack of enterprise of the Moslems, and though the reasons behind this relative decline do warrant more thorough examination, it would not be untoward to suggest that what is most relevant for us is that the comparative economic deterioration in the position of the Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots contributed to their malaise.

The most persistent grievance, one whose ghost continued to haunt British administrators even after it had in effect been removed, was that of the tribute. In his memorandum of 1907, Churchill outlined the nature and history of the tribute, and boldly raged against the injustice of the British position:

By the Convention of 1878 we bound Cyprus to pay a tribute to the Sultan of 92,800/ . This Convention was made for our own purposes … It happened by chance that just about the same time as our occupation of the island began the Sultan repudiated the Turkish Debt of 1855, of which Great Britain and France were joint guarantors, and which was secured on the revenues of the Turkish Empire. Here in Cyprus at least was one portion of those revenues which we could seize. We therefore intercepted the whole tribute, and devoted the money to the service of the repudiated loan. No doubt, from our point of view, this was a convenient arrangement. But was it an honest or moral action? ... [Britain] had and has no more right to make Cyprus contribute towards the discharge of that purely British obligation than to make Ceylon or any small independent state which could be coerced by force of arms. But this is what she has done. The Turk has never received a penny of that tribute, and in that respect the Convention of 1878 is, in fact, utterly evaded. Yet Cyprus has been made to pay all the same, and the money has come to us, and has been used by us to defray an integral part of purely British expenditure … Can we wonder at their feelings?

Churchill was not alone in his sense of exasperation. Several colonial administrators in Cyprus did try to convince their superiors that the financial burden of the tribute was unbearable, yet they were left having to defend such an indefensible policy, apparently as a result of the Treasury’s resistance, that even they could often not conceal their sympathy for native discontent concerning the matter. In a despatch to Chamberlain at the close of the nineteenth century, High Commissioner Sir W. F. Haynes-Smith acknowledged that the tribute was, “the main cause of agitation. It enters into almost every question in every corner of the Island, and whenever any man’s land, or house, or cattle, or crops may be sold for taxes, he curses the tribute which he considers has ruined him.” It was little wonder, considering the tribute initially constituted almost half of the island’s gross annual revenue.

578. See, for example, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 6th March 1885. CO 69/1; See also Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 7th March 1899. CO 883/6, 137 where the High Commissioner declares, “One cannot but sympathize with the desire of the people here to obtain some arrangement for the reduction or liquidation of the Tribute to Turkey.”
579. Ibid., 103; The members of the Council were willing to acknowledge the efforts of the local government in trying to remove the burden of the tribute, but clearly did not find their negative outcome satisfactory. See Cyprus Gazette 26th April 1904.
580. See PURCELL 1969, 213.
plead” for “relief”, frankly venturing that this was not only a financial necessity but also a
moral requisite in light of the fact that, “the occupation of Cyprus was undertaken by His
Majesty’s Government for high political reasons and in furtherance of an Imperial
policy.” The matter was brought up with Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamber-
lain, eldest son of Joseph, but Austen was not to accede, bluntly responding that there
needed first to be a, “reasonable prospect of future benefit accruing from our present
expenditure,” and that they, “should not merely be pouring out money in the vain hope of
stopping a greedy agitation.”

That it was the perceived danger of disassociating Cyprus from the Ottoman Suze-
rainty that often precluded Turkish Cypriots from more actively cooperating with the
Greek Cypriots over opposition to the tribute issue, rather than, as is often implied, their
unswerving obedience to the British, was illustrated as early as 1899. Here a vote in
the Legislative Council resulted in the defeat of its official members by a coalition of Tur-
kish and Greek Cypriot legislators who agreed this time round on a delicately worded
amendment proposed by the senior Turkish member which while complaining of, “the
burdens imposed under the Convention, and added on the people of Cyprus by reason of
the change of administration,” in no way implied an end to Ottoman suzerainty.

Mir’at-ı Zaman too records how Turkish Cypriot deputy Mehmet Ziyai later frankly sta-
ted in the Legislative Council that were it not for the Greek Cypriots possessing ulterior
polITICAL motives on the matter of the tribute, the Turkish Cypriots would be willing to
make common cause. As Churchill perceptively recognised in his memorandum of
1907: “[I]f the Moslems protest against these Greek demonstrations, which are every year
becoming more violent, it is only because they know that union with Greece means their
ruin, not because they do not feel the same economic pinch from present conditions.”

In 1911 Şevket Bey explained his understanding of the bi-communal differences as far as
concerned the tribute in the following manner:

The difference in their points of view was a political one; they desired that the British
Government should come to the aid of the finances of Cyprus in accordance with what was
considered necessary for her welfare and prosperity, whereas the Honourable Greek Mem-
bers considered that such grants should be given as a refund from the Tribute. The Honoura-

582. Chamberlain to Lyttelton, 30th November 1905. CO 67/143, 542.
583. Gürel deserves credit for being one of the first historians to clearly recognise the importance of this distinc-
tion, pointing indeed to the need for historical re-appraisal on this matter. [GÜREL 1984, 53 and 56]. Nev-
ertheless, it could fairly be argued also that despite genuine political concerns harboured by the island’s
Turks, there were times when they could perhaps have acted more flexibly in an effort to induce a recipro-
cal stance from the Greeks as to cooperation on relief from the tribute.
584. Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 28th February 1899. CO 883/6, 119; That British officials appeared to rec-
ognise well the motives of the Turkish Cypriots is supported by statements such as those of the High Com-
missioner who in 1899 noted that, “The Turks are unwilling to appear to act against the interests of the Sul-
tan by attacking the payment of the Tribute to Turkey,” Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 7th March 1899. CO
883/6, 137 and again in Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 22nd April 1899. CO 883/6, 165, where it was said:
“The Turkish Members in a very striking manner regulate their action in all questions respecting the tribute
by a deep feeling of loyalty to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey.”
585. Mir’at-ı Zaman 11th March 1907.
ble Greek Members should not be offended when they tried to defend the ties of Cyprus with Turkey, to whom she belonged, when they (the Greek Members) demanded her union with a Country with which she had no connection.587

This basis of the Turkish members’ opposition was acknowledged by Mr Kyriakides in the same year’s session when he recognised that:

They only differed from their Honourable Moslem Colleagues in the views as to the manner in which the money should be restored to the Island: the wish that the Island should progress by the utilization of all its resources was common to them all. The Moslems wanted this done by an increase to the grant-in-aid, and the Christians wanted it done by a restoration of the money which Great Britain took away from them, and which she had no right to take.588

In fact, on occasion, compromise was reached on the matter of pressing for relief on the question of the tribute between the two communal groups within the Legislative Council. They thus united in passing a resolution on the matter in 1910, with Greek member Mr. Nikolaides stating that, “in the spirit and substance of the Resolution they were agreed,” and assuring the Turkish members that they should not fear their Greek colleagues, “endeavouring to hide behind the Resolution any political designs, as the matter was one of a solely financial nature and in no way connected with any political question.”589

Though on the occasion of this member’s speech this may well have been the case, his words were not to prove sufficient to constitute a permanent relief to Turkish suspicions. Only three years earlier when the Greek Members of the Council first tried to convince their Turkish colleagues that their successful calls for the inclusion within the Address in reply to the High Commissioner’s opening speech for relief from the tribute were not meant to challenge Ottoman sovereignty, and that the Turks’ fears as to this were “groundless”, they had soon thereafter proceeded to press for the inclusion of the concluding paragraph of the same address to incorporate the call for enosis. An exasperated Şevket Bey had then argued that this only served to show, “how sincere the Greek members were in their assurances that there was no intention on their part to diminish the Suzerain rights of the SULTAN!,” and Mehmet Ziyai Efendi defensively retorted by, “assur[ing] the Council that there was not a Moslem who had not in his heart a desire for the union of Cyprus to Turkey and this was natural because they were a portion of the Turkish Empire and the Moslems were descendants of the Conquerors who conquered Cyprus and they were Ottomans and the sons of Ottomans.”590

The paradox for the Turkish Cypriots though, was that their relative weakness made them more dependent on the British and therefore generally less willing to confront them head-on. Their inability to do so was complicated by the fact that they did not possess a ready-made powerful and autonomous organizational apparatus that could be put to use in championing “the cause”. In contrast, we have already noted the importance of the role played by the Orthodox Church in the struggle for enosis. It was an organization with

587. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 30th March 1911. CO 69/27, 67.
588. Ibid., 1st June 1911. CO 69/27, 699; In 1899 the issue had been similarly conceded by Mr. Economides who had stated that: “Hon. Members had often had occasion to feel the reservedness of the Ottoman members in the Council in question regarding the Tribute on account of the jealousy they showed to preserve the Sultan’s rights of suzerainty.” Minutes of the Legislative Council, 10th March 1899. CO 69/12, 145–146.
branches in every quarter, every village; with plentiful funds, and with authority over the entire Greek Cypriot community. Angered by its loss of privilege under the British, the Church increasingly spared little opportunity to lash out against British injustice, and did so more and more under the nationalist banner. Further, as Beckingham aptly realizes, the Moslems were also more disadvantaged by the end of Ottoman control than members of the Christian millets on a more fundamental level too. This was not only because, “the unsacramental character of Sunni Islam and the absence of an ordained priesthood necessarily left Muslims less well equipped to resist encroachment than Christians,” but because under the Ottoman administration, the organisation of the Moslem populace, “was in many ways identical with the government of the empire. When Ottoman control ended the Muslims everywhere automatically lost much of their communal organisation. This loss was not shared by the Christians. The elaborate ecclesiastical hierarchy which had in so many respects ruled over them in Ottoman times remained intact and continued to function, within the limits of the law, under British administration, even though its powers were restricted in some ways.”591 The fact that Church leaders were elected through popular participation of the Orthodox laity only added to their stature and authority.592

For the Turkish Cypriots, the only comparable institution to the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, (if only barely), was the Evkaf. Like the Church, it too was in control of valuable real estate, and was potentially perhaps capable of acting as a power-base for organizing and agglomerating Turkish Cypriot political demands. Not only, however, did its administrators not have the same religious sanction of the generally revered Church leadership, but, more significantly, they were to come increasingly under the sway of the British.593 The Cyprus Convention had foreseen one Evkaf appointee from Istanbul, the other a British official, but in practice it was largely under British control, and eventually with the annexation of 1914, the British began to appoint both delegates, and the Evkaf totally lost its potential to act as a source for autonomous Turkish Cypriot political mobilization. The Ottoman archives unveil that the Turkish Cypriots much earlier had already complained to the Sublime Porte about inappropriate British influence over the Evkaf and misuse of its funds, and asked for Ottoman support in remedying this situation.594 It has been indicated that there were even efforts to bring the Evkaf under the control of directly elected representatives as early as the opening years of the twentieth century.595 Telegrams were sent to the Turkish press in Istanbul appealing for support for, “the safety of our Evkaf & the existence of the Osmanlis in Cyprus.”596 Yet, such efforts were again in vein, obstructed by the British authorities. They were to state that any autonomous committee for running the Evkaf was both unnecessary and precluded by the Cyprus Convention.597

The absence of an emerging Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie is often cited as a cause for the delayed advance of nationalism. Choisi is one of those who emphasises the lack of a

591. BECKINGHAM 1957b, 72.
592. KITROMILIDES 1980, 188–189.
594. Turkish Cypriot notables to the Office of the Sultan, 26th March 1887. BOA-Y.PRK.AZJ-107/11; Chief Secretary Clauson to the Mufti of Cyprus, 27th November 1908. SA1/907/1907, 53.
595. See enclosure in King-Harman to Lyttelton, 16th December 1904. CO 883/6, 174, and Mehmet Munir to High Commissioner, 8th March 1907. SA1/907/1907, 7–8.
596. Extract from Sabah, 2nd October 1908. SA1/907/1907, 46.
597. Clauson to Abd-ul Hamid Bey, 25th April 1907. SA1/907/1907, 44.
business middle class, which many scholars argue forms a critical basis for the development of nationalism. She claims that, “the absence of a Turkish Cypriot middle-class,” was the result, “of the socio-political structure of the Ottoman Empire and the influence of British colonialism,” and that:

[W]hereas within the Greek Cypriot community a wide business middle class arose as a result of socio-economic changes, the Turkish Cypriot middle class remained limited in numbers and restrained in its civil service function. It was, therefore, entirely dependent on the British colonial government for promotion opportunities. Because of the economic dominance of the Greek Cypriot elite, on the one hand – which controlled the prosperous trade-sector – and the lack of economic mobility within the Turkish Cypriot society on the other, no middle class could evolve and hence no “autonomous” nationalism could develop.598

Not all would subscribe to such argumentation. Deringil, for one, has put forward the argument that Kemalism was itself, “a middle-class phenomenon, and its leaders were almost all drawn from the stratum of a Muslim bourgeoisie that was emerging from the late nineteenth century onwards. In this sense,” he proposes, “Kemalist nationalists fit rather neatly into Hobshawn’s telling category of ‘classes that stood or fell’ according to the fate of the regime they wanted to create.”599 Kedourie, on the other hand, points correctly to the flaw in the modernist supposition that because the middle classes were pre-eminent in fostering nationalism in western Europe, this had necessarily to be so also in other areas of the world. “The term middle class,” he argues, “is closely tied to a particular area and a particular history. It presupposes and implies a distinct social order,” one he contends, which is marked by, “rapid industrial development.” This and other such features cannot be linked, he insists, to the existence of a nationalist movement. “In countries of the Middle and Far East, for example, where the significant division in society was between those who belonged to the state institution and those who did not, nationalism cannot be associated with the existence of a middle class. It developed rather, among young officers and bureaucrats, whose families were sometimes obscure, sometimes eminent ... educated in Western methods and ideas, often at the expense of the State.”600

Nevertheless, both Attalides and Kizilıyürek take a similar position to Choisi. Attalides, for instance, says that: “the Greeks as the economically dominant group, had a bourgeoisie which early came into conflict with the colonial administration over constitutional and economic issues. The Turkish Cypriot ruling groups were largely administrators, directly dependent on the colonial Government, and landowners.”601 Yet, there is evidence that the Turkish Cypriots did maintain some powerful commercial interests, vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots, well into the twentieth century.602 In fact, many of the politically active Turkish Cypriot cadres, including pioneering nationalists who instigated the spread of nationalism, could be considered to have been members of an emerging bourgeois class, from the entrepreneurial Necati Özkan in the 1920’s and thereafter, back to some at least of the members of the Ottoman Kiraathane in the opening years of British rule.603

598. CHOISI 1993, 19.
599. DERINGIL 1993, 168.
600. KEDOURIE 2000, 97.
601. ATTALIDES 1977a, 77; See also KIZILYÜREK 1993a, 30.
602. See GÜRKAN 1996, 93–94.
“Kıraathane” is literally translated as “public reading room” or “coffee house where newspapers are kept.”

It is probably better depicted, however, as a club, where besides the primary purpose of socializing with their peers, “respectable” gentlemen would gather also to discuss politics and current affairs. While Samani gives the date of the establishment of this “club” as 1881, Fevzioglu indicates that it was established in 1886. Whatever the case, there is widespread belief that the Osmanlı Kıraathanesi or “Ottoman Club” was established partly in reaction to the pro-enosis Greek clubs that had proliferated on the island, in particular, “Kypriyakos Silogos”.

The Ottoman Club was undoubtedly a meeting place of and for the elite, as is confirmed both by the memoirs of Fadıl Niyazi Korkut and interviews conducted by Neriman Cahit. Korkut related how his brother Ahmet Raik was unable to get sufficient support amongst the club’s patrons to be accepted as a member, and Hüseyin Cahit Balman recounted to Neriman Cahit how as a child in the 1920’s his grandfather, a common man, had taken him to the club as a treat, only to be humilitatingly asked to leave without having yet drunk his coffee. Nonetheless, the club’s influence was broadened by its decision to establish its own printing press, (for which, apparently public contributions were collected), and to publish its own journal, “Zaman”, which was launched with Young Turk tendencies, and remained in circulation from 1891–1900. Though documentation is quite sparse, there are indications that the club continued to be a focus of political activity for the Turkish Cypriots into the twentieth century. Mir’ât-ı Zaman recounts, for example, how crowds gathered and speeches were given in front of the Kıraathan by Şevket Bey and his comrades following their election victory in the Nicosia Municipal Council contest of 1908.

Gürkan indicates that with the shift in emphasis of trade from the east to the west that accompanied British rule, Turkish merchants in Cyprus were disadvantaged in relation to their Greek Cypriot compatriots who traditionally had much stronger ties with European markets. On such bases it might be surmised that the comparative disadvantages and sense of disgruntlement amongst a budding Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie actually helped to make them lean more readily to nationalist sentiment, as witnessed by the members of their ranks who championed the cause of Ottoman and Turkish nationalism. It is also noteworthy that a leading member of the Ottoman Club and the publisher of Zaman was Tücarbaşı Hacı Derviş, “Tücarbaşı” being a title meaning, “Head of the Merchants.”

All the same, it deserves recognition that a greater proportion of the Turkish Cypriot elite
were members of the civil administration rather than businessmen, and therefore more
dependent on the British. This, no doubt, must have circumscribed the autonomy of many
to freely express nationalist sympathies, let alone to agitate openly and defiantly.

However, the generally weaker and more dependent position of the Turks did not act
as a permanent constraint on challenging the British. To illustrate, an editorial in Kibris in
1894 vented anger with British disregard for Moslem rights, and argued that the
Christians were being favoured over the Moslems. It stated that they felt free to lead critic-
sim of the British authorities as:

We Ottomans are a people who were entrusted on a temporary basis to the administration of
the British government by the Ottoman state to which we are loyal and under whose protec-
tion we live. We should not, therefore, hesitate to openly demand our rights. Indeed, in light
of the fact that our newspaper is the most popular amongst the Moslem population, we will
not desist from our duty of guidance and leadership if the need to warn the government aris-
es because of threats to this people’s rights.613

Had the British truly brought the prosperity they had promised, had they brought rapid
advance, then conceivably this could have acted to impede, at least to delay the rise of
nationalism, for both Greeks and Turks compared favourably selected examples of
advance from their respective motherlands, with their own circumstances in Cyprus.
Kibris in December 1893 began protesting that the British were not doing enough to sup-
port Turkish Cypriot education.614 Within a few months, the journal was calling openly
for the restoration of the island to Ottoman rule, arguing that development in the Otto-
man Empire was more rapid than in Cyprus, where the British showed no interest in deve-
loping the island.615 In the international arena too, the Turkish Cypriot press had no
qualms about launching attacks on Gladstone and Salisbury, for their support of the “trait-
orous Armenians”, or deriding leading British journals, including the Times, whom they
accused of propagating the lie that the Turks were slaughtering the Armenians.616

In 1906, this time on domestic matters, the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Mir’at-
ıZaman criticised the British not only for discriminatory hiring practices, a favourite theme of the
newspaper, but also for the sensitive issue of not doing enough to protect Mosques from
stone-throwing Greek Cypriot children.617 The paper later also printed and commented
on a letter signed by eleven Turks which complained that, as if it were not enough that
they were menaced and discriminated against by the Greeks, the British administration
now was also discriminating against them by refusing to accept Moslems as witnesses for
certain transactions.618 So, despite their somewhat weaker position, the Turkish Cypriots
were evidently to some extent able to challenge British rule. They were not as often port-

612. Derviş was indeed a merchant and had received the title of “Tücarbaşı” after the death of his father who had
held the position before him. [See MERT 2000, 356–357]. For summary information on the Ottoman Club
see, FEVZİOĞLU s.a., 11–14, though readers should be cautioned that he does somewhat overemphasize
the historical significance of this organization.

613. Kibris 2nd July 1894.
614. Ibid., 4th December 1893. The following issue acknowledged gratefully the continued provision of funds
for education by the Sultan, even though it complained these were not being used effectively. Kibris 11th
December 1893.

615. Kibris 9th July 1894.
616. Ibid, 12th October 1896.
617. Mir’at-ı Zaman 17th December 1906.
618. Ibid., 30th December 1907.
rayed entirely “pro-British”, and were able to reprimand the British in several areas including those of economic, political, social and even international affairs. To allude to them, therefore, as not being able to act at all independently of the British in the political arena, including in terms of expressions of nationalism, is an inaccurate portrayal.

If the role of an emerging Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie and economic factors in “awakening” Turkish nationalism on the island cannot be totally discounted, what is incontestable is that the Turks lacked the degree and kind of government-backed support for nationalism received by the island’s Orthodox Greeks. The Greek Cypriots had interacted with mainland Greece in the pre-1821 era, but their interaction and its political impact grew dramatically with the establishment of the Greek state. Despite the fact that some authors try too much to play down the significance of the effects of the Greek state on Greek Cypriot society, there is strong reason to believe that it was in fact instrumental in fostering and embedding a national consciousness.619

Nationalist sentiment was infused amongst the Greek Cypriots not only through their educational system, itself supported by the Greek state, but also more directly through the activities of Greek consuls. Kitromilides has stressed the importance of the efforts of such Greek consuls in, “the penetration and development of Greek nationalism in Asia Minor and Cyprus,” arguing that, “The Greek State fostered programmatically the process by means of the expansion of the consular system from the 1840’s onwards with the opening of the Greek consulates in the major geographical points of Greek settlement in the Ottoman Empire.”620

The consulate of the Greek Kingdom in Cyprus was first established in 1846 and there is much historical information attesting to the role thereafter of its officials in advancing nationalism on the island. For example, in 1895, in correspondence with the Colonial Office the Foreign Office drew attention to the impropriety of the, “fact that Mr. Philemon, the Greek Consul at Larnaca, attended a meeting at Limassol in celebration of the anniversary of Greek independence, when addresses and replies were interchanged, in which the Cypriote Greeks were represented as looking forward to union with Greece, that he wore his uniform on the occasion, and appears to have so behaved as to give the impression that he was speaking in his official capacity.”621

The Greek state since its inception had worked hard to instil national consciousness not only within its own borders, but also within those territories which were as yet “unredeemed”. Though it did at times rein in Greek nationalists in Cyprus in order to avoid friction with Great Britain, it was nevertheless an important channel for the early dispersion of nationalist sentiment. For the Ottoman state, on the other hand, trying to hold together a complex mosaic of ethnic groups, nationalism was generally an anathema, and even when the state began to uphold Ottomanism as a means to maintain its integrity, it

619. For an example of this former tendency, MAVRATSAS 1999, 98–99.
620. KITROMILIDES 1990a, 9.
621. Enclosure in Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, 5th June 1895. CO 883/5, 6. Philemon, who continued to support the enosis cause in Cyprus, was eventually recalled by Greece in 1900 following representations by the British. [Enclosure in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 15th March 1900. CO 883/6, 223]. Yet, meanwhile, in 1895, the Acting Müftü complained again of the activities of the Greek consul in stirring-up enosis agitation which he charged the British had done little to stop, travelling to Istanbul to make known his community’s displeasure and anxiety, [Mehmet Ziyai to Sheihulislam, 6th May 1895. BOA-Y.PRK.AZJ-6/31], and, in 1896, the very first issue of the satirical journal “Kokonoz” took to task the Greek consul in a derogatory fashion. Kokonoz 4th November 1896.
did so only half-heartedly, with much less irredentist concern about gaining “unredeemed” territories, than on simply holding what it still had together!

### 3.4 Cretan Crises and the Escalation of Division

Of the international issues that served to polarize the island’s Greek and Turkish Cypriots during the early decades of British rule, probably the most persistent and most laden with nationalist feeling was that of Crete. While the aforementioned precedent of the Ionian Islands was one that fired the call for enosis amongst Greek Cypriots, it was no longer a burning issue that had the force to raise emotions unduly. Its transfer lay in the past. Crete on the other hand bore more resemblance to Cyprus in terms of its size, strategic significance, continued Ottoman connection, dualism of population and involvement of western powers. It was also a living, vivid example of, and inspiration for the struggle for enosis, from the Greek Cypriot perspective, and of the struggle to resist enosis, from the Turkish Cypriot perspective. As such it deserves special attention.

By the 1890’s, with revolt again having erupted in Crete, the Cretan issue began to act almost as a surrogate focus of attention for the two sides’ in Cyprus own political objectives. The press on both sides raised the issue frequently. The Turkish Cypriot satirical journal Akbaba, (literally, “The Vulture”), made much of developments regarding Crete, and significantly reflected their impact on internal tensions in Cyprus. The journal described the Greeks as a “shameless” nation. It narrated how with the outbreak of unrest in Crete Greek Cypriots had unashamedly plastered the walls of their shops and homes with large pictures depicting Greek victories over the Ottomans, and how hundreds of foolish volunteers had left Cyprus to fight for Greece in the War of 1897, but had been devastated by the Ottoman armies. Taunting the lucky few who returned in one piece to Cyprus, it teased: “How they had boasted when they left that they would cut off a hundred Turkish heads. Where are those heroes now?”

Crete thus quickly became a central reference point for defence of the two communities’ political demands both in front of their own publics and in terms of their appeals to governmental authorities. Turks would, for example, point to the massacres of Moslems in Crete by that island’s Greeks as proof of the prospects that awaited them were they not to resist the Greek Cypriots’ struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece, and they would deride the Great Powers for their nonchalance in the face of such atrocities.

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622. Akbaba 27th October 1897; See also Kebir 7th September 1896 for a further, earlier, example of conflict over the issue of Crete in the press; As concerns the Greek Cypriot volunteers in 1897, their true numbers are hard to come by. The minutes of the Executive Council Meeting of the 4th of July 1896 read, however, as follows: “Disturbances in Crete. In connexion with this matter His Excellency communicated to Council a report from the Commissioner of Nicosia that a certain Nicolas Catalonas of that place had been enrolling recruits for the purpose of aiding the insurgents. His Excellency informed the Council that a notice would forthwith be served on this person, and also that a general notice would be published in the Official Gazette as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of the Cyprus Neutrality Order in Council of 1881.” [Minutes of the Executive Council, 4th July 1896. CO 69/10]. This evidence contradicts Gazioğlu’s assertion that, “The then British High Commissioner, Sir Walter Sendall, who was a sympathizer with Hellenic aspirations, took no steps to prevent their going despite the ‘Neutrality Order of 1881’.” GAZIOĞLU 1997, 215.
Akbaba further censored both the British and the other Great Powers for their double standards, noting that while thousands of Moslems had been massacred in Crete these Powers had not lifted a finger to protect them, while were the nose of a single Christian to have bled they would have promptly intervened.\(^\text{623}\) It is worthy of notice that the article asserted that were Crete to have remained under the full control of its legitimate owner, the Ottoman Empire, everyone would have been fine.\(^\text{624}\) It would not take much for Turkish Cypriots to relate to the message therein.

In 1898 the High Commissioner reported to London new reverberations of the Cretan question in Cyprus in the following manner:

[The Greek community are much moved by the recent occurrences in Crete, and by the report that Crete has been placed under a Greek High Commissioner appointed by four of the Great Powers, freed from Turkish authority, and without the obligation of paying any tribute to Turkey. … There have been various demonstrations in the island on the subject, led by the authorities of the Greek Church. I understand a new society has been formed in Athens to endeavour to bring about the same results in Cyprus, and, I believe, branches are being formed in the Island... [He further disclosed that] [T]he Turkish community resent these demonstrations and ill-will is engendered.\(^\text{625}\)

A confidential despatch sent three years later sounded even more concerned, noting increasing numbers returning from education in Athens, “imbued with the Hellenic propaganda,” and appraising: “They have been bred upon the history of the success of agitation when applied to the Ionian Islands, and they have seen the success of organized agitation and violence in Crete.” Ominously it was reported that, “The progress of affairs in Crete is a most powerful influence on the Greek speaking Cypriotes, and there are several of the moderate men who, watching Crete, are beginning to think that union with Greece would be for the material advantage and progress of the Island.” In, appealing for some sort of relief from the tribute, the High Commissioner declared, “I believe that the determination is growing to use Cretan methods for deliverance from the burden.” \(^\text{626}\) Mr. Theodotou’s statement to the Legislative Council in 1899 that, “Cyprus had never ceased to protest against the Tribute by all peaceful means – but [that] it was manifest that other steps must now be taken,” appeared to give some credence at least to the above conclusion.\(^\text{627}\)

True the Turkish Cypriot press was on the whole not as prolific as that of the Greeks, and in this respect it might be surmised that the political influence of the issues such as the Cretan affair might for this community therefore have been more limited, but it should not be forgotten that the island’s Moslem Turks had access not only to local Turkish newspapers, but also to those of the wider Ottoman Empire and even beyond, where news and comment on the Cretan issue was no less vehement. Nor was the heightened division related to the Cretan issue restricted solely to the press. Books on the Cretan quagmire

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\(^{623}\) Akbaba also expressed anger at reports that the British had killed many Moslems in India. Akbaba 27\(^\text{th}\) October 1897.

\(^{624}\) Ibid.

\(^{625}\) Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 27\(^\text{th}\) December 1898. CO 883/6, 103.

\(^{626}\) Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 28\(^\text{th}\) November 1901. CO 883/6, 357–360.

\(^{627}\) Minutes of the Legislative Council, 28\(^\text{th}\) February 1899. CO 69/10, 15; Undoubtedly such statements did not endear Theodotou to the British. One leading Colonial Office official, Alexander Fiddian, in reference to a visit made by the legislator to London, was later to write, “It is a matter for congratulation that the cypus Department did not enjoy the privilege of an interview with this lying Greek.” 1921. CO 67/202.
also appear to have been disseminated in Cyprus. The shelves of the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club contained such a volume, while another, entitled the “Poem of the Cretan Struggle of 1890” was published in Greek in Cyprus. 628

There is also substantial evidence that the continuing question of conflict related to Crete played a significant role in firing public fervour amongst both communities to such an extent that it is known to have played a key role in triggering public unrest. By 1897, with Turkey and Greece having entered a state of war, tensions between the two communities in Cyprus seem to have been so high that the High Commissioner felt compelled to issue a proclamation prohibiting provocative meetings, assemblies, processions or written articles. 629 Commenting on the recently passed resolution demanding enosis the High Commissioner in 1903 was to convey that this resolution, “was deemed to be the equivalent of a resolution which is reported to have been passed in Crete advocating union with Greece.” 630 And, as the Cretan sore continued to fester in the early years of the twentieth century, so did tensions in Cyprus.

Of course, even though it continued to have great political salience until, and even after its final incorporation into the Kingdom of Greece, Crete was not the only international, or even Turco-Greek dispute to be dwelt upon, and to have repercussions in Cyprus. 631 There were by the early twentieth century other disputes that also inflamed rival passions on the island. Unrest and conflict in Macedonia, Thrace and Sisam (Samos), were all identified as points of reference by the adherents of the competing nationalisms in Cyprus. 632 Announcing the establishment of a new enosis association, called “the Patriotic League of Cypriots” an appeal in 1898 concluded, “Cyprus is naturally and locally Greek but she is threatened by numerous dangers. Let [us] work so as to avert every danger and prepare for the great day of the final liberty. After the Ionian Isles, Thessaly, and Crete, it is now the turn of Cyprus.” 633

For the Turkish Cypriots their resistance to the campaign for the union of Crete and other territories with Greece was attestation of their continued identification with the Ottoman Empire, and persistent desire to remain under its suzerainty. As early as 1894 Kıbrıs had called forthrightly for the British to leave the island and restore it to full Ottoman control, arguing that as the British had showed no great interest in the island, and as it had proved of no great use to them, they should free themselves of it by restoring it to its legal and rightful owner the Ottoman Empire. 634 In fact a series of petitions had been sent to the Sublime Porte the previous year, had included one from the Legislative Councilor for the Limassol-Paphos district, Ahmed Raşid protesting Greek Cypriot calls for

628. See Cyprus Gazette 5th February 1897.
629. Ibid.
631. Greece’s full sovereignty over Crete was eventually recognised in 1913 following the Balkan Wars. See Clogg, [CLOGG 1999, 69–71 and 79–83], for an outline of developments regarding the sovereignty of Crete.
632. See, for example, the Bishop of Kitium’s appeal to Churchill as regards Macedonia and Thrace; [Cyprus Gazette 17th October 1907]. Apprehension as to the fate of these territories and their inhabitants was also expressed by the Turks, albeit from a very different perspective, and the island of Sisam (Samos) too was yet another lesser area of controversy, where nevertheless, a concerned Turkish Cypriot press followed developments regarding Greek challenges to the maintenance of Ottoman suzerainty. See, for example, Mûrâât-zaman 8th June, 1908 and Mûrâât-zaman 22nd June 1908.
633. Enclosure in Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 19th July 1899. CO 883/6, 192.
634. Kıbrıs 16th and 23rd July, 1894.
enosis, noting that they were, “infuriating the national races,” and that it was unacceptable that such actions should be conducted by, “those who are subjects of the Sultan and live within the Ottoman dominions.” Another bemoaned, “the inaction of the existing British administration,” in the face of Greek Cypriot aggression, and declared that the Sultan’s loyal Moslem subjects, “strive for the restoration of the direct rule of the Sultan’s government in Cyprus.”635

The following year Kamil Paşa, (at the time out of office), communicated to the Ottoman governmental authorities that Greek national feelings had been awakened in both the towns and countryside of Cyprus through their schools, and told how their nationalist agitation was causing great distress to the island’s Moslems. The Moslems, he related, continued to joyously celebrate the Sultan’s birthday and, indicating that this reflected their loyalty to the Ottoman state, Kamil Paşa proposed the setting aside of an annual sum of 100 lira to be given as financial assistance to facilitate even more spectacular celebration of the Sultan’s birthday in Cyprus thereafter. This, he suggested, would act as a portentous sign to both the Greek Cypriots and the British.636

3.5 The Young Turk Influence

Underlying political developments and activity in the Turkish Cypriot community was the increasing impact of the ideas of the Young Turk movement. The role of this movement in Cyprus has to-date been paid insufficient attention, and even those who have succeeded in recognising it have typically done so with error. Katsiaounis, for instance, refers to, “a general consensus amongst authors,” that Young Turk ideas did not influence even the intelligentsia of the Turkish Cypriot community in the pre-World War I era.637 True, the Young Ottoman leader Namık Kemal might not have been greeted with much enthusiasm by the local population during his enforced three year stay on the island, but the fact is that by the 1880’s and 1890’s Young Turk ideas were progressively and visibly gaining ground amongst the island’s Turks. As to the years preceding the First World War, from 1908 to 1914, there is abundant evidence available that Young Turk ideas and sympathies were prevalent amongst the Turkish Cypriots, even in quarters where they had previously been resisted.

The transfer of the island’s administration to the British rudely awakened the Turkish Cypriots to the sorry plight of the Ottoman Empire, (and thereby made them more receptive to radical ideas for its salvation). It must be recognised, however, that it also ushered in a much more liberal epoch in terms of debate. In his memoirs the late Niyazi Berkes, a

635. See letters of February 1893 enclosed in BOA-Y.PRK.AZN-5416 .
637. KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 67; One of those who more successfully recognise the late nineteenth, early twentieth century background to Turkish nationalism in Cyprus is Van Coufoudakis. He acknowledges that a national identification was already emerging amongst the Turkish Cypriots at the end of the nineteenth century, and that the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, Kemalism and the Greek Cypriot enosis movement, “contributed to the consolidation and the organized expression of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist aspirations.” COUFOUDAKIS 1976, 31. I would, however, strongly dispute his claim that the British encouraged “nationalist expression” as far, at least, as concerns the Turkish Cypriots in the pre-World War II era. See COUFOUDAKIS 1976, 33.
prominent and well respected Turkish Cypriot academic, depicted how the liberal environment introduced with British rule allowed for the dissemination of radical and dissident publications in Cyprus, particularly those of the Young Turks, more so than in Ottoman controlled territories. He recounts from his childhood in the early twentieth century not only the sway of the Ottoman reformists such as Namık Kemal and Eşref Efendi, (another prominent poet, exiled in Cyprus), but also the presence, even in his own home, of numerous books and newspapers, that included dissident works published in Egypt, and satirical magazines from Azerbaijan.638

Though there is evidence that they continued to operate, Sultan Abdülhamid’s notorious spy network, naturally held less sway over the population in Cyprus than in other Ottoman administered territories and numerous Young Turks fleeing the Hamidian regime at the close of the century passed through Cyprus, interacting with its populace.639 Derviş Vahdetî, a infamous Turkish Cypriot journalist who had faced exile and even torture at the hands of the Hamidian authorities, but was ultimately to be executed by the Unionists for his role in a counterrevolutionary uprising against their regime, referred to how he and his other Turkish Cypriot friends helped these men both morally and financially.640 Young Turk journals and books were readily available to the literate. Amongst others circulating in the 1890’s, Vahdetî records the availability of Hürriyet, Mizan and Meşveret.641 Their ideas were disseminated through channels already referred to, and the local press itself was heavily infiltrated by those of the Young Turk persuasion.642

Zaman, as previously noted, was established initially as the organ of the Ottoman Club, and began to print articles of a Young Turk point of view. However, it appears that its main proprietor Haci Derviş felt compelled to put a brake on the publication of such pieces, probably as a result of pressure from the Ottoman authorities. It has been suggested that other members of the club later demanded that the paper be disassociated from the club, though it is not clear whether this was before or after the change in editorial policy of the paper.643 Indeed, whether or not there was actually such a clear-cut policy change is debatable. Mert has shown that at times thereafter the paper did, albeit inconsistently, continue to reflect Young Turk opinion, even after Derviş relationship with the Ottoman authorities became strained.644 Whatever the case, however, Young Turk ideas continued to receive substantial footage in the Cypriot press with the launch of a new newspaper, Yeni Zaman, (or, “New Zaman”), being published by the Young Turk journalists who left Haci Derviş’ establishment, and soon after was published also Kibris. Of these journalists undoubtedly the most influential was to become Ahmet Tevfik, whose long and distinguished career in Cyprus continued for a further two decades.645 Interestingly both of these two publications were also printed at the Ottoman Club’s printing

638. BERKES 1997, 32–33; Though during their lifetimes Young Ottoman intellectuals such as Kemal might not have received much public adulation they were to have a lasting legacy that by the twentieth century was being much more warmly received; For an interesting if brief account of some of the Young Ottoman Eşref’s exploits in Cyprus see, KORKUT 2000, 56–57.
639. Evidence regarding a notorious spy, a certain Dubarac Ali is found in Ottoman documents and is referred to also in the taped memoirs of Necati Orkan. See, Ministry of the Interior to the Office of the Sultan, and enclosures therein, 11th October 1902. BOA-Y.MTV-50/235; See also Volkan 30th January 1909.
640. For reference to the torture of Vahdetî, see KOCAHANOĞLU 2001, 26.
641. Volkan 12th December 1908.
642. See, for example, MERT 2000, 360–364.
643. For further details see AN 2002, 85–86.
press, supporting the suggestion that there were even within the club different strands of political persuasion. 646

It would be incorrect to depict the Ottoman Club as representing a single political doctrine, or of being a front for Young Turk activity. The club appears to have had no formal structure or set of regulations until well into the twentieth century, and as Korkut and others have explained, not all of its members were sympathetic to at least the more radical of the Young Turk proclivities. 647 One of the main reasons Korkut’s brother Raik was black-balled appears to have been related to his radical views regarding Islam. Raik, a teacher at the İdadi, was to be accused by conservatives of sodomy, though the charge was most probably slanderous. Bryant reveals that after investigating the matter, “the police chief commented that Raik’s opponents probably object[ed] to him because he was not regular in attendance at the mosque and had given up the costume of a divinity student for that of a layman.” 648 Particularly disturbing appears to have been an article he sent to the journal “Türk.” 649 Remarkably it was published the very same month, May 1904, that this Turkish nationalist journal printed Yusuf Akçura’s “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset.” 650

Ahmet Raik himself was truly a pioneer as far as the intellectual development of Turkish nationalism amongst the Cypriots was concerned. Particularly significant was the fact that his influence in intellectual Turkist circles ran far beyond the confines of the island. He collaborated not only with Turks from Anatolia, but also with Tatars and Azeris, most notably as part of the Füyuzat group mentioned above, which amongst other things was an early champion of linguistic unification amongst the Turks. 651 He had written for other Turkist journals too, and amongst the several translations of foreign works that he had published was part of Thomas Carlyle’s, “The French Revolution”. 652

Notwithstanding Ahmet Raik’s difficulties, as a locus of intellectual and political debate, the Ottoman Club was clearly involved, in parts at least, in the spread of Young Turk ideas and had members sympathetic to them. Derviş Vahdetî expresses his pleasure at finding a leading Young Turk newspaper available in the club, and we know also that at least some of Raik’s friends were patrons of the establishment. 653 Even if the Ottoman Club itself was not an organized Young Turk command centre others were being established on the island before the end of the nineteenth century.

Thanks to the valuable archival research of Professor Şükrü Hanioğlu we know that by the 1890’s there was established an active branch of the CUP. 654 In fact, Hanioğlu describes how a group of CUP sympathizers actually, “held demonstrations on the island, in which more than two hundred people allegedly participated, clashing with local British police.” 655 Hanioğlu confirms that the satirical journal Kokonoz was the organ of the

645. Tevfik, thought to have been born in Rhodes in 1838, spent much of his adult life editing and writing for a series of different journals in Cyprus, and showed consistence in his defence of the Young Turk line till his death in 1910. For further information see AN 2002, 77–88.
646. See, ÜNLÜ s.a., 17–27.
647. Ibid., 17 and KORKUT 2000, 59.
650. See BRYANT 1998a, 267–270; See also LEWIS 1968, 326.
651. SWIETOCHOWSKI 1985, 60.
Cyprus Branch of the CUP, and that this branch later also, “founded a newspaper called *Feryad (Cry)* and printed in instalments pamphlets previously advertised by the central committee.”⁶⁵⁶ By the end of the century, Hanioğlu reveals, “a secular group within the movement led by Doctor Burhan Bahaeddin seized power over the [Cyprus] branch.” Though it was eventually to be impeded by conservative, religious forces despatched to the island by the Sultan, “This section,” he continues, “was corresponding with both the Geneva center and the Egyptian branch and circulated a plethora of CUP propaganda material, particularly a translation of Schiller’s *Wilhelm Tell*.”⁶⁵⁷ The themes of freedom from tyranny and patriotism that run through the latter work of this leading Romantic, were easy to identify with, and no doubt left their mark on Turkish Cypriot readers.⁶⁵⁸

Though different strands even of Young Turk thought were apparent in Cyprus, the Anglophile leanings of many Young Turks from other Ottoman territories seem to have been much less pronounced, if not altogether absent.⁶⁵⁹ However, the central Young Turk

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⁶⁵⁶. Ibid., 109 and 141; Copies of the Feryad appear not to have survived, but that it did exist has been confirmed. For some further information about Feryad, see Ibid. 1995, 141n. and ÜNLÜ s.a., 31.

⁶⁵⁷. HANİOĞLU 1995, 120.

⁶⁵⁸. The following extracts, for example, left many parallels to be drawn by a Turkish Cypriot audience, parallels that undoubtedly some of the literate class did indeed identify: “From eldest time the Switzer has been free, Accustom’d only to the mildest rule”; “What! Austria try, forsooth, to force on us A yoke we are determined not to bear! Oh, learn to feel from what a stock thou’rt sprung; Cast not, for tinsel trash and idle show, the precious jewel of thy worth away, To be the chiefman of a free-born race”; “This foreign witchery, sweeping o’er our hills, Tears with its potent spell our youth away. O luckless hour, when men and manners strange into these calm and happy valleys came, To warp our primitive and guileless ways!”: “Here we are met, To represent the general weal. In us Are all the people of the land convened. Then let us hold the Diet, as of old, And as we’re wont in peaceful times to do”; “Yet are we but one race, born of one blood, And all are children of one common home”; “Expect not from the Emperor Or right or justice! Then redress yourself!”; “You dare not do’t. Nor durst the Emperor’s self So violate our dearest chartered rights”; “Who would live here, when liberty is one?”; “Liberty to him is breath; He cannot live in the rank dungeon air!”, “The accursed tyrant’s dead And on us freedom’s glorious day has dawn’d!” SCHILLER 1804.

⁶⁵⁹. Samani goes so far as to argue that Young Turkism in Cyprus actually took the form of opposition to the British. [SAMANI s.a., 22–23]. Her position is supported also by Ulus Irkad, who claimed that Turkish Cypriot Unionists were adherents of the pro-German, Enverist, Salonica wing of the Unionist movement. [Ortanı 12th April 1993.]. Certainly, while the Young Turks in Cyprus openly appreciated British liberalism, [see for example Mehmet Baki’s acknowledgement of the British having introduced liberal rule to “one small corner of the Ottoman Empire”, that is to Cyprus, in Mir’at-ı Zaman 4th March 1907], there is little evidence that they were prepared to countenance the triumph of British interests over those of the Ottomans. For example, an article in Akhiba, gleefully reports having received the good news that Britain was leaving Egypt, and calls upon other states to likewise leave the Ottoman territories they occupy, reprimanding the Great Powers for complicity in various scenarios against the Ottoman Empire. [Akhiba 13th October 1897]. In a similar vein, a decade later, Mir’at-ı Zaman was to note how the Greek nationalists had gained strength in Crete under the protection of the Great Powers, and how these powers were not doing enough to protect the Moslems of Crete from attack. [Mir’at-ı Zaman 12th August and 16th December 1907]. A year on this theme of the Great Powers failing to protect the Moslems of Crete from atrocities was still being worked. [See Ibid., 1st June 1908]. Concomitantly, there is little to support the suggestion that the British encouraged the strengthening of the Young Turks in Cyprus. In a confidential despatch to Joseph Chamberlain, Haynes-Smith reported in January of 1900 that he had recently received three applications, “from Turks who have come to Cyprus from Turkey, for permission to publish Turkish newspapers.” He explained that these persons, “object in desiring to start newspapers is, that they may have an opportunity of attacking the Sultan, and his Government,” and asked for approval, “to refuse permission to publish such Turkish newspapers.” Haynes-Smith also informed Chamberlain in the same despatch that he intended to warn the publisher of such a newspaper which had recently been established and was already in print, “that if he continues these attacks on the Sultan personally he will be prosecuted.” Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 17th January 1900. CO 67/122, 119–122.
themes of Modernization, Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism were all to emerge and be evident in the Turkish Cypriot community of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The quest for modernization, particularly for advances in the spheres of science and education, and the appeal for political unity amongst the Moslems are more visible in the first phases, but by the end of the nineteenth century the appeal to an Ottoman national identity was growing stronger.\textsuperscript{660} Echoing developments in other areas where the idea of Ottomanism had spread, we see the pro-Young Turk newspaper Kibrîs increasingly distinguishing between “religious” and “national” identity, talking of the need, for example, to teach the Turkish Cypriot youth of both their ‘religious’ and ‘national’ heritage.\textsuperscript{661} And again, in 1894, an editorial in this journal, while professing loyalty and adherence to Holy Islam and the Caliphate, professed the following: “The Ottomans’ character, their civilisation is to be admired. The Ottomans’ loyalty, the purity of their morals, their conviction and courage is legendary. It cannot be contemplated that a single member of the people of Cyprus would not be proud of belonging to such a nation. We wish to reiterate that they are proud and honoured to be of the Ottoman people.”\textsuperscript{662}

Weir reports also that among the Young Turks who had fled to Cyprus there was at least one who worked on the island as a teacher. Despite having together with his group of friends been, “obliged by the conservative Moslems of the Island to move on,” Weir claims that, “They had succeeded … in sowing the seeds of reform which sprang up as the soil became more favourable.”\textsuperscript{663} Some Turkish Cypriots also appear to have come under the influence of Young Turk thought through their own experiences in other corners of the Ottoman Empire. One of the most famous was Dr. Hafız Cemal. Cemal’s father had come to Cyprus from Turkey and married a local Turkish Cypriot. After his father died Cemal is said to have gone to Turkey to further his education, and it is here that he seems to have first become a Young Turk sympathiser while studying at the Military Medical College in Istanbul, itself the locus for the initial organization of the Young Turk movement.\textsuperscript{664}

In some respects it appears that the rejection of the vision of Ottoman nationalism by the Greeks of Cyprus, led the island’s Turks to increasingly use the banner of Ottomanism to represent the national aspirations of the island’s Turks only, acknowledging thereby its rejection by the Greeks.\textsuperscript{665} We see more and more references to the Ottoman race, to Ottoman blood and to the Islamic features of Ottomanism, references excluding the Greeks. In an issue reprimanding the Greek Cypriots for their support of the Greek armies warring with the Ottoman Empire, Akbaba calls upon all Turkish Cypriots to contribute towards a fund for the development of the Ottoman navy, pointing out that it would be

\textsuperscript{660} Numerous newspaper articles appeared on this issue of educational advance as early as the 1890’s, and a marvellous photographic specimen from the first years of the twentieth century shows the students of a Limassol Turkish school lined up in front of a huge Ottoman flag on which, aside from “Long Live the Sultan” was inscribed, “Selamet-ı Millet Maarifle Kaimdir,” or “The Salvation of the Nation Lies in Education.” For example of early press articles see, Kibrîs 13\textsuperscript{th} March, 4\textsuperscript{th} December and 11\textsuperscript{th} December 1893, and for a copy of the mentioned photograph, İSLAMOĞLU 1984, 31.

\textsuperscript{661} Kibrîs 31\textsuperscript{st} July 1893.

\textsuperscript{662} Ibid, 4\textsuperscript{th} June 1894.

\textsuperscript{663} WEIR 1952, 76.

\textsuperscript{664} MANİZADE 1993, 513; FEDAİ 1997, 1–2; ZÜRCHER 1984, 13.

\textsuperscript{665} Deringil reaches a similar conclusion when he argues that, “In the era of the Tanzimat and in the subsequent Hamidian period, leading statesmen had begun to think in terms of Turkism even if they couched their discourse in Ottomanist language.” DERİNGİL 1993, 167.
inconceivable for, “one in whose veins Ottoman blood circulates not to make the small financial contribution proposed for increasing further the glory of his state and nation.” Akbaba proceeded to stress that, “while the state is duty-bound to safeguard the independence and sentiments of the nation, it rests upon the shoulders of the nation to increase the fame and greatness of the state,” and concluded, “Without the efforts of the nation, the state is doomed.”

By the early twentieth century the transformation of national identity appears to have progressed still further with greater emphasis now placed on Turkism, Turkish culture, language, history, and if not yet a complete abandonment of the concepts of Ottomanism, (and to some extent Islamism), then at least their being appealed to increasingly in the vein of synonyms for Turkish nationalism. In a sense Turkish Cypriots who had appealed to Greek Cypriots to recognise that they too were “Ottomans”, and should act appropriately, had given-up on this effort, taking on the Ottoman label solely to represent themselves. We see more and more reference to the Ottoman Turks, their great history, and even to pre-Ottoman Turkish history and to origins in Central Asia. Critically by the early twentieth century the term “millet” was now increasingly being used, together with other terms such as “ansır”, “kavim”, and “milletdaş”, to reflect a modern conception of a Turkish “nation”, rather than an apolitical religious community.

### 3.6 Intercommunal Conflict and the Surfacing Turkist Tendency

In the opening years of the twentieth century we see the persistent appeal of the Turkish Cypriots to Ottoman authorities, their maintained efforts to avoid severance of this link, and the continued rise of tensions with strong nationalist overtones with the island’s Orthodox Greeks. For sure, Turkish Cypriot discourse had not disentangled Islamism, or Ottomanism completely from Turkish nationalism; they were all, in a sense part of a complex whole, but the signs that Turkism was gradually progressing to take greater pride of place, with Islamic and Ottoman associations being to a greater degree “supporting actors”, were growing.

Referring in his despatch to developments the previous year, in particular the nationalistic agitation and activities of the Director of the Limassol Gymnasium, Andreas Themistocleous, High Commissioner Haynes-Smith stated in 1903: “The Turks are not unmoved spectators of all this open agitation. Last year, when there was excitement in connection with the meetings of the Greek-speaking Cypriots, 680 Moslems were counted in one quarter of Nicosia who had armed themselves with swords and knives, and assembled to act, thinking the other party were going to take action.” In a secret report despatched

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666. Akbaba 25th November 1897.
667. In more general terms, Karpat argues that, “The search for the true roots of Ottoman history inevitably led to inquiries about the Turkish origins of the early Ottoman state,” and ultimately to the, “Turkification of Ottoman history.” KARPAT 2000, 12–13.
668. The transition in the usage of the term “millet” appears to have begun in the mid-nineteenth century. According to Mardin, leading Young Ottoman, Sadik Rifat Paşa, “was one of the first Ottomans to use the word ‘millet’ which to that date had had the connotation of ‘religious group,’ as the equivalent of the French ‘nation.’” MARDIN 1962, 189.
soon after, High Commissioner King-Harman, in response to London’s enquiry as to whether it would be possible to transfer British troops off the island, warned that from his local perspective:

[B]oth from a political point of view and for the sake of the peace of the Island, the maintenance of the garrison is of paramount importance. ... So long as the bulk of the Cypriot population is composed of Greek speaking people, the Pan Hellenic agitation which is inseparable from the Greek national character, must exist; and although I regard the agitation in itself as comparatively harmless, so long as it is watched and kept within due bounds by a firm and absolutely impartial administration, yet I am not blind to the fact that it is regarded by the Moslem population in a more serious light and that it tends to excite bitter feelings of retaliation between the two sections of the people. ... [T]he more serious nature of the Moslem people is undoubtedly alarmed and offended at the patriotic exuberance of the Greeks. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of the arbitrary methods of repression in vogue under the Turkish administration, the feelings between the two races in Cyprus must ever be strained, and cause of collision must exist which although dormant, may be easily aroused.

In the light of the above and other factors King-Harman, therefore, decisively concluded that the withdrawal of the British garrison would not only be inappropriate, but would be likely to encourage hostilities.670 His concern proved justified by developments that occurred soon after.

While Greek nationalist sentiment had clearly proliferated on the island by the close of the nineteenth century, it was now being augmented by the activities of a resident Greek national, firebrand and journalist Katalanos, who was for many years to become not only a focus of scorn for the Turks on the island, but also one who pushed even the British policy of patience towards enosis agitation over the line, leading them eventually to deport him.671 The Turkish Cypriots repeatedly complained of the activities of Katalanos, even blaming him personally for having poisoned the generally peaceful relations that had reigned between Moslems and Christians in the past. “Before Katalanos came to the country we Moslems generally lived in an atmosphere of mature, peaceful relations with the Christians without interfering with each others affairs,” said one commentator.672 Yet in some ways his activities were also a rallying point for those who wanted to take his action as an example for their own activities. One article lamented the fact that the Turkish Cypriots were not as well organized as the Greek Cypriots who it said, were prepared to follow Katalanos all over the island to clamour for enosis.673

Thus, though Greek nationalism might have been reaching new heights under the leadership of Katalanos, (and others, such as the Greek Consul Philios Zanetos and the Greek Cypriot politician Theophanes Theodotou), the sentiments of the Turkish Cypriots also appear to have begun to undergo transformation.674 This was partly a result of such agitation, and partly a consequence of the growing influence of Young Turk thought. Not only did they maintain their established opposition to enosis, but they also began to shape

672. Mir’at-i Zaman 15th July 1907.
673. The article insisted that Turkish Cypriots needed to awaken from their slumber and cried: “our national sentiments have disappeared, the Ottoman blood in our veins has dried up, we have come to resemble stiff logs, devoid of any human feeling, let alone of national sentiment.” Ibid, 11th March 1907.
this opposition in a different form. The matter, it seems, was no longer perceived simply as one of disloyal Ottoman Greeks challenging the rights of the Ottoman Sultan in Cyprus or threatening the religious community of Moslems in Cyprus, but increasingly as a more comprehensive nationalist struggle, with Greeks on the one side, and the Ottoman people, including the Ottoman people of Cyprus, on the other. While making references to the Ottoman community of Cyprus in the late nineteenth century the tendency had been to focus on all the Cypriots as being Ottoman subjects, and when talking of the Turkish Cypriots and their concerns, to place them essentially within a religious framework. By the early twentieth century, however, Turkish Cypriot sources increasingly emphasized their Ottoman identity, and even blood and race, in a nationalist manner that excluded the island’s Greeks. In Anderson’s, terms, the Greek Cypriots were now considered to lie beyond the “inherently limited” conception of the nation.675

Compared to the previous decade, references to the fatherland, and especially the nation, are to be found much more frequently in the first decade of the twentieth century. While reference to national feeling and identity was more in the form Ottomanism than ever before, we also see, however, the first discernible signs of the emergence of Turkism, a budding Turkish nationalism that was to gain in strength in the years after the Young Turks came to power. Greater reference is made now not only to pride in the greatness of the Ottoman Empire and its people, but to pre-Ottoman Turkish history, to pride in the character of the Turks, to the qualities of the Turks and to the Turkish people’s political rights. Newspaper articles recount the legendary exploits of the founders of the Ottoman dynasty Ertuğrul Gazi and his companions;676 speeches to the general public hark back to the greatness of the Selçuk Turks who had begun to settle in Anatolia in the eleventh century A.D., and celebrate the glorious lore of pre-Ottoman Turkic leaders.677

Uncommonly potent was an article printed by a Turk from Nicosia, a man by the name of Mehmet Baki. Congratulating its Turkish Cypriot members on their work in the Legislative Council, he remarks that all those who believe that the Turks are politically incompetent should observe the feats of these men. These deputies he asserts, give a lesson in, “patriotism and in how national rights are to be protected.” Describing how they strive for the cause of the “Turks” and “Turkishness”, he declares these men to be the pride of “Turkism” and “Ottomanism.” The most recent Legislative Council elections, Baki argues, “have shown how the Turks of Cyprus have embarked on the road of progress.” This progress of the Turks, he proceeds to say, is comprehensive, and confirms that the Turks are the, “noblest and most advanced nation of the East.”678 In terms of outlining the changing conception of the nation amongst the Turkish Cypriots, the following lines from the same article are especially revealing. Here Baki says that it is a matter for celebration that,

674. The Executive Council ultimately decided in favour of deporting Dr. Zannetos in September 1922, it being noted in the minutes that the action was taken in light of, “the antecedents of Dr. Zannetos as a violent agitator against the Government.” [Executive Council Minutes, 8th September 1922. CO 69/36]. Zannetos was a man of many trades, not least effective of which was his practice of the historical craft. Together with Katalanos, he was one of the most important Greek historians who according to Panayiotou, “rewrote Cypriot history to fit the model of Greek historiography.” PANAYIOTOU 1994, 91.
676. See Mehmet Baki’s article in Mir’at-i Zaman 4th March, 1907.
677. See the speech delivered by teacher Ahmet Eyyub on the occasion of the performance of a Namık Kemal play in Mir’at-i Zaman 10th February 1908.
678. Ibid., 25th February 1907.
“it has begun to be understood what is meant by the ‘sovereignty of the nation’,” and, “it has been comprehended in the East too that the country belongs to the nation.” The nation he concludes, “is not one great man,” but is based on the noble, advanced blood that flows through its people’s veins. Clearly, the concept of popular sovereignty which the Young Ottomans had derived from the French romantic writers, had, by now, begun to infiltrate Turkish Cypriot society too.

In the following week’s issue of Mir’at-ı Zaman Mehmet Baki elaborates his ideas further, claiming that the efforts of the Turkish deputies indicate that after many centuries the Turks of Cyprus no longer fatefully regard themselves to be helpless, no longer conceive of the government as the source of all authority, and have awaken to the fact that the people possess “national sovereignty.” While appreciatively recognising the liberal qualities of British rule, he talks of the glory and greatness of “Turkishness”, and contends that the “Turks of Cyprus” are only really reclaiming under this regime the liberty that was a natural part of their ancient heritage and culture, but in which faith had been corrupted over the centuries as a result of historical interaction with outsiders. Baki’s emphasis on Turks and Turkishness, on the concepts of the nation and national sovereignty, are truly striking and radical for their time. Yet, even he had not yet fully disassociated the Turkish national identity from Ottomanism. “The Turks of Cyprus are proud of being Ottomans,” he declares. Cyprus, he insists, belongs to the Ottomans, and while the Greeks are Ottomans too, they are not acting in a manner appropriate to their status as Ottomans. Their sentiments have been corrupted by Athens and they are abusing the liberty they possess, a liberty that they had first begun to taste with the onset of Ottoman rule.

The Turkish Cypriots continued to be affected in their “national awakening” not only by ideas and developments from the Ottoman Empire, but also by those of other Turkic and even non-Turkic regions. The Turkish Cypriots not only had access at this time to the writings of numerous foreign journals, but were receiving also news by telegraph from across the seas, from Ashkhabad to Anatolia, from Egypt to Crete. More importantly, Turkish Cypriot journals and, it appears also now, schools and even booksellers, were involved in disseminating the reformist ideas of those overseas, including those related to the nation and fatherland, to Ottomanism and to Turkism. Poems speaking of nation and fatherland were printed regularly in the press. Schoolchildren recited the patriotic verses not only of the Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire, but also of Turkists in other dominions. From amongst those of the latter category, children recited the verses of the “Words of the Nation”, a poem by the Azeri poet Mehmet Hadi Şirvani. Referred to in the Turkish Cypriot press as a “Turk of Russia”, Şirvani wrote prolifically for the Füyuzat, where this poem had actually been published in 1907), and was a particularly close associate of Hüseyinzade Ali.

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679. Ibid.
680. Mardin traces in some detail the European origins of much Young Ottoman thought indicating the special theoretical impact of Philosophes like Rousseau and Montesquieu on Namık Kemal. MARDIN 1962, 333.
681. Mir‘at-ı Zaman 4th March 1907.
682. Ibid.
683. An advert in the Mir‘at-ı Zaman, for example, notes that “Ethem Safi Bey”, (to be mentioned in the following section), has for sale copies of a book on the life of the reformist Ottoman statesman, Midhat Paşa, responsible for drafting the constitution of 1876, for six shillings. Mir‘at-ı Zaman 6th September 1907.
684. For example, Ibid., 14th January 1907.
References to “Turkey”, the “Turks”, “Turkishness” and “Turkism” were increasingly prominent. Complimenting an article it re-published from the famous satirical Azeri journal “Molla Nasredin”, wherein the failure of the Moslems to make social progress was depicted, the Mir’at-ı Zaman the following week more specifically caricatured the devil as doing his darnest to inflict harm on “Turkey” and the “Turks”.

3.7 Towards the Revolution: International Traumas and Domestic Tremors

No conclusive or wholly direct link can perhaps be made between the Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire in 1908, and the dramatic political developments in Cyprus that preceded it.\(^\text{687}\) What can be said, however, is that the CUP, which spearheaded the Revolution, and had managed to carry out organised activities on the island at the end of the nineteenth century, (if only temporarily), again began to view Cyprus as a critical centre for its activities in the years leading up to the Revolution. According to Hanioğlu, in 1906 the central committee of this party, “seriously considered establishing ... regional central branches only in Bulgaria and Cyprus.”\(^\text{688}\) The importance attached to Cyprus, he logically maintains, was the result both of, “The proximity of Cyprus to the Ottoman mainland,” and of, “British rule on the island.”\(^\text{689}\)

Hanioğlu’s extensive, original, and in-depth research on the earlier activities of Young Turk organizations provides valuable evidence as to the relationship between the CUP and Cyprus. In particular, he reveals that Turkish Cypriot intellectuals, though not yet the masses, “were receptive to Young Turk propaganda,” and, based on original correspondence, argues that they not only, “considered the Young Turk movement the source of salvation from foreign domination and from the unification of Cyprus with Greece,” but also regarded the Sultan to have failed them.\(^\text{690}\)

A letter penned by a certain Ağazade Ali Sıdkı of Nicosia, which Hanioğlu recently unearthed from Bahaeddin Şakir’s private papers, is especially striking in not only its support for the Unionists, but, even more, in its criticism of British rule. An extract reads:

Your efforts for the salvation of the fatherland have been applauded by our compatriots here… because if the fatherland be snatched from our hands we shall be trodden upon by the filthy feet of foreigners. Here is the example: your coreligionists [in] Cyprus. We have been oppressed under tyrannical British absolutism. Look! The Christians are insulting our elders day and night without missing an opportunity. They stone holy mosques and smear excrement on their doors. They prevent the muezzins from performing the call to prayer. They drink wine on the tombs of our ancestors and the government only looks on.\(^\text{691}\)

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685. Mir’at-ı Zaman reports, for example a diploma ceremony at a school in Iskele (Larnaca) where Turkish Cypriot students read poems by the Young Turk Münif Paşa, and, “the Words of the Nation’ poem of Mehmet Hadi Şirvani.” Ibid., 15th July 1907; HALİLOV 2002, 7 and 12.
686. Mir’at-ı Zaman 7th and 14th January 1907.
687. For example, one important trigger for the developments of the earlier year, which was in no way linked to those of the latter, was the visit to Cyprus of Under-Secretary of State, Winston Churchill.
689. Ibid., 156.
690. Ibid., 156–157.
At the end of October 1906, leading CUP stalwart Edhem Safi was asked by the notorious CUP leader and nationalist ideologue Bahaeddin Şakir to organize a CUP branch in Cyprus together with known Unionist sympathisers on the island, Ali Siddiki, Ismail Zeki and Ahmed Rüşdi.692 The first branch was soon after established in Nicosia, and within months another branch was also unofficially founded with the assistance of local sympathisers in Larnaca. The latter branch, with its location in a port-town, had the important job of disseminating CUP propaganda to other Ottoman realms. The large membership of the Larnaca branch, though officially constituted only in December 1907, meant that the following month, in January 1908, the CUP recognised it as, “the ‘central branch of Cyprus’.” Meanwhile, however, other sympathisers in the town, including one recorded as a schoolteacher, also appear to have been working independently of the “Cyprus center”, “to smuggle propaganda material onto vessels going to Ottoman ports.”693

As Hanioğlu maintains, the CUP’s pre-revolutionary impact on the Cypriot masses was undeniably limited by the conservative tendencies of those loyal to the Sultan.694 Even so, when the great political upheaval of the Young Turk Revolution successfully arrived in July of 1908, the Turks of Cyprus were already in a state of heightened excitement due to recent local occurrences, and were as a consequence to be more receptive to the impact of this revolution than might otherwise have been the case.

Much of the underlying Turkish Cypriot disquiet in 1907 and 1908 was related to still fresh memories of events that had occurred in April of 1906. The Turks claimed that a large crowd of enosis agitators with Greek flags had, under the leadership of Katalanos, invaded the forecourt of the main mosque in Famagusta, where they proceeded to demonstrate. Though the Moslems of the town had been persuaded not to retaliate by their leaders, over a thousand enraged Moslem Turks, ready to combat their Greek compatriots, later gathered in Nicosia chanting “Long live the sultan!” Eventually placated by reassurances given by the High Commissioner they finally dispersed. These events do not appear to have led to any serious casualties, but they no doubt left a bitter after-taste. The Turkish Cypriots reported them to the Sublime Porte, and seem to have believed that they were a portent of later troubles to come.695

The visit to Cyprus of a Greek cadet training ship the following September, appears to have done little to quell Turkish Cypriot concern accompanied as it was by, “a fervid demonstration of Hellenic feeling,” “speeches in support of the union of Cyprus with Greece,” and the adorning of towns in the blue and white colours of the Greek flag.696 In a confidential despatch High Commissioner King-Harman claimed that he would have ignored the proceedings, “but for the fact that they were eminently calculated to inflame
the Moslem population and to breed ill-feeling between the two races. Acknowledging
though that there had been no resultant disturbances, and congratulating the Moslems on
their, “commendable moderation and self-restraint,” he added that he was nevertheless,
“quite alive to the jealous suspicion with which the Pan Hellenic agitation is regarded by
the Turks and to the grave danger arising therefrom of a collision between the two
races.”697

By 1907 a decision had been taken to make more concerted appeals for assistance to
the Sublime Porte. A financial appeal was launched throughout the island for Turkish
Cypriots to contribute to a fund for the dispatch of a delegation to Istanbul to discuss the
predicaments and future prospects of the island’s Turks with the Ottoman authorities.698
Not long after the delegation departed, and was successful in getting numerous audiences
with Ottoman administrators of the highest ranks, including the Grand Vizier and several
ministers.699 If the testimony of one informer to the Porte is taken at its word, they had
communicated that their ultimate intention was to get the island restored to the Ottoman
Empire.700 This they plainly did not achieve, but they did manage to concentrate the
attention of Ottoman statesmen on their plight, and succeeded in getting support for their
requests for assistance in the field of education.701 Possibly the most important con-
sequence of this visit, however, was psychological. Greeted by exuberant crowds of
flag-waving Turks on their return, the deputation seems to have given a psychological
boost to the morale of the community, a boost based on the symbolism of the reaffirma-
tion that their “fatherland” continued to embrace them.702 The visit was reported to Lon-
don by the High Commissioner, though he represented it as the exploits, “of a few self
seeking politicians like Shevket Bey and Mehmet Ziai,” whom he claimed were after the
removal by the Porte of their political rival, Kadi Osman Nuri Efendi. One wonders whet-
ther the derogatory remarks attributed to these elected Turkish politicians were related to
the British desire to maintain Osman Nuri in his post on the basis that he was, “a loyal
and unswerving supporter of the existing administration;”703 or, perhaps upon the desire
to prevent appeals to the Ottoman authorities.704

Once again, ethno-religious tensions were by no means existent only at the level of the
elite, or even town-dwellers. One article refers to how “thousands of villagers” gathered
to hear patriotic speeches lambasting Greek Cypriot agitation for union with Greece and
stating that Cyprus, if anything, should be restored to the Ottoman Empire.705 It is also
notable that the bulk of the funds contributed for the above-mentioned deputation to the
Porte were collected from the rural areas, and that there is evidence too that villages con-
tinued to witness examples of conflict.706 The Turks complained in particular of their treat-
ment at the hands of the Greeks in the village of Angastina (Aslanköy), where the Mos-

697. Ibid.
698. Mir‘at-i Zaman 1st July 1907.
699. Ibid., 28th October 1907.
700. Ministry of Interior to Grand Vizier, 16th September 1907. BOA-Y.MTV-33/302.
701. Mir‘at-i Zaman 13th January 1907; See also Mir‘at-i Zaman 2nd March 1908, for further news that requests
for assistance relating to education have been granted by the Ottoman authorities.
702. See Mir‘at-i Zaman 28th October 1907.
705. Mir‘at-i Zaman 11th June, 1907.
706. See, for example, Ibid., 1st, 8th and 15th July 1907 for lists of contributions.
lem inhabitants had been forced to abandon their homes and move to other villages because of harassment, directed, it was claimed, by the Greek Cypriot muhtar.707

It was in such tense conditions that in September 1907, the Cyprus Gazette announced: “His Excellency the High Commissioner directs it to be notified for general information that the Right Honourable Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, will shortly visit Cyprus.”708 Churchill’s visit the following month caused excitement amongst the populace at large, and he was met on his disembarkment at Famagusta by a considerable crowd waving flags, hundreds and hundreds of Greek flags, in an expression of their desire for enosis. Still, if Churchill’s visit served to clarify the political sentiments of the Greek Cypriots, it did so also for the Turkish Cypriots.

As to the Turkish Cypriot participation in the welcoming ceremonies, in his address to Churchill in Nicosia, Hami Bey, on behalf of the Moslem deputies of the Legislative Council, explained: “The non-attendance of the Moslem Community at the ceremony of meeting and welcoming you, Sir, was due to the fact of their having been unable to reconcile with their national feelings their appearance among Greek flags.”709 Yet, despite this general boycott of the said ceremony, it is apparent that there were some “Ottomans of Famagusta” who, “in a manner befitting the Ottomans, in typical accordance with the Ottoman national manners and courtesy that constituted a part of their beings,” did attend the welcoming. In fact it was reported that a skirmish occurred when, the Greek Cypriots present attempted to take down the “glorious and heroic Ottoman flag,” that had been hoisted by the town’s Turks. Comparing their fury to that of an erupting volcano, Mir’at-ı Zaman congratulated the Turks of Famagusta for having, “safeguarded that glorious flag and substantiated the Ottoman presence to the conceited Greek Cypriots.”710 Confidential British reports describe the fracas in a less specific manner, yet confirm that tensions were present on the wharf. A confidential despatch of the 21st of October, 1907 disclosed that the pro-enosis display:

[W]as at one time in danger of being marred by the Turks of Famagusta who, in their indignation at the Greek demonstration, fell foul of some of the processionists and began what might have developed into a very considerable affray. Fortunately the exertions of the Police and the good sense of the Turks themselves combined to maintain the peace and when Mr. Churchill landed on the wharf there was some outward appearance of good order.711

The respective addresses of the two communities’ leaders to Churchill, as well as his own response reflected the heightened state of tension and the divergence of political outlook of the two communities in Cyprus that had grown to unprecedented proportions since the beginning of British rule. While rejecting changes to the status quo in Cyprus, including the prospect of greater autonomy, Hami Bey declared:

707. Ibid., 7th October 1907; Only a few months earlier another clash had occurred between Greek and Turkish villagers in the vicinity of Galatya. Initially sparked by a property dispute, it soon turned into an intercommunal disturbance which, according to Turkish sources at least, was again the result of the incitement of a Christian muhtar. Ibid., 17th February, 1907.
708. Cyprus Gazette 6th September 1907.
709. Ibid., 17th October 1907.
710. Mir’at-ı Zaman 17th October 1907; Hill reports further that the Moslems of Famagusta also attempted to break-up a related pro-enosis Greek procession, though of this I have found no confirmation, and he himself does not give a source for this claim. HILL 1952, 515.
We absolutely repudiate the union of the Island with Greece, and request that the delivering of speeches on the subject in places of official and high standing may be categorically prohibited.

The indulgence hitherto shown in such matters having increased the boldness of the Greeks, we are even at this moment hardly able to pass through the streets because of the shouts of “zeto” and the display of Greek flags. You having personally been an eyewitness of these demonstrations, Sir, we entreat that they may in earnest be prohibited, because the contemptuous and aggressive acts taking place against the Moslems have passed all bounds; neither our persons nor our places of worship escape their insults and jeering; the occurrence of such regrettable incidents in the towns being manifest, imagine, Sir, the state of the people in the villages. As a prolongation of this state of things would, God forbid, bring about grave results, it is solicited that measures for their prevention may be taken as soon as possible.712

Touching, diplomatically once again, on the issue of relief from the tribute, Hami Bey announced:

As the discontinuance or reduction of the tribute of £92,000 would be an infringement of the treaty, we absolutely repudiate this also. The illustrious British Government having just granted us in kindness an annual sum of £50,000, it is evident that a kindly assistance for the continuation and increase of that amount will be accepted and welcomed with great satisfaction.713

The written address delivered by the Bishop of Kitium, on the other hand, consisted of an impassioned plea for enosis, imploring, “As that great Statesman [Gladstone] has been the harbinger of the Union of the Sister Ionian Islands with Mother Greece, so we wish to look at Your Honour.” The Bishop signified also how wide the underlying rift between the two communities now was, both by his condescending air towards the Turkish Cypriots, and more sensationally by a distinctive reference to them as an, “alien minority.”714 How divergent the political appreciation of the two communities regarding international developments had become was further highlighted by the following extract of the address in which the Bishop assured:

The Mahomedan minority will not be prejudiced by following the National fate of the Hellenic Majority; but, on the contrary, will in a good many respects be benefited, as the Hellenic race has practically exhibited a remarkable religious tolerance and a tendency to communicate its own blessings to the foreign races, from the remotest years up to-day, as in Thessaly, Epirus, Crete and elsewhere.715

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712. Cyprus Gazette 17th October 1907.
713. Ibid.
714. Ibid.; Clearly such statements strikingly contradict the impression given by revisionist histories such as that of Plutis Servas who claims that these were years in which the common ground of “Cypriot” interest was appreciated and actually flourished. One of Servas’ bases for this contention relates to how popular the Turkish Mayor of Nicosia, Şevket Bey, who had been selected by a combination of Greeks and Turks, was amongst all sections of the populace. What he fails to stress, however, was the exceptionality of this occurrence. The only reason that Şevket had been elected despite the Turks only having a minority of the votes was that the Greeks were themselves bitterly divided over an Episcopal issue and could not field a common candidate. [See, Mir’at-i Zaman 13th April, 1908]. It is notable, though not touched upon by Servas, that such a situation was never repeated, despite the fact that he claims Şevket’s services in office had been so widely approved of. See SERVAS 1999, 53–54.
715. Cyprus Gazette 17th October 1907; In 1881 the Hellenic Kingdom annexed Thessaly and part of Epirus in accordance with the decisions of the Congress of Berlin.
And further, on the tribute issue:

The English Government have, in a manner worthy of the noble traditions of the British nation and in disregard of the integrity and sovereign rights of Turkey, assumed the initiative in the taking away from the hands of Turkey of the revenue of a most important Turkish province in Europe and in the application of that revenue for the improvement and advancement of that same province. While congratulating the British Government for that, we feel a still greater grief that such a Government and such a nation should, till now, suffer the people of Cyprus, who, by the help of God, have been freed of the Turkish administration for some decades past, to be wronged in a manner which is unheard of in the colonial history of Great Britain.\footnote{Cyprus Gazette 17th October 1907.}

For many years controversy surrounded the import of Churchill’s own response to these wildly contrasting addresses. Churchill did say: “I think it is only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their Mother-country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly, and fervently cherished.”\footnote{Ibid.} Greek nationalists duly seized upon this as recognition of the justice of their demands and Churchill’s encouraging words were, “ever after quoted,” but invariably at the expense of the continuation of his speech.\footnote{LAPPING 1985, 312–313.} As Hill, however, recognised, Churchill had also referred the supporters of enosis to the sentiments of the Moslem population of the island.\footnote{See HILL 1952, 515–516.} “On the other hand,” Churchill noted, “the opinion held by the Moslem population of the Island, that the British occupation of Cyprus should not lead to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and that the mission of Great Britain in the Levant should not be to impair the sovereignty of the Sultan, is one which His Majesty’s Government are equally bound to regard with respect.”\footnote{Cyprus Gazette 17th October 1907.}

In the wake of this visit the press had a field day, with Mir’at-t-i Zaman publishing a special issue that covered both the details of the visit and reflection upon Churchill’s statements, drawing to the attention of readers Churchill’s recognition of their sensitivities regarding the continued Ottoman association.\footnote{See Mir’at-t-i Zaman 17th October 1907.} This was, no doubt, a convenient position for the British to take, but it does not detract from the fact that these sentiments were genuinely held by the Turkish Cypriots. Nor should the significance of the fact that at the very time that Churchill was speaking in Cyprus, two of their three Legislative Council members were in Istanbul, conferring with the Ottoman authorities, be overlooked.\footnote{Without going in to detail, the confidential despatch on Churchill’s reception declared that, “It was unfortunate that two of the three Moslems members were absent from the Island on other business at Constantinople.” King-Harman to Earl of Elgin, 21st October 1907. CO 67/149, 253.}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 716. Cyprus Gazette 17\textsuperscript{th} October 1907.
\item 717. Ibid.
\item 718. LAPPING 1985, 312–313.
\item 719. See HILL 1952, 515–516.
\item 720. Cyprus Gazette 17\textsuperscript{th} October 1907.
\item 721. See Mir’at-t-i Zaman 17\textsuperscript{th} October 1907.
\item 722. Without going in to detail, the confidential despatch on Churchill’s reception declared that, “It was unfortunate that two of the three Moslems members were absent from the Island on other business at Constantinople.” King-Harman to Earl of Elgin, 21\textsuperscript{th} October 1907. CO 67/149, 253.
\end{footnotes}
Political tensions did not, however, abate following Churchill’s departure. In fact, there were Turkish Cypriot expressions of disillusionment that the Greek Cypriot assaults had not thereafter come to an end.\footnote{723 Mir'at-ı Zaman 4th November 1907.} At the end of December, 1907 it was announced that the Turks of Famagusta were to hold a performance of Namık Kemal’s most patriotic play “Vatan Yahut Silistre”, (the very play for whose writing he had been banished to the island), on the occasion of the 609th anniversary of the founding of the Ottoman Empire.\footnote{724 Ibid., 23rd December 1907; For the relationship between Kemal’s punishment and the play, see Şemsettin Kutlu’s introduction in KEMAL 2000, 7 and 9–11, and ZÜRCHER 1984, 8.} It was acknowledged that in gathering for the performance a purpose was to raise money for a girls’ school in the town, but the underlying political import of the event was already indicated by the initial announcement which urged: “It is vital that all our Ottoman brothers, taking a leaf out of the book of our Greek Cypriot compatriots, gather to celebrate such a sacred night.”\footnote{725 Mir'at-ı Zaman 23rd December 1907.} A special train was laid on to transport people from Nicosia to Famagusta and it was met at the station by the people of Famagusta and greeted by the cast’s rendition of the play’s chorus song, the words glorifying the Ottomans and their blood, written by Kemal with express purpose to enflame national sentiments.\footnote{726 Ibid., 3rd February 1908; See also KEMAL 2000, 12.} Large crowds gathered for the event despite heavy rain and accounts described how their, “Ottoman blood boiled over with emotion.”\footnote{727 Mir'at-ı Zaman 3rd February 1908.}

Community leaders, including Legislative Council members, local politicians, and teachers, gave numerous impassioned speeches, and the words they uttered are remarkable in the degree that they resonated with nationalist themes. These speeches were to an important degree of an Ottoman nationalist nature, but, as well as referring to Islam, contained the unmistakable tone also of Turkish nationalism. Many were published at length in the following weeks’ press. Much reference was made to the greatness of Ottoman and Turkish history, the sacrifices of ancestors for the land on which they stood, and comment given on how these heroes lived on in the nation’s heart. In an opening speech, Legislative Councillor Şevket Bey roared:

[O]ur adversaries, imagining us to be dead, have had the audacity even to enter the grounds of our mosques. But enough is enough! Let us put an end to this indolence and awake!.. Let us not be trodden underfoot!.. Let us open our eyes and prove that we are the heirs of our forefathers’ and show all that we are capable of protecting our rights.

Calling upon the people to protect the glory and honour embodied in being Ottomans, he concluded, “Long live our unity, long live the nation, long live the Sultan!”\footnote{728 Mir’at-ı Zaman 3rd December 1907.}

Midhat Bey, in his turn, declared that such unprecedented crowds had gathered for the purpose of demonstrating to everyone their patriotic passions, and how these emotions, which had been amassing for years, rumbling like a volcano in the nation’s heart, had now erupted the volcano as a result of the enterprise of the Ottomans of Famagusta. Referring to the crowd as the grandchildren of Selim II’s conquering armies, he exhorted them to realize that a united nation, conscious of its national duties could never be destroyed and would always defend its liberty and independence. “The era of indolence is over,” he declared. “We comprehend the meaning of fatherland. We take pride in being
Ottomans, and declare always that our Ottomanism will be defended forever under these skies of our sacred fatherland.” Emphasizing the importance of the contribution that each individual had to make to fortifying the already evident unity of the Ottomans of Cyprus, he rounded off: “Long live Union, long live the Ottomans!”

Speaking at the site in Famagusta where Namık Kemal had once resided, Mehmet Behaeddin, who had been closely involved in staging the play, and who was later to play an active part in Turkish Cypriot nationalist politics during the ascendancy of Necati Özkan, heaped lavish praise on the playwright. Behaeddin enunciated what a great patriot Kemal had been, depicted the sacrifices he had made for the nation and fatherland, and noted the pride he would feel in the people who had gathered there that day out of their love for their fatherland and nation. While appreciating the remarkable heroism and military prowess of their Ottoman forefathers, he reminded the crowd not to forget the accomplishments also of the Ottomans in other fields such as those of knowledge and learning, art and trade and exhorted them to prove through their efforts in such fields, “that the blood in your veins is of the highest calibre, is Ottoman blood.” He ended with the call: “let us pledge at this sacred site that we will strive for the progress and ascendency of our nation.”

Following the performance, Ahmet Eyyub, a leading teacher from Famagusta, delivered another significant speech. He emphasized the political, rather than artistic motivation for their gathering, and proceeded to give a long exposition of the glorious history of their Ottoman and Turkish forefathers; He stipulated how the Ottoman conquests had, “carried the blessings of the Ottomans and the Turks,” to different corners of the world; He raged that for many years their enemies had conspired to destroy Ottomanism, but exhorted the audience, however, not to lose faith, proceeding thereafter to catalogue the great virtues of the “Turkish nation”. Highlighting especially the tremendous accomplishments of the Turks in recent years, Eyyub emphasized that progress in education was paramount in order to strengthen the nation against its enemies.

Midhat Bey rose to speak once more following the performance. Delving again into the great historical achievements of their forefathers, he explained how: “While having once constituted only a small nomadic tribe, the noble Turkish people had conquered Asia Minor, wherein they established a magnificent state.” He narrated how the honourable and just Ottoman people in time emerged as the branch of the Selçuk state that was to be greater than all others, and, echoing Eyyub, noted how, “this sacred Ottoman flag for centuries was the standard of compassionate civilisation in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, and was for years custodian of some of today’s Great States.” It was to commemorate this magnificent Ottoman state’s founding that they had gathered on what was for all Ottomans a, “great national festival.” He repeated, “My esteemed Ottomans, a nation with a great history of civilisation and military accomplishment, recollecting its past and possessing national honour and dignity can never be harmed. It lives forever, forever ascending. Here, with great pride we see that we too have begun to appreciate this great truth.”

729. Ibid.
730. Ibid., 10th February 1908.
731. Interestingly he used the infrequently employed term “mületteşârım”, (which can be literally translated as “my co-nationals”), to address the crowd, denoting that he and they were all part of a shared nation. Ibid., 10th February, 1908.
732. Ibid., 10th February 1908.
quely revealing of the frame of mind of the Turkish Cypriots, and worthy of record, were Midhat Bey’s closing words:

Our goal, our aim, must always be to ascend and progress. The day will come when as a result of the sacred powers redemption will bring joy to all Ottomans. And, then it will be that in the caring palm of our motherland we too will forget our past sorrows and hand-in-hand with her will together raise up our civilization to the skies. Long live unity. Long live the Ottomans.733

Not only is it worthy of note that Midhat Bey omitted the customary cheer for the Sultan, but it is remarkable too that he appears here to be insinuating that the day of salvation would come when the members of the Ottoman nation in Cyprus united with their Ottoman brothers in the motherland.

In many ways this performance can be seen not only as the public rehabilitation of Namık Kemal in Cyprus.734 It was also a landmark in the rise of nationalism amongst the Turks of the island; never before does it appear so pronounced. The media of the theatre was thereafter to sustain a powerful role in “awakening” national sentiment amongst the Turkish Cypriot masses.735 Indeed, “awakening”, which according to Gellner is, “probably the most commonly used word in the nationalist vocabulary,” was now the catchword of Turkish Cypriot nationalists’ too.736

Just weeks before the Young Turk Revolution was initiated, an editorial entitled “The Fatherland” was published in the Mir’at-ı Zaman newspaper. It proclaimed and illustrated the great emotional potency expression of the word could evince; It observed that, “The fatherland is not simply the place where one is born and raised. All territories which as a consequence of their Ottoman character are part of the Ottoman state constitute the fatherland,” and explained that the loss of a single piece of the fatherland was tantamount to a person losing a part of his body; it emphasized that the horrors and injustice that befell them when a piece of the fatherland came under foreign administration, (in the supposed name of civilization), tore at the heart of its people. The editorial then stated: “For centuries the Turks have lived as rulers. As a consequence of their character, emanating from the climate from which they arose and the qualities of the upbringing they had, the Turks have not been the servants of any other nation, above them lying only God.” Therefore, it was continued, the fate of losing the fatherland, “would for us be worse than death.” As a result, he concluded every sacrifice made for the preservation of the fatherland was a justified one.737

Was it the British then that were driving a political wedge between the island’s main communities, one that eventually led to their total political divorce, or were there other processes at work? The following news about Famagusta, reported early in the twentieth century, appears to further support the latter thesis. Though the Turks may by the early twentieth century have grudgingly accepted the fact that they did not have equal representation in the Legislative Council, this did not prevent them from bemoaning and repeatedly trying to overcome the consequences of the failure to provide them with such equal representation in other bodies, particularly in those of the municipal authorities. The

733. Ibid.
734. For Bozkurt it was after this performance that he became a true legend. BOZKURT 1998, 61.
735. For a detailed exposition of the history of Turkish Cypriot theatre see ERSOY 1998, passim.
737. Mir’at-ı Zaman 24th February 1908.
Turks had for quite some time successfully blocked the establishment of elected municipal authorities for Nicosia and Paphos. Nevertheless, once they, and other such authorities did come under majority Greek control they frequently complained of the injustices and discrimination they faced, accusing them of favouritism towards the Christian residents and quarters of the towns. In 1907 Hami Bey proposed as a remedy the following insertion to the Municipalities Amendment Bill:

But the PRESIDENTS to be elected shall be Moslems and Christians to hold office in alternate turns for a term of years proportionate to the numbers of Moslem and Christian members constituting the council. The Vice President shall be a Christian where President elected is a Moslem, and he shall be a Moslem where the President elected is a Christian.

It failed to receive support from either the Greek or the British members of the Council. The three Moslem members then proceeded to send a memorial to the Secretary of State on the matter, but to no avail.

In terms of Turkish Cypriot attitudes regarding the municipal authorities the Mir’at-ı Zaman of the 29th June 1908, is particularly revealing; all the more so seeing as it was published even after the unprecedented election of a Turkish Cypriot, Şevket Bey, to the mayorship of Nicosia, (and Osman Cemal as deputy mayor), which might well have been expected to dampen separatist tendencies. The journal related news from Famagusta where the Turkish residents were making efforts to have the areas they inhabited constituted as a separate municipality. The joint municipal authority shared with the Greeks, where they had only two out of nine seats and virtually no influence in the forming of municipal policy, took account only of Greek interests, it was noted. The journal expressed hope both that this demand would serve as a precedent so that other beleaguered Turkish quarters in the towns could also be constituted as separate municipalities, and also that the British administration would give its support to such moves.

Nor did the Turkish calls for greater power vis-à-vis the municipalities end following Şevket Bey’s mayorship. According to the minutes, in the Legislative debates of 1912 Hami Bey announced that:

[He wished to declare that the last Municipal Law had deprived the Moslems of certain rights, as in consequence of the smallness of the Moslem population many Moslem requirements were overlooked and measures were passed which were detrimental to Moslem interests: National sentiments had had become very strong, and the element which constituted the majority lost no opportunity of giving vent to its feelings. During a recent visit to Limassol he had noticed that the Municipality had altered the names and quarters of streets

739. See, for example, Mir’at-ı Zaman 10th December 1906 and 21st March 1908.
742. Mir’at-ı Zaman 29th June 1908; Historically the Greeks had not been permitted to reside within the walled city of Famagusta following the Ottoman conquest, thus it had been inhabited almost exclusively by Turks, while Greeks had established their own population centres nearby in the district of Varosha. Baker, in fact claimed that Varosha, “was originally founded by the Venetian Christians who were expelled from Famagusta after the Turkish conquest,” though by the arrival of British rule it was already a thriving, “large village, or town,” that was clearly by then inhabited by a relatively prosperous Orthodox community and possessed, “a large Greek Church.” [BAKER 1879]. Whatever the case, under British rule both Varosha and the walled city of Famagusta were considered part of the same municipal authority and it was this situation that the Turks were apparently trying to end.
which had seriously affected Moslem feelings, and he believed this had been done with some special intention.743

Noting that similar actions had been taken in Nicosia also despite the apolitical behaviour of Moslem inhabitants designed to protect the status quo, he stated that: “The election of Presidents to serve on the Municipal Councils was decided by majority and the Moslems were thus deprived of ever having a Moslem President. They prayed that an amending law be introduced so as to bring about an equilibrium between the two elements.” Notably Hami Bey was seconded, not only by Ziyai Bey, but also by Şevket Bey himself on the matter of the changes to street names, the latter indicating that this, “had caused a serious feeling on the part of the Moslems.”744

The British, however, were not to give backing to this enterprise, a significant fact when it is remembered that they are often blamed for having established separate municipalities in Cyprus for Greek and Turkish quarters in the late 1950’s as part of their divide-and-rule policy. Though the details of those later developments do not concern us here, evidence cited above does illustrate that there was a genuine Turkish Cypriot feeling that joint municipal authorities did not protect their interests from much earlier on in the twentieth century, and suggests that they themselves instigated efforts to have the municipal authorities separated, without British support.

Even if the Turks of Cyprus were at the time focusing on internal developments, international affairs were also continuing in the lead-up to the Young Turk Revolution, to provide fuel for the emergence of Turkish nationalism. Indicating that the Turkish Cypriots were following wider instances of nationalist movements, the Mir‘at-i Zaman in 1907, gave news of Polish uprisings against the Germans.745 In Albania and Macedonia there were new challenges by non-Turkish elements of the Ottoman Empire, disrupting the broader vision of Ottomanism, contributing instead to the enhancement of the narrower Turkism, and these too were given broad coverage.

Developments in Iran were also followed with glee by the Young Turk press in Cyprus. Mehmet Baki commented in February of 1907 how the people of Iran had made progress and gained their liberty by taking over control of their state, and had remarked upon how the Ottoman people were even more deserving of such progress and freedom, freedom which they presently lacked only because they did not yet have control over their own state.746 One of several further news items as to developments concerning uprisings in Iran declared them to be the work of, “lovers of liberty”, and concluded: “Henceforth liberty will rule in the world.”747 The choice of words was not coincidental, with “Liberty”, (or “Hürriyet”), being the calling card of the Young Turks, and the name given

743. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 17th April 1912. CO 69/28, 39–40; On the matter of opposition to the changes in street names in Limassol, see also ALTAN 1997, 22–24.
744. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 17th April 1912. CO 69/28, 40–41; In fact, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, often riven by internal squabbles, was united by this matter. Şevket Bey himself acknowledged that his rivals Osman Cemal and Bodamylazade Mehmet Münir had protested to the High Commissioner on the same issue. Vatan 18th March 1912.
745. Mir‘at-i Zaman 30th December 1907.
746. Mehmet Baki in Mir‘at-i Zaman 25th February 1907; News about developments in Iran continued to be widely reported by Mir‘at-i Zaman in the months that followed, with one report, taken from a Young Turk journal based in Cairo, the Şaira-yi Osmani, relating the depth of popular support for the opponents of the Shah, [Ibid., 4th May 1908], another noting the breakdown in relations between the Azeris and the Iranian government. Ibid., 18th May 1908.
747. Ibid., 12th August 1907.
to the era opened by their revolution of 1908. And, in Crete too, events that unfolded in the months preceding the Young Turk Revolution again had important repercussions in Cyprus, affecting both debate in the Legislative Council and tensions on the streets. In fact, by now, some Turkish Cypriots were openly insisting that there was actually a direct link between Greek agitation in Crete and in Cyprus, with both being part of the same sinister plot.748

In the following months unprecedented impetus was to be added to the Turkish nationalist movement; impetus that was to break the idea of subjection to the Sultan and free the conceptualisation of nationhood based on Turkish credentials. Certainly, strong sentiments of Turkish nationalism were at this stage still likely to have been held by only a limited number of elite individuals. Yet the message was no longer trapped in the proverbial bottle; it was out amongst the masses, many of whom, already acquainted with Ottoman nationalism, were soon to become receptive to the exhortations of this more narrowly constituted force.

748. Ibid., 30th December 1907.
4 A decade of transformation: the Young Turk Revolution and the political evolution of the Turks of Cyprus

If the decades preceding the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 were characterized by incremental changes in Turkish Cypriot political attitudes and by the gradual, albeit hesitant, spread of nationalist feelings, the traumatic decade that followed the Revolution compelled ever broader sections of the Turkish Cypriot community to reassess their political outlook, and growing numbers to subsequently exhibit nationalist sentiments, in which, as the religious and Ottoman elements receded, the Turkish component was amplified. In the context of the wider Ottoman Empire, Karpat argues with some justification that these were the years in which the Turkish national identity was politicised under the Young Turks. He declares: “[T]here is no question in my mind that we must view as distinct phases the development of the modern Turkish national identity in the period 1870–1908, on the one hand, and its politicisation in the form of Turkish nationalism in the era of the Young Turks (1908–1918) and the Republic, on the other.” Some may question whether the cleft is actually as sharp as he asserts, yet it is all the same a most pertinent point from which to appreciate the great advance made in the politicisation of Turkish nationalism following the Revolution. The dramatic political changes that were the cause of this transformation in the Ottoman Empire had also their clear ramifications in Cyprus. In addition, for a community connected in sentiment to that Empire, though not physically attached, developments pertaining to the First World War and its culmination were to have their own distinctive implications for this “detached” Turkish community.

Though this period began in an atmosphere congenial to the repair of political fissures in the bi-communal society in which they lived, the underlying trend towards political divergence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots that had become noticeable by the end of the nineteenth century, soon re-emerged, and was aggravated, once again, by the effects of international developments. By the close of the Great War, with Britain now having annexed the island, the Greek Cypriots having strengthened their push for enosis, the Ottoman Empire having crumbled and an increasingly “Turkish” national identity beginning to take hold, the Turkish Cypriots lay at a precarious crossroad. The nature of their communal predicament, however, meant that they were to be especially receptive to

749. KARPAT 2000, 2.
the powerful impetus of Turkish nationalism that was to be championed by the Kemalist cadres in the War’s aftermath, and were ready to embrace and adhere to its precepts in steadily accumulating numbers. Essentially this decade then was one in which the Turkish nationalist sentiments, which at its outset had still been largely confined to a small intellectual vanguard, began to find a market amongst the Turkish Cypriot masses. Undoubtedly this market was still undeveloped at war’s end, but realization of the impossibility of Ottomanism and Islamism as ideological alternatives to Turkism, the urgency of the peculiar situation in Cyprus, and the impact of the war of national liberation initiated from Anatolia, were to combine to cultivate the fertile soil in which the seeds of Turkish nationalism were already germinating.

4.1 Ramifications of Revolution in Cyprus

The Young Turk Revolution, per se, was not the most spectacular of events.750 Discontent with the autocratic Hamidian regime had been growing for quite some time, and unable to put down a rather haphazard and unplanned rebellion of CUP members and sympathizers that erupted in Macedonia in July of 1908, the Sultan succumbed to the long-standing Young Turk demands for the recall of parliament and reintroduction of the constitution. Following elections, the re-established parliament, which initially contained 119 Turks, 72 Arabs, 42 Christians and 4 Jews convened on December 17th, 1908.751

In Cyprus news of the Revolution was greeted with widespread jubilation, not, by any means, restricted to the pre-existing Young Turk cadres on the island, but encompassing the Turkish Cypriot community as a whole, with several sources attesting to the fact that even those who had shied away from, or even denounced the Young Turks in the past now transformed into keen supporters of the Revolution.752 Korkut notes that when the news of the success of the Young Turk Revolution spread, everyone ran into the streets, even governmental employees like himself, and he elucidates also how even those who had previously been firmly behind the Sultan’s authoritarian regime, promptly came around in favour of “hürriyet”, or “liberty”, as this new era became known.753

Celebrations in Nicosia seem to have centred largely on the Ottoman Club, and amongst the prominent figures who gave speeches welcoming the arrival of the new era were the Legislative Councillor Şevket Bey, Osman Cemal and Dr. Hafız Cemal. The British were reluctant to have condoned these celebrations, initially refusing permission for the firing of salutary cannon shots, and consenting only after the personal intervention of Şevket Bey.754

750. Shaw and Shaw describe it as, “one of the strangest events of its kind ever seen in history.” SHAW – SHAW 1977b, 266.
751. See ZEINE 1966, 80–81.
752. The first reference to the beginning of the uprising in the Balkans and the leadership of Enver Bey and other CUP leaders was made in the Mir’at-ı Zaman of 27th of July. For reports of celebrations after confirmation of the Revolution’s success reaching Cyprus, see Mir’at-ı Zaman 27th July and 3rd August 1908.
753. KORKUT 2000, 59–60; Berkes also refers to widespread jubilation and how the Revolution was greeted with displays of the Ottoman flag, and cries of “fatherland” and “freedom”. BERKES 1997, 34.
754. Mir’at-ı Zaman 3rd August 1908.
Patriotic speeches were delivered at evenings held to collect funds for the Ottoman armed forces and leaders of the Revolution such as Enver and Niyazi became public heroes on the island as in other Ottoman domains.\(^{755}\) Countless poems and song lyrics lauding the greatness of these men were published in the papers and their portraits were given pride of place in ceremonies and celebrations.\(^{756}\) As he himself reveals, it was no coincidence either that the famous Turkish Cypriot academic, Professor Berkes, born at the time of the Revolution, was named Niyazi while his twin brother was called Enver.\(^{757}\) Banners carrying the Young Turk slogans of “Hürriyet, Adalet, İhret, Müş’avat”, or, “Liberty, Justice, Brotherhood, Equality”, were commonplace in celebrations, even those celebrating the Sultan’s coronation.\(^{758}\) Theatre performances reflecting the ideals of the Revolution also abounded, and Namik Kemal’s “Vatan-Yahut-Silistre” was being performed once again to large crowds, this time in Nicosia.\(^{759}\) Everywhere the “istibdat” or “era of despotism” of the previous regime was censured, with one prominent Turkish Cypriot author who had befriended Namik Kemal during his exile in Cyprus, Kaytazzade Mehmet Nazım, penning, and jointly publishing with Ahmet Tevfik, a four-act play entitled “Sofa”, described in the Cyprus Gazette as depicting, “the evil states of the late Regime.”\(^{760}\) The, “traitors to the state and nation,” who had encircled the sultan during this era were accused not only of political abuses, but also of, “stealing the nation’s money.”\(^{761}\)

Four explanations for this general conversion to the Young Turk cause come to mind. Firstly, and most commonly given as an explanation by nationalist historians, is the argument that the loyalty of the Turkish Cypriots was always to the Ottoman/Turkish state, thus most Turkish Cypriots who previously supported the authoritarian Hamidian regime would previously have felt support of the Young Turks and CUP to have been disloyal to the state with which they identified.\(^{762}\) In the new circumstances that now prevailed, however, loyalty to the Ottoman state necessitated identification with the cadres that had taken-over control; A second alternative would simply be to argue that the sudden out-pouring of support for the Unionists was more a cynical and opportunistic reflection of the desire to be on the side of the victor, and; a third explanation might be that those who

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755. See, for example, Vahdetî’s speech delivered in Cyprus shortly after the Revolution at a gathering for the benefit of the Ottoman navy, and published in the first issue of Volkan, in which while deriding particularistic ethno-nationalism he appeals to a civic concept of Ottoman nationalism. [Volkan 11th December 1908]. Gradually his emphasis on Islamism, however, became more poignant. See, for example, Volkan 19th February 1909, where he notes that whatever peoples’ race might be, Islam had the capacity to unite all Moslems as a single nation.

756. See, for example, Mir’at-ı Zaman 24th August, 28th September, 12th October and 30th November 1908, and 25th January 1909.


758. See, for example, Mir’at-ı Zaman 7th and 14th September 1908.

759. Ibid., 10th October 1908.

760. Cyprus Gazette 18th March 1910; The original advertisement for sales of the book can be found in successive issues of the Mir’at-ı Zaman. [See, for example, Mir’at-ı Zaman 29th March 1909]; Born in Cyprus in 1857, Kaytazzade had in his younger years, though after the onset of British rule, served in other parts of the Ottoman Empire as an Ottoman official. ÖZORAN 1971, 172. For reference to his acquaintance with Kemal, see YAŞIN 1998, 225.

761. Mir’at-ı Zaman 10th August 1908.

762. See, for example, Ahmet Tevfik’s depiction of the injustices they faced prior to the Revolution at the hands of those who depicted The Young Turks and CUP as traitors, when in fact, he says, it was these very people who were in reality performing their duty to the state and nation. [Ibid., 24th August 1908]; See also Ibid., 29th March 1909.
had in the past sympathized covertly with the CUP and the cause of the Young Turks, could now express themselves freely without any fear of retribution; Yet, there is a fourth explanation too: that Turkish Cypriots who in the previous months and years had become visibly concerned about their political future on the island, who had been alarmed by the exploits of Katalanos and his followers and the renewed and heightened calls for enosis that accompanied Churchill’s visit, perceived the Revolution to be a means to the potential salvation of the Ottoman Empire that through its rejuvenation would be better able to defend their interests. Such were the sentiments discernible from a leading article entitled “Hürriyet”, by Ahmet Tevfik. Herein, Tevfik glorified the Revolution as having safeguarded the interests of the Moslems and Ottomans, and prevented the collapse of the Ottoman government; without the Young Turk Revolution they would have sooner or later either come under the control of Christian governments, or, like the Jews, would have been left with no state of their own, he contended.763 Tevfik declared: “The Ottoman state, which only fifteen days ago was referred to by Europe as the “Sick Man”; is today once again proving to the Europeans its existence and affirming its sovereignty.” 764 Another piece no doubt reflected similar feelings: “Yesterday the Turks were [portrayed as] wild, as barbarians, [while] today, as you know, they have become civilization.”765

At the outset the label of Young “Turk” Revolution, in fact the term “Young Turk” in general, appears inappropriate, somewhat of a misnomer. Many of the initial leaders of the Young Turk movement were in fact not, ethnically Turkish.766 Furthermore, though in time ethnically Turkish cadres became increasingly prominent in the movement, and it was Turkish and Albanian activists, most particularly from among the younger ranks of the Ottoman officer corps, (which itself included, “practically no Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians or Jews”), who were most responsible for spearheading the revolutionary uprising of 1908, the Revolution was not itself launched on a manifest Turkish nationalist platform.767 It was open to all sections of the Empire to embrace, and was portrayed as a means of saving from implosion the pluralistic Ottoman Empire through the re-introduction of the constitutionalism and parliament that Abdülhamid had done away with in 1878. It was, nevertheless, the Turkish majority in the officer corps, “which determined the political course of the underground movement, saw in it a vehicle, not only for the strengthening of the Ottoman state, but also for Turkish nationalist aspirations.”768

Christians, Jews and Moslems; Turks, Greeks, Arabs and Armenians walked hand-in-hand through the streets of Istanbul welcoming the new era.769 Clogg argues that, “A real enthusiasm for the principle [of Ottomanism] was briefly evoked in the flurry of excitement with which the Ottoman Greeks, as indeed the Greeks of the Kingdom, greeted the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the restoration of the constitution.” 770

763. Ibid., 10th August 1908.
764. Ibid.
765. Ibid., 14th September 1908.
767. Ibid., 22; While conscription had been enacted for all the peoples of the Empire during the mid-nineteenth century, the considerably lower exemption fee for Christians and Jews than for Moslems in practice meant that the army was still exclusively composed of the latter. The officer corps too was, “drawn entirely from Muslims and predominantly from the Balkans and from Anatolia,” areas where the Turks constituted the bulk of the Moslem populace. [See RUSTOW 1973, 116–117]; For an even more thorough exposition of the conscription system in the late Ottoman Empire, see ZÜRCHER 1998, passim.
768. ZÜRCHER 1984, 22–23.
Such developments appear to have had some temporary effect on fostering a new cordial atmosphere in bi-communal relations on the island too. According to Kyriss, the Ottoman Club in Limassol was decorated for celebrations of the proclamation of Turkey’s new constitution not only with the Ottoman, but also with the British and Greek flags, and invitations were written to Greeks, in Greek, to attend the celebrations. Several apparently did so. The speech delivered by Mustafa Midhat, a Young Turk and at the time the headmaster of the Turkish school of Limassol, was said to have been, “warmly applauded by all.”

For several months Mir’at-i Zaman abstained from derogatory references to the Greeks, and did not record any cases of the intercommunal tensions it regularly depicted in the preceding period. The tone of its writing was much more sympathetic to the notion of camaraderie with the Greeks and developments were portrayed as the unveiling of a new era where Orthodox Greek and Moslem Turkish Cypriots would live together under the banner of Ottomanism. One article proclaimed, “From now on it will not only be our Mehmetts, but also our Dikrans, Yorgis and Yusufs who lay down their lives at our borders. From now onwards there will be no clash of “crescent” and “cross”, no conflict of Koran and Bible.”

In effect, then, the Greek Cypriots were once again being brought into the fold, re-incorporated in the vision of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious Ottoman nation. And, on the Greek Cypriot front too there appears to have been a thawing of attitudes too, members of this community flocking to theatre performances extolling the Young Turks.

All the same, how fragile this new entente may have been needs to be examined further. Though the words of an Arab doctor resident in Famagusta, stating with pride in a speech given at celebrations soon after the Revolution that he too was an Ottoman, were reported in the Turkish press, there is little indication that such opinion prevailed also amongst the island’s Greek Cypriots.

What is clear is that before long the honeymoon was over, in Cyprus even sooner than in many other areas of the Ottoman Empire, and the signs of estrangement between the two communities once again resurfaced. By the end of 1908, things were entering a by now increasingly familiar pattern. In response to articles printed in the Greek Cypriot press, that were apparently picked-up by some of the Istanbul journals too, Mir’at-i Zaman vehemently refuted any suggestion that the Turkish Cypriots supported Greece’s annexation of Crete and complained with annoyance that the renewed tensions related to the “Eastern Question” were causing the sceptre of the union of Cyprus with Greece to be raised once again on the island. It should be known, it was cautioned, that even were the rights of the Ottoman Empire over Cyprus to...
be overlooked, the Turkish Cypriot population would not accept such an outcome. The Great Powers, it was warned, should in such an event be prepared to witness a bloodbath on the island because, it was said, “rather than emigrate, we Ottomans prefer to join our forefathers [who lie dead] in these lands.” The “Ottomans” referred to were none other than the Turks of Cyprus!

By late December, the briefly subdued air of the press had returned to fever pitch. Reporting that the Greek Cypriots were once again calling for enosis, and pointing bitterly to the fate of the Moslems in Crete, Mir’at-ı Zaman charged that the Greek Cypriots’ ultimate objective was to massacre the Turks of the island within a few days of achieving enosis. They would not, it was declared, be permitted to achieve their goals. Appealing to national passions, the same issue published poems by patriotic Turkish authors Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Midhat Cemal, the latter’s entitled “To the Ottoman Flag.” In the first issue of the new year, Mir’at-ı Zaman described how a Turkish trader and his son had been brutally attacked when hawking their goods in a Greek Cypriot village, and in a threatening tone forewarning the inhabitants of this village that reprisals were likely, snidely cautioned them to keep in mind that the Turkish village of Gönyeli was not far-off.

Continued agitation over the fate of Crete was not helping cool tempers, this island having gained virtual independence by 1909 largely as a result of western pressures on the Porte. Developments were bemoaned in the Turkish Cypriot press, and passionate poems published in defence of Ottoman rights to Crete. One particularly impassioned poem, entitled simply “Crete” pronounced that Crete was, “the heart of the political existence of the nation,” that it was, “an eternal part of the being of the Turkish nation.” Yet, the declaration that, “the Ottomans won’t give a single stone to the enemy,” increasingly began to sound like the apprehensive verse of those concerned that this was exactly what was becoming more and more possible for Cyprus, rather than a genuinely held belief.

At the beginning of the year the Turkish Cypriot members of the Legislative Council had themselves written to the political authorities in Istanbul, pronouncing their fervent support for the proposal reported in the Sabah newspaper of Istanbul that an arrangement should be reached whereby, in return for the Ottoman Empire accepting a British annexation of Crete, (which for the Cretan Moslems would be much better than their fate under the rule of Greece), control of Cyprus would be restored to the Ottomans. Particularly poignant and revealing was the letter sent by Hami Bay to the Chair of the Ottoman Parliament where he stated:

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777. Ibid., 30th November 1908; Bodamyalızade Mehmet Münnir also expressed similar sentiments surrounding this issue in a letter he sent to press establishments in Istanbul. Though making clear that it supported the position taken by Bodamyalızade Mehmet Münnir, Mir’at-ı Zaman, however, stated that they withheld their congratulations from this individual due to the fact that he portrayed himself as the representative all the Turkish Cypriots. Ibid.
778. Ibid., 21st December 1908.
779. Ibid.
780. Interestingly this report did note that the Turkish trader had been assisted in his efforts to escape by a Greek Cypriot whom also the crowd proceeded to beat. Ibid., 11th January 1909.
781. Ibid., 9th August 1909.
782. Ibid., 11th January 1909.
With the establishment of the constitutional regime, the feelings of Ottomanism that have been rising amongst the Moslems of Cyprus for the past 30 years have been strengthened still further. The Cyprus Convention was made for the well being of the fatherland and in accordance with this view the Moslems who accepted the administration of Britain are complying [to the Convention]. However, because the Greek Cypriots are striving to realize the unification of the island with Greece ... the Moslems desire either the continuation of the legitimate right of the Ottoman State, or request the assistance of the nation’s representatives’ patriotic efforts to achieve an agreement with the British Government for the restoration [of Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire].

The Mir’at-ı Zaman was to go a step further, calling for both Cyprus and Crete to be returned to full Ottoman control.

Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriot journalists of different hues were united in castigating the Greek Cypriots for their “dream” of Enosis. While acknowledging Foni tis Kiprou’s denial of reports that the Greek Cypriots were preparing to use violent means to achieve their goals, Ahmet Tevfik called upon the paper to caution other Greek Cypriot papers such as Eleftheria, and the Greek Cypriot community in general, to stop giving this impression. From Istanbul an irate Delviş Vahdethi pointed the finger once again at Katalanos, whom he described as a “mischief-maker” that would bring no good to even the Greek Cypriots. Writers in Eleftheria were, in fact, to come under repeated criticism from a hypersensitive Turkish Cypriot population. When George Markides, wrote an article in the paper stating that he could not stop laughing at the Turkish Cypriots’ statements that the island should be returned to the Ottoman Empire, he was accused in the letter of “a reader” of Mir’at-ı Zaman, entitled, “Reply [-] To A Greek Dreamer”, of being ignorant of history and advised to recall that, “Cyprus was given to the temporary administration and occupation of Britain through an agreement made with the Ottoman state. Its legitimate owner is the Ottoman Empire [A]s can be understood from the word ‘temporary’, the day will come when this administration comes to an end, and then who will the island be left to? To the Ottoman state.” The island, the article warned, had never been Greek, and never would be, and if Greece and all Greeks, (“young and old, knowledgeable and ignorant”), continue to dream of expansionism they might find themselves being taught a lesson by the Turks, losing even what territory they already had. Member of the Legislative Council, Şevket Bey, joined the fray accusing Markides of ignorance as to the actions of, “the noble Turkish nation.”

Was Markides’ stance valid? For sure there was little evidence that Britain was at this stage contemplating a return of the island to the Ottomans. Nevertheless, behind the scenes discussions about the return of the island to the Ottomans appeared to have been conducted. Greek Cypriot Legislative Councillor Theodotou was apparently notified in 1910 by Undersecretary Colonel Seely, “that the present Turkish Government had made proposals to His Majesty’s Government for the resumption of Turkish rule in Cyprus.”

783. Ibid., 19th January 1909.
784. Ibid., 20th September 1909.
785. Ibid., 19th January 1909.
786. Volkan 2nd and 18th February 1909.
787. Mir’at-ı Zaman 12th July 1909.
788. Ibid., 5th July 1909. The same issue of the newspaper had also published a satirical poem indirectly addressed to Markides and his “Greek Dream.” Ibid.
There is incontrovertible evidence also that in late 1908 and 1909 tentative proposals along the lines, “that Great Britain might retrocede Cyprus to Turkey as compensation for the annexation of Crete to Greece,” were made to the British by both the French and Russian foreign ministers, the suggestion apparently emanating first from French Premier Georges Clemenceau himself. Monsieur Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, related privately to the British ambassador that, “If England desires to counteract the intrigues of Germany at Constantinople, to show her disinterestedness and to well establish her influence in Turkey let her give back to the Sultan Cyprus.” The British were, however, unwilling to countenance such suggestions and did their best to ignore them, but ultimately they could hardly fail to respond to their new allies of the Triple Entente. One Foreign Office official minuted, now that the suggestion has come both from Paris and St. Petersburg, it seems unwise to continue to ignore it altogether,” another suggested, “if any ‘compensation’ is to be offered by us to Turkey [for the loss of Crete] – I would suggest the region of Somaliland.” The draft despatch to Britain’s ambassador to Russia, penned in the Foreign Ministry informed:

To hand over Cyprus to Turkey would not increase the sovereign rights of the Sultan while the union of Crete to Greece would reduce them. It is the loss of their sovereignty over Crete and the fact that it goes to the Greeks whom they have always defeated in war, that appears objectionable to the Turks, and for this the handing over to Turkey of the administration of a Turkish island would be no compensation.

Your Excellency should take an early opportunity of pointing out these considerations to Monsieur Isvolsky and of intimating to him that His Majesty’s Government do not wish the question to be raised.

It would be a mistake to portray the Young Turk or even Unionist movement in Cyprus, or for that matter in any other region, in a stereotypical manner. So many different elements, each with their particular emphases, congregated under the same umbrella. Whether secularist or Islamist, pro-British or pro-German, more or less Ottomanist, more or less Turkist or pan-Turkist, portraying the views propagated by one strand of the movement at any particular stage as being representative of the whole movement throughout its course is erroneous. In this respect, it is wrong to infer as Ateşin does from a single newspaper article with a single author, that all young Turks, at all times, were cosmopolitans and/or pro-British, or to overlook the contributions of the Young Turks and Unionists, in some, though not all ways, to the rise of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Ateşin quotes extracts from an article in the Mir’at-ı Zaman of the 14th of September, 1908 by a Young Turk named Sırri, which announces, amongst other things, that, “the British flag, is as great and respectable as our own,” and that, “from now on the loyalty of the Moslems of Cyprus to the Ottoman state, the genuine love of which they are proud to cherish within, must be proved by its being shown to the British, to the British flag, and, keeping in mind the benefits to be accrued from the friendship between Britain and Turkey, [they] must avoid relying on certain futile goals.”

790. Mallet to the Colonial Office, 25th February 1909. CO 67/157, 265; British Ambassador to France, Francis Bertie reported that he himself had, “no doubt that the idea is Monsieur Clemenceau’s.” Bertie to Grey, 21st October 1908. CO 67/153, 126.
What Ateşin critically fails to observe, however, is the context in which this and other such articles were written: in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, at a juncture when relations between the Unionists and Britain were still reasonably good and Britain was considered to be defending Ottoman interests. In fact, at the height of post-revolutionary tensions in the Balkans this apparent support of the British appeared to be virtually “unanimously” appreciated amongst the Turkish Cypriots. The Commissioner reported that on the 28th of October 1908, “a mass meeting of Moslems was held in the principal square of Nicosia at which a deputation, comprising the Chief Cadi, the Mufti, the Turkish elected members of the Legislative Council and several of the leading Turkish notables, was selected and commissioned to wait upon me with a Resolution, unanimously passed.” This Resolution, forwarded to London, read as follows:

Resolved that an expression of the feelings of gratitude of the entire Moslem population of Cyprus be laid before the illustrious British Government … for the equitable and friendly sentiments evinced, and the political attitude assumed by that Government in appreciating the Constitution promulgated within the Ottoman dominions in the latter part of July last, and declaring that the rights of the Imperial Ottoman Government will be protected in the momentous questions of Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Crete, which occurred in the beginning of October.

One wonders whether Ateşin could generalize in the same manner as that above were he to examine the statements of Unionists on the eve of, and during the First World War. Were we to be able to decide, as does Ateşin, that Sırri’s article was representative of the intellectual impact of the Young Turk Revolution on Cyprus, we would have, at the very least, to see the same ideas consistently maintained in the following years, and this we definitely do not. Furthermore, though there were certainly other articles published in the press around this time, articles that did take a blatantly pro-British stance, it must be remembered too that they were always put in the context of the adoption of such a pro-British posture as being in the interests of the Ottomans. In essence then, even when Anglophile positions were propagated, they were justified in terms of their being the necessary expression of loyalty to the Ottoman state and nation.

What is in and of itself paradoxical, yet illustrates the above point regarding context well, is that while Ateşin does his best to denigrate the impact of the Young Turks in Cyprus, he simultaneously acknowledges the value of the ideas, and applauds the actions of Fadıl Korkut, and especially his brother Osman Cemal Efendi, when in fact both were powerfully influenced by the Young Turk movement, both actively rejoiced in the Young Turks rule and played key roles in organizing pro-Unionist and Turkist organizations.

794. Mir’at-ı Zaman 14th September 1908.
795. As Heller elucidates, however, Britain’s initially “favourable attitude”, one that was even from the outset “cautious,” in its sympathy for the new regime, was tempered by the more pressing need to maintain its alliance with Russia, a need that in the pre-War era became evermore important. Certainly the British did not want the new regime to slide toward the German camp, and as such, while “The important thing was to preserve Russian amity whilst also preventing Ottoman dependence upon Germany,” ultimately, Britain’s, “friendship with Russia was too important an asset for Brittan to risk.” Therefore, as Heller puts it, Britain, “did not feel any doubts or hesitations as to where her true interests lay.” HELLER 1983, 10, 21, and 43.
796. King-Harman to Earl of Crewe, 3rd November 1908. CO 67/152, 228.
797. Enclosure in Ibid., 231.
798. ATEŞİN 1999, 11–12.
799. For example, see Mir’at-ı Zaman 16th November and 14th December 1908.
In fact, it was no other than Osman Cemal who, together with Şevket Bey, was to speak at a rally of Turkish Cypriots held in Nicosia at the end of 1908 for the purpose of thanking the British for their support of the Ottoman Empire in the ongoing conflict in the Balkans.801

The Young Turks were also often accused of being “Westernizers”, or even atheists, but, though some may well have been appropriately labelled as such, the idea that any such generalization can be made is misconceived.802 Certainly the CUP government in 1913, in line with the advice of Ziya Gökalp began to introduce many secularising reforms, but such actions must not be misconstrued.803 Indeed Arai concludes, “Contrary to the received wisdom, Turkish nationalists did not necessarily pursue secularisation or Westernisation; they were rather in favour of Islamization and modernization. They searched for a means of regaining the original truth of Islam, and a way of modernization other than Westernisation.”804 In fact, in a manner typical of the Young Turks and of the Young Ottomans before them, the Young Turks in Cyprus frequently justified constitutionalism and the recall of the Ottoman parliament from religious premises, with an exasperated Ahmet Tevfik repudiating the charges that the Young Turks were atheists stating that “hürriyet” was God’s will for the people, and arguing that the Young Turks were actually doing their duty as good Moslems by championing such causes.805

4.2 The Politicization of Turkish Cypriot Clubs and Associations

In the liberal wave that swept across the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution numerous new clubs, associations and organizations were to be established, and a similar trend was duplicated in Cyprus too. Though, as revealed by Hanoğlu, the CUP existed as a semi-secret organization at the end of the nineteenth century, little is presently known about how it developed thereafter. Of other such associations in the late nineteenth century we also have little knowledge. In terms of the position in 1908, Özkan stated in a taped recording that the only Turkish Cypriot club in Nicosia at the time of the Revolution was the Osmanlı Kiraathanesi.806 Of the other towns on the island references are made to the existence of other Turkish Cypriot clubs, frequently called also Osmanlı Kiraathanesi, (for example, Mağusa Osmanlı Kiraathanesi, or, “The Famagusta Ottoman Club”), and the term appears to have been somewhat of a generic one for Turkish Cypriot Kiraathanes. Though I have found little to verify when they were originally established, there is verifiable reference to such establishments and their activities, (and to more formal associations with regulations, membership lists, and well-defined purposes), having proliferated in the aftermath of the Revolution.807

801. Mir’at-ı Zaman 9th November 1908.
802. See, for example, Ahmet Tevfik’s editorials in Ibid., 10th August 1908, and, Ibid., 9th October 1908.
804. Ibid., 97.
805. Mir’at-ı Zaman 9th November 1908.
806. ÖZKAN 1967; Fedai records the existence of an, “İttihad Kiraathanesi” (“Union Club”) prior to the Revolution, which Hafız Cemal is reported to have attended after returning to the island in 1904, and which apparently was also in Nicosia. FEDAÎ 1997, 2.
807. ÖZKAN 1967.
One of the first clubs to have become active in the wake of the Revolution was the “Türk Teavün Derneği”, (or, “Turkish Mutual Assistance Association”). It appears from its name to have been an essentially charitable organization, but the use of the name “Turkish” is telling, as is the fact that Ahmet Raik was amongst its leading members.

A letter from Hüseyin Vecih to the Mir’at-i Zaman written on the 29th of October 1909, announced that a year after the establishment of the association a new branch had now been established in Limassol, declared that their purpose was to “serve the national interest” and revealed that the first such service of this new branch would be to organise a performance of Namık Kemal’s play, “Gülnihal” for the benefit of the towns “Turkish” schools. The objectives of its fundraising activities were not, however, to be restricted to the island’s Turks, it being known that it participated in at least one campaign to raise funds for the Ottoman navy, Gülnihal, like another of his patriotic plays, “Akif Bey”, was penned during Kemal’s stay in Famagusta. If not as overtly Ottomanist as “Vatan-Yahut-Silistre”, it nonetheless also had a strong political message. The ruler, it was proclaimed should be the representative of the people, there by right of his respect for their wishes, rather than as result of nepotism or inheritance; a ruler whose duty it was to serve his nation and state.

We hear from the Mir’at-i Zaman also of the Yıldız Kirathanesi, or “Star Club”, in Nicosia as being a locus for displays of Young Turk sympathies, while Ersoy gives us information about a club called the “Ahrâr Kirathanesi”, (“Ahrâr” meaning “freemen” or “free ones”), being founded in Larnaca in 1909 as a result of Turkish Cypriot efforts to organize in line with the Young Turk philosophy. In particular, he discloses that this latter Kirathane made use of the medium of the theatre to try and spread the Young Turk message and organized a performance of the play entitled “Jön Türk” that was held on the 6th of March, 1909. As Ersoy indicates, that the air of intercommunal understanding that accompanied the Young Turks’ revolution still lingered, was illustrated by the substantial number of Greek Cypriots who came to see the performance. According to one account there were actually more Greeks present at one performance than there were Turks!

808. See ERSOY 1998, 10; See also KORKUT 2000, 58–60; It is notable that the secretary of this association, from whose ranks Korkut states the original Terraki Club emerged in 1908, was Mehmet Münir, later to succeed İrfan Bey as delegate of the Evkaf and member of the Legislative Council. Korkut indicates that the club was actually in existence before the Revolution, but that the latter development encouraged its members to take a more explicitly political stance. Ibid., 60.

809. Ibid.
811. Vatan 11th March 1912.
813. The Yıldız Kirathanesi was, for example, a sale point for tickets of the Namık Kemal play, “Vatan-Yahut-Silistre”, performed by the youth of Nicosia towards the end of 1908, [Mir’at-i Zaman 19th October 1908], as well as for tickets for the “Jön Türk” play to be performed in Larnaca at the beginning of the following year. Ibid., 1st March 1909.
814. ERSOY 1998, 12–13; The original announcement for this performance is given in Mir’at-i Zaman 1st March 1909 and details of the performance two weeks later in Ibid., 15th March, 1909.
815. ERSOY 1998, 11–13
816. Mir’at-i Zaman 15th March 1909.
Of such pro-Young Turk associations, however, probably the most important, as well as resilient, was to be the “Hürriyet ve Terrakı”, or “Liberty and Progress” Club established in 1909. The “Kardeş Ocağı”, (or, “Hearth of Brethren”), still up-and-running in Nicosia today, is a direct descendant of this club.

From its name there is no mistaking the political leanings and sympathies that lay behind the formation of the Liberty and Progress Club, and there is some suggestion that at one stage or another it might have functioned formally as a branch of the CUP. Though they may simply be the result of slips of memory, Özkan refers at one point to the club with the name “İttihad ve Terraki”, rather than “Hürriyet ve Terraki”, as it seems does also Berkes. Less coincidental is the fact that the club’s register of decisions of the executive committee itself records a switch of name in November 1923 from “İttihad ve Terraki” to “Birlik Ocağı”, a transformation to be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

It could well be surmised that as a result of being under British rule the club functioned as a front for the CUP without, due to its presence in British controlled territory, bearing its exact name. Perhaps it could even be speculated that the club may have had direct links to the CUP branch that had originally been established in Cyprus at the end of the nineteenth century. That there were Turkish Cypriot members of the CUP at the time of the Revolution, at least in Ottoman controlled territories, is confirmed by a news article a

817. Though a precise date of establishment for the Hürriyet ve Terraki is not discernible from the archive of the Kardeş Ocağı, 1909 is, based on the evidence, liable to be correct. Some authors, such as Ersoy, give the year 1908, but this is most likely a result of their associating the club’s establishment with the year of the Young Turk Revolution. [See ERSOY 1998, 8] I reach the conclusion that 1909 was the most likely year of establishment from several sources. Firstly, Korkut himself gives this date. [KORKUT 2000, 61]. Secondly, as Fedai and Altan point out, the Mir’at-ı-Zaman of the 20th of September 1909 informs us of the new establishment of the “Hürriyet Club by a group of traders and clerks. [Ibid., 92]. If the Hürriyet Club was founded in September of 1909, this would allow for three to four months for a reconciliation and amalgamation of this club with the Terraki Club, (which Korkut informs us was established earlier), before we would have to give 1910 or after as the year of the club’s foundation. But, another factor leads us to conclude that 1909 rather than 1910 was the year in which the Hürriyet ve Terraki came into existence, which is that 1909 is explicitly given as the date of establishment of the Hürriyet and Terraki in an old set of regulations for the Kardeş Ocağı Club apparently prepared at the beginning of the 1960’s, when some of the members of the club are still likely to have recalled accurately from their own memories the date of establishment. [See article 3 of KOR-1961(?), 1].

If this were all we knew then the matter would appear to be settled beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortu- nately it is not. From a photograph I found in the TRNC National Archives, we see the members of the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club standing in front of the club’s entrance. Under the name of the club read two dates. The first of these is 1328, which when converted from the old “Hicri” calendar covers a range of months in both 1909 and 1910. Next to this date, however, is a Gregorian calendar date whose numerals, when the picture is blown-up, are readable as 1910! Perhaps after all, then, the club was established as the Hürriyet and Terraki in 1910, while it was the “Terraki” and “Hürriyet” clubs that were established separately in 1909. The matter is certainly not “beyond reasonable doubt”.

The Kardeş Ocağı’s own secretariat had believed until I began to scan their documentation, that their founding could only be traced with certainty back to 1923, and that there were no grounds for asserting the club as being a continuation of the Hürriyet ve Terraki. Following my explanations, however, they have now accepted 1909 as their date of establishment. Credit should, however, be given to Fedai and Altan, who though they had not gone through the club’s records, had, based on Korkut’s account, already made the assertion of continuity between the Hürriyet ve Terraki and the Kardeş Ocağı. [See KORKUT 2000, 91n].

818. “Hearth of Brethren” is actually the translation used by Landau [LANDAU 1995, 75], while club records themselves translate it as “Fraternity Home” [See article 3 of KOR-1961(?), 1.] Landau’s translation is, I believe, a more accurate representation of the original Turkish term, which is why I therefore use it here.

819. ÖZKAN 1967; BERKES 1997, 34.
few weeks after the Revolution, which notes that after being prevented by the despotic regime from visiting his native land of Cyprus, police officer and member of the CUP, Nuri Ağazade, had finally stepped foot on the island. No matter what the precise nature of the link between the CUP and the Liberty and Progress Club, it is clear that the latter both sympathized with and propagated the CUP line.

Korkut, who was to become chairman of the club, stated in his memoirs that the club was originally brought about by an amalgamation of two others that had functioned for a short period separately, and as rivals: the “Hürriyet”, or “Liberty” Club and the “Terraki”, or “Progress” Club. A photograph showing its members sitting under its banner further verifies the existence of the Hürriyet Club, and articles in the press attest to the existence of both as patriotic and pro-Young Turk associations in 1909. Korkut claims that the two clubs were separated by a rivalry between the younger, more radical generation, and an older more conservative established elite, with the Terraki Club eventually being dominated by the latter, the Hürriyet Club by the former. He further claims that it was through his own initiative that the Kadı of the day, Numan Efendi, was convinced to bring the two groups together and unite them under a single banner, hence the “Hürriyet ve Terraki” Club, of which Ahmet Raik became the first secretary. Özkan’s memoirs, however, contrast with this version of events, making no mention of such a fissure, and claiming that it was physically impossible for all members to gather in a single club until Beliğ Paşa, a distinguished and decorated Turkish Cypriot notable, had built larger premises for this purpose. Korkut’s version of events, though, is probably more reliable, (at least in terms of his reference to rivalry between two separate groupings being overcome).

820. Mir’at-ı Zaman 31st August 1908.
821. KORKUT 2000, 64. See also SAMANLI s.a., 23, who supports the idea that the club was a front for the CUP, and Ulus Irkad’s contention that the Hürriyet ve Terraki was indeed one and the same as a CUP club. Ortam 12th April 1993.
822. Unnumbered photograph from the depots of the Evkaf Office Headquarters in Nicosia; See, for example, Mir’at-ı Zaman 26th July 1909, for evidence as to the activity of the Terraki Club in connection with the celebration of the first anniversary of the Young Turk Revolution. Here it is mentioned that the club was actually established the previous year. According to the Hicri calendar, probably that based on which this statement is being made, the new year, 1327, had begun on the 23rd of January 1909. If the information given is correct, this means that the club was probably established before this date. To date I have seen no sources which have dated the club’s establishment to 1908. On this basis, it might be speculated, therefore, that the club was actually founded on one of the first twenty-two days of January 1909. Two months later it is recorded that the Hürriyet Club had been established by “businessmen, civil servants and artisans.” Again no precise date is given for the establishment of the club, though from the gist of the report it can be assumed that it was a recent development. [Ibid., 20th August 1909].
824. Beliğ Paşa appears to have led an extraordinary life. According to an obituary published in the Doğru Yol newspaper in August 1924, he had moved with his parents to Egypt at the age of eleven. Here he caught the eye of Napoleon III’s wife who was on a visit to mark the opening of the Suez Canal, and was taken back to be educated in France where he apparently resided in the imperial palace till the Franco-Prussian war and the Fall of Napoleon III. Thereafter he held many high posts in the Egyptian civil service till he retired to Cyprus in 1904. [Doğru Yol 15th August 1924]. At the outset Beliğ Paşa appears to have been suspicious about the intentions behind the Revolution, although as indicated, he was soon to become supportive of the Hürriyet ve Terraki, though he did not prevail as much in its affairs as he apparently had done in the Osmanli Krraathanesi. [Volkara 15th December 1908]; As far as the building of larger premises is concerned, this is perhaps also partly corroborated by Korkut’s own testimony, where he states that around 1910, the club, acting on the suggestion of Beliğ Paşa, moved into larger, specially modified premises of which Beliğ Paşa was himself the landlord. KORKUT 2000, 63.
both as he, and especially his elder brothers Cemal and Raik were leading members of these clubs, and because, in terms of age, he, rather than Necati, could have witnessed developments first hand.825

What is notable is that there is no evidence of these or other pro-Unionist associations having any Greek Cypriot members, confirming that rather than leading in the long-term to a common political platform between the island’s Greeks and Turks, the Young Turk Revolution served on the island primarily to instigate a flurry of political activity on the Turkish Cypriot front. We must keep in mind then, that though the atmosphere in relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was improved in the immediate aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution, (just as it was to be to some extent two decades later as a result of the Graeco-Turkish rapprochement engineered by Venizelos and Atatürk), this did not lead to a consensus as to the fundamental political issues concerning the future of the island. In fact, my research has not turned up any evidence of Greek Cypriots playing any role in Young Turk or Unionist organizations established on the island. There is no record, for instance, of any Greek Cypriot members of the various Osmanlı Kraathanes, or of the Terraki, Hürriyet or Hürriyet ve Terraki clubs, or of their successors. In fact, the first set of regulations that are available for the latter club, (those amended in January of 1931), for what was then called the “Kardaş Ocakı”, effectively made being Moslem and Turkish preconditions of membership.826

It would not be logical, considering the record of activities of such societies as the Hürriyet ve Terraki, to expect the Greek Cypriots to frequent it.827 In the years leading up to World War I the club held several theatre performances, (in a purpose built theatre that Beliş Paşa had constructed adjacent to the club), with patriotic themes, including one written by Korkut himself, entitled “Red Blood in the Balkans” and Namık Kemal’s “Gülnihal”. The club also staged at least two renditions of Ahmet Vefik Paşa’s adaptations of Molière’s plays, “Le Mariage Forcé”, (or “Zor Nikâhı”), and “Le Médicin Malgrê Lui”, (or, “Zoraki Tabip”). Again the choice of playwright looks to be significant, Vefik Paşa being an early Young Ottoman who while in Paris had been in close contact with none other than Ernest Renan, and is credited by Lewis as being one of the first Ottoman intellectuals to sow the initial seeds of Turkish national consciousness.828 It was the plays of

825. Necati was born in 1899 and thus was barely ten years old at the time, while Korkut was born in 1887.
826. Article 4, of KOR-1931, 1.
827. Certainly there were clubs, restaurants and coffee shops where the Greeks and Turks would socialize. Of the late Ottoman period, Katsiaounis remarks that Greek and Turkish elites would still mix, “in salons and exclusive clubs, such as the luxurious Yeşil Cazino in Nicosia.” [KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 15], Korkut, on the other hand, records that the Young Ottoman poet Esref who had been banished to Cyprus, was a regular patron of a Greek tavern by the name of “The Two Brothers”, [KORKUT 2000, 56]. Remzi Bey’s daughter Vedia recalls how as a child her father would take the family to the “Pantheon” taverna, [ÖKSÜZOĞLU 1990, 7], and Neriman Cahit’s interviews provide evidence of similar socializing well into the twentieth century. [CAHİT 2001, passim]. Atalides, also records that, “in numerous mixed villages, even in 1974, Greeks and Turks sat in the same coffee shop.” [ATALIDES 1979, 81]. Yet one anonymous folktale of a sexually explicit verbal joust related to such interaction also hints at certain underlying tensions as represented in the jesting words of a Greek Cypriot patron, (Yannakis), a Turkish patron, (Sefer Dayı), and the owner, (apparently an unnamed Greek). Entitled, “The Poofs’ Coffeeshop” it reads: “Az Yannakis sat at the coffee shop: Here he’s appeared yonder with his large wide fez. His arse has become so slack too, it will not hold tight. / Uncle Sefer as he entered the coffee shop: How did you know my arse was loose? Or was it because you stuck in your tongue in search of something to eat?... / The coffee shop keeper as he served him coffee: shut up you bitch or else I’ll pounce on you, I’ll take out the bitter onion and rub it in your arse.” [YASIN 1999, 236]. Perhaps a psychoanalyst would be better placed to analyse any social hostility underlying the dialogue, yet to me at least, even if concealed, it does seem to be hinted at.
Molière more than of any other playwright that were translated and adapted and performed for the Turkish audience in the post-Tanzimat era, a development for which Ahmet Vefik deserves greatest credit. Of the many plays by Molière that he adapted, one leading observer, Petra de Bruijn, has commented that it was the two that have been recorded to have been staged by the Hürriyet ve Terraki, that were to be his most successful. Bruijn explains that while Vefik generally tried to conscientiously translate the words of the original, he gave these plays, “a Turkish setting with Turkish characters and making reference to Turkish society.” Significantly, Bruijn reveals that at times Vefik, “would change the words to serve as a vehicle for his political views. In Zor Nikâh for instance, he altered the text just slightly, but enough to ventilate his opinion on the use of too many Arabic and Persian loanwords.” He was, as Bruijn contends, to be a passionate defender of the use of the Turkish vernacular.

Such performances were often to collect money for the “Donanma-yi Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye”, essentially a patriotic association raising money for the strengthening of the Ottoman navy, a cause unlikely to have appealed to any Greek Cypriots. Korkut reveals that the club also raised money for this cause through other means, and that it was awarded a medal and “berat” by Sultan Reşad, successor to Abdüllamid, for its efforts in this field.

In the years following the Revolution, we have information regarding the establishment of many other associations including, in 1913, the establishment of a branch of the “Türk Ocağı”, (or, “Turkish Hearth”), described by Landau as being for its times, “The most durable and important of all organizations with pan-Turk proclivities.” Zürcher describes the early years of the Türk Ocağı in the following way:

The Türk Ocağı (Turkish Hearth) had been founded in 1911 by students of the Military Medical Academy to promote Turkish (and Panturkist) nationalism. This it tried to do through education (weekly lectures on all kinds of subjects) and mobilization of public opinion (for instance, campaigns to “Buy Turkish”). At first, its radical Turkish nationalist ideas made it unpopular with a government which still tried to save the Empire by Ottomaniast policies, but after the Balkan war of 1913 its ideas gained popularity and influence among the C.U.P leadership. A personal link on the highest level was formed by the Turkish nationalist ideologue Mehmet Ziya (Gökalp) (1876–1924), who was a member of the C.U.P. Central Committee after 1912 and at the same time one of the leaders of the Ocak.

Though we know little detail about its specific activities on the island, it was illustrative of the interaction between developments in the wider Ottoman and Turkish world, and Cyprus. Korkut attributes the founding of the Cyprus branch of this association to the efforts of three young Turkish Cypriots studying at the medical faculty in Istanbul: Dr. Pertev, Dr. Şevki and Dr. Küfi. These three men had joined the Türk Ocağı in Istanbul

828. KORKUT 2000, 63; MARDIN 1962, 209; Bernard Lewis writes that he is in particular, “credited with being the first to stress that the Turks and their language were not merely Ottoman, but were the western-most branch of a great and ancient family stretching across Asia to the Pacific.” LEWIS 1968, 347.
829. See BRUIJN s.a., 2 and, more generally, passim.
830. Ibid., 3.
831. KORKUT 2000, 63.
832. Ibid.; That the medal was indeed awarded to the club just a few months before the outbreak of the First World War is confirmed by the Kıbrıs newspaper. Kıbrıs 30th March 1914.
833. LANDAU 1995, 41.
834. ZÜRCHER 1984, 77.
where, he says, they internalised, “The Turkish Youth Ideal”. During their summer vacation of 1913 they initiated the establishment of a branch of the Türk Ocağı on the island, of which Osman Cemal, Fahil Niyazi Korkut’s brother, was to become the first secretary. Korkut notes that after a while he took over this position from his brother, which he held until the outbreak of World War I, but unfortunately he doesn’t inform us as to the fate of the society when war broke out.

It was no coincidence then that the initiative for the establishment of the Türk Ocağı in Cyprus was taken by these three young medical students, as, as with the Young Turk movement itself, it was students of this profession who had originally pioneered the establishment of the Türk Ocağı organization in Turkey in mid-1911. According to Arai, the medical students had sought, and received the support of nationalist intellectuals for their project, gaining the support of such heavyweights as Ahmet Ferit, Mehmet Emin, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura, the latter of whom Arai claims particularly, “wanted to make Türk Ocağı a window on Central Asia, a centre of the interchange between Turks inside and outside the Ottoman state.” Arai also claims that there are indications that the students were from the outset also under the influence of Ziya Gökalp, and elucidates the close association of the club with the CUP, claiming that the second meeting of the students and intellectuals, held in Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s home, was presided over by CUP representative and member of parliament, Ahmet Nesimi. This meeting confirmed the fundamental objectives of the organization to be as follows:

Turkish youths would be gathered into the club, and their national feelings would be awakened; then, the common people would be awakened. In order to inspire the rising generation with this feeling, every possible measure would be taken: arranging conferences, publishing books and brochures, offering material and moral aid to schools where Turks studied, and establishing some new schools if possible.

Under Ferit’s influence, it was stressed and unanimously agreed that, “Education was not the end but the means; the aim was to awaken a national feeling (milliyet duygusu).” According to Landau, “Türk Ocağı strove to educate the people in a nationalist spirit and teach them to esteem their cultural heritage.” Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic however, with Pan-Turkism no longer in vogue, “the refounded Türk Ocağı effaced the Pan-Turkic character,” and was actually closed down in March 1931 to be replaced by the Halk Evleri, or “People’s Homes”.

It is interesting to note that a club by the name of “Limasol Türk Ocağı” is still active in Cyprus today, and though it serves as a talking shop for political affairs, its members focus more on playing cards and, when other commitments permit, cheering the club’s football team. Whether the club was originally organically related to the “Türk Ocakları”

835. Dr. Pertev was later to play an important role in the Birlik Ocağı and Kardeş Ocağı that succeeded the Hürriyet ve Terraki, of which he was also probably a member, and was to have a significant role in the nationalist movement amongst the Turkish Cypriots in the 1920’s and after.
836. KORKUT 2000, 63.
837. ARAI 1992, 71.
838. Ibid., 82.
839. Ibid., 72–73.
840. Ibid., 73.
841. Ibid.
842. LANDAU 1995, 41.
843. Ibid., 77; ARAI 1992, 82.
in Turkey, like the club established earlier in Nicosia, is unclear, but the choice of name was itself no doubt a sign of where its founding members’ sympathies lay. Though the roots of the club are uncertain, it is known that in 1929 it received a telegram of thanks sent in the name of Mustafa Kemal for the club members’ congratulatory message on the occasion of the Turkish Republic Day.\(^{844}\) Though information is rather scant as to political activities in which “sports” clubs may have been involved in the first half of the twentieth century, it is well known that they served as centres for nationalist organizations in its second half. “Çetinkaya”, for example was to serve as the first district headquarters for the TMT, (“Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı” or, “Turkish Resistance Organization”).\(^{845}\)

Another important means by which the island continued to interact with Ottoman heartlands was through the press, and, as literacy increased it is probable that this channel of diffusion for ideas and intellectual currents became more and more effective. Many of the most prestigious journals of Istanbul were distributed in Cyprus, and beside ones referred to, or from which articles were copied and pasted in the local press, (aside also from any individual subscriptions that may have been taken out by Turkish Cypriots), we have direct reference to the more institutionalised intake of newspapers from advertisements placed by a Turkish Cypriot distributor in the local press. Thus, we can be assured that amongst the journals with a readership in Cyprus by 1909 were Tanin, Serveti Fünun, Tercüman-Hakikat, Sabah, Şehbal and Muhit, all published in Istanbul, and İtilhad, printed in İzmir, all of which were distributed on the island by a certain Kadızaı Hüseyin Efendi.\(^{846}\) There is little reason to doubt either that copies of the journal, “Türk Yurdu”, which acted as the organ of the Türk Ocağı and to which Emin, Ağaoğlu, Gökalp, Ferit, Gaspiralı and Akçura all contributed, were also circulating in Cyprus, at a bare minimum being read by the members of the Türk Ocağı itself.\(^{847}\) This journal was particularly noteworthy both for its leading role in propagating Pan-Turkism and for the fact that many articles published therein openly rejected the concept of Ottomanism as an alternative to Turkish nationalism.\(^{848}\) Not only was the role of the Russian emigrants greater within Türk Yurdu than in many previous publications, but significant funding for the journal actually came from a wealthy Tatar from Orenburg, Russia, named Mahmut Hüseynov.\(^{849}\)

Undoubtedly, ideas expressed in these journals had an impact on the political views of the Turkish Cypriots, and the fact that they included amongst their numbers such journals as Sabah and especially Tanin, both noted at the time for their support of the Pan-Turk line, and that this latter journal was a journal of choice when the Turkish Cypriots wished to make known their own views to a wider Turkish audience, is revealing.\(^{850}\) It was to Tanin, for instance, that Şevket Bey wrote a powerful letter, later published therein, in an effort to publicize the plight and views of the Turkish Cypriots. Here it was that he declared that though they had tried to live in harmony with the Greek Cypriots during the British administration, they completely rejected the idea of enosis, and would make any sacrifice necessary were they to feel that it was imminent, “unhesitant in preferring to die

\(^{844}\) Söz 15th November 1929.
\(^{845}\) Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Dergisi December 2003.
\(^{846}\) Mir‘at-ı Zaman 31st May 1909.
\(^{847}\) See ARAI 1992, 55.
\(^{848}\) Ibid., 48–65.
\(^{849}\) Ibid., 49.
\(^{850}\) For reference to the pan-Turkist credentials of Sabah and Tanin, see LANDAU 1995, 36 and 49.
free, rather than live enslaved.” These, he declared, were the sentiments of Ottomanism of the 55,000 Moslem people living in Cyprus, and in the same manner that they had in the past made these feelings known to the governments of the Ottoman state, they now wished to reveal them also to the world through the free Ottoman press.851

4.3 The Consolidation of Political Resolve

If Crete had been till then a primary international source of discord between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it was in the lead-up to the First World War supplemented and ultimately overtaken by the Balkan quagmire which emerged as the principal issue on the international agenda that enflamed tempers on the island. No sooner had the Young Turks come to power, than fresh disputes arose on the Balkan front. Bulgarian and Austrian challenges to Ottoman sovereignty caused disarray. The former proclaimed independence, the latter annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, both on the 5th of October 1908, and; the following day, these developments were compounded when Greece announced its outright annexation of Crete.852 There is little of substance to suggest that these early tensions led to any immediate outbreak of intercommunal hostilities in Cyprus, though they were undoubtedly interpreted by the Turkish Cypriots as evidence that the initially envisaged brotherhood of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire that had been propagated in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution was not much of a realistic prospect.853 The similarities with Cyprus in the political circumstances of these territories, over each of which the Ottomans had still held nominal sovereignty, is unlikely to have gone unnoticed either.

One way in which the perturbed Turkish Cypriots increasingly expressed their loyalty to the Ottoman state was to conduct campaigns to raise funds for the Ottoman military. The first of these campaigns were for the soldiers in the Balkan province of Rumeli guarding the front-line with Austria and Bulgaria, with Şevket Bey proclaiming publicly that it was a holy and national duty for the Turkish Cypriots to contribute economically to the Ottoman defence.854 Organized fund-raising efforts, at first at least, were directed by a commission established under the auspices of the Osmanlı Kiraathanesi of Larnaca, consisting of Hacı Kenan Efendi, Kamil Efendi, Müftüzade Ahmet Hulusi and his son Rauf, a gentleman by the name of Hüseyin, and the district’s representative in the Legislative Council, Hami Bey, who also acted as the spokesperson for the group.855 In a letter from Larnaca, it was noted that the villages of the district were also doing their duty in contributing to the cause, a fact confirmed over following weeks when lists of contributions from the villages were published.856 In one revealing letter announcing the most recent contributions, Hami Bey states, “the [Turkish] Cypriots know that Ottomanism is

853. Mir’at-ı Zaman 28th September 1908; Though the paper did soon after report that many Ottoman Christians, including Armenians and Greeks, were volunteering to join the Ottoman army in the face of Bulgarian and Austrian hostility, [Ibid., 26th October 1908], it later noted that their enlistment had been put on hold. Ibid., 15th February 1909.
854. Ibid., 9th November 1908.
855. Ibid., 7th December 1908.
856. Ibid.
the sole means of providing for our salvation and future," and rounds off his letter with, “Long live the fatherland! Long live the army!” 857 Similar public appeals were to continue until the outbreak of the First World War, encouraged by the press, and gratefully acknowledged by Ottoman authorities. 858

Though there are no signs of any Greek Cypriot involvement in these campaigns, the local Turkish press did publish a report communicating that ethnic minorities in the Ottoman Empire, including the Greeks, had volunteered to join the Ottoman armies and help defend the Ottoman fatherland, from which we can infer that there was still attention being paid to the idea of an Ottoman nation incorporating not only Moslem Turks, but also other non-Moslem and non-Turkish communities. However, by the end of 1908, beginning of 1909, it was obvious that after a brief interlude, relations between the two communities were once again entering a familiar, strained pattern.

While the Greek Cypriots, witnessing the Cretan developments, began to clamour once again for enosis, the Turkish Cypriots called for the restoration of the island to Turkey, and rumour was rife about the implications of international diplomacy that one day envisaged the island being joined to Greece, the next to the Ottomans and the third day being annexed by Britain. 859 That the demands for enosis should have escalated was understandable in light not only of developments overseas, but also in the domestic arena too. The long-standing and bitter dispute as to who would occupy the seat of Archbishop of Cyprus which had been vacant since the death of Archbishop Sophronios in 1900, was finally settled in 1910, and though both camps in the dispute had used nationalist rhetoric to try and garner support, it was the party recognised as being “ultra nationalist”, that of Kyrillos of Kitium, that was eventually to successfully see its candidate enthroned. 860

Under such conditions, the Turkish Cypriot position might be evaluated as being simply one of reaction to the escalation of the threat of enosis, and without a doubt enosis agitation was a spur for Turkish nationalism. Yet this was not the sole factor involved in the genesis of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. The relationship was not as has been suggested a fully dialectic one, even if it was certainly of great import. 861 Other factors too, however, factors which can not be considered as directly emanating from the rise of Greek nationalism in Cyprus, made significant contributions in raising national consciousness. Not least of these was the transformation of Turkish education and growing Turkish Cypriot literacy.

As detailed earlier, a more secular educational system had slowly begun to be introduced for the Turkish population of the island in the latter half of the nineteenth century as part of the series of Tanzimat reforms. The impact of this transformation initiated in the late Ottoman era was not immediate, nor initially widespread, yet as Rustow suggests, “of all the nineteenth century innovations, the new educational system most consistently proved its worth in the long run.” 862 Education was no longer of a purely religious character and Turkish Cypriots too were now taking courses in such subjects as history and geo-

857. Ibid., 14th December 1908.
858. See, for instance, Ibid., 29th March 1909; in one case the Kadi received a letter of gratitude from the Ottoman Minister of War for the generous contributions of the Turks of Cyprus. Ibid., 12th April 1909.
859. See, for example, Mir’at-i Zaman 21st September 1908, and Mir’at-i Zaman 9th November 1908.
graphy, which might be expected to have heightened awareness of Turkish roots and character, and of bonds with Anatolia.\textsuperscript{863} The first “Rushdie” school providing post-elementary education was opened in Nicosia in 1862. Its curriculum was based largely along the standard lines of modern secondary education. By the 1920’s the number of such schools had multiplied, they could now be found not only in the capital Nicosia, but throughout the island, including even in some of the larger villages and the Turks of Cyprus now had also a more advanced High School, the “İđadi”, (or Lycée as it by the 1920’s became), that prepared increasing numbers of students from all over the island for university education.\textsuperscript{864}

Though nominally under communal control, Attalides correctly points out with some justification that unlike the more autonomous Greek Cypriot school system, “the Turkish Cypriot educational system remained effectively under British control.”\textsuperscript{865} Their power over the Evkaf, which was instrumental in funding and organizing most of the schools, gave them an important indirect means of overseeing educational affairs. Moreover, the British more than once blocked the demands of elected Turkish legislators for greater control over their community’s education. When discussing the education bill in 1905 the Chief Secretary had noted that only one Moslem member would be permitted to sit on the Moslem Board of Education. Derviş Paşa, with the support of Şevket Bey, moved the amendment be made, “That all three Moslem Members of the Legislative Council may be at liberty to sit on the Education Board.”\textsuperscript{866} The amendment was rejected by the Government with all 6 official members voting against. It is more interesting to mark, however, that though the third Turkish member, Ratib Bey, was absent the votes in favour of the amendment also numbered six as four of the Greek members voted in favour.\textsuperscript{867} At first sight this appears a sign of solidarity with the Turkish demands for greater communal autonomy over education. But it is worth considering that while at the beginning of the day’s debate only two of the nine Greek members had been absent, as opposed to one Turk, the remaining Greeks, including those who had participated in the debate itself, did not vote at all. Mathematically, with the votes drawn at six apiece, the casting vote of the High Commissioner against the amendment meant that it was defeated. While appearing to give token support to the Turks, in practice the failure of the Greek Members to vote in sufficient numbers in favour of the Turks’ amendment meant that it was defeated by default. It may well be that that year’s unusual backing by the official members of the Greek sponsored address in reply to the opening statement of the High Commissioner had left the Greek members indebted to the Government.\textsuperscript{868} Two years later, Mehmet Ziyai Efendi again raised the issue of greater autonomy for the Turks in educational affairs when the matter of the appointment of a new Greek Inspector of schools was being discussed. He protested that:

> The appointment of a Greek Inspector could only be considered either as the concession of a favour to the Greek community or as the recognition of a right. If it was a right which had been conceded to the Greek community, a similar right should be conceded to the Moslems.

\textsuperscript{863} GAZİOĞLU 1990, 197–199.
\textsuperscript{864} FERİDÜN 2001, 9–10.
\textsuperscript{865} ATTALIDES 1977a, 78.
\textsuperscript{866} Minutes of the Legislative Council, 9th March 1905. CO 69/19, 49.
\textsuperscript{867} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{868} Ibid., 36–37 and 49.
If it was a favour, why should not a similar favour be bestowed on the Moslem community? The Government had acted against the principles of equality in depriving the Moslems of the Management of their secondary schools and it was only after persistent efforts that the İdadi had been snatched away from the clutches of the Government.\(^{869}\)

All the same, it is worthy of note that it had originally been with the support of the Greek members that a resolution moved by Derviş Paşa had in 1900 removed the İdadi from the Government’s “clutches”, the resolution having complained about government “interference” in its administration, about the fact that the Committee running the school, “consisted mostly of Englishmen,” and called for a Committee under the Kadi’s presidency to be, “composed of Turks only”, “in like manner as done in the case of the Greek Gymnasium.”\(^{870}\) The Bishop of Kitium had on this occasion put on record that he, “sympathised with the Ottoman members in resenting the action of the Government and in endeavouring to re-acquire their lost rights”; Mr Economides had opined, “that the demand of the Moslem members that they themselves should have the control of their educational institutions was a just one,” and; Mr. Theodotou had expressed that the Government’s threat to withdraw the monetary grant given to the İdadi, “was unbecoming.”\(^{871}\)

Despite the obviously greater British powers over the Turkish education system, they were not, until the later stages of their rule, much involved in its day-to-day administration. Theodotou’s claim in the same debate mentioned above that Government interference had generally been, for both the Greeks and Turks, “merely nominal and ministerial” was to some extent correct.\(^{872}\) Persiani, one of the few academicians to evaluate in depth British policy as regards education in Cyprus, accepts the fact that, it was not uniform and it was not always explicit.” Nevertheless, he asserts that, “Whitehead’s conclusion that ‘the major characteristics of British colonial educational policy owed more to the volition of the governed than to the persuasive powers of colonial officials’ is uniquely confirmed in the case of Cyprus.”\(^{873}\) Here he argues, the British, “did not have the financial means nor the human resources to play a significant role in education.”\(^{874}\) He further elaborates that:

Another element of the “adapted education” policy was the preference for community and racially segregated schools. This was in line with the policy followed in other colonies, it conformed to the British belief in the right of the people to select the school of their choice and it was practically and politically expedient. The stated justification was the belief in the efficient control of schools “by local bodies directly interested in and responsible for their efficiency.” Furthermore, the colonial government did not have the financial resources necessary to pay for the establishment and the running of government multiracial schools. The language problem also would be insurmountable with a policy of multiracial schools.

The most important reason, however, was that this policy was politically expedient. Both communities had their own schools before the British rule, were culturally very proud and

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869. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 8th March 1907. CO 69/21, 217. As reported to London, they had, “manifested a desire to have an Inspector of their own race and faith,” the previous year also. King-Harman to Earl of Elgin, 30th March 1906. CO 67/145, 242.
871. Ibid., 210–214.
872. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 8th March 1907. CO 69/21, 221–222.
873. PERSIANIS 1996.
874. Ibid.
sensitive and would not agree to sending their children to multiracial schools, because they feared that this would be a threat to their national identity. Consequently, this policy of political and economic expediency had the advantage of being presented as a liberal, laissez-faire policy and a response to popular demand.875

Persianis contends that the colonial education policy in Cyprus was only reversed after the October Revolt of 1931. Yet then, too, the evidence was, in fact, that their tighter, more direct control was based on the belief that, “it was about time to use education as a means of cultural integration.” In his words: “They wanted to persuade the Cypriots to abandon their political orientation towards Greece and Turkey, ‘two foreign countries’, and acquire ‘a higher conception of their responsibilities as Cypriots and of the position of Cyprus as part of the British Empire.” Enhanced British intrusion into the educational sphere was not designed then to deviously divide the two communities, but rather to foster, “the Cypriotisation of the two communities.”876 It was a, “policy of integration and assimilation of the communities of Cyprus,” that was introduced in the educational sphere after the riots of 1931.877 As will be seen though, by then competing Greek and Turkish nationalisms had become too far entrenched, and this change of policy, though unintentionally, only aggravated them further.

As a consequence of the initial British “laissez-faire” attitude to education, even in the Turkish Cypriot case, education did manage to act as a conduit, particularly through nationalist schoolmasters from Turkey, for the rise of Turkish national consciousness during the twentieth century. British control, then, was on the whole, not very obtrusive, and the obstacle was therefore not insurmountable for growing numbers of teachers in the Turkish schools who shared an enthusiasm for Turkish nationalist discourse. In fact, when the British did try to play a more intrusive and direct role in the education system, in the late 1920’s and following the 1931 October Revolt, they succeeded largely only in provoking further nationalist feeling.

The Turkish Cypriot intelligentsia earnestly believed that one of the principal ways to combat the threat of enosis and the relative decline of their community vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriot was by making advances in the field of education. Osman Cemal, for example, exhorted the Turkish Cypriot leadership to help imbue the people with “love of religion”, “love of the nation” and “national sentiments” in response to the downheartedness of the community in the face of Greek Cypriot charlatans travelling through the villages and raising the standard of enosis.878 “In front of our very eyes the Christians vaunt the cry, the clamour of their false Hellenism, while we still fail to understand that we are the Ottoman sons of our Ottoman forefathers, that we are the children of the true owners of the island,” Cemal chides.879 Cemal identifies education as the key to fortifying and strengthening the claims of the Turkish Cypriot community, and while chastising the community leadership for not doing enough in this field, he nevertheless indirectly acknowledges that things have begun to change:

875. Ibid.
876. Ibid.
877. PERSIANIS 1967, 246.
878. CEMAL 1997, 44.
879. Ibid., 17.
Were I to say that, “until a few years ago even the term Ottomanism was nowhere to be heard,” I would not be exaggerating. To the extent only that a summary of a summary of [the history of] our past sultans’ was taught in our schools and, as the teachers [themselves] had not been infused with national feeling, students would graduate from school barely knowing to which nation they belonged. While students need to be nurtured with national sentiments from primary school onwards, this important duty was neglected by our leaders.880

In fact a process of transition, even in the more rural environs, was doubtlessly now underway. By the First World War, as Bryant puts it, “The purely religious Quranic schools had … been replaced by a secular curriculum, often taught in classrooms detached from the village mosque.”881 That the nature of Turkish Cypriot education was gradually shifting from a purely religious basis to one that would allow for national socialization was confirmed soon after by an official “Report on Education in Cyprus” which stated:

It is only a few years ago that boys in Moslem schools were wholly occupied in learning the Koran by heart and in studying the rules of conduct set forth in the “Ilmi-hal,” or religious code. Religious instruction still takes up a large proportion of the school hours, but secular teaching, somewhat restricted it is true, has now obtained a permanent place in the time-table. It covers in the lower classes the rudiments of reading, writing, and arithmetic, and a little geography and some formal grammar are begun in the highest class but one. In the highest or fifth class the course of instruction includes, in addition to the subjects already mentioned, Ottoman history and hygiene, and in this class also the pupils are expected to make some attempt at written composition.882

This report is also interesting for our purposes in that though it clearly indicates the higher standards of education and the greater demands for educational autonomy of the Greek Cypriot community, it also registers that the Turks too, “would prefer to retain the ultimate decision with regard to the subjects of instruction in their own hands,” and registers that for them too the ultimate destination for higher education was the motherland, with the curriculum of the most advanced İdadi School, which by now had surpassed the Rüşdiyes in terms of seniority, being, “designed mainly as a preparation for the Constantinople University.”883

880. Ibid.
881. BRYANT 1998a, 289.
883. The report highlights the general inferiority of the Turkish teachers to their Greek counterparts, and attributes part of this to the dual function of educator and imam that Turkish teachers frequently performed: “[A] Moslem teacher often combines the work of teaching with the office of Imam, or priest, in the village mosque. This frequently leads to neglect, or at least to interruption, of his school duties, and it would be advisable to make it a condition of future appointments that the functions of Imam and of elementary school teacher should not be combined.” [Ibid., 11, 15–19, 25 and 30–31]; The degree to which interaction with Greece was fundamental to the Greek Cypriot educational system is also noted, particularly striking being the fact that all the regular professors teaching at the gymnasium held diplomas from the University of Athens. [Ibid., 25]. Dakin writes that, “Before the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, large numbers of Greeks from the unredeemed lands-Constantinople, Asia Minor, Macedonia, Thrace, Crete, Epirus, Cyprus, and other islands-found their way to the University of Athens, whence they returned to their territories as apostles of the megali Ídeia.” [DAKIN 1972, 255]. Meanwhile, even in the İdadi, which had the most modern of curricula amongst the Turkish schools, further advances were being made during this era. In a speech made by the headmaster of the İdadi at an award ceremony held in early 1909, he announced for example the addition of new subjects to their curriculum including those of Chemistry, History and Ottoman Literature. [Mir’at-ı Zaman 1st February 1909]. By 1918 the İdadi, having made significant progress, was now being recognised by the British as, “an admirable institution.” ORR 1972, 133.
It is important to emphasize, though, that it was not just the British who were recognising the inferior quality of Turkish Cypriot education to that of the Greeks, but the Turkish Cypriots themselves were frankly acknowledging and lamenting this state of affairs. Improving education during this era rapidly became a central issue upon which the ideas of Turkish Cypriot intellectuals focused, believing that it was essential for both their community’s material and national advance. It is significant that educational advance, then, was seen not only as a goal in and of itself, but was also regarded as the means by which the Turks of Cyprus could reassert themselves both in regard to the Greeks on the island, and as part of the wider Moslem/Ottoman/Turkish nation, to the rest of the world.

At the opening of a village school in Şilik, Limassol the schoolteacher Haci Sadık Efendi gave an impressive speech explaining that as a result of the unity they displayed the Greek Cypriots had overtaken them in the fields both of education and commerce; that the Turks had fallen behind them as a result of their irrational beliefs, such as those stating that those who learnt foreign languages were atheists, and that particular crafts were the natural preserve of Christians, others of Jews and therefore were unsuitable for their own people. Explaining the great advances made by other nations, Sadık expresses his regrets that, “We Cypriots, or more precisely let us say Turks, cannot even make our voices heard in such a small land.” Continuing, he declares, “We need to raise lion-hearted children who can serve the nation with all their hearts, who will defend all the interests of the nation with the foreigners ... we must show the whole world that in these here mountains of Şilik live lion-like Ottomans, angel-like Moslems,” and calls upon the people to awake from their slumber now that they have recognised how they lag behind the Greeks. Explaining how their great forefathers had shed their blood for the lands in which they now lived, he professed that by remaining united they would achieve their aim, to, “raise determined, filial children who will serve the nation and fatherland with all their hearts, that is lions like the Kamils, Midhats, Şinasis, Suavis, Ziyas and more recent Niyazis and Envers.” Repeating his assertion that they were the descendants of great Ottoman forefathers, Sadık pronounced that though their appearance may have changed, the blood in their veins was still the same blood; and declaring that the tears of sorrow that they presently shed would soon be replaced by tears of joy, he concluded with the Young Turk slogans of “Union”, “Justice” and “Equality”.

A similar, if somewhat more analytical letter published a month later by a teacher from Akaça-Peristona called Hasan Tahsin, recognised that some advances were being made in the town schools, but still lamented the state of education, particularly in the villages. Tahsin too stressed that the Turks were suffering as a community as a result of their backwardness in the field of education vis-à-vis the Greeks, and argued that the greatest evil in this respect was the undue proportion of time teachers spent on getting students to memorize “like parrots.” Not only did he make a strong case for the need for teachers to get students to truly comprehend what they were learning, but significantly, he also asserted, that amongst one of the principal duties of teachers should be to teach the children about their history and fatherland, “so as to awaken their national feelings.”

Especially remarkable in terms of efforts to reform and raise the standards of education for the Turkish Cypriots were the initiatives of Dr. Hafız Cemal, who in mid-1909 publis-
heded a programme entitled, “A Programme for the Future of the Ottomans of Cyprus.”

Carried in the press, this plan of action outlined, amongst other things, his views as to the appropriate course to be followed for improving Turkish Cypriot education in accordance with the needs of the fatherland and nation. Opening by declaring that, “Priority must be given to the schools as education is the spirit of every nation,” Hafiz Cemal argued for the modernization of both the method and the curriculum of education, counselled that, “teaching is the greatest, most spirited, most necessary profession for the nation,” demanded that teachers be given better financial conditions of employment, and insisted that teachers should focus only on teaching, not on performing religious duties which in many instances they were also expected to do. Cemal further contended that the Greek Cypriots had surpassed them because of their superior education, and proclaimed that if nothing were done to prevent it, they would use their power to subjugate and ruin the island’s Moslems.

Hafiz Cemal and others called also for the British authorities to give greater financial assistance to the education of the Turks, contributions of the colonial government at the time covering only about a quarter of the cost of a child’s education. Yet it was only later that the British seem to have come to regret not having devoted greater resources to the educational system, leaving it to be financed, (and run), largely by communal means.

Dr. Cemal’s wide-ranging agenda did not, however, stop here. He criticised the factionalism and lack of mutual intra-communal support, derided those who took liberty to mean the freedom to become intoxicated with wine and rakı, or the right to patronize brothels; he called for the Turks to use modern scientific techniques in agriculture, to avoid the overwhelming inclination to become government employees, or “Servants of the English!”, championed professions of trade and industry and, politically speaking, emphasized that while the Greeks may call for union with Greece, they could never come under the authority of Greece and must always insist upon the return of the island to its legitimate owner, the Ottoman Empire.

Socially Cemal also lamented the relative demographic decline of the Turkish Cypriot population, arguing that fathers were being too demanding in wanting substantial dowries for their daughters leading to people getting married late, and as a consequence having too few children. “While half, or even one dozen children run behind each Greek Cypriot woman, most of our Moslem women, after having given birth to one or two children,” stop having children, or even can not have children as a result of the prevalence of venereal diseases that have left the youth barren.

Most striking, however, was the economic nationalism that Hafiz Cemal displayed. Before the Revolution of 1908 he had tried to run an industrial training school for the

886. It might be argued that Cemal’s tract was one for the benefit only of the elite of Nicosia, but he also helped to enflame national sentiment in other areas of the island. In February of 1910, for example, he was to tour the island, and give a series of “national speeches” in the towns and the villages in order to raise funds for the “National Society for Assistance to the Ottoman Navy”. Ibid., 7th February 1910.

887. Ibid., 31st May 1909.

888. The Cyprus Annual report for 1910–1911 shows that the government paid only about 27% of the cost of a child’s education, with roughly the same amount being spent per Turkish and Greek schoolchild. Cyprus Annual Report, 1910–1911, 14.


890. Mir’at-ı Zaman 14th and 28th June 1909.

891. Ibid., 28th June 1909.
island’s Turks so as to increase their economic competitiveness, but had at the time faced, in particular, the opposition of conservatives who denounced his Young Turk sympathies. Now, however, his exhortations were progressively falling upon more receptive ears. Deploiring the fact that the Greek Cypriots would buy not even the smallest articles from the “Turks”, (but all the same acknowledging with some envy, the intra-communal unity that they possessed on such matters), Cemal insisted that, “the Moslem merchants must buy the majority of goods from Anatolia, that is they must buy and sell Ottoman products,” and, “Every Moslem must always conduct his trade with Moslems,” they, “must always support the Moslem merchants,” and, “always buy Ottoman products.” Cemal called further for the Turkish Cypriots to establish savings associations in every village and town, and through them to establish a “national bank” that would decrease their dependence on the Greeks, and, “to establish on the island a large Ottoman company that would increase the wealth and power of the nation through beneficial enterprises such as shipping.” In this respect, his exhortations paralleled, in fact in some ways surpassed the increasingly nationalist orientation of CUP economic policies that aimed at, “the partial displacement of non-Turkish merchants.”

Whatever the content of certain articles in the “Islam” newspaper that he briefly published on the island from 1907–1909 may have been, Ahmet An’s assertion that Dr. Cemal supported the Hamidian regime is not tenable. As noted earlier, he is likely to have made his first contact with Unionist circles during his medical education in Istanbul, and Hanioğlu’s recent research verifies that he was still in league with them in the days leading-up to the Revolution. He reveals that Cemal had established new ties with the CUP in April 1908, and suggests that his social influence was considered to make him a particularly useful CUP agent on the island.

A case then, could be made too that the Turkish Cypriots were also being thrust into a more nationalist stance by the Greek Cypriots as a result of their continued economic decline as compared to this community. Even if the Turks of the island had never economically been the incontrovertible “masters” of the island, their substantial economic power of old was still now clearly on the wane. Several Turkish Cypriot nationalists during this period began to openly champion the need for the Turks to advance in the fields of trade and manufacturing, and to place more emphasis on pursuing commercial careers rather than on securing plum government jobs. In fact, Osman Cemal had also openly stated that this latter negative tendency led to dependence on the government, and therefore reduced the potential contribution of capable individuals to defend Turkish Cypriot causes.

The greater advances of the Greek Cypriots were inciting the Turkish Cypriots to search for the causes of their own failings, and to contemplate the means by which they could themselves progress. Rather than remain despondent, the intelligentsia exhorted the community to look to their own great historical roots as a source of inspiration, goaded

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893. Mir’at-ı Zaman 14th June 1909.
894. JACOBY 2001, 32.
895. AN 1997a, 19.
897. CEMAL 1997, 41; See also the letter of Turkish Cypriot student Ahmet İrfan, studying in Izmir, to the Mir’at-ı Zaman. Mir’at-ı Zaman 30th November 1908.
them to live-up to the achievements of the forefathers whose blood they bore, and reminded them that it was erroneous policies and practices rather than any deficiency in their national character that was stunting their advance. If the Greeks were more successful, this certainly did not mean that they were inherently more capable, and were the Turks to return to the true essence of their beings they would soon see that they were at least as, if not more capable than their Greek Cypriot neighbours.899

Trends unrelated to the Greek Cypriots, however, especially the impact of the Revolution of 1908, were clearly also helping to develop each individual’s sense of national duty. The Sultan was no longer placed on an untouchable pedestal, beyond reach and reproach, and the people no longer had the duty to blindly obey him as servant subjects. Instead, the individual now had a duty to evaluate the national condition, and to act upon that evaluation in terms of the interests and well being of the nation. Thus, in a speech he gave to the crowds of Famagusta on the anniversary of the coronation of the Sultan, under banners proclaiming “hürriyet” schoolmaster Ahmet Eyyub, declared that the Ottomans would now get back the rights which they had been deprived of by the sultan’s abrogation of the constitution thirty years earlier, asserted that it was through their own efforts that they would now prosper, and pronounced that henceforth: “the Sultan will act in accordance and be loyal.”900 In a comparable manner, Ahmet Tevfik stated that when years earlier he had sent a telegram to the authorities in Istanbul complaining of the illegitimacy of the sultan’s despotic regime, he had never expected to see the day when Sultan Abdülhamid would bow, “to the sovereignty of the nation.”901 In a treatise, Osman Cemal castigated the poor leadership of the community’s elite cadres in the lead-up to the Legislative Council elections of 1911.902 However, Cemal was not beyond chastising the common people too, whom he intimated should take responsibility upon their own shoulders, and whom he faulted essentially for not having so taken matters into their own hands and having failed to overcome the influences of the Hamidian era of subservience.903 When Osman Cemal implores, “Now is the time for us to awake [!]” he is appealing not to one leader, or even to an elite section, but to the Ottoman Turkish nation as constituted in Cyprus.904 Spurring the people to action worthy of their forefathers, Cemal had stated: “We are the children and grandchildren of Ottomans who possess the most magnificent history in the world. Dispiritedness, ill-treatment and insults do not befit us.”905 To be fair, though, if patronage and political subservience had by no means been eliminated, (nor have they yet!), the political elite increasingly now had to appeal to the national sentiments of the common man. A frustrated King-Harman reported in 1910 of the Councilors that, “The Moslem members have shown themselves quite unable to resist popular pressure and have always been quite unreliable as supporters of the Government.”906

899. Mir’at-ı Zaman 1st March 1909.
900. Ibid., 14th September 1908.
901. Ibid.
902. In fact, the Cyprus Gazette, which gives the English translation of the title of the book as “Vigilance”, describes it as a treatise of “criticism on the indifference of the responsible leading Moslems in Cyprus to Moslem interests”. Cyprus Gazette 2nd February 1912.
904. Ibid., 42.
905. Ibid., 33.
Linguistic nationalism was also evidently beginning to leave its mark on a Turkish Cypriot community, which in the Ottoman era seems to have griped little about incorporating countless non-Turkish and even Greek words into their everyday vocabulary. In an article in the Mir‘at-ı Zaman of January 1909 Tevfik displays particular annoyance with the inappropriate use of French words, and though he accepts the possibility of using Arabic or Persian substitutes, he asks why they could not just write the word in Turkish, stating that the purpose of the newspapers is to serve the nation, and that to do so people have to be able to understand what they read. It is interesting that even though no reference is made here to the inappropriate use of Greek words, they rarely crop up in the Turkish Cypriot press of the time, despite the fact that commonly used terms would have been easily comprehensible to most of the Turkish Cypriot audience. Berkes even claims that the Turkification of language that began in the Ottoman Empire after the Abdülhamid era was particularly strong in Cyprus, recounting especially the efforts of his own Turkish teacher in Nicosia in this respect. British reports also refer to the “purity” of the Turkish language used in Cyprus during this period. It would not be unreasonable to expect that part of the motivation for this clarity of language, especially in the press, was the economic impulse referred to by Anderson, in that publishers needed to reach wider audiences, and Tevfik’s appeal might well have been motivated partly by economic self-interest in that the use of vernacular Turkish would allow him to sell his journal to a wider audience. Though his own local audience in Cyprus might have been able to comprehend Greek words incorporated in the text, this was less likely to be the case for a wider audience of prospective customers in the Ottoman Empire.

An analysis attributing political developments in the Turkish Cypriot community solely to a Greek Cypriot impetus is insufficient. The Turkish Cypriot calls for restoration to the Ottomans during these years were especially emphatic. In the wake of the Revolution all three Turkish members of the Legislative Council made known their support for this outcome to the Ottoman authorities, and rival Turkish Cypriot newspapers were willing to unite on at least this issue. It may well be that the Turkish Cypriot community’s self-confidence had been bolstered in the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution, their belief strengthened that the Ottoman Empire was on the mend, and that therefore, as a consequence, they were becoming politically more assertive. In a letter to the Mir‘at-ı Zaman, Tokadizade Sekip not only expressed great joy in the arrival of “Hürriyet”, but also pronounced that it was only now that the nation had become truly conscious of its existence. Another article in the same issue, entitled, “How we won the cause,” declared: “The nation won its own cause by wresting it with its own hand. It gained its legitimate right through the struggles of the heroes that it raised.” Nevertheless, reference to the divine was not omitted, with Tokadizade, before concluding his piece with the cry, “Long live the nation, long live liberty!” making sure to add, “we will succeed because God is with us.”

907. Even today the presence of Greek words is observable in common and especially casual language usage of the Turkish Cypriots. See SARAÇOĞLU 1992, 105–131, for a list of vocabulary identifying several such commonly used Greek words.
909. BERKES 1997, 31; For further information regarding linguistic nationalism in the Young Turk era, see ARAI 1992, passim, and especially, 29–32, 34–35 and 44–47.
911. See B. ANDERSON 1992, 43–44.
Turkish Cypriot pride and self-confidence is also likely to have been enhanced with the re-appointment in aftermath of the Revolution of Kamil Paşa, a Turkish native of Cyprus, to lead the Ottoman government. Ahmet Tevfik described this as, “a great honour” for the people of Cyprus. In fact, even though Kamil Paşa, who by now was aging and set in his ways, was to have a rocky relationship with the Unionists, he continued to have special importance for the Turkish Cypriots until his final fall from power, and eventual death in 1913, and he was defended by such incontrovertible Young Turks as Ahmet Tevfik, even at times when he was out of favour with the Unionists. Evidence exists, some of which has already been referred to, that he maintained a special interest in the circumstances of the Turks from the island of his birth, and did so till his last days, and it is perhaps therefore befitting that he is today buried in the forecourt of a small Mosque in Nicosia. Shortly before his death the paşa granted an audience to a deputation of Turkish Cypriot students of the Nicosia Idadi, including amongst their members Zihni. Zihni records that he promised to help them with their request for assistance for their school, and exhorted the students never to forget that they were, “the grandchildren of the [Ottoman] conquerors of Cyprus.” Zihni was later to become a history teacher and local politician, and no doubt never forgot Kamil Paşa’s advice. In fact, in his later years he was to publish a short treatise on the very subject of “The Turkish Conquest of Cyprus.”

Despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot representatives had invariably bowed to use of the British sanctioned label of “Moslem” representatives in their own speeches, we see that they were now openly referring to themselves at least as “Ottomans” and sometimes as “Turks”, even in the Legislative Council. In the opening session of the Legislative Council for 1909, the Turkish Cypriot members were to declare:

We, the Ottoman Moslem Members, representatives of the most loyal and most tranquil section of the Community, which section forms an integral part of the glorious, great and noble Ottoman nation, the lawful owner of the island, and has its proper sphere in the education, agriculture and trade of the country, have further to declare our opposition to the desire and

912. Mir’at-ı Zaman 10th August 1908.
913. Ibid., 7th December 1908; Pride on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community in Kamil Paşa’s position was expressed also by Vahdetî. [Volkan 12th December 1908]. In fact, Kamil himself was not the first native of Cyprus to rise to the highest rank in the Ottoman government, his own patron, Mehmet Emin Paşa, having also held the privileged post on more than one occasion. For reference to Mehmet Emin Paşa’s having introduced Kamil to a life in the service of the Ottoman state, see BAYUR 1954, 49.
914. Mir’at-ı Zaman 1st March 1909; Somewhat ironically, his son-in-law Esad Bey, who had lived and worked in Cyprus, was (as will be discussed in greater detail further on), to become a prominent figure in the Young Turk movement on the island. See, for example, HILL 1952, 529.
915. For further information on Kamil Paşa’s final journey to Cyprus, and his death soon after, See LUKE 1973, 157–160; As Tunaya notes some still continue to speculate as to the circumstances surrounding the paşa’s death, but no hard evidence has surfaced to substantiate claims that it was due to anything but natural causes. TUNAYA 2000, 83.
918. Though this practice was exceptional it was nevertheless not so for the Greek Cypriots who constantly referred to themselves in Legislative debates as “Greeks”, “Orthodox Greeks” or “Christian Greeks”, and particularly despised the label “non-Mahomedans” which the British frequently made a point of using. Though this labelling was attributed to the British, and though the British often consciously attempted to abstain from referring to “Greeks” in the belief that this would encourage nationalism, the distinction nevertheless had its roots in the Islamic categorization practiced by the Ottomans, whereby people were categorized as being either in or out of the Islamic community.
views which are expressed from time to time by our honourable Greek colleagues for union with Greece, contrary to the provisions of treaties concluded between the illustrious British and Ottoman Governments; and we earnestly pray that in the event of an understanding being arrived at between those Governments for the evacuation of Cyprus by the British Government the Island should be handed back to the exalted Ottoman Government, its legitimate owner in accordance with the unanimous wish of the entire Moslem population.919

In 1911 an attempt made to get a similar, slightly more strongly worded version again approved as a statement of the Moslem members views in the Legislative Council, was hampered by the refusal of the British members to vote in favour. The statement, supported by all three Turkish Cypriot members, had concluded:

[O]ur feelings as Ottomans, which feelings have been heretofore cherished by the Moslem community of the Island, having been the more stimulated and intensified by the constitutional regime which has been recently established, and is progressing and being promoted satisfactorily, in Turkey, we submit most passionately and ardently that, as the outcome of an early understanding between the two Powers, the Island may be restituted and handed over to the Imperial Ottoman Government, which possesses a glorious past and is striding towards a most brilliant future.920

The Greek members were incensed, Theodotou declaring that the Turkish members, “belonged to a race which was a newcomer to the island,” but that Cyprus had, “from Homeric times … been a Greek Country.” Theodotou also made plain that the Young Turk regime was not equally appreciated by the Greek Cypriots, stating that, “The Honourable Moslem Member spoke in his paragraph of the new constitutional regime in Turkey, but all that had been done was an alteration in the name, and matters were just as bad and even worse than before.”921

One of those gaining in notoriety who emphatically defended the Turkish Cypriots’ political position on the island was a certain Bodamyalızade Mehmet Münir. As a confirmed Unionist little loved by the British, he epitomized the anti-thesis of the uniform characterization of Anglophile Young Turks. In a letter of January 1917, the High Commissioner revealingly remarked of him: “For some time prior to his departure for Constantinople, which took place in April, 1914, he had played an active rather than a useful part in Nicosia municipal politics, and he was at one time a member of the Central Mejlis İdaré. After elections to that body which took place in December, 1912, the Officer Administering the Government declined to re-appoint him, though he was qualified by the number of votes he had received, owing to his generally undesirable behaviour and tendencies.”922 Ahmet Tevfik of Mir’at-ı Zaman did not particularly like him because of his association with the rival Sûnûhat newspaper and critical views about the administration of the Evkaf.923 He too, however, was a prominent Young Turk, and it has been suggested that he even had personal relations with the CUP leadership.924 Much of the rivalry between different camps of the elite, was not then, at this stage at least, a consequence of any

919. Cyprus Gazette 28th May 1909.
921. Ibid., 102–103.
923. For further elucidation regarding the dispute between Sûnûhat and Mir’at-ı Zaman concerning the Evkaf, see, for example, Mir’at-ı Zaman 23rd November 1908, where virtually the whole issue is devoted to the matter; An argues that Münir Bey was in fact the true financial sponsor of the Sûnûhat. AN 2002, 226.
fundamental political divergence regarding the Turkish Cypriots’ relations with the Ottoman Empire, but rather of domestic matters and personal rivalries.

In fact, there is quite strong evidence at this juncture of a common, if not wholly amicable, political stance. Neither Ahmet Tevfik, nor Şevket Bey, for example, had any qualms per se about the views expressed by Bodamyalızade Mehmet Münir to the Istanbul press regarding enosis and the political aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots; in fact they essentially seconded them. And, when events turned sour in Istanbul at the end of March 1909 following the outbreak of a counterrevolutionary uprising aspiring to overthrow the recently established constitutional regime, all sides expressed joy in its suppression, and; this was despite the fact that Derviş Vahdetî an apparently ideologically confused Turkish Cypriot and one time passionate sympathiser of the Unionists, was portrayed as the uprisings figurehead. 925 No sympathy was shown to Vahdetî when he was apprehended, with Tevfik suggesting he should get his just comeuppance, and expressing his amazement that a man who had not been able to find any following in his native land of Cyprus should have been able to find thousands of supporters in Istanbul. “This must mean that there are many daft men in Istanbul,” Tevfik exclaimed.926 As a matter of fact, even before Vahdetî’s arrest, a letter had been published in the Turkish Cypriot press by a Turkish Cypriot member of the CUP, and former governor of Adana, Şakir Paşazade Şükrü Bey, which referred to Vahdetî as “immoral and having no conscience,” and as a “traitor to the nation and religion.” In the name of all the Turkish Cypriots living in Istanbul, Şükrü Bey called upon the members of the Turkish community resident in Cyprus to secure assurances from the British authorities that Vahdetî would not be allowed to seek sanctuary on the island.927

For a few weeks prior to the Revolt of March 31st 1909, Ahmet Tevfik had raged against the factionalism that had arisen within the Ottoman Empire, warning that such disunity would be taken advantage of by the Great Powers and could lead to the ruin of the great Ottoman state.928 When news was received by the Kadi that this reactionary

924. KORKUT 2000, 61; A letter to the High Commissioner from the British ambassador to the Porte suggested that Münir’s influence in Unionist circles in the city extended to the capability to engineer the appointment by the Porte of a new Müftü to the island. [Lowther to King-Harman, 19th August 1910. SAI/907/1907, 192]. This contention is supported by Turkish sources too. [See, Vatan 25th January 1912]. It did not escape the notice of British authorities either that on the 2nd February 1910 Münir sent from Istanbul the following telegram to, amongst others, the “‘Hürriet’ Club”: “Good News! Order of the Sheikh-ul-Islam dismissing the Mufti, and directing the selection of a successor locally, was sent to the Naib (Cadi of Cyprus) three days ago.” SAI/481/1910, 1a.

925. For a wider, though not too detailed exposition of this counterrevolutionary effort, see, for example, KINROSS 1981, 34–39; For comment on the contradictions in the political positions taken by Vahdetî, see HANOĞLU 2001, 308; Kocahanoğlu argues that the uprising was a counterrevolutionary affair, much more complex and intricate than typically portrayed. He argues that it was not by any means the result solely of the manifest actions of Vahdetî and that it is better understood as a power struggle in which the significance of the religious symbolism employed by the counterrevolutionaries has been blown out of proportion and for which Vahdetî was to become the “scapegoat”. On the other hand, some have even gone as far as to suggest that Vahdetî had been a British agent, though any known evidence for positing such ideas is virtually nonexistent. There is, hence, probably much justification to the contention of Kocahanoğlu that the true contents of the “black-box” of the uprising of the 31st March 1909 have still to be revealed. KOCAHANOĞLU 2001, xiii-xvii, 14.

926. Nevertheless, Tevfik did express sympathy with Vahdetî’s wife, whom he stated was an innocent victim who had herself been poorly treated by Vahdetî. Mir’at-i Zaman 31st May, 1909.

927. Ibid., 24th May 1909.

928. See for example, Ibid., 8th and 21st March 1909.
movement had been suppressed by Unionist forces, and that Sultan Abdülhamid, (accused of having instigated the uprising with a view to restoring despotic rule), was deposed and replaced by his brother Reşad V, the Turkish Cypriots displayed a unanimous outpouring of support. The end of the “cruel” and “monstrous” Abdülhamid era was portrayed in the press as the final liberation of the “Ottoman nation”, and accordingly there was jubilant celebration throughout the island.  

Amongst the locations in Nicosia decorated for the occasion were the premises of the Osmanlı and Yıldız Kefaathanes, shops and offices including those of Beliğ Paşa and Osman Cemal, and the residences of Müftü Ziyaeddin, Dr. Hafız Cemal and Musa İrfan Bey. Particularly interesting in terms of confirming the active presence of a CUP organization in Cyprus was news that, “the stand erected by the members of the Committee of Union and Progress was decorated most magnificently,” and adorned with banners, and portraits of Reşat V, Enver and Niyazi.  

News was also given of celebrations in Larnaca and Poli, with it being related regarding the former, that it was not only the Osmanlı and Ahrâr Kefaathanes of Larnaca that were adorned with decorations for the occasion, but even the Hamidiye Kefaathanesi, named in honour of Abdülhamid himself! In the following weeks’ issues, prominence was given to the publishing of poems penned by Turkish Cypriot author Kaytazzade Mehmet Nazım, lauding the “Glorious Revolution” that had been carried out by the Unionists, noting how they had saved the “great fatherland”, and heaping particular praise upon the heroic army for the victory that had brought them back from the edge of catastrophe.

Once again, in a manner reminiscent of the initial Revolution of 1908, there seemed to be a flicker of reconciliation in the air during the festivities following the overthrow of Abdülhamid. Amongst the shops decorated in Nicosia was also one stated to belong to a man by the name of “Kosti”, presumably a Greek Cypriot, and more substantially it was noted that leading personalities amongst not only the British, but also the Greek community, (including clergymen), had gathered in front of the Şeri Court to listen to speeches congratulating the new sultan. The truce, this time, however, appears to have been even more fleeting than before, with it being reported only one week later that due to their dreams of enosis the Greek Cypriot press had complained about the celebrations. By 1910 the Turkish Cypriots were again complaining to the Ottoman authorities about the disloyalty of their compatriots, reporting for example, with grounds for justification, that the Greek Cypriots were collecting funds for the Greek navy.

Not long after, Bodamyalızade Mehmet Münir became the proprietor of a new newspaper known as Seyf, which appears to have been closely associated with the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club, and incorporated the star and crescent, together with a sword, in its logo.

929. Ibid., 3rd May 1909.
930. Ibid.
931. Ibid., 3rd and 10th May 1909.
932. Ibid., 10th and 17th May 1909.
933. Ibid., 3rd May 1909.
934. Ibid., 10th May 1909.
935. King-Harman to Earl of Crewe, 9th September 1910. CO 67/160, 99. High Commissioner King-Harman, indicated in the same despatch that this was only one of many appeals made to the Porte where he reported, “exaggerated reports of Greek feeling and action are constantly received from Moslems in Cyprus.” See also Tevfik Pacha to Grey, 8th September 1910. CO 67/161, 124 containing a copy of the Turkish Foreign Minister’s letter on the matter.
The title page of the paper records its address to be an office located adjacent to the afore-
mentioned club, of which Bodamyalızade Mehmet Münir is known to have been a mem-
ber. From the available issues of the paper it is not possible to assert with absolute cer-
tainty that the journal acted as the official organ of the club, though it is well established
that the editorial line was vehemently Unionist. As High Commissioner, Clauson de-
cribed it as, “a journal of violently Young-Turk proclivities.” While continuing to talk
of Ottomanism, Seyf strongly derided the opponents of the CUP leadership cadres whom
it lauded as great people struggling to defend the nation and fatherland.

Clearly in the years between the Young Turk Revolution and the First World War the
Turkish Cypriot Community was on the whole becoming politically more aware, active,
and assertive and it may well be that this also contributed to heightening tensions with
their Greek Cypriot compatriots that erupted into rioting and intercommunal conflict.
Once again tensions were not restricted to the urban elite. In July 1911, Vatan newspaper
reported that a brawl which had erupted in a Paşaköy tavern had soon turned into wider
disturbances between the Turks and Greeks of the village, one of the Greeks being
accused of having threatened that they were going, “to slaughter the Turks”, and it being
claimed that the Turkish coffee shop of the village had been attacked and the Turks sitting
there assaulted. In mid-September Vatan reported sensationaly that another Turkish
coffee shop, in Arkaca, had been stoned for several hours and then set on fire with the
Turks still inside, the exits having been obstructed by the Greeks.

Tension was evident even in the normally quite civil debate in the Legislative Council,
Şevket Bey complaining vehemently both about attacks on the Turks in mixed villages
and provocative editorials in the local Greek newspapers. Particularly offensive was an
article published in the Kyriakos Phylax of 25th March an extract of which was forwar-
ded to in a confidential despatch by Major Clauson’s. It read:

The presence of Turks among civilized peoples and even Turkish sovereignty over them in
the twentieth century will form an insult and disgrace towards civilization itself. Cyprus has
had the good fortune to get rid of Turkish sovereignty but not also of the presence of Turks
incorrigible and fanatic such as have been the Moslem Members of the Legislative Council
for the last five years. …

Hammer who undertook the most disgusting task of writing the history of the sanguinary
Turkish race from the time they settled in Europe, after he had related their always bloody
adventures for 378 years, exclaimed with relief when entering the seventeenth century:- ‘At
last both the writer and the reader of the History of the Turkish Empire can breathe somew-
hat on coming out of the suffocating atmosphere of massacres and torments’. It is a vain

936. BRYANT 2001b, 326–327; ÜNLÜ s.a., 43.
938. Seyf 9th June 1913.
939. Vatan 17th July 1911.
940. Ibid., 18th September 1911.
941. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 9th May 1911. CO 69/27, 390–394 and 406–407; Amongst others,
Şevket Bey referred to continuing problems in Angastina, which again was brought-up in the following
year’s debates. Here Ziyai Bey stated that: “Police men should be permanently stationed in all villages in
which Moslems were in a minority: He would not repeat the incidents that had taken place at the village of
Angastina, as they were already well known, but he would like to state that the few Moslems left in that
village did no longer dare to venture out at night,” and that even those few remaining Moslem inhabitants
were, “anxious to leave the village,” as soon as they could find a fair price for their properties. Minutes of
the Legislative Council, 22nd April 1912. CO 69/28, 88.
relief! If another historian would continue Hammer’s disgusting and hateful work until today, he would be suffocated and asphyxiated always in the same suffocating atmosphere of massacres and torments, because this race has been by nature born cruel and savage and blood thirsty.

Even now the general confusion throughout constitutional (sic) Turkey, the unceasing revolutions of Moslem and non-Moslem populations, the persecutions and oppressions and massacres of the Young Turks’ tyranny against all the non-Turkish and non-mahomeddan races give indeed a beautiful opportunity and invincible arguments for the restoration of a most Hellenic historical and christian country to the mouths of the wolves of Jarkent and Kashgar.

Respectable must be the national rights of every people, but such people as have shown good nature and gentleness of manners and promise to contribute on their part to the holy and high destination of mankind in the world. But what situation have the Turks in the world other than that of savage and cruel wild beasts, which as long as they are free will only kill and tear to pieces their victims or prey, and become harmless only when put in an iron cage? When Tamerlane enclosed the most blood-thirsty Sultan Bayazid in an iron cage, he indicated that it was only in that way that the race over which he ruled might become harmless and inoffensive.

It is with such cohabitants that our fate has been connected, and we are obliged to vindicate the means for a becoming life and progress not only against the Christian foreign rule which takes off and detains such means quite unjustly and rudely, but also against the Turkish perversness and dullness, against which only time and our racial activity and intelligence will deal the final blow.

The honour and prestige of the English Government impose every reserve of yielding character and even strengthening of unjust, unreasonable and perverse objections and requests of the Moslem representatives who look on this country not as their fatherland – because the Turks have never had a fatherland – but as their booty which has evaded them, and which they seek to recover, that they may grow fat by the sweat and blood of the rayahs.942

So infuriated were the Turks by such inflammatory and provocative, anti-Turkish articles in the Greek Cypriot press, as well as by statements to the effect that, “if Cyprus were evacuated by Britain the Greeks would not allow it to be occupied by any other Power than Greece,” that on September 21st 1911, three thousand Turkish Cypriots gathered in Nicosia to pass a resolution of protest.943

The great offence taken by the Turks to the attitudes displayed in this and other newspaper articles during the British era, has been recently described by one academic in terms of the Turkish Cypriots’ ongoing quest for “respect” from their Greek Cypriot compatriots. The Turkish Cypriots, Rebecca Bryant, maintains, “began very early in the British Colonial period to lament their neighbours’ disrespectful behaviour. While they did not deny them the right to political action, they denied their right to allow that action to take an intolerant form. They found that form intolerant – and found that it became more so.”944

943. HILL 1952, 518 and enclosure in Goold-Adams to Harcourt, 27th November 1911. CO 67/164, 175–176; See also Vatan 25th September 1911. While the estimate given here is 2,000, it is also recorded that similar gatherings were held in other parts of the island too.
4.4 The Limassol Riots and Intercommunal Tensions Sustained

The potential for intercommunal hostilities having escalated was signified on the 7th of October 1911, the Officer Administering the Government, C. W. Orr, had published an extraordinary issue of the Cyprus Gazette, proclaiming as follows:

Whereas His Majesty is happily at Peace with all Sovereigns, Powers and states:
And Whereas, notwithstanding His Majesty's utmost exertions to preserve Peace between the two Sovereign Powers, a State of War unhappily exists between His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey and His Majesty the King of Italy:
And Whereas His Majesty, being desirous of preserving to the natives of Cyprus and all persons domiciled there the Blessings of peace, which they now happily enjoy, is firmly purposed and determined to maintain a strict and impartial Neutrality in the said State of War unhappily existing between the aforesaid Sovereigns:
His Majesty has therefore thought fit, by orders under the hand of His Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, to instruct me to issue this Proclamation:
And all natives of Cyprus and all persons domiciled there are hereby charged and commanded to govern themselves accordingly, and to observe a strict Neutrality in and during the aforesaid War, and to abstain from violating or contravening either the Laws and Statutes of Cyprus in this Behalf, or the Law of Nations in relation thereto, as they will answer to the contrary to their Peril.945

In November of 1911 Kamil Kenan of the famous Kenan family of Larnaca several of whose members were to be interned by the British during World War I, (including Kamil), published a passionate article entitled “Awakening”. “My brethren,” he pleaded, “let us awake!:

Oh my Moslem brethren will we not yet awake from our slumber? Will we not yet be able to leave these valleys of sleep? All the nations have awoken, progressed; as for us we do not even hold our ground but are retreating? Has not this situation of ours yet been a lesson for

944. BRYANT 2001a, 909; A folk tale recounted by the Greeks of Cyprus in the late nineteenth century illustrates both a sense of growing superiority amongst the island’s Greeks, and suggests the offence that it would be likely to draw from their non-Greek compatriots. Called, “The Thief in the King’s Treasury,” it was re-published by Dawkins in his volume on “Modern Greek Folktales”. The final paragraph concludes: Now all this time the king of Turkey was laughing at our king, the king of Greece, because he could not catch the robber: the robber presented himself to the king of Greece: ‘Your Majesty,’ said he, ‘I will bring you the man, this king of Turkey. I ask you to commission a big ship and give me a dress all hung with bells, and announce to the king of Turkey the coming of the crown prince of Greece’ This was done as he directed. The Turk received him with bands of music and with festivities. In the evening when they were all asleep, the robber put on the dress with the bells and went to the king’s room. Ting a ling, ting aling ing! The king woke up. The robber said: ‘I am the Lord’s angel. I am to take you to Paradise; shall it be quick or dead?’ The king was quite dazed; he said: ‘Quick, alive! But please wait for tomorrow for me to say goodbye to my family.’ Then in just the same way the robber came the next night and put the king into a chest and nailed it up and took it straight to his steamer. But the robber had before this sent a telegram to the king of Greece that he must sit on a golden throne to receive them, just as though he were God. They arrived and the king of Turkey fell at the feet of our king, thinking him to be God. Then he said: ‘I am the king of Greece and I can show you that I can hold in captivity if not the robber then certainly you.’


945. Cyprus Gazette 7th October 1911.
us? … For God’s sake let us leave behind this ignorance, this conservatism and awake from our slumber …

Leaving aside for the moment our present condition let us take a look at the situation our own state the Ottoman State is in. Let us take a look and cry in misery. When we study as a guide our 600 hundred year long Ottoman history and consider our great advances and conquests; now, it is impossible for one not to cry when we see how day by day, one by one all those countries won by our forefathers’ blood are being lost.

Are we not those same Ottomans to whom all states, while trembling from our majesty, while waiting for our assistance and while in want of meeting and coming to agreement with us, to whom we now have, on the contrary, become in want of their assistance? Is this Islamism? Are these the holy orders of the Holy Qoran we hold in our hands? Should we not abide by the guidance of the relevant verses in this matter? Oh my Moslem brethren, calamity for our state means calamity for our nation. …

We once placed the blame on Abdülhamid, but now those days have passed; now the state means the nation, and the nation means the state.946

The Islamic references should be taken in context. Kamil was making here an appeal to the people not to spend on the sacrificial slaughter of animals on the occasion of the religious holiday of Bayram. Instead he called upon them to show their “patriotism” and to donate the expense that would be incurred by such sacrifice, (and in fact even more of their wealth), to the Ottoman navy so that the Ottoman state, the nation’s state, would once again be great.947 In the same vein, as accounts of the Ottoman war with Italy continued to be published, Midhat Bey also appealed to the people: “Let us give so that the nation can be free from danger, so that our future may be secure. And with this joy and contentment [of having donated] let the sweet scented wind that blows to us from afar, from the high seas, from snowy mountains always whisper to our ears of Turkism, of Ottomanism, of the tales of the Ottomans.”948

The clashes between the Greeks and Turks that occurred at the end of May, 1912 were closely connected to nationalist passions on both sides, and particularly to the contrasting outlooks of the two communities in relation to international developments concerning the Tripolitanian War between the Ottomans and the Italians that had broken out in late 1911. While Ottoman defeats were a sore source of frustration and concern for the aggravated Turkish Cypriots, they acted for the Greek Cypriots, particularly with the Italian invasion of the Dodecanese islands in May 1912, to create the impression that, “Cyprus own status might be affected and that the island could be given to Greece.”949 These disturbances were to poison the air that was to become even more acrid with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars soon after. The most violent conflict occurred in the town of Limassol, though clashes were also reported in Nicosia, as well as in some of the villages. In fact there had already been smaller scale disturbances in Hamitköy (Mandres), a rural area of Nicosia, two weeks earlier, when Greek high-school students had paraded through the area, and in

946. Vatan 6th November 1911.
947. Ibid. Here it was recorded also that great financial sacrifices for this cause were being made in the villages.
948. Vatan 20th November 1911.
949. GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 76; See also DOROS 1955, 333.
Topçuköy, eleven days prior to this.\textsuperscript{950} Once again Turkish Cypriots interpreted these developments in light of previous occurrences in Crete, as part of a plan, “to eject and destroy the Turks”, as, “basically the same as the programme followed by the ‘Ethniki Eteria’ in Crete.”\textsuperscript{951}

In correspondence with the Secretary of State, High Commissioner Goold-Adams outlined his appreciation of the background causes in the following manner:

It is unnecessary for me to draw your attention to the causes, which under normal circumstances, give rise, both here and elsewhere, to a certain amount of animosity between the Moslems and Greek Christians. These feelings have been accentuated in Cyprus within the past six months by two causes, viz., the increased agitation which has been organised amongst Greek Christians for annexation of the Island to Greece, the excitable speeches which have been made by the Christian leaders, the writings of the local Greek press, and the taunts hurled at the Moslems regarding the approaching doom of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of Italy, especially since the occupation of the Turkish islands in the Ægean Sea. On the other hand, the Moslems have unquestionably been rendered rather despondent by the results of the present Italian war, and many of the fanatical members have become more sensitive to anti-Ottoman displays on the part of the Greek Christians.\textsuperscript{952}

While Servas does admit to the detrimental effects that international developments were having on intercommunal relations, he once again attributes much of the blame to the British, whom, he implies, ignored rising tensions on the island as this assisted their divide-and-rule tactics.\textsuperscript{953} Yet, to be fair, on receiving news of the most serious incident in Limassol the High Commissioner had promptly, “authorised the local Commandant of Police to take such steps as he considered necessary to quell the riot, and to call to his aid the local company of the Devonshire Regiment,” and made provisions for the transfer of reinforcements from Egypt and the temporary recall of ex-policemen.\textsuperscript{954} Furthermore, it should not be overlooked either that it was the same High Commissioner who initiated a partial amnesty for those convicted of violent crimes in the riots, “with the object of … the mitigation of racial animosity in the Island.”\textsuperscript{955}

Within a few days matters seem to have come under control, though relations nonetheless remained acrimonious. By the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of June the Commissioner of Limassol, W. N. Bolton, communicated: “The town is quiet and that the ordinary work is being resumed, although the Moslems are still showing reluctance to get too far away from their own quarter. I have been trying hard to bring the leaders of both parties together but have so far failed, as the Moslems are exceedingly bitter about the desecration of their mosque.”\textsuperscript{956}

\textsuperscript{950} Vatan 27\textsuperscript{th} May 1912; While Kyriss’ attribution of all blame in the Mandres affair, as in the case of the more serious riots that followed in Limassol, to the British and Turks, absolving the Greeks of any wrongdoing, is clearly biased, so is Ismail’s portrayal of the events, which states that due to the, “Noble spirit and peace-loving nature,” of the Turks, not a single Greek Cypriot nose bled, and that even the thought of revenge did not cross the minds of the Turkish Cypriots. KYRISS 1977, 39–40; ISMAIL 1997, 190 and 192.

\textsuperscript{951} Vatan 10\textsuperscript{th} June 1912.

\textsuperscript{952} Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1912. CO 883/7, 132; The aggravating role of the Turco-Italian War is corroborated also by Bucknill who puts much of the blame for the riots on, “the open gratification expressed by the Christians at the Italian successes in the War & particularly at the occupation of the Islands.” Bucknill’s report to the Colonial Office, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 1912. CO 67/168, 298.

\textsuperscript{953} SERVAS 1999, 57–58.
Yet if in the towns in particular the Turks exhibited somewhat greater fears, in the villages the Greeks had their own misplaced concerns, with Bolton conveying that they were, “exceedingly frightened by absurd rumours of large bands of wandering Turks, and many of them have entirely lost their self-control.” Turkish sources in fact report tensions, if not any major incidents, continuing in or around several villages, including Dohni, Maroni, Kalavasso, Catalköy, Abohor (Cihangir), Eksomedoş (Düzova), Eğlence, Lakedamya, İbismlof, Pera, Aynapa, and İstilloz (Mutluyaka). Yet, in one article at least, it is also acknowledged that the Greeks did have their own concerns, it being stated that the Greeks of Kazafana (Ozanköy), (one of the few villages where they constituted a minority), were fearful of being attacked and had called upon the Greeks of neighbouring villages to come to their assistance if the need arose.

A three-man commission, headed by Bolton and incorporating also one Greek and one Turkish Cypriot, Messrs Stavros Stavrinasakis and Yorgancıbaşızade Mustafa Sami respectively, was appointed by the High Commissioner to investigate into the riots in Limassol. Their findings essentially confirmed Bolton’s general preliminary position that, at least at the outset, “the aggressive party were the Greeks.” A Colonial Office official was to state: “One thing comes out very clearly, and that is, that the Turks were not to blame for starting the riot…. You will notice that the great majority of the accused (& convicted) were Greeks.” The King’s Advocate in Cyprus, Mr. Bucknill, however, apportioned guilt to both sides, concluding an unofficial account on the matter by stating that, “neither party was blameless.”

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954. Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 30th May 1912. CO 883/7, 131; In an extraordinary issue of the Cyprus Gazette, published on the 31st of May 1912, the High Commissioner proclaimed: Whereas the Town and the District of Limassol are in a state of public disturbance and it is necessary that such a state of affairs be terminated: 1. The Town of Limassol will be until further notice occupied by an armed force of British Troops. 2. This force of armed Troops is empowered to disperse any assembly of persons which in the opinion of the officer in charge is likely to provoke a breach of the peace. Below he further announced: Whereas it is necessary, owing to the state of public disorder which has recently existed and owing to the state of public excitement which still exists, to take adequate measures to prevent the occurrences of further breaches of the peace by controlling and regulating the assembling together of persons in a manner likely to provoke a breach of the peace and to provide for due notice to the authorities and protection by suitable means of any assembly duly and lawfully convened and held. Cyprus Gazette 31st May 1912.

955. Clauson to Harcourt, 26th June 1913. CO 67/170, 86.

956. Enclosure No. 1 in Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 4th June 1912. CO 883/7, 134.

957. Ibid.

958. Vatan 10th and 17th June 1912.

959. It was though stated that the fears of these villagers were unfounded. Vatan 17th June 1912.

960. Mr. Stavros Stavrinasakis and Yorgancıbaşızade Mustafa Sami Efendi, the latter also a member of the District Council, were both described as being men of standing in their respective communities; See Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 27th June 1912. CO 883/7, 136 and Mir’at-ı Zaman 19th January 1909, for reference to Sami Bey’s election to the District Council; The High Commissioner reported regarding their appointments that: “In making my selection of the two individual gentlemen to be members of the Commission, I acted in consultation with the leaders of the two sections of the population in the Island and, consequently, it may reasonably be claimed for it that it was impartially constituted.” Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 2nd August 1912. CO 883/7, 143.

961. Enclosure No. 1 in Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 4th June 1912. CO 883/7, 135.

962. Undated Minute. CO 67/167, 261; For a full list of those tried and sentenced, see enclosure in Clauson to Harcourt, 26th June 1913. CO 67/170, 88–89.
There was common accord in the commission that the outbreak of the main hostilities in Limassol occurred with the “Djoumada incident”, one, “where a number of Christians threw missiles at two passing carriages containing Moslems, and one of the latter drew a knife and stabbed two Christians,” and that thereafter the spread and escalation of the disturbance was largely a consequence of the irresponsible actions of church authorities who rang the bells of the Katholidgi Street Church so as to summon the Greeks. However, there was a major rift as to whether or not the disturbances were premeditated. While the Greek and British members of the commission concurred that the events were not premeditated, the Turkish member insisted that, “this wild attack was planned and forethought.” The evidence that the latter furnishes to support his thesis, does not however, conclusively prove, as he suggests, that there was any widespread Greek conspiracy to eliminate or subjugate the Turks through this series of disturbances, though the examples he provides do indicate that there was a low level of tolerance and some degree of latent hostility towards the Turks already in existence amongst Greek Cypriots prior to the clashes. In the Colonial Office at least, it was observed that Sami Efendi’s, “charges against the Greeks,” were, “very likely true,” but even so decided that his findings could not be officially published without those of the Greek member, who had requested confidentiality on account of the fact that, “He doesn’t blame the Turks,” and would therefore have been likely to face the wrath of his own community.

That what the High Commissioner had hoped would be an “impartial” commission could not fully agree on the findings was not in his judgment simply a matter of honest differences of opinion, but, as he explains below, a consequence of communal prejudices. The High Commissioner declared that:

It was unfortunate that the members of the Commission could not agree on all of the points brought before them, although this is scarcely to be wondered at, owing to the introduction of the racial question, upon which it will be seen that the Greek Christian and Moslem members showed partisan feelings in their separate findings. The ring-leaders and principal offenders, and expected by Mr. Thorne, who conducted the prosecution on behalf of the Government, to be found guilty and severely punished, were acquitted owing to conflicting evidence; and the conflict of evidence was not confined exclusively to the civilian element, but unfortunately extended to the members of the police. Christian and Moslem policemen of all ranks, witnesses of similar events, failed to agree on matters of fact according as their evidence would tell for or against their co-religionists.

The Greeks of Limassol seem to have been particularly hostile towards the police in the aftermath of the disturbances. Bolton reported in a letter of June 2nd:

I regret to report that the feeling is very strong and bitter against the town police who fired on the rioters, and that the lower classes daily shout insults after them ... The truth is that the great majority were Moslems and the people have the idea that they used their rifles against the Greeks, picking off more or less harmless spectators. I regret to say that this idea is

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964. Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 2nd August 1912. CO 883/7, 143.
965. Ibid.
966. He notes, for example, how Greeks threatened to kill Turks for singing Turkish songs. Enclosure No. 3 in Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 24th October 1912. CO 883/7, 164.
967. Minute of 5th February 1913. CO 67/169, 86.
968. Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 24th October 1912. CO 883/7, 161–162.
encouraged by their leaders, and, I think, with a view to cover the fact that in Monday’s riot the aggressive party were the Greeks.\textsuperscript{969}

While the Greek member of the commission found the commanding officer of the police justified in giving the order to his subordinates to fire on the rioters, he criticised the manner in which, “the subordinate policemen have abused the order given,” arguing that:

\textit{Zaptiehs scattered among the crowd fired \textit{ad libitum} at the people, and this probably brought forward the greater casualties, whereas the zaptiehs should have been found under the orders and the immediate supervision of the officers, especially if we take into consideration that the majority of the zaptiehs (out of the 68, 14 being Greek and the others Turks) were firing at the Greeks attacking the Turks.}\textsuperscript{970}

The total tally of the casualties reported by the commission was as follows: “Caused by the rioters to civilians—3 killed, 100 wounded; caused by the rioters to the Police—1 officer and 14 men wounded; caused by the rifle fire of the Police—2 killed and 9 wounded.”\textsuperscript{971} Of these, the greater proportion were Turks, and while, as Bryant records, the Greek newspapers were still full of, “horror-struck stories about the new Turkish terrors,” even after the first clashes had subsided, “it was the Muslims who began the first of what would be a series of emigrations: Within a few months, 23 families had left Limassol to live under the protection of the sultan.”\textsuperscript{972}

Developments in Cyprus, as well as in its environs, appear also to have led the British authorities to re-evaluate the political framework under which they governed the island. In a letter written at the beginning of October 1912 in response to the Secretary of State’s suggestion that the number of Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council might be increased, the High Commissioner outlined his opposition to such a change in the context of a revealing exposition of the state of political affairs on the island:

Having now replied, as desired, to the two points raised by you, I feel sure that you will not object to my adding a few remarks upon the present general situation in Cyprus, which should, I think, be taken into consideration when dealing with any possible amendments, such as you suggest, to the Constitution under which the Island is now governed.

What I mean by “general situation” is the position created by the divergence of the views of Moslems and Greek-Christians, affecting their actions both toward one another and toward the British Administration. The Turk philosophically accepted the position created by the British Occupation, and is quite loyal to the present Island Government. Latterly, however, he has become extremely suspicious as to the permanence of Ottoman rights in the Island owing to the latitude allowed to the Greek-Christians in carrying on their propaganda for annexation to Greece. He finds himself in debt to the Greek money-lender, and he regrets the day when he was lord and master. There is little doubt that, if influenced by his leaders to do so, he would retaliate on the Greek-Christian for his wrongs, fancied or otherwise, fully prepared to emigrate if he failed to succeed. On the other hand, the Greek-Christian has within the last twenty years, that is to say, since he has felt secure in his freedom from the Turk, become hostile to the British Occupation. He is now comparatively rich and pro-

\textsuperscript{969} Enclosure in Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 4\textsuperscript{th} June 1912. CO 883/7, 134.
\textsuperscript{970} Enclosure No. 2 in Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 24\textsuperscript{th} October 1912. CO 883/7, 163.
\textsuperscript{971} Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 2\textsuperscript{nd} August 1912. CO 883/7, 143.
\textsuperscript{972} Enclosure in Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 4\textsuperscript{th} June 1912. CO 67/166, 409; BRYANT 1998a, 281–282.
sperous, and inflated with a sense of his importance. He makes himself offensive to the Turk, toward whom formerly he was servile; and he asserts the rights of Greece to the Island of Cyprus.

The feelings of the two races as above outlined guide the actions of both parties. No important question affecting the Island can, therefore, properly be dealt with if these facts are overlooked.973

Goold-Adams then went on to state:

Under the foregoing conditions it is an exceedingly difficult task for the Administration to carry on its work satisfactorily and ensure peace in the Island. These difficulties are but added to by the existence of a Constitution which is, I venture to submit, unsuited to the circumstances, which ostensibly gives to the people certain powers that they know they cannot exercise, thus causing dissatisfaction, and which does not give the central power sufficient real authority for all purposes, but especially for the control of mischief-making agitation. It places the central power to some extent at the mercy of the whims and fancies of one section or the other, and these whims and fancies are more often than not influenced by supposed favours meted out to the other side.974

In conclusion the High Commissioner conveyed:

The more I study the present position of affairs, the more I feel that radical changes in the Constitution are the only means of placing the Administration of the island on a more satisfactory footing. They might be in the direction of granting fuller powers to the central authority in all things, or of granting fuller powers in some things while lessening them in others. I am of opinion that small amendments of the existing constitution will probably only make a bad but workable arrangement unworkable, and I most strongly urge, for the following reason, that nothing whatever should be done at the present time. Any concession now made to the Greek-Christian section after their late violent agitation would only lead them to glorify the fact into a victory gained by their tactics, and encourage them very soon to repeat the process. Moreover, any apparent concession made by the British Government to the Greek element in Cyprus, especially at this moment, would be wrongly construed, both inside and outside the Island, by the Moslem element, and would only accentuate the ill-feeling existing between them and the Greeks. Indeed, taken in conjunction with the results of events elsewhere, it might tend toward open strife between the two peoples in the Island.975

Apathy could no longer be appropriately used to describe the political feelings of the Turkish Cypriots. Not only were they apprehensive in light of recent and ongoing developments, but they were simultaneously more prepared and willing to display an ethnic and national pride, defying political analyses that they were unperturbed and unmoved. A wonderfully expressive photograph of a Turkish Cypriot football team in 1912 shows the players accompanied by the İdadi school headmaster Mehmet Mücteba Bey, (who had been brought from Turkey the same year), and Mustafa Midhat Bey, (who was at the time the school’s history master), as well as the bookseller Lütfi Bey.976

974. Ibid., 225.
975. Ibid., 225–226; The High Commissioner’s position on the increase of Greek membership in the Council had been less emphatic only a few months earlier when he had appeared willing to consider accepting the demand if London thought it “politic” to do so, and so long as the official members in the Council were likewise increased, “so as to avoid the possible difficulties arising from the Government being outvoted.” Goold-Adams to Harcourt, 22nd February 1912. CO 67/165, 403.
lined-up in front of the Ottoman flag, but are proudly wearing shirts boldly emblazoned
with the star and crescent.977 These proud faces were more than just those of boys repre-
senting their school on the playing field, they were those, in Orwellian terms, of young
men off to do battle for the nation, men ready and willing to engage in “mimic war-
fare”978.

According to research done by Atun and Fevzioğlu, the first two Turkish football
teams on the island had been established in 1910; One called simply the “Hürriyet
Kültübu”, the other known as the, “Lefkoş’a Türk Futbol Ocağı” or, “Lefkoş’a Türk Ocağı”,
(‘Nicosia Turkish Club’). While the first was probably directly related to the Hürriyet
Club, the latter is also believed to have been established by the encouragement of brothers
Ahmet Raik and Osman Cemal.979 Atun and Fevzioğlu noticeably reveal that a succe-
sion of new clubs established in the island in the post-war years incorporated the name
“Türk” in their titles. From the Kardiş Ocağı archives we read also that in the early
1920’s the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club hosted meetings of something called the “Turkish
Football Association.”980

The High Commissioner’s despatch of 26th February 1912 provided official recogni-
tion of the increasing politicization of the Turks. High Commissioner Goold-Adams
wrote: “It is noteworthy to observe the growing interest of the Moslem voters, and the
growing apathy of the Christian voters, which latter fact is doubtless due to the reduced
interest taken in the Archiepiscopal question.”981 However, with the outbreak of the Bal-
kan War between the Ottomans on the one hand, and an alliance of Bulgaria, Greece,
Montenegro and Serbia on the other, the High Commissioner yet again issued successive
proclamations calling on the natives of Cyprus to remain neutral and respect the peace.982
Turkish political concerns were once more heightened by the military predicament of the
Ottoman Empire and the growing clamour that enosis was nigh. In a petition to the Secre-
tary of State, the Turkish members of the Legislative Council, Mehmet Şevket, Mustafa
Hami and Mehmet Ziyai declared:

It being manifest even from the well-known conduct, morals, and aggressions hitherto
eviced by our Greek fellow countrymen that if, God forefend! the island is, as the result of
recent events or otherwise, ceded to the Greek Government, the Moslem element in Cyprus
will thenceforth remain exposed to a most sorrowful plight, involving regrettable and exe-
crable circumstances which would form an everlasting dark stigma to civilisation in the
annals of the world, it prays that the Moslem community of Cyprus may be protected from
being let fall into that terrific vale, and that should a condition of constrained necessity arise
for changing the present political position of the island, the island may be ceded to the equi-
table administration of the illustrious British Government, or annexed to the administration
of Egypt which is found under the protection of that equity (sic): and being persuaded that
the abandonment to Greek administration of the Moslem community—which is so loyally
obedient to the British rule- by a change of administration, or the annihilation or ruination of
the Moslem in the hands of the Greek Government or the Greek population, under the effect

976. For the information concerning Müçteba Bey, see FERİDUN 2001, 17.
977. İSLAMOĞLU 1984, 33.
978. ORWELL 1945b; See also HOBSBAWM 2002, 142–143.
980. Hürriyet ve Terraki minutes of 6th and 7th November 1921. KO-HT/BO-KD.
982. Cyprus Gazette 23rd October and 1st November 1912.
of tragedies paralleling the tyrannies of the middle ages, through the granting of autonomy to the island, will in no wise [way?] receive the consent or permission of the great noble English nation and of the illustrious British Government representing that nation.983

Sir G. Fiddes described this petition as being “moderately worded” and while sympathetic to the concerns expressed, candidly expressed that they were unlikely ever to be taken into consideration. He opined: “I fear the Moslems have only too good reason to be apprehensive for their lives and property if the “Hellenic” element get the upper hand,” but declared quite frankly that, “The fate of Cyprus will, of course, depend on questions of “high policy.”984

The reference in the above telegram to Egypt has been cited as evidence of the Turkish Cypriots having “abandoned” Ottoman claims in favour of general Islamic loyalty,” yet the context, as well as countless previous and later pronouncements of even the petitioners themselves must surely be taken into account before reaching such a conclusion.985 Moreover, Egypt itself at that juncture was in fact still, nominally at least, under Ottoman suzerainty, and hence held similar status to that of Cyprus. It was only to be with the Treaty of Lausanne that the Turkish government recognised, as with Cyprus, the end to its sovereignty over Egypt as of November 1914 when it had been proclaimed a protectorate by the British.986

The Turks were especially infuriated by related articles published in the Greek Cypriot press, in particular in the Patris and Kypriakos Phylax newspapers where it had been written that the “wronged” Christian nations of the Balkans were preparing, “to take the terrible vengeance that ages breathe against the Turks.”987 Patris, edited and managed by the Greek Cypriot Mayor of Nicosia, pronounced: “It appears that the [Young Turk] constitution can no longer succeed in Turkey, and the benefit from its proclamation will be only negative. That is to say, it will be assured that the Christians in Turkey will find safety only when the Turks are deprived of all authority and placed under guardianship as childish and uncivilised.”988 The Kadi wrote to the Colonial authorities imploring them to initiate legal action on the basis that the language used, “against the Imperial Ottoman Government and Ottomans, and against the Ottoman flag particularly, [was] calculated to excite and make quiver the Moslem and Ottoman feelings.”989 Seyf translated and published one of the articles which it described to its audience as, “attacks ... [by] enemies of our nation against our Moslem & national honour.”990 Continued reports in the Greek Cypriot press that enosis was imminent and that Greece had even appointed a governor for the island, fuelled Turkish Cypriot angst, the High Commissioner noting in a confidential despatch to Lewis Harcourt that, “considerable alarm was manifested by the Turkish community.”991 This led in January 1913 to Şevket Bey seeking assurances from the

983. For the original Ottoman Turkish letter, see, enclosure in Clauson to Harcourt, December 1912. CO 67/167, 406.
984. Undated minute by Mr. Fiddes, CO 67/167.
985. See ATTALIDES 1979, 43–44; See also KYRISS 1977, 45.
986. Article 17 of the said treaty proclaimed: “The renunciation by Turkey of all rights and titles over Egypt and over the Soudan will take effect as from the 5th November, 1914.” See s.n. s.a. (b).
987. Enclosure in Cadi of Cyprus to Chief Secretary, 13th October 1912. SA1/860/1912, 34.
988. Ibid., 32.
990. Extract from Seyf, 4th November 1912. SA1/860/1912, 36.
High Commissioner that if such reports were in fact true, his community would be given ample notice of the transfer of the island, and that their property and religious interests would be protected. That the High Commissioner did not deny these reports outright, but rather stated, “that in the event of a transfer of the Island to Greece being contemplated, the Moslems in Cyprus could feel certain that the three points raised by him would be included in any conditions under which such a transfer might take place,” is unlikely to have done much to quell what he himself described as the, “considerable alarm” shown by the Turks of Cyprus.\footnote{992}

Within two months, newly elected Legislative Council member Dr. Eyyub was to send a short sharp telegram to the Colonial Office reading as follows: “News for union with Greece causing much panic. Mohammedans preparing for flight. We earnestly await your assurance by telegram.”\footnote{993} Only a few weeks later, similar representations were made now by the Kadi, Ali Rifat.\footnote{994} He wrote amongst other things that rumour of impending enosis was leading, “to great anxiety and commotion, and producing an important and noteworthy effect on trade.”\footnote{995} And, in the Legislative Council, debate was once again stalled by differences as to aspirations regarding the island’s future, in what was described in the Colonial Office as, “An annoying contest between the Christians and Moslems as to whether this country [Britain] is ‘magnanimous’ (ie ready to hand over Cyprus to Greece) or ‘treaty-respecting’.”\footnote{996} By the end of that year’s session things did appear to have calmed down somewhat, with the Officer Administering the Government, reporting:

> The discussions have been carried out in a spirit of moderation and fairness, and the Elected Members are to be congratulated on the restraint, good sense and public spirit which they exhibited in debate at a time when, owing to the course of events in the Balkans, the relations between the two sections of the population have not unnaturally been subjected to a somewhat severe strain.\footnote{997}

Beyond the confines of the Council chamber, however, matters had not yet settled, and as suggested by Loizos’ research in the village of Kalo, it appears that not all politicians were acting in a very responsible manner: “Old people remember that in 1914 three Kalo Greeks were sent to prison, one for ten years, for burning a Turkish coffee-shop in the village. This was apparently triggered, they say, by a speech made locally by a mainland Greek nationalist agitator, Katalanos, and followed the hostilities between Greece and Turkey in 1912–13.”\footnote{998}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{991. Goold-Adams to Harcourt, 21st January 1912. CO 67/169, 83.}
\footnote{992. Ibid., 84.}
\footnote{993. Telegram from Dr. Eyyoub to Colonial Office, 25th March 1913. CO 67/171, 366.}
\footnote{994. Of whom King’s Advocate Bucknill stated, he, “tries to uphold the Turkish suzerainty in every way he can.” Bucknill’s Report to the Colonial Office, 18th June 1912. CO 67/168, 293.}
\footnote{995. Enclosure in Orr to the Secretary of State, 3rd April 1913. CO 883/7, 7.}
\footnote{996. Minute by J. F. N. Green, 22nd April 1913. CO 67/169, 322; On this matter the Officer Administering the Government reported, “It is regrettable that the debate, which began with a genuine desire on the part of all parties in the Council to work harmoniously together, should have ended so acrimoniously; but, considering the hopes and fears which dominate the Moslem and Christian sections of the population at the present juncture, it is hardly surprising that a discussion of such a nature should have roused racial feelings and led to a somewhat heated controversy.” Clauson to Harcourt, 9th April 1913. CO 67/169, 324.}
\footnote{997. Clauson to Harcourt, 3rd June 1913. CO 67/170, 5–6. This report incidentally appears to support the thesis that nationally inspired intercommunal conflict can not be attributed solely to the agitation of the political elites, but had foundations in grass-roots divergences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.}
\end{footnotes}
Based on his research in the island of 1913 Dudley-Huxton wrote, “The Greeks for the most part profess to have no dealings with the Turks, and Turks and Greeks do without any doubt represent a very strong line of social cleavage, separated as they are by language, religion, social customs, and so on.” 999 This bleak picture was undoubtedly an over-exaggeration, but the long-established course of generally positive intercommunal relations and social integration appears to have entered a clear downward trajectory.

The approach of World War I, and the conflict referred to in the Balkans would not let tempers lie. When the Turks had protested to Sir Walter Sendall at the beginning of the 1880’s about the recruitment of Greek Cypriots for the Greek army, the High Commissioner purportedly replied that, “since the Greeks were doing their duty, it were well that the Ottomans should imitate them rather than remonstrate.” 1000 Thirty years on, with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, some at least may well have heeded his advice. Though conclusive records as to such participation have as yet not been uncovered, we do know that the Turkish Cypriots were at least egged-on to volunteer by the local press, with Seyf printing passionate stories of the escapades of volunteers fighting for the Ottoman army. 1001

4.5 The Rise of İrfan Bey and Collaboration with the British

Two men more than any others are famed for having left their stamps on the Legislative Council and general administration of Cyprus with a resolutely pro-British mark: Musa İrfan Bey, who was elected to the Council shortly before the First World War, and Mehmet Münir Bey, (not to be confused with the anti-Evkaf, and ardent Unionist Bodamızade Mehmet Münir), who took over the former’s seat shortly after his death in the mid-1920’s, and continued to play a major role in Cypriot politics until the post-World War II era.

Evidence corroborating a British divide-and-rule policy in Cyprus which politically manipulated the Turkish Cypriot community against Greek Cypriot pressures on Britain to hand-over the island to Greece is probably most cogent in the manner in which these two men were propelled into, and thereafter maintained for protracted periods, positions of political and economic power, and how they did so with British assistance. It is understandable then that both these men have generally been portrayed as lackeys of the colonial power and that they have typically been disowned by Turkish historians, who view their role as an embarrassing blot on the nationalist record. Yet, as we shall see, even in the actions of these two most prominent and staunchest adherents of British rule, we can decipher traces of the growing power of nationalist sentiment.

Originally İrfan Bey had owed his appointment to the Ottoman authorities whose delegate, according to the Cyprus Convention, he officially was. Following the British anne-
xation of 1914, however, British control of the Evkaf became ever-more direct, and the "The Cyprus (Mussulman religious property) Order in Council, 1915," passed at the end of 1915, gave the British the right to appoint not one, but both of the delegates of the Evkaf.\textsuperscript{1002} İrfan Bey had entered the Cyprus civil service as a post-office clerk in 1895, and been transferred to the Evkaf three years later.\textsuperscript{1003} Appointed as the Ottoman delegate of the Evkaf in 1903, he had for many years interacted with the British elite, and no doubt had ample opportunity for patronage as far as being elected by his own community was concerned. Korkut gives a vivid account of the use, or rather abuse of such power for electioneering purposes, stating that when his brother Osman Cemal ran as a candidate against İrfan Bey for the Legislative Council, a villager who approached him revealed to him that though his campaign speech and rendition of verses of the Koran were impressive enough, he should not expect the people of the village to vote for him, and insinuated that this was because they were financially indebted to the Evkaf.\textsuperscript{1004} Even the High Commissioner was to divulge, in a confidential despatch to the Secretary of State Andrew Bonar Law concerning the elections of 1916 that, "Among the Moslems, who are nearly always rent by party feeling, the supporters of İrfan Bey, the able Moslem Delegate of Evkaf, probably derived considerable advantage from the influence he exercises in that capacity."\textsuperscript{1005} It is noteworthy in this context, however, that while by this time the British were frequently referring to the undue power of Greek Cypriot money-lenders in determining the outcome of elections, they fail to make mention of the more institutionalised patronage that was used as an electoral tool by those Turks with access to Evkaf resources.\textsuperscript{1006}

Notwithstanding his powers, an important obstacle still existed to İrfan Bey’s plans to win election from the Nicosia-Kyrenia district in 1913, a seat that he was to hold for a decade thereafter. The long-standing incumbent, and probably the most prominent Turkish Cypriot politician of the day was Şevket Bey, who had held the seat for quite some time, and had also, as remarked earlier, served as Mayor of Nicosia. On being appointed a judge Şevket Bey had retired from active political life, opening the way for İrfan. The latter, described by the British as, “the ablest modern Turk in Cyprus,” was to replace Şevket, (with whom he had had a close relationship in the past), on both the Executive as well as the Legislative Council.\textsuperscript{1007}

An alternative replacement, however, might have been Müftü Haci Hafiz Mehmet Ziyaeddin. (Known also as Müftü Ziya, he had held the seat for Nicosia-Kyrenia for a decade from 1895–1905. He should not to be confused with Haci Veli Efendizade Mehmet Ziya, who also sat in the Legislative Council between 1906 and 1913, representing the Limassol-Paphos district). Müftü Ziyaeddin is sometimes also depicted as having fai-

\textsuperscript{1002} For this order, see Cyprus Gazette 30\textsuperscript{th} December, 1915.
\textsuperscript{1003} AN 2002, 195.
\textsuperscript{1004} KORKUT 2000, 62.
\textsuperscript{1005} Clauson to Bonar Law, 6\textsuperscript{th} November 1916. CO 67/182, 104–105.
\textsuperscript{1006} See, for example, Ibid. 107 where it is stated that “All the Christian Members, except Dr. Zanetos, are advocates and money-lenders, and owe their seats in the Legislative Council to the state of the law which permits Cypriot debtors to live in bondage to their creditors.”
\textsuperscript{1007} Bucknill’s report to the Colonial Office, 15\textsuperscript{th} June 1912. CO 67/168, 293; Telegram from High Commissioner Goold-Adams to Secretary of State, 25\textsuperscript{th} November 1913. CO 67/170, 456.
led to sufficiently champion the Turkish nationalist cause, and as the father-in-law of Münir Bey has himself at times been closely associated with an opportunistic pro-British stance. Nonetheless, as signified before, his role was more complex than that. As a representative in the Legislative Council in the early twentieth century we have already seen how he was savaged by one British High Commissioner for disloyalty in lieu of his having voted against the government, and from a British perspective he must be regarded at best, as having had a mixed record, and of not being wholly trustworthy.

Having already held political office, and with the status of Müftü, he is likely to have been a most formidable contender for the Nicosia-Kyrenia seat coveted by İrfan. Yet just over a year earlier he had been blocked from re-entering active politics by the colonial authorities. On the eve of the election he dramatically withdrew his candidacy, apparently as a result of British pressures, and left the path clear for İrfan to win the election. According to Korkut the British had threatened, with no legal grounds to do so, that if he did not withdraw his candidacy Ziyaeddin would have to forfeit his position as Müftü. Korkut claims that, had he been allowed to stand, Müftü Ziyaeddin would have won the election. He records even the rumour that in some sense he even did win the election! Korkut elaborates that as there had not been sufficient time to have it removed, Ziyaeddin’s name remained on the ballot papers and despite having announced his withdrawal from the race, he had actually received a majority of the votes. Şevket’s election does not seem to have disappointed the British, and though there is no conclusive proof, there is room for justifiable suspicion that they had more than a helping hand in guaranteeing his election as a “better” alternative to Ziyaeddin. It was İrfan, though who they were to appreciate much more, and it might be speculated further, therefore, that they later also had a hand in Şevket’s appointment to the judiciary which gave the opportunity for a by-election at which İrfan could stand.

The Secretariat Archives of the British era confirm much of the above. According to one file Müftü Ziyaeddin had stood for election at the end of 1911 and resisted till the last minute British pressures for him to withdraw his candidacy on the disputed grounds that he qualified as, “a member of the service of the Government of Cyprus.” Ziyaeddin had correctly insisted that he was appointed by the Ottoman authorities, not the Bri-

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1008. See, for example, BERATLI 1999, 117–121.
1009. The King’s Advocate described him in 1912 as, “representative of the old Turkish School; a man of great influence v rich; clever & largely concerned in making money.” Bucknill’s report to the Colonial Office, 18th June 1912. CO 67/168, 293.
1010. KORKUT 2000, 62. As confirmed below, Korkut’s recollections are essentially correct, though he appears to have confused some of the detail. He states the election to have taken place in 1910, while general elections were held in October 1911, and by-elections in March 1913. He also seems to have confused İran Bey with Şevket Bey, stating that the Müftü was standing against the former. İran Bey did not stand for election, however, till the by-election of 1913. It is possible, however, that the Müftü tried to stand again in this election and that Korkut was not wholly mistaken. Though I have not found much to support this, there is one interesting piece of information that supports this possibility which relates to a memorial delivered by Ahmet Said to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1930 regarding the candidacy of Münir Bey. He argued here that as a Government official Münir should be barred from standing for election, and cited the obstruction of the Müftü’s candidacy on this basis in 1913 as a precedent to support his contention. See Said to Secretary of State, 14th June 1930. CO 67/235/13, 20.
1011. Acting Chief Secretary to Müfti, no date, September 1911. SA1/1511/1911, 18.
Nevertheless, the British intimated that were he to stand he would lose the emoluments he received from the Cyprus budget and might no longer be recognised as Müftü if he remained adamant on taking his seat after election, or might not be allowed to take his seat. Acting Colonial Secretary T. H. Hatton Richards suggested in a terse manner that Ziyaeddin should, “be called upon for an explanation of his conduct in standing for election after authority was refused.” He revealingly wrote also that to concede the Müftü’s argument would be akin, “to admit Govt has no hold over him in matters of discipline,” and recorded that the Müftü’s candidacy was, “undesirable.” Ultimately on the 2nd October 1911 Ziyaeddin responded to the Colonial Secretary’s pressure stating in a telegram: “I withdraw my candidateship subject to any objections to be made later.” As noted, however, his withdrawal had come too late for his name to be taken down in some polling stations, and though numbers are hard to verify, many voters went ahead and voted for him. Şevket Bey himself reported in the Vatan newspaper that in the Famagusta-Larnaca district he himself had received 1017 votes as opposed to 916 for the Müftü. Had he not officially withdrawn his candidature and had he been able to continue on campaign on Election Day, it looks probable, therefore that the Müftü would have actually been elected to the Council where he might have impeded British designs.

Yet, it must also be observed that, overwhelmed by more enticing evidence of their collaboration with the British, most historians have failed to draw sufficiently intricate portraits of İrfan Bey, or for that matter of Münir Bey. Both these men genuinely opposed any move towards enosis, above and beyond what might be considered to have been the requisites of British policies. While clearly loyal to British rule and indeed epitomizing the more collaborationist wing within the Turkish Cypriot community, both men were also still capable of admonishing the British and reflecting nationalist sentiments, and even of voting against the British.

İrfan Bey himself did not deny, however, general cooperation with the British in the Legislative Council, justifying it in terms of the requisites of respect for Ottoman sovereignty. Speaking shortly before the British annexation, he said that, “it was naturally admitted by those who had framed the constitution that, so long as the Island continued to belong to Turkey, the Moslem Members would give their assistance to the Government, 1018. İrfan was not, for instance, above writing letters on the matter to the British press rebutting claims that enosis was justified, even as the British government itself was in the process of offering the island to Greece. Enclosure in Earl of Cromer to Bonar Law, 27th November 1915. CO 67/179, 499–500. 1019. Looking, for example, at the voting that took place as regards the Councillors’ address in reply to that of the High Commissioner, we see that on April 1st, 1914, the Greek Cypriots voted as a block while all three Turkish Cypriots combined with the British Officials to counter their motion, though by the following day the tables had turned, and the Greeks now voted together with the British to pass a motion on the matter, which was opposed by all three of the Turkish members, including İrfan Bey. See Minutes of the Legislative Council 1st and 2nd April 1914, 13 and 21.
and that had always been the spirit.”

In fact, the government was certainly now relying even more on the Turks to get their policies through the assembly than they had in the past, and this the King’s Advocate readily admitted. Stating in the Legislative Council, exasperated by what he deemed Greek Cypriot obstructionism to the functioning of the administration, that “it was only by the assistance of the Moslem Members that the Government managed to carry on.”

Mr. Hadji Ioannou was to declare that:

[T]he high thoughts which had passed through the minds of those who had granted their constitution had not been concerned with any fear of an elective majority, on the contrary it was obvious that it was their wish and desire that the Elected Representatives should express their views freely, and if in the political evolution of events the Government had found that it could, with the assistance of one section of the Elected Representatives, enforce its wishes that constituted an adulteration of the constitution which was not intended at the beginning.

İrfan Bey responded bluntly that, “on the contrary, in his opinion, that was the spirit of the constitution.” Yet, even were İrfan Bey’s analysis to be correct, it was not accepted to have been the case in the practice of the past, nor was it to be always the case in the future, a fact that some perceptive Greek Cypriots and British colonialists, no matter what their motives may have been, were themselves fully prepared to grant. Colonial Office minutes regarding the debate that raged at the end of 1912 as to whether or not to revise the constitution, are especially revealing in this context. Walter Ellis counselled: “the Turks have given a general support to the Govt., & this has enabled administration to be carried on without resort to Orders in Council. If addl. Greek members were allowed to be elected, the balance would be overthrown,” Sir J. Anderson, however, questioned this line of reasoning, stating: “apart from divisions on the question of the Tribute, what instances are there of the Turks voting with Govt against the Greeks? Formerly they always voted together against the Govt.” Though Anderson acknowledged that the Greeks and Turks had cooperated against the government in the past, he argued, howe-

1020. Ibid., 9th June, 1914, 331; Nevertheless, it is a fact that he himself did not hesitate to continue “assisting” the British on most issues even after the British repudiated Ottoman suzerainty. How much reflection of this sentiment was a result of their own internalization of nationalist beliefs, and how much was a consequence of the need to acknowledge and reflect the sentiments of a wider public is difficult to judge, but nevertheless perhaps only of secondary importance, for either way it indicated that nationalism was on the rise, and even if they did not themselves hold sentiments of Ottoman or Turkish nationalism, that they felt compelled to acknowledge them is of significance.

1021. Ibid., 330.

1022. Ibid., 331.

1023. Ibid.

1024. See, for example, Mr. Constantinides’ comments in the Legislative Council, where he went so far as to state that, “up to 1902 they had never had any divergence of opinion except, of course, as regards union with Greece.” Ibid., 2nd April, 1914, 18. And, in his minutes regarding cooperation between the Greeks and Turks, in the face of British opposition, regarding the following year’s budget, Mr. Fiddian, at least, expressed surprise at those who believed that there was little precedent, and noted that what he found perhaps surprising when he took over the department in February 1926, was that, “there was very little evidence of real friction between the Administration and the Elected Members, and it is only fair to say that a period of comparative calm in the internal politics of Cyprus is a development which the history of the Island from 1880 on to 1911 gave one no reason to expect.” Minute by Fiddian, 1st December 1916. CO67/219/14, 7–8.

ver, that changes were now taking place. “It appears,” he said, “that recently the Turks have ceased to act closely with the Greek members as they did formerly.”

Too often in the existent Turkish literature we come across the presumption of a misleadingly sharp dichotomy between the progressive Kemalist nationalists and Islamist reactionaries or traditionalists, the latter to become the centre of “opposition to Atatürk’s reforms”. Though labelled by many as “traditionalists” or “Islamists” partly as a result of their tendency to stick to, or at least acquiesce in the increasingly blatant British tendency to emphasize the Moslem rather than Turkish character of their community, (and thus, especially in the period of the Kemalists, to try and disassociate the Turkish Cypriots from Turkey), neither İrfan nor Münir were religious reactionaries; the latter was positively not, as described by Kızılıyrek, a, “religious leader”. Not only had the King’s advocate described İrfan as a “modern Turk”, but also he had openly communicated that he, “belongs to the Young Turkish Party.” In fact, the two men often had as their opponents men with much more pronounced views as to the place of religion in politics. Even some Colonial Office officials had their doubts, (subsequently proved to be unfounded), about the loyalty of İrfan. On the eve of war with Turkey, Mr. Green, for example, cautioned that they might, “have to look after him carefully.” To what degree these men sympathized with the Young Turks, or for how long, is not clear, though we do know that both in the pre-World War I era did belong to the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club.

To be fair, it should be recognised too that there is an argument to be made that both these men sincerely felt that it was in the interests of their own community for them to side with the British, that at the time they honestly perceived this as the best way in which to secure the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. This is the understanding of his father’s political convictions that Necati Münir Ertekün has given, and no less a critic and rival of these two men than Fadil Korkut attested to İrfan Bey’s honesty, to the fact even that he died with barely a penny to his name and that he treated his challengers in a gentlemanly manner, withholding from using his ample powers to seek revenge. In actual fact, Korkut himself willingly granted that, despite his faults, even his pro-governmental stance was reasonable, because İrfan Bey:

[R]ealized the value of the votes that he at times used in favour of the government; knowing well how to gain concessions from the government in return for the vote he gave. And even that he, when necessary, would not shirk from voting together with the Greek Cypriots against the government. But, I must at once add, that the concessions he gained were concessions that particularly benefited our community’s political position, and met the needs of our general community and the needs of individuals that arose from time to time.

Praise for his services to, and defence of the interests of the Turkish Cypriots is also heaped on İrfan Bey in the memoirs of Mehmet Zeka. He states, for instance, that when a

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1027. See, for example, GÜREL 1984, 161.
1028. KIZILYÜREK 1993b, 61; I find it hard to believe that Kızılıyrek truly meant to use these particular words to describe Münir, and would like to believe that their use was some sort of simpler unintended error.
1029. King’s Advocate Bucknill’s report to the Colonial Office, 18th June 1912. CO 67/168, 293.
1030. Minute by Mr. Green, 30th October 1914. CO 67/174, 45.
1031. KORKUT 2000, 60 and 65.
1032. Ibid., 32–33.
1033. Ibid., 33.
French commander visiting the island during the First World War insisted that the Turk-
ish flag be removed from the mosques, it was İrfan Bey who bravely interceded and made
sure that the flags continued to fly despite the ongoing conflict.  

4.6 The “Turkification” of the Young Turks and the Prelude to War

As international tensions mounted in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars and the lead-up to
World War I, the Turks of Cyprus continued to express that their sympathies lay with the
Ottoman Empire. By 1913 this Empire was now more directly controlled by a CUP pur-
suing a more aggressive policy of Turkish nationalism. On January 23rd 1913, fearing
that negotiations were being made to give-up the age-old Ottoman city of Edirne (Adri-
anople) to the Allies, the Young Turk forces invaded the Sublime Porte, killed the Sultan’s Minister of War, and basically took over full control of the reins of power until over-
taken by defeat at the end of World War I. It was following this event that the aged,
though still active and alert Kamil Paşa had returned to his native land of Cyprus where
he died suddenly soon after his arrival. His funeral was reportedly attended by Moslems
and Christians alike.  

Interestingly Nazım Polat has unearthed an open letter to the Sultan, signed by intel-
llectuals and notables from various parts of the empire, which was published in the Istan-
bul journal “Sebil-ür Reşad” on the very same day the coup was initiated. In it the signa-
tories declared that they were, “not prepared to accept any peace [agreement] that threate-
ned the national existence,” and declared, “the time has come for taking revenge for the
blood spilt and for the rapes of the innocents.” At the head of the list of signatories were
two Turkish Cypriots, a certain Rifat of the Ulema, and a teacher named Mustafa.  

Having successfully led the raid on the Porte, it was Enver Paşa, the committed
Pan-Turkist, who now rose to the forefront in the CUP leadership triumvirate of Talat,
Cemal and Enver paşa.s According to Landau, “Enver had the most definite ideas in
favor of Pan-Turkism and its crucial future role as an expansionist policy and he was the
one largely responsible for its adoption as a state policy.” The defeat of Russia, result-
ing from an alliance with Germany, could open-up the way for the fulfilment of Enver’s
Pan-Turkist dreams by making possible unification with the Turks of the Caucasus and
Central Asia, and this undoubtedly was one of the factors that drew him closer to the Ger-
man-led Triple Alliance as opposed to the Triple Entente. Yet, Enver’s dream was not to
be, and the Ottoman Empire was not only soundly defeated, but it lost the overwhelming
majority of its remaining territories, and faced occupation and dismemberment following
the War. It was here that the nationalist forces of Mustafa Kemal, (who later took on the
name of Atatürk, “father of the Turks”, bestowed upon him by the Turkish parliament in

1038. LANDAU 1995, 51; Landau notes that at least one member of the ruling Triumvirate, Cemal Paşa, was not
such a keen pan-Turkist, and leaned more towards, “relying on the Turks of the Ottoman Empire.” Ibid.
In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriots were not only establishing numerous clubs and associations in broad sympathy with the dominant political trends of the Empire, but they were actively raising funds for the Ottoman cause, and particularly passionately, for the Ottoman navy. In fact, there was to be uproar when Britain requisitioned two ships that had been ordered by the Ottomans, and paid for by contributions of the Osmanlı Donanma Cemiyeti, which was active also in Cyprus, and it was Irfan Bey himself who strongly protested to the British stating:

I think it would be misleading and doing injustice to the Moslems of Cyprus if I were to say that the recent action of England in taking over the warships, for the construction of which almost every Moslem contributed, was not resented by them in common with their co-religionists elsewhere.

I can frankly state that this resentment is not owing to any anti-British feeling or policy in Cyprus; on the contrary it is due to the feeling that England as a Mohammedan Power, and traditional friend of Turkey, does not and did not think fit to extend her helping hand to Turkey of late, to the heart felt desire of the Moslem world, to the degree anticipated.

Despite the religious dimension involved, it should not be overlooked that the raising of funds for the Ottoman navy was seen also as an important national duty for the Turks, particularly in terms of military capabilities vis-à-vis the Greeks. It was no coincidence that the play performed by the youth of Famagusta for the purpose of collecting funds for the Ottoman navy concerned the plight of their brethren in Crete, for these were the types of political issues now attracting attention amongst the Turkish Cypriot community and most likely to inflame their passions and loosen their wallets. The High Commissioner’s confidential despatch of 4th September 1914 noted:

Since the outbreak of the war, and the resulting difficulties between Great Britain and the Ottoman Government, some of the local Moslem newspapers, following the example of their Constantinople confrères, have been exciting their readers against Great Britain in consequence of England having taken over from their builders the two ships under construction when war commenced, the view put forward being that the ships were taken in order to deprive Turkey of all chance of taking aggressive action against Greece and not that Great Britain in the exercise of her rights desired to strengthen her own navy. There is no doubt whatever that these writings were having a markedly bad effect throughout the Island, so much so that acts of disloyalty occurred amongst the members of the Police which have had to be drastically punished.

That even at this late stage, with Britain and the Ottoman Empire on the verge of war, Turkish Cypriots were willing to stick-out their necks in favour of the Ottoman CUP regime, as opposed to silently acquiescing to the policies of their British administrators, is

1039 After defeat in World War I Enver was to embark on an ill-fated adventure in Central Asia. This finally resulted in his death in battle in 1922 against the Bolsheviks in Turkestan, fighting for the achievement of his Pan-Turkist dream. [See KINROSS 1981, 297]: According to Zürcher, Kemal had especially strained relations with Enver and disliked Talat, but appeared to have greater affinity for Cemal, the only member of the triumvirate who genuinely tried to assist Kemal’s nationalist movement in Anatolia. ZÜRCHER 1984, 54.

1040 Enclosure in Goold-Adams to Harcourt, 4th September 1914. CO 67/ 173, 408.

1041 Kibris 30th March 1914.

significant. And, it is probable that this assertiveness was partly a consequence of effects of the shift to a more aggressively nationalist, for that matter a more aggressively Turkish nationalist pursuit of policy being adhered to by the CUP regime making themselves also felt in Cyprus too.

If Turkish nationalism had not been initially publicly espoused by the Young Turks, it does appear to have, at least made its mark on the leadership of the CUP by the time of the 1908 Revolution, and it had by the outbreak of the First World War, become a dominant platform upon which they ruled, central to the programme that they preached. If, as Karpat states, Ottomanism and Islamism had till then been championed by the Ottoman state itself, the sense of Turkish national identity that had emerged more autonomously was now also to be politicised through state efforts.1043 Karpat explains the transformation that was taking place in the following passage:

When the Young Turks came to power in 1908, contrary to some uninformed opinion, the situation did not change much. The Young Turks were dedicated Ottomanists and realized after a few “secularist” moves that any tampering either with Islam or Ottomanism would alienate the Arabs and undermine Ottoman unity. The Balkan war and especially Albanian independence in 1912, however, once more brought up the basic question of “kern” (core) that Goltz had raised and led to what Yusuf Akçura called “political Turkishness” or Turk-kism. True, Akçura had pleaded the cause of political Turkism as early as 1904, but at that time he did not reject Ottomanism or Islamism. He merely proposed de-emphasizing them because they had lost some of their practical value, not their cultural or symbolic importance, as a careful reading of his seminal Üc Tarz-i Siyaset (Three political ways) indicates. By 1913 the Young Turks had temporarily abandoned the government - then seized power through a coup. They eliminated all opposition and embarked on an ill-fated journey to revive and even expand the empire, in part following German advice to turn Turkishness into the political ideology of Turkism. The Young Turks, however, had not been apologists for Turkism from the start.1044

Yet some would object to this final assertion. For example, Hanioğlu goes even further, arguing that from careful scrutiny of the private papers of the CUP leadership it is evident that even before their espousal of Turkish nationalism became manifest, “while its official organs were promoting an Ottomanist policy, the central committee was [already] shifting to Turkish nationalism.”1045 The debate on the matter is as yet unresolved as is the question of how and why and whether emerging Arab nationalism within the Empire was a cause also of the shift to an emphasis on Turkish nationalism.

Poulton argues that the Young Turks were from the moment they came to power, Turks, determined to Turkify the other ethnic groups within the Empire and preserve the Turkish dominance of the state.1046 A major premise for his argument is the enforced Turkish language education system that was set-up throughout the Empire. Feroz Ahmad and Zeine would however disagree. Ahmad arguing that with significant non-Turkish elements remaining both in the leadership of the CUP and in the country at large this was not a feasible proposal, and that Ottomanism and Islamism were the main policies pursued,

1044. Ibid., 25.
even throughout World War I. Zeine, on the other hand, contends that while initially the Young Turks were not nationalists, they did attempt to Turkify later.

What is plain is that ultimately, at some stage the CUP leadership did come to the conclusion that they could not maintain Abdülhamid’s emphasis on Islamism because as Landau maintains, it was too closely associated with Abdülhamid, and also because this policy had not proved very successful anyway. Thus, it is probably most correct to say that the CUP itself was until about 1913, largely Ottomanist. They did not, however, completely disown Islam as a legitimizing factor, as this could have been akin to shooting themselves in the foot when it is considered that most inhabitants of the Empire were still devout Moslems. However, as the Moslem communion itself disintegrated, and the Arabs in particular cut loose, the emphasis of policy was increasingly switched to Turkism.

In fact, the collapse of the Arab-Turkish alliance within the Ottoman Empire can be considered the final straw that broke the camel’s back. If the Arabs too were to strive for independence, then the notions of Ottomanism, or Islamism as the primary legitimizing features of the Empire were now moving beyond redemption. In Poulton’s words, “The Young Turks, while paying lip-service to the concepts of Ottomanism and equality to all in reality progressively pursued a policy of Turkism.” There are, admittedly, differences of opinion as to whether it was actually Arab nationalism which triggered the rise of Turkish nationalism, now that the Turks felt there was no other alternative for preserving their own political rights; or whether, alternatively, as Zeine proposes, it was the rise of Turkish nationalism which actually triggered an Arab reaction. The truth is probably somewhere in-between, with mutual interaction between these two nationalisms. Yet, if there is something favouring the former argument it is that the Turkish nationalists were invariably identifying themselves with the Ottoman state right up until its last moment of collapse, thus wholly blatant Turkish nationalism within a multi-ethnic, eventually even multi-national empire would have been suicidal. This position is supported by Kushner who points out that even:

> The nationalism of the early Turkists was largely cultural. Nowhere in their writings was there a challenge to Ottomanism and Islamism, the official doctrines of the state. On the contrary, they were all too often eager to note their adherence to these doctrines. [They] were interested in the integrity and well-being of the state. It was therefore impossible to extend their Turkism beyond its cultural aspects.

Rustow argues that whether or not the Young Turks’ policies were right when first formulated, “once adopted they served, to some extent, as self-fulfilling prophesies. The facile way in which the Union and Progress movement after 1908 equated Ottomanism with Turkish nationalism served to antagonize further all the non-Turkish groups; and the heavy-handed repression of Albanians, Armenians, and Arabs confirmed each of these groups in their course of rebellion and secession.”

1048. See ZEINE 1966, 85–86.
1049. See LANDAU 1995, 46.
1050. See OBA 1995, 16.
1051. POULTON 1997, 76.
1052. KUSHNER 1977, 98.
1053. RUSTOW 1973, 105.
As Zeine indicates however, the Arabs were initially not generally in favour of independence and their opposition to Ottoman authorities, in which they often held many of the top positions, was largely related to abuses and misadministration; \(^{1054}\) Gradually, however, they did begin to develop a national consciousness that was to motivate their drive for independence. Zeine elucidates that several factors combined with the Turkification policies of the Young Turks to fuel the independence movement. These included the, “despotic policy of Djemal Pasha, Commander in-chief of the IVth Army in Syria, during the First World War, when he ordered the hanging of prominent Arabs in Beirut and Damascus;” the promises of the Allies to give the Arabs their independence, and; the actual covert and overt military and financial support given by the Allies to the Arab Revolt that began on June the 10th, 1916.\(^{1055}\)

As evidence of Turkification most scholars put forward the issue of language uniformity.\(^{1056}\) Karpat explains that:

> The Young Turks tried to maintain the existing Ottoman multinational state and to Turkify it by universalising the usage of Turkish. ... The imposition of the Turkish language in some Arabic schools and in Albania, and the expanding control of the central government in Istanbul over Arab areas which had enjoyed some autonomy in the past, were proof that the Ottoman state had lost its universalist Muslim characteristics.\(^{1057}\)

Karpat concludes that:

> The secularist Turkish nationalism, which gave priority to linguistic and ethnic affiliations, had started a chain reaction which broke the unity of the Muslims by stimulating the rise of ethnic and linguistic nationalism among them. Albanians and Arabs, under the leadership of their own agrarian and bureaucratic elites and supported by the West, sought independent nationhood.\(^{1058}\)

Jacoby too makes a similar case. He contends that:

> Supported by laws aimed at consolidating central control of the imperial periphery through restrictions on public association, press freedoms and the autonomy of the millets, the CUP embarked upon a programme of measures intended to promote an ethnocentrically Turkish national identity. Article 17 of the 1909 constitution, for instance, stipulated that Turkish language classes were to be a compulsory part of the curriculum, and that for secondary and higher levels Turkish was also to be the medium of instruction. Another measure was the requirement to use Turkish, rather than the Arabic of classical tradition, in the judicial system. In all the, the changes brought about by the CUP can be seen as part of a gradual move from reform aimed at Ottomanist integration (the strengthening of ties to a multinatio-

\(^{1054}\) On this matter see ZEINE 1966, 17.  
\(^{1055}\) Here the classical story of “Lawrence of Arabia”, the notorious British agent who played a prominent role in this revolt need not be recounted. But, that it is a story founded in truth need only be noted. For Lawrence’s own account of these events see T. E. Lawrence, “THE SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM.”; Zeine’s weakness, though, appears to be his understatement of the real existence of Arab nationalism even before the coming to power of the Young Turks in 1908. Perhaps what needs to be distinguished here is the idea of an Arab nation with political rights of self-determination that began to be supported by a narrow, largely Christian Arab circle by the late 1880’s, and the much wider-based Arab nationalism that had spread to the Arab Moslems in the post – Young Turk era. In this latter context Zeine’s contention that Arab nationalism was largely a response to the Young Turks’ Turkification is, from the perspective of the masses, feasible. See KARPAT 1973, 111.  
\(^{1056}\) On this issue see also ARAI 1992, 45–46.  
\(^{1057}\) KARPAT 1973, 111–112.  
\(^{1058}\) Ibid., 116.
Though Karpat, Zeine, Jacoby and others make a strong case for the pre-eminence of Turkish nationalism in the pre-World War I empire, the issue is not undisputed. As mentioned, Feroz Ahmad for one disputes the abandonment of Ottomanism and Islamism for Turkism. He claims that the Young Turks:

[C]ould not abandon any of the three elements in their ideology – Ottomanism, Islam, and nationalism – any change could only be one of emphasis. Despite the increasing importance of Turks as the most significant numerical group, Islam, not nationalism received the most emphasis; only some intellectuals in the capital took Turkish nationalism seriously.1060

What is more, an Arab, in fact an Egyptian Prince, Prince Said Halim Paşa, who was also a renowned Islamist, was appointed Grand Vizier in mid-1913 and maintained this position until 1917 when he resigned following the Arab Revolt. This appointment by the CUP is surely at least partial evidence of the fact that they were not by any means whole-hearted Turkifiers.

A more plausible and balanced argument, is that the Young Turks, unable to fully maintain the Islamist ideology of their rival Abdülhamid, and realizing that Ottomanism by itself was not proving sufficient to maintain the Empire, saw Turkism as an additional means of garnering support and solidarity amongst a substantial proportion of the population. As far as the Turkish language was concerned, this too could be seen more as an attempt to strengthen the Empire by making more centralization possible and by integrating the diverse population therein contained.1061 Even Ziya Gökalp, who has been described as the “Grand Master of Pan-Turkism in Turkey”, and who was a chief ideologue of the CUP), never fully abandoned Islam or Ottomanism, until the Empire had itself fully collapsed.1062

By 1913, with Arab nationalism on the rise, suggestions were even being made by some intellectual leaders, for the formation of a Dual Monarchy, (a sort of federation), between the Arab and Turkish components of the Empire, along the lines of the relatively successful Dual Monarchy that had successfully kept the Magyars and ethnic Germans of the Austrian Empire together within the new compromise structure of Austria-Hungary ever since 1867.1063 Perhaps, it was a mistake not to try this idea, as a famous female Turkish nationalist, Halide Edib, had urged, but by the end of World War I it was too late.1064 The Arabs had revolted and the Ottomans’ choice of the losing side in the War was to lead to ultimate catastrophe for their empire, as well as for the ideologies of Ottomanism and Islamism.

Whatever the case, by the time of the outbreak of World War I, Turkish nationalism was being openly displayed, and its impact gradually spreading through Cypriot society.

1060. AHMAD 1993, 39.
1061. This could perhaps be compared to the common use of English in the U.S.A. which would be hard to argue is necessarily an attempt to Anglicize the different ethnic groups of which its population is composed, but more a consequence of the integrative need for a common means of communication.
1062. See LANDAU 1995, 37; It is interesting, however, that Gökalp can also be seen as a theoretical founder of secularism within modern Turkey. See HEYD 1950, 88–92.
1063. See OBA 1995, 120.
1064. For Halide Edib’s views on this issue, see ZEINE 1966, 95.
As amongst the Turks of Istanbul and Anatolia, in Cyprus too it was perhaps still the terms Ottomanism and Ottoman nation that were generally still being utilized, but day-by-day their usage as virtual synonyms for Turkism and Turkish nation was growing. A new generation was emerging in whom national values were being inculcated from an early age through socialization in the schools, and as education advanced so did the scope of the nationalist message, a message that by 1914 was increasingly reaching the villages as well as the towns. Further, in some cases at least, parallel to developments in the Ottoman heartlands, clear espousal of “Turkish” nationalism was becoming evident. Telling was the editorial in the Kibris newspaper published on the 1st of June 1914, on the first anniversary of the paper’s establishment, in which the newspaper’s objectives were outlined:

Our newspaper’s primary goal is to serve Turkism and the nation.
This is for us a most holy duty and most unshakable undertaking and objective.
Our year’s collection [of newspapers] is very rich with articles written for this purpose.
Singing the songs of bitter grief in our nation’s most calamity-stricken times; with a Turkish heart, Turkish soul, and Turkish endurance, “Kibris” has been the first on the island to scream “revenge!” in the face of the oppression, cruelties, insults and murders and our pages have never stood back from reflecting the pure and exalted sentiments of mighty Turkism.

“Kibris” is the most fanatical supporter, most fanatical disseminator of the national idea, of the idea of revenge. For he who is unconscious of his nationality, who is unaffected by the insults he is subjected to, to the cruelties he suffers, is one who believes that a nation has no right to live. Because it believes that Turkishness will only be exalted with this nationalist fire and revenge; that the Turks, known to history, known to the world and known especially well by enemies, will in this way once again arise.

In its one year of publication “Kibris” has striven in line with this aim and has always led the way in the nationalist activities on the island.
Our circumstances are sufficient to prove its degree of success.
This conduct will continue to constitute the most important of our goals in the future as well.
We declare again today that our primary purpose is to serve the Turks, to serve the nation.
And one of our most important goals will be to protect and defend our national interests on the island.1065

Strikingly not one reference was made in the editorial to either Ottomanism or Islamism.

Though British officials in Cyprus do not appear to have comprehended this transformation, they were by the outbreak of World War I gradually, and somewhat belatedly, acknowledging the risks posed to their administration by the Young Turk movement in Cyprus, and trying to counteract them, with Goold-Adams reporting:

There are in Cyprus, as in Turkey itself, the two political parties, the Old Turkey party predominating in numbers; and it is this party which I hope to influence by what I have written, thereby strengthening the hands of the best of the Moslem community in resisting the insi-

1065. See for instance the news of how the schoolchildren of Tatsu village were now being taught to identify with the Ottoman flag and recite nationalist verse. Kibris 1st June 1914.
1066. Ibid.
dious influence of the Young Turkish Party, which at the present moment is being led astray by the German advisors in Constantinople.1067

As war approached, tensions surrounding the political destiny of the island once again mounted. According to both Purcell and Georghallides, Britain had indeed by the beginning of 1913 made informal representations to Venizelos about the possibility of enosis, though nothing had come of them.1068 Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot political leadership anticipated that the achievement of enosis was not far off. In a speech in the Legislative Council shortly before the outbreak of World War I, Theodotou had proposed the insertion of the following in the councillors’ official reply to the High Commissioner:

“The great historical events appositely alluded to by Your Excellency, that have taken place on the Greek Peninsula and in the islands, and in which the chief part was taken by Greece, with which Cyprus is attached by unbreakable ties, such events having been obtained at the cost of great labours and sacrifices, in which the Cyprus people had its share, have transformed in the conscience of the people their lively desire for national restoration into certainty that the annexation of Cyprus to Greece is imminent.

“The people of Cyprus base their confidence not only on the change of events which have ensued in the Near East, and on the strength of their own rights, but also on the deference of the right of nationalities displayed by the Ruling Power, in pursuance with its noble and liberal traditions.”1069

This early explicit reference to the principle of the right of national self-determination is meaningful as it increasingly became the means by which the Greeks justified their appeals for enosis, and in this they were to be amply assisted by the fact that Britain at times utilized it as a bait to garner support during the First World War. Theodotou in 1915, pronounced that now Britain had annexed the island, the “excuse” that the island was not Britain’s to give was no longer an adequate justification for British retention, especially as, “the right of nationality ... was the Gospel on which Great Britain based her reasons for fighting in the present war.”1070 Though İrfan Bey was to respond outright that, “he denied the principles of the right of nationality,” Dr. Eyyub Necmeddin’s response was more substantial. Asking if Theodotou, “was of opinion that the inhabitants of Poland were satisfied with their lot up to now,” he went on, in true Bismarkian fashion, to remark that, “it is might and interest which rule in the world!”1071 A little later in the debate he elaborated his ideas further in a rather more convoluted way, stating:

From the very creation of the world the various races inhabiting it had always struggled with each other on the grounds of religion and race, and in the course of time when civilization had advanced there were less wars on account of religion, but the different races continued

1067. Goold-Adams to Harcourt, 4th September 1914. CO 67/173, 404; The written material that the High Commissioner referred to was a letter which he wrote to İrfan Bey, so as for him to publish in the Turkish Cypriot press, that insisted that the British requisition of the two Ottoman warships should not be taken as an affront by the Turkish Cypriots.
1068. Purcell states that: “In December 1912 or January 1913, Lloyd George (in the presence of Prince Louis Battenberg and Churchill) suggested to Venizelos that Cyprus be exchanged for a base at Argostoli, in Cephalonia. Venizelos accepted in principle, but there was opposition from Streit, the Foreign Minister of Greece (on the grounds that this would tie Greece to Britain), and the matter dropped.” PURCELL 1969, 231; See also GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 92–93 and TERLEXIS 1968, 69–70.
1069. Minutes of the Legislative Council 1st April 1914, 7.
1070. Minutes of the Legislative Council 19th April 1915, 10.
1071. Ibid., 11.
to fight with each other for other reasons. During the last three centuries the principle of nationality had come forward and was taught in the schools. The principle of the right of nationality was a very bright principle and was a basis for the future prosperity of communities, and had the nations that had embraced the principle adhered to it free from any selfish motives they would not have seen the world in its present condition. France was admitted to be one of the most civilized nations in the world, and yet the way they had oppressed the Moors in Algeria was as bad as the way some cruel people might treat animals. When they had such facts before their eyes they could never be sure that they would receive proper protection from other Governments. He fully admitted that the principle of nationality was a very good and bright one, but it was not based on the principles of humanity, and it was therefore not always possible to apply it nowadays.1072

When, however, Theodotou went on to state that, “Cyprus had been from the most ancient times, and continued to be, a Greek country, and through all those ages it had preserved its national character,” a new can of worms was opened by İrfan Bey who could not resist remarking that this had been, “thanks to the Turks.”1073 Not to be outdone, Theodotou retorted that:

[It] was not thanks to the Turks, but due to the indomitable power of the Greek race by which it had been able to absorb and assimilate its rulers instead of being absorbed and assimilated by them. Cyprus, therefore, Hellenic as she is from one end of the Island to the other had the right to raise her voice and proclaim that it was not possible for her to live under any other flag than that of His Majesty King Constantine XII1074 [and continued to state that] ... the time had come when they expected the magnanimous British Nation to liberate them from their chains and unite them to their Mother Greece ... [which was] the prayer that was in the heart of every Cypriot.1075

Not willing to yield to his more eloquent opponent, İrfan Bey commented that he, “supposed that the Honourable Member meant the Greek-Cypriots,” and in this they finally concurred, with Theodotou replying that this to be sure was the case.1076

In fact, this final point is interesting in that while some sources have portrayed the Turkish Cypriots as having for long been indifferent to the prospect of enosis, Greek Cypriot leaders themselves often accepted that this was not the case.1077 As some authors have acknowledged, the reality was that it was in fact the nationalist movement of the Greek Cypriots that was “indifferent” to Turkish Cypriot political sentiments and not vice versa. As explored in previous chapters, the doctrine espoused by the Greek Cypriots excluded the Turks, and their nationalist movement made no serious effort to co-opt them in its struggles. Bryant aptly asserts that the Turks were repelled by Greek Cypriot political action, “in large part because it ignored them in both material and ideological terms.”1078 The Greek Cypriots’ cause might well have been considered anti-colonial, but, “The aim of ‘Enosis’ … which played a central part in the nationalist movement of Cyprus differen-
tiated the Cyprus movement from other movements in the colonial world which simply aimed at the overthrow of the colonial Rule and the establishment of a people’s own independent state.”  

Anita Walker’s research amongst the Greeks of the village of Dhali suggests that this perspective continued to be shared by the elite and villagers alike. “For Greek Cypriots in Dhali,” she writes, “freedom from colonial rule implied freedom to choose incorporation into Greece.” It was most importantly this characteristic of the Greek Cypriot call for “freedom” which most obdurately obstructed political cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots. And, in turn, as the Turks felt increasingly threatened by the aspirations of the Greeks, they too no doubt tended to become less tolerant of the differences of the Greek Cypriot community and more ethno-centric, leading to greater social distance developing between the two groups.

Under such conditions, it is hardly remarkable that two diametrically opposed nationalisms were encouraged on the island, for, as Loizos was to write, enosis, “has been a dominant political symbol in the island’s life for over a hundred years, in which time it has excluded other possible nationalisms, for example, a ‘Cypriot’ nationalism which would have sought to unite the island’s Greek and Turkish populations.”

That this was the case might be partially understood from Rizvi’s pertinent analysis that, “the Greek Cypriots mistook Turkish relative passivity as an indication of its acquiescence in the movement for ‘Enosis’.” His argument would be bolstered further by the supple-

For the first seventy-five years of British rule, while the Cypriot Greeks and the British were blowing alternately hot and cold on the question of Enosis, Turks, both in Cyprus and Turkey, were rather quiescent. Of course every time the Greeks made a lot of noise about Enosis, the Turks gave notice that they would not accept such an eventuality, but they did so with dignity and composure.

Many Turkish-Cypriots reasoned that the Sultan had seen fit to let the British have Cyprus and they, the Cypriot Turks, had no right and little reason to complain about it. They were contented with the new administration, except for minor matters in which they hoped to obtain satisfaction from the authorities. Britain was a Christian power, hence no self-respec-

1080. Especially striking are the words of one of her interviewees: “The traditional feeling of the people was that ‘free’ meant, for the people of Cyprus of those days, to become part of Greece—that was their utmost objective, the goal to which all people of Cyprus … geared their efforts, their hopes. That’s what they meant, being free: being part of Greece.” WALKER 1984, 478.
1081. LOIZOS 1974, 129.
1082. RIZVI 1993, 62.
1083. Admittedly, though not typically the case, the British did on occasion recognise this, such as in 1904 when the High Commissioner wrote in a confidential despatch complaining of the Greeks “cajoling” of the Turkish members of the Legislative Council that, “They cajole the Turkish Members on every subject except that of union with Greece and even as regards that agitation many of the Turks are contemptuously indifferent, because they believe the British Government cannot permit it. If the Turks at any time believe that the question is being considered there will be violence unless controlled by force.” Haynes-Smith to Lyttelton, 14th January 1904. CO 67/138, 42–43.
ting Muslim community with a proud imperial and military tradition could relish her domi-
nation, but except for World War I, she was a friend and an ally and her rule was just and
respectful of the Muslim religion and Turkish rights in Cyprus. The Cypriot Turks closely
cooperated with the British and supported them against the Greek majority. Only at rare
moments, as in the crisis of 1931, did the Turkish members of the Legislative Council
become irritated enough to vote with the Greeks against the wishes of the British Governor,
thus upsetting the balance and causing serious embarrassment to the British. …

At no time, however, did Turkish acquiescence in British rule imply any degree of loosening
of the spiritual ties holding the Cypriot Turk firmly attached to Turkey. Legally they became
British subjects after 1914 and they took some pride in it, but without, for a moment, falte-
ring in their basic and transcendent loyalty to Turkey which was and always remained their
fatherland.1084

With only a few months remaining before the start of the War, the Secretary of State
had come to the conclusion that he would accept the Greek Cypriots’ lesser demands for
greater representation in the Legislative Council, though notably agreeing with the condi-
tion put forward by the High Commissioner, “that any increase in the number of elected
Christian members must be accompanied by an equal addition of Government nominated
members.”1085 War, however, appears to have interrupted these plans for constitutional
reform, though when such reform was finally introduced in 1925 it was to be along the
very lines that had been contemplated in 1914. That this, if implemented, would anyway
have satisfied the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots is highly unlikely, with Mr. Hadji
Ioannou having openly expressed in the Legislative Council, “that it was unreasonable for
the Right Honourable the Secretary of State to expect them to admit that their request for
an increase in the membership of the Council would be satisfied if the official seats were
also to be increased,” and quite reasonably that, “The wish of the Greek Representatives
was not to the effect that they should sit in the Council in greater numbers, but in order to
secure a political step in the country which would enhance the progressiveness of the
administration.”1086

It was not just in their endeavours to achieve enosis, however, that the Greek Cypriots
failed to get the support of the Turks, but also in those calling for a greater degree of
self-government. Typically, this is represented also as evidence of the Turks acting as the
instruments of the British, yet looking from their angle, their stance is also understandable
in other ways. Any greater degree of self-government which meant that the Greek
Cypriots had the ability to unilaterally decide upon policy, and whereby undoubtedly also
the ability of the Turkish members to gain the patronage of the British administration in
return for their assistance, would be liable to be detrimental to the interests of the Turks.
Hami Bey, for example, was to take the position that, particularly in light of develop-
ments regarding the Moslems in Thessaly and Crete over the past 30 years, he could not
possibly agree with the Greek Cypriot members that the posts of Commissioner should be

1085. Secretary of State to Goold-Adams, 20th March 1914. CO 883/7, 45; See also, Minute by Sir G. Fiddes,
11th March 1914. CO 67/172, 237, where it is stated also that giving additional representation to the
Greeks would be, “regarded by the Turks as another kick at fallen Islam and will alienate them from the
Govt.”
1086. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 9th June 1914, 330.
held by natives for the “feelings of the two elements inhabiting the Island” were not, “in accord”.  

Admittedly, if the Greek Cypriots were to abandon the goal of enosis, and to use their additional powers in the interests of all Cypriots, there is no reason why the Turkish Cypriots could not have also benefited from reform of the constitutional framework. However, they repeatedly asserted their lack of trust in the impartiality of the Greek Cypriots, particularly were they to be given a majority in the Council, and, with some justification, felt that the Greeks would be encouraged to contemplate any such development as a step towards enosis.

Defending their positions was no longer as simple as in the past. The question of equal as opposed to proportional representation in the assembly, for instance, was no longer one where the Turkish members could so easily point to the Ottoman Empire for precedents justifying their case. The Parliament constituted in Istanbul following the Young Turk Revolution, did not provide equal representation to the various ethnic or religious groups within the Empire, and this fact was duly noted by the Greek members, Mr. Theodotou stating that, “what they now asked for was nothing more than what justice demanded, and what the Turkish Constitution granted to all the people under her administration, namely a proper representation in Parliament according to the population of each province.”

A report prepared by the General Staff of the War Office shortly before the outbreak of the First World War observed that: “The Cypriots are divided into two great classes, Christians and Mohammedans; though the usual separation of creed divides them, there is an absence of fanaticism, and the Moslems generally live in peace and harmony with their Christian neighbours.” As far as it went this analysis was basically accurate. “Peace and harmony” were still the rule, and to observers without the benefit of hindsight, disruptions to the norm such as those witnessed in 1912, might have appeared as insignificant exceptions. Yet they were in fact far from insignificant, representing as they did the growing rift between the two communities to which rival nationalisms, increasingly defined on ethnic, rather than purely religious premises, were gaining sway in Cyprus. Martial law and the extraordinary circumstances of the War and its aftermath may have temporarily camouflaged these tendencies, yet they remained a reality that the British would, and to an important extent did, overlook at their own peril.

4.7 World War I: Trials and Tribulations for the Turks of Cyprus

The outbreak of the “Great War” was undoubtedly a time of great trauma for the Turkish Cypriots. Caught between loyalties to the Ottoman Empire, (whose sovereignty over the island they had continued to insist upon in the post-revolutionary period), and to their...
British overlords, overt expressions of the Turkish Cypriot sentiments were understandably curtailed, and those that were made must be judged with great care, taking into account once again the context from which they emanated. It is attested to by Landau’s study of colonial papers that by 1914, “a Young Turk Party was active in British-governed Cyprus, siding with the Ottoman Empire and Germany against Great Britain,” and that, “Three years later, several Turkish Cypriots became active Young Turk sympathizers and propagandists,” and as we will see there were, despite the restrictions, numerous other bases for arguing against the conventional wisdom that Turkish Cypriot sympathies during the war years lay unreservedly with the British.1092

It is likely no coincidence that the Turkish Cypriot press fell silent during this period. From 1915 to 1919 no Turkish Cypriot newspapers were published.1093 Though some mystery still surrounds the precise reasons for the interlude, it is possible to logically suggest that under the conditions of British imposed martial law, publishers and journalists either did not feel able to, or were physically obstructed from, freely expressing their sentiments regarding the progress of a war in which Britain and the Ottoman Empire were in battle. Certainly financial constraints and logistical difficulties like the scarcity of necessary materials such as paper might have had an impact, but that numerous Greek Cypriot newspapers managed to survive, should not be overlooked. Perhaps especially revealing in a negative sense is that the British could not find anyone to publish a pro-British journal at a time when it would have been useful for propaganda purposes. A secret despatch by the High Commissioner of the 17th April 1917 reveals that such a publication would not have gone amiss from his request to London for the continuation of the supply of Turkish, (and Greek), newspapers, as well as occasional pamphlets and documents, “owing to the racial affinities of its two principal communities.”1094 Clauson notes that, “no Turkish newspaper is published here at present, while the local Greek press is totally inadequate as an exponent of the aims and achievements of the Allies,” and further states that, “These circumstances, together with the fact that bazaar rumours are not less plentiful here than in other Eastern Countries, render it desirable that the transmission of the publications under discussion should not be discontinued.”1095 Clauson’s report as to the use of such materials in Cyprus, remarked that amongst the Turkish language material, “distributed gratis to the principal towns and clubs of the Island,” was the Al-Hakikat newspaper.1096

Bryant suggests that, “many leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community began to demand censorship of that community’s newspapers,” and that this, “became the primary cause of the death of a flourishing local press,” but her argument here is not very convincing. As evidence for her assertion she cites the comments of the Colonial Secretary in response to a rejected Turkish Cypriot application to publish a new newspaper in 1917.

1091. As noted earlier, in a confidential despatch in 1910 to the Secretary of State, High Commissioner King-Harman had stated that any suggestion of the Ottoman sovereignty having ended with the British Occupation of 1878, would have important ramifications in Cyprus. It would, he had forbode, “be joyfully and maliciously paraded by the Greek press and would occasion deep offence to the hyper-sensitive Turks.” CO 883/7, 122; See also, CEMAL 1997, 26, for a direct Turkish source.
1092. LANDAU 1995, 49.
1093. ÜNLÜ s.a., 47.
1095. Ibid.
1096. Enclosure in Ibid., 412.
He had stated: “no Turkish paper was at the time published in the island and that the publication of a paper with obviously political intent ‘might tend to revise [revive?] animosities within the Moslem community at present more or less dormant outwardly.’”

However rivalries and animosities existed in the Turkish Cypriot community, (as in the Greek), long before the War began, particularly in the press, and they were to immediately resurface once the press was re-established at war’s end. The various newspapers, both before and after the War, were consistently at each other’s throats, and had made appeals for the silencing of their opponents too; would it, therefore, not be a little too coincidental to suggest that it was only during these specific years that the British heeded such calls out of respect for the Turkish Cypriots’ own desires?

True the more religiously conservative wing led by the Kadi had protested to the authorities about articles in the Seyf considered to have been “blasphemous” for their criticism of dogmatic interpretations of the Koran, (that it was insisted were an impediment to a modern, rational and scientific education), and requested that punitive action be taken against the newspaper. Yet even though the British authorities held that there was little legal case for prosecution, they went ahead and ordered the Chief Commandant of Police to issue a strong warning and threaten legal proceedings. Shortly after, on the eve of war, the paper ceased publication. A few months earlier Bodamyazade Mehmet Münr had departed for Istanbul where he remained till war’s end. In January of 1917 High Commissioner Clauson reported to the Colonial Office as follows:

For some time prior to his departure for Constantinople, which took place in April, 1914, he had played an active rather than a useful part in Nicosia municipal politics, and he was at one time a member of the Central Mejlis İdaré. After the elections to that body which took place in December, 1912, the Officer Administering the Government declined to re-appoint him, though he was qualified by the number of votes he had received, owing to his generally undesirable behaviour and tendencies. Among Munir Bey’s activities in Nicosia was included the conduct of the now defunct Turkish newspaper “Seyf”, a journal of violently Young-Turk proclivities; he was tireless in attacking the Old-Turk party, and it seemed to be his aim generally to stir up strife in the Moslem community of Cyprus. I have reason to believe that responsible Moslems here regard him with strong disfavour, and viewed with relief his departure for Constantinople. It may safely be assumed that he proceeded to Constantinople, where he was at the outbreak of war with Turkey, in order to carry on more effectively his intrigues with the Committee of Union and progress. …

As far as the attitude of this administration to Munir Bey is concerned, I would only say that I find no reason to credit him with friendly or loyal sentiments towards the British Government in general or towards that of Cyprus in particular.

Would the British authorities, which had not long before been unwilling to accord such credence to the complaints of the Kadi and Müftü concerning inflammatory rhetoric in the Greek press, have been prepared to have intervened on their behalf if the Seyf had not

1097. BRYANT 2001b, 324.
1098. Cadi to Chief Secretary, 18th June 1914. SA1/879/1914, 5–6; See also Minute by Mr Amirayan, 2nd July 1914. SA1/879/1914.
1099. Acting Chief Secretary to Cadi, 6th July 1914. SA1/879/1914, 8; Minute by Mr Amirayan, 2nd July 1914. SA1/879/1914; Cadi of Cyprus to Chief Secretary, 13th October 1914. SA1/879/1914, 10.
1100. Minute by Gallagher, 22nd October 1914. SA1/879/1914.
1101. Clauson to Secretary of State, 22nd January 1917. CO 67/184, 79–80.
been a Unionist journal with strong links to the authorities in Istanbul with whom the British were preparing to do combat?

Closer analysis of the particular comments that Bryant refers to suggests a sub-text, one where it was the British, rather than the Turkish Cypriots, who were concerned that a quite “dormant” Turkish Cypriot community, albeit only acknowledged as being “outwardly” so, might ruffle some feathers to their own dislike through the publication of a paper intent on challenging the Evkaf. The fact that the application was being made by Osman Cemal who had been a leading critic of the pro-British elite, no doubt also contributed to concerns. The Acting Chief Secretary’s minute addressed to the High Commissioner made a point of predicting that if publication were permitted, “undesirable public controversy, involving a quasi-Govt. Department, would ensue.” Furthermore, without giving any reason for the refusal of a permit, it was suggested that the application could be renewed, “at the end of the war.”

In fact, a confidential file opened by the Colonial Office in September of 1914, adds some further credence to the proposition that the British were keen to silence the Turkish Cypriot press during the war years. The file was entitled “Attitude of Moslem Community towards Gt. Britain” and its contents were summarized in the following terms: “Reports that feeling has been stirred up by Turkish newspapers agst. Gt. Britain in respect of her taking over two ships being built for Turkey. Trs. copy of corre. with İrfan Bey in an attempt to counteract the influence of local Moslem newspapers.” Fiddes cautioned: “it must be remembered that the Press in that island is said to wield far too great an influence.” As seen from the following paper, entitled, “Moslem Community [:] Attitude Towards Great Britain,” the High Commissioner was concerned enough to order the District Commissioners to hold meetings with the leading Moslems so as to assure them that the requisition of the ships were not intended as a slight to Turkey.

That many British officials had concerns about reactions to the war from the Turkish Cypriots is evident from numerous reports. They had already decided by September of 1914, to annex the island on the outbreak of hostilities with Turkey, and secret minutes reveal that Colonial Office staff, concerned that Cyprus would be hard to defend against an Ottoman attack, were not fully reassured by the comments of some overseas that they, “did not think the Turkish Cypriots would give trouble in the event of a war with Turkey.” In one minute was ominously recorded an omission: “the H. C. says the Greeks are ultra-British. He does not mention the Turks,” and suggested that the position of the Turks as Ottoman subjects would be difficult once hostilities began. In fact, in a pri-

1102. Minute by Acting Chief Secretary, 5th April 1917. SA1/620/1917.
1103. Osman Jemal to Chief Secretary, 5th April 1917. SA1/620/1917, 2.
1104. Minute by Acting Chief Secretary, 5th April 1917. SA1/620/1917.
1105. Ibid.
1108. See file cover entitled “Moslem Community [:] Attitude Towards Great Britain” in CO 67/ 173, 463.
1109. Minute by Sir G. Fiddes, 3rd September 1914. CO 537/24, 6–7, and Minute by W. Ellis, 3rd September 1914. CO 537/24, 7.
1110. Minute by W. Ellis, 3rd September 1914. CO 537/24, 7; From a legal standpoint the Greek Cypriots were just as much Ottoman at the time as the Turks. It may be assumed, therefore, that what the author was really referring to was probably not the legal implications, but rather the sentiments of the Turks of Cyprus.
vate and frank letter to Lord Kitchener at the beginning of 1915, Lewis Harcourt expressed his own concern about potential difficulties as follows:

If & when Greece comes into the War it may lead to some disturbance in Cyprus. The overwhelming majority of the population are Greek but the armed constabulary are all Turks. ... Would you ask Maxwell to hold a half battalion of Territorials or other white troops ready at Port Said to start at short notice for Cyprus if required. I have told the High Commd. at Cyprus to communicate at once with Egypt as well as with me if there is trouble.1111

Yet, it is equally clear that no revolt or uprising of the Turkish Cypriots did materialize, and that the British repeatedly affirmed the loyalty of this community.1112 Ellis’ prediction of September 1914, proved accurate. He had stated, “I am inclined to believe that even in the event of war with Turkey, there would be no concerted action by the Turks in Cyprus against us – provided the Greeks abstain from undue jubilation & insult.”1113 Admittedly the British did make some extra effort to respect Turkish sensitivities.1114 They also tried somewhat to assure that tensions between the island’s Greeks and Turks were kept under control during the war years, keeping secret, for example, Greece’s use of the island to transfer arms, and maintaining a garrison of Maltese troops, whose only duty was “to prevent or quiet any racial conflict between the Greek and Turkish lower classes.”1115 However, they did little to dissuade the island’s Greeks from continuing to preach the virtues of Hellenic nationalism in their schools and through their press, or at religious or even athletic gatherings.1116 They appear even to have believed at one point that their aspiring for Union with Greece could actually compliment British interests, with High Commissioner John Clauson declaring in a secret despatch of January 1916 that:

My experience of Greek-Cypriots is that they have a deep respect for English institutions and ideals, and that their Hellenic sentiments do not run counter to their loyalty to British rule but flow alongside it as a far stronger current of influence in their political consciousness. There is room, I believe, for Hellenic nationalism within British Imperialism.

1112. See, for example, Clauson to Bonar Law, 26th June 1916. CO67/181, 176 and Minute by W. Ellis, 18th October 1916. CO 67/181, 504.
1113. Minute by W. Ellis, 19th September 1914. CO 67/ 173, 463.
1114. For example, when it was decided in 1916 that an Armenian corps would be located in Cyprus, the High Commissioner stated, “it is advisable to minimize contact with the Cypriot Turks who are uneasy,” and recommended that, “a secluded site in the north or east of the island should be sought.” Telegram from Clauson to Secretary of State, 6th September 1916. CO 67/181, 419.
1115. Telegram from Clauson to Secretary of State, 3rd January 1915. CO 67/176, 4; Enclosure in Clauson to Bonar Law, 24th July 1915. CO 67/177, 178.
1116. Clauson to Bonar Law, 21st January 1916. CO 67/180, 38–39; As to their schools in particular, Orr recorded at war’s end: [T]he Greek elementary schools are used largely for fostering the Hellenic idea; there is hardly a school in the island whose walls are not adorned with portraits of the Greek royal family; Greek flags are displayed on all occasions, and Greek Independence Day celebrated every year with great fervour; Greek schoolmasters present florid addresses to the High Commissioner when he visits their villages, in which union with Greece is represented in flowing periods as the predominant ideal filling the breasts of all the villagers, and the schoolchildren are marshalled in an imposing phalanx, and taught to shout in unison “Zeto Enosis” (Long live Union), as the High Commissioner approaches.” ORR 1972, 131–132.
If these views are correct it is unnecessary and would be impolitic to combat manifestations of Hellenic sentiment except in so far as they offend the legitimate susceptibilities of other more actively loyal British subjects in Cyprus, or transgress the canons of international comity.\footnote{1117}

When at the end of the year Venizelos was to undertake a campaign to recruit soldiers from Cyprus, the British were content to turn a blind eye, despite the realization that it could, “cause great offence” to the Turkish Cypriots.\footnote{1118} In a minute on the matter, Mr. Fiddes of the Colonial Office declared, “If Cypriots do want to join the revolutionary army why not let them?”, though he did add the caveat that this, “should not be officially encouraged,” and suggested that the, “Govt. could pretend not to notice it.”\footnote{1119}

Much is made of the expressions of loyalty made by the Turkish Cypriot leadership at the outbreak of the war and following the island’s annexation on the 5th of November 1914.\footnote{1120} The day after annexation the High Commissioner cabled to the Colonial Office the following telegram:

Order in Council for annexation of Cyprus to Great Britain was published last evening. To-day the Moslem leaders called on me voluntarily and expressed on behalf of the Moslem population their acceptance of the change which had taken place and promised the same loyal obedience to His Majesty the King as heretofore they declared that they were ashamed of the present actions of the Turkish Government who showed so little gratitude \textit{[to]} Great Britain for all the sympathy and help accorded by that country to the Ottoman Empire and Moslem people in the past. Everything is proceeding normally anticipate no trouble. GOOLD ADAMS.\footnote{1121}

An appeal that followed to Secretary of State Lewis Harcourt, signed by seven of the leading Turks of Cyprus, including the Kadi, Müftü, Irfan Bey, Şevket Bey and Yorgancıbaşzade Mustafa Sami, had pronounced, “We rejoice in the annexation of this island to the British Empire.”\footnote{1122} Superficially, it would, as stated by Attalides, “seem that the Muslim leaders welcomed the severance of relations with the Ottoman Empire.”\footnote{1123} However, it must again be recalled that such proclamations were being made at a time when it appeared that the threat of the island being permanently united to Greece was imminent, as testified to by other sections of the same letter which announced:

We learn with very deep regret that the Greeks of the Island have taken advantage of the Proclamation of the annexation of Cyprus to renew their demands for the cession of the Island to Greece. … We entertain the deep conviction that were this Island to be handed over to Greece, as seems to be the firm opinion of the local Greek politicians, such a step would be disastrous to the 60,000 Moslems of the Island.\footnote{1124}
Basing himself on such manifest expressions, Hill goes so far as to claim that the annexation was, “received with enthusiasm, even by a large majority of Moslems.” He does not note in this context, for instance, that martial law had already been in force on the island for three months prior to the annexation order. Hill writes that the Moslem leaders made statements such as those alluded to above “voluntarily”, which, if not an attempt by the author to justify British annexation, is rather naive. Certainly they had no physical gun pointed to their heads, but Hill totally overlooks the circumstances in which they made such declarations. Contrasting İrfan Bey’s statement made before the annexation and start of hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, regarding the Ottoman warships, acknowledging the efforts the British made in annexing the island not to hurt Turkish sensibilities, (by, for instance, steering clear of any public ceremony in Nicosia, “To avoid the possibility of hurting Turkish feelings” and giving assurances that annexation would not affect their communal and religious rights and privileges), and; most importantly, recognising the dearth of alternatives open to the Turkish Cypriots, should help one to comprehend why the Turkish Cypriots generally “acquiesced” to rather than “rejoiced” in the annexation.

The Turkish Cypriots, even if sympathetic to the Ottoman cause, numerically constituted only a small proportion of the island’s population, and had no military capacity to take the initiative in overthrowing British rule. Korkut contends that İrfan Bey got the other signatories to agree to such declarations with the assurance it would ease the situation of the Turkish community on the island through the war years, and it must be granted that there was no sweeping policy of British repression of the Turkish Cypriots during the War, a reality that might to some extent be attributed to a policy of appeasing the British followed by much of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Doubtless a strong element of self-interest was at work too, for any sign of disloyalty would undoubtedly have led to the loss of the privileged posts held by leaders such as the Kadi and Turkish Evkaf Delegate who had both been appointed by the Porte. Beckingham’s position that declarations made at the outbreak of the war, “may perhaps be discounted because of the positions held by those who made them,” is a much wiser stance than that taken by Hill, though, as will be discussed, his emphatic appreciation that, “there was virtually no sign of dissatisfaction anywhere and no instance of disaffection during the war,” is not of the same calibre. That these Turkish officials were able to retain their posts by unequivocally and publicly supporting the British annexation is a fact, but a fact that can not be used to extrapolate the sentiments of the Turkish Cypriot community at large.

Keeping in mind that it is underlying sentiments, rather than overt expressions and actions, that we are principally trying to reveal, there are several indications that the Turks of Cyprus though outwardly generally displaying loyalty to the British in an explicit sense, continued to sympathise with the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the more realis-
tic appreciation of Orr is worth noting, for unlike many he was able to make some distinction between the manifest and latent sentiments of the Turks. Talking of the situation during the War, Orr wrote that, “the Turks in Cyprus, although naturally sympathizing with the struggles of their compatriots outside the island, have remained loyal and law-abiding subjects of the British Empire.”

Korkut testifies that the people were in fact distraught when a few days after the annexation they heard from Reuters’ news reports, that the Turkish Cypriots had declared they were happy with the annexation. Berkes recollects that during the War those relatively well-educated Turkish Cypriots, particularly those who were not dependent on British patronage, were adamantly pro-German, and that faith in the triumph of the Germans dominated even in the villages, and recalls also how growing-up during the war he had found a portrait of Wilhelm II concealed in his own home. His view as to pro-German sympathies appears to be validated by the somewhat disappointed words of the High Commissioner in a telegram sent to the Secretary of State at the end of 1916 regarding the establishment of a prisoner of war camp in Cyprus. Here High Commissioner Clauson declared: “I think that the effect on the Cyprus Moslems will be beneficial by shaking the idea of German invincibility in their slow minds and showing them British treatment of gallant adversary.” Kaymak, on the other hand, recounts how during his school years at the beginning of World War I the students would recite the words from Namık Kemal “Vatan Yahut Silistre” and sing patriotic Ottoman songs in which the Greeks were portrayed as traitors. When the British forbade them from doing so, he says, they then began to whistle the tunes. Altan refers to a report from an Ottoman officer conducting surveillance who had picked up a Turkish Cypriot fisherman by the name of Hacı Karayusufoğlu Hüseyin, off the island’s coast. The latter had informed the officer that the island’s Moslems always prayed for an Ottoman victory and wanted to join the Ottoman ranks but were prevented from doing so by the British.

That many Turkish Cypriots continued to view the island as Ottoman territory, in their hearts at least, is indicated not only by the above, but also by a statement made by Ahmed Said in the Legislative Council in April, 1918. In what, considering the context, must be considered a quite courageous speech he maintained that Ottoman rights still continued despite the British having claimed to have annexed the island. Faced by another proposal for enosis, Said Efendi pronounced that the Turkish councillors, “were compelled, both by race and sentiments, to resist it to the utmost.” He proceeded to state that when the Cyprus Convention had originally been made in 1878:

1131. ORR 1972, 169.
1132. KORKUT 2000, 64.
1133. BERKES 1997, 35.
1134. Telegram from High Commissioner to Secretary of State for Colonies, 13th October 1916. CO 67/182, 23.
1135. KAYMAK 1981.
1136. The same intelligence, revealed also, however, that there were also Moslems, as well as Greeks who had volunteered to join the British army and had been sent to the front in Salonica. ALTAN 1997, 29–36.
1137. In fact British documents indicate that the British themselves were not wholly sure as to the legal status of the annexation until the finalization of peace with the Treaty of Lausanne. [See, for example, articles 30 and 31 of the memorandum of 18th December 1924 prepared by Mr. Headlam-Morley and Mr. Childs in FO 286/922; See also Mr. Dawe’s letter of the 12th May 1925 written to Miles W. Lampson, where he states that Cyprus had not been officially declared a Crown Colony until then, “because it was thought better to wait till the Great Powers had formally recognised the annexation.” FO 286/922.
It was, of course, impossible to fix the duration of England’s occupation of Cyprus and it was therefore agreed that she should continue to occupy Kars, Ardahan and Batoum. If this question was now submitted to arbitration it would be found that England had no right to cede the Island to any other Nation except the former owner. ... [Said therefore would] request in the name of all the Moslems of Cyprus and in the name of the entire Moslem world that England should remain faithful to the Convention.\textsuperscript{1138}

When Mr. Lanitis replied that the Convention had been terminated long-before Kars, Ardahan and Batum were returned, (which had been restored to the Ottomans by the Russians as part of the peace made for their withdrawal from World War I), Said Efendi demurred, stating that, “the termination of the Convention had not yet received final judgement, and in his opinion was still in force.” According to the minutes:

He then said that they prayed the illustrious British Government that if it was decided to leave Cyprus she should cede it to the party from whom she had received it and to whom it rightly belongs. Such an act would not only cause great pleasure to the entire Moslem world, but it would also prove that England respected Treaties and Conventions.\textsuperscript{1139}

That Said Efendi was willing to challenge the assumption that Britain’s annexation was legitimate and legal is even more significant when it is considered that at the time he was considered by many in his own community to be rather too close to the colonial administration, while it was his rival, Dr. Eyyub, who was considered the nationalist.\textsuperscript{1140} However, whatever perceptions may then have been, as we will see, by the late 1920’s the tables had turned, and, while Eyyub had moved to the British side, Ahmet Said now assumed the nationalist mantle.

Korkut’s memoirs indicate too that the core membership of the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club maintained a staunchly pro-German stance during the War reflecting the hope that the German side would win and that at the outcome of the war Cyprus would once again be restored to Ottoman rule. The members of the club, states Korkut, were at the time under the full sway of Unionist propaganda.\textsuperscript{1141}

\textsuperscript{1138} Minutes of the Legislative Council 3\textsuperscript{rd} April 1918, 7, 7–8.
\textsuperscript{1139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1140} KORKUT 2000, 66; Nevertheless, it is possible to see that Said indicated attachment to the Ottoman state even earlier. In the Legislative Council session of 1917 he had retorted in response to another call for enosis by the Greek Cypriot members that, “When they looked round from the top of the mountains of the Island they would not see Peloponnesus but the Anatolian coast.” He declared that, “they urged the British Government that if it ever became necessary to cede the Island to another Government it should be restored to its former owner,” and that this, “would be a means of bringing about a great friendship between Turkey and England in the future. If that proposal could not be acceded to then they trusted and prayed that the Island should remain in the hands of Great Britain.” Minutes of the Legislative Council, 6\textsuperscript{th} June 1917, 204–206.
\textsuperscript{1141} KORKUT 2000, 64.
He recounts also that Necmi Sağıp Bodamyulızade, an eccentric Turkish Cypriot by all accounts, one day boldly marched into the club and announced, “Gentlemen, you are mistaken, the English are going to win this war”, then turned around and marched out again.\textsuperscript{1142} Korkut himself was branded an Ottoman sympathiser, and he charged that the colonial authorities had denied him the promotions he deserved as a consequence.\textsuperscript{1143} He informs us also that many government-employed members of the Hüriyet ve Terraki Club, (including Münir Bey, who was later to win such fame for his pro-British loyalty), resigned from the club, and that others were transferred by the government to posts in distant parts of the island.\textsuperscript{1144} Amongst those civil servants transferred away from the capital were Korkut himself, and his brother Ahmet Raik; each being posted to different towns.\textsuperscript{1145}

Turkish Cypriot insecurity was undoubtedly enhanced at the end of 1915 when the British made their first and last ever formal offer of enosis.\textsuperscript{1146} With the Entente Powers pressed on the Balkan front Britain offered the island to Greece in return for Greece joining the war on their side, but were turned down largely due to the Greek King’s belief that the Entente Powers were unlikely to triumph.\textsuperscript{1147} The Greek Cypriots were likely generally disappointed in the fact that the offer had not been taken up by Greece, and were described by the High Commissioner as having been “obviously perplexed” as a consequence.\textsuperscript{1148} Though the offer thereafter lapsed, they nevertheless took this offer in itself to represent a justification of their demands, and thereafter frequently used it as a point of reference. In the words of Georghallides, “the incident vindicated the Greek Cypriot aspirations for enosis and, even if only briefly, Britain conferred official recognition of those aspirations. In spite of later attempts by the British Government to discount or ignore the offer and its implications, it could not be erased from the record of British rule.”\textsuperscript{1149}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1142.] Ibid.; Ateşin discloses Necmi’s real name to have been Mahmut Aziz, though he clearly stopped using this name at an early age. [ATEŞİN 1999, 35]; Though Necmi Sağıp Bodamyulızade was certainly one of the most captivating characters of the Turkish Cypriot community in the twentieth century, and though, as Bryant argues, his demands for “respect” from both the Greek Cypriots and the Colonial administration were highly symbolic of the political transformation of the Turks in Cyprus, her depiction of Necmi as being the primary symbol of nationalist opposition to the Münir camp, of his being a revered, “national leader” of the first half of the twentieth century is inaccurate. [See BRYANT 1998a, 341–354] Though this is not the place to delve into detail, Necmi, though obviously an exceptional man, appears to have been much more seriously mentally disturbed than Bryant appears to recognise, quite possibly a paranoid schizophrenic, and his status in the community one of a man who while respected for his learning, (and therefore nicknamed the “philosopher”), was considered to be highly eccentric and somewhat humorously “out of touch”. Further, positing Necmi as the nationalist nemesis of Münir is also misleading in that while he might be considered nationalist, especially in later years, he maintained a much more fundamental emphasis on religion as a component of his national identity than the much more popular and influential nationalists who successfully vied for leadership of the community with Münir and who ultimately triumphed.
\item[1143.] KORKUT 2000, 65.
\item[1144.] Ibid.
\item[1145.] Ibid.
\item[1146.] Georgallides states that an informal approach, again related to strengthening Britain’s strategic capabilities in the lead-up to the First World War, (through provision of facilities in Greece), was made by British ministers to Venizelos at the end of 1912. GEORGHALLIDES 1988, 17; See also DOROS 1955, 341.
\item[1147.] See, for example, GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 90–92; Luke argues that, “the British Government allowed itself to be persuaded by the French to let the inducement take the form of Cyprus.” LUKE 1973, 88.
\item[1148.] Telegram from High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 8\textsuperscript{th} November 1915. CO 67/178, 157.
\item[1149.] For a more detailed analysis of this offer, see Georgallides’ fourth chapter, “The First World War and the Offer of Cyprus to Greece,” in GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 88–102.
\end{footnotes}
In a memorial to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, both Church and lay leaders united in expressing that they had:

[L]earned with very deep emotion the magnanimous decision of the liberal protecting Power to restore Cyprus to her mother country … [and had] deliberated on this fresh conspicuous manifestation by Great Britain of Her liberal and philhellenic sentiments, … [further noting the] unspeakable joy, … [of] The Greek people of Cyprus, … [and pronouncing] the vivid gratitude now filling their hearts owing to the recognition, in so practical and generous a manner, of their national rights whose fulfilment they have, from the very first day of the English Occupation, based on the liberal conception of their Great Protecting Power of which liberal conception Hellenias has, at various times, had so many tokens … [They declared therefore that] This most significant event, which has, Right Honourable Sir, stirred most deeply the souls of us Cypriots and has strengthened our opinion of our nation, and our feelings, which are also the feelings of our nation, in regard to and towards Great Britain, constitutes for us the most gratifying point in the history of our fatherland, from the time of the loss of its national liberty to the present date, and also the last station in the fulfilment of our so long awaited national rehabilitation. 1150

It was not by any means just the Greek Cypriots upon whom this offer left its mark. The inaccuracy of the claim that the Turkish Cypriots were “indifferent” to enosis is powerfully evidenced even in the context of a war where the Ottomans were fighting against the British, and where the offer of enosis was being made directly by Britain itself. The Turkish Cypriots vehemently denounced the British offer in a flurry of telegrams sent to London, and İrfan Bey himself was willing to publicly as well as privately lead the condemnation of the offer, announcing that:

The Moslems of Cyprus have read in the Press with the greatest alarm and dismay, the offer of Cyprus to Greece for her co-operation in this lamentable war. Although they can hardly conceive that the greatest Mohammedan power could thus repay their genuine and consistent loyalty they vehemently protest against such a cession which would bring about for them ruin and disaster.

They fervently pray His Majesty and the illustrious British Government to have mercy on them and be graciously pleased to avert this calamity. 1151

A few days later İrfan sent a letter to the influential Earl of Cromer, petitioning for his support in averting, “a most appalling disaster,” that, “would simply mean deliberate persecution and forced emigration,” and signifying that, “The course of events in Thessaly and Crete since they become part of the Greek Kingdom are a conclusive proof that their apprehensions are not groundless.” 1152 A virtually identical letter was posted to the President of the “Islamic Society” in London, Prince Abdul Karim, petitioning also for his assistance. 1153 The High Commissioner communicated to London regarding the Turkish

1150. Enclosure in Clauson to Secretary of State, 11th November 1915. CO 67/178, 161; Orr also admitted as much, allowing that, “the incident showed that England was prepared to recognise that on national grounds the claims put forward by the Greek-speaking Cypriots that the island should be united with Greece were not considered unjustifiable.” ORR 1972, 163.
1151. Telegram from High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 2nd November 1915. CO 67/178, 127.
Cypriots: “They are deeply moved but will remain quiet, I think, unless the Greeks exasperate them.”1154

In debate in the Legislative Council all three Turkish Cypriot members put on record their strong opposition to this offer, and voted against an alliance of British and Greek Cypriot members on a resolution that they held alluded to recognition of Greek Cypriot political aspirations for enosis.1155 That they did so even though the explicit purpose of the disputed paragraph had been to express support for the British war effort is particularly relevant, for sitting in the Legislative Council of an island occupied, in fact now annexed by Britain, at a time when their co-nationals were at war with Great Britain, is not something they are likely to have contemplated doing lightly. In relation to the offer of enosis made in 1915, İrfan Bey stated that they: “most emphatically objected to this and firmly believed that such a mistake would not be repeated. The news of Great Britain’s offer had been received by the Moslems and other loyal subjects in Cyprus with extreme commotion,” he said.1156 Hami Bey in turn declared that he was, “strongly averse to the proposal to cede Cyprus to Greece, which was repugnant to all Moslems and which they characterised as a grave mistake,” and that they, “could not fathom the reasons which had induced Great Britain to make the offer, but he considered such an offer was altogether irreconcilable with the welfare and interests of the country, and he most earnestly trusted that Great Britain would not repeat the mistake.”1157

Throughout the war years the Turkish Cypriots remained steadfast in their opposition to enosis, and never shirked from expressing such opposition both in debate in the Legislative Council and through countless memorials and petitions.1158 Not once is there any evidence of a Turkish Cypriot representative condoning proposals for enosis. The Greek Cypriots had frequently combined successfully to support enosis.1159 It is noteworthy that the Turkish Cypriots were able, despite personal rivalries and grudges, to do likewise in an effort to defend their own political interests. Impressive, both on this account and in terms of the scale of the participation in the initiative, was a petition of 19th December 1917. Signed by virtually all the prominent members of the Turkish Cypriot community, including the Müftü Ziaeddin, the sitting members of the Legislative Council, İrfan, Hami and Said Beys and ex-member Dr. Eyyub, Beliş Paşa, Kaytazzade Mehmet Nazım, Dr. Esad and Dr. Behiç, Osman Cenal, Mehmet Behaeddin and Hafiz Lisani, the petition had been framed by a gathering held for this explicit purpose. The petition read:

1156. Ibid., 5.
1157. Ibid., 6.
1158. See, for example, Sir John Clauson’s reference to İrfan Bey’s petition in telegram from High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 2nd November 1915. CO 67/182, 127–128.
1159. See for example, telegram from High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 14th December 1917. CO 67/ 186. 390; See also Clauson’s remarks in a secret despatch, where while discussing communication between the Greek Cypriots and Athens he informs: “The Union of Liberals Club at Limassol organized by Mr. J. Kyriakides, a British subject, and composed practically entirely of British subjects, is ostensibly Venizelist, but like all Greek-Christian political organizations in Cyprus entirely subordinates any other issue to the object of Union with Greece.” Enclosure in Clauson to Secretary of State, 1st April 1918. CO 67/188, 347.
The recent general action of the Greek element of Cyprus for union with Greece has disquieted us, the Moslems of Cyprus, by raising anew political questions which are adverse to our political rights and national existence, at a time when the whole world is moaning under the calamities and disaster of the general war, and has produced a deep effect on the Moslem population of the Island.

At a meeting of Moslems comprising Members of the Legislative Council, the heads of the religious community, Members of the Municipal Councils, and distinguished personages representing every district, which was held under the presidency of His Eminence the Mufti at Nicosia this day, we vigorously protest against this recent general action, and the resolution for union with Greece; and we solicit that our objection may be laid before the Central Government.1160

Especially striking was the High Commissioner’s secret evaluation of this development. He said:

As regards the Moslem protest, it is very unusual if not unprecedented for Moslems to proceed from all parts of the Island to the capital for a meeting, although it is common enough for the Greek-Cypriots to do so. The Moslems are uneasy owing to the offer of Cyprus to Greece in 1915 and the apparent conviction of the Greek-Cypriots that annexation to Greece is imminent. The Moslem protest does not embody their usual declaration of loyalty to the British Government.1161

There is some confusion about Turkish Cypriot emigration from the island during the war years. Annual figures do not appear to be available, though from 1911–1921 the rate of increase of population for the Moslem as compared to the non-Moslem inhabitants of the island was considerably slower, (8.7% for the Moslems, compared to 14.57% for the non-Moslems).1162 Though there is no way of ascertaining precisely to what degree emigration during the war years was responsible for this, that the underlying trend of Turkish emigration that had begun with the British take-over was in evidence even prior to the War, and that it may well have been partly a consequence of the political situation the Turkish Cypriots faced, is indicated by Osman Cemal’s treatise where he protests forcefully against those defeatists who claim that it is no longer possible for the Turkish Cypriots to live on the island under prevailing circumstances, and states that if even a few people migrate it constitutes a big blow to their community’s existence on the island, and might even imperil the Ottoman retention of sovereignty over the island.1163 The matter also came up indirectly at one point in a debate during the Legislative Council session of 1915 related to the fate of the Moslems of Crete and Thessaly under Greek administration. When, in response to charges that the Moslems had been persecuted, Theodotou replied that, “If the Moslems of Thessaly and Crete had left in order to go live with their co-racists that was not the fault of Greece!” Irfan Bey questioned why, if that was the case, “they did not run away from Cyprus also.” Theodotou responded that, “the hon. member had anticipated him, as he had intended to point out that many Moslems of Cyprus had left and gone to Constantinople and other parts of Turkey,” to which Irfan, “remarked that very few Moslems had left Cyprus, and those that had done so had gone to take up [Ottoman] Government appointments.”1164

1160. Enclosure in Clauson to Secretary of State, 24th December 1917. CO 67/186, 419.
1161. Clauson to Secretary of State, 24th December 1917. CO 67/186, 428.
Hill suggests too that the low level of Turkish emigration after the beginning of British rule indicates contentment, and supports Dendias’ contention that even after British annexation in 1914 only about 4,000 Turks actually chose to leave the island. But, the number of Turks said to have left amounted to almost 10 percent of the entire Turkish population on the island emigrating in one wave. This could, especially when considered in conjunction with the existence of other major waves of emigration, occurring when the occupation first began in 1878 and following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, well signify that whatever the economic and political advantages of life under the British might have been, many of the Turks were voting with their feet, and showing that they were not, in fact, willing to accept the prospect of British rule, let alone that of enosis. Considering that war was raging, and emigration to the Ottoman heartland was inevitably fraught with extraordinary difficulties, only adds to the significance of such a figure.

It is notable too that the original proclamation made by High Commissioner Hamilton Goold-Adams that had given Ottoman subjects resident, but not born in Cyprus one year within which to leave Cyprus, or otherwise, at the end of the period stated, to become British subjects, was later revised. Four months later, a new proclamation was issued by Goold-Adams’ successor that gave those in this category only one month to choose to retain Ottoman nationality, and at most two months thereafter to depart the island. It might be speculated, though without further evidence only speculated, that one reason for this revision was a desire to reduce the outflow of Turkish Cypriots. We know for a fact from other sources that during British rule there was at times concern expressed about the emigration of Turkish Cypriots, and the consequences that this could have for the balance-of-power on the island, and that at more than one point, (though in the following case with little support expressed by officials in Cyprus and the Colonial Office), it was even suggested that displaced ethnic Turks from Macedonia be transferred so as to shore-up the Moslem Turkish population on the island, and “redress the balance.”

Some quote a figure of only twelve Turks having elected to retain Ottoman nationality following British annexation. However, a careful reading of the High Commissioner’s confidential despatch of 28th September, 1916 relating to the matter, indicates that this assumption is misconceived, because the number refers only to those, “who desired to retain Ottoman nationality, but were unable to leave Cyprus within the period of two months prescribed in paragraph 2 of the Proclamation of the 3rd March, 1915,” not to those who successfully left prior to this deadline.

1165. HILL 1952, 413n.
1166. That it was by no means easy for the Turks of Cyprus to emigrate is corroborated by Berkes, who nevertheless was himself to leave with his family after the War. BERKES 1997, 26.
1167. Cyprus Gazette 5th November 1914.
1168. Ibid. and Cyprus Gazette 4th March 1915.
1169. Enclosure in Fiddes to Clauson, 8th March 1917. CO 67/187, 396–397; In a similar manner, shortly after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–88, barely weeks into the British administration Wolseley had suggested a likeminded policy in response to a letter from ambassador Layard, Britain’s ambassador to the Porte. “He again harps upon the refugees and the miseries they must undergo this winter. I wish from my heart that I could bring every one of them here to keep down the bumptiousness of the Greek element but I cannot devote any funds of the island to paying their expenses.” WOLSELEY 1991, 98.
1170. See, for example, ORR 1972, 174.
1171. Clauson to Secretary of State, 28th September 1916. CO 67/181, 519.
That the British military were at one stage seriously concerned of the danger of Turkish Cypriot collaboration with the enemy, was indicated by letters sent by both General Murray and Admiral Wemyss to the High Commissioner in early 1917, “urging the great importance of taking every precaution against the conveyance through Cyprus to the enemy in Syria of naval or military intelligence, and against the furnishing of supplies or information to enemy submarines.”\footnote{Enclosure in Clauson to Fiddes, 8th April 1917. CO 67/184, 379.} And a few months later the Secretary of State even communicated to the High Commissioner the views of the General Officer Commanding Egypt, General E.H.H. Allenby.\footnote{Telegram from Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 11th August 1917. CO 67/185, 357; Clauson, however, derided the suggestion in response to the request for his opinion by the Minister. [Telegram from High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 13th August 1917. CO 67/185, 356]; That Allenby was, however, at least partially justified in his concerns is indicated by the results of Keser’s study of intelligence documents of the Turkish military. [See KESER s.a., 35–39 and 158–169]. Particularly sensational was the aforementioned case also noted by Altan of Turkish Cypriot fisherman Hacı Karayusuğlu, who was taken from his boat off the shores of Cyprus by Turkish officers to be debriefed in Adana about the political and military situation on the island. Ibid., 165–169.}\footnote{Enclosure in War Office to Colonial Office, 11th August 1917. CO 67/183, 350.}\footnote{Ibid., 351.} Allenby, having described the geo-strategic significance of the island, had advised the following regarding the military importance of the island in secret communication with the War Office:

Cyprus is one of the chief centres of our Intelligence activities on the Syrian coast and to its potentialities as a base for enemy Intelligence operations. In this latter connection I would say that a proportion of the population of the Island is formed of Moslems of Turkish origin, some of whom appear, from Intelligence reports, to have Turkish sympathies. Some of the Greeks in the Island are also said not to be above suspicion.

These facts, coupled with the facilities which exist for communication between Egypt and the Island and the position of the Island in relation to the enemy coast, make it desirable that the military control in Cyprus should be, at least, as effective as it is in Egypt.\footnote{Enclosure in War Office to Colonial Office, 10th October 1917. CO 67/183, 267.}\footnote{Minute by Sir G. Fiddes, 20th February 1917. CO 67/187.}

As a consequence, Allenby was to go on to, “request, with a view to obtaining effective and uniform control and co-ordination of action here and in Cyprus, that this Island be included within the area under my command.”\footnote{See, for example, Minute by Sir G. Fiddes, 20th October 1916. CO 67/183, 118; When it was suggested that the prisoners might be employed on the island, as some eventually were, Mr. Fiddes commented, “They could not be left at large among the Greeks, and they might do mischief among the Turks.” Minute by Sir G. Fiddes, 20th February 1917. CO 67/187.}\footnote{Ibid., 351.}\footnote{Ibid., 165–169.}

Further evidence of wartime Turkish Cypriot sympathies with the Ottomans is found also in relation to the prisoner of war camp established on the outskirts of Famagusta in 1916. The bulk of these prisoners were Ottoman Turks captured by the British in the course of the war, and from the outset the Turkish Cypriots seem to have been disturbed by the presence of such a camp. In a letter to the editor of the Westminster Gazette, a Turkish Cypriot lawyer from Larnaca, Mehmet Aslan, wrote: “I ask your sanction to make known (before it is too late to remedy a political blunder) that the Cypriote Moslem community would be seriously grieved if the proposed internment of 4,000 Turkish prisoners of war at Famagusta is carried into effect.”\footnote{Enclosure in War Office to Colonial Office, 10th October 1917. CO 67/183, 267.}\footnote{Minute by Sir G. Fiddes, 20th February 1917. CO 67/187.} That the British were somewhat concerned about the consequences in terms of the Turkish Cypriots’ sensitivities and the possibility of seditious interaction with these prisoners is evident.\footnote{See, for example, Minute by Sir G. Fiddes, 20th October 1916. CO 67/183, 118; When it was suggested that the prisoners might be employed on the island, as some eventually were, Mr. Fiddes commented, “They could not be left at large among the Greeks, and they might do mischief among the Turks.” Minute by Sir G. Fiddes, 20th February 1917. CO 67/187.}\footnote{Ibid., 165–169.}
brought outside of the municipal limits of Famagusta over which civilians exercised author-

ity.\textsuperscript{1178} In a stern warning the High Commissioner proclaimed:

> Any person who shall knowingly or wilfully aid or assist any alien enemy of His Majesty’s dominions, to escape from any prison or place of detention or from His Majesty’s dominions, or who shall knowingly receive, relieve, comfort, or assist him shall be guilty of an offence under Martial Law and shall be liable to punishment by the utmost rigour of fine or imprisonment or both such punishments.\textsuperscript{1179}

Korkut notes that during the War the only Turkish Cypriot permitted to visit the camp was an imam from Famagusta called Mustafa Nuri Efendi. Ultimately, he too, however, was punished with imprisonment in Kyrenia Castle, and though Korkut’s memoirs do not furnish any details as to why, he leaves us to presume that the hoca’s incarceration was a consequence of trying to clandestinely assist the prisoners.\textsuperscript{1180} This is a proposition supported by Ali Nesim, who had the opportunity to interview the imam’s daughter, Fatma Izzet Adıloğlu. According to her testimony, despite the insufficiency of the evidence against him, the imam was imprisoned for two years in Kyrenia Castle together with Ali Hüseyin Babaliki, and the imam’s family friend, merchant, (later to be a leading politician as well as Fatma hanım’s brother-in-law), Mahmut Naim Celaleddin.\textsuperscript{1181} Some further evidence of the provision of such assistance, albeit at times portrayed in an exaggerated manner, is furnished by Keser. At the end of the War, however, the British apparently relaxed conditions on Turkish Cypriot visits to the camp, and Korkut was one of those who himself paid such a visit. He records that the Turkish clubs on the island had then collected gifts and contributions for the prisoners, and received permission to hold a theatre performance for their benefit.\textsuperscript{1182}

Georghallides’ claim that, “Throughout the war years the Turks did not waver in their loyalty,” is contradicted by still more evidence that several prominent Turkish Cypriots were imprisoned for political reasons in Kyrenia Castle and other locations.\textsuperscript{1183} Information about Turkish Cypriots incarcerated by the British during World War I and its immediate aftermath, for real or suspected pro-Ottoman activities is admittedly limited and often hard to verify in terms of specific evidence. Yet, it is nevertheless significant as a dramatic exposition of the risks that at least some Turkish Cypriots were prepared to take in supporting, or even associating themselves with the Ottoman cause.

Unfortunately I have not come across any comprehensive official list of such internees in British or other archival repositories, but from a variety of sources, including both such archival material, and also memoirs and interviews, we see that many of those interned were just the kind of leading members of the Turkish Cypriot community who might have been most capable of organizing some sort of resistance to the British. According to Keser their ranks were composed of men from various corners of the island including politicians and business leaders. Keser lists the following internees:\textsuperscript{1184}

\textsuperscript{1178} Cyprus Gazette 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 1916.
\textsuperscript{1179} Ibid., 23\textsuperscript{rd} December 1916.
\textsuperscript{1180} KORKUT 2000, 41; Keser’s research suggests that the Turkish Cypriot imam had, in fact, been smuggling extra rations into the camp. KESER s.a., 91.
\textsuperscript{1181} NESIM 1990b, 27–30.
\textsuperscript{1182} They chose to stage another of Namık Kemal’s patriotic plays, “Gülnihal”. KORKUT 2000, 41.
\textsuperscript{1183} See GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 88.
\textsuperscript{1184} KESER s.a., 149
1. Ali Hüseyin Babaliki from the Karpaz
2. Famagusta member of parliament Mahmud Naim [Celaleddin] Efendi
3. Giritli Hasan Hüseyin Captain, his brother Ali and brother-in-law Captain Ahmet Çavuş
4. Ahmet Çavuş of Limassol, his brother Osman and son Ali
5. The Kenan brothers, businessmen from Larnaca, Raşid, Kamil, Said and Hasan Efendi
6. Kamil Paşa’s son-in-law Dr. Esad
7. Ahmed Sadrazam from Kormacit, the owner of the Kolya farm
8. Küçük Hacı Hüseyin Efendi from Bilelle
9. Hoca Mustafa Nuri Efendi of Famagusta, a relative of Mahmud Naim
10. Dr. Eyyub Bey, the Legislative Councillor from Paphos

Though I find it impossible to confirm all of these names with complete certainty, there is widespread affirmation of the internment both of Dr. Esad and of the Kenan brothers, the latter having been, “[a]ccused of smuggling gasoline to Turkey.” That Hoca Mustafa Nuri Efendi was interned is confirmed, amongst others, by both the imam’s daughter and by Korkut, who, as mentioned, noted that he had been the imam of the Ottoman prisoners of war. Both Hoca Nuri and internees with descriptions matching those in numbers 2–5 are also recorded in an interview given by Con Rifat’s daughter, Şifa Dizdar, to Harid Fedai, in which she further mentions that the grandson of Naim Bey, (himself father of Mahmut Naim Adil Efendi), a certain Şevki Bey, was let off more lightly for being a member of the CUP by being confined to the walled area of the old town of Famagusta. A man referred to as, “Osmançı”, is also mentioned to have tragically drowned after falling overboard from a ship captained by Ahmet Çavuş in September of 1920. The report of this news in the Doğru Yol newspaper of the 23rd of September 1920, recalls that he had also been imprisoned for a while in Kyrenia Castle, and it appears that the person being described is the same as the “Osman” registered in number 4. That members of the Babaliki family were also interned is confirmed in the memoirs of Mehmet Zeka, who records also that his father too was imprisoned for 6 months in Famagusta apparently for providing food to the Ottoman prisoners. Of Ali Babaliki Ahmet An writes that amongst the disloyal war-time activities of this merchant had been his collec-
tion of money for the purchasing of petrol for the Ottoman navy and assisting Ottoman soldiers in the Famagusta prisoner of war camp to escape. Yet another of whom there are accounts that he was imprisoned as a result of charges that he had been involved in efforts to abet Ottoman prisoners of war on the island to escape to Anatolia was the schoolmaster Turgut. He was later to take on the surname Sarıca and as a leading Turkish teacher on the island played an important role in spreading nationalist sentiment in later years. Amongst the books that he was to publish in Cyprus in the early 1930’s was one entitled, “Ziya Gökalp and some of his works.”

Surprisingly, Keser does not make any mention here of Dr. Hüseyin Behiç and Hasan Karabardak who are also known to have been imprisoned as suspected co-conspirators with Dr. Esad, and following which Fadıl Korkut and Con Rifat, (another advocate and prominent nationalist of the 1920’s and 1930’s), were also brought in by the police and cautioned not to get involved in politics or otherwise they too would find themselves behind bars. Rifat was no stranger to trouble with the authorities, having previously run into trouble with the Ottoman authorities for his association with the Young Turks. It was from this association that he gained the nickname “Con” (or, “Jön”, as in “Jön Türk,” or, ‘Young Turk’), that he was to carry for the rest of his life. In addition to those mentioned by Keser, Korkut testifies too that a relative of his, Ahmet Taif, was also arrested for political reasons during the war, but he does not disclose his fate thereafter.

The case of Dr. Eyyub, upon which Keser does not deliberate, is particularly interesting, yet his internment is overlooked in most sources. He was a member of the Legislative Council at the outset of the War, and was once again elected following the War. However, he did lose his seat in the interim, when he was defeated in the elections at the end of 1916 by Ahmet Said Efendi. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the High Commissioner thereafter registered both that Eyyub had been credited with, “Young Turk proclivities,” and also that his replacement was likely to, “follow Irfan Bey in the Council.” The British did not, however, find anything untoward in the apparent use of Evkaf resources in the unseating of Eyyub, known also to be on bad terms with Irfan. Having stood for election at the end of 1916, it seems therefore, that Eyyub’s imprisonment probably occurred sometime in 1917 or early 1918.

It is known also that some Turkish Cypriots fought on the Ottoman side in the First World War. Berkes, for instance recounts hearing news of the death of his cousin Suphi Bey in Gallipoli while fighting as a colonel in the Ottoman army. An interesting file

1192. AN 2002, 335.
1194. AN 1997b, 13.
1195. Stevenson to Milner, 26th April 1919, CO 67/191, 503–506 and KORKUT 2000, 30; All three of these men, that is Behiç, Esad and Karabardak are claimed by Samani to have been members of the Hüriyet ve Terraki Club. [SAMANI s.a., 23]. Though she does not give relevant sources for this information, Korkut does indicate that both Behiç and Esad are likely to have been members. KORKUT 2000, 30 and 42.
1196. FEDAİ 1986, 15; AN 1997a, 146.
1197. KORKUT 2000, 65.
1198. Clauson to Secretary of State, 6th November 1916. CO 67/182, 105.
1199. Ibid.; According to Ulaş Irikad, Eyyub had actually been a founding member of the Paphos CUP Club established in 1909. See Ortam 12th April 1993.
1200. See, for example, Storrs’ evaluation of Eyyub enclosed in Storrs to Shuckburgh, 12th March 1930. CO 67/ 233/14, 47 and Clauson to Bonar Law, 6th November 1916. CO 67/182, 104–105.
1201. NESİM 1990b, 28.
in the British archives registers the Colonial Office’s request that, “a Cypriote named Salih (Munaka?) Ibrahim, who is a prisoner of war (No.3113) at the Turkish Prisoners of War Camp, Béziers, Dép. Hérault, may, when the time for repatriation arrives, be sent to Cyprus instead of to Turkey,” and calls upon the Foreign Office to, “make the necessary representations to the French Government.” Another Turkish Cypriot, Hasan Hilmi, who had apparently gone to work in Beirut when the war erupted, and was then enlisted in the Ottoman army, actually ended-up a prisoner on his native island after being wounded and then captured on the Medina front. Nevertheless, I have found nothing substantial to confirm that there were many who clandestinely left Cyprus specifically for this purpose. It is more likely that “some” of Turkish Cypriot origins were already enlisted in the Ottoman army at the outbreak of the war, and that “some” of those who emigrated from Cyprus after the War began thereafter joined the Ottoman ranks. Professor Manizade does, however, say that “3–4” of his Lycée friends had clandestinely left Cyprus in a small boat to join the nationalist forces in Anatolia, though he mentions only one of these by name, Ali Rıza, whom he says fought under the command of Refet Paşa, (a close comrade of Mustafa Kemal), dying a year later for the nationalist cause.

4.8 Turkish Cypriot Political Initiatives at War’s End

If, as Korkut argues, the Turks of Cyprus had been comforted by the thought that the British annexation was only a temporary consequence of the War, and that the eventual triumph of the German camp would end the British occupation, their hopes were gradually transformed into a progressively intensified state of alarm. The predicament and despondent frame of mind that was to plague the Turkish Cypriots is reflected upon by Berkés, who observed that:

The announcement of the annexation by Britain during the War deeply shook the Turkish Cypriots, who until the onset of the First World War had still continued to see themselves as people of the Ottoman state. They found themselves in a vacuum. They were neither Turks, nor Greeks, nor British. Just as there was no means for them to emigrate anywhere during the War years, as a result of the friendship of the British state with Greece, they began to fear the approach of the years ahead when the Greek Cypriot sword would hang over their heads. They had no way of living in a carefree manner like the people of Turkey who were under the influence of German propaganda only. Through British and Greek Cypriot-Greek news sources they were in a position to more closely comprehend that the war was not proceeding in the Turks favour and there was nothing they could do. In short, it was they who began to feel that they were prisoners of the world powers that were the enemies of Turkey

1202. BERKES 1997, 34.
1203. Enclosure in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 19th March 1920. CO 67/200, 198; The French foreign ministry was to reply that the said prisoner had already left France, informing the British ambassador: “Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a l’honneur de faire savoir à cette Ambassade, d’après une communication du Ministère de la Guerre, que ce prisonnier a été dirigé par train sanitaire le 13 février 1918 sur Feldkirch (Austrie) en vue de son rapatriement.” French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to British Ambassador in Paris, 23rd April 1920. CO 67/200, 250.
1204. KESER s.a., 82.
1205. MANİZADE 1965, 14.
1206. KORKUT 2000, 64.
or Turkishness before the time that Istanbul became a captive of the foreigners. The end of
the war, the foreign occupation of Istanbul, confirmed to them that their fears had been justi-
248 fied. 1207

Even though the conditional British offer of enosis had by now lapsed, the Turkish
Cypriots can not have been heartened by contemplating what the implication of victory
for Britain and her allies would be for them, especially once Greece finally began to con-
tribute to the British war effort in 1917. 1208 In the post-War era, Greek Cypriot claims for
enosis were being justified by reference to Greece’s role in the War and buttressed by
emphasis of the right to national self-determination such as that propagated by Woodrow
Wilson in his Fourteen Points; the Greek Cypriots increasingly began to use this termino-
logy in conjunction with more traditional historically sanctioned appeals to the justifica-
tion of enosis. For the British, who had encouraged such beliefs during the War years, the
need now also arose to deny the validity of the principle, at least as far as concerned Cyp-

1207. BERKES 1997, 26–27.
1208. King Constantine had by now been forced to flee the country, and with the reins of power now firmly in his
hands, Venizelos proceeded to lead Greece to war. CLOGG 1999, 93.
1210. Owing to the absence of a Turkish press at the time of the Congress we can not track detailed develop-
ments concerning the Congress well. However, the resolutions passed by the Congress were published
again a year on in the Doğru Yol newspaper together with an open letter from Ahmed Raşid to Dr. Eyyub
in which valuable information is given as to the previous year’s gathering. Doğru Yol 15th December 1919;
The resolutions are re-printed in İSMAIL - BİRİNCİ 1987, 30–31; See also, KORKUT 2000, 29.
union of Cyprus with Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, it was resolved on the 12th of December that their, “sole national goal” was to see the island returned to its legitimate owner, the Ottoman Empire and to send the Müftü to deliberate with the Ottoman authorities and attend the Congress in order to realize this goal.\footnote{1211}

There is no evidence, as some might wish to suggest, that the British were in anyway involved in encouraging this development, and to the contrary they appear to have been dismayed by the tone of the resolutions adopted. This makes it particularly significant that these resolutions were not seen to have gone far enough by some of the younger generation of Turkish Cypriots, many of whom suspected the Müftü of once again having been strong-armed by the British, the rumour having spread that he had been warned-off any drastic proclamations by the British in a clandestine visit paid to him by a high-ranking colonial official shortly before the opening of the Congress.\footnote{1212}

Dissatisfied with the outcome of the Congress, Dr. Behiç and others took the initiative in inviting delegates to the Hürriyet ve Terraki club to consider further the action that needed to be taken. As a result of their deliberations, Dr. Behiç, Con Rifat and Fadıl Korkut were to apply to the High Commissioner’s Chief Secretary, Mr. Fenn, for passports so that they could themselves travel to make representations abroad. This they were bluntly refused. It was to be shortly after that Dr. Behiç, Dr. Esad and Hasan Karabardak were imprisoned in Kyrenia Castle, (see below), and Korkut and Con Rifat cautioned by the police.\footnote{1213} Regarding Dr. Esad, Malcolm Stevenson wrote to London confidentially that, “Dr. Essad is a somewhat truculent person, and, in spite of his relationship by marriage to the late Kiamil Pasha, upon which he trades, has latterly become a Young Turk and has evinced pro-German and generally revolutionary sympathies.”\footnote{1214} A minute written in the Foreign Office files reads: “Dr Essad has turned pro-C.U.P. & contemplated producing a rising in Nicosia … It all shows that there is no essential difference between C.U.P Turks & anti-C.U.P Turks.”\footnote{1215}

Furthermore, it was the British who while having had permitted the departure of numerous Greek Cypriot deputations in the past calling for enosis, now blocked the sending of a similar delegation by the Turkish Cypriots, consisting of the Müftü and Beliş Paşa’s son-in-law Arif Bey, which after having conferred with the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul had planned to make their community’s case at the Paris conference.\footnote{1216} In this respect, I do not find it possible to subscribe to Vural’s contention that, “it is impossible to separate the Moslem elite’s approach to the Cyprus problem from the position maintained by the British.”\footnote{1217} Luckily for these Turks, however, the British, having contemplated relinquishing the island, were ultimately to choose for strategic reasons to retain control.\footnote{1218}

Malcolm Stevenson, the Officer Administering the Government, (and soon to be High Commissioner following Clauson’s death), preferred to notify London of developments

\footnote{1211. Doğru Yol 15th December 1919.}
\footnote{1212. KORKUT 2000, 29.}
\footnote{1213. Ibid., 30.}
\footnote{1214. Stevenson to Milner, 6th May 1919. CO 67/192, 135.}
\footnote{1215. Minute of 21st May 1919. FO 371/4225, 196.}
\footnote{1216. See KORKUT 2000, 29–30.}
\footnote{1217. YÜCEL 1996, 66–67.}
surrounding the gathering of Turkish Cypriots in a different manner. He informed the Colonial Office:

2. It was originally intended by the Moslems to send a deputation to London to support their memorial, but this project was abandoned as it was considered that any representations which they submitted on this subject would not receive less consideration, if forwarded through the usual channels than if made by a deputation in London.

3. Shortly after the departure of the Greek Christian deputation from Cyprus a small and unimportant section of the Moslems decided to send a counter deputation to London to ask for the restoration of Cyprus to Turkey in the event of his Majesty's Government relinquishing possession of the island. This resolve which has, I may add, not yet materialized, appears to have been prompted by anxiety to express disapproval of any project for the union of Cyprus with Greece rather than to formulate a request for any alteration in the government of the country. 1219

Two secret despatches of the 26th of April and 6th of May 1919 respectively, are intriguing, revealing much about the escalating concerns of the Turkish Cypriots, the real political transformations that their community was undergoing, and even disloyalty to the British. The first of these declares that:

The presence in England of the Greek-Christian Deputation has caused some uneasiness amongst the Moslem population who fear that the Island may be ceded to Greece and this has resulted in the formation of a small party advocating the return of the Island to the Ottoman Government. … The leaders of the “Union with Turkey” party are Dr. Mehemd Essad and Dr. Hussein Behije. … Associated with these two persons is a certain Hassan Karabardak, a rowdy individual and the leader of the butchers and hamals (native porters) who are a rough and undisciplined section of the community. He took a leading part in the riots of 1912, and has latterly attached himself to Dr. Behije’s party.” 1220

Having initially described the party as being “small”, the Officer Administering the Government, Malcolm Stevenson, nonetheless later conceded that:

The Union with Turkey party has recently been very active and has become a disturbing factor both to the large section of loyal Cypriot Moslems and to the Greek-Christians, who, I

1218. Already, in November 1918 a confidential report stated on the matter that there were: “reasons why in present circumstances it would be dangerous and impolitic on the part of the British Government to hand the island over to a minor Power such as Greece. Cyprus, though still undeveloped and never used by Great Britain to any great extent as a place of arms, is capable of enormous harbour improvements, would make a convenient submarine and aeronautic base, and is admirably adapted to serve as a station and training ground for troops. Thus equipped it would command not only the entrance to the Suez Canal at Port Said but also the coasts of Asia Minor and Syria with access to the Baghdad Railway, and would vindicate the pre-1219. Stevenson to Long, 24th December 1918. CO 67/189, 383–384.

1220. CO 67/191; Rowdy or not, Hasan Karabardak had long before made a name for himself for his patriotism, notably having donated for auction a horse and cart in 1911, the proceeds of which were to go to the fund for the Ottoman navy. Vatan 20th November 1911.
may add, have been behaving with exemplary propriety of late. Dr. Behije has been in the
habit of touring the villages and quite recently was fined for creating a disturbance at Aphania village in the Famagusta district.1221

Noting that the Union with Turkey Party had not received the support of İrfan and Hami Beys, Stevenson, however, records that the third Turkish member of the Legislative Council, Said Efendi, did give it his support, though, “in a somewhat half-hearted manner.”1222 Though he preliminarily discussed why he had caused the three aforementioned men to be interned in Kyrenia Castle, it was really in the following despatch that he elaborated on this matter. Here he reveals:

I should explain, in amplification of my former despatch, that in addition to the information given by Said Effendi, Member of the Legislative Council, as to the likelihood of a disturbance, reports had been received from certain ex-agents of the late military intelligence department in Cyprus and other sources that Doctor Essad, Doctor Behije and Hassan Karabardak contemplated the creation of a disturbance at Nicosia during Easter week, which was to be followed, on a signal if successful, by an outbreak of the Prisoners of War at the Camp at Famagusta who were to over-power their guards, seize their rifles and take part in a general rising. …

The Chief Commandant of Police has been and still is engaged in prosecuting enquiries regarding the whole matter, but so far, I regret to say, without much success. I have been informed, however, by Colonel Brown, Officer Commanding the Troops, that a day or two before Easter, a match box, containing a letter written in Turkish, was thrown into the Prisoners of War Camp at Famagusta in which it was stated that British Rule in Egypt had been completely overthrown and that 15,000 English people had been massacred. … it is interesting to record that, on the night on which the arrests at Nicosia were made, all the prisoners of war in the camp at Famagusta went to their beds fully dressed.1223

Stevenson concluded:

In this connection I would mention that persistent rumours as to the imminence of the cession of Cyprus to Greece have much perturbed the Moslems of all classes in the Island and, should the cession be ultimately decided upon, I consider it highly desirable that before any announcement is made, the present small garrison in the Island should be temporarily strengthened by the addition of two or three companies of infantry as a precautionary measure against disturbances.1224

One Turkish source claims that guns had even been stashed in Karabardak’s garden, though, without any further proof, this contention appears to be an embellishment of Karabardak’s true tale.1225 Whether or not the charges of an attempted Turkish uprising in Cyprus, caught in the bud, had any foundation remains obscure, but that the possibility seriously perturbed the colonial authorities, and that there was an active and assertive movement for “Union with Turkey” gaining momentum at war’s end is corroborated.1226

1222. Ibid., 503.
1224. Ibid., 135.
1225. KESER s.a., 150.
1226. While evidence to corroborate any such contention is scarce, it has been raised that the British, sensitive as they were to the position of Moslems in India and Egypt, had certain concerns that this insurrectionary effort in Cyprus might be linked to a wider Pan-Islamic movement against them. See GÜREL 1984, 102–103.
By the time the Paris Conference drew to a close, a new movement, this time in Anatolia, was already gaining its own momentum. This movement was to help relieve the immediate post-War despondency of the Turkish Cypriots and raise hopes once again of restoration to the Turkish motherland.

In the wake of the Young Turk Revolution the Turkish Cypriots certainly did not possess a full-fledged “Turkish” national identity that could clearly be differentiated from Ottomanism based on multi-ethnic and religious premises. In fact, it could well be argued that in its immediate aftermath at least, the Young Turk Revolution had served to reinforce this multi-ethnic, multi-religious concept of Ottomanism. That even the intelligentsia was still confused about the relative positions of Moslem, Ottoman and Turkish identity is illustrated by countless sources. Osman Cemal for one, while capable of repeatedly distinguishing between the nature of being Moslem and the nature of being Ottoman could in virtually the same breath turn around and use the terms “Moslem” and “Turk” interchangeably. However, as it soon became apparent that such a conceptualisation had proved to be a chimera, the Turkish Cypriots began to revert to the underlying propensity to use Ottomanism as a synonym for Turkism.

With the ascendancy of the CUP’s policies of Turkification after 1912–13, the related acceleration in the break-up of the multi-ethnic basis for Ottomanism, and the emasculated position of the Ottoman Empire in the post-World War I period, now largely, though by no means wholly devoid of non-Turkish territories, the tide was changing. We do still see reference to religious and even, for a short while, to Ottoman identity in the post-World War I era, but despite British efforts to bolster the religious as opposed to the ethnic basis of their identity, the Turkish Cypriots were now in the process of elevating a national identity based principally on the Turkish character to pride of place. Unlike the Ottoman element of identity, the Islamic component did not wholly disappear from sight, but rather was generally submerged within that of Turkishness. Karpat argues, along comparable lines when he states that there was a process of transformation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries whereby, “three pre-existing identities–Ottoman, Muslim and Turk– one imperial, the others religious and ethnic, evolved, amalgamated, and fused into a single national” identity although officially the Islamic and Ottoman components were ignored or even condemned.

Separatist movements among the Arabs had been especially detrimental to the concept of Islamism as a basis for saving the empire. Even strong defenders of this Islamist emphasis appear to have been conscious quite early on that without the Arabs, the goal of a political union maintained on Islamist premises could not be upheld, and that it would lead to the Turks going their own way. Vahdetî himself had said as much at the beginning of 1909 when he complained about the Arabs not being prepared to walk-hand-in-hand with the Turks. He bemoaned that:

Even though the poor Turk is the ruler, the conqueror, even though he established a world-wide state, he puts up with every verbal slight, gets on with every race, yet despite this it is always the Turk, always the Turk [who is faulted]. Do they not know, were it not for the Turks would Islam have managed to uphold its current strength? Where are the Arabs of

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1228. KARPAT 2000, 1.
Andalusia, where are the Abassid governments, where are the Egyptians, Sudanese, is the fault [for the Empire’s difficulties] all that of the Turks?

Were the Arab people waiting for the appearance of Ottoman constitutional government so as to awaken [?] Now, when we should all be striving together, was it necessary to propagate the racial cause? Was it necessary to break-away from the Turks and unite with the Greeks, the Armenians? 1229

Arguing that the Greeks and Arabs had traditionally been highly privileged within the Ottoman Empire, Vahdetî warns that predators will devour any tribe that tries to break away from the Ottoman nation and focusing on the Arabs exhorts:

O yee noble Arab people! You are taking the wrong turns. Achieving your objective will not be easy. For your enterprise does not resemble that of the Cretan concession. We perceive it [as one that aims] to break-up our country. And we are justified in perceiving it as such. We will either cherish our beloved country together, or will ruin it together by plunging a dagger in its heart saying that “what we cannot have, neither will you”. It is in comprehension of this that we must act. 1230

Yet, the Arabs were to break away too, and the Ottoman Empire to disintegrate.

If a pattern is to be discerned in the early decades of British rule, up to the conclusion of the First World War, it is, by-and-large that the Turkish Cypriots unequivocally rejected enosis and continued to cherish and defend their Ottoman connection. From the perspective of the Ottoman Empire too, interest was also maintained in Cyprus, especially as to the conditions of the Turks living there, and especially to respect of the legal rights accorded to it as of 1878. While on the one hand the Turkish ambassador to London, Tevfik Paşa, was making diplomatic representations to the Foreign Office, rejecting even the idea of modification of the internal administration of the island in a manner seen as damaging to Turkish interests and declaring: “les réformes réclamées par les membres grecs de la susdite Assemblée ne sont pas compatibles avec la situation de l’Ile et des habitants vis-à-vis de la Sublime Porte.” 1231 On the other hand, the Turkish parliament was appointing and paying the costs for a legal expert to advise the local advocates of Turkish Cypriot defendants accused of involvement in the Limassol riots. 1232 Even during the War years the Ottoman authorities made a point of sending payments, albeit irregularly, to the Kadi and other salaried Ottoman officials in Cyprus, through the American authorities. 1233

1229. Volkan 12th February 1909.
1230. Ibid.
1231. Enclosure in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 14th May 1912. CO 67/181, 63–64; Ottoman interest in the island was maintained despite British attempts to discourage it, with one minute by a Colonial Official concerning how to respond to Tevfik Paşa’s letter, stating, “We do not want to encourage the Turks to [think?] that they have still an interest in Cyprus.” Minute by J. Anderson, 16th July 1912. CO 67/168, 62.
1232. Minute of Proceedings of the Ottoman Parliament, 30th June 1912 in BOA-MV-60/166 and Minute of Proceedings of the Ottoman Parliament, 4th March 1913 in BOA-MV-127/174; The Turkish ambassador was also to send a memorandum on this issue to the Foreign Office. Enclosure No. 1 in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 10th July 1912. CO 883/7, 137.
Throughout this period, the British remained largely oblivious to the genesis of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. It was not that Britain was wholly ignorant of the rise of Turkish nationalism per se, nor even of phenomena such as Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism and even Pan-Turanianism. On the contrary, with World War I still raging, but the Russian plank of the Triple Entente having collapsed, British policymakers with geostrategic concerns had, as noted before, even suggested, “the scheme of Kurdish nationality as a counterweight against Pan-Turanianism”; arguing that through manipulative propaganda the Kurds, “could be utilized to drive an important wedge into the Turanian line”. 1234

Within months of the close of the World War the Foreign Office had published a confidential handbook entitled, “The Rise of the Turks – The Pan-Turanian Movement”. Delving deep into the history of the Turkish people, this volume provided detailed information about the early Turkist movement, making reference to the ideas and work of men like Ziya Gökalp and Tekin Alp. 1235 On coming to power, it was perceptively enunciated, “The Committee of Union and Progress found that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralization and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State idea. They therefore fell back upon their Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkification as the natural means of achieving their ends.” 1236 Registered also was the rise of linguistic nationalism in the years leading up to Balkan War of 1912–13, and the impact of the “Balkan War” itself, following which, it was assessed, the CUP had officially, “incorporated Turkification in their programme.” 1237 The authors contended that it was the “shock” of this War which had truly “stimulated” Turkish nationalism. 1238 Despite the fact that such far flung territories as Hungary, Siberia, Finland and Persia were suggested to have either Turkish or Turanian populations, no such population was indicated in Cyprus, whose Turks did not even register as a footnote. 1239 In light of the magnitude of the task at hand, the pursuit of victory in a General War, it is perhaps not so astonishing that the Turks of Cyprus would not feature in such a Foreign Office handbook. However, the same excuse would not pass for those British officials with direct responsibilities for the island. 1240

As far as Cyprus was concerned, the colonial officials seem throughout this period to have misconceived, ignored, and/or overlooked the aspirations of the Turks, and they appear to have remained largely oblivious to the developing undercurrent of Turkish nationalism on the island, perchance at times mistaking silence for apathy. 1241 In a similar manner to how the British were often to fool themselves into believing that the advanta-
ges they could supply for the Greek inhabitants of the island would discourage the desire for enosis and that the, “mass of the Greek-Christian Community … evince little interest in the activities of its political leaders regarding the union of Cyprus with Greece,” they were likewise to misjudge the persistence of the bonds between the Turkish Cypriots and Ottoman Turkey. Another confidential Foreign Office handbook of November 1918, this time to do with Cyprus, announced in a typical manner that, “the Moslem inhabitants, who have nearly forty years been separated governmentally from their Ottoman compatriots, could hope for no greater security or advantages by the retrocession of the island to Turkey than they now enjoy.”

The bonds, however, were more real and durable than thought, and no matter how latent they may have been during the war years in particular, they should have been more easily discernible. So long as the “motherland” continued to pay an identifiable interest in their fate, the Turkish Cypriots could find some emotional solace in its support, even when in practice its impact upon their lives may have been limited, and could continue to look forward to the day when they would be politically reunited. What is often overlooked, for sake of convenience, by most Greek and Turkish authors, (albeit different sakes!), is the fact that the republican regime established in Turkey following the First World War explicitly defined Cyprus outside of its political boarders, formally and unambiguously rejecting the desires of many Turkish Cypriots for union with Turkey. Yet, despite this, however, and despite the fact that many of the actions taken by the Turkish Republic in regard to the Turkish Cypriots might have been expected to have put pay to any nationalist initiatives, it was, in fact, precisely during this period that the scope and depth of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was to reach unprecedented heights. It is to this apparent contradiction that we now turn.

1241. This tendency was identified by Percy Arnold, who observed that the Turkish Cypriots were, “apt to treat the Enosis movement like the weather, something that is always with us.” ARNOLD 1956,153.
5 The rise of the nationalist tide

The First World War was undoubtedly a time of particular turbulence for the Turks of Cyprus. Having gradually begun to gain in confidence and experience as to voicing their political concerns and organizing for the fulfilment of their political objectives, they were faced with the outbreak of war by the harsh reality of the limits to their power. Their persistent faith in their continued political association with the Ottoman heartland and their escalating sentiments of solidarity with the wider Turkish community, were violently shaken by the onset of hostilities between the empire of their roots and the empire of their rulers’. The annexation of the island by the latter, Britain, left little leeway for them to profess or display a dual allegiance.

For sure the Turkish Cypriots did not rise-up against the British during the war years, and invariably expressed loyalty to their colonial masters. Yet, at the same time, careful scrutiny of the evidence suggests that beneath the surface there continued to be a strong, broadly supported sympathy for the Ottoman Empire, and even hope that its victory in war would facilitate their re-integration into that great political union. As described in the previous chapter, some even went as far as to actively work for this purpose, or at least to bravely assert it as their desired outcome to the ongoing conflict.

By the conclusion of the War such hopes had been largely dashed. The defeated Ottoman Empire was on its knees, occupied and in the process of dismemberment, and the diminishing prospect of union with Turkey, was worse still, rapidly being overtaken by a much more real prospect of enosis with Greece. Under such circumstances British rule, (in fact virtually any other form of rule), was doubtlessly to be preferred, and, unable to change the larger international equation upon which their political destiny rested, submission to British rule as by far the better of two evils, was to be expected.\footnote{The argument is supported by the memoirs of Berkes. BERKES 1997, 27.} A community which had been “put in its place” by colonial rulers when its leaders attempted to plead their case in the international arena, was left to revert to the default of a cultural fatalism.\footnote{According to McHenry, three days after the Congress the Müftü announced that the Turkish Cypriot delegation had been refused permission to depart by the British and, while stating, “that the Assembly meeting had produced some positive changes in that all Turkish Cypriots now appreciated their common dilemma and had experienced a chance to reaffirm their solidarity,” he now, “advised his fellow delegates to pray.” [McHENRY 1987, 130–131]. Based on a report in the Söz of the 14\textsuperscript{th} of October 1933, Ismail and Birinci too state that the Müftü announced that the government had not allowed the delegation to leave the island and that the people should therefore “pray to God”. ISMAIL - BİRİNÇI 1987, 32–33.}
A few attempts to obstruct efforts for enosis do seem to have been initiated in the form of a campaign to garner support and the intervention on the Turkish Cypriots’ behalf of certain international sympathisers deemed to have influence with the British. One such appeal was made in mid-1919 to the Agha Khan. Once again it has been cause for the spurious argument that Cyprus’ Moslems were so conservative, and so overwhelmingly bound to their Islamic identity as to reject any connection with Turkey and the Turks. It appears that Hill has served as the main source of information for most such observers on this matter, for it is he who relates a report that, “the London Moslem League submitted to the Secretary of State a representation received by the Agha Khan from the Moslems of Cyprus, protesting against the agitation in Greece and the island.” Yet, if this were to be sufficient grounds for extrapolating such contentions, one wonders what conclusions might be drawn from the fact, also revealed on the very same page by Hill, that a similar appeal was made by the British-Israel World Federation!

Just when despondency was most magnified, the pendulum was to swing once more. The movement of national resistance that emerged in Anatolia was in a short space of time to rekindle the desire for association with the wider Turkish community, and the belief that this might be a short, or at least medium-term outcome of the national liberation struggle gained ground. Concurrently, the threat of enosis diminished. Greece had not proved up to the task of conquering Anatolia and was in poor shape, distraught by its failure. It was no longer able to press its irredentist demands. The British had anyway come in large measure to the conclusion that in the post-War period, they wished, essentially for strategic reasons, to maintain control of Cyprus, irrespective of whatever the prevailing winds of international legitimacy may have been. To this the Turks of the infant Turkish Republic that succeeded the Ottoman Empire did not object. The nationalism they espoused was unmistakably Turkish in character, but, unlike that of the Greeks, it explicitly renounced irredentism. Hence, once independence had been achieved for the Turkish Republic, it showed a strong tendency to support the international status quo. The prevailing nationalism in Turkey was now characterised by the concept of borders limited essentially to the Anatolian heartland where the Turks predominated, a principle embodied within what came to be known as the “Misaki Milli” (or, “National Pact”). It was a pact that renounced the imperial mission of the multinational Ottoman Empire, and replaced it instead with the ideal of a Turkish nation-state.

1246. HILL 1952, 530; For some reason Gürel, who apparently is also amongst those using Hill as his source on the matter, contends that a “Turkish Cypriot deputation visited the Agha Khan”. I have found absolutely nothing to support the assertion that there even was a Turkish Cypriot deputation in England at the time, let alone that they had visited the Agha Khan, leaving me to conclude that Gürel may well have misread Hill, who says in the same section in which he talks of the intervention of the Agha Khan that there was a “Greek Cypriot” deputation in London. See GÜREL 1984, 104 and HILL 1952, 529–531.
1248. In marked contrast, the foundations of Greek nationalism rested upon, “a vision of a greater Greece that drew its inspiration from the splendours of the Byzantine Empire; a vision of territorial expansion in which all the ‘Greek’ populated areas of the Near East would be included within a unified Greek state, with its centre in the imperial city of Constantinople, the ‘New Rome’, and, as Peckham observes, “The title bestowed upon the new King George I in 1864-‘King of the Hellenes’, rather than King of Greece-encapsulated these irredentist ambitions.” By the 1880’s, he contends, “the distinction between Greece and the Greek lands,” had itself, begun, “to break down.” PECKHAM 2000, 84–85 and 87.
In any case, even had the Republic sought to pursue the prize of Cyprus, it had little realistic basis to expect that Britain, which despite the Philhellenic sympathies of many of its leaders had denied the island to Greece in the wake of the war, would now turn around and award the island to Turkey. Militarily Turkish occupation of the island was unthinkable and politically the Republic did not have the capital or leverage to negotiate for its transfer from Britain. Yet, notwithstanding these obvious constraints, there is no doubting that many Turks in Cyprus did cherish the prospect of liberation by the nationalist forces of Mustafa Kemal. However, just as the Greek Cypriots had been disappointed by the failure of Venizelos to champion enosis at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Turkish Cypriots were in a similar fashion to be disillusioned by the outcome of the treaty strenuously negotiated between the allies and the new Turkish administration of nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal, (see below). In essence, though they later tried to rationalize it, and to laud its chief Turkish negotiator, renowned commander and comrade of Kemal, Mustafa İsmet Paşa, (later, becoming İsmet İnönü), a sense of abandonment was often apparent, for this treaty in fact brought little more comfort to the Turkish Cypriots than had the earlier Treaty of Sevres which the vestiges of the vanquished Ottoman authorities had succumbed to while in a much more debilitated state.

Disappointment with Lausanne did not lead, however, to a loss of national identity or sentiment. Though physically dislocated from the new Turkish Republic, the Turks of Cyprus continued to look to it for social and political leadership, as well as for economic opportunity, and they were to be profoundly affected by the powerful political currents that dominated Turkey. The ideology and reforms of the Republic were increasingly widely adopted in Cyprus, (on occasion with the sanction of the Colonial authorities, but often in the face of their opposition), and Turkish nationalist sentiment grew to unprecedented highs, paralleling, sometimes perhaps even exceeding trends in what continued to be referred to as the “motherland”. The date of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, the 29th of October 1923, soon came to be celebrated in Cyprus by the Turks, for whom it is still today a public holiday. Likewise other national days proclaimed in Turkey were also celebrated, and to British consternation became occasions for the making of public speeches as to their national significance. Certainly, as with the earlier nationalism of the Greeks of the island, Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was to an important extent also a “second-order” nationalism, a response to the nationalist developments of the Turkish mainland. Yet, it had also its own specific characteristics and conditions.

1251. See, Minute on Major Barnes’ question to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 15th November 1920. CO 67/200, 616.
1252. Venizelos seems to have been willing to leave the question of Cyprus to time, in accord with the message conveyed to him by Earl Curzon that Britain had no intention of ceding Cyprus in the foreseeable future. Naturally, Venizelos was after much greater gains in Anatolia at that time, and in these endeavours he required British assistance, and thus, as a consequence Cyprus was not a priority.
1253. Söz recalled in 1930 how: “Seven years ago on this very day in Lausanne after much struggle, İsmet Paşa, who represented Turkey and Turkishness with all its meaning, succeeded in getting his own point of view accepted by powerful governments, and won for Turkey its independence and freedom.” [Söz 24th July 1930]. In fact, Ahmet Raşid, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Central Committee of the National Congress was to invite him to come to Cyprus, an offer that was politely declined. [Söz 3rd September 1931]. Gürel records that the Ottoman Delegation to the Paris Conference had tried to raise the matter of negotiation with Britain as to the “political status” of Cyprus, albeit an unrealistic effort made to no avail, and only to be swiftly rebuked for having even considered the matter open for discussion. GÜREL 1984, 100–101.
The rise of education and literacy accelerated this process of nationalization of the ethnically Turkish masses of Cyprus for whom religious identity had long been the primary locus of identification. It could be argued too that further momentum was unwittingly added to this trend by measures taken by the British regarded as restricting or obstructing the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Traditionalists and British loyalists among the Turks tried to stem dissension, but faced increasing difficulty in maintaining their hold over the populace. The conservative, pro-British stance of İrfan Bey and the like had never gone unquestioned or unopposed; nor was that of his successor Münir Bey to do so. What was unprecedented, however, was the level of nationalist opposition to their stance, that had so risen by the end of the 1920’s as to threaten not only the political hold of these loyal elites, but, by implication, also the foundations of British rule in Cyprus.

5.1 From Sevres to Lausanne: Despondency, Hope and Disillusionment

With the conclusion of the First World War the victors prepared in Paris a series of treaties, which were then duly imposed upon the vanquished with little or no consultation as to their views and aspirations. Most notorious of these, particularly as concerns debate surrounding the Paris Conference’s ultimate failure was the Treaty of Versailles concluded with Germany. However, long before the Treaty of Versailles was finally pronounced dead-and-buried, the Treaty of Sevres concluded with the Ottoman authorities had already failed.

Till then though, the Turks of Cyprus were in the dark. Talk of enosis was rife and their Ottoman homeland defeated. As such they reached out to all who could, it was hoped, be of assistance in supporting them. One such aforementioned case, sometimes misinterpreted, (notably once again by Attalides), as being a result of the weakness of their Ottoman/Turkish identity as opposed to their Moslem identity, was their appeal for support to the Agha Khan in mid-1919, “protesting against the agitation in Greece and the island.”1256 As Wosgian appropriately indicates, however, this was a result of his perceived influence with the British, and not evidence of the lack of association with Tur-

1254. For example, in noting that the club would be organizing festivities for the celebration of the 23rd April, the register of central committee decisions, notes that numerous speeches were to be given on the evening of this anniversary. [Birlik Oçağı minutes of 22nd April 1924. HT/BO-KD]. Birlik then reported that Fadıl Niyazi had said in his speech that, “all the Turks in the world, not only the Turkish government, could be proud of this day.” [Birlik 25th April 1924.] Söz of the 23rd April 1931 also noted the special importance of this anniversary for it was the day that the people of Anatolia came together to establish The Turkish Grand National Assembly, establishing and pronouncing the national sovereignty of the nation, and freeing it from its servitude to the Sultanate. “The 23rd of April opened the way for Turkishness, and has caused the nation to assume its identity.” [Söz 23rd April 1931]; That revolutionary principles of the Turkish Republic had already been accepted in Cyprus by the mid-1930’s was validated by the Turkish consul, who noted, “The devotion of the Turks of Cyprus to Turkey and the Turkish Revolution is so strong that even those amongst them feel the need to be appearing outwardly to support them.” Report of Turkish Consulate in Cyprus, enclosed in Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, 14th May 1937. BCA 30.10.0.0/10441-124.886-18.]

1255. WORSLEY 1979, 7.

1256. ATTALIDES 1979, 43–44; HILL 1952, 530.
Further, it should be recalled that Turkish Cypriot efforts to work with the Ottoman authorities and to attend the Paris Conference six months earlier had been prevented by the British. At this juncture the nationalists gathering in Anatolia had no influence over the western powers, while the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul were emasculated. Yet still, till the revelation of the Treaty of Sevres’ details, the nationalists held-out some weak hope of union with Turkey, Ahmet Raşid arguing in the Doğru Yol that the strategic importance of the island meant that Ottoman negotiators should demand possession of the island and, “finally put an end to years of longing.” Such wishful thinking had no foundation in the realities of the time.

The Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10th 1920, was decried by the press, which fully supported Mustafa Kemal’s rejection of its provisions, that were described as being incompatible with the honour of nationalists. As far as Cyprus was concerned, there were three key articles incorporated in section IX of the treaty, which read as follows:

“Article 115:
The High Contracting Parties recognise the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on November 5, 1914.

Article 116:
Turkey renounces all rights and title over or relating to Cyprus, including the right to the tribute formerly paid by that island to the Sultan.

Article 117:
Turkish nationals born or habitually resident in Cyprus will acquire British nationality and lose their Turkish nationality, subject to the conditions laid down in the local law.”

For the Turks of Cyprus then, this treaty appeared to put an end to any aspirations of being re-united with the Ottoman Empire. For the traditional elite in particular, but also generally for the island’s Turks, clinging to British rule appeared a logical, if somewhat ignoble, means by which they might hope to have at least some influence on the course of their political affairs, at least as far as obstructing the rising calls for enosis was concerned. Not all, though, lost faith in the future of the Turks.

Detail as to how general Turkish Cypriot opinion responded to the new state of affairs envisaged by Sevres is not much available; but articles in the local press indicate that they had not been willing to concede the complete dismemberment and humiliation of Turkey, regarded such arrangements as a betrayal of the principles of justice according to which the armistice had originally been concluded on October 30th 1918, and still held some faith that such an unjust state of affairs would not be permitted to stand. An article in the Doğru Yol of 22nd March, 1920, mentioned above, slammed the provisions being foreseen for the establishment of an independent Armenia, applauded the Turcophile Pierre Loti’s praise of the Turks and disparagement of the Armenians, and in cognisance of prevailing international discourse declared: “At a time when the principles of nationality are dominant, the Turks eagerly expect from the Civilized Europe the acceptance & satisfaction of their own national rights, too.”

1257. WOSGIAN 1963, 175.
1259. Ibid., 6th September and 1st November 1920.
1260. s.n. 1924.
1261. The remaining columns of this issue of the
Doğru Yol newspaper were no less intransigent. An article entitled, “While in expectation of peace and rest,” written by Raşid, declared:

“It is the lack of compliance with the feelings of justice that the Hellenes have been made to encroach upon Smyrna in the name of Civilization. Thousands of sinless persons have been led to death & misery. And again, it is due to the lack of that choice feeling that peace with Turkey could not, as yet, be concluded. If those who rely on the principles of respecting the rights of even the smallest nations, did not intend to assail the life of a great empire, but were to follow the same principles in that respect, too, then of course, mankind would long ago have bidden farewell to the days of calamity.

We know not why the destruction of an innocent & just nation should be desired in order to please the Armenians & Greeks whose crimes are quite in the open. It is a great injustice to expect a nation to be entombed by its deadly enemy without that nation raising its voice. In such a case the world which is already in a confused state will become more confused & confounded. The earth will again be dyed with the blood flowing from the veins of mankind.

We wonder whether such a scene of carnage cannot be averted with a tinge of justice. One must be confident that after such a war peace cannot precede justice. Will the Majesty & grandeur of those who neglect this point be able to tolerate the weight of their responsibility?

Poor mankind! Poor & oppressed Turks! Was this to be your fate while in expectation of peace and rest?”

Even more striking was a piece written by Mehmet Remzi. As with Raşid’s article, the British had this translated and put on file as an example of “dangerous publications”. Entitled, “The eve of war,” Remzi’s editorial asserted:

The Turks who have lived as independent people ever since the creation of the world understand – (are familiar with) the blessing of independence as much as other nations and perhaps to a greater extent. The Turks who have taken part in the general war with the lofty aspirations of preserving their national independence and glory, have proved to the world at large that their vital power is still in existence and by sacrificing their invaluable children they have demonstrated that they are the true heirs of their ancestors’ bravery and valor. The Turks who respect the rights of other nations as much as their own, on receipt of informations in regard to Wilson’s magical conditions of peace preferred the abandonment of arms to vain carnage and declared to the allies their readiness to agree to an armistice under these conditions, in view of the conclusion of peace.

No Turk believed that the joy following the armistice the statements of Wilson will remain as a Theory; that the end of this great war will still be a national greed and political competitions until the arrival of the Hellenic forces in Smyrna by order of the peace Conference in as much as for the Turk this kind of artifice and intrigue were things to be rejected and loathed.

The occupations of and the tragedy and oppressors in Smyrna will stain the brightest pages of the history of the victorious nations until the day of resurrection and these will be a cause of circumspections for Turks and Moslems.

1261. Extract from Doğru Yol 22nd March 1920. SA1/1153/1919, 76; The journal İrşad was also to argue that this unjust treaty was the cause of the resulting war in Anatolia. İrşad 1st September 1920.
The erroneous and biased action of Versailles has led the Turks once more to arms and to great, very great sacrifices in order to save their endangered independence.

Those who have fought for 4–5 years for their home, before they could find time to cure their wounds, ran once more to the frontiers. The Turks, discovering that the time of peace has not, as yet, commenced, have formed the (national forces) & have bound themselves by an oath that they will fight unless Asia Minor & Constantinople is saved from every kind of enemy. As if the tragedies that have taken place before the eyes of the powerful civilized ones were not sufficient, the Armenians in Cilicia, under the patronage of their French masters, are extinguishing thousands of Turkish homes & violating the honour of thousands of young girls.

The Turk looked on these things with the calmness & seriousness that characterizes him and was in expectation of the decree from the tribunal of justice of the victorious ones.

Reuter’s agency published that the League of Nations had decided that “the whole of Thrace will be given to Greece; Constantinople will be placed in a position indicating its internalization; the independence of Armenia will be ratified; Turkey will be deprived of her coast and she will be reduced to the position of a Government devoid of military and Naval forces and one whose existence is equal to her non-existence” and that in order to make the Ottoman Government to accept these conditions the (50,000 troops of Greece) would be enough to crush down the national power begotten from the general conscience of the Turks.

If the Conference of the Victorious ones called (Council of Nations) do not give up to a certain extent the national political greed and make up decisions that will secure the rights of nations, they must admit that we are in the eve of another general and sanguine war.

The deafening noise that will be caused by the collision of the East and West is, of course, a great calamity for mankind.

On the whole the Turkish Cypriots rapidly embraced the new nationalist movement that emerged under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia, defying the Sevres settlement and the Sultan’s government in Istanbul that had conceded to it. İrşad lauded the will and determination of Kemal whom, though, “not the child of some important family,” deserved respect and support, not because of his ancestry or age, but because of his, “determination and will,” because he was endowed with, “a magnificent national sentiment.” Kemal might be, “the son of a tobacco factory clerk, but he ha[d] received a good education and military discipline and won great power.” It was now, under Kemal’s leadership that, “The shadow of the sick man was once again being cast upon Europe.” Kemal had become the leader of the new Turkish nation, not its sovereign; He deserved adulation for his services to that nation, for reviving it from the ashes, not as a consequence of his heredity, not as a result of any dynastic legitimacy. “Nationalism,” Kohn contended, “is inconceivable without the ideas of popular sovereignty preceding–without a complete revision of the position of ruler and ruled, of classes and castes.”

1263. Ibid., s.a. SA1/1153/1919, 69–72; Reference to Wilson’s Fourteen Points was no coincidence for the nationalists in Anatolia had indeed, “based their claims on president Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ and the principle of self determination for the ‘the Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire’ embedded in them.” ZÜRCHER 1999; See Wilson’s speech of the 8th of January 1918 where his “programme of the world’s peace,” was set forth, including as it did his twelfth point that, “The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty.” WILSON 1918.

1264. İrşad 1st March 1922.

1265. KOHN 1946, 3.
It was this revision that was now taking place in Turkish society, both in Turkey and in Cyprus.

As Zürcher, however, illustrates, the nationalist movement that Kemal himself led itself had roots in the CUP cadres, and was not, as commonly portrayed, solely originated through the efforts of Kemal.1266 Though having, within months of joining, already by the revolution of 1908, “paid useful services,” as a member of the CUP, Kemal had, “joined it too late to enter the inner circle of power,” and thus did not hold a prominent enough position to significantly influence its leading policies.1267 As Deringil argues the position of official history, “that the Nationalist movement was ‘born’ in Anatolia purely as the brainchild of Mustafa Kemal,” the creation of, “the image of a national resistance that which somehow sprang up in the Anatolian steppe without any previous preparation,” without any basis in the actions or cadres of the CUP, is totally misleading.1268 Yet in practice it was Kemal who soon singularly epitomized the movement like no other, a movement that was destined to have much more success than the ill-fated efforts to redeem power that Enver was to undertake upon the defeat of the Empire. For the Turks of Cyprus, Enver’s doomed efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia were undoubtedly more distant, his escape from the Ottoman Empire aboard a German vessel an additional embarrassment.1269 Faced by the very real prospect of Cyprus’ incorporation too into a Greater Greece, the efforts of the nationalist forces under the leadership of Kemal to resist this irredentist Greek programme were naturally to receive greater sympathy.

The fact that Kemal’s forces were soon to do battle with the Greek armies that had first landed on the eastern shores of the Aegean on the 15th of May, 1919, and had proceeded to occupy, (in league with the British), a substantial portion of Asia Minor in pursuance of the Megali Idea, was particularly poignant for the Turkish Cypriots, who soon after began to take various initiatives to help their besieged fellow Turks of the mainland. In March 1920, for example, the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club organized a performance of Namık Kemal’s play “Akif Bey” for the benefit of the Turkish refugees of the Greek occupation of Izmir, with Mehmet Emin’s poem “Yurdumuzun İniltsisi”, (“Our Country’s Groaning”), being recited to the audience as a prelude to the opening scene.1270 Similar efforts to raise funds for those stricken by the fighting in Anatolia were undertaken in other parts of the island too. A portrait of Mustafa Kemal in the TRNC National Archives, for instance, has inscribed on it information as to its origins, noting that it was auctioned at a literary performance held in Limassol on the 26th of February 1921 for the benefit of Turkish refugees across the seas.1271 Around the same time the İrade journal made a similar appeal calling people to listen to their, “Turkish hearts,” and stating that this was a moral, not legal, duty for the Moslems of Cyprus, “who though being separated from the motherland for over forty years, still possess a clean unblemished Turkish soul.”1272 One

1267. Ibid., 42–43 and 53–54.
1268. DERİNGİL 1993, 171; Deringil makes a strong case too for the ideological linkages, often overlooked, sometimes refuted, that run from the thought of Namık Kemal and the Young Ottomans, through those of the Young Turks and the CUP, to the ideology of Kemalism. “Mustafa Kemal,” he asserts, “was no accident of history.” Ibid., 181.
1269. VÖLKAN - İTZKOWITZ 1984, 108.
1271. The copy of the inscribed portrait is available in the Turkish Cypriot National Archives. MAA-TK-5749.
might reason that such efforts had no political significance, that they were purely charitable endeavours. Such a line of argument would, however, be erroneous. Charitable assistance was directly related to political sentiments and ideals. As to the duty to help, Doğru Yol urged, “Citizens, let us think carefully: Anatolia is the final homeland of the Turks, the final safe-haven,” and İısad too proclaimed that it was a, “national duty,” to assist those fighting for Anatolia, as, “the Anatolian war will either bring the end of Turkey, or will be the first step in its development,” and, “because the Anatolian war constituted a struggle to defend the independence of the whole Turkish nation.” These efforts were clearly then an expression of shared sentiment with the struggle of the Turks in Anatolia, an expression of the ‘Turkish Cypriots’ support for the nationalist forces attempting to recover control of the Anatolian heartland from its occupiers. No better sign of this existed, than the growing adulation for the very subject of the above-mentioned portrait, Mustafa Kemal, commander-in-chief of the national resistance, and increasingly a symbol of hope for the Turkish Cypriots. The powerful charisma of this heroic leader was soon destined to affect Turks both near and far.

A poem published in the Doğru Yol newspaper by a certain Nazım of Larnaca, and called, “Movement in Anatolia” read:

“A great army marching about in Anatolia
Is said to have become the protector & guardian of the Turk.
Fatherless orphans & every young one have run thereto & filled the camps.
It is said, in the hearts there is a lofty feeling: the will to die.
That the forces shed tears in profusion for Smyrna –
They are right to cry: the flower that has been severed is the lock of the bunch
and is worth Continents.

O Kemal, be thou a leader of the faith with banner in hand & forces behind.
Make western[er]s understand again that Turks know not obedience by force (of arms).”

Further satirical verses published once Kemal’s forces had begun to advance against the Greek armies, acclaimed Mustafa Kemal and ridiculed the Greek king and his soldiers, declaring “our armies will now proceed to march to Izmir”. Especially revealing was the opening stanza which read:

“Anatolia is the hearth of the Turks,
And Cyprus is a part of it,
Could the flag of the Greek be raised,
While there exists the red standard of the Turk.”

Evidence, though not extensive, does exist that the Turkish Cypriots may have played a minor part in assisting the nationalists’ efforts more directly. There is little to substantiate Altan’s contention of it being indisputable that, “many a [Turkish Cypriot] man fought side by side with Atatürk especially in the Graeco-Turkish wars of 1921–1922.”

1272. İısad 1st January 1921; In the following issue İısad applauded the efforts to raise money in Larnaca which had been undertaken in a meeting held in the “Itihad Club”. Ibid., 1st February 1921.
1273. Doğru Yol 5th January 1920.
1274. İısad 1st September 1921.
1275. For the charismatic features of Mustafa Kemal, see VOLKAN - ITZKOWITZ 1984, 152–153.
1277. Ankebut 23rd October 1921.
1278. Ibid.
However, official British documents do report as to covert efforts to abet the Turkish nationalists. For example, Judge Raif, (of whom more mention will be made below), despite his denials, was convicted in March 1920 of taking part in Famagusta, “in a political meeting at the mosque in order to raise funds and volunteers for the Kemalist army.”

Amongst a handful of cases referred to over the years by the newspaper, the Söz of the 14th of May 1931 notes, for example, that a Turkish Cypriot doctor, Osman Necmi, a major in the Turkish army, had come on leave to his family home in Cyprus, and recounts how this man, to whom the Turkish Cypriots were grateful and of whom they are most proud, had served the motherland both during the First World War, and after during the War of Independence, when he was present also at the glorious Battle of Sakarya where the Greeks had been repelled. A special tea party was to be held in his honour at the Kardeş Ocağı where speeches extolling his achievements and expressing the Turkish Cypriots’ pride in Necmi’s contribution to the motherland were delivered by club members.

Reports as to the curious comings and goings of Greek naval vessels to the island give some further indication of possible covert assistance to the Kemalists via Cyprus. One confidential report stated:

The Officers of the “CONSTANTINOPOLIS” were entertained by the Greek community at FAMAGUSTA. After considerable entertainment, the Greek officers began to give away information and they said that the reason for the “IERAX” waiting at Cyprus was to catch ships carrying contraband goods to MERSINA, and that she had already captured a Lloyd Triestino ship carrying 500 tons of wheat for Kemal.

The same report too, related an incident that apparently occurred at the beginning of 1922, where: “S/S “BERKSHIRE” (line unknown) carrying coal, consigned to a British Subject at Cyprus, was seized by the Greek Auxiliary “Naxos” and taken to the PIRA-EUS as a prize,” and it might be supposed that the unnamed “British Subject” mentioned could well have been a Turkish Cypriot, sending coal to the Kemalists.

Throughout the war in Anatolia countless theatre performances, invariably with plays portraying patriotic themes, were put on to collect funds for the struggling Turks of Anatolia. The themes they portrayed had an important role in politically socializing the population which, though much less so than before, was still to an important extent illiterate. In his study of the Turkish Cypriot theatre movement, Yaşar Ersoy especially highlights the role of the Kardeş Ocağı and its forerunners in the field of spreading the values of

1279. ALTAN 1997, 42.
1280. Judge Raif’s petition to Secretary of State, enclosed in Storrs to Secretary of State, 12th March 1931. CO 67/238/11, 37.
1281. Söz 14th May 1931; This man, as well as a few other cases of Turkish Cypriot practitioners of medical and veterinary professions who were officially acknowledged for their contributions to the Turkish War of Independence, was an acquaintance of Derviş Manizade the Turkish Cypriot professor of medicine-cum-amateur historian settled in Turkey. Osman Necmi later rose to the rank of general and took on the surname Tulgar, by which he is referred to also by Derviş Manizade. MANIZADE 1965, 14–15.
1282. Söz 18th June 1931.
1283. Though in some cases such visits by Greek naval ships were “certainly illegal” as far as concerned the need to, “conform to the accepted rules of maritime warfare,” due to their backing of the Greek expedition in Anatolia the British sometimes turned a blind eye. Enclosure in Admiralty to Colonial Office, 18th April 1922. CO 67/209, 8.
1284. Ibid., 10.
1285. Ibid.
Kemalism through this early audio-visual alternative to the written word. The theatre, he concludes, was used most effectively as a medium to get the Kemalist message across to the common folk.  

By mid-1922 Greek advances in Asia Minor had been reversed and the Turkish nationalists had become the ascendant power in Turkey. In June of 1922 the editor-in-chief of the Ankebut published poems not only lauding the Turkish victories and Kemal’s leadership, but indicating the desire for their struggle to continue till the unification of Cyprus with Turkey. In a poem, entitled “Anatolia is my country,” Mehmet Fikri wrote:

“Kemal Paşa! My country is deserving of you alone.
My faithful ancestry, lucrative properties, green field lie open.
Let your soldiers, the children of ancient Turks, march
So that the glory of the west rots under steel-tipped boots.”

Ateşin argues that the starting point for the metamorphosis of the identity of the Moslems of Cyprus was the victory of the Turkish Troops in Izmir, ejecting the occupying Greek forces as of the 9th of September 1922. He explains that, despite the fact that they were being left out of the national confines foreseen by the National Pact, as soon as news of the liberation of Izmir was received joyous and spontaneous celebrations were seen on the streets of all the main Moslem centres, noting this as clear evidence of a strong communal spirit. As we have seen, even earlier roots for the initiation of this transformation can be identified, yet the Kemalist triumph in Izmir undoubtedly spurred the general shift to Turkish nationalism underway in the Turkish Cypriot community. The Hürriyet ve Terraki central Committee register of decisions confirms that it was decided as early as the 8th September 1922 that the club would be adorned with decorations to celebrate the freeing of Izmir. Two high school students present at the main celebrations in Nicosia the following day were Fazıl Küçük and Faiz Kaymak, both of whom were to become leading lights of the nationalist movement in later years. Held without authorisation from the British authorities, Küçük later recounted that armed police were eventually sent to disperse the jubilant crowds and claimed that leading figures involved in the meeting were arrested and questioned. The local Turkish Cypriot press gleefully reported the advances of the Kemalist forces, and with renewed confidence, alluded even to the aspiration that they would be liberated too. The Ankebut journal of the 13th September, 1922 printed a portrait of Mustafa Kemal, and gave the text of a rousing speech he had made to “The great noble Turkish nation.” Below the picture stood the caption: “Our Commander-in-Chief Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa has declared the Mediterranean as the objec-

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1286. ERSOY 1998, 22; Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots and their clubs were also using the theatre for purposes of national socialization, with for example, the Panerghatikos Club performing a play called “Kutchouk Mehmet” referring to the Greek revolution of 1821, and the persecution of the Greeks in Cyprus that occurred during the same year. Enclosure No. 2 in Officer Administering the Government to Secretary of State, 3rd April 1924. CO 67/227/4, 69.
1288. This journal, established in Larnaca in 1920, was owned by a certain Derviş Ali. As indicated on its title page, this weekly publication was especially directed to teachers, who paid only half-price for their copies.
tive for our armies.”1293 Even more exuberantly, the Ankebut a fortnight later published, together with another picture of Kemal, a poem by a leading Turkish poet and diplomat Abdülhak Hamit, rejoicing in the triumph of Turkish independence and glorifying the Turkish army, which, it was declared, had risen from the bosom of the nation.1294

The printing of the picture of Atatürk was significant from a different angle too. Though issues of newspapers known to have once been published are not believed to exist today, Dedecay is probably correct in her assertion that the picture of Atatürk in the Ankebut of the 13th September 1922 was the first occasion that a human figure had been portrayed in the Turkish Cypriot press. Her assessment that such pictures had till then not been printed as a consequence of religious conservatism is also proper and we can fairly conclude that this and other such portraits of Atatürk that soon followed were an indication of the deeper transformation that was taking place in society.1295

The euphoria in Cyprus surrounding the nationalists’ triumphs continued quite some time, Ankebut publishing another article a month later referring to “Our National Struggle” and remarking that, “the Turk was three years ago believed to be dead and his estate not divided but looted,” but that today, “the Turk is stronger than ever, the Turkish nation is more self-sacrificing than ever and more determined to have its right recognised.”1296 The satirical journal Davul wrote gleefully that the Greek Cypriots’ faces had turned the purple hue of an aubergine from humiliation.1297 In reading the last two sentences of the conclusion, it might even be construed that the article subtly pointed to the paper’s aspirations for Cyprus for it was declared: “The Turkish army stands waiting at the head of the country and nation like the owner of the world. We have not the slightest doubt or anxiety that all our rights will be won.”1298 That the liberation of Izmir had left a lasting imprint on the Turkish Cypriot psyche is supported both by the fact that celebrations on the anniversary of the liberation continued to take place in subsequent years.1299 Even three decades on, during what we may call “the second wave of Turkish nationalism,” an underground nationalist organization, pre-dating the more well-known TMT, bore the name of “Dokuz Eylül Cephesi”, or the “The Ninth of September Front”.1300

As Kutlu Adali was to record from conversations with Turkish Cypriot villagers, the rural Turks who had been oft taunted, if not usually physically harangued while the Greeks advanced in Anatolia, also now took the opportunity to get their revenge. On hearing the news of the Greek retreat the Turks in one mixed village (Kavaklı), are said to have gleefully chanted, “Live long Kemal Paşa, Live with your soldiers for thousands [of years], Chop of the head of a hundred thousand Greeks,” and then hastily raised a

1293. Ankebut 13th September 1922; Reşat Akar has said that this statement created widespread excitement amongst the Turkish Cypriots. [AKAR, 1981, 11]. Sixty years later, the nationalist historian Altan still points to this statement as a foundation for his assertion that despite the constraints imposed by the Misaki Milli, all obstacles will eventually be surmounted and the union of Cyprus with the motherland will be achieved. ALTAN 1997, 5–6.
1294. Ankebut 30th September 1922.
1296. Ankebut 25th October 1922.
1297. Davul 15th October 1922.
1298. Ankebut 25th October 1922.
1299. For example, the club’s register indicates a similar decision for 1924. Birlıqcı minutes of 9th September 1924. HT/BO-KD.
makeshift Turkish flag in front of the coffee shop. Adalı’s account suggests that the tensions ultimately led the Greeks to abandon this mixed village.\textsuperscript{1301}

Aspirations for union with Turkey were expressed directly soon after in December 1922, through a petition organised by Dr. Eyyub, and purporting to contain signatures from all the Turkish population centres on the island, both rural and urban. The standard petition form began with the following paragraphs:

\begin{quote}
We the Moslem inhabitants of _____ in the district of _____ in the island of Cyprus respectfully and earnestly beg that our religious & national claims set forth herein below may be taken into consideration in the Peace Conference which will be held shortly:

Art 1. We the Moslem people of Cyprus beg that, in the settlement of the fate of Cyprus in the general Peace Conference which will be held shortly between the great national Council of Turkey and the allied nations, should the restoration of Cyprus to Turkey which is our national desire & the aspiration of our heart, be impossible for any political reason, the Island may be restored to its pre-war status & that without the consent of the Turkish Govt and of the Moslem people of the Island, it may not be handed over to any Govt. excepting Turkey.\textsuperscript{1302}
\end{quote}

In his covering letter to the Governor forwarding the petitions, Eyyub announced:

\begin{quote}
We shall be evincing the moral qualities which distinguish the Turks by stating that as far as protection of life and property is concerned it is evident that over sixty thousand Moslems in Cyprus entrusted by the great Osmanli Government to the great British Government forty-four years ago by reason of political exigencies of the time, are satisfied with the English administration. But at the present time it being a political necessity in the world that every people should express their aspirations and desire which constitute a natural right pertaining to every people, We the Moslem people of Cyprus also, by reason of the cancellation of the old treaties that existed, claim that the Island may be abandoned and restored to the recent national government of Turkey which is the original master of the Island.\textsuperscript{1303}

Eyyub cautiously added the caveat, however, that:

\begin{quote}
Should the conclusions of the negotiations between the two governments not necessitate the restoration of Cyprus to Turkey for any reason, we add that we strongly oppose the annexation or transfer of Cyprus to any power excepting England.\textsuperscript{1304}
\end{quote}

Yet, for all the joy displayed in the victories of Kemal’s nationalists, they were not for the Turkish Cypriots to bring union with Turkey. On the contrary, with the Treaty of Lausanne finalized on the 24th July 1923, and eventually coming into force on the 6th of June 1924, Turkey unequivocally renounced any claim to the possession of Cyprus. Even though it should have been expected, the Turkish Cypriots, who had been closely following news of the negotiations in Lausanne, were nonetheless shaken by this outcome.\textsuperscript{1305} A sense of abandonment, though seldom openly voiced, (probably because it would raise eyebrows as being disloyal to the motherland), was likely to have pervaded, and it occasionally surfaced. In its first issue the Birlik newspaper of the 4th of January 1924 was to state: “Unfortunately the Lausanne Treaty, which for Turkey is equivalent to recognition

\textsuperscript{1301}. ADALI 1997, 151–152
\textsuperscript{1302}. Enclosure in Dr. Eyyoub to Stevenson, 11th December 1922. SA1/1273/1922, 12.
\textsuperscript{1303}. Dr. Eyyoub to Stevenson, 11th December 1922. SA1/1273/1922, 10.
\textsuperscript{1304}. Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{1305}. BERKES 1997, 37.
of its liberation, has cut-off and separated our beautiful island from the Turkish fatherland.¹³⁰⁶ Even more dramatic were the lines published in the Davul of the 22nd of April 1923, when early reports of the treaty’s expected contents had first been received:

Events have occurred that had never come to mind,
Oh, what had been our hope, oh what has happened Lord!
Before the roses of that hope blossomed,
Those buds suddenly wilted oh Lord!
Joyous, lively Turan has become a ruin,
All aspirations, hopes, dreams have turned to naught.¹³⁰⁷

Only a month earlier another poem, signed, “a yearning person,” had called upon Turkish soldiers to know no bounds, and plant the flag wherever any Turk lived.¹³⁰⁸ At the start of the year, “M.A.”, the author of the aforementioned despondent lines in the Davul, had proclaimed much more optimistically that they were, “Turaniots, sons of Turks,” with a great past and that while four years earlier they had been in the depths of darkness, the Turkish nation had now arisen to greatness once again.¹³⁰⁹ Having lived for close to half a century under the illusion that one day their island would ultimately be re-embraced by the motherland, they were now faced by the harsh reality of the undisputed rule of a foreign power being recognised and sanctioned by that motherland. They had for long witnessed and deplored the fate of Turks and Moslems which had come under foreign rule, most notably in Crete, and as repeatedly attested to by British reports, there was a widespread belief that were Cyprus too to come under Greek control it would mean the end of their communal existence on the island. As McHenry correctly asserts, however, for Turkey, “The fate of Cyprus … was an issue of minor proportions in comparison with other questions which the Lausanne Conference undertook to resolve,” and it was naturally not a serious priority for Mustafa Kemal.¹³¹⁰

According to one account, a leading Turkish Cypriot who is said to have volunteered to serve in the Ottoman army in war against the Greeks in 1897, who is known to have been active from the initial stages in the nationalist campaign in Anatolia, and who played a leading role in determining Atatürk’s early economic policy, did try to intervene somewhat on the Turkish Cypriots behalf.¹³¹¹ This remarkable man was Hüseyin Sirri. (He later adopted the surname Bellioğlu.) Sirri Bey, together with Dr. Rıza Nur, (İnönü’s deputy at the Lausanne conference), is said to have made a last ditch appeal to İnönü to at least have included the clause, that were Britain to leave the island it would revert to Turkey’s control. İsmet Paşa is said to have abruptly dismissed the suggestion. No doubt much more concerned by the bigger picture, İnönü apparently pronounced that they were chasing an illusion and refused to even raise the issue.¹³¹² I have come across no other

¹³⁰⁶. Fadıl Niyazi in Birlik 4th January 1924.
¹³⁰⁷. Davul 22nd April 1923.
¹³⁰⁸. Ibid., 11th March 1923.
¹³⁰⁹. Ibid., 28th January 1923.
¹³¹¹. For more detailed information on Sirri Bey and his political fortunes see AN 2002, 238–247.
¹³¹². This account is given by Manızade who himself was apparently told the story by Sirri Bey. MANİZADE 1998, 96; A similar, if not quite identical account is also given by Kadir Mısıroğlu. MISIROĞLU 1973, 79.
source to precisely confirm this particular story, but it is now beyond doubt that Sırrı Bey was indeed amongst the most outspoken critics of İnönü’s handling of the Lausanne negotiations.¹³¹³ In fact, he ultimately expressed his dissatisfaction not only with İnönü’s handling of the negotiations, but also, in a closed session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, with Rıza Nur himself. The latter he complained had failed to give convincing arguments as to why the Turkish delegation had reneged on previously agreed positions vis-à-vis the National Pact and made unsanctioned and unwarranted concessions.¹³¹⁴ Both Nur, and İsmet Paşa, however, defended their actions. Regarding Cyprus, İsmet was actually to reveal, in a somewhat self-congratulatory manner, that while the British had opposed the idea, the Turkish delegation at Lausanne had succeeded in getting for the Turks of the island the right to opt for Turkish nationality.¹³¹⁵

Sırrı Bey was not placated by İsmet’s defence. On the contrary, he persisted in his criticisms, and made quite clear in a further closed parliamentary session that he believed Cyprus, as well as the other islands close to the Turkish shores should not have been relinquished. The islands, he insisted, were to be considered, “a component part of Anatolia,” and surrendering them threatened the future well-being of Anatolia.¹³¹⁶ As the minutes of the session reveal, Sırrı then proceeded to launch a blistering attack against those responsible for negotiating the Treaty of Lausanne’s provisions concerning Cyprus:

[Sırrı Bey (İzmit) - ] Now, one of the territories given away as a gift is the island of Cyprus. (Yes, Bravo voices). The representatives for Adana and Silifke are better situated than I to appreciate the political significance of this territory. The place is near enough for one to feel the breath of the other. In other words, I do not find it necessary to describe the political importance of this land, I am merely making note of the situation. (Voices of Bravo). The people of this land, one fourth of the population being Moslem, despite being few in number, despite their co-citizens being a people as ruthless and vindictive as the Greeks, and their rulers being an unforgiving people like the English, have participated in the Anatolian National Movement, repeatedly winning the deserved appreciation of this government. Was it not proper that while giving-up this island, sacrificing it for the fatherland’s sake, an article, at least, were included to guarantee the rights of the Moslem inhabitants? Oh, blessed men, is it not proper to incorporate an article, a provision to protect also those Moslems’ ownership rights under the law of man, to prevent the government from being able to act arbitrarily in respect to their affairs?

Hüseyin Avni (Erzurum) – This action also contravenes the National Pact…

Sırrı Bey (Continuing) – Suppose that we do not think of the Moslems there, the minority is small. Let (40) thousand more Moslems be sacrificed together with the other Moslems we have sentenced to slavery with our own hands for the sake of this country. But, again for the sake of this country there was a reservation that has been forgotten. That is that we should have put a condition that this island of ours could not be made a gift, returned, or in any other way given to a third state, as happened in the case of the Seven Islands, Korfu, Yaku, and Ayamu, where these islands were taken from us and given to Greece. This has precedent in international law … Unfortunately the Delegation of ours did not even see this. It did not

¹³¹³. See, for example, Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 4th March 1923, 75–76; See also, AYDEMİR 1995, 78. ¹³¹⁴. Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 2nd March 1923, 9–11. ¹³¹⁵. Ibid., 3rd March 1923, 70–71. ¹³¹⁶. Ibid., 5th March 1923, 113.
deem it necessary to pursue even this. Oh you Moslems, this is why our Moslem brethren on the island of Cyprus have been abandoned to ruin in the infidel’s hand.\textsuperscript{1317}

Also referring to Cyprus in his own grilling of the Lausanne delegation was Hüseyin Avni Bey.\textsuperscript{1318} In rejecting the delegation’s faith in understandings reached with the British on the matter of Mosul, (originally foreseen as an integral part of the territories of the National Pact), he railed, “We will not be deceived gentlemen. [The question of sovereignty over] Mosul is to remain pending for a year. What does this mean gentlemen? This is mocking the nation. Did you get back Egypt from the British; did you get Cyprus back gentlemen? Why should he who does not give you Mosul today do so tomorrow?”\textsuperscript{1319}

The Turks of Cyprus were now stranded on an island outside the confines of the newly formed Turkish state and the feelings of being left marooned were understandable. Ten years on, Con Rifat wrote a forceful editorial ostensibly complaining that the press in Turkey was not making sufficient effort to defend the rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriots. Though only a small weak community, the Turkish Cypriots had since 1878, he said, “fearlessly resisted all those who had attacked their national honour and had always striven to preserve to the utmost the honour and glory of Turkishness,” whatever the expense; had shared the sentiments and goals of the greater Turkish community and had considered their interests as a whole, as being one, “as children of the same family. “Despite knowing it to be impolite,” wrote Con Rifat, “we have no choice but to say that those who hold the principle responsibility for our sorry state are the Turkish delegates to the Lausanne Peace Conference.”\textsuperscript{1320}

The Treaty of Lausanne, though while not in accordance with Sırrı’s wishes, had, as İsmet Paşa announced, made certain special provision for the right of Turkish Cypriots to emigrate; and, they were again to do so in more significant numbers than often appreciated. There is evidence that a notable number had done so, illegally, even before these legal provisions were applied, and that many did so illegally also afterwards, once the provisions had expired, so as, most probably, to circumvent the prohibitively obstructive measures introduced by the colonial authorities.\textsuperscript{1321} Yet, there was an alternative, the

\textsuperscript{1317} Ibid., 115.
\textsuperscript{1318} Another noteworthy figure in Lausanne as part of the official Turkish delegation, acting as an advisor in his capacity as the foreign ministry director of political affairs, was Yusuf Hikmet Bayur. Bayur was a grandson of Yusuf Kamil, or, as he was more frequently called, Kamil Paşa, and so, like Sırrı Bey, no doubt had particular sensitivities on the Cyprus question. Despite his ancestry, he was, however, a dedicated Turkish nationalist, one of the first, according to Nur, to have left Istanbul to join-up with the nationalistic forces in Anatolia, and was to have a long and distinguished career in politics during the Republican era. As a comparatively junior figure in the delegation he appears at the time, however, to have been especially hard worked and to have had little therefore to do in shaping key decisions. [NUR-GREW 2003, 82]. It should not pass without being said that it was this very same Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, who following Turkey’s ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne was to be the sole courageous member of the new Turkish parliament to vote on principle against Atatürk’s presidency of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, (voting instead for İnönü), and who, following the death of Atatürk, was the only member of the 323 parliamentary group of the governing Republican People’s Party to vote against the presidency of İsmet İnönü. Aksiyon Dergisi 16–22 October, 1999; Yeni Şafak 9th July 2000; Radikal 29th October 2001

\textsuperscript{1319} Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 4th March 1923, 93.
\textsuperscript{1320} “Arkadaşlarımıza Muhahellerinden Mahrumiyet Açılışı,” in Masum Millet 19th August 1933.
\textsuperscript{1321} Berkés recalls, for instance, that until Lausanne, those who left Cyprus could do so only illegally. BERKES 1997, 37; Reference to later illegal emigration is made in Kührs 28th November 1949.
alternative of remaining on the island. With Britain having asserted its intention to maintain its rule, Greece having little intention to try to force the British hand on the matter, and the Greek Cypriots, therefore, having apparently come to terms with the fact that there was no short-term prospect of their national aspirations being realized, the majority of Turkish Cypriots were to choose to stay. Nonetheless, the task for budding Turkish nationalists on the island had clearly been complicated. Kızılyürek explains the predicament they faced in the following manner:

Established on the basis of Kemalist nationalism, the state of the Republic of Turkey had limited its area of operation to the borders of the National Pact and, just as it had no political programme for the “Outside Turks”, it did not develop any policies concerning the Turks living outside of the borders of Turkey. As a consequence of this, it was announced, following the Treaty of Lausanne, that those Turkish Cypriots who so desired could settle in Turkey, and the Turkish Consul for Cyprus, Asaf bey, even encouraged the Turks of the island to do so. This was to make particularly difficult the task of Turkish nationalists pioneering the adoration of Turkey that had developed in Cyprus on the basis of opposition to Enosis.1322

Tom Nairn suggests, the contractionist rather than expansionist nature of Kemal’s nationalist agenda was extremely disappointing for the Turks of Cyprus.1323 The subdued sense of rejection by the new Turkish nation-state did not recede till the second half of the century. An article believed to be written by a Turkish Cypriot for the Istanbul paper, Cumhuriyet in 1936 still talked of being an “abandoned community” and of being “neglected” by the “mother country.” More diplomatically, Remzi was to write in the aftermath of the October Revolt of 1931 how at the time, “The Turks stranded outside the national borders of Turkey had looked toward the great sun which illuminated the horizons of Turkey and with quavering heart awaited the rising of this sun.” Conceivably the most poignant example of frustration, though, is the case of none other than Alparslan Türkeş, who even today remains from beyond the grave the spiritual leader of pan-Turkists in Turkey and even father a field. Born in Nicosia, Cyprus during the First World War, Türkeş emigrated to Turkey with his family in mid-1933, his dream apparently being to enlist as a military cadet. When his father took him to be registered, he is said to have initially been told that his son was ineligible because the family held British passports and therefore could not be considered Turkish. Alparslan’s furious father reputedly protested to the responsible official that they were pure blooded Turks and fumed: “It’s your fault. You left us in the hands of the British!”

Meanwhile, the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club itself underwent a major transformation in late 1923 that was closely related to developments in Turkey. Fadıl Niyazi Korkut had gone to study law in Turkey at the close of the First World War, during which period he maintained some contact with nationalist circles.1327 On his return in 1922 he says that he found the club was in dire straits, its membership seriously depleted.1328 According to the

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1323. NAIRN 1979, 38.
1324. Enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 1st May 1936. CO 67/265/3, 90.
1325. Söz 28 th January 1932.
1327. Korkut notes that he was assisted by Dr. Esad, after being released by the British had returned to Istanbul. [KORKUT 2000, 42]. Thereafter, both Esad and his wife, Faika hanım, are stated to have gone to Anatolia to assist the nationalist resistance. KESER s.a., 137 and 147.
club’s Central Committee decision register, Fadıl Korkut rejoined the club in early December 1922.  

This was just a few weeks after Dr. Pertev, who was to toil for a long time side-by-side with Korkut, and had himself recently completed his medical education in Istanbul, had been admitted as a member. The register indicates that there were at the time around sixty permanent members, a number which despite numerous trials and tribulations was to increase significantly by the end of the decade. Together with his colleagues, they decided to change the elite nature of the club and make it more populist, adopting the new name Birlik Oçağı, (or “Hearth of Unity”), as well as a new set of regulations geared to pursuing its guiding principle, declared to be, “towards the people”.

According to the minutes of the club, the transformation from the Hüriyyet ve Terraki was made on the 1st of November 1923, in accordance with a decision taken on the 25th of September of the same year. Soon after it was decided to have printed 300 copies of the club’s regulations at the Vatan Printing Press, and to have made 250 badges imprinted with a new emblem for the club with a white background whereupon lay a red star and crescent, the inverse of the Turkish flag. In line with the new popularising policy, it was decided by the central committee of the club on the 18th of November 1923 to establish a new newspaper in the name of the club, called simply “Birlik”, or “Unity”. The first issue was to be published on the 4th of January at the Vatan printing press. Though the license for the paper was to be held in the name of central committee member Ahmet Hulusi, final authority regarding editorial policy was to lie with the committee as a whole, appealing the decisions of which could only be done through a general meeting of the club. The paper continued to be run in the same manner through 1924 and early 1925, but, by April 1925 a crisis arose. At a meeting of the club’s central committee Fadıl Bey and all others present, except for Ahmet Hulusi, stated that they wished the newspaper to continue publication as the organ of the club. Ahmet Hulusi

1328. Polat claims that in the post-war period the club entered a seriously degenerative phase in its history, becoming a gambling and drinking den, and suggesting even that initiatives had even been taken to sell drugs there. Eventually, he contends, the few remaining members of the club decided to temporarily close the club doors. [POLAT 1999, 447]. Yet, as explained in this study, even if such was the case, the club does not appear to have remained closed for more than a matter of months, for we know it to have been active at the time of the post-War “National Congress”, and in the first half of 1920. We also have minutes for the club executive council from the second half of 1921.

1329. Hüriyyet ve Terraki minutes of 6th December 1922. HT/BO-KD.

1330. Ibid., 7th November 1922.

1331. Ibid., 21st January 1923.

1332. KORKUT 2000, 48; Despite its elitist air, the club had in fact been somewhat involved in activities directed to the general public, even before the change to the Birlik Oçağı. Most pronounced were the theatre activities, but the club also acted as a hub for other social activities such as hosting meetings of the “Turkish Football Association”; [Hüriyyet ve Terraki minutes of 6th and 7th November 1921. KO-HT/BO-KD]. The organic connection of the Birlik Club with the Hüriyyet ve Terraki was not however, denied, with a picture of the latter continuing to be displayed in the Birlik Club’s library room even after the transformation had taken place. The inventory of items possessed by the club notes also the presence in this room of a portrait of the King and Queen, and in the main upstairs room, a portrait of Mustafa Kemal. KO-BO-E.

1333. Hüriyyet ve Terraki minutes of 25th and 30th September 1923. KO-HT/BO-KD.

1334. These unfortunately do not appear to have survived; See Birlik Oçağı minutes of 18th November 1923 and 24th April 1924. KO-HT/BO-KD.

1335. Ibid., 18th November 1923.

1336. Ibid., 12th December 1923.

1337. Ibid., 18th and 24th November 1923.
on the other hand disagreed, arguing that the general assistance proffered by the club to
the newspaper was unsatisfactory, that sufficient effort was not being made by club mem-
bers to write articles for the journal, and that from now on he intended to omit from the
paper’s title page the statement that the newspaper was the organ of the club.1338 As of
the 21st of April, the issue was conclusively resolved, it being finally decided, in accor-
dance with Hulusi’s wishes, that the newspaper would no longer be associated with the
club.1339

In the interim, on the 16th of March 1924, the club central committee was to accept the
resignation of Remzi, the editor of the nationalist Söz newspaper.1340 This resignation
may have been the result of personal motivations, with Remzi angered by the prospect of
his own newspaper facing the competition of the Birlik journal. Alternatively, it might
have been because it was in this journal that Korkut and others were to campaign against
the line initially taken by Söz that encouraged the emigration of Turks from the island in
the aftermath of Lausanne.1341 The dispute may also have had to do with differences as to
the greater emphasis on religious identity that Fadıl was at the time espousing, a policy
which the adamantly secular Remzi did not condone.1342 Whatever the case, matters
escalated to such a degree that Fadıl Bey opened legal proceedings against Remzi, Greek
Cypriot judge Mr. Mavromatis eventually convincing the men to reach a gentlemen’s
agreement.1343

Despite such differences, the club survived intact, and continued to play an important
role in the Turkish Cypriot community. Korkut was to be elected the first chairman of the
newly re-constituted club.1344 He reveals that the club members thereafter re-invigorated
their tradition of organizing theatre performances. Amongst the productions they staged
was one called “Yavuklunun Mendili”, (or, “Yavuklu’s Handkerchief”), a play about the
Turkish national war of liberation which Korkut himself wrote, and which was later also
performed by the youth of Limassol.1345

1338. Ibid., 13th April 1925.
1339. Ibid., 21st April 1925.
1340. Ibid., 16th March 1924.
1341. KORKUT 2000, 48–49.
1342. Fadıl Niyazi in Birlik 4th January 1924; Fadıl Bey, however, insisted that this emphasis on religion was
not a reactionary one, and later also argued that their Turkish national identity could not be separated from
their religious identity, they were part and parcel of the same thing, and at different times it would be more
or less appropriate to emphasise one or the other aspect of their being. [Ibid., 29th August and 5th September
1924]. All the same, it is interesting that it was on the 17th of April 1925, just as Fadıl Bey’s role in
running the paper came to an end, that the paper for the first time emphasised itself to be a “Turkish news-
paper”. See slogan under title on the front page of Birlik 17th April 1925; See also POLAT 1999, 446.
1343. Birlik 10th October 1924; Nevertheless, dispute seems to have simmered for quite some time, and more
than two years later the parties were once again involved in a legal wrangle. See Birlik Oçağ minutes of
19th March 1927. KO-HT/BO-KD
1344. Dr. Pertev and Ahmet Hulusi were also amongst the members of this first central committee of the Birlik
Club. Ibid., 4th November 1923.
1345. KORKUT 2000, 48.
The intermittent British wavering regarding the maintenance of its rule over the island, and the danger that the consequence if it did decide to leave the island was liable to be enosis, to be sure did not help to reassure the island’s Turks as to their future prospects. In this respect, the proclamation of Cyprus as a Crown Colony, announced in an extraordinary issue of the Cyprus Gazette of the 1st of May 1925, could, in some ways, be considered as welcome a development for the Turkish Cypriots as it was unwelcome for the Greeks. While the former’s confidence in British intentions to hold on to the island was fortified, the Greeks of Cyprus, who had been heartened by the coming to power of a Labour Government in Britain in 1924 which they viewed as sympathetic to their goals, were being firmly told, (as they were also to be told several times in subsequent years), that the issue of the island’s union with Greece was closed. Hamilton Fish Armstrong wrote in the final issue of Foreign Affairs that year that the news, “was received with dismay by the Greek Cypriots, who realized that it placed still further beyond their reach the goal of their nationalistic aspirations.” All three Turkish members of the Legislative Council, İrfan, Hami and Eyyub Beys, went on record to express their satisfaction with the declaration of Cyprus as a Crown Colony, though Dr. Eyyub, who on numerous occasions in the first half of the 1920’s criticised and voted against government measures and proposals, did not bow to this change quite as submissively as the others. Greek leaders, however, expressed considerably less satisfaction with the declaration of the island as a Crown Colony, Archbishop Kyrillos III declaring in a letter of the 1st of May:

On the occasion of to-day’s official pronouncement of the declaration of the Island of Cyprus as a Colony, We, the Archbishop of Cyprus, President of the Holy Synod of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus and National Leader of the Hellenic population of Cyprus, express, in the name of the clergy and people, their very deep grief, and lay an emphatic protest against the renewed ignoring by this political action of the indefeasible historic

1346. See Cyprus Gazette 1st May 1925.
1347. In a report entitled, “The Question of Cyprus,” that was published in Athens in 1931, the Greek Cypriots noted again, as they frequently liked to do so far as concerned their expectations from the Labour Party, that, “Mr. Ramsay Macdonald himself at the Socialist Congress at Berne in February 1919 proclaimed that the Labour Party would apply the principle of self-determination to Cyprus.” [Enclosure in Storrs to Secretary of State, 23rd March 1932. CO 67/244/8, 122]. Storrs himself did not dispute this fact, though he diplomatically put it down in his memoirs to, “the expansive atmosphere of a Socialist Conference,” one where MacDonald had almost carelessly, “invoke[d] a principle now hardly mentionable in polite society.” [STORRS 1937, 545]. All the same, when the Labour Party came to power again at the end of the 1920’s hopes were to mount [see Enclosure No. 1 in Storrs to Secretary of State, 18th September 1929. CO 67/227/6]; However, disappointment in this party’s practice was later again to be widely expressed, as for example in a telegram sent by Archbishop Kyrillos to Macdonald in November 1929. Here the Archbishop pronounced: “Hellenic population Cyprus protesting against disappointing answer of right honora-ble secretary colonies repeats firmly and respectfully its unaltered aspiration for national restoration expecting from British government liberal decision in accordance with its rights supported by history and with principles proclaimed by Labour Party and in conformity with international and British justice.” Telegram from Archbishop Cyrillos to Prime Minister Macdonald, 8th November 1929. CO 67/228/1, 44; See also TERLEXIS 1968, 72–73.
1348. ARMSTRONG 1925, 156.
1349. Georghallides, for example, confirms that in the past Eyyub had been, “keen to emphasise his independ-ence both from Irfan bey and the Government.” GEORGHALLIDES, 1979, 241; For the statements made on the proclamation of Cyprus as a Crown Colony by the Turkish legislators, see Minutes of the Legislative Council, PART I, 1st May 1925, 38–39.
national rights of the Hellenic people of the Island to their national restoration, which it was expecting soon to receive from the Liberal English Nation; and we declare that the burning and unalterable desire of the Hellenic people of the Island was, is and will always be its union with its mother Hellas.¹³⁵⁰

To this C. D. Fenn responded in the name of the Governor that, the Governor, “desires that you should be informed that you must clearly understand that, as has already been pointed out to you on more than one occasion, the question of the Union of Cyprus with Greece has been finally closed and cannot be reopened.”¹³⁵¹

Such determined retorts may have helped to quell the anxiety of most Turkish Cypriots, as no doubt did the fact, deserving recognition, that there was no concerted effort amongst the Greek Cypriots to drive out their Turkish neighbours. Yet, nevertheless, the flow of emigration from Cyprus to Turkey that began slowly in the aftermath of the First World War, gained greatest velocity in the mid-1920’s, and continued, at fluctuating speeds till the Second World War, was all the same quite considerable. Without a doubt economic motives played an important part. Conditions for the poor in Cyprus during the 1920’s were especially harsh, and enthusiasm to emigrate to Anatolia was inflated by the euphoria that greeted the birth of republican Turkey and later of promises of assistance to Turks who emigrated to the new more constricted homeland.¹³⁵² A decision taken by the Turkish Government at the end of 1925, for instance, noted that the Turks of Cyprus had, according to the Treaty of Lausanne, the right to emigrate to the republic, and decided that, as far as conditions permitted, families that so emigrated would be given a house and sufficient land, though any other costs would not be met.¹³⁵³

Fears as to their future prospects on the island in terms of security under a potential Greek regime, though considerably diminished in the short-term, might, with some justification, be considered as a long-term concern encouraging emigration, particularly once Turkey had renounced any title to the island. The poverty of the common man and woman on the island, when coupled with apparent positive economic incentives to emigrate was certainly another. Aside from these two factors, however, must also be recognised a more purely nationalist impulse to emigration. For many, especially of the younger generation, Turkish nationalist sentiments had been incrementally ingrained since the earlier years of the century, and had reached new heights with the success of Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist movement in Anatolia. Identification with the ideals of this movement did not diminish following the Lausanne Treaty, but were rather progressively enhanced as the progress and dynamism of the Republic roused national pride in Cyprus too. Turkish Cypriot people had had to face the harsh reality that the new Turkish state was not pursuing the territorial integration of Cyprus, but they nevertheless considered themselves part of the nation upon whose foundations this state had arisen. For many, then, a powerful impetus for emigration was the force of nationalism, and this was on occasion to be recognised by observers of the time.

¹³⁵⁰. Cyprus Gazette 12th June 1925.
¹³⁵¹. Ibid.
¹³⁵². Storrs noted in the mid-1920’s that the people of Cyprus had, “a far lower standard of life than the poorer classes of Egypt, Palestine, or even Syria.” Storrs to Secretary of State, 29th December 1929. CO 67/220/3, 34.
Emigration was further encouraged, by official Turkish channels, particularly by the Turkish Consul Asaf Bey whose appointment to Cyprus was first announced in the Cyprus Gazette on the 26th of November 1925. Turkey, at various times, looked favourably upon such emigration as a matter of policy. Mr. Dawe of the Colonial Office minuted in 1927, that Asaf was an, “active and able Consul”, who had been sent to Cyprus by the Angora government, “to persuade the Turks to opt for Turkish nationality,” and stated that there was, “no doubt that considerable numbers,” did so under the influence of promises being made to them, albeit with little understanding of what they were letting themselves in for. The Foreign Office’s appraisal of Turkey’s governmental intentions on the matter was not, however, so clear-cut. In a letter from the Foreign Office to the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, it was stated that:

While it is the desire of the Turkish Government to induce Moslems of other countries to settle in Turkey ... it may also be assumed that the Turkish Government will not view with disfavour the creation of bodies of Turkish nationals in foreign countries. The existence of such bodies would afford the Turkish Government opportunities for intervention in these foreign countries.

After a brief interlude, in which the consulate was temporarily closed down during part of 1927 and of 1928, Asaf returned to re-establish the Turkish consulate in the middle of the latter year, and soon got down to work again. By November 1928 Storrs was reporting to Secretary of State Amery that, “since the re-establishment of the Turkish Consulate in Cyprus last June a number of Cypriot Turks have been leaving Cyprus on emergency passes issued by the Turkish Consul this year in the same manner as to optants under the Treaty during the two years during which an option could be made”, he proposed to tighten-up the conditions under which Turks would be allowed to emigrate. In May, 1929, Dawe was to put on record his support for the view, “that it is very desirable that we should bring within the British fold the Turkish optants who now wish to remain in Cyprus,” and to emphasise that, “The presence of the Turkish community,” in Cyprus was, “an asset from a political standpoint.” A more conscientious official minuted:

Cyprus is not a prison, & there is not good reason for, & every kind of objection to, detaining people in it against their will.

The proposal to impose a system of exit visas [purportedly] to prevent criminal[s] escaping justice seems to me grotesque.

That Turkey continued to promote emigration during 1930, is indicated again by Dawe, who minuted on the 30th of January, 1930:

[O]n entry into Turkey every facility is offered to these people to enable them to become good Turkish citizens. There is no doubt that the new Turkish Consul in Cyprus has been

1354. Cyprus Gazette 26th November 1925; From the Cyprus Blue Book, it appears that the original date of his appointment was actually the 17th of October, 1925. See Cyprus Blue Book 1926, 162.
1355. Minute by A. J. Dawe 26th October 1927. CO 67/221/11, 10.
1357. See Cyprus Gazette 17th August 1928 for the first announcement of the re-opening of the consulate. This is confirmed later as having been officially authorised on the 11th of February, 1929. Ibid., 22nd March 1929.
1358. Storrs to Secretary of State, 22nd November 1928. CO 67/226/19, 5 and 7–8.
1360. Minute by Mr. Clauson. CO 67/227/11, 8.
sent there for the purpose of recruiting as many of these citizens as possible - & it is that fact which gives rise to the present problem.\textsuperscript{1361}

When during the 1930’s the Turkish state showed signs of wavering in its policy on the matter of emigration from Cyprus, the community there had already been considerably depleted and weakened, and though later the Turkish authorities at times tried to arrest the flow of would-be emigrants, it was only partially stemmed.

The Söz and Doğru Yol newspapers were initially the main protagonists of emigration, soon supported by the Consul Asaf, while, as noted, Fadıl Niyazi Korkut, the leading light of the Birlik Ocağı, took a much more cautious stand.\textsuperscript{1362} The Birlik newspaper complained that emigration was being encouraged by the fact that the island’s Turks were not supporting each other enough economically, and the Birlik Club, in order to strengthen the economic potential of the community took the initiative in organising a well-attended fair for Turkish craftsmen that was to receive praise for its success not only from the Turkish press, but even from the Greek.\textsuperscript{1363} Though the nationalism of those cautioning against the difficulties of emigration may have been questioned at the time, such questioning was not really justified, particularly as many of those who emigrated did so under the mistaken illusion that life would be easier on the northern, Anatolian shores of the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{1364} Birlik defended its stance on emigration by pointing to an article in the nationalist Yeni Adana newspaper of Turkey which asked, “To what extent is this emigration [from Cyprus] in line with Turkish interests on the island?”\textsuperscript{1365} In an open letter to the editor of Söz, Fadıl Bey also warned that emigration was against Turkish interests and challenged: “If you have any document to show that emigration is in accordance with general Turkish interests then bring it out into the open, [and] from that moment on let us work together [to achieve this goal].”\textsuperscript{1366} Thus, in various ways protagonists of remaining on the island tried to question the nationalism of emigration, arguing also, for example, that one of the principle reasons for emigration was the sly encouragement of the Greek Cypriots, who saw the Turkish presence on the island as an impediment to achieving their political goals.\textsuperscript{1367} Slamming those who accused them of not being nationalists for defending a continued Turkish presence on the island, Münir İzzet of the Birlik Club wrote in the Birlik newspaper: “We should know this, that Turkism, nationalism does not mean only living in Anatolia and breathing in its air; genuineness requires and it is to be understood by how much one works materially – morally for the survival, the well-being of Anatolia, whatever corner of the world one may live in.”\textsuperscript{1368}

In mid-1924, in response to what was described as “a letter from Famagusta” calling for discussions pertaining to the conditions of the Turkish Cypriots, the Birlik Ocağı decided to respond with a letter stating that they were of the opinion that they should first decide whether or not the community intended to remain on the island, suggesting that an assembly of Turkish Cypriot professionals and representatives should decide as to whet-

\textsuperscript{1361} Minute by A. J. Dawe, 30th January 1930. CO 67/227/11, 12.  
\textsuperscript{1362} See, for example, Fadıl Niyazi in Birlik, 4th January 1924.  
\textsuperscript{1363} Birlik 1st August 1924.  
\textsuperscript{1364} Kıbrıs 28th November 1949.  
\textsuperscript{1365} Birlik 22nd August 1924.  
\textsuperscript{1366} Ibid., 29th August 1924.  
\textsuperscript{1367} Ibid., 15th August 1924.  
\textsuperscript{1368} Ibid., 17th October 1924.
her or not a congress of representatives from all over the island should be organized to discuss the matter.\footnote{Birlik Oçağı minutes of 20th May 1924. KO-HT/BO-KD.} Noting that they agreed fully with all other aspects of the letter, they decided to write to all the other Turkish clubs of the island to express their views on the matter.\footnote{Ibid., 22nd May 1924.}

District Congresses were held around the island, that for Nicosia gathering in the house of Misirlizade Ahmet, (the father of Necati Özkan), and presided over by Behaeddin Bey. Both men were included amongst those chosen to represent the capital’s population at an island-wide congress, as were also other familiar names, such as Ahmet Raşid, Dr. Pertev and Remzi Bey.\footnote{Birlik 1st August 1924.} Further deliberation as to their future on the island eventually resulted in the gathering of the proposed congress and the establishment of an organization called the “Moslem Turkish Association of Cyprus”, that has been considered most notable for its incorporation of the term “Turkish” in its name.\footnote{ISMAIL 1997, 263–264.} Yet, once the Congress had gathered and agreed upon a constitution it failed to perform the tasks for which it had been established, Söz putting the blame on İrfan Bey and his supporters for impeding its functioning.\footnote{Söz 2nd January 1926. See also Ibid., 7th February 1926.} Korkut, on the other hand, implies that the British were more directly to blame for the lack of substantial achievement on this issue. He claims that it was at this juncture that Midhat Bey, a leading figure behind the initiative, had been given a plum job by the authorities, and insinuates that as a consequence he abandoned efforts to institutionalize the Association and it remained still-born.\footnote{KORKUT 2000, 31. Perhaps Korkut’s evaluation of Midhat was prejudiced by the later controversy surrounding Midhat’s second-marriage, shortly before his death, to a Greek Cypriot. See AN 2002, 353–357.}

Whatever the case, we cannot surmise that those who remained on the island were devoid of Turkish nationalist sentiments. While heated debate did rage in the mid-1920’s, it cannot be considered as one of those with nationalist sentiments, (the pro-emigration camp), versus those without any nationalist disposition, (anti-emigrationists). Georghallides argument that the Treaty of Lausanne, “asked the Cypriot Turks to choose between loyalty to Turkey, with consequent emigration to that country, and loyalty to Cyprus,” and that, “A large majority of the Turkish Cypriots chose the latter option – in other words life as a minority in a pre-dominantly Greek island,” is in this respect critically flawed.\footnote{GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 339–340.}

Later, as British documents were to reveal, many of those nationalists who had initially encouraged emigration were to do an about-turn, including Söz and its proprietor Remzi Bey, who had himself been an optant for Turkish nationality under the treaty of Lausanne.\footnote{Palmer to Secretary of State, 3rd February 1939. CO 67/300/4, 19.} In fact, by the beginning of the 1930’s Söz was actually printing articles as to the difficulties being faced by Turkish Cypriot emigrants to Turkey.\footnote{Söz 6th August 1931.} All the same, this too should by no means be taken as constituting proof of a change of Remzi’s fundamentally nationalist views, or of the paper’s attitude towards Turkey and its leaders. For in fact, even minor details of news regarding the political leadership of Turkey were given front page coverage: Mustafa Kemal’s visit to Antalya or to Izmir, a minor accident by the
car in which İsmet Paşa was travelling, and the like. The adulation expressed towards these leaders in the Turkish Cypriot press in general, but particularly in Söz, was at times no less vehement than that of even the press of Turkey, Kemal being described, for instance, as, “Our beloved saviour and great leader.”

Though there is little proof to support charges that emigration of the Turks had been encouraged by their Greek Cypriot neighbours, there is sound evidence that it was hindered to an extent by the British. Ateşin’s contention that the British did not try to discourage Turkish Cypriot emigration till the mid-1930s is inaccurate. In fact, even earlier, in the late 1920’s, as can be inferred from the content of Storrs’ despatch to Amery mentioned above, the British had tried to discourage Turkish emigration from the island as it had apparently reached worrisome proportions. Most importantly, one might suppose, they were concerned that the serious diminution of the Turkish Cypriot community would be detrimental to their own interests. The possibility of using loyal Turks as a counter-weight to the Greeks was apparently not one that the British would choose to willingly lose. It was not for no reason then that the Turkish ambassador to London in 1927 complained: “certain Cypriots of Turkish origin who have opted, under Article 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne, for Turkish nationality, are having difficulties put in their way by the local authorities when they seek permission to migrate to Turkey.”

The precise number of those who emigrated is a matter that remains unresolved, and the lack of record on the matter, means that it will never be conclusively ascertained. Nevertheless, some rough estimate can be made. In a despatch of September 1927, Mr. Nicholson, the Officer Administering the Government, stated:

According to information furnished by the late Consul for Turkey in Cyprus, 3, 813 Emergency Passes and 66 Passports were issued by him to 9,227 and 83 Cypriot Turks who exercised their right of option under the Treaty of Lausanne.

Many of these people left the Colony without their departure being reported to Government and no accurate figures are available. It is believed however that the total number of departures did not exceed 2,500 to 3,000.

The same despatch predicted that a further 300 to 400 Cypriot Turks who had opted for Turkish nationality could shortly be expected to leave the island, though it also correctly pointed out that in some instances disillusioned emigrants who had expected to have found much higher standards of living in Anatolia had since returned to Cyprus. The press in Turkey was reporting in mid-1927 that of those who had opted for Turkish nationality, 5–6,000 had already settled in Turkey. Yet, we further know that many had

1378. Ibid., 3rd April 1930, and 5th February and 10th December 1931.
1379. Ibid., 3rd April 1930.
1380. ATEŞİN 1999, 15.
1381. Minute by A. Fiddian, 4th April 1927. CO 67/221/11, 2; See also GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 413–419.
1382. Nicholson to Secretary of State, 7th September 1927. CO 67/221/11, 28; As the British were later to readily admit, they had, “no reliable info of their own to show what persons did or did not opt for Turkish nationality within the prescribed period;” and this essentially meant that they could not challenge Turkish consuls when they provided “optsants”, (who for all the British knew may well not have “opted”, with papers to emigrate. Turkish consuls interested in encouraging emigration would thus be prone to minimise estimates they gave to the British of those who had actually taken up the option, so as to justify further emigration. [See Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 5th March 1935. CO 67/260/19, 52–53]; For an example of an emergency pass issued by Asaf Bey, in this case to a certain Havva Hüseyin and daughter Meryem, see MAA-OK-169.
emigrated even before the rights accorded to them under the Treaty of Lausanne had come into force, before even the Turkish consulate had been established. Accounting for developments during that year, the Cyprus Annual Report of 1923 had noted:

It is anticipated that the gradual resumption of normal relations with Turkey will restore Asia Minor as the most accessible field of opportunity for Cypriots who desired, or were driven by circumstances to seek their fortune and settle abroad. Intercourse between Cyprus and such ports across the Strait as Mersina and Adalia is at present extending perceptibly; and expeditions undertaken by individuals of the Moslem section of the population, ostensibly in pursuit of trade, but partially, no doubt, in order to examine conditions of life in that quarter, have already, in some instances resulted in actual settlement.

The next year’s report declared:

A very considerable number of members of the Moslem community, drawn mainly from the poorer classes and attracted by rumours of lucrative employment and the prospect of making their fortunes in Asia Minor, emigrated during the year. Of this number many have already returned in a state of complete destitution and it seems unlikely that there will be any great tendency on the part of their brethren who remained in Cyprus to follow their example.

Then, in 1925, the Annual Report announced: “The abnormal emigration of Moslems to Asia Minor noticed in the Report for 1924 diminished considerably in 1925, and may be regarded as having been spent by the end of the year.” However, in 1927, Asaf having been active for two years, the Annual Report was still recording an outflow:

The emigration of Moslems to Asia Minor continued during the early part of 1927, but by August most of those who had opted for Turkish nationality in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne and intended to leave Cyprus, had departed. It is estimated that since 1924 about 5,000 Turks have emigrated to Anatolia.

The following year it was informed that emigration had persisted, “on a small scale,” during 1928, though it was also asserted that many who had left in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne had returned to the island. Yet, despite the fact that there were some disillusioned returnees, and temporary fluctuations, many continued to emigrate to Turkey in subsequent years. The demographic impact if not staggering, was considerable. In the year that the census of 1931 recorded the relative decline of the Turkish population, the Annual Report was now forced to concede at least that, “The relative dwindling of the Moslem population is partly due to the fact that large numbers of Moslems left Cyprus during the years 1924 to 1926 to become Turkish subjects.”

1384. Attachment to Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 8th August 1927. CO 67/221/11, 33.
1385. In fact, in the wake of the First World War the Cyprus Annual Report had already stated: “There has been a tendency for the Mohammedan population to decrease due principally to a gradual return to Turkey and to the poverty of the Turkish villager in comparison with his Greek compatriot.” Cyprus Annual Report 1920, 4.
1389. Cyprus Annual Report 1927, 40; Meanwhile, in July of 1926 Söz had reported, “from reliable sources,” that 15,000 had so far used their option to emigrate. This, however, is likely to have been a serious exaggeration of the true figures, as one would expect a significant drop in the population figures in the following census if this had truly been the case. Söz 31st July 1926.
St. John-Jones is one of the rare souls to have tried to accurately estimate the true demographic impact of Turkish Cypriot emigration, not only during the 1920’s, but ever since the British takeover. He supposed that:

[I]f the Turkish-Cypriot community had, like the Greek-Cypriots, increased by 101 per cent between 1881 and 1931, it would have totalled 91,300 in 1931 – 27,000 more than the number enumerated. Is it possible that so many Turkish-Cypriots emigrated in the fifty-year period? Taken together, the considerations just mentioned suggest that it probably was. From a base of 45,000 in 1881, emigration of anything like 27,000 persons seems huge, but after subtracting the known 5,000 of the 1920s, the balance represents an average annual outflow of some 500 – not enough, probably, to concern the community’s leaders, evoke official comment, or be documented in any way which survives today.1392

Yet, when all was said and done, many, in fact, quite likely, most of those who held strong nationalist sentiments chose to remain on the island. Not only were the numbers of those such who stayed sufficient enough to lead the political transformation of the Turkish Cypriot society, but their numbers were growing as more and more students were socialized through the channel of education.

5.3 Leaders and Leadership: İrfan and Münir, Eyyub and Behiç

Political developments in the ranks of the Turkish leadership during the mid-1920’s left their mark on the years to come. İrfan Bey had for long been the leading figure of the Turkish Cypriot community, having maintained his position of unswerving loyalty to the British that he had advocated at the outset of the First World War. He had continued in his position as delegate of the Evkaf, won consecutive terms in the Legislative Council, and received appointment to the prestigious position of member of the Executive Council. When he suddenly died in August 1925, the British did not wait long to choose a successor. In fact, it was at the very funeral of İrfan Bey that Malcolm Stevenson gently slipped back in the procession to confer with a man who belonged, “to one of the best local Turkish families,” who was then still a rather inconspicuous official in the Treasury Department, and had been in the government service since the age of 15, Mehmet Münir.1393 It was here that Stevenson, now Governor, made his proposition to an apparently overwhelmed Münir: that Münir should replace İrfan as delegate of the Evkaf, and by implication no doubt, that he should become leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. According to his son, a totally unexpecting Münir Bey humbly declared that he was hardly worthy of such an honour, and protested that he did not know how he could possibly manage to fill İrfan’s shoes.1394

Notwithstanding such humility, however, it was Münir who was most amply to fill the shoes of İrfan, at least as far as the British were concerned, and there is evidence that he had long ago been talent-spotted by the colonial authorities. In a despatch sent by High

1392. ST. JOHN-JONES 1983, 56.
1393. Stevenson to Secretary of State, 14th July 1921. CO 67/203, 458; Munir Bey to G. Hazlerigg, 5th July 1928. CO 67/225/20, 16.
1394. ERTEKÜN 2003.
Commissioner Stevenson in mid-1921 to Secretary of State Churchill, he personally supported the applications of Mustafa Fuad Bey, Ordinary Judge of the District Court of Nicosia, and his brother-in-law Mehmet Münir Efendi, Bookkeeper in the Treasury for leave of absence, so that they might proceed to England for legal training. In fact, Stevenson further proposed, “that they should be granted, in addition to three months’ vacation leave, leave of absence on half salary for eighteen months and, thereafter, leave of absence without pay for a period of from six to nine months as required, any further extension being a matter for the consideration of the Government having regard to all the circumstances.”

Of the elder of the two men, the despatch informed:

Fuad Bey, who is a son of His Eminence the Mufti of Cyprus, is in his 34th year and has had nearly fifteen years’ service under the Government, during the last eight of which he has been a Judge of the District Court. He is an exceptionally able judicial officer, has an excellent knowledge of English, which he speaks and writes with complete fluency, and belongs to one of the most influential and wealthy Turkish families in Cyprus.

As to Münir, it was stated:

Munir Effendi is in his 32nd year and has had 15 years’ service in the Treasury Department. He, too, is a very able official with an excellent knowledge of English and belongs to one of the best local Turkish families. He is a brother-in-law of Fuad Bey, whose sister he married, and is possessed of ample independent means.

Most interesting, however, were the comments that followed:

It is very desirable, in my opinion, to encourage young men of the position and ability of Fuad Bey and Munir Effendi to have a good legal training. There are but few Turks of good social standing in the Island who possess the requisite legal knowledge or educational qualifications for judicial office and there is no doubt that, apart from any advantage which these officials will derive from a course of legal study, it will be to the advantage of the Government of the Island that they should have this training.

Münir was in October 1925 to win with ease the seat in the Legislative Council vacated by the death of İrfan, defeating by a handsome margin his opponent Behaeddin Bey. In June 1926 he was appointed also an additional member of the Executive Council.

1395. Nicholson to Secretary of State, 7th September 1927. CO 67/203, 459.
1396. Ibid.
1397. Ibid., 458.
1398. Ibid., 458–459.
1399. See ATESİN 1996.
1400. Cyprus Blue Book 1926, 98.
Münir was to serve the British well and his clear fancy for protocol and honorary titles were to be adequately satisfied by the British, who were to make him the first ever Turkish Cypriot to be knighted. All the same, it was at one point apparently thought, albeit mistakenly, that Münir might take a radically different course to İrfan, Söz reporting that he was believed to have been an adherent of Eyyub’s nationalist camp, and his appointment had therefore initially been generally welcomed by the Turkish Cypriot opposition. Instead, however, as the paper acknowledged, it was Münir who was to take the lead, and Eyyub to do his bidding.

Münir was the son-in-law, and at the same time the nephew, (having wedded his cousin), of the last Ottoman-appointed Müftü, Mehmet Ziyaeddin, and came from a well-off and prestigious family of Nicosia. He was well supported in his career by, (and no doubt supported in turn), other family members who held top positions in the Colonial administration. His brother-in-law Fuad was to become a high-ranking judge, and Fuad’s younger brother Faiz was to rise to become an Inspector of Police, a position he occupied when the October Revolt broke out. Münir himself never hesitated in expressing his devotion, and the British in turn were to remain loyal to him. In one letter of 1928, where an “upset” Münir declared that his current terms of employment were unfair, he stated: “I do not think I deserve such a treatment after what I have done and am doing for Cyprus and for His Majesty’s Government.”

However, just as with İrfan Bey, Münir’s record was not, as sometimes imagined, always one of absolute subservience to the British and their interests at the expense of Turkish Cypriot wants. Though infrequently, he did on occasion vote against the British in the Legislative Council, and it has been argued, with some justification, that though the British may well have “used” him for their purposes, he too was not beyond manipulating their reliance on him for achieving Turkish Cypriot communal interests, particularly in the field of education. In the wake of the three Turkish members voting with the Greeks to throw out the Appropriation Bill of 1926, Reginald Popham-Lobb, (later Reginald Nicholson), the Officer Administering the Government, was to caution that the government’s reliance on the Turkish members of the Legislative Council, necessitated by the constitutional system, not only kept open traditional division between Greeks and Turks, but tended, “to imbue the Mohammedan members with the idea that their support of Government measures entitles them and their co-religionists to special treatment.” This confidential despatch was interesting also in its indicating that the members of the Council, (including also one would presume the Turks, considering that they were prepared to thereby strain their comparatively good relations with the British), were to vote

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1401. See, for example, the minute recorded by G. Hazlerigg on the copy of a letter dated 21st July, 1928 that was to be sent to Münir Bey in CO 67/225/20, 14. Here an exasperated Hazlerigg recorded that, “He specially asked for the “Hon” !!! to which he is not entitled, I take it, in this country,” in relation to a request by Münir Bey that correspondence to him during his stay in London be addressed as to “The Hon. M. Munir Bey, M.E.C., M.L.C.” He had, however, earlier noted more appreciatively that Münir was, “a very pleasant fellow to talk to.” [Minute by G. Hazlerigg of 4th July 1928, CO 67/225/20; Münir’s son was also to acknowledge his father’s fancy for protocol, noting how just days before his death he wrote to him gleefully about the honorary guest books he was being asked to sign. ERTEKÜN 2003.

1402. Ibid.


1404. ERTEKÜN 2002; ERTEKÜN 2003; See also GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 259.

1405. Popham Lobb to Secretary of State, 29th November 1926. CO 67/219/14, 48.
against the government because of public pressure to do so, and had they not acted in such manner, they would have been liable to lose their seats at the next elections.\textsuperscript{1406}

Despite the reality that Münir and his associates were undoubtedly fervently pro-British, the fact that even they were open to charges of disloyalty and of being pro-Turkey by certain adamant and prominent enemies of the Kemalist regime is in itself revealing. It indicates what is corroborated by other evidence, that whatever the complex motivations of these men may have been, they could not publicly afford, even if they so desired, to openly confront the Kemalist regime established in Turkey. In this respect, the most notable charges against them, as also against Turkish teachers and the new Turkish Consul, Ali Asaf Bey, came from Said Molla, the notorious Ex-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice and “Chairman of the Anglophile Society in Turkey”, who had been branded a traitor, and was a leading figure amongst the 150 persons exiled from Turkey by the republicans for collaborating with the enemy. Amongst a flood of correspondence with British officials in late 1925, early 1926, Said Molla made the following allegations:

Such persons are trying with all their might to deceive the Moslem people and turn their mind in favour of Turkey. In order to secure this end the Consul of Cyprus is trying as a leader and from Turkey such school Directors and teachers are summoned that among them the red propagandist Kiazim Nami, the Director, is one of the Editorial staff of the newspaper called “Joum Houriet” published in Turkey. The publications of this paper against the English people have naturally been communicated to the Foreign Office from Constantinople. Ever since these persons came to Cyprus the religious position of the school has changed and the Cadi of Cyprus, not being able to accept the future responsibility, has been obliged to resign from his office as the Chairman of the Education Board on the face of the dirty fingers of Turkey which play a role in Cyprus. The Mufti of Cyprus has been gained (got at) through his son and son-in-law and he has made such statements by means of separate supplements of newspapers in favour of Turkey and in the name of the Moslem religion that they are all contrary to the Moslem religion and the truth. Books have been brought from Constantinople to this Island against the English people. They are called “Turkish Sovereignty and English World Dominion” and this book of propaganda which is against English people and embodies problems in regard to India and Egypt is of such a nature as to corrupt not only the heedless but even the sensible Moslems through distorted and false incidents contained therein.\textsuperscript{1407}

The “red propagandist” referred to by Said, Kazim Nami, was the stridently Kemalist headmaster of the Turkish Lycée, who by mid-1925 was also giving evening classes in the meeting room of the Birlik Ocağı.\textsuperscript{1408} He had been a member of the CUP at the end of the nineteenth century, and became a close associate and personal friend of Mustafa Kemal from his early days in Salonica where they had conspired together as to how to save Tur-

\textsuperscript{1406} Popham Lobb described the matter in the following words: “According to my information the Elected Members intended to throw out the budget in any case, whether there was a deficit to be met or not. Their opposition to the Turkish Tribute, as recorded in several Resolutions adopted by them or their predecessors, accurately reflects popular feeling and the attitude which they have taken up on this occasion will no doubt increase their chances of retaining their seats at the next election.” Ibid., 45.

\textsuperscript{1407} Attachment to Stevenson to Secretary of State, 13th January 1926. CO 67/216/3, 10–11.

\textsuperscript{1408} Birlik Ocağı minutes 14\textsuperscript{th} November 1925. KO-HT/BO-KD; Such evening classes became increasingly popular, with teachers often devoting much of their free time. The Annual Report of 1932 stated on the matter: “Evening classes in the new Turkish alphabet continue to be held at a great many Mohammedan schools throughout the island; they are popular and well attended.” Cyprus Annual Report 1932, 32.
key. Calling for Nami and other persons involved in such efforts to have their employment severed, Said Molla warned also that, "Turkish Consuls should always be kept under a severe control." In an apparent appendix to this letter, he charged that Turkish Consuls were dishonestly exploiting their membership of Masonic lodges, "and are easily deceiving the members of these lodges in the countries where they have been appointed. It should be known that any Turk entering any Masonic lodge, does not do so owing to any conscientious conviction but merely to derive a benefit or a particular object." Fuad Bey, he accused of, "English enmity and cooperating with the Turkish Consul and with the Director of the school who is the propagandist of Turkey"; and the Müftü, he stated, "has recognised Mustafa Kemal Pasha, at this time, as the 'Prince of the Believers' i.e. as a lawful Khalif." In a letter of the 2nd of January, 1926, Said Molla accused Münir Bey of having illegally used Evkaf funds to support republican charities in Turkey, and charged that, "While the Moslem children in Cyprus are in extreme need, Munir Bey, without bearing this in mind, performs a private duty entrusted to him by Turkey, by remitting £240 to Doctor Fuad, who is a member of the Turkish Parliament and a propagandist against English people." Said went as far as to proclaim, "officials consisting of a father, a son and a son-in-law such as Ziayeddin, the Mufti, Judge Fuad and Munir, the Delegate of Evqaf," were, "the tools of Turkish barbarism."

Said was also originally to have poor relations with the Turkish Cypriot press, not only the radical Söz, whose editor, Remzi, was eventually to serve a two month prison term because of his attacks on the Molla, but also the more conservative Birlik. The fact that Said was on such poor terms with such a wide array of Turkish Cypriots, for whom he was practically persona non grata even though he was a guest of the British authorities, is considerably worthy of recognition. That he was disavowed by all sections of the Turkish Cypriot community, can, at a bare minimum, be regarded to reflect the fact that none wished to be associated with an enemy of the Kemalist republic, and to signify again, as a later Turkish consul was to confirm, that Turkish Cypriot leaders could not, even if inclined to do so, afford to be seen to be in conflict with Turkey because of the dire political consequences they would face from their own public.

Indeed, as Bryant has revealed, there is evidence that even in the villages the Turkish Cypriots would not tolerate criticism of the Kemalist regime and its leadership. She records the fascinating case of the Turkish villagers of Mathiati who were infuriated by a reactionary schoolmaster’s charge that Mustafa Kemal, "was a Jew who had destroyed the Turkish people by distancing them from their Islamic heritage," and that portraits of

1410. Attachment to Stevenson to Secretary of State, 13th January 1926. CO 67/216/3, 12.
1411. Ibid., 13–14.
1412. Ibid., 3–4.
1413. Ibid., 3.
1414. For the incarceration of Remzi Bey see Söz 31st July 1926, ÖKSÜZOĞLU 1999, 9–15 and FEVZİOĞLU s.a., 7; It has been claimed that Remzi Bey was also earlier forced by the colonial authorities to leave his job as a teacher because of his political activities, but I have found no evidence to substantiate this. [See, for example, ISMAİL - BİRİNCİ s.a., xii]; For reference to Said’s troubled relations with Söz see letter from the Ministry of the Interior, 13th December 1925 in BCA 30..10.0.0/92C50-106.695-47; For reference to Said’s complaints regarding Birlik see letter from Said Molla, enclosed in Ministry of the Interior to Prime Minister, 16th July 1925. BCA 30..10.0.0/92C36-106.695-35.
1415. Report of Turkish Consulate in Cyprus, enclosed in Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, 14th May 1937. BCA 30..10.0.0/10441-124.886-18.
Kemal were being, “made by Jews for profit.”\(^{1416}\) As Bryant puts it, the significance of such incidents is that, “the censorship comes not exclusively from a coterie of Muslim notables … but from average villagers who demonstrated a willingness to publicize the ‘heretical’ actions of one of their own.”\(^{1417}\)

It is perhaps easier, as some nationalist historians have done, to see matters in black and white, eliminating the shades of grey which ultimately were more truly reflective of Turkish Cypriot sentiments and consequent actions. Just as there were for all nationalists occasions upon which one might interpret their actions or words as being those of collaboration with the British, even contrary to Kemalism and Turkish nationalism, there were also for the indisputably pro-British cadres ample opportunities for adjudging their behaviour as being that of persons with warm dispositions towards Kemalism, Turkey and the concept of Turkishness. Even Münir was to adorn his house with scenes of the Bosphorus and ultimately with a portrait of Atatürk, and his brother-in-law Judge Fuad was to be particularly proud of the fact revealed to him by a researcher that his family roots had been traced to Uşak in Turkey.\(^{1418}\) Münir further, in fact, bitterly refuted charges that he was anti-Turkish, in a secret letter to the Colonial Secretary in which he bemoaned the fact that his cousin, a student in Ankara, was being persecuted as a result of propaganda by the nationalists against Münir. He stated:

3. The Turkish Republic is given to understand by certain persons in Cyprus that my family, my friends and myself we are hostile to the Turks and against the Turkish Republic. Their idea is to get something out of the Turkish Government for their own benefit. The same people in Cyprus and the Turkish Government also consider that whoever is loyal to the British Government must necessarily be anti-Turkish.

4. This propaganda which is based on falsehood has been going on for some time. There is no such organization in Cyprus which acts in a hostile manner to the Turkish Government.\(^{1419}\)

Münir continued to complain also of the related attitude taken to him by the Turkish Consul in Cyprus, towards whom he said, he had, “always acted very courteously,” and had, “called on him on two occasions on the Turkish republic day,” but had not received any reciprocation to his gesture.\(^{1420}\) Certainly, there is no definitive evidence that Münir was in any way “anti-Turkish,” or even, as Bryant claims, “anti-Kemalist.”\(^{1421}\) Less categorical and much more perceptive is Bryant’s evaluation of Münir as possessing “the comfort and cleverness of an insider who sees himself not as a Turkish citizen of the British Empire but as a citizen of the British Empire who happens to be a Turk.”\(^{1422}\) Though undoubtedly Münir’s primary allegiance and loyalty was to be to the British, even Söz on occasion felt the need to acknowledge his support for Turkey, in one notable instance the paper warmly appreciating the role played by Münir and his followers in showing hospitality to a party of Turkish sportsmen from Adana and Mersin who had visited the island. “We must declare,” Söz exuberantly wrote:

\(^{1416}\) BRYANT 1998a, 296–297.
\(^{1417}\) Ibid., 297.
\(^{1418}\) ERTEKÜN 2002; ERTEKÜN 2003.
\(^{1419}\) Attachment to Palmer to Secretary of State, 10\(^{th}\) April 1935. CO 67/262/2, 61.
\(^{1420}\) Ibid., 61–62.
\(^{1421}\) BRYANT 1998a, 341.
\(^{1422}\) Ibid.
that despite the fierce struggle and dispute between us we are extremely pleased by the role played by the Elkafeclar in this affair.

This occasion has shown this truth to us, that there is not a single man amongst us who would turn away from the new and sound road that has been opened by our Turkish nation.1423

Still, no one can dispute that İrfan, and then Münir were to act as two staunch pillars supporting British rule during the first half of the twentieth century, and to constitute in practice significant obstacles to the spread and intensification of Turkish nationalism on the island. Münir had soon taken on the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots in the Legislative Council after İrfan’s death in 1925. He was joined here by a relative, none other than Mahmut Celaleddin, and by Dr. Eyyub Musa Necmeddin. It has been held that Münir had been an adherent of Eyyub, and even that as a result he had been expected to follow the nationalist line that Eyyub had frequently displayed in the past. The opposite was to occur, and Eyyub, together with Celaleddin was invariably to follow Münir’s lead. Quite mysteriously, for reasons still not fully unveiled today, Eyyub was to largely abandon the nationalist platform and opposition to British policies that he had previously upheld.1424

Even the Greek members of the Council were to put on record their astonishment.1425 One possibility, supported by Kızılıürek, is that Eyyub Bey’s political line was reversed as a consequence of his having become heavily indebted to the Evkaf.1426 However, in an endnote to the memoirs of Korkut, editors Harid Fedai and Mustafa Haşim Altan claim Eyyub’s indebtedness to Münir to be based on an altogether different footing. According to these two historians, Eyyub, who was a bachelor, had been having an affair with a married woman, and after coming to blows with her husband, the matter went to the police. It was then, they claim, that a distraught Eyyub Bey sought and received the assistance of Münir Bey, who, by then delegate of the Evkaf and in a position of influence with the administration, can be inferred to have helped cover-up the matter.1427 Perhaps, in fact, Eyyub’s debt to Münir, or more directly to the British, was neither to do with an amorous affair, nor with financial difficulties, but rather with a puzzling legal case of 1925.1428 According to a British report, Eyyub in 1925, “Pleaded guilty before the Court to a charge of accepting a bribe in his capacity of Member of the Leg. Council in connection with the appointment of Popular Valuers and was fined £5 and ordered to enter into his own cognizance to appear before the Court and receive judgment when called upon.”1429 As a dispute concerning Judge Raif was later to show, Münir was not averse to involving himself with Judicial matters, he was closely related to Judge Fuad, and prior to his appointment to his Evkaf post, had served for a while himself as a judge.

1423. Söz 28th April 1932; Of course, as the Söz also noted, Necati and the Kardeş Ocağı were also prominent in showing hospitality to the party. Ibid.
1424. For confirmation of Münir Bey’s influence over the other two Turkish councillors, see Nicholson’s confidential despatch, where he states that, “Münir, “controls the votes of his two colleagues in the Legislature.” Nicholson to Secretary of State, 20th December 1928. CO 883/8, 96.
1425. In one debate in 1928 Mr. Hadji Procopi sarcastically commented that, “he remembered the speeches which he (Dr. Moussa) used to make in 1923 and 1924 and he could not understand if the present Dr. Moussa was that of 1923 or whether he had changed in 1928, and why he had changed.” Minutes of the Legislative Council 1928, 335.
1426. KIZILYÜREK 1990, 23.
1427. KORKUT 2000, 94n.
1428. Attachment to Storrs to Shuckburgh, 12th March 1930. CO 67/233/14, 47.
1429. Ibid.
Possibly here then, in Münir’s intervention on behalf of Eyyub, lies the explanation as to why the latter was considered now to be, “in debt to M. Munir Bey and completely under his influence,” for there is no evidence available that the case was properly followed-up.\footnote{1430} The timing of the arrest of Eyyub certainly appears to have been interesting. Söz announced that he was arrested simultaneously with the news that he had just won the elections.\footnote{1431} Though initially it too could give no information as to why, it stated, (signalling its disbelief), in the following week’s issue that he had been accused of accepting bribes from a village muhtar.\footnote{1432}

As to Mahmut Celaleddin Efendi he was characterized in the same British report referring above to Eyyub, and despatched shortly prior to the 1930 elections by Governor Storrs, in the following terms:

\begin{quote}
[M]erchant of Famagusta and member of the Medjliss Idareh of that District. Of good family but almost illiterate and by no means clever. Has some influence with the Turks of Famagusta. Is related to Munir bey and is entirely led by him in Legislative Council matters. Was formerly assisting the Turkish Consul in connection with the emigration of Moslem Cypriots to Anatolia but since his election to the Leg. Co., [in October 1925], he has ceased to do so. Is fond of drink, and the Greek members of the Leg. Co. take advantage of this to extract promises of help from him which he forgets when sober.\footnote{1433}
\end{quote}

Interestingly, the report made no reference to Mahmud’s internment during the war, or to the fact that two of his brothers had been prominent in the nationalist movement in Turkey, fighting on their side. The first, Raşid Bey, was to rise to the rank of Colonel, and the second Ali Vefa Bey, was to be elected to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.\footnote{1434}

Having considered the derogatory tone of the appraisals of Eyyub and Celaleddin given in the above report, the shining commendation of Münir Bey that preceded them makes quite a contrast:

\begin{quote}
Barrister at Law, one of the Public Loan Commissioners, member of the Irrigation Board and of the Central Board of Education (Moslem). Nephew and son in law of the Mufti and a very respectable person. Has a good deal of influence with the Turks and is all pro Government. His advice as an Executive Councillor is generally sound and has good knowledge of local conditions. He is a valuable man to keep on the Executive and Legislative Councils.\footnote{1435}
\end{quote}

A further prominent individual of whom we had made mention earlier, and who it has been asserted was himself intending to stand in upcoming elections to the Legislative Council, was Dr. Hüseyin Behiç.\footnote{1436} The fate of this nationalist political leader was to cause a scandal in the Turkish Cypriot community that has still not been fully lived down. On the 6th of June 1924 Behiç was sentenced to death by the Assize Court of Nicosia, a sentence confirmed by Stevenson on the 11th and carried out with little delay, his final

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\begin{flushleft}
1430. Ibid.  
1431. Söz 10th October 1925.  
1432. Ibid., 17th October 1925.  
1433. Attachment to Storrs to Shuckburgh, 12th March 1930. CO 67/233/14, 47.  
1434. NESIM 1990b, 29.  
1435. Attachment to Storrs to Shuckburgh, 12th March 1930. CO 67/233/14, 47.  
1436. Behiç had been narrowly defeated in the Legislative Council election for the Famagusta-Larnaca district in 1920. Birlik 16th May 1924.
\end{flushleft}
words reportedly being, “There is no justice!” The crime: premeditated murder of his wife. Behiç has gone down as somewhat of a legend in Turkish Cypriot history, with ballads and folk songs composed in his honour. Three quarters of a century on the charge continues to surface that Dr. Behiç was hanged for political reasons as part of a British conspiracy to prevent his challenging the pro-British Turkish Cypriot leadership.

The sentence may well be considered to have been excessive, and hastily passed, and whether or not there was premeditation or extenuating circumstances involved, may be contested. Yet, it had been acknowledged at the time that Behiç did have a violent nature and no one disputed that Behiç had gruesomely killed his wife. At his trial he himself made no contestation of this, and the fact is that no evidence has been furnished to show that the allegations of a British conspiracy are justified.

That Behiç had some following, and that he was not wholly abandoned by his associates, in spite of the grim nature of the crime, is affirmed by colonial files, which show that amongst those who appealed for clemency on medical grounds, which show that amongst those who appealed for clemency on medical grounds, (the Dr. apparently having suffered a stroke while in custody, and, albeit after the trial, having also pleaded insanity), were none other than Dr. Esad, then President of the Turkish Red Crescent of Salonica, whom, as a minute addressed to the Chief Secretary reaffirmed had been, “associated with Dr. Behiç in certain matters in 1919 which led to the arrest and imprisonment of both under martial law and the deportation of the former from the country,” and Dr. Eyyub, who organized a petition with hundreds of signatures calling on the High Commissioner to commute the sentence of death. Amongst others pleading for clemency were Fadil Bey, Midhat Bey, and Mahmut Celaleddin.

For our purposes, the fact that one of the most prominent nationalist leaders was no longer, could not have helped the cause of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. All the same, with some delay, other nationalist leaders were to rise to effectively challenge the pro-British Turkish Cypriot elite, and eventually, in 1930, to defeat its leading figure, Münir Bey, in elections to the Legislative Council.

1437. Ibid., 27th June 1924; For the original court case file on the trial of Dr. Behiç see MAA-NAC-767/24.
1439. See, Mustafa Doğrusöz, “İngiliz Adaleti”, Kıbrıs 31st August 1998 and “O Mahalleden Bir Daha Geçmedim”, Kıbrıs 3rd June 1999; See also ISMAIL - BİRİNÇI s.a., 118.
1440. Birlik noted, for example, that the doctor was already infamous for the numerous brawls he had been involved in. Birlik 16th May 1924.
1441. In a letter to Rauf Denktaş reproduced in Denktaş’ book on the Turks under colonial rule, Aydan Akkurt describes the execution of Dr. Behiç as an “Ugly plot of the British”. [DENKTAŞ s.a., 55]; Keser calls it a, “cunning plan.” Keser’s claim is that British intelligence had spread rumours that Behiç was being unfaithful to his wife, while he, on the other hand, was informed that she was being unfaithful to him. The sinister rumours, it is suggested, had so enraged Behiç as to lead to his killing his wife. KESER s.a., 144–7.
1442. Minute by Malcolm Stevenson, 20th June 1924. SA1/767/1924; Dr. Eyyoub to Stevenson, 13th June 1924. SA1/767/1924, 60–61.
1443. Fadil Bey, Midhat Bey and Mahmud Djellalledin to Stevenson, 14th June 1924. SA1/767/1924, 54–55.
5.4 The Constriction of Autonomy Frustrated by Social Transformation

During the second half of the 1920’s several key reforms were undertaken by the colonial administration, most notably under the governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs who replaced Malcolm Stevenson in late 1926. Some of these were designed to apply to society at large, others to the Turkish Cypriot community in particular. Each, however, served to restrict the area of autonomy in which the Turks of Cyprus could operate, and to enhance British ability to control Turkish Cypriot communal institutions. Concomitantly, however, an opposing force was at work, one that had been observable for quite some time, but that by the late 1920’s early 1930’s was increasingly apparent, at least to the academic with the benefit of hindsight. This latter force emanated from the social transformation undergone by the Turkish Cypriots, which when coupled with the impact of developments in Turkey, was fostering an ever more powerful Turkish nationalist sentiment on the island.

Time was to show that measures which restricted the autonomy of Turkish Cypriot institutions, empowering instead the dependent pro-British elites, not only failed to ultimately obstruct Turkish Cypriot opposition, but on the contrary were to fuel it; for what the British seem to have failed to understand, was that the foundations of Turkish Cypriot political awareness and assertiveness had by the time these reforms were introduced already reached a viable level for reaction to occur; no longer could they be said to be limited to a small elite group, having begun by now to spread to the common man. (Less so admittedly to the common woman, though, with the secularisation of society underway in Turkey, showing its effects not wholly restricted to the male sex either).

In Ottoman times the two most powerful posts held by Moslems, aside from that of Governor, had been those of the Müftü and Kadi; stations that had been retained and safeguarded with the implementation of the Cyprus Convention. Though neither position can be said to have compared to that of the Archbishop in terms of socio-political weight, they nonetheless were prestigious and power-wielding statuses. It should not be forgotten that it was under leadership of müftüs and kadıs that earlier political initiatives had been taken by the Turkish Cypriot community in the past, and the loss of these institutionally independent posts could naturally be expected to strike a blow to the chances of organizing and agglomerating Turkish Cypriot political demands.

The first to go was the independence of the Kadılik, the Cyprus Gazette of the 7th of October 1927 announcing that the office of the Kadı of Cyprus, and the regional posts of kadı also, had been abolished. Accordingly the judges were thereafter to perform their şeri duties under the auspices of the Evkaf, whose funds they would thereafter receive their wages from. Acting Governor Henniker-Heatton communicated with Lord Passfield, (the recent title assumed by Sidney Webb of Fabian fame), “in regard to the transfer of the three Sheri Judges to the Evkaf Department.” On this matter he explained:

The appointment of Sheri Judge will cease to carry with it any salary or emoluments. To provide for their remuneration the three Sheri Judges will be appointed Evkaf Agents with

1444. Storrs announced that he had become Governor in an extraordinary issue of the Cyprus Gazette. Cyprus Gazette 30th November 1926.
1445. Cyprus Gazette 7th October 1927.
salary at the rate of £270 per annum, and it will be a condition of their appointment that they shall continue to discharge the duties of the appointment of Sheri Judge and that these duties shall take precedence of their duties as Evkaf Agents.  

Henniker-Heatton continued to explain that:

As Evkaf Agents the Sheri Judges will be under the control of the Delegates of Evkaf but all questions of promotion, transfer, dismissal or grant of leave affecting them will be subject to the Governor’s approval; and I propose to issue an Order under the Evkaf (Mohammedan Religious Property Administration) Order-in-Council, 1928, effecting the necessary amendments to the Evkaf Regulations made thereunder. As Sheri Judges they will be subject to the Governor’s pleasure in all respects.

As to the other posts of the Şeri Courts, those of deputy Şeri Judges, clerks and the like, these he said were to, “be abolished as from the 1st of January, 1930.” Henniker-Heatton’s final comments were notable, in that they indicated Münir was closely associated with these changes. Henniker-Heatton stated: “In conclusion I would mention that the Governor formulated the scheme above described after exhaustive discussion with the Turkish delegate of Evkaf who adopted a helpful attitude in the matter.”

That it was not just the Turkish nationalists, but also the British themselves who were conscious of potential threats to the independence of the judges under these new arrangements is shown by Dawe’s minute of the 6th of January 1930. Dawe registered that he had sought advice as to, “whether the appointment of the Sheri Judges to be Agents, or, in other words, executive officers, of the Evkaf Department, would affect the independent and impartial discharge of their judicial functions.” In response to his enquiries, Colonel Beattie had informed him, “that he did not think”, that this would be a problem, “and that in any case the functions of the Sheri Judges are quite unimportant.”

Next came the Müftülük, which was diminished in status and brought under Evkaf control. A small notice published on an inside page of the Cyprus Gazette of 18th January, 1929, entitled, “ABOLITION OF OFFICE”, announced, “His Excellency the Officer Administering the Government, with the sanction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, is pleased to declare that the office of Mufti has been abolished with effect from the 1st January, 1929 inclusive.” In place of the Müftülük was established the “Fetva Eminliği”, or “Office of Fatwas”, soon to be occupied by yet another relative of Münir Bey.

On the retirement of Müftü Ziyaeddin, Hakkı Bey, who had been kadı of Larnaca, and was too young to be retired upon the abolition of the Kadılık, had been appointed by the British governor as the new Müftü. Korkut notes indignation at the fact that a British governor was appointing their community’s Müftü, and records also the fact that this appointment may have been partly inspired by the fact that Hakkı Bey was also related to Münir Bey. Nevertheless, he grants that when in 1928 Münir in collusion with the British suggested that the Turkish Lycée should be replaced by a College run on British
lines, it was the new Müftü Hakkı Bey, at the time also the head of the commission directing the Lycée, who courageously and firmly resisted any such undertaking. The Lycée was not abolished, (though the later adoption of separate college classes within the Lycée was, as will be expounded below, by itself a matter of much dispute). Soon after, however, it was the Müftülük that was to be abolished, with Korkut implying that this was in some part a punishment for Hakkı Bey’s obstinacy over the abolition of the Lycée.

For an instance, Korkut maintains, the people’s expectations rested on Hakkı Bey’s shoulders, it being hoped that he would defy this government order too, and refuse to accept the post of Fetva Eminı that had been created to replace the autonomous Müftülük. Hopes however were dashed when within a couple of days Hakkı Bey came round to accepting this new post. McHenry argues that though he was humiliated by the decision and did threaten to resign, Hakkı Bey eventually decided against this course of action due to his concern about the future welfare of his family.

Meanwhile the Cyprus Evkaf (Mohammedan Religious Property Administration) Order in Council, 1928, had also been passed. The order announced that the Governor, with the sanction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had the power to appoint delegates of Evkaf; “The Evkaf department”, that was being established according to the order; “shall for the purposes of this Order be deemed to be a Government Department”; and that the Delegates would, “be under the direction of the Governor”, and subject to the approval of the Governor in appointing and dismissing personnel to the Evkaf department. Having received news of a new draft Order-in-Council, G. Hazlerigg was to have minuted that its main purpose was, “to put the administration of Evkaf generally on the same footing as the administration of a Government Department in the Island.”

Wosgian’s argument, on this count, that such measures were not the result of any British intention, “to weaken the Turkish community or interfere with it,” is impossible to support. The assertion that the British might not have desired to weaken the Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis the Greeks is understandable, as is the assumption that they would wish to strengthen the pro-British Evkaf. Yet, these developments surely weakened Turkish Cypriot communal autonomy while enhancing British capabilities to affect their affairs. To suppose that the British held no purpose of interference is not very realistic. While these laws were not actively resisted by the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Councillors of the day, led as they were by Münir, they were, on this very basis, to form a major plank for the opposition campaign against them in the months and years ahead.

Measures restricting communal autonomy did not stop here though; two new laws, the Cyprus Elementary Education Law of 1929 and the “Newspaper, Books and Printing Presses Law, 1930” were to further threaten communal autonomy, in these cases for the

1453. Ibid., 34–35.
1454. Ibid., 35.
1455. Ibid.
1457. The same Gazette issue also published more detailed regulations for the Evkaf. See Cyprus Gazette 14th December 1928.
1458. Minute by G. Hazlerigg, 18th July 1928. CO 67/225/20, 5.
1459. WOSGIAN 1963, 82.
1460. Georghallides, for one, forcefully disagrees with such a view, arguing that during the Storrs era the British worked hard to establish indirect rule over the island’s Turks through Münir, though they, “had never developed a corresponding system of influence over the affairs of the Greek community.” GEORGHALIDES 1985, 490.
Greek Cypriot as well as the Turkish Cypriot community. According to the first of these laws, the Cyprus Elementary Education Law, the, “school teachers were brought under the direct control of the Government for appointment, promotion, dismissal and all disciplinary purposes,” though “Boards of Education, one for each religious community, consisting for the most part of elected members, retained control of curriculum and books.” As Henniker-Heaton was to admit later, the motivation was largely political. He wrote:

I was told when I first arrived in Cyprus that the root of the political problem lay in the elementary schools and accepting that of necessity, I took my part in pressing forward the Elementary Education Law of 1929: I said at the time believed then and believe now that it was the best bit of work for British rule done since the Occupation. That was not for the reason given, namely the education of the small school children, but because we did at last get some control over the product of the secondary schools.

Moslem elementary education had, in fact, already come under greater government control than that of the Greeks with the passage of the Moslem Education Bill of 1920, which had been championed by İrfan Bey. According to this bill, “teachers were appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Boards of Education, and their salaries paid from direct taxation earmarked for education.” Not all Turkish Cypriots concurred with İrfan’s appreciation of the bill, some arguing against it on the same grounds as the Greeks, that it would diminish the autonomy of their community. Of those who expressed displeasure with the bill the most prominent was Eyyub Bey. He was to argue that:

The Education Law of 1920, by which the Moslem education of Cyprus was placed under the control of the Government, required a great deal of consideration and amendment as far as its financial side was concerned. … It was also right that in a Constitutional Government like that of Cyprus a greater measure of control should be given to the people in the matter of education.

To these remarks İrfan Bey took offence, retorting that:

[A]s everybody was aware, he was one of the leading spirits in the passing of the Education Law, and he could not allow the remarks of the hon. member to pass without criticism. In the first place he would thank His Excellency the High Commissioner and His Excellency’s ministers for their assistance in passing that famous Education Law which laid concrete foundation for Moslem education in Cyprus and without which there would have been no elementary education for Moslems in Cyprus. The schools would have been closed and no masters would be found to work for the salary offered by the community. The first objection raised by his hon. friend and other people with the same ideas was that Moslem education had been handed over to the Government: He did not understand what that meant, but what others gave him to understand was that the Government, being of a different nationality, might check the advancement of the Moslem schools to the detriment of their religious and national feeling. That, however, was a Greek sentiment which he had heard expressed for

1461. Cyprus Gazette 28th May 1930.
1462. Report of the Department of Education for the School Year 1932–33, 1;
1464. Report of the Department of Education for the School Year 1932–33, 1; These conditions had not originally been brought for the Greeks, who insisted they impinged on their autonomy, but in 1923 a similar law was finally passed for them too. Ibid.
1465. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 8th March 1922, 9.
years by the Greek members of the Council, and of which he himself was accused both by Greeks and Turks in Cyprus because he was the intermediary for handing over Moslem education to the Government. ... [H]e thought that most of the people had already understood it, because they saw that under the new Education Law the Koran was not struck off the school curriculum ... They also saw that their national sentiments, far from being interfered with, were given more freedom.1466

The dispute over the matter was raised once again in the following year’s Legislative Council debates, when the issue of the passing of a similar law for the Greek Cypriots was being discussed. İrfan Bey once again praised the education law and criticised the Greeks for having rejected it noting that for his community, passage of the bill, “had not led to the suppression of religious and national feelings.”1467 Mr. Elliades stated, however, that the Moslems in the island were complaining about it and that they, the Greek Cypriots, “would never accept or allow that their education should be subjected to anybody else.”1468 To this, İrfan Bey said that he had privately assured Greek schoolmasters that, “under the Moslem Education Law the national and religious sentiments of the Moslem population were better safeguarded than they had ever been heretofore,” and implied that the schoolmasters continued to be free to do as they wished in class.1469

It was, however, not long after that some effort was made to censor the material used in Turkish elementary schools. Books imported from Istanbul exhorted children to love and make sacrifices for the fatherland, spoke of regaining lost territories, “when the time comes,” recounted injustices done to the Turks by Italians, Cretans and Russians, and encouraged children to study the art of warfare well.1470 In a confidential letter of July, 1921 addressed to the Chief Inspector of Schools, the Acting Chief Secretary wrote:

With reference to your letter of the 7th July, 1921, on the subject of the books selected by the Moslem Board of Education for use in Moslem Elementary schools, I am directed to inform you that it is considered advisable that all the passages in the Books in question which you have mentioned in your letter should be deleted, as well as those which it was previously decided to delete.1471

Regarding these books, (including a volume entitled, the “Anatolian Child”), the Acting Chief Secretary directed that the pages be “cut out neatly.”1472 The Chief Inspector of Schools, Cannon Newham, eventually confirmed that the deed had been done, reporting:

I have the honour to say that by your instructions a large number of new Moslem School Books imported from Constantinople last summer were sent to the Printing Office to have certain pages removed which work was to be done out of Office hours and paid for out of the Education Fund.1473

1466. Ibid.; Eyyub was not alone in his opposition to the bill, the İrşad journal, for example, describing it as being, “against the nation’s interests,” as it deprived it of the ability to run its own educational affairs. [İrşad 1st October 1920]. Ahmet Raşid also declared his amazement at how such a law, reducing as it did the Turkish community’s autonomy in education, could have been accepted. Doğru Yol 20th September 1920.

1467. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 17th January 1923, 4.

1468. Ibid., 4–5.

1469. Ibid., 21st August 1923, 153.


1471. Acting Chief Secretary to Chief Inspector of Schools, 14th July 1921. C/1067/1921, 26.

A confidential draft memorandum was further prepared by Newham to be sent to the Chief Collector of Customs and the Island Postmaster calling on them to, “detain all Turkish School Books that may be brought into the Island until examined & passed by an officer from the Education Department authorised by the Chief Insp. of Schools.” The Acting Chief Secretary, however, called instead for the taking of less drastic precautions, directing, “that no instructions should be issued to the Customs Department, but that, in the event of unauthorised books being found in use in Moslem Elementary Schools, the Board of Education should exert its authority to prevent infringement of the regulations prescribed under section 10 (1) (a) of Law 24 of 1920.”

Notwithstanding such cases, İrfan’s argument deserves at least some credit. Yes, there was greater British control over the education of the Turks, and yes this can be regarded as having been an impediment to the dissemination of a nationalist outlook. Yet British control did not, on the whole, constitute an insurmountable obstacle for those teachers in the Turkish schools who shared an enthusiasm for Turkish nationalist discourse. In fact, when the British did try to play a more intrusive and direct role in the education system, especially in the late 1920’s and following the 1931 October Revolt, they succeeded largely only in provoking further nationalist sentiment. Thus, for example, the British decision to change the name of the Turkish Lycée to “Islam Lycée” caused consternation, indicating that Turkish nationalism had already by then taken root. Due to the significance of the alternative school names in terms of what they represented, this can be considered to be a particularly strong sign that ethno-national identity was well on the way to replacing religious identity as the principal focus of communal identification.

As to the new press law of 1930, it put important new financial burdens upon the press, providing permits to print a newspaper only on the condition that applicants, “give and execute a bond, in the sum of two hundred pounds with one or more sureties, or otherwise secured,” for the paying of penalties which might be imposed, “for printing or publishing or causing to be printed or published any seditious or other libel at any time after the execution of such bond, and all other penalties whatsoever which may be imposed upon or adjudged by a Court against him or them under the provisions of this Law.” Soon after, Birlik was to be shut down. Its proprietor’s, Ahmet Hulusi’s, inability to provide the economic sureties required of him by the law has been cited as the reason for the folding of the paper.

British measures do not appear to have succeeded in achieving their general political goals or, more specifically in tempering the hostility of the Turkish press. Indeed, after differences emerged in mid-1925 the Birlik newspaper had cut-off its links to the Birlik Ocağı, and had eventually become commonly regarded by many as being relatively pro-government. It was this paper however, rather than the more aggressively nationalist competition of papers such as Söz, which was forced to close down. Moreover, despite the negative obstacles, a new opposition paper was also soon thereafter established.

1473. Chief Inspector of Schools to Chief Secretary, 28th February 1922. C/1067/1921, 37.
1474. Draft Memorandum prepared by Chief Inspector of Schools, Cannon Newham enclosed in Chief Inspector of Schools to Chief Secretary, 10th September 1921. C/1067/1921, 35.
1475. Acting Chief Secretary to Chief Inspector of Schools, 17th September 1921. C/1067/1921, 36.
1476. See NESİM 1990a, 63 and McHENRY 1987, 139–140.
1477. Cyprus Gazette 28th May 1930.
1478. KONUR 1938, 67–68.
1479. The first issue was published on April 11th 1931. FEDAİ 1986, 72.
Named the “Masum Millet”, or “The Innocent Nation”, its proprietor was the infamous Con Rifat. The surety for the journal was put up by the brother-in-law of Necati Özkan, advocate Behaeddin Bey of whose nationalist credentials mention was made in the previous chapter.1480 In the statement of the newspaper’s editorial objectives, published in both English and Turkish in the inaugural issue, Rifat assured the British that they should have nothing to fear from the island’s Turks whom he stated were “loyal to the government” and knew not the meaning of “national aspirations”.1481 The way in which he then lashed out at the British administration, suggests, however, that this “loyal” approach may well have been a ruse, and that such assurances may well have been made for the sake of evading censorship. In the same piece Rifat wrote in somewhat broken English:

This Government not only restrained but also chained the press, the freedom of action and of speech, interfered with our language, destroyed with a stroke of pen the religious institutions without consulting the proper Turkish Authorities and obtaining their consent and did not yet replace them by the new ones in the way I have suggested and pointed out two years ago, wanted to govern us without laws and rules, subjected us treatments which can only be meted out to a primitive and Bedouin Clansmen, ridiculed with the Moslem rights and openly challenged our social honour and dignity.

Those who are cognizant with the political history of the latest part of the preceding century recollect the when in the year 1878 the then British Prime Minister, Lord Beaconsfield, returned to England after that inauspicious Berlin Congress he had declared that we will make Cyprus a Paradise in the Mediterranean. His Lordship and his successors before erecting this paradise acal edifice; they thought first of its angeis and they discovered this aptitude to exist in Turks, whom they taught to live hungry and naked, and really they succeeded in this attempt.1482

Again, in employing the types of measures outlined above what the British were failing to appreciate, and what has often also been overlooked by historians of the era, was that Turkish nationalism had by the end of the 1920's already left an indelible mark on the Turkish Cypriot community. Again, as the British were to make the mistake of underestimating the hold and scope of Greek nationalism, they were likewise to do so with that of Turkish nationalism1483. Typical of such misconstrued appreciations was Storrs’ claim in 1928 that were there to be a plebiscite, ninety percent of the population would vote for, “closest union with Great Britain.”1484 It is hard to find sufficient evidence to support Kızılürek’s assertion that the colonial administration was following closely the Kemalist

1480. Ibid., 51.
1482. Ibid.
1483. Reflective of the spurious means by which the British estimated such sentiment was, for instance, a secret despatch of 22nd June, 1921, in which High Commissioner Stevenson was willing to assert in terms of the resurgent enosis movement that he was, “satisfied that the whole movement is an artificial growth propagated solely by the professional politicians of the towns, and rooted in the soil of their own self-interest.” What is telling is that he was prepared to reach such a conclusion on the basis of having, “caused discreet and personal enquiries to be made in the principal villages, particularly in the Nicosia district, by Greek-speaking British Officials,” as if the populace would unanimously express its sentiments openly to such “discreet” British enquirers. [Stevenson to Secretary of State, 22nd June 1921. CO 67/203, 372–373].
A. J. Dawe deserves credit for not having been so naive, at least as concerned the supposed rural-urban divide in nationalist sentiments believed to exist by many officials, minuting that, “Mr. Nicholson in his despatch draws a clear-cut line between the anti-British intelligentsia and the mass of the peasants. I doubt whether this picture entirely corresponds with the reality.” Minute by A. J. Dawe, 23rd April 1929. CO 67/227/4, 23.
1484. Storrs to Secretary of State, 18th January 1928. CO 67/223/17, 75–76.
movement on the island, which if truly the case would only make them more at fault for not having awakened to its significance. In fact, the presence of loyal Turkish Cypriot elites appears to have given them almost a false sense of security on this matter. Recognition of the increasing depth of support for Kemalist Turkey and the rise of nationalist emotions should rather have cautioned against an attitude of ignoring the increasingly assertive emerging political classes. For these latter, British measures would be likely to be construed as a threat to their community’s established socio-political rights, and as such, to cause them to distance themselves from the British administration.

Despite limitations, education was undoubtedly playing a leading role in the transformation of Turkish Cypriot society. While in 1921 the total number of Moslem primary school students was 7,357, by 1926 their numbers had risen to 8,787. This constituted a jump of almost twenty percent in five years. By 1931, the total had risen still further to 9,967, making an overall increase of just over thirty-five percent during the decade. For the Greeks too the corresponding figures had increased, but the relatively slower rate of increase of seventeen percent for the decade, (increasing from 35,500 in 1921 to 41,534 in 1931), can be considered a sign that Turkish Cypriot education was no longer lagging as far behind that of the Greeks as in the past. The change in secondary school education was even more pronounced. While in 1921 the total number of students enrolled in the two Turkish secondary schools, the İdadi and the Victoria Girls School, (first established at the beginning of the twentieth century), was only 253, by 1926 the number enrolled in secondary education had increased to 396, and by 1931 was over six hundred, bringing up the level of enrolment in such schools, which had been markedly lower at the beginning of the decade, to a similar level to that of the Greeks.

Furthermore, the qualitative aspect of education, though still wanting in many respects, had all the same changed for the better too. No longer was schooling a matter primarily of religious indoctrination, but was advancing in line with developments in republican Turkey, and longer-term trends that had been underway since the Tanzimat era. Based on the curricula of Turkey, education had by now been secularised and pride of place given to the sciences, as well as to such subjects as history and geography where students were brought in touch with their Turkish roots. By the beginning of the 1930’s the modernised

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1486. All figures for education between 1921 and 1926 are calculated from the Cyprus Blue Book, 1921, 152, 1926 and 1931, except for the figure for secondary education by 1931 which is from the Report of the Department of Education for the School Years 1930–31 and 1931–32. Enclosed in CO 69/42, 14.
1487. In fact, though unfortunately too little research has been done on the matter, (no doubt because most historians of the island have to-date been men), the social status of women within the Greek community appears to have been just as poorly as in the Moslem community. [See STAVROU 1992, 68–71 and 82–84]. A memorable telegram of the 10th of June 1905 was despatched by a very concerned Bishop Kyrianis, president of the Holy Synod, to the Colonial Secretary. Calling for a stay of execution of the law, it protested that the vagueness of the Education Law of 1905 gave women the right to vote for school committees, which it was stated was, “extraordinarily dangerous [!]” [Telegram from Bishop Kyrianis to Colonial Office, 10th June 1905. CO 67/143, 628]. Comments from the Colonial Office five years on in 1911 were just as striking. Mr. Ellis wrote, “The demand for female education is very odd as coming from the Moslems … We shall have a suffragette movement next, I suppose?” Next to his minute, Secretary of State Lewis Harcourt added, “This is despairing! There will soon be no island refuge left for me! The Isle of Man failed me long ago!” [Minutes by W. Ellis, 2nd May 1911, and by L. Harcourt, 2nd May 1911. CO 67/162, 230]. The Minister had little to fear. Equal voting rights for women were not to be enacted for another five decades!
curricula of Turkish secondary schools included amongst others also the subjects of philosophy, sociology, psychology and civics.  

At the end of the 1920’s İbrahim Hakkı, the Turkish Inspector of Schools, (notably to be described later by the British as “a Kemalist and a dangerous man”), published a new edition of a small book entitled “Kıbrıs Coğrafyası”, (or, the “Geography of Cyprus”), which had first been published in 1906 and which dealt in fact not only with the geography, but also with the political history of the island. What was distinctive about this volume produced for schoolchildren was the fact that reference to the “Moslems” was in many places supplanted by reference to “Turks”, as was even historical reference to the Ottomans. So, for example, the book talked variously of the “Turkish” population of Cyprus; explained that there were long-standing “Turkish” laws in Cyprus; informed students that Cyprus was originally a geographic part of Anatolia; pronounced, (in contrast to Greek claims), that it could not be said that the first inhabitants of the island belonged to any nation as there were no nations at that time; Declared that the “Turkish” flag had been planted on the island as a consequence of the Ottoman conquest, and that it was the “Turks” who had conquered the island. Its classification of the elected membership of the Legislative Council stated that there were three “Turkish” as opposed to twelve “non-Moslem” members of the Legislative Council.

This volume was soon after expanded with the collaboration of Mustafa Midhat Bey to become, “Mekteplere Mahsus Küçük Kıbrıs Coğrafyası ve Küçük Kıbrıs Tarihi,” or; “A Short Geography of Cyprus and Short History of Cyprus for Schools.” Describing the population of Cyprus in 1931 it wrote: “The population of Cyprus is 348,000. 65,000 of these are Turks, 283,000 are non-Turks. Most of these are Greek Cypriots, some Catholics and Armenians.” Evaluation of the contents of this book, that by the numbers of copies printed and successive editions published was clearly very widely used, is similarly telling. Throughout, the story of the Turks, as opposed to that of the Moslems or even Ottomans, is emphasized. Analysis of material such as this, as well as of the press, leads us to conclude that the rapid “Turkification” of nationalism under way in the new Turkish Republic was having a notable impact in Cyprus too.

It took several years for a confidential British despatch to recognise that the history taught to the Turkish Cypriots, “since the changes in Turkey itself, has made extravagant claims both for the Turks themselves as a race, and for their language.” More generally, it was acknowledged, Cyprus’ history had been, “distorted and portrayed entirely out of historical perspective according as its teachers were Greek Orthodox or Turkish educationists with Kemalist leanings.” It was to be suggested as a consequence that the government should commission a history of Cyprus, though the memo prepared by the scholar who was indeed brought to Cyprus to research the feasibility of such a project frankly and appropriately reiterated that it was not so much the books themselves that thwarted the “balanced” teaching of history, as it was the teachers.

1489. For the British description of Hakkı, see Palmer to Secretary of State, 4th November 1936. CO 67/255/8, 153.
Karpat explains the process of historical revision under way in Turkey at the time, and having its effect now also in Cyprus, in the following useful way:

The Republican government abolished the monarchy in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924, and so extended the break in the political regime to everything associated with the Ottoman and Islamic past. The reasons behind such drastic action were the new regime’s fear of religious-popular reaction and its desire to create an “authentic” Turkish national identity rooted in the popular lore. It stemmed also from the desire to break free from historical

1490. HAKKI 1927, passim. Available in MAA-TK-491; The physical link between Cyprus and Anatolia is one of the most frequent topics in Turkish sources, often attributed pride of place as justification for the island’s genuine “Turkish” character, it most commonly being argued that the two were at one time physically attached. [See, for example, BEDEVI 1978, 5; SARPÈR 1938, 31; DANIŞMEND 1958, 12; ÇEVİKEL 2000, 9]. Papadakis makes note of this tendency too, and highlights also that maps used by the Turks have tended to focus on the vertical dimension so as to stress the proximity of the island to Turkey, while the counter-action taken on the part of Greeks and Greek Cypriots has been to emphasize the horizontal dimension that visually brings Cyprus closer to Greece while in school maps, “the problem of distance between Greece and Cyprus is resolved by placing Cyprus in a box at the bottom right-hand side of the map, the revery positioning it alongside Crete.” This is, as he indicates, fully in accord with the importance that Anderson accords to nationalism’s symbolic use of maps. [PAPADAKIS 1998b; See also CONSTANTI- NOU – PAPADAKIS 2001, 134–135]. On the other hand, Vannik Volkan, a Turkish Cypriot psychoanalyst, made a particularly original contribution to the debate on these issues, including not only a novel appreciation of the psycho-political implications of the island’s shape but also his personal childhood recollections from the mid-twentieth century. He writes:

Some of my own childhood memories may shed light on how Cypriot Turkish children symbolized a connection between the island of Cyprus and Turkey. Parents often spoke of Turkey and passed along to their children a sense of identity with the mainland country, which seemed a land of promise … The map of Cyprus made the connection concrete, since on maps the Karpasia peninsula of the island looks like an arm stretching toward Anatolia’s (the mother’s) Gulf of Alexandretta. I can still hear what we learned in elementary school on Cyprus: ‘Cyprus was once connected with Anatolia, but it sank into the sea. It rose, only to sink again. When it rose for the third time after its third submersion, it was, alas, no longer connected with Anatolia.’ This account reflects eons of geological change, and to this day I do not know how close it comes to the truth. [VOLKAN 1979, 12–13]. Volkan’s emphasis of the psycho-political association made with the island’s geography/geology appears justified by Feridun’s introduction to his book on the history of Turk- ish Cypriot Education. Here he most dramatically explains that after the shift of continents that had begun millions of years ago Cyprus, a “frightened and hesitant,” island finally emerged, “remaining with its index finger pointing to the bay from which it had been detached from its mother.” [FERİDÜN 2001, 5].

There was of course one indisputable, physical reality, that when compared to circumstances of the Greek Cypriots enhanced the Turkish Cypriots’ ability to imagine themselves as one with Turks of Ana- tolia, which was that the coast of Asia Minor was visible from the northern shores of the isle. Admiring from Kyrenia the splendour of the scene before her, Esme Scott-Stevenson had written, “Before us lay the sea, like a great calm lake, and beyond that again rose the bold shore of Asia Minor, with its range of blue mountains, making the most lovely background imaginable. The distance between the two shores is forty miles, but it looks far less, and can be crossed in a sailing boat in six hours.” [SCOTT-STEVEN- SON 1880, 30].

As to the incidental question as to whether or not Cyprus was at some ancient stage, well before either Greek or Turk left an imprint on its soil, connected to the Anatolian mainland, despite some effort to answer the question, this author, like Volkan, is still not fully certain, when, or even if the island was at some point connected to the Anatolian mainland, or whether or not it sank and rose a number of times. Braudel though has made one interesting suggestion: that the discovery in Cyprus, as in certain other Mediterranean islands, of the skeletal remains of dwarf elephants, “point to the degeneration of an ancient species, literally trapped when the islands broke away.” BRAUDEL 2002, 25.
romanticism, nostalgia for the past grandeur and irredentism. Maybe the leaders thought that in order to control the future they needed to impose a historical amnesia on the nation until the nation could view its past with detachment and dispassion.1497

For the Turks of Cyprus, though, this created somewhat of an additional paradox, never wholly resolved, in that while efforts to adhere to the republican version of history were clearly underway, these clashed with the desire to maintain the past history, and thus future aspirations, of Cyprus, (an island excised from the confines of approved national frontiers by the republicans and relegated to the forgotten Ottoman past), within the bounds of nationally legitimate discourse.

On the whole the Turks of Cyprus quite enthusiastically followed changes initiated in Turkey, though, surely some more conservative eyebrows must have been raised at first. From the outset, however, the Ankebut had no reservations supporting deep-seated changes, publishing in September 1920 the following radical poem inscribed by a certain Kaya. Entitled “The Archaic State”, it read:

Why should enmity stay hidden in hearts
Why should not pens write of rights
How can we sacrifice the great East
For a palace that has damned the people

They say the palace rules, and the people are servants
The sultan eternal, the nation culpable
Both guide, and also guardian
Whose goal is to harm this land and nation
I am the body, I am the heart, you are the one that lives
Oh sultanate that has robbed me for a thousand years

As the dragons with open wings stand at your door
My fire will assuredly soon engulf
The fringes of your rotten throne
Oh you dead person’s ghost who is not of my blood
Seek from now pardon for your sins

A thousand dragons at your head, a thousand-and-one angels of death
It is not dying; nor will this glorious nation die
There is no palace, there is the nation know this as the law
Oh o archaic state, o archaic state1498

The resonance for our purposes of the above lines is amplified not only by their severity, but even more so by the fact that they was published before, rather than after the abolition of the sultanate in November of 1922.

Of course, Kaya’s words did not reflect the opinion of all. There is evidence that to begin with some were disturbed by developments. Berkes recalls, for instance, that not all Turkish Cypriots were thrilled by Mustafa Kemal’s abolition of the sultanate, and especi-

1497. KARPAT 2000, 27.
1498. Kaya in Ankebut, 20th September 1922; The reference to the Sultan not being of the author’s “blood” was due to the fact that the sultans could not claim, like the nationalists, to be descendents of Turkish forefathers, being, “almost always the son of a female slave, a royal concubine bought or captured in war, and the grandson of one on his paternal side as well.” According to Ze’evi, “in many cases,” the sultan also, “had much in common with his slaves as far as culture and ethnicity were concerned.” ZE’EVI 1996, 183.
ally by the termination of the Caliphate in 1924.1499 Yet, considering the revolutionary nature of the changes underway, it is little surprise that they came as a shock to many Turkish Cypriots. Nor were they alone in holding such sentiments which, if anything, were held more widely in Turkey itself.1500 All the same, within a short period of time, even those who had supported the old order before its abolition were to uphold the republican and secular vision of the Kemalists. No group, with the possible exception of the press, was more responsible for this than the teaching cadres.

That schoolteachers were prominent in the Turkish nationalist movement is well established. Berkes conveys how the majority of his teachers at the İdadi during the mid-1920’s were Kemalists and would take the leading role in theatre performances with nationalist themes, depicting in particular Turkish victories over the Greeks.1501 Necati Özkan himself was for a while before entering upon his political career to lecture on Ottoman history at the İdadi, where he noted people walking by the classroom would stop to listen on the streets.1502 Ateş describes the teachers as the, “rank-and-file” of the reformist movement.1503 Critically, elementary school teachers invariably were by now the output of the Nicosia İdadi, or Turkish Lycée as it later became.1504 This secondary school followed the curriculum of schools in Turkey, and brought its senior masters from Turkey, harbouring on the whole a highly nationalist teaching staff. Indeed, İrkad has argued that in the pre-World War I era the Ottoman authorities required that any teachers to be seconded for service in Cyprus had to be supporters not only of the CUP, but also of the pan-Turkist Türk Ocağı.1505 Amongst the Turkish Cypriot students socialised in this environment, many then went out to the environs and disseminated the nationalist message as teachers in the elementary, and intermediate Rushdie classes, which by the beginning of the 1930’s were, “nominally attached to all elementary schools and actually flourishing in the towns and larger villages.”1506

Not only were the teachers active in the press, as apparent through their leading role in the publication of the İrşad journal, (see below), but they also established an organization in July 1918, called the “Cyprus Turkish Teachers Association.”1507 Bryant accurately points to the group’s explicitly declared statement that it would shy from becoming politically involved, but this should not be equated with the organization itself, and its members being apolitical.1508 Though any direct political activities are not documented, and though its ineffectiveness was later to be criticised by Ahmet Raşid, the very use of the word “Turkish”, instead of “Moslem”, the word conventionally associated both with their

1501. BERKES 1997, 37.
1502. ÖZKAN 1967.
1503. He simultaneously blames the colonial administration for having separated the profession of teacher from that of imam and having thereby weakened religious knowledge, overlooking in the process the long-standing calls that had been made for this very measure by men such as Hafız Cemal, as well as the secularisation process underway in Turkey. ATEŞİN 1999, 32.
1504. WEIR 1952, 73.
1506. Cyprus Annual Report 1932, 32.
1507. See M. Behaeddin and Midhat Bey to Chief Secretary of Government in Cyprus, 3rd April 1919. SAI/674/1919, 2; Bryant states that the establishment of the association was in 1919, but the letter referred to in this footnote clearly states the association to have been formed the previous year. BRYANT 1998a, 250.
1508. Ibid.
community, and in particular with their community’s educational enterprises, can in itself be regarded as a political statement.1509 The fact that Behaeddin Bey was Honorary Secretary to the Association, and Midhat bey its Chairman, indicate that it might well have had a nationalist strain to its outlook, and any manifest appearance of being apolitical may well have been related to the political context in which they had to operate, most notably the continuing hostilities between the British Empire to which they were subject, and the Turkish nation to which they felt themselves to belong.1510

Faiz Kaymak tells how they would sing, and have their students sing patriotic songs during the pre-1931 era, including one, which he himself recited called, “Türklük Marşı”, or “The March of the Turks”. The words of this song express devotion to the Turkish nation, to its long history and to Turan as the homeland of the Turks, and pronounce, “We are Turanians”.1511 Özkan further recounts how the primary school headmaster Hafiz Lisani Efendi would at his own expense hand out flags and other nationalist symbols to children on national days and would get the older children to recite poems with nationalist undertones, such as those of Namık Kemal.1512

A rather morbid piece of evidence of the impact of the schoolmasters on nationalist passions can be ascribed to the murder of an Orthodox priest in the mixed village of Lurucina in September 1924. As Georghallides explains it, “The perpetrators of the crime, subsequently sentenced to death, were two young Turks from the village who had been excited by a fanatical teacher.” This, “new teacher,” he states had been, “attempting to strengthen,” the, “Moslem and Turkish consciousness” of the Turks of the village. Georghallides justly points out that this grave incident did not escalate into a string of reprisals, though all the same, it appears that tensions may not have abated easily.1513 Stevenson published a special proclamation in an extraordinary issue of the Cyprus Gazette of the 31st of October 1924 directing that:

A procession in connection with a marriage which takes place at Tymbou on the 2nd November, 1924, and is proceeding from the village of Tymbou to the village of Lymbia is prohibited from passing through the village of Louroudjina.1514

Further corroboration of the nationalist inclinations of the teaching class might be deduced from the fact that a disproportionately high number of teachers appear to have been amongst those who emigrated to Turkey following the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, the Annual Report for 1927 describing such emigration as a cause of, “a certain difficulty ... in maintaining an adequate staff of teachers.”1515 Clearly, though, education levels for the Turks were improving significantly. In fact, by the 1930’s, British reports show that virtually all the graduates of the Turkish Lycée, were going on to higher education in Turkey, and that there was apparently now actually a higher proportion of Turkish Cypriot scholars going on to university than there were of Greek Cypriots. According to a

1509. For Raşid’s criticism see Doğru Yol 22nd March 1920.
1510. See M. Behaeddin and Midhat Bey to Chief Secretary, 3rd April 1919. SA1/674/1919, 2.
1511. KAYMAK 1981; Kaymak interestingly notes that Alparslan Türkeş, a student of his, afterwards adopted this march for his followers to use as an anthem, and further notes how the British banned the singing of this song.
1512. ÖZKAN 1967.
1513. GEORGHALLIDES 1979, 410.
1514. Cyprus Gazette 31st October 1924.
memo produced by the Director of Education, there were believed to be a total number of 373 students who had left Cyprus for post-Secondary school education between 1931 and 1936, and of these while 189 had gone to Greece, 116 (or 31%), “all Moslem Cypriots”, had gone to Turkey.1516 The Director of Education’s confidential report for the period of 1936–1940 stated regarding Turkish Cypriots going on to university education that: “in the last 10 years they have made much greater use, in proportion to their numbers, of these facilities than the Greeks,” but, he soberly recorded, “Few that have so gone have returned to Cyprus.”1517 Furthermore, the director observed: “It is reported that the average number of Cypriot students at Athens University at any given time is about 40; the number of those in Turkey must be disproportionately high, as for several years nearly all the ‘graduates’ of the Moslem Lycée went there as a matter of course.”1518

The desire for further education in Turkey was also most likely indicative of the attraction of the motherland to students, now increasingly imbued with nationalist and Kemalist values. For the communal well-being of the Turkish Cypriots it had its down-side as greater and greater numbers of qualified Turkish Cypriots who had originally gone to Istanbul for educational purposes remained in Turkey, settling there, and thereby depriving the Turkish Cypriot community of some of its best and brightest human material.

A natural consequence also of improvements in education was the increasing rate of literacy. According to the 1931 census, almost half the population was now literate, with the previous decade having seen a 31.85 percentage increase in the number of literate males, and an even more staggering 63.07 percent increase in the number of literate females.1519 And, with increased literacy came also the greater ability for dissemination of nationalist literature and commentary.

In the aftermath of the war the British policy towards Turkish Cypriot publications, non-existent while it raged, was somewhat relaxed. Despite the fact that the British continued to make use of censorship as well as unofficial warnings to editors, the Turkish press had quite a pronounced resurgence in the aftermath of the First World War and the years of conflict in Anatolia. The Blue Book for 1919–1920 registered the establishment of two new weekly newspapers, “Toghrul Yol” and “Vatan”, and a monthly journal, the “Ershad”.1520 Circulation was noted as being 1,200, 800 and 500 respectively.1521 By 1920 a fourth journal, described as a “social and literary review”, the “Ankebout”, was added to the previous three publications.1522 A year later saw the publication of Söz, which was, unlike others, to manage to stay in print for a much longer duration.1523 Söz was soon to become the principle Turkish nationalist newspaper, propounding from the outset the Kemalist creed and continuing to do so for the following two decades, outliving and invariably outselling its rivals in the process.

Nevertheless, without detracting from the prominence of Söz as a spearhead of the Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus, it should be recognised that all the aforemention-
ned journals gave support to the Kemalist movement, and were both reformist and nationalist in outlook. 1524 Positively no less vehemently nationalist was the line taken by the Doğru Yol newspaper, of which Ahmet Rashid was “publisher & proprietor”, and former headmaster, Mehmet Remzi, (who was to become editor of Söz as well), variously described as editor, assisting editor and “reputed editor.”1525 The paper was to pronounce that it had been established to give a voice to the Turkish Cypriot people who had remained voiceless for five years during the war and who had been intimidated to the verge of forgetting their Turkishness.1526

Whatever Remzi’s precise relationship with Doğru Yol might have been it is evident that he maintained a close relationship with Raşid. Not only did the two men write for each other’s journals, but according to a, “strictly confidential,” report of the Chief Commandant of Police to the Colonial Secretary, Remzi, together with Raşid’s father, was the initial source of finance for the Doğru Yol.1527 The file on the Doğru Yol newspaper maintained by the Colonial Secretariat revealed that neither man was initially expected to take a strong, partisan political line, Raşid stated as belonging, “to the opposite party to Irfan,” though his “political views” were nevertheless considered to be, “apparently not extreme.” Both, individually, it was stated, “appear to be reasonable men,” and Remzi too was, “not supposed to be hostile to the British Regime.”1528

The Chief Commandant’s report did, though, remark that Remzi, “frequents the Hurriet Club in Nicosia”, and that Raşid, “belongs to the Turkdernei Club which is frequented by Young Turks, [and] he also goes to the other Turkish Club.”1529 Very soon, however, these two “reasonable men” were running into trouble with the authorities for their nationalist articles and editorials. A letter written by Mehmet Remzi as “editor” of Doğru Yol confirms that the paper was soon placed under censorship. He appealed for the removal of this on May the 18th 1920, protesting: “there are 13–14 Greek papers on the Island but none of them is subject to censorship.”1530 His request was turned down.1531 A confidential letter from the Provost Marshal to the Chief Secretary had in fact already elucidated the new, revised British attitude towards the paper:

I have seen Ahmet Rashid Effendi, the Editor of “Toghru Yol” to-day and drew his attention to the articles which appeared in his paper (issue of 22nd March 1920).

1524. Vatan was in fact to get into trouble with the religious establishment for its reformist ideas regarding religion. See Cadi to Chief Secretary, 30th September 1920. SA1/684/1911, 11.
1525. See Minute of 4th October 1919. SA1/1153/1919; Amongst Remzi’s last students was Fazıl Plümer, a close associate of the nationalist leaders of the second wave of nationalism in Cyprus during the 1950’s. PLÜMER 2001, 8.
1527. Chief Commandant of Police to Chief Secretary, 10th October 1919. SA1/1153/1919, 15.
1528. Minute by C. H. Hart-Davis, 10th October 1919. SA1/1153/1919; Chief Commandant of Police to Chief Secretary, 10th October 1919. SA1/1153/1919, 13.
1529. Ibid., 12 and Chief Commandant of Police to the Chief Secretary, 8th October 1919. SA1/1153/1919, 1; The Türk Derneği Club to which Raşid was noted to belong seems to have maintained a close association with the Hüriyet ve Terraki Club, [Fadıl Niyazi in Birlik 29th August 1924], and maintained them with the Birlik Ocağı at least until the mid-1920’s. [See Söz 10th October 1925]. Though little detail is available, the club is reported to have held a tea party for a Turkish prisoner of war released in January 1920. Doğru Yol 19th January 1920.
1530. Remzi to Chief Secretary, 18th May 1920. SA1/1153/1919, 95.
1531. Acting Chief Secretary to Remzi, 26th May 1920. SA1/1153/1919, 98.
I have warned him that if he publishes articles of this disloyal strain again I shall not allow him to publish his paper for Public circulation before I have completely censored it.\footnote{1532} To the annoyance of the authorities, Söz and Vatan were printing equally nationalistic articles during this era. The High Commissioner, for example, was informed in September 1922 that it was, “almost time the Commissioner Nicosia saw the editors of these two papers, and warned them to be careful what articles they publish.”\footnote{1533} The secretariat files confirm that both Söz and Vatan received identical letters of appreciation from Ankara.\footnote{1534} That to Vatan, printed on the front cover of the paper, noted that it was sent from the, “Government of the Great National Council of Turkey. Office of the General Director of Press & Intelligence, Press Branch,” and was signed by none other than Ahmet Ağaoğlu. Ağaoğlu wrote, “I particularly express thanks for your patriotic publications,” and requested that they continue their, “praiseworthy struggle.”\footnote{1535} It was also brought to the attention of the colonial administration that an honoured Vatan had also added the following lines below the copy of the letter that it published:

Turks are one everywhere. All the children of Turan are attached morally & materially, to the great struggle.

We too, like everybody, have done the duty devolving on us in breaking asunder the chain attempted to be attached on the neck of our great nation which in her history never bore the yoke of bondage.

In this matter we resisted every difficulty & deprivation. We tried to be the interpreter of the echoes of the national heart that beat at Angora.

We publish the above letter of appreciation & we are indebted to our people for this success secured by our paper which is the reflection of our ideas (thoughts) in general and with tears of joy we congratulate the people on our great victory.\footnote{1536}

The following article, a re-print in Vatan from the Yeni Adana newspaper of Turkey, a leading proponent of the Kemalist forces, illustrated why the British had become concerned.\footnote{1537} Entitled simply, “The Turk is coming!…”, it read as follows:

While the Turkish troops entered green Brussa from one side, they approached the shores of the White sea [Mediterranean] on the other side. The horses of the brave Turkish cavalry neighed in the vineyards of Aïdin & on the green slopes of Smyrna. The heroic Turk has pulled down everthing in one stroke. Now the world is asking: Are there Greek troops in Anatolia at this time?

All the world is amazed at this our quick victory. The Greek troops are running off.

Run off you assassins! Do run off fearing the penalty for the buildings you have destroyed, for the people you have killed, for the innocent heads you have cut off.

Run off! There! The Turk is coming.

\footnote{1532}{Provost Marshall to Chief Secretary, 26th March 1920. SA1/1153/1919, 78–79.}
\footnote{1533}{Minute by Acting Chief Secretary, 21st September 1922. SA1/1098/1922, 5.}
\footnote{1534}{Extract from Vatan, 12th September 1922. SA1/1098/1922, 2 and 4.}
\footnote{1535}{Ibid., 3–4; I have found no evidence to support Keser’s claim that such letters were sent at the instigation of Atatürk, and it therefore appears to me that this is in fact a distortion of the truth. KESER s.a., 128.}
\footnote{1536}{Extract from Vatan, 12th September 1922. SA1/1098/1922, 2–3.}
\footnote{1537}{For more information on the stance of this newspaper during the Turkish resistance to occupation that followed the First World War, see İNUĞUR 1999, 356–358.}
Those who incited you to crimes, had told you that you would not be called upon to render an [ale?] for what you do & you believed that.

You have played with Turkish blood & heart with the cruelty which even a hyaena could not perpetrate.

Run off if you can – for the Turk is coming.1538

As revealed by a confidential and personal letter from Larnaca to the Chief Commandant of Police, “Yeni Adana”, (or, “New Adana”), from which the above-article had been taken, was circulating in Cyprus despite its nationalist and sometimes anti-British articles.1539

İrşad, published on the initiative of a society of young schoolteachers from Larnaca, had the explicit objective of improving the educational standards of their community, but was also a strong supporter of the nationalists in Turkey. It not only called in its launch issue for support for a more national education, but also argued that this would be the means by which the Turkish children could defend themselves against the Greek race.1540

The two other publications to have the greatest impact in the mid and late 1920’s were the aforementioned Birlik Newspaper, which as noted had begun publication in 1924, and was to close shop in 1930, and the “Hakikat” which following its first publication in 1923 was, as the main organ of the loyalist Evkaf camp, to become the main rival of Söz.1541

By the late 1920’s, with the change of administration of the Birlik and its severance of ties with what had now become the Kardeş Ocağı, this paper too came to be openly recognised by the authorities as, “a pro-Munir Bey Turkish newspaper.”1542 Yet it would be wrong to regard either of these papers as being wholly uncritical of the British administration or disrespectful of Turkey and its new republican system. A piece in the Hakikat in May 1926, spoke of the government of the Turkish Republic as, “our government” and Turkey as, “our fatherland”; It called upon the, “Turks of Cyprus, as in all parts of Turkey,” to repay their debt to, “the heroes who had fought for the independence of the country,” by providing assistance to the orphaned children of these “martyrs”; this it was stated would bring, “another victory for our nation.”1543 Only a few weeks later the Hakikat tore into the government for having appointed an Armenian to the post of assistant Turkish translator, a post which it said, “befits none but a Turk.”1544 The paper announced that the government’s appointment had, “broken the hearts of 65,000 Turks,” and stated:

Mr. Utidjian’s education and attainments, whatever they may be, are not important for us. What has offended us is that the Government takes no notice of us, and the fact that our rights are ignored. Ever since the occupation of the Island by the British the Turks have always sided with the Government during the deceitful and wicked efforts of the spoilt Greeks in the Legislative Council to secure independence. The Turks have worked side by

1538. “The Turk is coming!…,” extract from the Vatan 12th September 1922, in SA1/1098/1922.
1539. District Commissioner Larnaca to Chief Commandant of Police, 28th September 1922. SA1/1121/1922, 4.
1540. İrşad 1st June 1920.
1541. The Blue Book for 1923 registers circulation of 1,000 copies for Hakikat as compared to 1,200 for Söz. A rough balance in sales between the two was maintained throughout the decade. Cyprus Blue Book 1923, 164.
1542. Press summary prepared by Turkish translator Mr. Utidjian, 2nd April 1929. SA1/950/1926, 45.
1543. Hakikat 29th March 1926.
side with the Government for the destruction of the “Megali Idea” (= Great Idea) of the Greeks. They have in this way shown their loyalty to the Government. … This being so, are we not entitled to expect the Government to take into serious consideration the present important position of the Island Turks who have always supported the Government in difficult times and have helped them to defeat all the attacks of the Greeks with ease?\footnote{1545}

Likewise, Hakikat was often just as determined also in its adulation of Mustafa Kemal, one caption under a large portrait referring to him as, “Our President His Excellency Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha who bestowed honour and joy on our nation.”\footnote{1546} Notably the pro-Evka'f papers frequently criticised the actions of the nationalist camp as actually being detrimental to Turkey and the Turks, or contradicting the principles espoused by that republic. In other words, they turned matters around, accusing their opponents of actually being the ones disloyal to the motherland and the Turks, and themselves as being true patriots and followers of the principles of the modern Turkish state.\footnote{1547} In 1930, Hakikat went as far as to accuse the publishers of Söz of, “opposing the Turkish existence in the Island,” and the “self-proclaimed” nationalist camp in general of colluding with the Greeks.\footnote{1548} Such men, it was claimed would only, “serve and facilitate the purpose of the Greeks.”\footnote{1549} While a decade earlier, “the persons attacking the Turks in the island were the Greeks,” now, it bemoaned, “we see in the same line some men of our own race,” men whom it described as having, “a common cause with Greeks.”\footnote{1550}

Despite the fact that there was till the late 1920’s, early 1930’s little evidence of an effort to systematically anglicise the masses, knowledge of English, yet another channel for the transfer of political ideas, was also spreading. In fact, as early as 1923, the Cyprus Annual Report noted that there was now invariably someone who could read and write English in even the more remote villages.\footnote{1551} This was confirmed also by the Annual Report of 1930, which informed: “The knowledge of English is rapidly becoming more widely diffused.”\footnote{1552} That English was in many cases able to function as a medium of communication between the two communities, particularly the elite, and the fact that, “as a general rule”, the Turks were still “familiar with Greek,” for some it being their principal language, meant that language, was still not an absolute breaking-point between the two communities.\footnote{1553} All the same, it is noteworthy that crosscutting cleavages of religion and language were apparently on the decline. According to the 1931 census Greek was the mother tongue now for only 2.54 percent of Moslems.\footnote{1554} At the turn of the century, 2,278 out of a total Moslem population of 51,309 had been classified as

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\begin{itemize}
\item 1545. Ibid., 4–5.
\item 1546. Hakikat 5th July 1926.
\item 1547. See, for example, “The abominable observations of ‘Seoz’ emanate from a few wretched and valueless brains.” Extract from Hakikat, 7th April 1928. SA1/950/1926, 30–35 and “The Lyceé and the College” Extract from Hakikat, 14th March 1931. SA1/950/1926, 115–118.
\item 1550. Ibid., 58–59.
\item 1551. Cyprus Annual Report 1923, 8.
\item 1552. Cyprus Annual Report 1930, 5.
\item 1553. Ibid.
\end{itemize}
having Greek as their mother tongue, amounting to 4.44 percent of the overall Moslem population. It might reasonably be assumed that this decrease, which continued thereafter, was in an important part the result of the spread of formal education.

Meanwhile, the library of the Birlik Ocağı was already adorned with quite a selection of books with nationalist themes. Amongst some of the most notable possessions of the library by the end of the 1920’s were volumes entitled “Mustafa Kemal Paşa and Köse Hoca”; “The Future of Anatolia”; “A General History of the Turks”; “The Turkish Heart”; “Shirt of Fire”, (by Halide Edib), and; “Turkification”. This latter book, (as already referred to above), had been personally inscribed by its author Tekin Alp, and included such subtitles as, “The Objective and Benefits of Turkification”; “What is the Nation”; “The Nation Means Mentality”; “The Common Conscience”, and; “The Attraction of Turkishness”. Other volumes included, “Turkish Superior to All”, “The Golden Book of the Turk”; “Turkish Folk Literature”; “My Beloved Turks”; “Ankara”; “Turkish Art”; “The Third Year of the Establishment of the Republic of Turkey”; “National Information about Azerbaijan”, and; “Towards Turan”, the last a book of poems published in 1918 by pre-eminent nationalist author Mehmet Emin. Amongst the journals noted were numerous volumes of “Şehbal Mecmuası”, a review in which Halide Edib, amongst others, had published work; “Türk Yurdu Mecmuaları”; “İslam Mecmuası”, and “Altın Yurt”, all of which are noted to have contained articles by prominent nationalist intellectuals. The Turks of Cyprus were by now reading more, and the Turks of the club, at least, seem to have been well acquainted with the Turkish nationalist literary scene.

In fact, the increasing numbers of advertisements in the press from booksellers indicate that the impact of literary works and journals from Turkey was more widespread. An advert placed in the Birlik in June 1924 by Ahmed Cemil for his general store, called the, “Fatherland Bookshop and Binding House,” listed first amongst the wide range of products on offer, “all types of national and literary novels and pamphlets.” A fortnight later there was another advert, this time for Lütfi and Seyfi’s, “National Bookshop,” which notified that they were also the sole agents for the Cumhuriyet, the celebrated Istanbul newspaper that was to champion the Kemalist transformation, and whose articles were to become a source of concern for the British administration in Cyprus. Berkes, too, confirms the eagerness with which an appreciative Turkish Cypriot audience was now scanning newspapers from Istanbul and devouring the works of prominent nationalist authors such as Halide Edib and Yakup Kadıri.

Societal pressure for the improvements in Turkish education that were now making the national socialization of greater numbers of Turkish Cypriots feasible, had been moun-

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1556. This ongoing trend was to be recorded by the Turkish consulate in the mid-1930’s, the Consul reporting that while some of the island’s Turks had forgotten their own language, many were once again starting to learn Turkish and that, “it is expected that the others will soon revert fully to Turkishness soon.” Report of Turkish Consulate in Cyprus, enclosed in Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, 14th May 1937. BCA 30. 10.0.0/10441-124.886-18.
1557. ALP 1928, 2.
1558. See book and journal inventory of the Birlik Ocağı in KO-BO-E.
1559. Ibid.; “Alternative Yurt”, was a journal from Adana, southern Turkey, published by members of the Adana Türk Ocağı. See s.n. 2004a.
1560. Birlik 6th June 1924.
1561. Ibid., 20th June, 1924.
1562. BERKES 1997, 36.
ting for quite some time, and the press in particular, had continuously championed this cause. Yet, it is infrequently recognised that the traditional Turkish Cypriot political elite, often with British support, played a leading role in facilitating the significant improvements in levels of education that were to accrue. What may seem somewhat paradoxical is the fact that British policy, and particularly the efforts of the pro-British Turkish elite, most notably İrfan and Münir, in the process seem to have contributed to the rise of nationalism.

With the declaration of Cyprus as a Crown Colony, the British decided to pay more attention to the internal development of the island, and greater resources were appropriated for education. On the whole, to the chagrin of the Greeks, the Turks received a higher proportion of these funds, largely as a result of the willingness of İrfan and Münir to cooperate with the British. Necati M. Ertekün is not wholly unjustified, it seems, when he argues that his father Münir Bey capitalized on British reliance on his support to have funds used for the building of schools and other public works benefiting the Turks; works that the community left to its own resources could not have afforded. He surmises too that this is likely in some outlying rural areas to have prevented the Hellenization of Moslem Turks by the richer more numerous Greeks, to whose schools Turkish Cypriots had often been forced to entrust their children for lack of Turkish schools of their own. The development of Turkish Cypriot education appears to have arrested the flow of such assimilation, as well as to have infused the Turkish youth with nationalist sentiments, and the Greeks, at least, expressed their dissatisfaction with the Turks getting more than their fair share of educational resources.

As to the leverage of the Turkish leadership over the government, in December, 1928 the Officer Administering the Government, Nicholson complained:

[T]he present position whereby Government is perforce indebted to the good offices of three Turkish members for its continued ability to maintain legislative and financial control is radically unsound.

The Turkish members are always conscious of their position as creditors who deserve special consideration in view of services rendered and the Greek community is correspondingly dissatisfied with a situation which enables Government to override their wishes by the aid of a small non-Greek minority.

Certainly the Greeks were perturbed by the role often played by the Turkish councilors, despite their better consciences, in acting as a crutch for the British administration, and with some reason. In a “manifesto to the Greek People of the Island” they bemoaned, for instance, “the triumvirate of the Turkish minority” for having supported the government on the budget for the upcoming year, stating that together with the English, “their Turkish allies” also bore responsibility for this outcome. “Unfortunately,” it was stated, “the representatives of the Turkish minority, forgetting again their incumbent duty, sided with the official English array and thus our struggle failed.” Yet, to some degree they too bore responsibility for this outcome.

1564. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 267.
By the 1920’s levels of political participation were also being amplified as illustrated in terms of voting. The numbers of registered Moslem electors in the Legislative Council elections had risen from 5,182 in 1911 to 13,163 a decade later in 1921, and the numbers of those who actually voted in these elections, from 2,853 in 1911, to 7,459 in 1921.1567 Despite the fact that there had been in the interim considerable emigration, the number of electors was to rise slightly to 13,616 in 1925.1568 More significantly, the number of those who voted in the election had increased also, by close to fifteen percent, reaching a number of 8,552.1569 When compared to the equivalent figure for the Greek Cypriots of 29,966 this appears to be quite a significant proportion of the adult male population, one that in this case was actually higher than that of the Greek Cypriots.1570 By 1930, however, there was a discernible decline in the number of Turkish electors, which fell to 11,789, probably as a result both of economic conditions and the cumulative effects of emigration.1571 The number of actual voters fell also to 5,686.1572 The latter statistic, however, is partly explained by the fact that one of the three Moslem seats had ultimately been won by Zeka Bey without the holding of a poll, due to the withdrawal from the race of Celaleddin Bey.1573 Meanwhile, the number of Greek Cypriot voters had also declined, to 26,024, though this decline was less perceptible.1574

Though such elections and political participation in general were largely segregated communal affairs, and though there was never a formal alliance of Greek and Turkish politicians, it is worthy of note that on some occasions political support and activity did cross the divide. To illustrate, a confidential police report of 1931 testifies to certain Turkish chauffeurs having offered to put up their motorcars free of charge for the service of Mr. Galatopoulos election campaign.1575 And there is more than sufficient cause to confirm that each community took some interest in the other’s political developments. Necati described, for example, how on election night Greeks had also been amongst those who gathered to await the result of his contest with Münir.1576 Georghallides even relates that having encountered Hadji Pavlou while the latter was on a campaign tour, Necati, “advise[d] his Greek listeners to vote unanimously for Hadji Pavlou in the forthcoming by-elections, promising to co-operate with him on local problems in the Council inasmuch, he said, as they both belonged to the Greek and Turkish Popular parties.”1577

Gradual urbanization was also no doubt having some increasing impact on politics. Traditionally, ever since Ottoman times, the Turks had been proportionately more con-

1567. Enclosure in Stevenson to Secretary of State, 23rd November 1921. CO 67/204, 485.
1568. Cyprus Blue Book 1925, 96.
1569. Ibid.
1570. Ibid.; There was typically no staggering divergence between the levels of electoral participation of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The High Commissioner’s report on the elections of 1906, for instance, gave the percentage of Moslem to Christian voters polled for the three districts of Nicosia-Kyrenia, Lar- naca-Famagusta and Limassol-Paphos as 66.57 percent to 60.14 percent in the first district, 57.2 percent to 47 percent in the second, and 51 percent to 66.25 in the third. King-Harman to Secretary of State, 22nd October 1906. CO 67/146, 467.
1571. Cyprus Blue Book 1930, 106.
1572. Ibid.
1573. Though it was soon after withdrawn, Hakikat was still publishing letters from supporters of Celaleddin’s candidacy in August of 1930. See extract from Hakikat, 18th August 1930. SA1/950/1926, 62.
1574. Cyprus Blue Book 1930, 106.
1575. Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 13th March 1931. SA1/1576/1929/3, 111.
1576. ÖZKAN 1967.
1577. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 475.
centrated in the towns than the Greeks, just over a quarter of all Turks being urbanized at
the outset of British rule compared to only half that proportion in the Greek Cypriot community. 1578 Though over time these proportions of Greeks to Turks living in the towns converged, the overall numbers of Turkish Cypriots living in the urban centres was nevertheless increasing, and was still proportionally higher than that of the Greeks in 1931 as well as even at the close of British rule. 1579 With growing numbers in proximity to the city centres of greatest political discourse and activity, it could be suggested that those who had previously been too distant to be regularly effected by high levels of nationalist discourse and activities were now sufficiently close to the major sources of their emanation. Transportation and communication capabilities on the island were anyway also advancing. Even the distant villages could no longer be considered wholly isolated. It is notable that in the 1930 elections a major means of campaigning for both Turkish Cypriot camps was to send out convoys of carloads of supporters to the villages, Necati making a point to record that the villages would be adorned with Turkish flags ahead of his convoys’ arrival. 1580 In fact, Necati constantly emphasized on the campaign trail how frequently and regularly he had visited the villages, whilst his opponent he charged, had barely deigned to visit a handful of villages, and then only just before the elections. He further exhorted the villagers to take independent political decisions, uninfluenced by the pressures of the pro-Münir camp. In a speech he gave at Ambelicou, with Ahmet Said standing by his side, he raged:

What village did Münir Bey, our Member of the Legislative Council, visit during the 5
years, and talked with the villagers and listen to their complaints. … Did he ever visit any of
the villages up to now? But now when the time has come to ask for the votes of the villagers
he remembered the villagers and he repaired some of the Mosques of the villages. He sent
some of his men to some villages, and he also visits some villages, in order to convince them
to vote for him. He says that he has only two men with him, one of them is the ex-Inspector
Mehmet Eff. of Morphou and the other is the Mukhtar of Letka Mehmet Bey. And these
men are the Gods of these places, and that on the day of the elections they can bring all their
men, and give him their votes. For this reason I want to tell you to be careful and on the day
of elections you must give your votes to the person who wants to vote for the Nation. You
have tested Münir Bey for five years and you derived no benefit from him. If you elect him
again, he will say that the people are bound to give him their votes, and you will see no
benefit at all after this. I promise you that if you vote for me you will derive greater benefit
from me. I am a Member of the Municipal Council since 2 years. You may go to Nicosia
and ask the poor people about me, those who sell small things in the markets. Look at Ay.
Sofia street as well as the streets of many Turkish Quarters. If you select me as a member of
the Legislative Council for the coming five years I will try for the prosperity of the villagers,
and the people in general. 1581

1578. ST. JOHN-JONES 1983, 124; Part of the reason for this undoubtedly lies in Taeuber’s explanation, sup-
ported by others too, including Alexander Melamid, that during the Ottoman era, “the Turks lived in
Cyprus as a ruling class.” TAEUBER 1955, 12; See also MELAMID 1956, 357.
1579. ST. JOHN-JONES 1983, 124–125 and 128; In terms of more precise figures, for example, while the over-
all proportion of Moslems was registered as 18.46% in the census of 1931, the corresponding percentages
for the island’s major towns were 32.76% in Nicosia, 21.67% in Larnaca with Skala, 15.85% in Limassol,
19.84% in Famagusta with Varosha, 40.64% in Paphos with Kimia and, 24.01% in Kyrenia. Report of the
Census of 1931, 1–2.
1580. ÖZKAN 1967.
1581. Enclosure in Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 4th September 1930. SA1/
1576/1929/1.
An interesting item of news relating to the infiltration of Turkish consciousness and nationalism into the daily lives of the villagers appeared also in the Söz of the 27th of March 1930. Here it was reported that villagers of Köfünye and other nearby villages, young and old, male and female, gathered together at a local stream on the 22nd of March in what was believed to be an ancient Turkish custom of commemoration for the legendary liberation of the Turks from Ergenekon, from whence they purportedly spread round the world. The article noted how the schoolchildren of the villages had sung nationalist tunes, concluding, before the gathering dispersed, with a recital of the Turkish national anthem.1582

The myth of the great gulf of politics between rural and urban areas, alluded to too often by British officials, often exaggerated by later-day historians, and always suspect, was clearly now narrower than it ever had been. Life in town and village was not identical, but as one of the rare commentators to recognise the realities of the matter has stated, “the miniature scale of the country,” meant that, “It was possible for some people to stay in their rural habitat while doing urban work,” and consequentially, “The inhabitants of the towns were, then, fewer than those making regular use of them.”1583 By the end of the 1920’s then, even leaving aside the high level of rural-urban interaction, schoolmasters in the villages were indoctrinating the inhabitants, the press raising their national awareness, and politicians actively seeking their support, both appealing to and fuelling their national sentiments in the process.

5.5 Intercommunal Relations in a state of Flux

As to intercommunal relations... Understandably some strain had been evident while conflict continued in Asia Minor. Martial law was still in force in 1920, though despite this the British noted that fragility of intercommunal relations was observable, especially in Limassol.1584 The most serious incidents of the era occurred in April of the following year, coming a few weeks after the Greek Cypriot members had begun to boycott the Legislative Council and after a new, related, Greek Cypriot memorial had been addressed to Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, “protesting against the decision of His Majesty’s Government not to relinquish the Island,” and praying, “that a plebiscite should be taken to ascertain the wishes of the people of Cyprus with regard to the question of Union with Greece.”1585

High Commissioner Stevenson’s confidential report centred on the intercommunal disturbances that took place on the 6th and 7th of April, during celebrations to commemorate the anniversary of Greek Independence.1586 Yet, even before the trouble occurred, Stevenson established, the Turks had been aggravated by the publication of the programmes for celebrations in Nicosia and Limassol. He explained that these:

1582. Söz 27th March 1930.
1584. Stevenson to Parkinson, 20th December 1920. CO 67/201, 194.
1585. Enclosure No. 2 in Stevenson to Secretary of State, 13th March 1921. CO 67/202, 293.
1586. Stevenson to Secretary of State, 13th April 1921. CO 67/202, 495.
[G]ave very great offence to the Turkish population, which is always liable to become excited by Greek demonstrations and the parading of Greek flags. On the present occasion the Turks appear to have been more than usually incensed by the proposed action of the Greeks, in view of the military situation in Asia Minor, and also because the persons responsible for the programme had taken the opportunity to include among the ceremonies the usual resolutions for the union of Cyprus with Greece.\footnote{1587}

Stevenson conveyed that Theodotou and Katalanos, and the Church authorities were largely seen as responsible for having organised these processions. When they began to parade, including in their ranks veterans in Greek army uniforms and countless Greek flags, and their bands struck up the tunes of militarist and nationalist marches, the Turks prepared to respond. Stevenson states that:

\begin{quote}
During the whole of the 6\textsuperscript{th} there was very considerable uneasiness manifested by the Turks and a large crowd of them, numbering several hundreds, gathered together near the Police Station in anticipation of any disturbance. Through the indefatigable efforts of Irfan Bey, member of the Executive and Legislative Councils, they were however kept in check, though with difficulty.\footnote{1588}
\end{quote}

Tensions continued the following day, and commander Gallagher’s account of the affairs illuminates the matter further. He remarked:

\begin{quote}
I have no hesitation in saying that this was an organised procession with the intention of irritating the Turks and unduly exciting their feelings, and that if this procession had been allowed to perambulate the Town, very grave consequences would have ensued.

On the morning of the 7\textsuperscript{th} instant, whilst on another tour of inspection in the Town, my attention was drawn to a large body of Turks in the vicinity of the Konak Square. I very carefully studied the attitude of this body of Turks. They were unusually silent and it struck me very forcibly that they were gathered there for the purpose of watching the trend of events.\footnote{1589}
\end{quote}

A memorial dated the 11\textsuperscript{th} of April, addressed to Stevenson and signed by İrfan, Hami and Said, registered the Moslems concerns. It stated:

\begin{quote}
We the Moslem members of the Legislative Council beg leave to lay the following before Your Excellency.

As Your Excellency is well aware the agitation carried on by the Greek-Christian politicians for the union of Cyprus with Greece was, for a long time, of spontaneous nature, but since two years they have assumed the character of an organized propaganda, such as the sending of deputations to England and demonstrations in Cyprus.

These demonstrations appear to have taken the form of organized processions which are provoking the indignation of the Moslem Community.

The Moslems of Cyprus are law-abiding, and respect the authority, but these recent organized agitations are becoming very trying to their temper, and if continued, we venture to submit, the time may come when it will be a question if their patience and law-abiding dispositions will stand the strain, and in spite of every endeavour it may not be possible for their leaders to keep them under control.
\end{quote}

\footnote{1587. Ibid., 496.}
\footnote{1588. Ibid., 498.}
\footnote{1589. Enclosure No. 7 in Ibid., 523.}
We, therefore, earnestly pray, in the interests of peace and order, that steps may be taken, in time, to put an end to these vexatious organized public agitations which, we fear, may lead to very serious and deplorable consequences.1590

In a personal letter to the Chief Secretary of the colonial administration, C.D. Fenn, İrfan Bey going into more detail explained his view of the causes of tension:

The hatred that the Greek politicians are trying to imbibe into the heads of schoolboys and riff-raffs of the Greeks, against the Turks, are simply boundless. Besides the lectures delivered and the speeches made in private, you see pictures of a very inciting nature exposed here and there such as the one the Police fortunately captured the other day, and prevented its being taken round, in a carriage, through the streets of Nicosia, by a drunken lot playing harmonium and singing songs. If those people were allowed to come to a main Turkish quarter I fear the consequences would have been very grave indeed.

Sometimes several of the Greek politicians try to assure us that they bear no ill-feeling against the Turks, but putting this assurance and their actions and attitude together, one cannot help becoming very suspicious of their intentions.

Then, on the other hand, one hears of a lot of inciting accounts such as a Greek telling some Turk that “when Greeks come to Cyprus we will revenge the year 21” when our Bishops and laymen were massacred by the Turks, etc.”, and this sort of feeling is strengthened in recent years by the erection of a monument in the Archbishop’s Palace, in the image of the late Archbishop Kypriano, the martyr as they call it, of whom so much fuss is made every year since.

In view of all these organized propagandas, the arrangements made this year for the celebration of the anniversary of the independence of Greece, had certainly made the Moslems of Nicosia suspicious and all sorts of ideas were brewing up in their minds; and on the 6th and 7th April you could see some several hundreds of them coming together to be on the look-out, just outside the Police Station, but happily the effective measures taken by the Police prevented the Greeks coming into contact with them by preventing processions through the Turkish quarters, and the Turks were advised by me to keep away from the Greek quarters, for a few days, and not to give the slightest cause to anything, and I am glad they have listened.1591

So concerned had the High Commissioner initially been by the escalation of tempers that he immediately hired police reinforcements and called for urgent military support from Egypt, which ultimately however he was not to need. That while İrfan consistently used the term “Turk” in his more casual, and therefore, most likely, more natural correspondence with Fenn, rather than that of “Moslem” which was used in the official memorial to the High Commissioner, is perhaps revealing of how identity was being transformed. Though the Turks still typically deferred to British classification of population according to religion, self-identification as “Turks” was mounting. Revealing also is the fact that the Turks concerns were not limited to the towns. Though Stevenson wrote in a confidential despatch of the 25th of April that Nicosia was the centre of the disturbances, and said of the town that if processions had not been prohibited, “serious racial riots would almost certainly have occurred,” he noted also that he had since learnt, “that in addition there was a very large body of Moslems waiting in Geunely, a village a few

1590. Enclosure No. 9 in Ibid., 527.  
1591. Enclosure No. 10 in Ibid., 528–529.
miles out of Nicosia, to come in and join their coreligionists if any fracas between Greeks and Turks had occurred. During the night of the 6th, İrfan Bey informs me they sent in emissaries to know if their services were required!  

It was following the disturbances and a particularly vehemently anti-British speech of the 8th of April in the New Hellenic Club that he himself had established, that Katalanos was purported to have threatened that:

If the Government refused to allow them to have their own way in the matter of processions and celebrations in public, they must be prepared to resist the Government in every way possible … if the Police interfered, they should proceed to extreme measures. Telegraph and telephone lines must be cut so as to disorganise Government communication; the police must be overcome, and it was already known that they need not be feared; English houses must be attacked and the occupants killed; Government House must be carried and the High Commissioner disposed of.1593

Stevenson’s despatch, based on the words of a government informant present at the club during the above speech, noted also:

[T]here is some evidence that about December last, Mr. Catalanos, after the return of the Cyprus deputation from London, made a strong effort to form a small body of workers who would be prepared to inaugurate “Sinn-Fein” methods for prosecuting the campaign for union with Greece, but it appears that the project did not find favour with the other agitators.1594

Not long after, Walter Ellis of the Colonial Office was to minute in response to a wave of 500 resolutions for Union with Greece from the Greek-inhabited population centres: “Then there are the Turks to be thought of – who certainly wd. [would?] not submit to be handed over to Greece without a struggle.”1595 It may be charged that such an appreciation was motivated by the need of the British, having now decided to retain the island, to find justification for their actions. All the same, such statements are not alone in leading us to conclude that there were Turks potentially prepared, albeit perhaps unrealistically so, to resist a transfer to Greece. As far as Britain was concerned, however, the matter of enosis was anyway closed, and that this was the case was pronounced to the public in Cyprus through an extraordinary issue of the Cyprus Gazette in which the following message from the Secretary of State was published. It read:

Lieut.-Colonel Amery, M.P., Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, on my behalf received the Members of the Greek-Christian Deputation from Cyprus on the 26th of October and informed them that His Majesty’s Government could hold out no hope that union of Cyprus with Greece would be sanctioned. MILNER.1596

The reference to Katalanos’ contemplation of the use of Sinn-Fein tactics was interesting in that it was in 1920 that similar comments were made by İrfan Bey in the Legislative Council regarding opposition to the Education Bill by certain sections of the Turkish Cypriot community. In a speech where he wholeheartedly defended the bill, and, “assu-

1592. Stevenson to Secretary of State, 25th April 1921. CO 67/202, 599–600; Interestingly Gönyeli was the very same village of which Greek Cypriots had been warned about facing reprisals from a decade earlier. Mir’at-ı Zaman 11th January 1909.
1594. Ibid., 582.
1595. Minute by W. Ellis, 13th April 1921. CO 67/203.
1596. Cyprus Gazette 17th November 1920.
red His Excellency that the Bill was a popular one,” he also granted that support was not unanimous, and that there was opposition to the bill, “amongst a certain number of people who may be classed into three categories. The first lot was a number of stingy rich. The second lot were some Moslem Sinn Feiners so to speak, while the third lot were agitators. These last are but a fraction of the population.”1597 There is no hard evidence to corroborate that either Greeks or Turks were seriously considering violent insurrection along the lines of the Irish, but even the fact that references were being made to such endeavours is telling as to the presence of nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments in at least some segments of the population.

During a visit to London in July 1922, Sir Malcolm Stevenson was to write a determined letter to the Undersecretary of State regarding the proposed reduction of British forces on the island, which gives some indication of the sensitive state of political feeling in Cyprus at the time. He stated:

I desire to protest in the strongest manner against against [Sic.] any reduction of the very small garrison which is maintained in Cyprus. The average strength of this garrison is three officers and 100 other ranks only, a numerical strength which cannot, in my opinion, having regard to the present political situation in the Island, be reduced without very serious risk. Moreover, the racial antagonism between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks has been very much accentuated recently in consequence of the state of war between Greece and Turkey and the present position in Asia Minor, an additional circumstance that calls for the most constant watchfulness on the part of the local government. In these circumstances I cannot view, without grave misgiving any proposal for the reduction of the military garrison whose presence produces a moral effect which cannot be underestimated and which, in view of local considerations, racial antagonisms and political agitation, it is impossible to expect from a police force alone which is composed of both Turks and Greeks.1598

As noted earlier, the police force had been opened up to Greek recruits with the onset of British rule. The Turks, who were for a long while to maintain a majority within the force, were ultimately to lose their preponderance during the mid 1920’s. The Annual Report of the Police Force for 1922 shows that there were 557 Turks as opposed to 384 Greeks.1599 By 1927, with the report now categorizing them as Cypriot Moslems and Christians, there was a dramatic drop to 341 in the number of Moslems, while the number of Christians had risen to 420.1600 Though some explanation for this abrupt change may be found in numbers of Turks emigrating to the new Kemalist Republic, this then begs the question how deeply loyal and devoted the Turkish police really were to British rule if so many of them were prepared to emigrate to Turkey. Alternatively, or conjunctively, we may speculate that such a large drop in the numbers of Turkish police in so few years was related to a conscious British effort to reduce the proportion of the Turks in the police force, maybe again because they no longer were so sure of their loyalties. Whatever the case, even a loyalist such as Münnir Bey was willing to publicly lament the declining influence of the Turks in the police force, subtly chiding the government for this develop-

1597. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 13th September 1920, 78.
1600. The report for 1922 had included separate categories for Catholics and Armenians though they constituted in total barely one percent of the police force. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that the Greeks did not constitute the overwhelming majority of those now characterised in 1927 as Cypriot Christian members of the police force. Gallagher to Chief Secretary to Government, 2nd February 1927. CO 69/38.
ment. In one of his rare and early speeches in the Legislative Council Münir stated that, “whether the Government acted rightly or wrongly in appointing natives to be Local Commandants of Police, he regretted to see that so far none of these posts had been offered to a Moslem.”

Meanwhile, a minute from Mr. Ellis confirmed that the War Office was to be duly informed that the Secretary of State supported Stevenson, arguing that he, “did not consider it desirable to remove or diminish the garrison,” as a consequence of the ongoing war between Turkey and Greece. Nevertheless, once the matter of Anatolia had been resolved, relations between members of the two communities appear to have settled into their normal civil, generally cooperative state during the rest of the inter-war period. For example, a decision is registered by the Birlik Ocağı to purchase tickets proffered by the “Greek Cypriot Club” for the benefit of a night school. Intercommunal friendships were still to be found, commercial relations were not brought to an end, and, as often related, Greeks and Turks did often still attend each others wedding celebrations. Within the Legislative Council too there were again frequent instances of cooperation between Greek and Turkish members, and reading of the minutes shows that despite the occasional jibe, members were in the best “British” manner, on the whole most courteous to one another.

The “Katastrofi” had undoubtedly blunted enosis agitation in Cyprus, the High Commissioner noting in a confidential despatch of the 24th of December 1922 that, “The trend of recent events in the Near East has been such as to cause the intensive campaign carried on for many years for Union of the Island with Greece to lack conviction or attraction,” and commenting following the Archbishop’s memorial calling for self-government, and putting to one side the immediate achievement of enosis as a demand, that, “In place of Union the demand for constitutional reforms has been definitely adopted as the principle plank in the new platform.” He concluded though, that, “The Island is in truth immature even yet for the advanced constitutional system which was grafted on the country shortly after the British Occupation in 1878, and any question of granting it a further measure of political liberty is one which, in my opinion, must be approached with the greatest care and deliberation.” It was an evaluation that was to be echoed at the end of the same decade by A. J. Dawe, who was to express:

In 1882 we gave the Island a Constitution which was unsuited to the character of its inhabitants. This Constitution was the outcome of the sentimental eighties and of the belief in the absolute efficacy of democratic institutions regardless of environment. It was superimposed upon the islanders by Sir Robert Biddulph, and was no doubt devised so as to prove acceptable to the particular school of thought which was at that date in political power. The Greek memorial itself had stated:

The Hellenic population of Cyprus, therefore, submits, Right Honourable Sir, the request that the Constitution of the Island be amended in order that the Cypriote people should be

1601. Minutes of the Legislative Council 1925, PART II, 16th December 1925, 68.
1602. Minute by Walter Ellis, 27th July 1922. CO 67/209, 326.
1603. See undated Birlik Ocağı minute, (inscribed between minutes of 28th March 1927 and 3rd March 1927), in KO-HT/BO-KD.
1604. KYRISS 1977, 17.
1605. Stevenson to Secretary of State, 24th December 1922. CO 67/208, 500–502.
1606. Memorandum on Cyprus Constitutional Question by A. J. Dawe, 23rd April 1929. CO 883/8, 106.
made masters of their own house by granting to the Country full self-government, in which the two cohabiting elements, the Hellenic and the Moslem, should participate in the Executive and the Legislative, the administration and the public appointments, in proportion to the population of each element. In emphasising the prompt acceptance by the Hellenic population of Cyprus of reservations for the protection of the interests of the Turkish minority, with which it will sincerely co-operate for the promotion of the country, we consider it unnecessary to add that in the granting of this self-government Constitution the Governor will have the veto. Moreover, we declare, that the Island is ready to accept any reservations Great Britain might wish to make for the protection of the naval and the military interests of the Empire.\textsuperscript{1607}

Just as the Greek’s were tempering their political stance in consequence of the outcome of developments in Anatolia, the Turks were inversely hardening their own. Most notable of this period in terms of their actions was the earlier mentioned petition organised by Dr. Eyyub at the end of 1922. There were though, aside from the primary article calling for, “the restoration of Cyprus to Turkey,” a second and a third supplementary article to this petition. The second announced the desire for the provision and guarantee of greater autonomy in communal affairs, religious institutions, education and the Evkaf being the three issues addressed. The third however, in an apparently contradictory manner stated:

The recent claim of the Christians of Cyprus for the extension of rights being of such a nature as to lead our preservation and entity to positive danger, we express our hope that our strong objections against such a rule will be seriously considered.\textsuperscript{1608}

As this third article illuminated, even those Turks most willing to press for greater autonomy for communal matters, stood back from supporting Greek claims for island-wide self-government. The apparent fear, that was to be maintained throughout the decade, was that the smaller Turkish community would quickly be subjected to a partial Greek majority, and, as in Crete, self-government might soon act as a stepping-stone to union with Greece.

It was here that greater common political ground might conceivably have been found amongst Greeks and Turks on the island, pursuing the goal of jointly taking more of their shared destiny into their own hands, and subsequently removing it from those of their British overlords. In the face of a concerted, joint effort to achieve self-government, the British might ultimately have had to make substantial concessions, but instead, Turkish resistance to the idea allowed them the ideal excuse of rejecting the idea “for the sake of the Turks”. On more than one occasion, it is true also, that the Turks, purportedly fearing Greek domination, refused to cooperate with the Greeks in demanding more locals to be appointed to positions of high authority. Instead, they more often than not, supported the British position that only Englishmen would be able to maintain an impartial balance between the two communities.\textsuperscript{1609} Were there no distinguished Greeks or Turks who would be considered impartial by both communities? It is truly hard to concur with such a view. Yet, if a lack of self-confidence was an issue as far as the Turks were concerned, the words and actions of their Greek compatriots did not help either, for they never provided

\textsuperscript{1607}. Enclosure No. 1 in Stevenson to Secretary of State, 24\textsuperscript{th} December 1922. CO 67/208, 505.
\textsuperscript{1608}. Enclosure No. 2 in Ibid. CO 67/208, 516–517.
\textsuperscript{1609}. See, for example, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 10\textsuperscript{th} and 11\textsuperscript{th} March 1908. CO 69/22, 24, 26, 32–33.
a genuine sense of assurance that self-government was not to be exploited as a spring-board to enosis. On the contrary they served to intensify Turkish Cypriot apprehension, pushing the Turks more often than not into the waiting arms of the British. As Georghallides concedes, self-government was for, “the great majority,” of the Greek Cypriot political class, regarded as an, “intermediate stage towards enosis,” while for others even contemplation of this temporary phase was regarded as a betrayal to the ultimate national cause of enosis.\textsuperscript{1610} According to Georghallides there were, “three main trends: the nationalist-autonomist-enosists, the nationalist-enosists and the pure enosists. It goes without saying that all three were agreed that the final goal should be the island’s national restoration and achievement of liberty through its cession to Greece.”\textsuperscript{1611} The idea of common “Cypriot” political destiny, independent of Greece, as of Turkey, was barely contemplated. Georghallides, for instance, conveys that the idea of an autonomous state of Cyprus was rejected by leading Greek Cypriot newspaper Eleftheria because it, “implied the existence of a ‘Cypriot nation’ which was inadmissible.”\textsuperscript{1612}

In the elections of 1925 those elected to serve the Greek Cypriot community had been of the moderate wing of the political spectrum, with one prominent nationalist, Theodotou, failing, (by an admittedly small margin of only 39 votes), to be re-elected.\textsuperscript{1613} The presence of “moderates” with the declared intention of leaving the issue of enosis to one side and working for the benefit of the country, might be considered to have been welcome and to have contributed to the enhancement of intercommunal relations, but the Turkish Cypriots, with some justification, were constantly wary of the ultimate aims of these members.\textsuperscript{1614} Thus, debate in the post-election Legislative Council session of 1925 reflected simultaneously both that a new page was apparently being turned, and also that insecurity and distrust had not been overcome. While Eyyub Bey noted with gratitude that, “no reference had been made in the Draft Address to any political question,” in other words to the aspiration for enosis, Mylonas assured, rather than reassured him that:

If the political question had been left outside this Chamber it should be emphasized that this did not mean that they or the people whom they represented had abandoned their aspirations. In conclusion he wished to inform the hon. Moslem member that the political question had not been laid aside altogether; this question had been brought forward in the Select Committee but had been thrown out by the combined votes of the official members and the Mohammedan member of the Committee.\textsuperscript{1615}

When discussion turned to the Greek Cypriots’ call for more expansive political liberties, Turkish fears and suspicions again surfaced. Dr Eyyub said, “The proposal for political liberties might seem attractive at first sight but one should consider its results.” It would, he argued, ultimately have a negative effect on relations between the communities. He explained, somewhat timidly and rather unconvincingly: “That the people of Cyprus were not yet in a position to co-operate in all matters and the system of education was res-

\begin{thebibliography}{1615}
\bibitem{1610} GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 199.
\bibitem{1611} Ibid., 200.
\bibitem{1612} Ibid., 213.
\bibitem{1613} Ibid., 246.
\bibitem{1614} Söz 17th October 1925.
\bibitem{1615} Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1925, PART II, 11th November 1925, 6; A virtually identical exchange took place between Eyyub and Mylonas just over a year later in January 1927. Mylonas on this occasion having stated that, “The hon. Moslem Member might rest assured that the ideas of the Greek Members had remained the same since the year 1878 and that they would always remain the same in the future.” Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1927, 21st January 1927, 7 and 11.
\end{thebibliography}
ponsible for this state of affairs. An improvement in education had certainly been made and it was hoped that a time would come when perfect harmony would reign over both elements of the population.” Mr Hadji Pavlou then remarked that though Eyyub Bey had not dismissed political liberties outright, he was disappointed that Eyyub Bey had not accepted the sincerity of the Greek Cypriots desire to cooperate with the Moslems and that this was in fact why they had left their, “national aspirations,” outside of the Legislative chamber. He felt that though Eyyub approved of the paragraph in question he, “had declared himself against it out of fear that it was a trap.” The Turks, unswayed as on other occasions, then proceeded to vote with the British to defeat the Greeks’ motion.1616

Yet, the inability of the two communal sections to agree as to the future political status of the island, itself nothing very new, did not preclude their siding together on other issues. Less than twenty-four hours later the very same Greek and Turkish members (including Münir Bey), showed common resolve in their criticism of the Government’s handling of the Agricultural Bank, defeating the official members’ stance that such criticism should not constitute part of the Address in Reply to the Governor’s Opening Speech.1617 It was based on such cooperation that an exuberant Dr. Eyyub soon after stated that in terms of relations with the Greek members, “The dark clouds which had over-shadowed them had disappeared and there was now a clear sky above them and an opportunity for a sincere co-operation for the improvement of Cyprus.”1618

Nevertheless, while the Turks in practice remained reluctant to take any initiative in establishing a substantive political front with the Greeks for the attainment of “common” political rights, they were now becoming increasingly more assertive in what they considered to be their own “national” rights vis-à-vis the British administration. That the Turkish Cypriot community was undergoing political transformation had been indicated also in a rare recognition of changing political sentiments by Stevenson himself. In a confidential despatch of 24th December 1922, concerning the petition organized by Eyyub Bey, Stevenson, though watchful to emphasize its limitations, had already acknowledged a new more politically demanding strand in Turkish Cypriot politics. He wrote:

The organiser of the petition, Dr. Eyioub, who, it is believed, has the covert support of the Cadi of Cyprus and the Mufti, is actuated primarily by local political jealousy of Mousa Irfan Bey, Member of the Executive and Legislative Councils, who is also Moslem Delegate of Evcaf and Treasurer of that department, and further by the feeling, shared by a certain section of his co-religionists, that Irfan Bey is too pro-British, and apt on occasion to support the Government to the detriment of so-called Moslem interests. Irfan Bey, who is a man of humble origin, has risen to the high position which he now occupies entirely by his own ability and integrity, and has never swerved in his loyalty to the Government. Throughout the late war and recent crisis his influence has sufficed to keep the Moslem population of the Island quiet at times of acute national feeling, and he has naturally not a few enemies among those Turks of advanced ideas or fanatical tendencies. A movement seems to have been started, or rather to have come to a head, during the past six months which aims at turning the political situation in the Near East to advantage locally and thereby discrediting Irfan Bey. The present petitions are the sole issue of the movement which born in a moment of enthusiasm is already on its decline.

3. As regards the several points of the petition, the request for a return to Turkey, or to the status ante bellum, is more in the nature of a reply to the reiterated demands of the Greek-Cypriots for Union with Greece than the considered expression of a desire for the

1617. Ibid., 12th November 1925, 18–20.
1618. Ibid., 16th December 1925, 42.
discontinuance of British administration in the Island. The Moslems of Cyprus have no doubt sentimental leanings towards Turkey, and would not be averse to a return of the old regime. They have, however, as is apparent from the terms in which their demand is couched, no illusions as to the probability of its acceptance, and are, in fact, well content with the restful security enjoyed under the British administration. The proposal to establish a Central Moslem Board is prompted by several considerations. It is to be a counterpoise to the “National Council” elected, as I have already reported, by the Greek-Christian community for the purpose of directing the agitation for Union with Greece, and it is to secure control of the finances of the Evcaf Department, at the present time most ably administered by Irfan Bey and his British colleague, to strengthen the power of the Sher’ (Religious) Courts as against the ordinary Civil Courts, and to direct Moslem education on more national lines. Thirdly the request that wider local powers of self-government may not be accorded the inhabitants of the Island arises from the hereditary hatred and mistrust of the Turk for the Greek, and from the fear that the Moslem minority would be at the mercy of the Greek-Christian majority in any legislative assembly possessing an unofficial preponderance.1619

McHenry refers to the Turkish Cypriots having soon after sent a delegation to Turkey to seek support, but as he himself admits information on this matter is scant.1620 Indeed, a report posted by the Times’ correspondent in Istanbul, dated the 31st of December 1922, revealed that a delegation of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, having been, “assured of … Turkey’s sympathy,” by Mustafa Kemal and his government in Ankara, was now on its way to Lausanne. The same report bore the subtitle, “Turkish Demand For Cyprus.” There was, however, nothing here pertaining to the Turkish Government’s attitude on Cyprus. Instead, it was simply recorded that: “A delegation from Cyprus has arrived here on its way to Angora bearing a petition from the Turkish inhabitants of the island demanding its return to Turkey.”1621 They did not get what they wanted. Just as the “Katastrofi” had dampened the call to enosis, Lausanne was to put a break on calls for Cyprus’ restoration to Turkey. Nonetheless, other issues, though not directly connected with the island’s political future, were also telling of distancing of Greeks from Turks in Cyprus, and on these matters, the calming of the macro Graeco–Turkish relationship had little impact.

The decreasing incidence of intermarriage was also somewhat of a pointer to a growing split between the two communities. Undoubtedly it had always been a largely religious issue that served as a barrier, though now national strains can also be suspected to have enhanced opposition to such unions. They were as a result, by the inter-war era noticeably few and far between, and by 1938 some observers were going as far as to state: “There is no intermarriage between Turk and Greek.”1622 Though it was not quite so, such marriages were certainly more of a rarity than in the past. The British, for instance, noted how a leading Turkish judge of the era was generally disdained due to the fact that he had married an Orthodox lady.1623

Another underlying social trend also did not bode well for Greek-Turkish cooperation in Cyprus. This related to the declining numbers of Greeks and Turks living in mixed environs. As Patrick’s study shows, there was a marked trend of the, “progressive segre-

1619. Stevenson to Secretary of State, 24th December 1922. CO 67/208, 511–513.
1620. McHENRY 1987, 133.
1621. The Times of London 1st January 1923.
1623. Stanley to the Colonial Secretary, 5th April 1937. CO 67/277/15, 84.
The Municipal Councils, for quite some time a bone of contention, continued to cause some dissatisfaction during this era too. Doğu Yol had in 1920, for example, reported that the Turks of Famagusta desired to have a separate municipality due to the actions of the Greeks that were, “inconsistent with Turkish feelings & tradition.” Birlik transmitted the complaints of the Limassol Turks in 1924 that the mayor was permitting pigs to wander on a Moslem graveyard. In 1926, The Moslem councillors of Nicosia, including in their ranks Fadıl Niyazi Korkut and Dr. Pertev, submitted a petition to the authorities, calling particularly for a greater role in running the Council, noting that though they had five out of a total of twelve councillors, yet their community had no weight in determining either the position of President of the Council, or the Vice-President, and they praised a letter of a prominent Greek advocate, Mr. Kyriakides, published in the Fonî tis Kiprou, for supporting their recommendation that the Turks should at least hold the office of Vice-President of the Council. The British, however, did not countenance such proposals. The Commissioner of Nicosia C. H. Hart-Davis on this occasion saying, “I do not think the Moslem Minority on the Municipal Council of Nicosia are oppressed or unable to make their influence felt.” On the contrary, he opined:

[They are expert intriguers, and take the fullest advantage of the power which the political divisions of the Christian majority frequently put into their hands. I have known more than one instance of successful bargaining of the Moslem minority by which they have obtained

1624. PATRICK 1976, 8; One of the few Greek Cypriot authors to point to this trend is Peter Loizos. He raises the question as to “Why?” there was even, “in the earliest period already a tendency to leave the community to the majority.” Implicitly, it could be said, he acknowledges that heightened strain between the communities was not a phenomenon characteristic only of the second half of the twentieth century, let alone solely a result of Turkey’s military intervention, but unfortunately he does not go on to directly address his own question as to the cause of this, “strong direction of change.” [LOIZOS 1994, 11] Kliot and Mansfield also note the phenomenon though they too give no satisfactory explanation. [KLIOT - MANSFIELD 1997, 499]. Worsley, on the other hand, does make a credible suggestion that, “‘minority’ families in a mixed village would have to move into a ‘majority’ village for their children’s schooling.” [WORSLEY 1979, 8]. Attalides also suggested this possibility, as well as that perhaps the inhabitants of these villages, “were the victims of urbanization or movement to larger villages.” [ATTALIDES 1979, 90]. Yet, even if such reasons were in some cases valid, it is unlikely to have accounted for the phenomenon as a whole.

Though the matter was undoubtedly being approached from the Turkish Cypriot perspective, one wonders whether the complaint published in the Vatan newspaper of 10th June 1912 that over recent years the Turks had been frequently abused and insulted in mixed areas where the number of Turks was particularly small, may also point to intercommunal tensions as a cause of the tendency of mixed settlements to disappear. [Vatan 10th June 1912]. Kyriis himself, based on Greek sources, notes two specific cases of mixed villages abandoned by the Turks during the tense period of the Balkan Wars, “after a conflict with the Greeks of surrounding villages,” though he immediately stresses that this was an “exceptional phenomenon”, and goes on to associate the “roots” of this phenomenon with other factors. [KYRISS 1977, 40]. There is little to support his assertion that, “The chief motives of such changes were financial.” [Ibid., 74]. In fact, as suggested by Loizos, intercommunal political tensions do appear to have played a significant part in the development of this trend of separation. This is not to say that on every occasion it was the harangued Turks who abandoned these mixed villages. In one case at least, it appears to have been the Greeks who, in the wake of the military calamity in Asia Minor felt compelled to leave. Nevertheless, the typically smaller numbers of Turks in the mixed villages, no doubt made this turn of events the exception rather than the rule. ADALI 1997, 151–152.

1626. Doğu Yol 22nd March 1920 in SA1/1153/1919.
1627. Fadıl Niazi et. al. to Colonial Secretary, 15th June 1926. SA1/757/1926, 33–34; See also translation of extract from Nea-Phone-Tes-Kyprou of 17th April 1926, “a letter of Mr. J. Kyriakides. SA1/757/1926, 31–32.
1628. Hart-Davies to Colonial Secretary, 7th July 1926. SA1/757/1926, 37.
from the Christian majority advantages for a section of the Moslem community, even when these were to the public disadvantage.\textsuperscript{1629}

By the end of the decade British understanding as to the changes underway in the Turkish community, appeared to have made at least some progress, Nicholson prophetically warning as follows in a confidential despatch:

Neither is it certain that Government will invariably be able to count upon the votes of all the Turkish members. Signs are not wanting of a determined movement, supported if not directed by foreign agencies, in favour of introducing in Cyprus the reforms recently carried out in Turkey and the cleavage between the Old and New Turks is already in process of breaking down the solidity of the Turkish community.

It is not impossible that an adherent of the new school may displace one of the present Turkish members at the next election and, in that event, that he might throw in his lot with the Greek majority whenever his party saw any advantage in such a course.\textsuperscript{1630}

Yet that confusion still reigned as to the British appreciation of the Turkish community is witnessed by a strikingly contradictory confidential appraisal made by Nicholson hardly two months later in January 1929, in which this time he downplays the growing tide of support for Kemalism. Here he declared:

Unlike the Greek Christian population the Moslem community, although a small section is endeavouring to bring about the adoption of some of the social and other changes recently effected by the Turkish Republican Government, is not split up into opposing political factions and jealously maintains its racial solidarity vis-à-vis the Greek majority. It is represented in the Council by the Director of Evcaf, Munir Bey, who is a nephew and son-in-law of the ex-Mufti, by a leading Turkish medical practitioner and a Famagusta merchant of good standing. These members satisfactorily represent the interests of their co-religionists, who tend to gravitate towards the towns as they cannot make headway against the sharper Greek peasants. Between 1901 and 1921 the Moslem population increased by 19.5 per cent, and the Moslem inhabitants of the towns by nearly 25 per cent.\textsuperscript{1631}

Admittedly Nicholson might have been focusing in the latter despatch on the unity of the Legislative Council members, but as the opening sentence of the above extract shows, he does in fact talk of “the Turkish community” being undivided, and gives the impression that the Kemalists were but a minor, insignificant nuisance, that would not pose any threat to the prevailing order.

All being said, once again care must be taken to realize that still, intercommunal disturbance was the exception not the rule, and day-to-day relations were invariably cordial during this period. Changes were undoubtedly underway amongst both the Turkish and Greek communities, and increasing political awareness amongst the masses might have contributed to differentiation between the two groups. Nevertheless, there were no instances of large scale intercommunal disturbances during the second half of the 1920’s.

A final matter is worth mention here, however, and that is the establishment of the communist movement in Cyprus. Here was a movement ideologically antithetical to the nationalism of both the Greeks and Turks; an internationalist movement that would in theory build up its support from the nature of the cross-cutting cleavage of class. As such it

\textsuperscript{1629}. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1630}. Nicholson to Secretary of State, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1928. CO 67/227/4, 260.
\textsuperscript{1631}. Nicholson to Secretary of State, 30\textsuperscript{th} January 1929. CO 67/227/4, 131.
might have been viewed as potentially overcoming the inability of existing political forces to bridge the gap between Turks and Greeks; as having the necessary characteristics to unite the two ethnic groups in common political cause as no movement or ideology had been able to do till then. The movement though was not to live up to such promise. As Horowitz records, it was to be yet another in a long list of, “avowedly nonethnic” communist and socialist parties, “to be captured by one or another ethnic constituency.”

At the Pancyprian Meeting of AKEL, (or the, “Progressive Party of the Working People”), held in Limassol on the 5th of October 1941, AKEL’s first party congress, George Vassiliades, one of the two non-communists elected to the central committee, had stated that, “Any person … of whatever religion, nationality or ideology would be accepted for membership.” The party, harboured some, “idealistic intellectuals and a, few politicians previously associated with outlawed nationalist movements.” However, it was still, in essence a reformulated version of the old Communist Party of Cyprus, the KKK, (or, “Kounounistiko Komma Kyprou”), which had been proscribed for seditious activities by an Order in Council of the 16th of August 1933. Furthermore, it was, as with its banned predecessor, once again established with overwhelmingly Greek membership, not one of the nineteen members elected to the central committee at the meeting was a Cypriot Turk and most of its founders had been formerly members of the KKK. None of the founders of either AKEL or the KKK had been Turks. Plutis Servas, one time leader of both parties, notes, albeit for the AKEL decision of 1946 to use the slogan “Self-government – Enosis”, that this understandably turned the Turks of Cyprus away from the communist movement. He testifies that in order not to be hostage to unachie-

1632. HOROWITZ 1985, 9–10; Similar conclusions to my own as far as concerns the communist movement in Cyprus and its relationship with the Turks are reached also by Beratlı. See BERATLI 1999, 132–137.
1633. Office of the Commissioner of Police to Colonial Secretary, 9th October 1941. CO 67/314/14, 15.
1634. ADAMS 1971, 22
1635. Cyprus Gazette 16th August 1933.
1636. Office of the Commissioner of Police to Colonial Secretary, 9th October 1941. CO 67/314/14, 17.
1637. ADAMS 1971, 12 and 23.
1638. SERVAS 1999, 119; In fact in a telegram to the Foreign secretary, AKEL’s new General Secretary, Andreas Fandis, had stated in July 1945:

Please convey the following message to your premier. Working Peoples Progressive Party Akel expresses confidence Cyprus will be nationally rehabilitated and ceded motherland Greece stop Cyprus people connect fulfillment their foremost and unchangeable demand meaning Cyprus union with Greece with your great effort for satisfaction Greecees national aspirations stop Cyprus Greek people having contributed their best to great antifascist peoples victory believe time has come to live free within boundaries Greek state.

[Andreas Fandis, AKEL Party General Secretary to Foreign Secretary, 18th July 1945. HO 334/510, 100–101.]

Even earlier, in August of 1944 while Servas was still himself party General Secretary, a proclamation was issued on the occasion of Sir Cosmo Parkinson’s visit by the Central Committee of AKEL, “To The People Of Cyprus”. It exhorted:

“All, without exception, all workmen, farmers, small manufacturers, men of understanding, in town and country, in every corner of Cyprus, must take the opportunity to demonstrate to our Official visitor and through him to the English Government and all mankind, that here lives a People with one and only one demand in regard to its post-war future, to be united with its Mother Greece.

All, without exception all, let us make the 28th August a day of our national case. Let us proclaim everywhere that the Cyprus People is fed up with its chains and wants to live free in a sacred close embrace with Mother Greece.”

Proclamation of the Central Committee of AKEL to the People of Cyprus, in Anorthosis of 23rd August 1944. Extract enclosed in CO 67/323/3, 478.
vable dreams, AKEL officials turned at this stage to the concept of self-government as a way out:

However, so as not to be accused of being traitors to the nation, they felt the need to add the terms ‘Self-government – Enosis’ to the slogan. ... This was akin to holding a rotten plank in an effort to escape. ... How were the Turkish Cypriots to make an effort for the achievement of self-government? Considering that a change of order that aimed for Enosis was being foreseen ... this slogan that was being used destroyed its respectability and good will for the Turkish citizens.1639

Whether Servas should not be criticised for his own role in linking the communist movement to the cause of enosis is debatable, Adams at least, argued that Servas himself had had an, “intense belief in the enosis cause.”1640 Yet, Servas’ appraisal illuminates, to some extent at least, the earlier years too, when though the communists may not have openly espoused the goal of enosis, they nevertheless were not always willing to unreservedly discount it, and thus put to rest the concerns that potential Turkish Cypriot sympathizers might have.

Most commonly voiced is the argument founded on the precepts of the Marxist perspective that the limited membership of the Turkish Cypriots in the Communist Party was a consequence of their more backward state of economic development, and consequent lack of a receptive proletariat class. Yet even if the Greek Cypriots were by now clearly more economically developed, the idea that there was no overlap between the two communities in terms of occupations and class is untenable. Religion too might be portrayed as an obstacle, with conservative Moslem clerics disavowing such Godless movements, and thereby hindering Moslem participation. Even so, it should be remembered that the Orthodox Church was also hostile to the communist movement, and that despite this the movement still spread amongst the Greek Cypriot populace. It would not, therefore, be beyond suggestion that Turkish nationalist influences were also at work. Though Servas highlights the 1940’s, as far as the Communist Party’s policy concerning enosis was concerned, the fact of the matter is that from a much earlier date the party, while not then pursuing enosis as a principal objective, was not prepared to unequivocally rule it out. Even if the public face of the KKK during the 1920’s was largely an anti-unionist one, “lip-service support of enosis” was permitted and this was in itself enough to leave it vulnerable to charges from the Turkish nationalist wing of it being traitorous for any loyal Turk to join.1641

On the 20th of February 1924, a letter signed by D. A. Chrystomides, first Secretary of the Cyprus Communist Party, was sent in the name of the Executive Committee of the said party to the Labour Party of Britain upon its ascension to power. The letter began:

Comrades,

It is with unfeigned joy that the communist party of Cyprus on behalf of the Labour & Rural organizations of this island is greeting the access to power of the British Labour Party … As regards the National question that is the union with Greece – which has long been asked by the civic capitalistic class – it leaves us partly indifferent as having one political front with the capitalist is against our movement & our struggle for the salvation of the labourers.

1639. SERVAS 1999, 119.
1641. Ibid., 32.
The so-called leaders have always taken advantage of the question of the union with Greece to influence the people to their own interest. During the union struggles of the so-called leaders—our party has closely & sympathetically followed their activities engaging its attention at the same time to enlighten the masses as regards the struggle between the classes being confident that with the Union, the Capitalistic colonial policy of Great Britain would receive a severe blow.

We are now add that we have in view your programme of ceding Cyprus to Greece in which case we shall join hands with the proletariat of Greece for the struggle against the Greek & international capitalists. If you on the other hand decide to keep Cyprus we shall then enjoy the socialist regime & will celebrate the emancipation of the Labourers & rural population of this Island.1642

However, by the start of the next decade, with, “Even the Labour Governments of Ramsay Macdonald, after years of support for enosis,” having now unambiguously put on record opposition to union with Greece, the tune of the Communist Party in Cyprus as far as concerned the enosis issue had perceptibly changed.1643 Now “partial indifference”, was replaced by upfront opposition. Storrs, writing as to the political situation, informed in his secret despatch of the 4th of June 1931:

The situation has been complicated to some extent by communistic activities. The first overt action of the communist party, composed almost entirely of Greeks, was to inaugurate counter demonstrations on the 25th of March, the “National Independence Day.” At Limassol they tore down the Greek and substituted a Bolshevik flag; both there and at Nicosia they endeavoured to break up meetings for Union. They presumably looked for Government indifference, but a number were arrested by the police and sentenced to imprisonment for terms up to two months. As one of the main subjects of their attacks is the Church, the Synod is doing what lies in its power to suppress the movement. On the whole their attacks are far more bitter against their fellow-countrymen than against the Government at present. The movement has spread rapidly; the number of communists registered by the police having increased from 181 to 365 in the last six months.1644

A proclamation of July 1931 was sent by the Communist Party of Greece to Cyprus, and countersigned on behalf of the Communist Party of Cyprus, by Costas Skeleas. It revealed a strong admonition to the workers of Cyprus not to be taken in by the calls for enosis as well as a strong dislike of “Makdonal”, whose arrival in power the Cypriot communists had earlier welcomed. It declared:

The cunning politicals of Cyprus are howling for the “Union of Cyprus, those men that have never done anything else than to unskin you and exterminate you, they are howling much more now that “independent” Greece had the festival for the century of her liberty.”

The thieves of your bread are shouting for the Union, for “the very ancient wish” of Cyprus to be united with Mother Greece.

But who is this mother Greece? What is this mother for her children?

Mother Greece is not only one. They are two – Greece of the poor and Greece of the rich, Greece of the oppressors and Greece of those being oppressed, Greece of the exploiters, the embezzlers, the robbers and executioners, and Greece of the starving, tortured and those

1643. LAPPING 1985, 314.
1644. Storrs to Secretary of State, 4th June 1931. CO 67/239/14, 27.
being exploited. In the “independent” Greece the poor villager is still working as a metayer to the chiflick owners in the same way as at the time that the chifliks were owned by the Agas and Beys. … This is the condition of the laboures, the poor peasants in Greece, “In the free mother Greece.” … These are the freedom of the free Greece! … Labourers, poor peasants, life strugglers of Cyprus, Greeks and Turks!

You have nothing to gain from the famous “Union”. … Joined together, Greeks and Turks, all press Cypriots against the strange sovereign who kneel you under the exploitation and the press and against the native robbers and executioners. Against to the two enemies with the same cruelty against to the two parties! … Struggle under the standard of the Communist party of Cyprus against to the double party of the enemy against to the British imperialism and against to the native exploits unionists. Like the Voudist Indians and Moslems in India, join and you Greeks and Turks together and struggle for your freedom of the British yoke for your full politic independency, like and against to the new tyrant the Greek capitalist, against the imperialistic press which grew great.

Struggle against to the new imperialistic fascist Laws of Socia fasista, Makdonal, against to the Taxes with which the servants of the British press are paid.

Against to the British Colonial press in Cyprus.

Against to the union of Cyprus with Greece. For the full Politic independency of Cyprus.

For the defence of the India revolution and for the raise of Egypt, and for the laboury Soviet Democracy of Cyprus.”

A few weeks later Skeleas had printed and distributed his own proclamation entitled, “Communism in Cyprus: The Voice Of Danger And The Fear Of The Capitalists,” in which he derided the nationalists’ portrayal of the Communists as traitors and disputed the nationalists reference to Cyprus as “our Greek Island” noting that, “they forget that it contains 60,000 Turks.”

All the same, it seems that the communist movement in Cyprus still had very few Turkish members, Turkish sympathizers’ names in the British files and Turkish Cypriot press being very rare. That new efforts were underway, however, to attract greater numbers of Turks to the movement in the immediate period before the October Revolt, can be ascertained not just by the greater care now taken in Communist declarations regarding the question of refuting the objective of enosis, but also through more direct efforts. For example, a notice in Turkish was distributed amongst the Turkish inhabitants of Nicosia on the 3rd of August 1931, with two of the seventeen signatories of this appeal to the workers Turks: Mehmet Hüseyin, classified as a tailor, and Mehmet Emin İbrahim, a dyer.

According to a confidential police report of 10th August matters had progressed, with Salim Aziz Bulli, and Ahmet Hulusi of Nicosia, the first an auctioneer, the
second a grocer, having, “undertaken to lead the Turkish Communists,” and, “frequenting Vatiliotis’s (Red 102) house where they take lessons on communism.” Aside from their having, “written abroad to get communistic books in Turkish,” and the report mentioning the improbable information that, “Ahmet Houlousi enrolled 200 Turks as communists,” the most interesting revelation was that, “They decided to appoint Salim Aziz as the President and Ahmed Houlousi as the Secretary of the Turkish Communists.” 1649 The salience of this arrangement was striking, showing as it did that even in the communist movement Greeks and Turks were not to be a fully politically integrated whole. 1650

Even granting, as apparently does Storrs, that by 1931 the communist movement was wholeheartedly against enosis, other sentimental associations of the Turks may well have precluded their involvement. In lieu of the fact that the communist movement was so closely associated with Russia, the historical “enemy” of the Turks, the Turkish nationalists were also able to portray it as traitorous for Turks to join the Cyprus Communist party from this respect too. Hakikat relayed talk of the communist threat to the Turkish Republic. 1651 Söz was even more outspoken. In an article entitled, “Whoever leaves the flock will be devoured by the Wolf,” Söz noted the increase in statements issued by the “Bolsheviks” in recent weeks, and warned: “The communist movements in this country are being instigated by the Greek Cypriots. Their orators, guides and writers are all Greek Cypriots.” The communist movement in Cyprus was, “one directed against Greek tradesmen and capitalists.” All the same, the paper noted, a few Turks had also signed up to, “the Bolshevik list” and by doing so had, “done a very great disservice to their own community.” Söz further cautioned: “We know that in Bolshevism there is no religion or nation; but those who invented it propounded this idea solely to control and exploit the foolish. For in fact Moscow is even more nationalist than Ankara and Athens.” It was, however, acknowledged with relief that while the Greek newspapers were complaining that there were about sixty Greek Cypriot teachers in the movement, “not a single Turkish teacher,” had joined. 1652

Thus, though the communist party of Cyprus was starting to gain some momentum by the end of the 1920’s, the role of the Turkish Cypriots therein was negligible. There were maybe a handful of Turkish members, but they were never in any position to have a significant impact on the movement. Gradually, the British appear to have become concerned about this movement, but as far as the Turkish national movement was concerned, it never constituted in this era a serious impediment or threat.

**5.6 Debating Constitutional Change**

Greek-Turkish political cooperation was persistently limited by the two sides’ incompatible views as to the ultimate or ideal political destiny of the island, and here there was

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1649. Sub-Inspector of Police to Local Commandant of Police, 10th August 1931. SA1/607/1931, 452.
1650. In this context it is noticeable also that even in calls for self-government during the 1920’s the Cyprus Communist Party advocated, “separate representation of the minorities (Turks, Armenians, Latins, etc),” rather than representation founded on non-ethnic lines. MICHAELIDES 1993, 37.
1651. Hakikat 7th July 1931.
never any serious effort to reconcile the two positions. Enosis remained the ultimate
objective of the Greek Cypriots, and was just as strongly opposed by the Turks. Even in
1920, with Turkish Cypriot morale at a low point due to Ottoman defeat, it was remarked
that Turkish Cypriots would be “violently opposed” to enosis.\footnote{1653} Once they had rebounded
from the disappointment of Lausanne, some Turkish Cypriots even began again to allude to the
day when they might be united with motherland Turkey. Nor had the Katastrofi led to the abandonment of the goal of enosis, which if anything was to be supported
by ever growing numbers. Even the wider, idealized concept of the Megali Idea, albeit
now plainly being, “a metaphor of dubious status,” was still referred to, and as such could
not have helped allay Turkish concerns about Greek Cypriot intentions.\footnote{1654} In a speech to
a crowd at an athletic meeting in 1929, Theodotou could still use the following rhetoric,
which not only contributed to the British description of him as a “chief extremist”, but
also must have made Greek Cypriot assurances to the Turks that they would have nothing
to fear under the rule of Greece, hard for the Turks to appreciate.\footnote{1655} Theodotou bello-
wed:

I shall sacrifice the rest of my life for our enslaved country by every struggle and even by
blood. Greek brothers, we are ruled by a tyranic Government and this is the English Govern-
ment. They are endeavouring by every fraudulent trick to reduce the Greek feelings but they
will never succeed this. Let them put heavy taxes on us, let them rule us like the uncivilized
nations, they shall never succeed to reduce our national feelings, on the contrary our feel-
ings are strengthened and we become more courageous. If they leave us ragged we shall
call for Greece, if they turn us into Lords we shall again call for Greece and only Greece.
The Prisons are strengthening us, the deportations are beautifying us and the hanging is
sanctifying us. This is witnessed by the 300 martyrs who were killed by the known barba-
rous nation, also the hanging of Archbishop Kyprianos and Patriarch Grigoris and so many
others whose blood painted the waters of the Bosporous. By our strong will and sacrifice
we shall succeed our liberty and will fly to the bosom of our mother Greece under the
blue-white flag we shall go forward together with our brothers of Dodecanisos and Voroiipi-
rotes (Northern Epirus) we shall march to the town of our dreams (Constantinople). We
shall wake up the double-headed Eagle who is sleeping in the Churches, we shall give him
power to fly under the arches of St. Sophia. Hurrah the Union with Greece, Down with
Tyranny.\footnote{1656}

It was this kind of rhetoric which helped foster a closing of the ranks on the Turkish side,
with, for instance, Necati, (now a member of the Nicosia Municipal Council), and Münir
Bey being able to join together with the Müftü, Eyyub Bey, Ahmet Hulusi, the editor of
Birlik, and other leading Turkish Cypriot figures, to telegram the Secretary of State their
satisfaction with his statement ruling out enosis.\footnote{1657}

Nevertheless, as mentioned before, despite fundamental differences, some scope for
cooperation was still being found by Greek and Turkish members of the Legislative
Council, and this, quite unjustifiably, increasingly worried the British. In the appropria-
tions vote of November 1926 the government had been defeated by an alliance of Greek

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item 1653. Minute of 12th October 1920. CO 67/200, 616–617.
  \item 1654. CANEFE 1998b, 289.
  \item 1655. Nicholson to Secretary of State, 10th May 1929. CO 67/228/1, 82.
  \item 1656. Corporal Nicola and L/Corporal Kleanthi to Local Commandant of Police, Nicosia, 6th May 1929. CO 67/
228/1, 84–85.
  \item 1657. Münir Bey et. al. to Secretary of State, illegible date, November 1929. CO 67/228/3, 18–20.
\end{itemize}}
and Turkish members. Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members, (who on this occasion also expressed a common displeasure with the high costs of British officials employed by government), voted in unison against the reading of the Appropriation Bill because of the continued inclusion of the £92,000 tribute item. Significantly, Dr. Eyyub noted that while the issue had long occupied the Council, one of the main reasons for the prevention of its resolution had now disappeared. In his words, this was a “political” difficulty, “which was continued up to August, 1924, but which had now in his opinion disappeared.” His reference was to the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, whereby questions of tribute and sovereignty had been conclusively dealt with, at least in terms of international relations.

The prospect of further collaboration that would diminish the British control over the Legislative Council began to seriously concern policy-makers both in Cyprus and London. One of the earliest signs of this new focus of debate is contained in a Colonial Office file that dealt with this issue of the rejection of the estimates by the Legislative Council in 1926. Minuting in detail on the matter, A. J. Dawe, who was to become one of the strongest proponents of democratically regressive constitutional change, was to suggest that there had been only two precedents to the ongoing situation in 1888, and 1911 respectively, and declared:

For forty-four years (i.e. since 1882), we have been able to work (with varying degrees of difficulty) a Constitution in which the Elected Members of the Legislative Council outnumbered the official Members. This has been possible because except on rare occasions the Turkish members have never combined with the Greek Members. With the aid of the Turkish votes and the casting vote of the Governor the official element has always had a bare majority. But if the Turks are going to vote with the Greeks, the constitutional machinery will clearly break down for the simplest reason that there can be no alternative Government, and that every time a Government measure of importance is defeated, there will be a deadlock. ... if there is going to be a rapprochement between the Greeks and the Turks, some alternative will obviously have to be made in the Constitution as we cannot govern Cyprus by continually invoking the cumbersome machinery of Imperial Orders in Council.

Dawe proceeded to outline his objections to the constitution as it stood, notably stating:

There is another point against it. Is it sound to rely upon the continuance of hostility between two sections of the population to enable the Government to carry on? It seems to me that a system which depends upon the exacerbation of the racial antipathy between the Christians and Mohammedans is essentially wrong. For the British Government to be forced to rely on the representatives of a small minority of the population to enable it to function is an unsound application of the “divide et impera” principle and derogatory to the dignity of the Government. [Dawe suggested:] It may not be practical politics, but I am inclined to think that the best thing which could be done in the presence of the situation now before us would be to increase the grant in aid, if possible, to the full amount of the debt charge and, at the same time, abolish the present Legislative Council and set up one containing an official majority. If this were done, Cyprus would make rapid strides ahead.

1658. Celaleddin Bey complained, for instance, about the unnecessary expense of the principal Forest Officer. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 24th November 1926, 156.
1659. Ibid.
1661. Ibid., 5–7.
Alexander Fiddian, however, disputed Dawe’s analysis, arguing in particular that several other similar instances of the government being defeated by an unofficial majority did exist, and actually contradicting his appraisal by stating that, “it is only fair to say that a period of comparative calm in the internal politics of Cyprus is a development which the history of the Island from 1880 on to 1911 gave one no reason to expect.” He commented, “I think Mr. Dawe takes an unduly cheerful view of the past,” and noted that he, “used to be told,” that all it took for the government to be defeated in the Council was for one Turkish member, “susceptible to the influence of the Greek moneylender,” to fail to attend the vote. Nonetheless, Fiddian warned that Dawe’s suggestion to establish an official majority would only play into the hands of opposition to the government, and was, “only to be considered in the very last resort.”

Removal of the financial burdens on the island came to be seen, then, as the primary means of abrogating the dissatisfaction of both councillors and population with British rule. That the “Turkish tribute” was still a source of friction between the Government and Legislative Council members, and justifiably so, was increasingly recognised, not just by administrators in Cyprus, (who had pleaded the case for the removal of this burden in the past too), but also by officials in London too. In 1925 the Foreign Office was now openly recognising the fact that the Ottomans had in fact never really been paid a penny of this tribute and Fiddian was frankly admitting, (on file, not publicly!), that the people of Cyprus had been tricked out of surplus monies due to them from tribute payments. In October 1926 Secretary of State for the Colonies, L. S. Amery, was to appeal to Winston Churchill, now himself in charge of the Treasury, as below:

I do trust you will be able to do something to help, because, as I told you in my last letter, the Island is crying aloud for development, and I am sure you will agree with me that we owe the Island something for the huge sum we took from it since the earliest days of the British occupation until the fixing of the Grant-in-Aid.

Both Stevenson and his philhellenic successor Storrs were also to quite frankly express their sympathy with the sense of injustice prevailing in Cyprus regarding the tribute. Yet, in secret communications of 19th November 1926, in which the Treasury essentially admitted its complicity in swindling the inhabitants of Cyprus, it stubbornly concluded that, “the present is not a time when the heavily-burdened British taxpayer can be asked to re-open the question.” Not too long after, though, Churchill was finally to succumb to these increasingly persistent calls to loosen the Treasury purse-strings, calls which past statements showed he sympathised with no less than Cyprus’ Governors. In fact, communication from the Palace to the Colonial Office, dated 18th July 1927, showed that even the King felt the need to express his support for removing the tribute, and had come to this conclusion partly as a result of reading Churchill’s previous analysis.

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1662. Minute by A. Fiddian, 1st December 1926. CO 67/219/14, 8.
1663. Ibid., 10.
1666. For Stevenson see, Stevenson to Secretary of State, 14th April 1926. CO 67/217/3, 30–34; For Storrs, see Storrs to Secretary of State, 29th December 1926. CO 67/220/3, 33–35; Crawshaw, in fact, argues that all those who had headed the British administration had without exception protested against the tribute. CRAWSHAW 1978, 25.
1668. King’s Secretary to Hawkey, 18th July 1927. CAB 21/302.
In announcing in the Cyprus Gazette of the 31st August, 1927 that the weight of the tribute had been finally lifted, Storrs publicly acknowledged that he himself had:

addressed earnest representations to the Secretary of State for the Colonies pressing for a reconsideration and revision of the existing state of affairs. These representations embodied no suggestions for mitigations or palliatives but an urgent appeal for nothing less than a final, permanent and definitive solution and settlement of an anomaly which has been the discouragement and indeed the despair of the Budgets of half a century.1669

Though formally the tribute still remained, the grant-in-aid which had been fixed earlier at £50,000, was now to be increased by the sum of £42,800 amounting to the previous shortfall of Cyprus’ tributary payment minus the grant-in-aid. As Georghallides points out, Churchill now insisted on a contribution of £10,000 towards imperial defence, but in practice Cyprus had now been relieved of its long-standing and debilitating financial burden.1670 Yet, relieving the tribute did not have the desired political effect. The damage had already been done as far as public opinion was concerned, and though expressions of gratitude were to be heard, it did not really contribute to easing the political difficulties of the Government.1671 Dawe had suggested a two-pronged approach of simultaneously alleviating the financial burden of the tribute and introducing a new constitution that would give the government sufficient political power. The first proposal had now been implemented, but without being accompanied simultaneously by constitutional change as Dawe had wanted. Constitutional reform, then, continued to remain on the agenda throughout the latter 1920’s.

Though it should not be forgotten that even at the beginning of the twentieth century, and again in the pre- and early post-War era the issue of constitutional change as a means to obviate the difficulties of the unofficial majority had been contemplated, the increased frequency of such deliberation in the latter half of the 1920’s is particularly striking.1672 A central focus of debate became the extensive proposals prepared in late 1928 by Reginald Nicholson as to how and why a new constitution for Cyprus could and should be formed. Dawe ably summed up Nicholson’s suggestions in a minute to his Colonial Office colleagues on the matter:

Mr. Nicholson’s proposal in brief is that a new Legislative Council should be set up composed of the Governor and 33 Members. Fifteen of these would, it is proposed, be Official Members, 3 of them Nominated Members, and 15 would be Unofficial members who would reach the Council after going through a mixed process of election and selection. In this process the machinery of the old district Council of Administration (Medjlis Idares)-a survival from Turkish times—is to be utilised. Three-quarters of the number of the Members reaching the Legislative Council through this avenue [which in accordance with the principles of the Medjlis Idares foresaw the Governor’s ability to choose members from amongst a selection of elected candidates] are to be bona fide agriculturists; and the whole object of the proposed new arrangement is to ensure that in an agricultural country the unofficial representation shall be predominantly agricultural and to exclude the money-lending and lawyer class who

1669. Cyprus Gazette 31st August 1927.
1670. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 52.
1672. See minute by H. B. Cox of 9th June 1904 in CO 67/138, 428, and see also Stevenson to Parkinson, 20th December 1920. CO 67/201, 193.
are not representative of the people, and whose activities have brought about the present constitutional impasse.1673

Dawe pronounced that he, “entirely agree[d] with Mr. Nicholson that the present constitution ought to be abolished in favour of a pure Crown Colony system. The only question is whether we have reached the psychological moment for performing the operation, and if so, by what exact methods we are to go about it.”1674 Likewise, H. R. Cowell added on Christmas Eve of 1928 that, “The question of the reform of the Cyprus Constitution will probably have to be taken up some time,” but concluded that, “a sufficient excuse for taking immediate steps,” did not exist.1675

In relation to Nicholson’s proposals, which he reaffirmed he broadly supported, Dawe, however, later noted certain matters that he felt could be further discussed, including the question of “Communal Representation”, of which he stated:

It will be seen that the idea of communal representation runs all through the Medjlis Idaré machinery, and the Unofficial members elected through this process to the proposed new Council would, therefore, be chosen on a communal basis. The old division between the Greeks and Turks will, therefore, appear on the new Council.1676

Dawe, however, went on to comment:

The communal representation system is at the present time coming in for a good deal of criticism. The question is whether it would be practicable to take advantage of the present opportunity to eliminate it in Cyprus. ... It may be that in Cyprus the cleavage between the Greek and Turkish communities is such an obstinate reality that it is impossible not to take account of it in securing popular representation in the Legislative Council.1677

Storrs’ appreciation of this matter differed. In one memorandum he explained:

Communal representation and the segregation of castes were not established by the Constitution of 1882. They have been an integral part of the life of the community for centuries at least. There are no signs of fear, hatred and contempt in the villages, where for ages the peoples of the two main divisions have lived and worked amicably side-by-side, even under the severe strain caused by the Greco-Turkish war. At first sight it would appear simple to establish a common voting list. Were there anything approaching numerical equality that could be done, but the overwhelming preponderance of the Greek element means either that there would be no Moslem representation or that, if a proportion of Moslems had to be elected, that proportion would be chosen by the Greeks. Either issue is unthinkable for patent

1673. Minute by A. J. Dawe, 23rd April 1929. CO 67/227/4, 13–14; The somewhat naive appreciation that the pure agricultural class was the complete and utter tool of the money-lenders in political matters continued to shape British opinion for long after. Palmer argued in 1937 that the relative quiet in the rural areas was due largely to the fact that, “the urban influences which up to 1931 were able through the Legislative Council, and the Elective system and usury to dominate the villagers and control their votes,” had now been replaced by, “effective District Administration.” Palmer to Secretary of State, 2nd July 1937. CO 67/280/5, 66–67.


1677. Ibid., 33–34; This position had also been adopted shortly before by H. R. Cowell, who had written, “I think it is a matter for serious consideration whether it would not be desirable to abolish the present Council and to substitute a Council with an official majority, but containing members elected on a general franchise and not on a communal basis. As we have seen in Ceylon, these communal franchises tend to perpetuate racial differences and to encourage the evils which they are presumably created to avoid.” Minute by H. R. Cowell, 25th December 1928. CO 67/227/4, 3.
reasons; it suffices to say that by such means Moslem feelings throughout the country would be permanently embittered and alienated.\footnote{1678}

Dawe’s extensive “memorandum on Cyprus constitutional question” included also a section entitled “The Divide et Impera System” which stated:

The occasions on which over-riding Orders in Council have been called for have been rare until recent years. The main reason for this is as follows:

Three of the Elected Members are Turks, elected on a communal basis. While their Greek colleagues have been chronically in opposition, the three Turks have in normal times always supported the Government. In the present composition of the Legislature the alignment of the three Turkish Members with the Government side gives $9 + 3 = 12$ for Government against 12 anti-Government. There is in addition the Governor who has a casting vote which gives a government majority.

On this shaky system the Government of Cyprus has in the main depended since 1882. this system is clearly defective. It places the balance of power in the hands of three Turks. These form the smallest of the three groups which compose the Council—the Official (9), the Greek (12), and the Turkish (3). The Turkish element in the island which they represent forms between one-fourth and one-fifth of the total population. Their representation in the Legislative Council is as much as that of the other two groups put together. Notwithstanding these facts they have in normal times always found themselves deprived of effective power. This galling position is clearly not designed to bring out the best and most constructive elements in the character of the Greek representatives. Had the Constitution been constructed on a wiser plan I think we should have tried to reconcile the Greeks by giving them a weight in the public affairs of the Island equivalent to their numerical preponderance. What we have done, however, is to force them into the position of a permanent and embittered Opposition. We have given them opportunities for incensed and irresponsible criticism in inverse ratio to their opportunities for exercising effective power.

The system is also bad because it relies for its efficiency upon keeping alive the racial hostilities between the two sections of the population. A sounder policy would have attempted to minimise the differences between the Christians and Moslems rather than to exploit them.

The system also puts the British Administration at the mercy of a small clique of Turks: We can only carry on sufferance; and this is often a humiliating position and one which is derogatory to the dignity of the British Government. To the oriental mind the Constitution appears to be not so much a disinterested experiment in liberal ideas as a trap cunningly laid by the hypocritical British to secure their own predominance. This position detracts from our prestige and makes good government difficult.\footnote{1679}

Yet to some degree this analysis actually contradicted Dawe’s own observation that in recent times especially, the Greek and Turkish members of the Council had increasingly formed alliances to block government measures, with plans, “passed by Order in Council because there was no hope of getting them through the Cyprus Legislature.”\footnote{1680} The real crux of the matter of constitutional change, for both Dawe and Nicholson, was not in fact any idealistic motivation to obviate a system of divide-and-rule per se, but to find the means whereby the British could govern imperially without being hostage to the locals’

1680. Ibid.}
whims. Any charitable conception of Dawe’s claim that the Greeks should be given, “a weight in the public affairs of the Island equivalent to their numerical preponderance,” falls flat when one adduces that the system he was proposing would actually give the British control over a higher proportion of members of the Council than before. Any greater numerical representation for the Greeks could have been considered solely a pyrrhic victory, as such representation would undoubtedly have been less autonomous of British rule than before. British “predominance” was in fact the very objective of the exercise; predominance through which the British would rid themselves of any dependence upon the Turks, without actually conceding any real democratic power to the Greeks. In essence it would obviate any need to divide-and-rule, the failure, rather than existence of which was being grieved over, without democratising the political system. Dawe granted as much when he quite frankly declared: “Cyprus is not ready for responsible government. There is, I think, no section of the community which possesses the required qualities.” He added that, “By whatever route we approach the problem it seems that the best system for Cyprus is Mr. Nicholson’s, benevolent autocracy,” and concluded melodramatically: “We must either make up our minds to govern the Island or we must clear out.”

A wiser policy may well have been to have recognised the growing political awareness and development of the two communities, and acknowledge their justified demands to be listened to. After all, there was in reality little likelihood of Greek and Turk combining to challenge the continuation of British sovereignty over the island so long as they did not share, and had little foreseeable prospect of sharing any common platform for espousing what might be brought in the place of British rule. Overall, it would be unfair to claim that the British were constantly motivated by a desire to enhance racial discord on the island, for the very reason just stated. Certainly they may have had some potential benefit in doing so, but the evidence shows that the British officials and administrators, were not all, and not always at least, desirous of exploiting this racial cleavage.

Sir John Shuckburgh, soon to become Deputy Undersecretary of State, took a more cautious attitude than both Nicholson and Dawe. More considerate of the ramifications that such constitutional change might have, particularly for the home government, he warned: “Let us be under no delusion in the matter. Our action will be bitterly denounced 1681. Minute by A. J. Dawe, 23rd April 1929. CO 67/227/4, 24 and 26–27. 1682. A minute of January 1930 illustrates the point:

> It occurred to the Department, when the publication of a White Paper was decided upon, that it might be useful to include in it, side by side with the Greek memorial, certain counter-memorials, opposing the Greek demands, which we have received from other Communities in Cyprus (Muhammadans, Latins, Armenians, etc.). The Governor, whom we consulted by telegram, did not favour the proposal, which he thought would arouse ill-feeling; but he suggested that a note might properly be incorporated in the White Paper, merely stating that counter-memorials had been received. Hence the footnote, which is based closely upon the wording of the Governor’s telegram (No.64).

> I feel some doubt about this. First, there is the question of Parliamentary procedure. It is I believe, a more or less established principle that if a document is quoted or referred to in a Parliamentary Paper, the Government may be called upon to produce it. Hence the footnote may lead to a demand (which we may find it difficult to resist) for publication of the actual text of the memorials. That is just what the Governor has advised us is against the public interest.

> From the wider point of view, I think that our refutation of the Greek case can well stand on its own merits, and that there is no need to call in the dissident minorities to our assistance.

> On the whole, I would omit the footnote. Minute by Sir J. Shuckburgh, 14th January 1930. CO 67/227/7, 12–13. As the minutes that followed indicate, it was indeed ultimately decided to omit the footnote altogether.
as reactionary and tyrannical, not only by the local politicians, but by advocates of ‘democracy’ everywhere,” and stated, “I take it that, in any case, H.M.G. would not wish to take so drastic a step until after the General Election.”

Storrs, however, was already becoming rapidly disillusioned by the product of the electoral process in Cyprus. He put on record his preference for, “a system of nominated Councillors”, in a private letter to Shuckburgh of 12th March 1930 with which he enclosed too a memorandum on the subject prepared by his newly appointed Colonial Secretary, Herbert Henniker-Heatton. Here it was declared: “It is I think admitted by everyone who has considered the matter here from the Government’s point of view that the ideal is an entirely nominated Council.” Notwithstanding this ideal, Henniker-Heatton was prepared to “risk” giving the Greeks a majority in the new council, believing that so long as they were nominated, and thus not the “flawed” result of the electoral process, this would be unlikely to cause any problems.

Rumour of constitutional change had by now reached the ears of the populace of Cyprus, with Archbishop Kyrillos telegraphing Passfield in June of 1930 to say:

The present constitution is disavowed and disapproved as being illiberal and undesirable but also the most liberal reform would not constitute satisfactory solution for the Hellenic people of Cyprus constituting the five sixths of the population and whose only aim and demand is union with mother country Greece.

Secretary of State Lord Passfield, apparently had the final word in July 1930. As disclosed in a minute recorded by Dawe on the 6th of January 1931, and assented to by his superiors, the matter had now been put on ice. Dawe wrote:

There has been no material change in the constitutional position in Cyprus since Lord Passfield gave his decision recorded in my Minute of the 14th July, i.e., that there was not a sufficient case for him to take action for the revision of the Constitution and that things must go on as they are. A new body of unofficial members was elected last October; and it was at one time thought that they would be sufficiently intransigent to throw out the Budget for this year. This has, however, now been passed with the aid of Turkish votes; and we are, therefore, still without any ground for action other than the general defects of the Constitution. ...

Any revision of the Constitution which would be worth while would have to be in a “reactionary” direction; as this does not seem to be the psychological moment for such a change. I presume there is nothing further to be done at present.

The debate as to constitutional change was brought to a more permanent conclusion, though, only by the October Revolt, following which the constitutional order that had
governed in Cyprus for half a century was brought to an abrupt and inglorious end, and essentially dictatorial powers vested in the person of the Governor.

5.7 Turkey and the Kemalist Surge in Cyprus

Mustafa Kemal’s, or Atatürk’s nationalism is sometimes depicted as the “true”, or “first” or “real” Turkish nationalism.\(^{1688}\) In fact, it is much better appreciated as a particular stage in its evolution, albeit one that still holds sway over many Turks. As Mardin puts it, even “to cite Namık Kemal as the intellectual mentor of Atatürk is not an entirely erroneous point of view.”\(^{1689}\) Atatürk’s form of Turkish nationalism, though containing radical and original elements, did not emerge spontaneously and unassisted, but rather on the back of earlier theoretical developments, and very critically within a particular historical milieu that allowed his nationalist vision to become that which prevailed within the territory of Turkey.

Kemal professed to have been a Turkish nationalist even from his earliest years in the army, and it is well attested that on joining the unionists he had, “belonged to the radical wing within the Committee which openly thought along Turkish nationalist lines.”\(^{1690}\) Mustafa Kemal had not been interested in preserving the Ottoman Empire, as were the Ottomanists, nor was he after the unification of all the Turkic groups in the world, as were the Pan-Turkists. For him the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey, (essentially comprising Anatolia, plus a few extensions), were sufficient. As Efraim and Inari Karsh put it, Mustafa Kemal, “had reconciled himself to Turkey’s loss of the Arabic-speaking provinces-and even, for that matter, to its demise as an imperial power-but not to the subjugation or partition of the Turkish homeland itself.”\(^{1691}\)

Kemal explained: “Everyone who lives within the borders of the Republic of Turkey is a Turk.”\(^{1692}\) Notwithstanding the ejection of a large number of Orthodox Christians to Greece in the population transfer agreed to following the defeat of the invading Greek forces, this was in essence to remain his main conception of who should be accepted as Turks. This can be considered a definition largely compatible with Anthony Smith’s territorial model of nationalism, a model where nationalism develops to embrace all those who live within an idealized territory.\(^{1693}\) Mustafa Kemal in particular tried to instil a shared pride in the Anatolian homeland, an effort that had actually begun before the Republic amongst certain Turkists. Lewis summarizes this whole enterprise very well:

[A]n interesting new development appeared – the assertion of identity with earlier, pre-existing local civilizations. ... the so-called Anatolianist movement [supported] theories, fathe-

\(^{1688}\) See for example the statement of the former Turkish Minister of Education, Avni Akyol, that Atatürk’s form of nationalism is the first “real” Turkish nationalism. As quoted in EROĞLU 1992, 74.
\(^{1689}\) MARDIN 1962, 404.
\(^{1690}\) ZÜRCHER 1984, 51.
\(^{1691}\) KARSH - KARSH 2001, 328.
\(^{1692}\) As quoted in GÜVENÇ 1997, 23; In Güvenç’s terms Atatürk had thus managed to cut the legendary “Gordion knot” for the second time, by circumventing the confusion as to whom the Turks actually were.
\(^{1693}\) For more details see SMITH 1983, 219–220; Note that Ottomanism also broadly fits this model.
red by Atatürk, of the Turkish origin of such ancient peoples as the Sumerians, the Trojans, and, above all, the Hittites.

This movement was partly political, with the purpose of encouraging the Turks to identify themselves with the country they inhabit – and thus at the same time of discouraging Pan-Turanian adventures.1694

Still, Kemalist nationalism at times also displayed elements of Smith’s “ethnic” model, which unlike the “territorial” was founded upon those who shared a particular ethnicity rather than territory.1695 This doubtlessly signified occasional inconsistencies in Atatürk’s explanation of who the Turks were, such as to make the different definitions which he gave sometimes hard to reconcile. Yet this is quite understandable in that, “the ideology of Kemalist nationalism was not fixed from the start.”1696 In fact, by the 1930’s, Kemalists were increasingly emphasizing ethnicity, and even racial undertones could now be discerned in Atatürk’s explanations of who the Turks were.1697 Despite certain wild theoretical forays, however, the majority of Atatürk’s definitions stressed the territorial and cultural elements of nationhood, especially the importance of language as opposed to any racial requirements. A more typical definition given by Atatürk would be that: “A nation is a political and social construct composed of citizens bound to each other through unity of language, culture and ideals.”1698 He pronounced:

The language of the Turkish nation is Turkish. [The Turkish nation] sees that everything forming its nationality is protected by its language. The Turkish language is the heart, the memory of the Turkish nation.1699

In line with the above statement, Atatürk placed tremendous importance on reform of the Turkish language, believing, as others had before him, that the literary complexity and Arabic script of Ottoman Turkish, as well as the contamination of the vernacular form of the commoners’ Turkish, was hindering social progress.1700 By 1928, having secured the Turkish state, no longer concerned about the association with other Islamic peoples, and feeling strong enough to confront residual religious forces, Kemal, as we have noted, went as far as discarding the Arab script, and replacing it with the Latin.1701

Atatürk, more than any other, understood the importance of making the Turks feel pride in their heritage and Turkishness. Those who had for centuries used the term “Turk” as an insult, seeing the Turk as an “ignorant boor”, and even a “human cancer” were now confronted with Mustafa Kemal.1702 Kemal was to bear the name “Atatürk”, or “father of

1694. LEWIS 1968, 3.
1695. See, for example, POULTON 1997, 128.
1696. Ibid.
1697. One particularly extraordinary move was backing for the “Sun Language theory”, temporarily propagated in Atatürk's later years, which essentially led to depiction of Turkish as the “mother of all languages.” [See KINROSS 1981, 466–467]. The “National History Thesis” that was developed after 1931, on the other hand, held that, “practically the whole of European civilization had Turkic roots.” [DERINGİL 1993, 168. See also CANEFE 1998b, 383–384]. Such untenable propositions, though, were soon ditched.
1700. See KINROSS 1981, 441–445 and 465–472; Berkes notes that this is one of the rare points which Gökalp may not have approved of, for Gökalp was against excessive “purification” of the Turkish language, believing instead that Arab and Persian words that had become naturally part of the common language should not be replaced. See BERKES 1959, 13–14; HEYD 1950, 120–121.
the Turks”, with honour, and proudly pronounce the famed words, “Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene”; (that is, “Happy is he who can call himself a Turk”). He sincerely felt that without instilling a strong national consciousness into the minds of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey they would be doomed. His sometimes excessive emphasis on the “importance” of the Turks might, therefore, best be construed as a valiant attempt to integrate and to inculcate pride in what had been a divided and dejected people. For, without national consciousness and pride these people, he believed, were at risk. “It should be known,” he declared, “that nations unaware of their national identity, are the prey of other nations.”

The self-assured confidence and unbounded pride which he exuded could not but help build ethno-national pride in, and raise the self-esteem of the Turks of Cyprus too.

Notwithstanding differences in emphasis, a lot of what Kemal said had been pronounced in a similar vein by earlier Turkish nationalists, though admittedly perhaps not so forcefully, nor by such a charismatic figure. Kemal, however, differed from most of the early Turkists in two important ways: in his strict secularism, and in his absolute rejection of Pan-Turkism. In the first he went further in his reforms than most early Turkists would have been willing to go, and in the latter he demonstrated a desire for limitations that few early Turkists would have accepted willingly, if at all.

Though many of the early Turkists may have favoured the reform of Islamic institutions, they were not on the whole secularists. Many, including some of the most progressive such as Akçura and Gökalp, placed a much more pronounced accent on the role of religion within their nationalism than did Atatürk. As far as Islam was concerned, Kemal was not beyond using it for political ends. In fact, he did just this, to good end, during the War of Independence in order to rally the Moslems behind his cause. As E. and I. Karsh argue, Kemal had to begin with in fact gone, “out of his way to avoid challenging the sultan’s authority, directing his ire instead at Grand Vizier Damad Ferid and his ministers.” This, as they rightly conclude, “reflected Kemal’s political caution and realism,” for, “So long as the Turks considered the sultan-caliph to be their supreme religious and temporal ruler, there was no point in launching a frontal assault on this cherished institution; it would be infinitely better to pretend to defer to the sultan while effectively pulling the rug out from under him.” More generally, Zürcher goes as far as to conclude that while, “The terminology used by the pioneers of the resistance is not entirely consistent,” there is strong evidence, “that their ideology was a cocktail of political,

1702. The description of the Turks as a “human cancer” is attributed to a statement made by former British Prime Minister Lloyd George in 1914. See H. POPE – N. POPE 1997, 59.
1704. Nevertheless it deserves recognition that while constantly exalting the greatness of the Turkish nation, Kemal took special care not to defame other nations, called for peaceful relations among all nations, and denounced irredentist demands. In his words: “[The Turkish nation] is always proud to carry in its conscience the sentiment of humanity together with the national feeling. This is because the Turkish nation knows that to continue its irreversible progress along the path to civilization which it has entered, it must develop humane and civilized relations with all civilized nations with whom it moves forward on an equal but independent level.” Ibid., 20.
1705. For a broader comparison see EROĞLU 1992, 64–65; It should be said, for example, that a series of Islamic Congresses held at the dawn of the twentieth century had actually contributed to a consolidation of Turkish national identity in the Russian territories.
1706. RUSTOW 1973, 106.
1708. Ibid.
territorial and religious elements, but one in which the Ottoman Muslim identity predominated to such an extent that we can indeed speak of ‘Muslim nationalism’. This was not to mean that the movement’s goals were religious in nature, “its aims,” he states, “were clearly political, but the group identity on which it based itself was defined primarily in religious terms.”

Yet, once the war had been won and Mustafa Kemal was secure in power, he swiftly dropped the use of religion as a legitimising tool, set out to separate religion from the state, and attempted to relegate religion to the sphere of the private conscience of individuals. Kemal’s shift in emphasis away from Islam was signified most powerfully by the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924, a year and a half after the institution of the Sultanate had itself been abandoned.

Atatürk’s position on Pan-Turkism was resolute. He was, as Aksin correctly stresses, a “realist” on this issue. Feyzioğlu contends that according to Atatürk’s principles a nationalist:

- loves all Turks in the world. He accepts all natural relations with them; counts them as brothers, and wishes for them to progress along civilized and prosperous lines. But, as a “political domain”, he identifies with the Turkish homeland, [i.e. the territory of the Republic of Turkey]; acting realistically and intelligently, he avoids adventurist utopias that could endanger the motherland.

Whether or not Atatürk could have succeeded even had he chosen to follow Pan-Turkist policies is another matter. Enver tried and failed, and in all probability Mustafa Kemal would have done so as well had he been so rash. His brilliance lay in realizing the limitations to his power and acting accordingly. E. Karsh and I. Karsh eloquently describe Kemal’s unique capability on this front in the following sentence: “This combination of vision and pragmatism, of absolute commitment to an ultimate grand design coupled with contemporaneous flexibility, stood at the core of Kemal’s extraordinary success.” In the following passage Landau provides a fine summary of Atatürk’s motivations:

- [P]atriotism had vindicated itself remarkably while other ideologies had failed [and] Turkey, badly ravaged by war, needed to concentrate its efforts on its own reconstruction. Turkey was now a smaller and fairly homogeneous state, as compared to the huge multi-national Ottoman Empire; hence the option appeared more feasible. A self-centred policy would also prove advantageous in foreign relations, as the renouncing of Pan-Turk ideals would assist in normalization of relations with the Soviet Union – a policy which Mustafa Kemal prudently pursued.

Thus, though a variety of Pan-Turkist, and even Pan-Turanian associations and literary enterprises still continued to function outside of the Republic of Turkey, in as wide a range of locations as Cyprus, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Hungary, and France they were not countenanced by Kemal and his lieutenants in Turkey. As has been mentioned, when the Turk Oçağı continued to display such tendencies it was actually forced to shut...

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1709. ZÜRCHER 1999.
1711. AĞŞİN 1991, 42–43
1712. FEYZİOĞLU 1985, 398.
1713. KARSH - KARSH 2001, 329; See also, LEWIS 1968, 352.
1714. LANDAU 1995, 75.
1715. For a discussion of the role of such organizations and journals see Ibid., 74–97.
down. Though “Outside Turks” could be a matter of moral concern and interest, they were discouraged from becoming a political concern. Atatürk centred his goals on Anatolia, and denounced adventurist goals, as his renowned saying, “Peace at home, Peace in the World,” suggests. In his words:

Today’s Turkish nation is content for its existence with its present homeland. Because the Turk believes that he can enrich even further than has been done till the present the holy qualities of his deep and famous past, of his great and powerful forefathers within the boundaries of this homeland.

The Pan-Turkists in the early republican era were not on the whole persecuted, however, but rather co-opted. Many such as Akçura and Ağaoğlu actually assumed prominent positions within the Republic where they continued to expound nationalist ideas. Such rewards, coupled with the success of the Republic and the magnetic charisma and leadership of Atatürk, combined to make them toe the Kemalist line rather tranquilly. A dramatic example of this turn-around is provided by Landau’s exposition of the case of the renowned Pan-Turkist Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul) who actually, “re-edited some of his poems to read ‘vatan’ (fatherland) instead of ‘Turan’.”

Perhaps, yet a third, supplementary, feature differentiating Atatürk’s nationalism from many, (though not all) early Turkists was his emphasis on Westernisation. As Feyzioğlu points out, in many states, especially those that had previously been colonies in Asia and Africa, nationalism was often partially born as a reaction against the West and Western civilization. In Atatürk’s Turkey, however, nationalism and Westernisation developed in tandem. As Arai indicates, this too may not have been something that many of the earlier Turkish nationalists of the Young Turk era would have advocated. Modernization, probably yes, but westernisation, often not. Kushner too notes that the degree of Westernisation under Kemal Atatürk was not on the whole something that had been envisaged by the earlier Turkists. He stresses correctly that it was not just western institutions that were being encouraged and adopted, but western social customs too, from the opera, to top hats, to ballroom dancing.

Mustafa Kemal, then, was a Turkish nationalist like Akçura, and Gökalp, like Ağaoğlu and Gaspırlı. Yet, in some fundamental ways, though continuity cannot be denied, and though he was not perhaps the pioneer of Turkish nationalism as such, he was a revolutionary nationalist, who developed his own concept of the Turkish nation, and of its purpose. He was above all, unlike his predecessors, to an extraordinary extent, successful in translating his Turkish nationalist ideals into reality. He did manage to secure a Turkish homeland, and to instil a Turkish national consciousness.

Meanwhile, before Mustafa Kemal set foot on the Black Sea coast to lead the Turkish War of Liberation in May of 1919, the Turkish Cypriots under the leadership of figures

1717. ATATÜRK 1997, 14.
1718. LANDAU 1995, 75–76; As Deringil points out, Akçura’s ideological influence continued and he was to become, “a major contributor to the maximalist ‘National History Thesis’ as it evolved after 1931.”
1719. LANDAU 1995, 76.
1720. FEYZIOĞLU 1985, 389.
1721. ARAI 1992, 97.
1722. KUSHNER 1977, 103.
such as the Müftü, Ziyaeddin Efendi, journalist and teacher Mehmet Remzi, and lawyer and author Ahmet Raşid, had gathered the Turkish Cypriot “National Congress”. The congregation’s decision to send a delegation to the post-World War I Conference of Paris was a symptom of their political objectives, and was an autonomous development, not a result of British intrigue, nor even of the involvement of Turkey, or of the still non-existent impact of Mustafa Kemal. Though on this occasion the Turkish Cypriots had been prevented from sending their envoys to raise their concerns in international fora, they were at least well relieved by the failure of the Greek’s own mission. The Leading article of the Doğru Yol newspaper of the 5th of January 1920 headed, “On the Occasion of the return of the Cyprus Greek Deputation,” defiantly chastised the Greek Cypriots. It read:

Ever since the cession of the Island of Cyprus to England, the Greeks of Cyprus, too, following the vestige of their own race, commenced to demonstrate their aspirations & desire for the Union of Cyprus to Greece; and upon the indulgence they had seen they introduced the same even as far as the debates of the Legislative Council.

This question formed the warmest discussions of the Legislative Council and at the same time it has been the sole cause of making the Turkish & Greek element to adopt an attitude of hostility against each other.

Had the Christians guarded themselves against putting forward this question in such a manner as to hurt the feelings of their Turkish Compatriots during this long succession of years, the condition of both elements in the Island would have been far better than what it is at present. Joining hands we would have tried to improve our country.1723

Lamenting the fact that this had not been the case and that as a result both communities had lost-out, the article moved on to give its appreciation of developments in the following way:

After they have been made to understand … that the Cyprus question is a Turkish-English question and after it as been heard from official lips that Turkey will remain as an independent Empire, it is a question how far our Greek compatriots may cherish any hope for the future Union of Cyprus.

The dispersion & decline which the Hellenes imagine in the case of Turkey and especially the question of Smyrna impart to them the hope that their multifarious visions will be realised. The actual erroneous theory begins at this point.

Let us proclaim not only to the Cypriot Greeks & to the whole Helenism but to the whole world that the Turkish Empire is not destroyed & it will not be destroyed. As long as the sun shines upon this planet the Turkish race & Islamism will continue with perfect stability.

It is possible for any power to lose a war, provided the life element of a nation is not annihilated. To-day a greater living activity is observed with satisfaction in the Turkish nation. A patriotic party that has burst out of the patriotic bosom of the nation is a strong evidence in this fact. …

Considering that the Turks have more historical connections with Cyprus & that the return of Cyprus to Turkey is more natural in view of the understanding between England & Turkey, the Moslems of Cyprus have not raised such a clamour. They expected the vindications of rights & they are still in expectations with a great moderation & quietness peculiar to people who are sure that they have a right.1724

Goading the Greek Cypriots, it said: “Come on, is not Greece your own Country, go there & reap the advantages of every kind of liberty. The Turks are enough for us,” and concluded:

The unsuccessfulness of the deputation has fully manifested their wrong cause & it has corroborated our hopes that sooner or later the Island will be given to the Turkish administration as it was prior to 1878 & that our Christian compatriots will lead a life of freedom under Osmanli sovereignty.1725

Though the Turks of Cyprus must surely had been disappointed and concerned by the outcome of the First World War, they had not completely given up hope of redemption. By late 1919 as Mustafa Kemal and his comrades had risen against the occupying allied forces under whose control the imperial administration in Istanbul had by now fallen, and the impression of their endeavours upon the Turks of Cyprus progressively increased. The Turkish Cypriots kept close track of developments in Anatolia through their press, campaigns to raise funds for his soldiers were initiated, and some Turkish Cypriot volunteers apparently even went to fight in his ranks.1726 Again, as with the Greek Cypriot relationship with the Greek War of Independence, perhaps even more so, it would be wrong to assert, as Turkish nationalists are prone to do, that the Turkish Cypriot populace played any truly substantial role in these developments.1727 The belief, however, that they were part of a greater Turkish nation, and that, as such, a Turkish government in their own state should ideally rule over them, was by now gaining some ground amongst the Turkish Cypriots. The trouble was that Mustafa Kemal’s nationalism relied essentially on limiting claims to territories where the Turks were in a majority. With the Treaty of Lausanne Kemal had made his rejection of pan-Turkist philosophy crystal-clear. It was largely for this reason that the Turkish Cypriots did not receive the same level of understanding for their goals that the Greek Cypriots had obtained from Greece; much less did they find in the Turkish Republic the equivalent of the newly established Greek Kingdom which had itself in earlier times championed the irredentist doctrine of the Megali Idea.

At the same time, there is some evidence that Turkey was from the outset concerned about the possibility of enosis and Psomiades for one notes that agitation for enosis in Greece, coupled with rumours that Britain might be willing to cede the island to Greece, could lead to public unrest in Turkey even in the 1920’s.1728 While on the one hand Turkey politically distanced itself from objectives in Cyprus, on the other it reacted vehemently against Greek threats of encroachment and the plight of the Turkish Cypriots. An apt explanation for this apparent contradiction is one suggested by Tachau. Tachau has argued that in the Cyprus dispute we find that Turkey, “demonstrates the disparity between the official version of Turkish nationalism [a territorially limited one] and the actual operative ideas and loyalties of the people.”1729 Though his was an explanation given in

1724. Ibid., 58–59.
1725. Ibid., 57.
1727. In writing their book on relations between Cyprus and Turkey during the two decades following the First World War, Birinci and Ismail state that one of their, “purposes in preparing the book,” was to disprove accusations that, “the Turkish Cypriots did not contribute to the War of Liberation.” They then proceed to try as assiduously as possible to achieve their objective.” ISMAIL – BİRİNÇİ s.a., iv.
1728. PSOMIADES 1962, 238.
1729. TACHAU 1959, 267.
the 1950’s it may well be considered somewhat enlightening for earlier periods in the Turkish Republic’s relationship with Cyprus also. Thus though the Turkish public may have begun to have openly expressed concern over Cyprus, the Turkish state appeared much more willing to accept the recognition of British sovereignty over the island with article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne as final, and thereafter she avoided pressing claims of her own over the island up until the 1950’s. This complements Rustow’s argument that, “Whereas many postcolonial states have resorted to a boisterous and aggressive foreign policy to relieve internal tensions, Turkish rulers down to the mid-twentieth century almost invariably recognised the primacy of foreign over domestic policy.” Hence, he too contends that, “It was not until the eruption of the Cyprus conflict in the mid-fifties and until Menderes’ appeals for additional American aid in 1957 and 1958 that the effect of domestic tension began to be felt in foreign relations.”

As McHenry puts it, unlike the pan-Turkists, “Atatürk’s policy was one of extending his claims only as far as his power and leverage extended.” In addition, he believes, Atatürk, “also intended to convert Britain from an enemy into a friend,” and that as a consequence, “demanding the return of Cyprus would not have advanced that goal.” Yet, despite the sometimes lukewarm reception Turkish Cypriot nationalists received from Ankara, this does not seem to have deterred them hugely. Contrary to Stefanidis’ and especially Pollis’ arguments that Kemalism had little impact in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot nationalists worked hard, and effectively, especially through the press, to champion the modernizing Kemalist reforms undertaken in Turkey on their island’s soil. In light of ample evidence, Pollis’ position that, “the incipient prenationalist trends of the pre-Atatürk era in the Ottoman empire had left the Cypriot Moslems untouched, as did Atatürk’s revolution itself,” that, “It was not until the middle 1950s that Turkish nationalism found some roots in Cyprus,” and Farr’s assertion that, “Turkish Cypriot political consciousness emerged slowly under British rule, but did so without substantial reference to Turkey until after the Second World War,” are simply unsustainable.

1730. Article 20 read simply: “Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914.” See s.n. s.a. (b).
1731. RUSTOW 1973, 110.
1732. Ibid., 111.
1734. See STEFANIDIS 1999, 2; See also POLLIS 1976, 51 and 55.
1735. POLLIS 1976, 51; POLLIS 1979, 53; FARR 1997, 34–35; There are of course numerous others who fail to recognise the “first wave” of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. See, for example, Kliot and Mansfield, and Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, who argue that it only emerged in the 1940’s and Pollis, who again, in a more recent volume, argues that Turkish nationalism had apparently, “made little headway in Cyprus,” even in the early 1950’s. [KLIOT - MANSFIELD 1997, 496; HADJIPAVALOU-TRIGEORGIS 1990, 110; POLLIS 1996, 78.] It deserves notice though that in a more recent work Pollis, perhaps for the first time, shows some recognition of the earlier development of nationalism amongst the Turks, and though she doesn’t fully appreciate the background and timeframe to this “recasting” of the Turkish Cypriot’s identity, she at least acknowledges that it was a process that did begin before the Second World War. [POLLIS 1998, 96.] Attalides, on the other hand, to his credit, has managed to express from the outset at least that the, “Turkish Cypriots, contrary to what some Greek Cypriot writers imply, did have a consciousness distinct from and opposed to Greek nationalism,” but nevertheless argued that this was on a purely religious basis and claimed that, “they did not form a Turkish nationalism oriented to the Turkish State until the Second World War.” [ATTALIDES 1979, 40.] Despite otherwise not presuming to speak too much for the state of the island’s Turks, Loizos also makes a similar error in attribution of the rise of Turkish nationalism on the island to the time when, “The Turkish minority began, under British stimulation, to counter demands for Enosis with their matching demand for Taxim, partition, in the late 1950s.” LOIZOS 1975, 24n.
could be made that they were often more successful in adopting Atatürk’s reforms than their motherland itself. Revolutionary decisions to use the Latin alphabet to abandon the fez and chador and adopt western dress were followed closely by the Turks of Cyprus and widely adhered to under the instigation of Turkish Cypriot Kemalists.\footnote{1736} This was all the more remarkable, as Gazioglu rightly points out, due to the fact that they were generally under no legal or administrative obligation to do so, and also that the British continued to discourage and disparage Cypriot Kemalists and to give their full backing to their rivals the pro-British, traditional elites.\footnote{1737} It has even been put forward that, Atatürk himself was impressed and moved by the Turkish Cypriots adoption of his reforms.\footnote{1738}

Writing in the 1950’s Beckingham observed:

In Cyprus the Muslim remained free, and in most respects he still remains free, to accept or to reject the revolutionary changes which were made compulsory in the Republic. He could, if he so wished, wear a fez, use the Arabic alphabet, join an order of dervishes, advocate the restoration of the Ottoman Caliphate, and at that time, [in the post-revolutionary 1920’s], though no longer today, he could still practice polygamy within the limits prescribed by the religious law (seriat). It might have been expected that in the years 1923–1928 devout and conservative Turks would have emigrated from Turkey to Cyprus. Nothing of the kind happened. The only emigrants were Armenians and Greeks; Turks were migrating in the reverse direction, from Cyprus to Turkey. In fact, the changes met with less opposition in Cyprus, where their acceptance was entirely voluntary, than in the Republic, where they were obligatory, and in the island there has been no parallel to the spasmodic attempts that have been seen in Turkey since the victory of the Democrat Party in 1950. This phenomenon can be attributed partly to the influence of British administration and partly to the importance of the religious community... in the Ottoman system. Confronted by a large, politically conscious and active Greek majority and by powerful British officials the Cypriot Muslim has, in domestic politics, tended to identify Islam and Turkish nationalism.\footnote{1739}

Further, as Beckingham explained, “The social changes associated with Atatürk’s revolution were introduced into Cyprus without encountering the opposition of mullahs, as they did in some parts of Turkey.”\footnote{1740} Considering that the mullahs of Cyprus had initially been much more noticeably opposed, partly on perceived religious premises, to the ideas of the Young Turks, it may well be speculated that a significant social transformation had occurred in the interim, particularly during the years following the Young Turk Revolution.

It appears that the triumph of Atatürk had infused new hope and confidence amongst Turkish Cypriots. After years of dejection, of degeneration and of humiliating defeats of the Ottoman Empire, after witnessing the rise and progressive expansion of an independent Greece, they now not only saw the destruction of the Greek armies invading Anatolia, but also the rise of a new charismatic and powerful Turkish leader who emerged to establish a dynamic new Turkish Republic. The psychological impact, the boost must have been tremendous.

\footnote{1736. See, for instance, YAVUZ 1991, 69; McHENRY 1987, 134–135.}
\footnote{1737. GAZIOGLU 1999, 43.}
\footnote{1738. Ibid.; AKAR 1981, 39.}
\footnote{1739. BECKINGHAM 1957b, 65–66.}
\footnote{1740. BECKINGHAM 1955, 140.}
By the late 1920’s, then the pro-British Turkish Cypriot elite, which had tended to accept subservience to the British in return for positions of power and privilege, were finding it hard to withstand the growing might of Kemalist, Turkish nationalists. Though Choisi also recognises the growing power of the Kemalists in Cyprus, she raises an important point by arguing that it would be wrong, “to conclude that the political claims of equality by the Kemalist opposition have given rise to a Turkish nationalism.” Instead she focuses on their sense of injustice at the British favouritism shown to other members of the Turkish Cypriot elite and on personal rivalries with this pro-British faction. However, she looks, thereby to be missing the crux of the issue as far as the development of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus is concerned. Yes, personal rivalry and competition for colonial patronage may have been instrumental in motivating the efforts of some of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leaders. True also, we can never know for certain to what degree they saw nationalism and Kemalism in general as a means to serve their own interests, and to what extent they believed themselves to be acting in the collective interests of their community. Yet, it is not only in Cyprus that nationalism has been used as a cloak to strengthen the power, resources and capabilities of individual leaders; it is not only here that there has on many an occasion for many a person been cause to recall Orwell’s reference to nationalism as “power hunger.”

Orwell did, nonetheless, also recognise that nationalists could and did often make sacrifices for collective causes which were not necessarily in their own personal interests. “It is important,” he cautioned, “not to confuse nationalism with mere worship of success. The nationalist does not go on the principle of simply ganging up with the strongest side. On the contrary, having picked his side, he persuades himself that it is the strongest, and is able to stick to his belief even when the facts are overwhelmingly against him. Nationalism is power-hunger tempered by self-deception. Every nationalist is capable of the most flagrant dishonesty, but he is also -- since he is conscious of serving something bigger than himself -- unshakably certain of being in the right.” Moreover, the very fact that they were able to utilize this force may intimate the pre-existing presence of and/or the simultaneous spread of nationalist sentiment amongst the masses. It can become all too easy to simply identify a, “stirring of national consciousness ... as a ploy utilized by aspiring elites in order to enhance their own status.” Wonderfully symbolic of the connection of nationalism to the masses were the brand names used by the popular cigarette manufacturer Hamid Bey, names such as “Beautiful İzmir” and “Turan.” The rhymes used to advertise these products in the press were equally telling, one entitled, “to addicts,” speaking of how the cigarettes had been food for the soul and a health cure, while those produced by the Greeks were responsible for chest problems. Nationalism was quickly becoming a marketing tool, much more influential with the masses than Choisi grants.

1741. KIZILYÜREK 1993a, 26.
1742. CHOISI 1993, 12.
1743. A similar line to that of Choisi is taken also by An. AN 1997a, 253.
1744. ORWELL 1945a.
1745. Ibid.
1746. CONNOR 1994, 73–74.
1747. Davul 3rd June 1923.
Finally, in light of the earlier entry of pan-Turkist ideas to the island, the rise of ethno-nationalism in Turkey, and the persistently growing demands for enosis, it would not, in fact, be unreasonable to suspect that the Turkish nationalists in 1920’s and 1930’s Cyprus did hold their own genuine nationalist sentiments. Choisi herself acknowledges that the British offer of enosis in 1915, “was seen by the Turkish Cypriot elite as a serious threat and might have led part of the upper class to a break-up of its unconditional loyalty to the British.”

Surely in the aftermath of such disillusionment the adoption of Turkish nationalism, a turn externally towards Turkey and internally towards emphasizing a Turkish political identity, should not be considered extraordinary and must be granted some share in the explanation of the motives of the Kemalist leaders.

With Lausanne Turkey had repudiated any desire to incorporate the territory of Cyprus; yet, even then, she continued, largely indirectly, (though not wholly so), to exert a critical influence in Cyprus. Reforms were quickly picked-up upon by the Turks of the island and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became for the Turks in Cyprus as well as in Turkey the principle symbol of their nationalism. Students were rapidly introduced to the heroism of the “Ata”, Kemalist teachers apparently going so far as to draw pictures of him on blackboards for students to view, and the Turkish government was aware of the effort undertaken in Cyprus to follow the reforms of the young Republic, in particular of the role of the teachers in this respect.

A letter of 1925 sent to the authorities in Turkey from Cyprus, conveys the efforts underway by Turkish teachers to spread the use of the hat amongst schoolchildren as opposed to the fez which had been discredited by the Kemalist regime as a symbol of Turkey’s decrepit past. The letter complained about the Kadi, Haci Rifat, (now, depicted by the Turkish authorities as a traitor under the sway of the British), as well as certain others, for their efforts to obstruct this change. Nevertheless, however, it was acknowledged that the British had been unwilling to intervene on their behalf, and that the school commission which Rifat nominally headed had voted against the prohibition of the wearing of hats. This information, garnered from the Republican Archives in Turkey, is essentially confirmed by the colonial secretariat’s files, which contain a translation of a letter from the kadi asking the government to take action on the matter. That the British authorities were not prepared to back him up on the matter is noteworthy.

Chief Inspector of Schools, Cannon Newham had stated in a letter of the 27th October, 1925 to the Colonial Secretary, that he had reason to believe that the members of the Governing Body of the Lycée did not support the Kadi, and that the matter would be, “of considerable delicacy”, as far as concerned elementary schools too. Four days later the High Commissioner recorded his decision that the matter was, “not one for interference by govt., or by the Board of Education, whose duties are fixed.”

1748. CHOISI 1993, 11.
1749. ATEŞİN 1999, 24; Letter from Ministry of the Interior, 13th December 1925. BCA 30.10.0.0/92C50-106.695-47.
1750. Ibid.
1751. Recall that Kadi Rifat had earlier been commended by Said Molla for his efforts to resist this change.
1752. Letter from Ministry of the Interior, 13th December 1925. BCA 30.10.0.0/92C50-106.695-47.
1753. Attachment to Chief Inspector of Schools to Colonial Secretary, 27th October 1925. SA1/969/1925, 1; The Muftu, on the other hand, came out in support of the hat, announcing to the press that he saw no religious foundation to oppose the adoption of this headgear. Söz 31st October 1925.
1754. Chief Inspector of Schools to Colonial Secretary, 27th October 1925. SA1/969/1925, 2.
to be complaints only a few months later that Newham himself was not admitting students donning hats to school, Söz stating that Cannon Newham should know full well that the Turks had adopted the civilized international dress form, and that he should understand that, “Turkish Cypriot children are an inseparable part of the Turkish nation.” Furthermore, Turkish government employees were to come under pressure to wear the fez for many more years, Judge Raif being one so pressurized as late as 1938.

Interestingly, one particularly important case of adoption of the reforms of mainland Turkey, that of language, with the Arabic script being abandoned for a Latin one, was more clearly encouraged by the British. They played a very substantial role in instigating comparable changes in Cyprus, making it compulsory that government officials learn the modern Turkish. Why they took this position is not wholly certain. As has been stated in this thesis on more than one occasion the pro-British Turkish Cypriots on whom the British relied so heavily were by no means against modernization, and were sometimes more personally influenced by western mannerisms and culture than many of their rivals. In such circumstances, it could be argued that the support of Münir and others for such change in language was an outcome of their genuine desire to be more “European”.

There is for sure nothing to suggest that Münir Bey resisted this change. As early as October 1928 he had minutted the Colonial Secretary that:

> It is understood that in future the Turkish newspapers & especially all the Turkish books published in Turkey will be issued in Latin characters. We have discussed this matter with the Director of Education and for the present we have simply asked that the Schoolmasters should acquaint themselves with the Latin characters and their various rules, in order to be in readiness to teach the boys when the books are to be issued in the new characters.

Acting Colonial secretary C. H. Hart-Davis was to minute six months later that the teachers had actually taken the initiative. He wrote: “In many schools, even in small villages, the schoolmasters have learned the new alphabet, and are actually teaching it.” Cannon Newham stated at the end of the same month that:

> It is inevitable that it be adopted next school year throughout the Schools, as otherwise we shall not be able to get any Textbooks – and I should therefore wish all School matter, attendance lists, notices to S/masters etc to be printed in the new characters.

Conceivably also it was ascertained that such a change was inescapable; the government could either lead or follow, but in time it was inevitable that the small Turkish community on the island, already so dependent educationally on Turkey, (including not only curricula, but also teachers, text books, higher education and the like), would come under the cultural orbit of the mainland Turks. Even so, the British role in enforcing the new alphabet’s use in the schools was for some time to be considered by the Turkish nationa-

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1755. Minute by High Commissioner, 31 October 1925. SA1/969/1925.
1756. Söz 20 March 1926.
1757. DENKTAŞ s.a., 39–42; This is supported by the report of the Turkish Consulate, which stated that after Raif’s refusal to go along with this demand the order for the wearing of the fez at ceremonies was relaxed. Report of the Turkish Consulate in Cyprus, enclosed in the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister, 14th September 1938. BCA 30/10.0/10445-124.887-3.
1758. ERTEKÜN 2003; It should be remarked, though, that Münir was one of the last to abandon the fez.
1759. Minute by Münir Bey, 6th October 1928. SA1/1320/1928.
1760. Minute by C. H. Hart-Davis, 10th April 1929. SA1/1320/1928.
lists an act of recognition by the Government of their Turkish identity. Söz was most gratified with the government’s decision on making the learning of the Latin alphabet compulsory for Turkish government officials, relating in March 1930 that a commission headed by Münir Bey had prepared a report on the matter, and thanking the governor for his implementing the necessary changes. The committee had unanimously agreed, “that the new Turkish Characters should be introduced throughout the Colony.”

Not absolutely all, however, were so welcoming of the changes. One letter of protest, of the 21st April, was particularly striking, both in its reactionary stance, and in its confirmation thereby, of the need for a more balanced interpretation of Münir. The letter signed “Ussouf Zia-Eddin, British Subject and Ex-Muderis and Agent of Cadi, Famagusta”, read as follows:

To His Excellency the Governor of Cyprus.

Your Excellency,

As it is known, after the Great War, in order to revenge Great Britain and its Allies, Bolshevism, Communism, was created and subsequently, upon the permission of the Victorious powers, Kemalism has also been added which is the illegitimate factor of the above, and are plague for the humanity and religion.

I need not mention the ill-objects and ambitions of the three above said which are the plague for the humanity and religion; but of late years this perishable fire began to fall also in this unfortunate, Cyprus, like lightning, and some of the thoughtless people began, without thinking for it before hand, to blow this with all their power.

We, the “Ulemas” (learned men) of Cyprus, contemplated to extinguish that fire and though final and official steps were taken, the Government, unfortunately, did not listen our real and useful proposals, having been deceived by untrue words and our desires were not acceded to and we were refused. Therefore unlawful accidents occurred which have never been seen, in any Colony of the just Great Britain which we know it officially to be the protector of religion.

Upon the perishable and malicious report of an unauthorised, unlawful and unaware body, the most important religious institutions of the Cypriot Musulmans which are also important by the Government, have been abolished. The posts of the Mufti, Chief Cadi etc. were also abolished inspite of the personal and religious freedom; our Musulmans religious lessons and Koran were diverted by foreign letters and removed from our schools and were replaced by religious lessons, habit and immorality which are against the Musulman character.

Now according to the information given by Newspapers, Söez, Birlik and Hakikat, our

1762. An alternative argument is that put forward by the author Hasan Behçet, who claims that the use of the Latin alphabet in Turkish Cypriot schools was the result of a special request made by the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet Paşa to Governor Storrs, which the latter duly promised to implement. Behçet claims to have been told this by İnönü himself. BEHÇET 1969, 314 and 314a.

1763. Söz 1st December 1932.

1764. Ibid., 27th March 1930.

1765. Münir Bey et. al. to Colonial Secretary, 28th March 1930. SA1/1320/1928, 13; On the 11th of April the Cyprus Gazette published the following announcement with regard to “New Turkish Characters”: “It is hereby notified for the general information that Government proposes to introduce the new Turkish characters recently adopted in the Republic of Turkey into general use in this Colony as from the 1st of January, 1932. ... As from the 1st of June, 1930, all Laws, Bills, Orders in Council and Bye-laws, and all Rules and Regulations issued by Government will be printed in the new character only.” Significantly, it was noted also that all Moslem officials must learn the characters by prescribed deadlines. Cyprus Gazette 11th April 1930.
Musulman letters, religious lessons and religious habits are about to be removed from
Cyprus, through the report of an unlawful body consisting by Messrs. Fuad, the Judge Raif,
Munir, the Delegate of Evcaf and Midhat, one of the School masters of the Lycee.

The poor officials and Musulmans are compelled by the Government to learn the Latin cha-
| racters which do not properly suit our language; thus the unlawful project of the Kemalism
| is perfectly accepted.

Therefore we, the “Ulemas” and Musulman population of Cyprus are left in anxiety.

Your Excellency we have no representative in the Island who can alter our religion and
change our national habit or to abolish our Musulmanic institutions; this is not permissible
by the Sheri Law.

If this is done by the local Government under what authority they do. If these are caused to
be done by the aforesaid respected body, again under what authority?

There is no nation in the world, except Bolshevism and Kema lism, who can allow for the
abolition of their religious institutions and national habits. Consequently neither the local
Government nor any one else has the right to abolish the religious institutions, rules of the
Kouran, traditional and national habits of our Musulman Cypriots.

We are not under the administration of the Bolsheviks or Turkey but under the British
Government who is the protector of the religion.

We want to keep and protect our Musulmanic institutions and traditional and national habits.
Not a single Muhammadan, in Cyprus, can accept this hateful actions, because those who
accept it cease to be Muhammadan. Those Turks who have accepted it are 1% who are in
the religion of Kemalism. The correctness of my statement can be found out through a
report, after enquiries and investigations made by a body consisting the “Ulemas” including
myself.

The Cypriot “Ulemas” and Musulmans will not be pleased by any action beyond this and we
cannot keep silent.

While the Musulmanic institutions, Sheri Rules and the traditional nationality is protected in
all parts of the world even in Greece; we cannot, Sir, but say and publish that; these were
insulted, varied and changed in Cyprus, under the British administration; it is regretted and
astonishable.1766

Notwithstanding this forceful exception, itself most illustrative of changes underway, it
is well attested that the Turks of Cyprus keenly adopted this reform. The Annual Report
of 1930 recorded that, “The new Turkish alphabet,” was already, “rapidly coming into
use,” even though it was not yet obligatory for all officials.1767 Beyond government
encouragement, however, there was clearly also a strong voluntary desire to adopt such
changes and, “teachers donated their time to conduct special literacy classes for children
and adults.”1768 The Söz reveals also that the Birlik Oçağı played a pioneering role in the
matter, holding a course for the teaching of the new alphabet to the public as early as Sep-
tember of 1928.1769

Another important social change that can be attributed in large measure to socio-political developments in Turkey was related to the place of women in society. Mustafa Kemal had made a special point of championing the emancipation of women, arguing that without such social change Turkey’s development would forever remain stunted.\textsuperscript{1770} Turkish women in Cyprus evidently gained in confidence by recognising in the words of one Hıfzıye Ahmet the role that, “the Anatolian Turkish woman,” had played in the liberation of the motherland, and claiming that this was evidence of the greater role they themselves deserved to play in society.\textsuperscript{1771} Birlik proudly related news of the participation of a female Turkish doctor in a medical congress in London indicating that it was a sign of advance.\textsuperscript{1772} By the end of 1925, some women had already begun to abandon the veil. Söz reported that it was a source of pride that the Turkish Cypriot women had begun to understand the objectives of the revolution in Turkey, arguing that they had taken a step in the direction of civilization that others would soon follow.\textsuperscript{1773} By the late 1920’s early 1930’s, by which time Turkish Cypriot girls were receiving formal education in numbers far greater than ever before, Söz was portraying a positive westernised role for the female in society and publishing on its front page articles about, “Women in Turkey” which related the new political rights that they now had.\textsuperscript{1774} Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriot ladies were starting to take the first initiatives of their own and establishing their own organizations.\textsuperscript{1775} They received warm praise from the Kemalists for so doing, particularly for the setting-up of the “Nicosia Turkish Ladies Philanthropic Society”, an initiative which was given coverage and repeatedly applauded in the Söz.\textsuperscript{1776}

At the same time as reforms underway in Turkey were being adopted on the island, the flow of charitable assistance between Cyprus and Turkey continued, even after Turkey’s acute need of the war years had passed. Villagers, as before, contributed substantially to these efforts.\textsuperscript{1777} When assistance came in 1931 in the opposite direction to help the victims of a natural catastrophe in the Paphos region of Cyprus, the island’s Turks were particularly moved, not so much by the sum of just under £150 which had been sent from Ankara, but by the symbolism of the maternal care being received from Turkey and distributed personally by the Turkish consul.\textsuperscript{1778} An Article entitled “Brotherly Affection” in the Söz declared: “When we see how in their times of greatest need the motherland finds and assists her genuine children who have fallen apart from her and warms their quivering

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1770} KINROSS 1981, 342–343; Volkan and Itzkowitz make the bold assertion that his interest in the matter may well have been related, at least partially, to his, “uneasy relationship … with his engulfing mother.” They argue that for Kemal, “Freeing the Turkish woman to stand on her own feet before the world would render her, in a sense, less dangerous. The enemy is far less threatening when out in the open.” VOLKAN - ITZKOWITZ 1984, 255–256.
  \item \textsuperscript{1771} Birlik 4\textsuperscript{th} January 1924.
  \item \textsuperscript{1772} Ibid., 15\textsuperscript{th} August 1924.
  \item \textsuperscript{1773} Söz 2\textsuperscript{nd} January 1926.
  \item \textsuperscript{1774} Ibid., 12\textsuperscript{th} June 1930.
  \item \textsuperscript{1775} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{1776} See Ibid., 21\textsuperscript{st} and 28\textsuperscript{th} January, and 18\textsuperscript{th} February1932, and a letter sent by Ekrem Tahsin and published in the Söz of 17\textsuperscript{th} March 1932. The latter person, wrote the letter as a student of law in Ankara, but had shortly before been the leading supporter of Necati in the Turkish Lycée during the 1930 elections, and had been expelled from school by its British administrators as a consequence of his nationalist activities. Following Necati’s election, however, a compromise was reached and Tahsin allowed to complete his studies. See Ibid., 1\textsuperscript{st} January, 1931.
\end{itemize}
hearts with her embrace, our pain dies down, our eyes brighten and we look to the future with strengthened faith.”\textsuperscript{1779}

Aside from such altruism, and the socio-political change that it reflected, Turkey also had some more direct impact on the island. Clearly it is important not to overstate, as many nationalist Turkish scholars have done, the direct role played by Turkey and its leaders in fostering and championing nationalism in Cyprus during the inter-war years, and in some ways, at specific junctures, it can be argued to have acted detrimentally to this cause. Nevertheless, certain points do deserve mention. The Turkish government had, for instance, provided important financial assistance to the nationalist journal Söz on more than one occasion, in particular paying for the purchase for the newspaper’s typeset in 1927.\textsuperscript{1780} Remzi Bey had written to İsmet Paşa, then serving as Prime Minister, the following letter:

\begin{quote}
We established the Söz newspaper and printing press in order to secure and defend certain of our local communal rights. At the time when we began to publish the Anatolian war of liberation started, and observing that Turkey’s most important places had been occupied by the enemy we took it upon ourselves as a duty to support here the national cause without reference to our inadequate capabilities. The value and importance of our publications at that time were acknowledged appreciatively by the directorate-general of the Turkish press and a letter of appreciation bearing the signature of Ağaoğlu Ahmet effendi was sent to our office ... We believe that in order to prevent the national feelings of the close to fifty thousand of our co-racial people who have had to remain on the island from being injured by opposing publications and to prevent any opportunity for misunderstanding, we think it necessary to try and continue the publication of Söz. ... If you believe that we are justified in the matters we have raised we beseech and implore you to please support the sending to us of one size 12 font size stamp, another size 16 font stamp, and 32 font size Turkish letters.\textsuperscript{1781}
\end{quote}

These materials were needed as armaments with which to continue the struggle, though all the same it was concluded: “If you are of the opinion that our duty here is at an end, we are, most excellent general, ready to heed your order to go to any part of Anatolia.”\textsuperscript{1782}

\textsuperscript{1777.} See, for example, the letter published in Söz from M. Fikri Vezir of Galatya village informing Remzi Bey that the villagers have collected money for the “Ankara Himaye Etfal Cemiyeti”. [Ibid., 27\textsuperscript{th} March 1930]. Such assistance continued throughout the decade, and into the war years, with it being taken as an expression of love for the motherland. The Turkish Consul was to be particularly impressed by the amount of £1,500 pounds collected by Turkish Cypriots from all over the island in 1938 for victims of a major earthquake, and cited this, amongst other things, as evidence of the Turkish Cypriots’ deep sense of loyalty to Turkey. [Report of Turkish Consulate in Cyprus, enclosed in Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, 14\textsuperscript{th} September 1938. BCA 30..10.0.0/10445-124.887-3]. It was indeed no mean amount by the standards of the time, and coverage related to this Turkish Cypriot fund-raising effort in the mainland Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet was also to cause concern to the British Governor. [Enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1938. FO 371/21935]. The Cumhuriyet paper itself was considered “the most influential” mainland Turkish paper in Cyprus, “Its Kemalist tone,” it was said, “tends to develop a nationalist and racial feeling among local Moslems, and so to produce dissatisfaction.” “Particulars of Local Newspapers and Periodicals.” Enclosed in Acting Governor to Secretary of State, 16\textsuperscript{th} June 1939, CO 323/1663/11.

\textsuperscript{1778.} Michael Georghiou to Local Commandant of Police, 14\textsuperscript{th} May 1931. SA1/1576/1929/3, 311.

\textsuperscript{1779.} Söz 7\textsuperscript{th} May 1931.

\textsuperscript{1780.} They cost 262 “lira”, 25 “kuruş”, and were loaded on ship on 4\textsuperscript{th} March 1927, destined for Larnaca. Telegram of 4\textsuperscript{th} March 1927. BCA 30..10.0.0/2717-28.159-2..\textsuperscript{1780}

\textsuperscript{1781.} Remzi to İnönü 21\textsuperscript{st} May 1927. BCA 30..1.0.0/AS-10.59.6.

\textsuperscript{1782.} Ibid.
Having received a positive response to his initial appeal, Remzi was to make a further request for material support from Turkey that was also duly granted in the form of type-set procurement for Söz in early 1929. In this case the appeal made by Remzi was that there was a need for Latin letters to maintain the Turkish character of Cyprus, and it has even been suggested that Mustafa Kemal himself gave his support. Even Mehmet Ateşin, who rejects the idea of interest in Turkish Cypriot affairs being displayed by Republican Turkey’s leaders prior to the 1950’s, concedes that, “for some reason, we witness that the leaders of Republican Turkey showed great interest in the matter of the reform of the alphabet.”

The Republic’s first consulate in Cyprus was instituted in 1925 with Asaf Bey appointed consul. It is well established that he, to the eventual chagrin of the British, assisted the budding Kemalist movement, and attested that he actually campaigned on behalf of Necati Özkan and his associates. Purcell in fact contends that, “Kemalism was fostered above all by the Turkish Consul Asaf Bey.” So, as with the rise of Greek nationalism, then, though at a later juncture in history, the “motherland’s” consuls were to play a role in encouraging the growth of Turkish nationalist sentiment on the island as well. Amongst one of the first places that Asaf Bey was invited to after his arrival in Cyprus was the Birlik Ocağı, which held a tea party in his honour. It was not to be his last visit to the club either, which by the end of his stay in Cyprus had become a hot-bed of nationalist agitation. Asaf was eventually recalled by Ankara at the end of 1930, according to Storrs as a result of British complaints. The Evkaf party was more than likely happy to see him go too, Hakikat stating that, “the news of this transfer has been received with satisfaction in the island,” and reporting that the people of Famagusta in particular had “rejoiced” at the news. For the nationalists, though, the consulate under Asaf had plainly become a focal point of political attachment. They made a point of paying their respects to the Turkish consul, Necati noting in particular that every 29th of October, Turkey’s “Republic Day”, he would travel to the consulate to pay his respects. However, to what degree intervention in the internal political affairs of the island was the personal policy of Asaf, and how much it was policy sanctioned by Ankara is not clear. Georghallides suggests that Asaf was actually acting largely alone in the hope of impressing ultranationalists in Turkey.

Certainly, exaggeration of Turkey’s and especially Atatürk’s interest in Cyprus during the early republican years is misleading. Birinci and Ismail, for instance, dedicate one part of their four part book on relations between Turkey and Cyprus during the Atatürk era to

1784. Once again, though, the claim, without further corroborating evidence, may well be an effort to unduly attribute a serious concern held by Atatürk for the island’s Turks. See, for example, Rauf Raif Denktaş interview in Köprü Dergisi December 1985, 13.
1785. ATEŞİN 1999, 16 and 22.
1786. See, for instance, PURCELL 1969, 243; See also McHENRY 1987, 134.
1787. PURCELL 1969, 243.
1788. Birlik Ocağı minutes of 29th June 1925. KO-HT/BO-KD.
1789. Attachment to minute by T. H. R. Cashmore, November 1965. DO 220/43.
1790. Hakikat 25th November 1930 in SAI/950/1926.
1791. ÖZKAN 1967.
1792. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 468; Undoubtedly the greatest impediment to uncovering the remaining mysteries to the Turkish republic’s early policies as to Cyprus remains the fact that the archives of the Turkish Foreign Ministry remain closed to the public.
propagation of, “the interest shown by Atatürk in Cyprus and in the Turkish Cypriots,” pronouncing that, “It is known that as a consequence both of its being a strategic island, and of there being on this strategic island a Turkish people full of love and longing for the Motherland, Atatürk took great interest in Cyprus.”1793 Misleading also, however, is the assertion that the Turkish government and mainland Turkish institutions and organizations paid no attention to developments of the island. The consulate was not the only channel of influence. The Halk Evleri, (or, “People’s Homes”), established in Turkey in place of the Türk Ocâğı in 1931, were to continue to remain in contact with the principal Turkish Cypriot clubs throughout the 1930’s, and the records of the Birlik Ocâğı confirm Ersoy’s findings that they supplied materials to the their Turkish Cypriot counterparts.1794

That Turkey, though restrained, and to be sure not actively pursuing any irredentist ambitions towards Cyprus, was nonetheless by no means disinterested in the island’s situation and fate, was confirmed by Storrs. He vividly enunciated his great surprise at how well informed leading Turkish political figures were during his ostensibly private visit to Turkey that followed soon after the October Revolt. Not only was it related to him by the ambassador that there was considerable interest in Turkey about developments in Cyprus, but he witnessed this also first hand.1795 Regarding his meeting with Prime Minister İnönü, he was to write:

The Prime Minister, with the friendliness of whose personality I was most favourably impressed, displayed no less than his colleagues and subordinates a knowledge of and sympathy with the problem of Cyprus which I confess I had not anticipated.1796

Yet, Storrs also reveals that Turkish politicians did not necessarily support the rise of a Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus, let alone one that would challenge British authority. By the end of the 1920’s relations between Turkey and Britain had begun to improve,

1793. ISMAIL - BİRİNÇİ s.s., 275 and 277; References to Mustafa Kemal reportedly cautioning those on a military exercise in the Antalya region, to “pay attention to Cyprus” which so long as it lay in enemy hands would endanger the supply roots of southern Turkey, is perhaps the most frequent abuse of a rare statement by Mustafa Kemal being used wholly out of context to imply a major political interest in the island. [See, for example, the Turkish Cypriot Historian, H. Fikret Alasya’s dedication at the front of his book, “Tarîhte Kıbrıs”, xxii; See also ALTAN 1997, 7–8, and s.m. s.s. (c), (the homepage of the website www.kibristurkundur.com). On the latter, an ultra-nationalist website emphasising in particular the importance of Cyprus for Turkey and the Turks, the matter is contorted even further. Not only are Atatürk’s words invoked in relation to his having said that attention should be paid to Cyprus, but it is now also added that he uttered as well, “We need Cyprus.”]. Turkish Cypriot President, Rauf Raif Denktaş, has claimed that the above-mentioned story was recounted to him by a young officer who was in the presence of Atatürk when he spoke these words. [Interview with Rauf Denktaş in Köprü Dergisi, December 1985, 13]; On a similar front, see also ATTALIDES 1979, 83–84. Though there appears to be an error in the date Attalides gives, (Atatürk having already died by 1939), he nevertheless points to another powerful example illustrating the above point, where Atatürk is claimed to have stated that the time for incorporating Cyprus would also come. Attalides may well have confused the date with that of the final incorporation of the province of Hatay into the Republic of Turkey, which is itself associated with its own legend in nationalist discourse. Manızade writes that he was told by another Turkish Cypriot, Safvet Engin, who, it is said, had an opportunity to meet Atatürk during his final days, at a time when Hatay was on the way to becoming a part of Turkey. Safvet Bey is purported to have humbly asked Atatürk as to what was to become of Cyprus. Putting his hand gently on Safvet’s shoulder, Atatürk is said to have responded, “Its turn will come too Safvet Bey.” [MANİZADE 1993, 511]. As Papadakis argues, this, and other such unsubstantiated claims have also provided fuel for the efforts of Greek Cypriot nationalism to demonise Turkish intentions as to the island. PAPADAKIS 1998a, 73–74.

1794. ERSÖY 1998, 33–34; the inventory of books belonging to the Birlik Ocâğı also shows that a greater number of literary volumes were received from the Halk Evleri.


and it was now the Soviet Union, which had in the past given support to the Kemalist
regime, that showed greatest concern with the line followed in Ankara. 1797

Kızılıürek has argued that this shift in Turkish foreign policy led during the 1930’s to
the abandonment by Kemalist intellectuals in Cyprus of their anti-imperialist, anti-British
position and to their adoption of a collaborationist policy vis-à-vis the colonial power. 1798
The manifest adoption of anti-British positions by the Turkish Cypriot Kemalists did
diminish during the decade, partly perhaps as a consequence of Turkey’s new internatio-
nal alignments, but also no doubt as a consequence of the curtailment of liberties in Cyp-
rus following the insurrection of 1931. There is, however, little to support the contention
that the Kemalist leadership in Cyprus was now hand-in-glove with the British. Common
front was not formed between the colonial authorities and the island’s Turkish nationalists
until the following decade, and even then it could be said that it was not always as
unbreachable as it is portrayed. All the same, however, Kızılıürek is right in so far as he
points out that the change in Anglo-Turkish relations did have important consequences
for the Turkish Cypriot nationalists. A Turkey recovered from the tumult of the 1920’s,
continuing to maintain hostile relations with the British, might sooner or later have been
tempted to support the strengthening of an anti-British Turkish nationalist movement in
Cyprus. This it certainly did not do.

Of his luncheon with Şükrü Kaya, the Acting Foreign Minister, Storrs had written:
He displayed an even closer acquaintance with the affairs of Cyprus than those I have
already mentioned and went so far as to express his appreciation of my attitude “de bon
père” before and up to the disturbances and of “plus de blague” when once events had pro-
ved that the paternal treatment had been abused. He impressed upon me that he had fre-
quently recommended all Turks who had anything to do with Cyprus to maintain the closest
and most loyal contact with the British Government, recommending them if they found the
Greek preponderance unfavourable to leave the country and go elsewhere rather than remain
and create difficulties for the authorities. 1799

It could well be argued then that the policy of encouraging emigration, which Asaf
himself had directed for a long while, was to have negative consequences for the cause of
Turkish nationalism on the island. The charge might thus be brought that Turkey actually
discouraged the strengthening of a nationalist movement on the island. And, if we rely
solely on an approach to the issue from this perspective, such arguments are far from sen-
sesless. Yet there was simultaneously another side to the coin. Aside from the indirect im-
lications of the success of Kemalism on the mainland, there was also a more direct result
attributable to the activities of Turkish consuls as of the middle of the 1920’s. In particular
Asaf’s role in supporting and championing the rising Turkish nationalist movement and
its leaders should not be lightly dismissed. Asaf was especially close to Necati
Mısırlızade and his comrades, and contributed to their triumph in the 1930 elections. It
was a triumph that signified a critical turning point in the political history of the Turks of
Cyprus, a victory that demonstrated that Turkish nationalism had indeed now flourished.

1797. The Bolsheviks, who initially gave harbour to Enver, appear to have grown suspicious of his pan-Turkist
aims, and turned instead to develop stronger ties with the Kemalists. GÖNLÜBOL - SAR 1974, 29 and
82.
1798. KIZILYÜREK 1988, 86.
The rising wave of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus during the 1920’s culminated in the remarkable victory of the “populists” led by Necati Özkan in the 1930 Legislative Council Elections. Not only had they fought the campaign on a nationalist platform, but, as many have failed to recognise, they had won the elections as a result of the success of their unprecedented efforts to politically mobilize the Turkish Cypriot masses, masses whose intensified Turkish national sentiment was appealed to in the campaign to unseat Münir and his associates, and to put an end to what was portrayed as their unconditional loyalty to their British patrons.

From an apparently Marxist perspective, Kızılyürek contends that the nationalism that emerged in Cyprus, (in his earlier assessments only in the 1920’s and then also only as a, “nationalist movement of the intelligentsia”), was, “not supported within Cypriot history.” For him, it, “was a movement of the elite rather than of the masses.” Yet, Kızılyürek’s determinist approach as to the “necessary” historical conditions of nationalism in Cyprus, (bringing to mind Gellner’s theory also), overlooks the reality that such “conditions” have not been prerequisites for the rise of nationalism in countless other cases either. As Kedourie fairly points out, the Ottoman Empire itself was one of the principle areas still, “innocent of industrialization,” when the phenomenon of nationalism surfaced. Whatever particular cases may suggest, the evidence shows that there is nothing to substantiate claims that nationalism appears solely because of sociological necessity, and much to indicate a reverse relationship, that of the force of nationalism, in fact, being responsible for shaping social conditions. Indeed, in one short passage in his later work, Gellner seems to quite candidly recognise the bug in his own theory as it related to the case of Greek nationalism in particular, and Balkan nationalisms in general:

The first nationalist rising was that of the Greeks, and it would be idle to deny that some of its features present a problem for our theory. Our theory links nationalism to industrialism: but early nineteenth-century Athens ... bore very little resemblance to Engel’s Manchester, and the Morea did not look like the Lancashire dales...

1800. KIZILYÜREK 1990, 24; For the sometimes inconsistent views as to the place of nation within Marxist thought, and in particular as to the conceptual dichotomy of “nations with history” as opposed to “nations without history”, see HEROD 1976, passim.
1801. KEDOURIE 2000, 143.
Generally speaking, not merely Greek, but also the other Balkan nationalisms can be seen as constituting a major problem for the theory, given the backwardness of the Balkans by the standards of industrialism and modernity.”

“All one can say on this point...,” he continues, and proceeds to try and formulate some explanation for what he frankly concedes is an anomaly.1802

What is especially troubling with Kızılyürek’s interpretation, however, is the impression it leaves as to the circumstances of the masses, who are depicted as wholly disassociated from any nationalist sentiment, or involvement in efforts to achieve nationalist goals. Kızılyürek is by no means alone in fostering this impression, which above all is that created by the British themselves. What we see, however, in terms of the British is that such an interpretation of the Turkish Cypriot masses’ condition, (and for that matter, a parallel misinterpretation of the Greek Cypriots’ condition), is founded on their self-delusional interest in downplaying it, rather than on an objective appreciation of the evidence. Though, undoubtedly it cannot be claimed that the non-elite sections of society were uniformly nationalist in sentiment, (as neither of course were elites or intelligentsia), it can fairly be ascertained that by the close of the 1920’s, a substantial proportion of them were indeed so imbued. To be sure, the British oversight of the true appeal of the, “‘national’ concept” was not restricted to the case of Cyprus. Hobsbawm asserts:

It seemed to imperial observers, that in the dependent world it was often an intellectual import, taken up by minorities of évolutés out of touch with the mass of their countrymen, whose ideas of community and political loyalty were quite different. Such reflections were often just, even though they tended to cause imperial rulers or European settlers to overlook the rise of mass national identification when it did occur. 1803

In a similar vein, some have erroneously portrayed the struggle for power in the 1930 elections as being simply a matter of the personal differences and rivalries of the competing elites in the Turkish Cypriot community, totally overlooking the impact of the rise of Turkish nationalism amongst the lower social ranks of the community. Yet the prize sought by the new elites in the aftermath of the election was not the favour and the patronage of the British, but adulation and power based on the support of the Turkish Cypriot masses, as well as of Turkey itself. Thus, they were appealing to the nation, the Turkish nation, and sought, at least indirectly the sanction of the national, rather than governing imperial state. Furthermore, throughout the remaining year of political liberty that followed their electoral victory of October 1930, (and preceded the October Revolt of 1931), the Turkish Cypriot populists continued to promote a nationalist agenda and to mobilize the members of their community for that purpose.

To the British what was often considered most threatening about the new state of affairs that materialized with the nationalist success was the fact that despite their obvious differences, the new Turkish elite was much more willing than the old to find common ground with the Greeks on matters of common interest. By the end of the 1920’s the Greeks had begun once again to take a more politically demanding, more blatantly pro-enosis and anti-British stance, and paradoxical as it may appear, these two increasingly assertive nationalist movements, with ultimate aspirations that were mutually exclusive, were to combine against the government in the Legislative Council. The criti-

1802. GELLNER 1998, 41–42.
1803. HOBSBAWM 2002, 152.
cal political dilemma this created for the imperial power was “conveniently” solved only by the October Revolt of 1931 in which Greek nationalist forces for the first time physically challenged British rule through insurrection.

The October Revolt, in which the Turks did not participate, was quite quickly quashed and followed by the abolition of the relatively liberal provisions of the colonial constitution under which the British had till then governed Cyprus.1804 Though they unanimously denounced the revolt in which they had played no part, (nor been invited to do so), the Turks were to suffer more than their share of repression; Yet, the very fact that undisputable evidence of Turkish nationalism continued to surface in its aftermath, despite the heavy-handed measures adopted by the British, was to attest to the underlying presence of significantly widespread Turkish nationalist sentiment, and to the fact that the victory of the nationalist Turkish Cypriot elites in 1930 was founded in profound socio-political change, and was not the ephemeral result of intra-elite, interest-based rivalry.

6.1 The Rise of Necati Özkan and the “Populist” Nationalists

Misirlıçade Mehmet Necati Özkan was born in Nicosia at the very end of the nineteenth century, on the 12th of May 1899, to a family of some means. His destiny, though, lay in the twentieth century. His father and brother-in-law had both stood in elections against Evkaf candidates... unsuccessfully.1805 The epithet “Misirlıçade” or “relative of the one from Egypt” points to a family connection with this country, explained in the semi-official biography of Necati as being that his great grandfather, Halil had lived in Egypt for many years, having left Cyprus to work on the Suez Canal.1806 Aside from politics, Necati was to be active both in education, teaching history, geography and Turkish as a young man at the İdadi school from which he graduated in 1915, and throughout his life as an entrepreneur, who amongst a wide range of pursuits was involved in running a grocery store, selling timber, setting-up a cigarette factory and a cinema, and investing in the hotel and travel industry.1807 According to the aforementioned biography, the surname he later adopted, Özkân, or “Pure Blood”, was bestowed on him by no other than Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, with whom he is said to have had an audience in the mid-1930’s.1808

Necati, or Özkan as he became, was clearly an ambitious man who had been raised in a family of political challengers, educated in the leading Turkish schools of Cyprus during the Young Turk era, who as a businessman was particularly sensitive to the deteriorating position of the Turkish vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriot community. He was as such without a doubt the figurehead of the first wave of Turkish nationalism. Yet, what is often overlooked, though notably acknowledged by the man himself, is that he was not a “one-man-show”.1809 The idea that this one individual had single-handedly defeated

1804. For an account of measures taken to quash the revolt, see GWYNN 1934, 331–366.
1805. Necati recounted with some satisfaction how he proved wrong people who had initially said, “his father lost to the Evkaf, his brother-in-law lost to the Evkaf, and so will he.” ÖZKAN 1967.
1807. Ibid., 14, 35 and 57–73.
1808. Ibid., 224–227.
1809. Özkan himself emphasised the collective nature of the success won in the elections. ÖZKAN 1967.
Münir and the “Dark Force”, that “the worthless Nejati”, a, “nonentity” as he was described by an enraged Storrs, was singularly responsible for disrupting the constitutional system of Cyprus and still is a fallacy. Likewise, to overlook the values that he represented, and the product of which he partly was, focusing instead on his political activities as being solely those of one vying for personal power, not representing or representative of any widely held ideals save self-empowerment, is much too facile an approach.

Necati and his colleagues and advocates were the tip of the proverbial, if not titanic, iceberg; they were the visible symbols of the force of Turkish nationalism that had been gradually emerging during previous years, and were better politically organised than commonly recognised. Reference is actually made by some contemporary authors to the establishment of a “Milli Cephe Partisi”, or, “National Front Party”, of Kemalists, possibly as early as 1926, which was led by Özkan, but I have found no evidence to support the assertion that any such formal, structured political party was established. Instead the “Milli Cephe” or “National Front” appears to have been a looser term used to describe the un-institutionalised alliance of populists and Kemalists that fought against the pro-government candidates in the election of that year.

Özkan’s political career gained momentum in March 1929 when he was elected to the Municipal Council of Nicosia. His tumultuous political career continued thereafter into the mid-fifties, when he was finally elbowed-out from the political scene by another, rising nationalist leader, Dr. Fazıl Küçük. The highlight of this career, however, was undoubtedly his dramatic victory over Münir Bey in the Legislative Council Elections of October 1930. He stated himself that he had actually been preparing for these elections for four years prior to his successful candidacy and in a letter he later wrote to the General Secretariat of the Republican People’s Party he explained that “they” had initiated, “the local national struggle in Cyprus in 1927.”

Amongst the initiatives that he undertook as a member of the Municipal Council, in association with the other Turkish members, was the eventually successful struggle to have the municipal market-place established in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.
records that at the time Turkish businessmen were still considerably involved in the commercial life of the town, (to which many from surrounding areas would also come to trade), and argues that this accomplishment helped to stem the long deteriorating position of the Turks vis-à-vis the Greeks in the commercial field.\footnote{1817}

Necati emphasized that despite having been elected to the municipality, he would also frequently journey out to the villages, explaining to the villagers how their Legislative Councilors, (Münir in particular), were under the British thumb, and disparaging them for their policies and actions, charging them, for example, with having appointed an anti-Turkish, anti-Moslem English headmaster to the Lycée, (see below).\footnote{1818} He worked hard to build-up a broad base of support not only by travelling regularly to villages near and far to court the potential votes of rural constituents, but also by establishing ties with like-minded nationalist figures.\footnote{1819} Amongst those latter to whom Necati pays special gratitude for their assistance and efforts in the 1930 campaign are Necmi (Avkıran) Bey, Dr. Pertev, Fadil Niçazi Korkut, Remzi Bey and Ahmet Raşid Bey.\footnote{1820} Many of these men had already been in trouble with the colonial authorities because of their views and all were at one time or another members of what was by 1930 now called the Kardes Ocağı, successor to the Birlik Ocağı and the Hürriyet ve Terraki, to which several had also belonged.\footnote{1821}

There were, however, some doubts about the appropriateness of Necati’s candidacy for the Legislative Council, particularly regarding his youthfulness. He was barely thirty years old, (though Zeka Bey, who was to become the new member for the Famagusta-Larnaca district, was himself notably only twenty eight years old when he won the election) and this perturbed even his brother-in-law Behaeddin Bey, who five years earlier had himself run unsuccessfully against Münir Bey.\footnote{1822} In an extraordinary issue published just before the election, Hakikat was to try to exploit this as a point from which to attack the candidacy of Necati whom it described as, “an inexperienced boy.” Consequently, it said, that, “Those who do not wish to become tools in the hands of the Greeks must vote for Munir Bey.”\footnote{1823} In a society where age was traditionally deferred to, apprehension as to Necati’s youth and inexperience was somewhat understandable, but the fact that it did not ultimately act as an impediment, may also signify a changing political culture.

\footnote{1817. Ibid.}
\footnote{1818. Ibid.}
\footnote{1819. Of course, such developments regarding nationalist campaigning in the villages were not by any means restricted only to the Turkish community. [See for example, LOIZOS 1975, 31–33]. In fact, they were probably evident much earlier and more forcefully in the Greek Cypriot community.}
\footnote{1820. ÖZKAN 1967.}
\footnote{1821. Missing club records for the period in question make it hard to determine the precise date on which the name change took place. Nesim claims it occurred in January of 1931, [NESIM 1986, 34.], but while the club was indeed still referred to as the “Birlik Ocağı” in 1929, by the following year it was already being acknowledged in the press as the “Kardes Ocağı.” [See Söz 6th November 1930]; The Hürriyet ve Terraki registry of central committee decision notes, for example, that Ahmet Raşid was unanimously elected a member of the Hürriyet ve Terraki as of 15 May, 1923. [Hürriyet ve Terraki minutes of 15th May 1923. KO-HT/BO-KD]. Confirmation of the membership of still other leading lights of the nationalist movement is found in the annual lists of Birlik Ocağı members contained in KO-BO-AED.}
\footnote{1822. KORKUT 2000, 39; Necati confirms though that Behaeddin was in the end to back his campaign. Necati ÖZKAN 1967.}
\footnote{1823. Extract from Hakikat, 14th October 1930. SA1/950/1926, 65–66.}
Korkut too concedes that he was one of the last to give his backing to Necati, partly as a consequence of the rift that had occurred between them two years earlier over the question of participating in celebrations to commemorate the onset of British rule. Korkut recalls that when Storrs began to make preparation for the holding of spectacular celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the British Occupation in July 1928, he, together with Dr. Pertev, Necmi (Avkıran) Bey and Şevket Bahçe, (the four of whom were Turkish members of the Nicosia Municipal Council and prominent members of the Birlik Club which had by now abandoned its temporary, wary apolitical stance), signed a declaration stating that the day that the Turkish flag had been taken down from the castles of Cyprus was not a cause for celebration, but for sorrow. Korkut noted that he was still at the time the head of the Birlik Ocakı that had replaced the Hürriyet ve Terraki Club, and inferred that, under the instigation of an incensed Storrs, members of the club who were government employees began to resign, leaving behind only self-employed tradesmen and professionals. So as not to cause problems for the Ocak and the few government employees who remained members, Korkut albeit temporarily, resigned his position as its chairman and the club’s name was changed to Kardeş Ocakı. Necati, Korkut recalled, was amongst those who led people to sign a petition of protest against the four Municipal Council members. Korkut highlights the irony that in the upcoming elections Necati, (whose earlier action could only have pleased the Governor), was now to be confronted by Storrs.

The manifesto, which had been signed by Şevket Bahçe, Mehmet Necmi (Avkıran), Dr. Pertev and Fadıl, was published in both the Söz and Birlik issues of the 10th of March 1928. Entitled, “The Fiftieth Anniversary is a day of mourning for the Turks of Cyprus,” it read:

To the respected public of Nicosia:

We all know that until fifty years ago we, Turks, were the rulers of this Island. The lack of equilibrium in the East caused by the Turco-Russian war resulting unfavourably for the Turks brought, on 12th July, 1878, British Administration to our Island and thus our three-century-old sovereignty over this Island came suddenly to an end. As every one of us knows, while passing from supremacy to a state of subjection the Turkish mass in Cyprus has kept its cold blood; it has, in keeping with old Turkish and Moslem tradition, always remained loyal to the Laws and the administration of the new Government and has endeavoured to forget the painful change at least outwardly. Although during the past fifty years we have been subjected to all sorts of conditions, good or bad, and although, particularly the recent policy [of the Government], has been aiming at throwing us under the feet of the majority, yet, we Turks, have not for a moment failed to respect other people’s feelings and have never tried to cause misunderstandings by recalling our past of fifty years ago. It is to be regretted that Government has decided to hold festivities during these days of mourning for us. … we, Turks, are not so stupid as not to be able to realize that these festivities are for the celebration of a day which has put an end to our sovereignty and which is, consequently,
a day of mourning for us. Once this point is understood we will naturally be excused from participating in such festivities.

We deem it a duty to submit this point to the respected public of Nicosia for their consideration. We trust that our public will not debase themselves to the extent of joining those persons who rejoice on the day of their father’s death, and we hope that they will not take part in any of the festivities whether actually or as on-lookers.1828

In response the faithful Münir forwarded petitions from many Turkish Cypriots, including those gathered by Necati, protesting this attitude, and in a personal letter to Münir Bey, also forwarded by Münir, one of the signatories, Şevket Bahçe Bey, now distanced himself from these actions. Şevket claimed that he had been ill at the time of signing the manifesto, and had therefore not been able to make, “an all-round consideration of the matter.”1829 More predictably, Hakikat slammed the manifesto as virtually traitorous, but the way in which it appealed to Turkish patriotism to justify its criticisms was most worthy of note:

We, Turks of Cyprus, have not forgotten nor can we forget that time was when Cyprus was ours and that the Island was part and parcel of our mother country. During our life of fifty years under British rule in this beautiful Island we have not on any occasion failed to declare and manifest our attachment to our mother country. Articles in the newspaper columns confirming this attachment of ours are being seen and read almost every week. Hakikat, in particular, has, since the first day of its publication, been cheering up our saddened hearts by enumerating the changes that have taken place in our country, Turkey, and the wonders ensuing from those changes. Is it possible for us not to weep bitterly at our inability to benefit from the abundant blessings of our Turkey? But, alas, like other enslaved classes of human society, we, too, have, due to the requirements of the times and owing to political necessity been left under foreign rule. Alas while we were eagerly looking forward to the possibility of living within the national frontiers our great leaders have out of respect for International Law been compelled to leave us under British rule. Naturally we will not give up all hope from our Turkey. If need be we shall, undoubtedly, not fail to make sacrifices as circumstances permit. But, without forgetting that we are living under foreign, i.e. British, rule, it is absolutely necessary that we should realize our mistake of labouring against our own interests and that we should adopt a definite line of conduct. Reason and our country’s interests demand this. …

It is to be regretted that those of us who have not been able to realize and appreciate this necessity have, through their recent behaviour, unconsciously helped the Greek Committees in their (…..?) activities. Let us speak openly. Before taking the decision to abstain from the sports, etc., which the Government contemplates holding on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary, the Greeks went round the villages and enlightened the Greek public mind, and the Greek newspapers have for months been publishing hot articles on this subject. The meetings of the Church Committees and religious councils in this connection are still fresh in our minds. The reason why the Greeks have decided to stand aloof is because they wish to see their ambition for the union of Cyprus with Greece realized!!.

As it would not become us, Turks, to take any attitude whatsoever in favour of these preparations of the Greeks and of their struggle for the attainment of the aforesaid object, we

cannot but consider (sic) the manifesto … to be nothing less than a proposal calculated to
stain our national dignity both internally and externally.\textsuperscript{1830}

The article then condemned the authors of the manifesto further, decrying, “Your
effort, as self-appointed leaders of the country, to represent all the other young men of the
place as unpatriotic and devoid of the national spirit is an unpardonable sin,” and charged
that what they were calling for:

Can be nothing else than to bow before the mighty strength of the Greeks, to endorse all
their acts, and, what is more, to declare preference of Greek to British rule. … in your mani-
fest one comes across things that smack of Greek policy and shrewdness. We are in need of
men who can work independently and not by aping. In our anxiety to release ourselves, that
is to say the Turks of Cyprus, from the cruel grip of the Greeks we have always and at all
times felt the danger of going against the Government. The act of your coming forward with
half measures has made the position of the Turks more difficult than ever. Through your
proclamation you have not only pleased the Greeks and have caused them to rejoice, but
you have also facilitated the union of the Island with Greece. We are heart and soul opposed
to such thoughts and acts. We had explained in our last issue the policy and wisest course
that the Turks of this country should follow. We now wish to ask you: Do not the opposition
and animosity exhibited by you affect the Fatherland rather than the Government?\textsuperscript{1831}

Memorably, Hakikat was also to laud the efforts of those, including Necati, who orga-
nised to counter the calls of the manifest, as showing true patriotism and avoiding compli-
city with the Greeks, which it equated with, “a very loathsome enmity towards the father-
land.”\textsuperscript{1832} The paper wrote:

In our opinion the measures and acts which correspond to the local and national needs are
the protest that was prepared by the enlightened youth of Nicosia against the famous mani-
fest and submitted to the Government … naturally we, and everybody who thinks like us
and the patriotic population of Nicosia have felt the obligation of defending the Turkish exi-
istence in the Island against the ambitious aims of the Greeks.\textsuperscript{1833}

All the same, by mid-1930, (notwithstanding the largely personal differences that had
emerged in this association during the mid-1920’s), the Kardeş Ocağı Club, which Korkut
led, had mobilized behind the populist and nationalist, blatantly anti-Evkaf, and a little
more subtly anti-British, party and programme of Necati Özkan and his supporters. Kor-
kut records that he, together with Dr. Pertev, Ahmet Raşid and Remzi Bey were to take
charge of the election campaign.\textsuperscript{1834} Pertev was to receive special praise for his efforts in
support of Necati in Söz, with an article explaining how the two were travelling to the vil-
lages to campaign together.\textsuperscript{1835} Fences having been mended between Korkut, Remzi and
Necati, it was to be at the Kardeş Ocağı, Korkut’s power base, that Özkan and his suppor-
ters first gathered in the aftermath of the announcement of their electoral victory; here
that they were to be greeted by swarming crowds and embraced by Asaf who had travel-

\textsuperscript{1830} “Do not the opposition and the hostility that have been shown affect the fatherland rather than the Govern-
ment?” Extract from Hakikat, 17\textsuperscript{th} March 1928. SA1/623/1928, 27–29.
\textsuperscript{1831} Ibid., 26–27.
\textsuperscript{1832} “The abominable observations of ‘Seoz’ emanate from a few wretched and valueless brains.” Extract from
Hakikat 7\textsuperscript{th} April 1928. SA1/950/1926, 33.
\textsuperscript{1833} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1834} KORKUT 2000, 36.
\textsuperscript{1835} Söz 25\textsuperscript{th} September 1930.
led to the club from his consular post in Larnaca so as to congratulate Necati; and from the balcony above the club from which Necati, and the other leading campaigners, including Korkut, stood shoulder-to-shoulder and spoke in turn to the crowds.\footnote{ÖZKAN 1967.}

Of Niyazi, and Remzi, Raşid and Pertev we have already made some mention, and more could undoubtedly be added, but there was also one other significant figure that needs to be referred to, a son-in-law of Con Rifat, who was to emotionally embrace Necati in the Kardeş Ocağı on the night of his election victory. This individual was Judge Raif, the father of probably the most famous living Turkish nationalist, Rauf Raif Denktaş.\footnote{It is probably revealing, that, despite the financial burden it imposed, Judge Raif was to send all his sons, including Rauf, to receive their education in Turkey. DENKTAŞ s.a., 8 and 11.} As a judge Raif was to claim to have been persecuted by Münir Bey and his brothers-in-law Fuad Bey and Inspector Faiz, who accused him of being involved in nationalist politics. Raif was to strenuously deny any such complicity. Yet, Özkán’s memoirs suggest otherwise; they suggest that he was, albeit circumspectly, so implicated. Necati describes Judge Raif as an exceptionally heroic and nationalistic man who had been of great assistance to him during the campaign.\footnote{ÖZKAN 1967.} His association with the nationalists is confirmed by his son Rauf Denktaş, who states that amongst his fathers closest friends with whom he was in regular contact, and with whom he discussed social and political affairs, were Remzi Bey and Con Rifat.\footnote{DENKTAŞ s.a., 8–9 and 19; Raif Bey’s close friendship with Con Rifat is confirmed also by the latter’s daughter. [FEDAİ 1986, 234–235]; Necati Münir Ertekün believes that it was really Con Rifat who became the cause of the feud between Judge Raif and his father. All the same, he states, enmity between Rifat and Münir was not so great as to preclude the former from giving Münir a lift in his automobile when the latter’s car broke down. ERTEKÜN 2003.} In fact, Rauf Denktaş goes as far as to claim that his father was the closest friend that Remzi Bey had and that, “they were like brothers.”\footnote{DENKTAŞ s.a., 64; DENKTAŞ 1993, 15.} His family doctor was Dr. Pertev.\footnote{Ibid., 10.} Furthermore, he attests that Raif had supported Necati in the Elections of 1930. When as a child he awoke from his sleep one evening he found that his father had left the house. He recalls that on his return his father was elated, having returned, he discovered, from the celebrations of Necati’s victory.\footnote{DENKTAŞ s.a., 10.}

As mentioned earlier, Judge Raif had been fined as early as 1920 for having participated in clandestine efforts to raise funds for the Kemalists. Necati’s memoirs and Raif’s own actions before and after the election affirm that his heart at least was still firmly in the Kemalist camp, no matter that he himself adamantly denied to the British authorities that he was involved in politics, writing: “I have never at any time whatsoever taken any part in politics, either directly or indirectly.”\footnote{Judge Raif’s petition to Secretary of State, enclosed in Storrs to Secretary of State, 12\textsuperscript{th} March 1931. CO 67/23k/11, 42.} While accepting that he, “happen[ed] to be a friend of some of Munir Bey’s opponents,” he denied having visited Necati’s house for political purposes.\footnote{Ibid., 35 and 42.} This allegation, he claimed, was part of a slanderous campaign against him led by Münir and Fuad Beys. Much preferring the word of Münir to Raif, Storrs was to report: “Munir bey who is intensely pro-British does believe that the Judge...
has for some years at least been implicated in the political movement in favour of Turkey to correspond with the Greek cry for Union with Greece.”

Raif’s repudiations led to a rare, if roundabout, acknowledgement of nationalist tendencies in the Turkish Cypriot community, Storrs proceeding to observe: “It is not difficult to understand that such sentiments should exist in the island as the Turks in Cyprus are as a people without a nation, while nationalistic ideas are being flaunted perpetually throughout the country through the Greek ‘national’ movement,” and further that though Münir had, “the support of all the most respectable members of the Mohammedan community,” he had, “suffered some unpopularity through refusing to swim with the kemalist tide now flowing as an aftermath of the work here of the late Turkish Consul.”

He transmitted to London too Münir Bey’s view as, “a trusted Executive Councillor of long standing,” that it was, “unwise that Judge Raif should be in a position through being stationed at Nicosia to influence large numbers of his fellow-countrymen politically.”

Peculiarly titillating is part of a minute on Judge Raif’s file by Sir John Shuckburgh, whose analysis was frequently seconded, and, “whose skill with the pen had become a tradition in the Colonial Office.” He wrote: “This is an unsatisfactory case. As Mr. Cowell says, it all sounds rather trivial; but the bitter personal vendetta between two prominent Turks – of the existence of which the papers leave no doubt – may be fruitful in future trouble.” Much can certainly be read into these final words, though there appears to be no further evidence that an apparent reference to the potential exploitation of the rift between Münir and Raif was later acted upon by the British.

Not only did Necati have prominent backers for his own election campaign for the Nicosia-Kyrenia seat, but he had also an alliance with two other candidates, one with a political past, the other a novice politician, who shared the same populist/nationalist platform, and stood side-by-side against Münir’s collaborators, Eyyub and Celaleddin respectively. The first was Ahmed Said Hoca, who had served before in the Legislative Council. Elected in 1916, Eyyub later defeated him in the elections of 1921. His theological teachings, Necati claimed, were so enlightened and impressive as to attract the attention of even Atatürk.

Circumstances were also to be on the side of Necati and his colleagues. Underlying socio-economic trends on the island surely had an important effect on enhancing the electoral opportunities of these three men. Another factor, extraneous in origin and not legitimately attributable to the actions of Münir and his allies, or of the colonial administration in Cyprus, can be expected to have also bolstered their chances. This was the Great Depression, the effects of which were beginning to be felt by the time Election Day arrived in October 1930. Storrs himself was to acknowledge this in a secret report to London concerning both Greek and Turkish Cypriot political opposition. “The economic depression
here, as elsewhere throughout the world,” he explicated, “has strengthened the elements of discontent among the population.”

Hit by successive droughts during the 1920’s the agricultural producers were naturally hurt, but so were larger commercial operators, including the enterprises of the Kenan family of Larnaca:

From the beginning of 1930 the Cypriots became painfully aware of the sudden deterioration of the country’s economy and of their helplessness in the face of the American and European depressions. Before the end of January the first major commercial failures were announced with the triple bankruptcy of the Larnaca produce exporting firms of Ahmed Kanaan and Sons, Said Kanaan and Sons, and Rashid Kanaan and Sons. Following the collapse in prices, these firms specialising in the export of cereals and potatoes could meet only seventy per cent of their combined liabilities of 17,000. By March the well-known Nicosia draper’s firm of G. E. Christodoulides became insolvent, to be followed by others. The falling prices, the competition of cheaper imported cereals, especially flour, and also the lack of demand even at low prices for the staple products of local agriculture increasingly undermined financial position of the farmers, making it steadily harder for them to maintain regular payments on their loans, including those to the co-operative societies.

Such economic discontent as was raised by the Great Depression in Cyprus could not have helped the pro-government incumbents, who somewhat unfairly, by default as it were, were to be held accountable for all the economic woes of their constituents without respect to whether or not they were indeed wholly responsible.

6.2 The Nationalists’ Electoral Triumph

The campaign itself was bitter to say the least, and, marked by an unprecedentedly sharp island-wide rift between two camps, that while certainly not devoid of personal antagonisms was represented as, and represented in reality too, the most visible gulf as to political policy to emerge in an election between two Turkish sections.

Of the accusations hurled against the Münir camp, branded the “Kara Kuvet”, or, the “Dark Force”, by their opponents, the most vigorous were that they had become the instrument of the British and ignored the needs and sentiments of the people. Remzi Bey set out both their major complaints against Münir, and their evaluation of the meaning that the success of Necati would contain. In an article entitled, “Necati Bey and the elections,” published on the 2nd October 1930, he complained not only that the Evkaf would at every election abuse its powers and resources and about the fact that Münir had undue powers because of the numerous positions he occupied, but also, and more fundamentally, about the fact that Münir preferred to be in league with the government rather than to consider the interests of the community. Thus it was, Remzi argued, that Münir had been involved in abolishing the Müftülük and bringing the Şeri courts under the administration of the Evkaf without any reference to the desires of the people. Necati, on the other hand, was portrayed as a populist who had put himself forward, for the common good of

1852. Storrs to Secretary of State, 4th June 1931. CO 67/239/14, 23.
1853. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 294.
1854. Söz 2nd October 1930.
freedom and happiness, to liberate the people from such absolutism. In anticipation of Necati’s victory Remzi wrote that it was, “Pleasing to note that our people have comprehended this important point and every Turkish villager has seen it as incumbent upon himself as a duty of the nation and fatherland to gather round in support of Necati Bey.”

The first to triumph of the populists was not, in fact, however Necati, but Zeka, who’s opponent withdrew from the race. Georghallides claims that it was in the face of Zeka’s popularity and broad support that Celaleddin realized he had little hope of success and withdrew his candidacy. Zeka was thereupon declared to have won the election uncontested on the 7th of October. Attention therefore quickly turned to the other two districts, to the heated races between Necati and Münir, and Said and Eyyub respectively. The latter rivalry was by no means a new one. The two had vied with each other for the seat for quite some time. Despite the fact that Eyyub was not much liked by the British, having been the champion of the nationalist camp in the early 1920’s, and being described to the Colonial Office as late as March 1930 as, “An unscrupulous and bombastic rogue and agitator,” they nevertheless would have been certain to prefer his election to that of Said. He might at least be expected to abide to the lead of Münir. Aside from disclosing his, and other councillors’ sexual practice, it had been stated also in this British report that, “He is entirely guided by his own interests in all matters and is quite unreliable but at present he is in debt to M. Münir Bey and completely under his influence.”

Said, a lawyer as well as religious authority, who at one stage had been more warmly received by the British, had nevertheless displayed sentiments of Turkish nationalism in the past too and in the run-up to the election was to spearhead the legal challenge to the dominance of Münir. During mid-1930 he sent a succession of memorials to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the subject of Münir’s multiple appointments being incompatible with his presence in the Legislative Council. Together with the British responses, his correspondence was published in full in both English and Turkish, in the Söz newspaper, which had become the principal mouth organ for the nationalist camp in the run-up to the elections. Said detailed the numerous public positions held by Münir, and protested that as a public official, “the Delegate of the Evcaf whose functions are obviously non-political, must not take any part whatever in politics nor must he interfere in any way with any party matters.” To support his arguments, Said cited precedents, stating that: “the Mufti of Cyprus and the Commissioner of Famagusta Capt. Young were obliged to withdraw their nomination from the elections for the Legislative Council, the former in 1913 the latter in 1891 at the indication of the Government that they were considered as members of the Civil Service.”

In a confidential despatch the Acting Governor Henniker-Heatton informed Passfield: “The memorialist is making capital in the local press, for electioneering purposes, of his correspondence with Your Lordship.” The fact of the matter was, however, that, des-

1855. Ibid.; See also, Söz 1st January 1931.
1856. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 461.
1857. Attachment to Storrs to Shuckburgh, 12th March 1930. CO 67/233/14, 47.
1858. Söz 1st May 1930, 26th June 1930, and 14th August 1930.
1859. Said to Secretary of State, 14th June 1930. CO 67/235/13, 19.
1860. Ibid., 20.
pite official British rebuttals of Said’s claims, and their insistence that Münir was not a public official as Said argued, some colonial administrators privately granted the justified nature of the nationalists’ complaints. Dawe seems to have conceded that the situation was not an ideal one, though his explanation for its necessity by force of circumstance was typically prejudiced and arrogant:

With respect to the general question of Munir’s multiple appointments, there is, I think, some force in the criticism that one man ought not be allowed to combine so many functions. The practical difficulty is, however, that the Cypriot Turks are not a very bright lot, and when a Turk has to be appointed to a Council or Committee the choice naturally falls upon Munir as he is the only one among them who carries the necessary guns. The occasions for making such appointments are numerous in Cyprus as Cypriot representation on public bodies is always on a communal basis. The field for Greek committee men is extensive; but for the Turks it is practically confined to Munir.1862

Nicholson, the Officer Administering the Government in Storrs’ absence, had as early as 1928 conceded the fact that, with amongst other things, the Cyprus Evkaf Order in Council, 1928, having brought the Evkaf department under the direction of the Governor and deemed it, “to be a Government Department”, the position of Münir on the Executive Council was undesirable at the very least. He had elaborated that:

In so far as the functions of the Executive Council are concerned, the object of appointing persons other than those holding public office is in order that the Governor may through them be kept in close touch with public opinion, an object which cannot be attained through the medium of Official members alone, and I recollect that in a Windward Islands despatch in or about 1920 the Secretary of State emphasised this point in connection with the appointment of Unofficial members to the Executive Council of St. Vincent.

It goes without saying that members of the general public who are entirely independent of the Administration are better fitted and more likely to give impartial and sound advice on certain matters than Government officers whose knowledge and judgement are necessarily circumscribed or liable to be affected by the nature of their duties and the relationship in which they stand to the Executive. This consideration applies particularly in such a case as that of Munir Bey who, as I have pointed out, holds his appointments in the Evkaf Department during pleasure and is not amenable to the Colonial Regulations but only to the Governor.

The political conditions of this Colony render it all the more necessary that the governor should be able to command the counsel of independent advisers and for the reasons which I have stated I consider that this object would be better secured by the appointment in place of Munir Bey of an additional member entirely unconnected with the Administration.1863

His despatch had further reasoned that:

A situation where the Administration retains control only by the grace of a small non-Greek minority is far from satisfactory and the presence in the Executive Council of the senior Turkish Elected Member, who controls the votes of his two colleagues in the Legislature, inevitably gives occasion for the belief on the part of the Greek community, which has already found expression in the Press, that the consistent support accorded to Government

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by the Turkish Members is the result of an arrangement between the Governor and those Members.\textsuperscript{1864} In accordance with these views, Nicholson was not too long after to have had tendered the resignation of Münir Bey from the Executive Council, effective as of 12\textsuperscript{th} March, 1929.\textsuperscript{1865} Still, he was administering the island on only a temporary basis. When Storrs re-assumed the reins of power, he once again re-appointed his trustworthy friend Münir to the Executive Council.\textsuperscript{1866} Storrs did claim that, “it was only with great reluctance,” that he had re-appointed Münir Bey and that he appreciated fully, “objections to these appointments being held by one individual,” but, meanwhile he also transmitted a memorial in support of their colleague Münir signed by Eyyub and Celaleddin, claiming that, “the strong and almost unanimous desire of the whole Moslem Population is that the Moslem Delegate of Evcaf should represent the Moslem population on both the Executive and Legislative Councils.”\textsuperscript{1867} Eyyub’s support here was especially remarkable, in that it contrasted wildly with the position he had taken earlier regarding İrfan Bey and his relationship with the government. In a digging reference to this he had at one time contended that: “in order that the elected members of the Legislative Council should be able to carry out their duties towards their constituents satisfactorily they should have nothing to do with the Government either directly or indirectly.”\textsuperscript{1868}

The pro-Münir Hakikat had also joined in the fray. It was recorded by the British that in its issue of the 30\textsuperscript{th} March 1929, the Hakikat had declared that it, “mourns Munir Bey’s sudden and forced retirement from the Executive Council and mentions in sorrowful terms the various blows the Turks of Cyprus have received from Government especially during the last few years.”\textsuperscript{1869}

In justification of his decision to re-appoint Münir, Storrs declared to Passfield:

> With the present composition of the Legislative Council he is invaluable and no question should arise of his resigning his seat. As Member of the Executive Council he is independent and is at entire liberty to take a stand at any time on Government policy which is opposed to my views except where the Evkafr department is directly concerned. I am prepared, however, to take an opportunity to replace him when the means can be found of so doing without detriment to Government. I propose to submit certain recommendations to you in this connection on my forthcoming leave in England.\textsuperscript{1870}

It is unlikely that he ever made any serious recommendations to this effect for Münir was to retain his seat on the Executive Council and position as Delegate of Evkaf, until he finally retired in 1947, Storrs, Dawe and their associates undoubtedly having been unable to find any other Turk endowed with the necessary attributes to fill the position.

\textsuperscript{1864} Ibid.\textsuperscript{1865} Cyprus Gazette 15\textsuperscript{th} March 1929.\textsuperscript{1866} Cyprus Gazette 15\textsuperscript{th} November 1929; Originally Stavros Georgiou Stavrinakis had resigned together with Münir, but when Münir was reappointed, it was Panayiotis Loizou Kakoyannis, not Stavrinakis, who was appointed with him. According to Georgallides, Stavrinakis had been accused, “of failing to support in the Legislative Council measures which he had approved in the Executive Council,” and it was for this reason that a more loyal alternative was sought. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 188–190.\textsuperscript{1867} Storrs to Secretary of State, 7\textsuperscript{th} May 1930. CO 67/235/13, 32.\textsuperscript{1868} Minutes of the Legislative Council 1923, 7\textsuperscript{th} December 1923, 183; In response to this jibe Irfan, as earlier noted, was to affirm his faith in the existing constitution, and to argue that it actually intended for members of elected bodies to interact with the government. Ibid.\textsuperscript{1869} Press summary prepared by Turkish translator Mr. Utitidjian, 2\textsuperscript{nd} April 1929. SA1/950/1926, 45.\textsuperscript{1870} Storrs to Secretary of State, 7\textsuperscript{th} May 1930. CO 67/235/13, 32.
The government’s intransigence on the above matter was actually a blessing in disguise for the nationalists. The issue of Münir’s multiple appointments, and his relationship with the Government were to provide critical fodder on the campaign trail, Necati passionately arguing that numerous benefits would accrue through the separation of powers if the various posts held by Münir were to be occupied by different individuals. In one speech in Ambelicou he explained:

Münir Bey has three posts, (a) Delegate of Evkaf, (b) member of the Executive Council (c) Member of the Legislative Council, although it is necessary to have three different persons for these posts. If there were three persons in these posts their opinion would not be the same. If the Delegate of Evkaf was exceeding his rights in the Evkaf’s office, the Member of the Legislative Council would ask him for explanation as to why he has done so. But now would a man who is doing something wrong scold himself?1871

In Ambelicou, Necati also signalled that the government would not be able to take his vote for granted in the Legislative Council as they had done Münir’s, and made a point of openly praising the Greek members’ courage in confronting the government. He stated:

If the members of the Legislative Council and especially our Turkish Members of the Legislative Council did not co-operate with the English Members, this would not have happened. Although the Greek Members of the Legislative Council always try for the benefit of the Island, they are always defeated because they are 12 united votes, but the Turkish and English members are 13. The leader of our members of the Legislative Council, Münir Bey, never raises any objection in the Legislative Council. For example, if a farmer employs a labourer on wages, when a quarrel takes plays between the farmer and myself, whom will that man support? Myself or his master? Undoubtedly he will help his master because he pays him his wages. Münir is serving as a Member of the Legislative Council since 5 years. I want you to tell me what good he has done to any of you?1872

Seeing as Münir and so many of his close family members depended for their prestigious and lavishly-paid jobs on the government, Necati warned, the people should expect nothing from them:

This man receives a salary of £80 per month from the Government. His brother Vassif Bey, Azziz Bey and all his other relatives Fuad Bey and others are likewise Government officials and they receive high salaries: How can such a man be a National leader and work for the benefit of the Turkish population? How is it possible for him not to work for the benefit of the Government?1873

Similar arguments were made in his speech of the 8th of September at Mora, where Necati warned that Münir cared, “only for his relatives to the detriment of the people,” and self-assuredly promised, “If I am elected I shall render great services for Nation, just as Moustafa Kemal at Turkey.”1874 “I am,” he pronounced, “a Nationalist and democrat,” and this time made some effort to guard himself against charges of being pro-Greek.1875

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1871. When Dr. Eyyub travelled to Gönyeli village to campaign on behalf of Münir, a hostile crowd, not placated by Eyyub’s assurances that Münir could not be considered a government official, confronted him on the issue. Refet to Local Commandant of Police, 22nd August 1930. SA1/1576/1929/1, 291; Attachment to Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 4th September 1930. SA1/1576/1929/1, 329.
1872. Ibid., 330–331.
1873. Ibid., 331.
1874. Ibid., 353.
1875. Refet to Local Commandant of Police, 10th September. SA1/1576/1929/1, 354.
Münir, he declared, never helped the Moslems gain work, while he, Necati, never employed Christians in his enterprises. Similar speeches were made around the island, reiterating issues such as that above, and others too, such as the question of the Lycée. Notable were the comments Necati made in a speech in Gönyeli:

Dear brothers, open your eyes. This is the Gentleman who drove your children away from the schools. To-day we have a Turkish Lyce in which they appointed an English Director and we cannot fly our flag. The Armenians have also a school but their directors are Armenian, and they fly their own flag. No one prevents them. The Greeks are also the same. Did you ever hear the Greeks to have an English director?

In Luricina he railed further against Münir for having, “abolished the posts of Mufti and Cadis which we inherited from our ancestors,” complained that Münir had shown no respect or gratitude to the martyrs, “who were killed for the sake of the Nation,” and had contemptuously removed their graves so as to please the Greeks, and promised himself, “to work for your rights and for the Nation.” Comparable points had been raised in Lefke, where Necati stated to his audience that as a government official Münir feared defending their rights, whereas, he assured, “I am not afraid from asking the rights of the Turks.”

Particularly poignant was a speech delivered by Necati at the newly established “Halk Kulubü”, or, “People’s Club” in Nicosia on the 6th of September 1930. According to the report sent to the local commandant of police, he had declared:

Dear brothers, The Turkish population of Cyprus has been awakened. Every Turk knows the way of administration of the Evkaf’s affairs. The Turks have been sacrificed by thousands in order to conquer Cyprus. Instead of repairing the graves of our Martyrs to a more suitable and better place, they took away their bones from their graves and put them at the sweepers cart of the Municipality under the feet of Greeks and took them to the cemetery. Which Turk can bear this? These graves are the graves of the conquerors of Cyprus. What right has the Evkaf to remove these graves without asking anybody? Although some persons who love their country and their religion, by writing in the newspapers tried to prevent the removal of these graves from their places, they could do nothing. Does our Mohamedan religion allow this? The Greeks are putting up statues and they try to get the island under their rule. But our Turkish leader is removing the graves of our Martyrs.

Necati announced that he was overjoyed by the response he received in the villages, the condition of which Münir had never shown any concern for. Münir, he pronounced:

[T]hinks only of his high salary, and he tries to be the favourite of the Government. … See the Greek Members of the Legislative Council, they always try. They have established National Clubs in all villages, and they inspire the people with National feelings. We are to-day being driven into a great precipice. The Nation understands this, and will take itself out of this precipice.

1876. Ibid.
1877. Ibid., 355–356.
1879. Attachment to Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 16th September 1930. SA1/1576/1929/1, 365.
1880. Attachment to Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 8th September 1930. SA1/1576/1929/1, 338.
1881. Ibid., 337–338.
Said was supported in his own campaign by Necati, who travelled to Said’s district to support his comrade, delivering speeches in his favour. Necati also appears to have given some logistical support to Said, but it narrowly failed to prove sufficient, with Eyyub ultimately holding on to his seat by the skin of his teeth by a slender twenty-four-vote margin. Necati in fact asserts that had he sent a few more cars to the district to help in Said’s campaign, (so as to transport voters to polling stations), Said would have won, but the always modest Said, he says, had failed to request this assistance from him. In fact, a more obvious reason for Eyyub’s victory is likely to have been the division of the nationalist vote. The race in the third electoral district of Limassol and Larnaca had in fact been a three-way contest. Though Eyyub and Said had been the front-runners, a third candidate, registered under the interminably long name of “Ahmed Houloussi Haji Hussein Agha Kiouproulouzadé”, also ran. He actually collected quite a considerable share of the vote with 644 votes, as compared to 1347 for Said and 1371 for Eyyub. If the information revealed by Georghallides is true, that Eyyub made complaints about the Turkish consul having been in league with both his opponents, it indicates that were the third candidate not to have stood for election, Said would most likely have picked up the larger share of his votes, at least a large enough proportion to unseat Eyyub.

Necati’s race with Münir was, however, a two-horse contest and, as noted, his resources in the election were much superior to those of Said. He readily admitted that he had spent a sizeable sum on the campaign. Korkut confirms that Necati had pledged to spend his inheritance from his father on the campaign, and that he even went into debt to finance the effort. He claims to have been privy to the knowledge that Necati spent £3000 pounds for this purpose, a very considerable amount for the time. Belittling Necati’s victory, Storrs, in a loaded but unsubstantiated attack, accused Necati of having, “secured his election by a very lavish disbursement of money.” Such accusations of electoral impropriety in Cyprus were not new. The “Precis of Mr. Nicholson’s Despatch On Cyprus Constitution,” had pronounced: “The presence of the money-lenders and advocates on the Council is due to the presence which they bring to bear on a debt ridden electorate and to use of wholesale bribery at elections.” Yet, whatever their true foundations may or may not have been, Storrs and others never furnis-

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1882. Enclosure in Storrs to Secretary of State, 29th October 1930. SA1/1430/1930, 8.
1883. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 467; Paradoxically, Eyyub had complained about election irregularities to his detriment a decade earlier, when the target of his complaint was not Turkey, but apparently the Evkaf in league with the British. In a debate in the Legislative Council in 1922, he stated that there was a need, “to draft a Bill providing for the proper election of members of the Legislative Council and suitable for constitutional governments. The members of the Council were the representatives of the country and as such ought to be elected free of any possible influence.” [Minutes of the Legislative Council 1922, 8th March 1922, 7.] To this Irfan had replied, “that he hoped the hon. Member had been duly elected,” and, in turn, Dr Eyyub had responded, “that he had been duly elected, but unfortunately with great difficulty—a difficulty which should not have existed in a country governed by constitution. He did not want to give particulars.”
1885. Ibid., 40.
1886. Stors to Secretary of State, 12th March 1931. CO 67/238/11, 29.
1887. Precis of Mr. Nicholson’s despatch on the constitution of Cyprus, in CO 67/227/5, 20; Though it is certainly true that indebted villagers were often prone to come under the sway of their creditors, it should be recorded, however, that even in Ottoman times, “inequality of landownership was not as pronounced as in other regions of the Empire,” and most villagers still tilled their own land. [KATSIAOUNIS 1996, 33.] As a consequence they were perhaps not always as directly bound to the money-lenders and ağas as they would have been were they to be landless rural labourers.
hed any evidence to the Colonial Office to verify their accusations. It is striking that such accusations were made always only against those displaying ‘disloyalty’. A more objective approach would doubtless argue that the British were themselves implicated in electoral malpractice by, at a minimum, turning a blind eye to the use of Evkaf resources, (over which they had legal responsibilities), for electoral purposes. Necati openly accuses Münir of having abused Evkaf resources in an effort to win the elections. Korkut more specifically charges that the government was actively helping Münir raise votes, claiming that it was Storrs himself who encouraged the director of American mining concerns in Cyprus, a major employer of Turkish Cypriots, to give his backing to Münir. Kaymak was to argue, though, that such government interference and pressure back-fired, and ultimately contributed to the nationalists’ victory in the 1930 elections.

Storrs’ censure of Necati’s electioneering, and his evidently powerful personal dislike of the man, may well have been linked to his exceptionally close association with Münir Bey. His personal friendship with Münir continued even after both men had aged, and he was to laud Münir in his memoirs as, “the indispensable and permanent Ataturk of Cyprus.” In his despatches he vehemently defended Münir against charges made by Judge Raif and others that Münir Bey “terrorized” his opponents, and that he was the most unpopular man amongst the Turks who would feign loyalty to him only because of his powers of patronage and because they were financially indebted to institutions that he controlled. However the depth of spitefulness that can be quite powerfully felt in his attitude towards Necati suggests a deeper, more personal cause for his disparagement, that went beyond plain loyalty to Münir and annoyance with the failure of his own political strategy. It may well have had to do with Necati’s complaints to the Colonial Office about Storrs’ in the run-up to as well as after, the elections.

Necati disclosed that he had telegraphed his lack of trust in the impartiality of the Governor to the new Parliamentary Undersecretary of State Dr. Drummond Shiels, and requested that he come to oversee and monitor the elections so as to prevent Storrs from committing electoral fraud in Münir’s favour. In fact, Necati contended further that Shiels was furious with Storrs for having backed the wrong horse in the elections, and though this particular assertion has not been directly confirmed by any impartial source, it is true that Colonial Office officials were to become increasingly critical of Storrs’ over-reliance on Münir. Shiels wisely minuted in Raif Efendi’s file on the 26th May 1931:

I must confess that I have the feeling that the Govr is influenced in his outlook by his great admiration of and personal friendship for Münir Bey. He was much disappointed at his non-success in the elections. ... Apart from the purely judicial aspect of this matter, it has

1888. ÖZKAN 1967.
1889. KORKUT 2000, 38–40; Necati was clearly no angel, and readily, quite proudly admitted to Machiavellian tactics that he used against Münir in the campaign. He did not however disclose in his interview with Ali Süha having ever directly proffered money in return for votes. ÖZKAN 1967.
1890. KAYMAK 1968, 11–12.
1891. STORRS 1937, 577; Necati Münir Ertekün notes how his father, on his annual trips to England, would socialize and dine with the Storrs. ERTEKÜN 2003.
1892. Storrs to Secretary of State, 12th March 1931, and Judge Raif’s petition to the Secretary of State enclosed therein. CO 67/227/5.
1893. ÖZKAN 1967.
1894. Ibid.
some political importance. The Greeks are fairly solid against the Govt., and the Turks have been helpful to the Govt., the Leg. Council being constituted as it is, it is very important that the Govr should not appear to side with one section of the Turks in the split which has taken place. I know it is for the best reasons that he is drawn to Munir bey’s party – because they are strongly pro British – but we dont want the other section made more anti-British, as they may become if Munir Bey’s party is too much backed up at Govt. House.1895

It is an established fact that the planned visit to Cyprus of Dr. Shiels was rescheduled and that as a consequence he in fact turned up on the island on the eve of the elections, rather than after. Officials in Cyprus even expressed apprehension at this change of plan’s meaning that he, “would be arriving in the middle of the electoral campaign.”1896 All the same, the visit went ahead, Shiels arriving in Cyprus on October the 15th, on a supposedly “unofficial” visit, the “real purpose,” of which, according to Georghallides, “was the rather vague one of Shiel’s familiarisation with the constitutional and political problems of Cyprus against the background of Passfield’s declared preference for the maintenance of the status quo.”1897 Korkut states: “With the campaign underway and the election drawing near, the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies Doctor Shiller [sic.] was by coincidence present in Cyprus. According to the belief held by our community at the time, had Doctor Shiller not been present in Cyprus, it was not inconceivable that Storrs would have acted more aggressively towards us and disrupted the elections.”1898

That Storrs was as particularly disliked and distrusted by the Turkish nationalists, at least as much as he himself disdained them, might be explained solely by his championing of Münir and the unpopular measures and laws adopted during his governorship. There may also have been deeper, historical and psychological reasons, which when compounded by Storrs’ widely recognised philhellenism, might have justly or unjustly prejudiced them against the Governor.1899 This lay in Storrs’ long-standing friendship with Thomas Edward Lawrence, more commonly known as Lawrence of Arabia, with whom he had worked in the Middle East and who was regarded with particular hatred by the Turks for his role in raising the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. It was Storrs, together with Liddell Hart, who was to address a literary luncheon held at Grosvenor House as a tribute to Lawrence shortly after his premature death in a motorcycling accident.1900 In his notorious, “Seven Pillars of Wisdom,” Lawrence

1895. Minute by Dr. Drummond Shiels, 26th May 1931. CO 67/238/11, 6.
1896. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 381.
1897. Ibid., 382–383.
1898. KORKUT 2000, 40.
1899. His arrival in Cyprus was clearly a source of optimism for the Greeks who, “welcomed him in the hope that he might prove to be the last British Governor.” [GEORGHALLIDES 1988, 23]. “It was,” therefore, Crawshaw remarks, “ironic that the first serious outbreak of violence during British rule should have erupted when Stors, an impeccable philhellene, was Governor.” [CRAWSHAW 1978, 26–27]. Nevertheless, despite early disappointments, Georghallides reveals that as late as mid-1930 the Archbishop was still hopeful appealing to Storrs’, “love for Greek classical education and Greek civilization,” [GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 371]. While the genuineness of Storrs’ philhellenism is sometimes questioned by Greek sources, he was undoubtedly a passionate admirer of Greek civilization and had even been awarded the title of Commander of the Order of St. Saviour by the Greek government. [GEORGHALLIDES 1988, 23]. Though he clearly left Cyprus in many ways a bitter man, his positive sentiments for the Greeks do not appear to have dissipated. It has even been contended that when asked to pronounce his views regarding Cyprus at a dinner-function in 1943, “the ex-Governor, without hesitation, rose and solemnly offered a formal toast ‘for the union of Cyprus with Greece.’ ” Ibid., 31.
1900. s.n. s.a. (b).
himself was to have publicly flattered Storrs with lavish praise, describing him not only as, “the most brilliant Englishman in the Near East,” but also as providing, “a lesson to every Englishman alive of how to deal with suspicious or unwilling orientals.” Storrs may, as Lawrence maintained, have had some success in charming the Arabs’ leaders, but he was not to prove to be as savvy with either the Greeks or Turks of Cyprus.

The false sense of security fostered by Storrs’ personal friendship with Münir may have led him to ignore the sensitivities of other Turkish Cypriots who were not only unhappy with his measures reducing their communal autonomy, but also disturbed by the fact that traditional rights, such as that of each district court having to have one Greek and one Turkish judge, were being removed under Storrs’ administration due to what was interpreted as his pro-Greek favouritism. Most strikingly, angry assertions were to be made, that Storrs degraded the Turks, treating them as some sort of uncivilised tribe, ignoring their desires and ruling through Münir as a chieftain. Korkut was to write: “Storrs considered us a herd lowlier than the Negroes of Africa.” In fact, notwithstanding their own prejudices, these men seem to have been reacting to Storrs’ remarkable orientalist outlook, one that no doubt many other colonial officials also exhibited, but which he himself perhaps epitomized best. As such, it is no coincidence either that Edward Said lists Storrs, together with Lawrence “of Arabia”, amongst the ranks of the archetypal “Orientalists-cum-imperial agents.” According to Said, each such agent, “believed his vision of things Oriental was individual, self-created out of some intensely personal encounter with the Orient, Islam, or the Arabs; each expressed general contempt for official knowledge held about the East.” Yet, their “knowledge” was perhaps little better, for, “in the final analysis, asserts Said, they, “expressed the traditional Western hostility to and fear of the Orient.” Though we may never know to what extent the barely concealed hostility expressed by Storrs in the wake of the election was a consequence of the deep-seated bigotry Said attributes to these Orientalists, as opposed to a more personal frustration at the failure of his policies, yet hostile and frustrated he certainly seemed to be.

Necati’s defeat of Münir was to constitute a major blow to the British, even if not universally recognised as such at the time. After the result was announced, a high level colonial official is said to have quite simply uttered, “What a shame, the machinery of government will no longer work.” When counting was complete, Necati had won by a handsome margin of 440 votes, defeating the incumbent, Münir, by 1553 votes.

The elections highlighted the failure of British policy. When compounded by pre-existing Turkish Cypriot economic dissatisfaction, the British initiatives to foil the efforts of...
the nationalists had actually backfired and caused a backlash. The scale of the Kemalists’ victory in October 1930 signalled that their positions were now backed by a majority of Turkish Cypriots.\footnote{1907} Meanwhile, however, the Greek Cypriots had witnessed their own nationalist wave in the elections, the “moderates” of 1925 being replaced by a more stringently pro-enotist set of members, “veteran nationalist politicians,” including Theophanes Theodotou who had been narrowly defeated last time round.\footnote{1908} Korkut highlighted the significance attributed to the defeat of Münir in the following manner. “This election,” he argued, “was not like a simple election where one candidate wins a membership against another candidate. With this election our community showed that it did not like the 30 years of the Evkaf-Government politics, and that it rejected outright the antidemocratic hardships caused to our communal causes over the past five years.”\footnote{1909} On similar foundations a writer from Larnaca was to declare in the press that the fact that this great victory bringing freedom to the Turkish Cypriots had occurred in 1930 would make this year forever special.\footnote{1910} Truly, on the admittedly small scale of Turkish Cypriot politics, this was a momentous event.

Despite the fact that there had been a clear chasm between the populists and the “Evkafcılar”, it still deserves to be recognised that just as the candidates were not appreciable in wholly black and white terms, nor were the electorate. Necati himself was to grant that even amongst the ranks of those who had voted for Münir there were dedicated Turkish nationalists, and on election night he described their success as the victory of the people as a whole, calling for all now to unite.\footnote{1911} What needs to be understood is that the significance of the election lay largely in the nationalist agenda upon which it was fought. On the other side stood Necati and his associates, propagating the nationalist creed, and on the other, Münir and his supporters, fighting a defensive rear-guard action against the indictment that they were disloyal to the nation. Neither side, not even the pro-British loyalists, could any longer afford to reject Turkish nationalism and Kemalism.

For sure it was the urban populace that had been most effected by the nationalist wave, but the villagers also had by now begun to be carried along too. The nationalists’ pre-eminent candidate, Necati, had certainly gained more than his fair share of support from the villagers. Though the centre of celebration on election night was understandably the town of Nicosia, Necati himself confirms that the rural areas too displayed great joy in his victory, streaming in to congratulate him in his home over the next three days.\footnote{1912}

The nationalist camp was to receive support in the elections from a variety of social segments, one in particular, the youth, was singled-out as having been especially enthusiastic. Korkut also records the important role played in the campaign by the final year Lycée students, recalling how they travelled to the villages to campaign for Necati and confirming that they composed the song “Bağrımız Yanıktr su ver Necati”, (“Our throats are parched, give us water Necati”), in his honour.\footnote{1913} Necati, himself recalls with gra-

\footnote{1907. Necati had defeated Münir to win the Nicosia-Kyrenia seat, and the “progressive” lawyer Mehmet Zeka had replaced Mahmud Bey in the Famagusta-Larnaca district. The only Turkish candidate who retained his seat was Dr. Eyyub, and even he had favoured Kemalist initiatives in the past. Ibid., 137.}
titude both the composition of this song and the support of the youth and of the Lycée students in particular for his campaign. Considering that the younger generation were by now being systematically socialized with nationalist sentiments and that they knew no other Turkey except for Kemal’s republican nation-state, it is quite easy to perceive why the weight of the youth lay with Necati and his fellow challengers to the traditional elite.

According to a confidential police report, when just before midnight the results of the First Electoral District had been announced, “A crowd of about 3000 people began to cheer for Nejati Eff., the successful candidate who got up the balcony of the Birlik Club [sic. It was by now named the Kardeş Ocağı] and delivered a speech thanking his electors.“ Following speeches given at the club, “they marched in procession headed by two Turkish flags carried by one Kel Ali Shekerli and Moustafa Yorganji Osman to Asma-Altı. There Nejati Eff. delivered another speech asked the people present to follow him to the Lycée school so that the unhappy students who were refused permission to join in their rejoicings may be given a chance to be happy.” The boys, with, “musical instruments in their hands,” and yet another expectant crowd were already, “assembled there awaiting the arrival of Nejati Eff. and his supporters.”

Here, Necati and Fadıl both gave speeches in which they, “assured the students that they had now been freed from oppression.” From the Lycée, Necati led the crowd, now accompanied by the school band which, “played various tunes all along the route,” on a tour of Nicosia, journeying to the houses of Raşid and Remzi Beys, who were warmly thanked by Necati for their efforts in his victory. The procession finally stopped at the doorstep of Necati’s home, from where the crowd only, “began to disperse at about 3.30 a.m.” Meanwhile, an English master of the Lycée, Mr. Alford, had complained to the police, “that the boarders of the Lycée annoyed him by shouting and throwing stones at the door of his room at the Lycée.”

An infuriated Storrs put Necati under police watch, stating in a confidential despatch that Necati had: “first distinguished himself on the night of his election by stirring up a riot in the Turkish Lycée in which one of the English masters was assaulted,” more justifiably accusing him of being, “in the forefront of the Kemalist anti-Government move-

1913. KORKUT 2000, 40; The poem included the following poignant stanzas:
You rose from a distance, he persecuted you, you drove him away
You crushed the despot, strangled the wild beast.
We are oppressed youths, thirsting for the flag,
We’ll demolish burn, break and march through.
Go towards the front and lead the way Necati,
Our hearts are burning…Give us water Necati.
The victorious sun that shines on your forehead,
Has increased the fire that burns in the hearts.
The Turkish children with bleeding eyes,
Have embedded their arrows in the enemy.

From text given by KONUR 1938, 57.
1914. ÖZKAN 1967.
1915. Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 19th October 1930. SA1/1420/1930, 8.
1916. Ibid.
1917. Ibid.
1918. Ibid.
1919. Ibid.
ment,” and reporting: “It has been necessary to keep a watch on his activities.” Surveillance of Necati and of the comings and goings to his home was maintained in the following months and years. Necati, (together with Remzi), was ultimately condemned in June 1937 to end up on a secretly prepared list of undesirables, “whose subsequent exclusion from the Colony would be desirable if a suitable opportunity arose.”

Following upon the bitter shock he had received, Storrs unwisely, did not try even at this late, though perhaps not yet too late, stage to build-bridges with the nationalists. On the contrary he chose a conflict-ridden and provocative course that could only have incensed them further. To their consternation, he re-appointed Münir to the Executive Council on the 28th of October, 1930, (barely a week after he had been discredited by a popular vote), and personally awarded him his O.B.E., the award of which was published in the Cyprus Gazette of the 1st of January 1931. As Georgallides puts it, the final humiliation was that, “Continuing to defy Münir Bey’s critics, the Governor bestowed on the Turkish Delegate the insignia of an officer of the British Empire during the April 14, 1931, official opening of the spring session of the Legislative Council, to which Münir no longer belonged.”

From the British perspective, a policy of appeasing some at least of the Turkish nationalists’ demands is likely to have led to their seeking compromise, but instead Storrs stubbornly chose to maintain a policy of confrontation.

Özkan gives a vivid account of a meeting with Henniker-Heatton that took place a few days after the election. The latter, who had invited Özkan to tea, quickly turned the conversation from civilities and congratulations to hard politics, asking Necati: “Will you tell me, what sort of policy will you follow in the assembly?” Necati apparently requested that Henniker-Heatton speak more candidly, the latter thereafter enquiring: “Will you side with the Government or side with the Greek Cypriots?” Necati maintains that he was infuriated by this line of questioning, and responded:

My nation has chosen me, I was brought [to power] by election, with a large majority. I will stand wherever I see the interests of my nation. I am neither a bought man, nor can I be bought. I am a serious, honest, and nationalist man. Did you arrange this tea party to ask me this? I find this most regrettable! I am amazed that having witnessed the long struggle upon which I embarked, you invited me here to ask such a question! I can stay here no longer and cannot accept your tea.

Necati claims to have then curtly said good-bye and departed abruptly.

1920. Ibid.; As this report points out, in a written statement he later gave, Alford actually charged that large stones were then thrown at him, but missed, while he traversed the grounds of the Lycée. [See, Statement of Mr. Charles Alford of Nicosia in “Report of the Proceedings at the Turkish Lycee, Nicosia, In the Early Hours of the Morning of October 16th, 1930” enclosed in Alford to Colonial Secretary, 17th October 1930. SA1/1420/1930, 2]. Alford also wrote to the Colonial Secretary to say: “I have been advised that I should report to you personally, as a British citizen, that I was assaulted, by Cypriot Turks, in the discharge of my duties.” Alford to Colonial Secretary, 17th October 1930. SA1/1420/1930, 3.

1921. Storrs to Secretary of State, 12th March 1931. CO 67/238/11, 29–30; See also GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 469.

1922. See for example the confidential police report of 25th February, 1931, where observations as to a meeting held in Necati’s house the previous evening, and later continued by four of the participants in the Kardeş Ocagna, (namely Ahmet Raşid, Remzi Bey, Behaeddin Bey and Zeeka Bey), was forwarded to the Chief Commandant of Police, and from him on to Governor Storrs. Enclosure in Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 25th February 1931. SA1/1576/1929/3, 23.

1923. Ashmore to Colonial Secretary, 5th June 1937. CO 67/280/5, 68.


1925. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 477.
Within days however, on the 28th of October, Necati was summoned by the authorities once again, this time by Governor Storrs. Ostensibly the purpose was to discuss an alleged break-in and theft from the Lycée, purportedly involving Necati, but an underlying motivation may well have been to try and scare the young, impressionable and inexperienced legislator into towing the Government line, a path of action conceivably deemed more necessary now by the failure of the more gentle line of persuasion taken by Henniker-Heatton. In the draft of a confidential despatch on the October 1930 elections, Storrs had originally stated:

4. An unpleasant and disquieting incident marred the jubilations of the successful candidate for the 1st (Mohammedan) Electoral District (Nicosia-Kyrenia), Mehmed Nejati Bey, who with a band of rowdy supporters appears to have broken into the precincts of the Turkish Lycée at Nicosia and incited the pupils to defy with violence the authority of the English masters in charge. Police enquiries are proceeding. Opposition to the appointment of English masters at the Lycée is one of the chief planks in the so-called “turkish nationalist” programme professed by Nejati Bey.1927

The paragraph was later crossed out, and did not enter the final version of the despatch, Storrs perchance realising in time that the evidence to corroborate his accusations was wanting. As the minutes of the file on the, “assault on Mr Chas Alford by Turkish Lycee boys,” were to show, “Mr. Alford the Commercial subject Master of the Lycee complained of the conduct of the students to the police but he was unable at the time or since, to produce any evidence of identification either by himself or others to support his complaint.”1928 As a result, it was stated, no criminal proceedings could be brought. The Chief Commandant of Police was forced to concede: “I do not think that Nejati Effendi’s conduct on the night in question was such as actually to cause a breach of the peace.”1929 He rejected also the idea that Necati had, “entered upon ‘enclosed premises’ with an unlawful purpose viz. to inflame the minds of the school boys so that they should commit acts of insubordination,” and had, “incited to the theft of the school band instruments.”1930

Two accounts of the meeting between Storrs and Necati, (attended also by Colonel Gallagher, Chief Commandant of Police, and simultaneously British Delegate of the Evkaf), are available. The first of these is that given by Storrs himself. Apparently it was the Colonial Secretary Henniker-Heatton who first suggested to the Governor that he, “may wish to send for Nejati Effendi and make it clear that the only course now left for him is to try to repair the damage he has caused. That he can only do by apologizing to the Headmaster and throwing what influence he carries on to the side of discipline.”1931 To this Storrs’ minute responded on the 30th of October:

I sent for N Eff yesterday & in the presence of the CCP administered to him a stern reprimand for his behaviour. I then caused him to apologize, on the spot, v humbly to Mr Grant [headmaster of the English School], convinced for the purpose; concluding by warning him,

1926. ÖZKAN 1967.
1927. Stors to Secretary of State, 29th October 1930, (draft). SA1/1430/1930.
1928. Minute by Chief Commandant of Police, Gallagher, 24th October 1930. SA1/1420/1930.
1929. Minute by Chief Commandant of Police, Gallagher, 28th October 1930. SA1/1420/1930.
1930. Ibid.
before Mr G & Salih Khoja, of the Lycée, against the introduction, in any form, of politics into school life.1932

It was basically this version of events that was then published in the Hakikat, which stated that it had been “authentically informed” as to the goings on at the meeting.1933 The paper was to use the episode to mock Necati, whom it stated had, “prayed to be pardoned!”1934

Necati’s version of how events had unfolded differed. According to Necati, Gallagher brandished his sword in what might be deemed a threatening manner, but was most probably a ceremonial salute to the governor. Aggressively questioned by Storrs, Necati claims to have stood firm. Questioning then apparently turned to Necati’s plans for the following day, the 29th of October, the anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Necati was apparently pressed as to whether or not he intended to go to pay his respects to the Turkish Consul in Larnaca, and to speak to the crowds in Nicosia. Necati states that, he replied firmly that he would, “as always, of course go,” to visit the Consul and as far as concerned speaking to the crowds, it would depend on how things developed: “I decide what I will say on such national days… If I act in contravention of the law, then you can hold me responsible.” Following this, he maintains, he walked out of the meeting.1935 The Söz was to report that Necati had indeed addressed the crowds, and had paid a special visit to the Lycée where students greeted him with a rendition of the Turkish national anthem. Necati also went to congratulate those at the Kardeş Ocağı, above which club were emblazoned with lights the words, “Long live the Gazi [Mustafa Kemal]”.1936

The Governor’s confidential report on the newly elected candidates dated the day following his reprimand of the young Legislative Councillor, said of Necati: “I am informed that Nejati Bey is weak and irresponsible. In view of his adherence to the ‘turkish nationalist’ creed, which is of recent growth and, I believe, extraneous origin, I am quite unable to foretell what his attitude in the Council will be. Indeed the objectives of the movement which he represents are by no means clear.”1937 The matter did not die down easily, however. Within days Necati had drafted a memorial to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, arguing that the treatment meted out to him had been not only uncalled for, but also insulting.1938 Necati’s letter to Passfield stated:

1932. Minute by Storrs, 30th October 1930. SA1/1420/1930
1933. See Hakikat, “Necati Bey offered an apology to the Headmaster of the Lycée before His Excellency the Governor,” and also “Necati Bey’s apology Communicated to the students,” undated extracts translated from Hakikat, in SA1/950/1926, 70–75.
1934. “The Question of Interview”. Extract from Hakikat 25th November 1930. SA1/ 950/1926, 87; As time more than anything showed, the nationalists were not so easily cowed, Remzi arguing in response to an article in the “Cyprus News” that they should not be fooled into thinking that those who now represented the Turkish community would be scared-off pursuing their just objectives. Söz 29th January 1931.
1936. Söz 6th November 1930.
1937. Storrs to Secretary of State, 29th October 1930. SA1/1430/1930, 10–11; His appraisal of Zeka was, however, more positive and optimistic: “Mehmet Zeka Bey appears to be a person of intelligence and vigour. There is reason to hope that he may be relied upon to cooperate with the Government and to uphold the traditions of loyalty of the Turkish community. He is twenty-eight years of age and intends shortly, as I am informed, to complete his studies for the Bar in England.” Ibid., 10.
On the invitation of His Excellency the Governor of Cyprus I attended the Government
House on the 29th October, 1930. Contrary to my expectations I have been treated there
unbecoming and in a way incompatible with the honour and dignity of my position as a
representative of the people. I dare say this treatment of His Excellency is liable to be con-
strued as an act constituting a contempt and humiliation for the people I represent.
I was reproached and intimidated by His Excellency in the presence of the Chief Comman-
dant of Police on the assumption that public peace was disturbed on the 15th October, 1930,
when people and students rightly showed usual enthusiasm towards me on the occasion of
my election as a Member of the Legislative Council.
I beg to submit Your Lordship that I never disturbed the peace of the Colony nor have the
people I represent ever ceased backing the Government since the British Occupation.
Nevertheless even if I acted in any way contrary to the Laws of the country the proper
course to be taken was to take legal steps.
It is obvious that the action of His Excellency in this case is inconsistent with the traditions
and principles of the British administration, and it has caused a deep impression on the
people I represent in such a degree that it is likely to affect the traditional confidence and
faith cherished by them towards the Government.
I therefore strongly protest against this action of His Excellency the Governor.1939
In a despatch to Lord Passfield, Storrs defended his actions, stating that despite his
having earlier, “expressed his regrets and assured me that he would support the Headmas-
ter in the maintenance of discipline,” Necati’s line had now changed:
The effrontery with which he has now seen fit to address Your Lordship in full conscious-
ness of his improper behaviour shows sufficiently that, while that reprimand was merited, it
has unfortunately not been followed by contrition. The truth is that he is a weak character
who is trying to save his face with his supporters by this petition.1940
As might be expected, Passfield supported his Governor in the matter, writing to Storrs:
“I support the action which you took in this matter; and I would request that Nejati Effendi
may be informed that I have received his memorial but am not prepared to interve-
ne.”1941
That Storrs’ initial fracas with Necati had been related to the Lycée, was telling, for the
most important conflict Storrs had with the nationalists following the elections concerned
this school, which had been a hot-bed of nationalist agitation during the campaign and
whose students had been a powerful source of support for Necati in his political ventures.
Yet, the struggle over the Lycée must be appreciated in broader terms for it exemplified
really the endeavour of the nationalists to wrest greater communal political autonomy
from the British authorities, and the efforts of the government to obstruct this objective.
Indeed, in an attempt to hamper the nationalists’ effort to assume administrative control
over the school, a special order was published in the Cyprus Gazette of the 26th of
December 1930, decreeing that from then on:
That at any meeting of the Governing Body of Moslem Secondary Schools convened by the
Governor under the provisions of the Secondary Education (Moslem) Laws, 1920 to 1929,

1939. Nedjati to Secretary of State, 5th November 1930. SA1/1420/1930, 9–10.
1940. Storrs to Secretary of State, 19th November 1930. SA1/1420/1930, 13–14.
for the purpose of electing a Chairman, the Governor or his representative shall, in case of an equality of votes, have a casting vote.\textsuperscript{1942}

This was to be followed-up a few months later by a further more general order declaring:

That at any meeting of the Governing Body of Moslem Secondary Schools the Chairman shall, in case of an equality of votes, have a casting vote in addition to his own vote.

These orders contributed to changing the balance on the educational body. With Münir as its chairman, and Eyyub following his lead, the pro-Government members influence on the committee was enhanced.

A major focus of opposition to the government on education, concerned the English headmaster of the Lycée, Mr. Grant, whom the British had recently had appointed despite the objections of the nationalists that perfectly capable masters could have been found in Turkey, even if not in Cyprus itself.\textsuperscript{1943} As the British themselves were to acknowledge, the appointment of an English headmaster to the Lycée had contravened, “a long established precedent,” of, “approach[ing] the educational authorities in Turkey with a request for the selection of suitable persons to fill these posts.”\textsuperscript{1944} A letter of the 29th December 1930 indicated that it was not just from Nicosia that opposition was emanating on the matter. Sent from Larnaca, and published on the first of the following year in the Söz, it declared that while Necati and Zeka Beys were worthy of praise for their nationalist policies, the action of Eyyub Bey in supporting the government’s position on the question of Turkish Cypriot education was wholly incomprehensible in that this policy was an affront to Turkishness. Eyyub, the letter declared, had not even had the decency to avoid offending, “the most dear motherland and great Turkish nation,” from which surely appropriately qualified schoolmasters could be found.\textsuperscript{1945} Ahmet Raşid lambasted the government on the matter, complaining that while the government expected the Turkish Cypriots to remain loyal, the Governor nevertheless appeared to be treating the person of Mr. Grant as more important than the desires of the Turks. “We do not want to believe,” he wrote, “that his Excellency the Governor would want to upset seventy thousand Turks and the hearts of maybe more than fifty million Turks in the world for the sake of Mr. Grant.”\textsuperscript{1946} Another article more dramatically spoke of, “the bleeding wound,” of the Turkish Cypriots and argued that there was, “no way”, that the efforts underfoot, “could succeed in distancing and detaching the people from Turkey and Turkishness.”\textsuperscript{1947} Grant himself was to refute charges that he, “discouraged boys from going to Stambul University,” and that he had said, “If you want a Turkish Flag go to Turkey.” He stated also that the other English master at the Lycée, Mr. Alford, denied the charges against him too, including one, “that he made a statement that there were so many nations in the world that Turkey was a tenth of a nation.”\textsuperscript{1948} All the same, even the British authorities were ultimately freed to face the fact that Grant was not a particularly appropriate character for the

\textsuperscript{1942.} Cyprus Gazette 26th December 1930.  
\textsuperscript{1943.} See, for example, Söz 2nd October 1930.  
\textsuperscript{1945.} Söz 1st January 1931.  
\textsuperscript{1946.} Ibid., 5th February 1931.  
\textsuperscript{1947.} Ibid., 6th August 1931  
\textsuperscript{1948.} SA1/1430/1930.
position he held, and was not helping his own cause, it being reported that he had lost
interest in the school and was being seen drunk in public.1949

The Turks prepared a memorial against the continuation of the college branch of the
Lycée and the school’s administration by an English headmaster. The former was opposed
on the grounds that, “The maintenance of a College branch in our school is above the
power of our budget.”1950 Yet, that the real foundations for opposition to these policies
lay on national rather than financial grounds was revealed more vividly in the section of
the memorial dealing with the issue of an English headmaster. Here it was asserted:

As to the question of an English Head Master we request that the following circumstances
be considered more indulgently for the sake of the interests of the Community. The adminis-
tration of our school through an English Head master is objectionable for various reasons
and far from securing benefit. The Head master is entirely stranger to the habits and the
inclination of our children and population. He absolutely does not know how and from what
point to lead them. To endeavour to change by force the character of one race into those of
another race does not result anything but preparing ground for reactions. The experience for
two years has given us examples to prove and authenticate our claim. One of the other rea-
sons is that the Head master being unable to come into con-tact, directly, with our youths
owing to language, his influence consequently cannot be extended upon them.

… Moreover it is a question of self-respect and dignity of the Community. The point of con-
tention as the none-existence of a qualified person amongst our nation to administer this
school is very much annoing the Community. Nevertheless this school has had a life of
more than 30 years, during which period of time it has always been administered by the Tur-
kish Head masters and the proper discipline together with pupils’ good behaviour and char-
acter has been kept up in a good and decent manner. Today in the Island there is a pleasant
Turkish intellect and enlightedness. This is secured in this school under the Turkish Head
masters. The great majority of the Turkish Government Officials who at present occupy
offices in the Government Departments are graduated from here. This school is a fertile and
fruitful institution which revived the Cypriot Turk who was in destitution. The existance of
a non Turkish Head master, in the administration of the school has caused bad impression
to the people. The general opinion deemed it a natural right to have a Turkish Head master
in a Turkish school. And we are unable to find a reasonable excuse for refusing this right. In
case the Government insists upon having an English Head master against the general desire
the danger of closing the school will always exist.1951

Fadil Bey argued in a similar vein in a speech he gave in late 1931. Here he stated:

We are at the edge of a precipice having lost everything we had. Your leaders are thinking of
a way of preventing our fall into this precipice by putting a rock before us. The rock to save
our fall will come from the Lycée. The Government is not interfering with the Greek
schools, why should she interfere with ours. I want to educate my son as I like. We must
have a Turkish Head master inorder to inspire our children with the national feelings.1952

What is most worthy of remark, is not the fact that the Evkafcılar defended the imple-
mentation of the Anglo-Saxon College system, (somewhat to be expected), but that they

1949. GEORGHALIDES 1985, 471.
1951. Ibid.
felt the need to try and justify themselves by reference to Turkey. Hakikat contended that, “many great Turkish intellectuals,” now themselves considered the Anglo-Saxon system to be a superior system of education that should be adopted in the Republic.\textsuperscript{1953} Though it was eventually to be noted with some satisfaction that the commission in charge of the Lycée had decided not to renew Grant’s contract, and that a prominent student supporter of the nationalist camp, Ekrem Tahsin, who had, “delivered speeches prior to the election against the administration of the Turkish Lycée,” and had been expelled by the English Headmaster shortly before the election, was to be allowed to continue to attend the school, matters did not subside so easily.\textsuperscript{1954} The new governing body of the Lycée was informed that its calls for greater communal control and a more national line of education at the Lycée had been rejected, by the British Director of Education, J. R. Cullen.\textsuperscript{1955} The latter figure was unanimously disliked by the Turks, including Münir, for being too pro-Greek, or at least for being perceived as such for having a Greek wife.\textsuperscript{1956}

Despite the fact that Turkish headmasters were finally appointed and the “college” system eventually abandoned, the sore of education continued to fester, only to be aggravated, rather than as hoped alleviated, by the repressive measures introduced by the British in the aftermath of the October Revolt.\textsuperscript{1957} Henniker-Heaton acknowledged the critical position of the secondary schools in relation to British rule in the wake of the October Revolt. In a letter to Secretary of State Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister he described secondary education as, “the heart of the problem for the future of Cyprus,” and explained his concern as follows: “The secondary schools are very far from being all right. Astonishing as it may seem the curriculum in the Lycées or Gymnasiums is laid down by the Ministries of Public Instruction in Greece or Turkey.”\textsuperscript{1958} The results he described as “deplorable” particularly because: “These schools furnish practically all the schoolmasters for the elementary schools.”\textsuperscript{1959} However, even after the crackdown that followed the revolt, renewed British efforts to come to grips with the Lycée were not to succeed. While Dawe called for stricter measures to be introduced and stressed that the Lycée’s courses in the mid-1930’s were still, “dominated by chauvinistic politics,” the Governor favoured a less confrontational line, making the case instead for the introduction of virtually imperceptible changes to the curriculum that would break-off the connection with Istanbul without causing a stir.\textsuperscript{1960}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1953.] “The Lycee and the College”. Extract from Hakikat 14th March 1931. SA1/950/1926, 116.
\item[1954.] See Söz 1st January 1931 and minute by Chief Commandant of Police, Gallagher, 28th October 1930. SA1/1420/1930; For information as to the speech delivered by Tahsin at the Lycée on election night, see Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 19th October 1930. SA1/1420/1930, 8.
\item[1955.] Söz 20th August 1931.
\item[1956.] In fact his British superiors were themselves to come to a similar conclusion, arguing, without furnishing any valid evidence that “Cullen has a Greek wife and is under her thumb.” Palmer to Allen, 25th January 1934. CO 67/255/8, 153.
\item[1958.] Henniker-Heatton to Cunliffe-Lister, undated letter of November 1932. CO 67/246/13, 4; Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there was, of course, nothing new in this, nor as is frequently depicted was this a policy cunningly introduced by the British. Education of the two communities had from Ottoman times been shaped by Istanbul and Athens respectively. See HADJIPA VLOU-TRIGEORGIS 1990, 110.
\end{footnotes}
Disputes carried over by the nationalists from the pre-election to post-election era were not solely to be concerned with education, however. As far as concerned the apparently religious institutions of the Şeri Courts and the Muftülük, it might at first glance seem that demands for their reinstitution made by nationalists claiming to be followers of Mustafa Kemal were paradoxical. Less superficial evaluation, however, clearly indicates that there was significant political import associated with their preservation by the nationalists.

In mid-1930 the Governor had appointed a Committee, “to consider the position of the Sheri Courts,” which was composed of Münir Bey as its chair, judges Fuad, Raif, Halid and Hulusi; Hami Bey, and; Midhat Bey as secretary. The minutes of this committee’s meetings are notable both in terms of how they shed some light on the perceived political importance of these matters under review, and in terms of the common ground, apparent in private at least, that could be found between those of the “nationalist” and those of the “loyalist” camps. Münir Bey’s report on the meetings held noted that there was unanimity as to the, “opinion that the Sheri Courts and the administration of the Moslem Orphan’s estates should be retained as a separate institution at any cost,” and that the committee, “deplores the action of the Government in striking out of the Estimates the provision for the maintenance of these religious institutions, which formed a privilege for the Moslem Community from time immemorial and which the British Government had rightly retained ever since the Occupation.”

1961. The Government was called upon to right this wrong. Interestingly, Fuad Bey revealed that he had from the outset been opposed to the transfer of control of the Şeri Courts to the Evkaf, and had made his opposition known to the Government. He thus indirectly concurred with Raif Bey’s condemnation of this situation, Raif having protested that, “There is no country in the world where Courts are subordinated to such an office.”

When during committee deliberations Judge Raif moved to, “suggest that there should be a Mufti elected by the people,” he was struck down by Münir, who stated that the issue was beyond the terms of reference of the committee. Fuad intervened to disclose once again that he had been, “against the abolition of this post,” also, though he now had his doubts, especially if election were to be involved, and agreed with Münir Bey’s view that this was an issue beyond their remit. Raif Efendi did not, however, retreat and argued: “In my opinion the Turks also must have a Bishop, who must be a free and bold man possessing the faculty of effective speech, so that he may be able to guide the people.”

1963. When Münir insisted that the Fetva Emini was indeed “free”, Raif retorted: “I don’t want a Mufti like that. The Mufti must be elected like the Archbishop, he must go round the country and advise the people in their political, and religious affairs and enlighten them. He should also be the president of the Moslem community.”

1964. Raif, then, was looking for a political, not just a religious leader, not one that would be an unrepresentative puppet appointee, but one who would be elected by the Turkish Cypriot people and would embody their political will.

Though Raif and others had initially expressed some doubts about the retention of the Şeri system of law, and had championed the view, “that the provisions of the Turkish Laws at present in force in Turkey,” as regarding family affairs, “and which can be appli-
cable in Cyprus should be adopted,” he ultimately accepted that the Şeri Courts should be maintained, stating: “If the corporate body of the Turkish Community is recognised and a Mufti is elected by the people as the President of the Turkish Community of the Colony, then I agree that the Sheri Courts should be retained as a separate Institution.”

A simple interpretation of the Turkish Cypriots’ continued attachment to traditional religious laws and institutions even when they had long since been replaced or abolished in republican and secular Turkey, would be to diagnose it as a reflection of the failure of the national identity to supersede the religious. Yaşın, for example, argues that the activities of the local clubs and Turkish Cypriot press between the two World Wars indicated identification with the Islamic or Ottoman community, and that, “even if Cypriots identified themselves with Balkan and Anatolian Turks, this feeling was not really based on Turkish nationalism.” He further contends that while, “It is possible to find some poems and articles which talk about ‘Turkism,’ ‘Turks,’ and ‘Turkish patria’ in the Muslim Cypriot newspapers published in the early twentieth century. ... such poems were connected with utopic and romantic ideas of a latent Pan-Turkism called ‘Turanism,’ and they contained no notion of any concrete concept of the Turkish nation, national sovereignty, or a nation-state.” There are, however, important flaws in the bases upon which he constructs his arguments, such as his contention that there was, no use of the title “Türk” in early Turkish Cypriot organizations, foundations and theatres. The existence of the “Türk Ocağı” and “Türk Derneği” come to mind, as does the news that celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the “National Bairam” of the 29th of October centered around not only the Birlik Ocağı and the Türk Derneği, but also the “Türk Dar’ül-hamî”, (an association for Turkish music first founded in Istanbul in 1914), and the “Türk Esmaf Kulubü,” (or, “Turkish Shopkeepers’ Club”). Indeed, Nazım Polat has maintained that the “Türk Teâvün Cemiyeti” established in Cyprus in 1908 was in fact, “the first association in the Turkish world to have had incorporated the word ‘Turk’ in its name.” Yaşın appears to argue further that “Pan-Turkism” was not really “Turkish” nationalism, which is clearly misjudged, and though he is justified in indicating the influence of CUP sympathizers who were exiled to Cyprus, he depreciates the role of the Turkish nationalist sentiments of writers native to the island. Certainly the idea of the concepts of “the Turkish nation, national sovereignty, or a nation-state,” were not always dominant in poetry and the press, but they were nonetheless observable, as examples in this thesis show, in the post World War I era, and were even evident at times before. Finally, Yaşın perhaps shows too little regard for the meanings associated with the use of the terms “Ottoman” and “Moslem”, especially with the transformation they began to undergo in the early twentieth century; and of the interconnectedness they increasingly had with Turkish nationalist sentiment.

Such perceptions, though commonly held, have failed to grasp the true significance of this association, an association that continued, even if in less comprehensive terms, well into the post-World War II years. Writing in relation to the new family laws adopted by the Turkish Cypriots in the 1950’s, J. N. D. Anderson explained:

1967. Ibid., 226.
1968. Söz 1st October 1928.
There can be little doubt that this community is in fact considerably less strongly attached to Islamic orthodoxy and traditionalism than were (or are) the Anatolian peasantry, and that it was far better prepared to accept a Western codier of family law than was the Turkish population as a whole in 1926; and this explains the equanimity with which the Turks in Cyprus have accepted – and even advocated – the most radical departures from the Shari’a in this recent legislation. But whereas the Turkish reformers were prepared to jettison Islam itself, if that were necessary and practicable, on the altar of progress, the Turks in Cyprus regard Islam as an essential element in their communal particularism, and the allegedly “religious character” of their law as not only justifying the retention of special courts but preserving the cohesion of their community.  

The validity of Little’s criticism of Walker Conner’s strict separation of national and religious identity is illustrated well in the Turkish Cypriot case. As he contends, there has been a strong religious component to numerous nationalist identities, not least the Greek. While the strictly secular tenants of Kemalism might make it appear awkward to claim that the Turks of the island were both Kemalists and defenders of traditional religious institutions, a more advanced analysis requires us to appreciate that the Turkish Cypriots saw the defence of their traditional institutions as a means of protecting their autonomy. The role of the Müftü, for example, was no longer perceived as being chiefly religious. Despite internal disputes within the community as to the matter, there appeared to have been already from the late nineteenth century, (notably after the onset of British rule but predating the Kemalist influence), an increased politicisation and call for the Müftü to act not solely as a religious authority, but also as the popular political representative of the people. By the early twentieth century a, “growing tendency to interpret that office as primarily a political one had finally won out.”

It was from this perspective, in continuation of historical trends, that in the lead-up to the “Turkish National Congress of Cyprus” of May 1931, the nationalists, pressing their advantage, prepared both to raise the heat on such “political” issues and to institutionalise their movement.

6.3 The “Turkish National Congress of Cyprus”

In the wake of the election the pro-Münir forces were trying to recover from the shock of defeat. Hakikat hit back at the triumphant critics of Münir and the government with the following leading article, entitled, “Dangerous Publications.” It declared:

In an article which appeared in the last issue of “Seuz” dealing with certain demands from the Government, it is said: “There is a limit to loyalty & obedience”. The Moslem Community in this country, which is in minority, & in the position of self-defence against powerful competitors, has been able, during the last fifty years to hold its own with the sympathy & support of the government; and the most important factor which has secured this sympathy & support is the sincere loyalty of the Moslem Community to the British Crown. …

We know that those who are intoxicated with success often put themselves in dangerous positions, but these people must not be permitted to drag the whole of the Community into the ditch.\footnote{1973}

Yet, Hakikat was no longer the force it had been before the election. By 1931 its circulation had halved to 420, while Masum Millet and Söz sold approximately 720 and 970 copies respectively.\footnote{1974} By 1933 it was out of circulation.\footnote{1975} The reality was that the “Evkaflılar”, though still bolstered by the government, had lost the support of the general public.

The nationalists, on the other hand, entered the new year exuberant, and full of optimism. Söz wrote on the 1\textsuperscript{st} of January that the previous year had been, “a happy one for the Turks of Cyprus,” as, “The great transformation occurred during its fine days.”\footnote{1976} A poem by Lycée student Ahmet Ratip printed in the following week’s edition looked to the future. Entitled, “A Little Light”, it concluded with these final two stanzas:

\begin{quote}
Rise up my flag and live in the skies!  
Rise and salute the motherland on our behalf!  
Soon perhaps it will send over a light,  
To open these rusted tearful eyes.
Raise it up; raise it up so it burns in the skies,  
My scarlet flag that is dyed with my blood!  
Raise it up, raise it up, let it rear-up in the sky,  
My scarlet flag that thirsts for Turkish blood!\footnote{1977}
\end{quote}

Ratip’s poems continued in the following weeks and months to appeal to the emotions of the Turkish nation, one published on the 26\textsuperscript{th} of March, called, “The last words of a martyr”, uttered:

\begin{quote}
Agh! I am shot in the most slender part of my body,  
My furious blood is flowing deep like a flood.  
I have been shot in seven places for the fatherland’s sake,  
I did not allow the enemy to touch the light of my nation.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
I would not allow my free-living body to be hung,  
I would give my life for my country rather than allow the traitors to trample on it,  
The home of the Turk shall not be set on fire by the death of one person,  
The cruelty of thousands will not suffice to suppress the Turk.  
If I die, may the nation, fatherland and civilisation live on,  
May the new state with its worldwide reputation live long.  
May the brave soldier who will save my fatherland live long,  
May the national sentiments raising my nation up live long.\footnote{1978}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
1973. Extract from Hakikat 11\textsuperscript{th} November 1930 in SA1/950/1926, 83–84.
1975. The Cyprus Blue Book for 1932 records a circulation of only 330 for the Hakikat, while there is no entry for the paper the following year. Cyprus Blue Book 1932, 199 and Cyprus Blue Book 1933, 208.
1976. Söz 1\textsuperscript{st} January 1931.
1977. Ibid., 8\textsuperscript{th} January 1931.
1978. Ibid., 26\textsuperscript{th} March 1931.
\end{footnotes}
Three weeks later, Ratip’s verses rang loud again, most distinctive amongst them being his “Motherland” poem:

Motherland, joyous land
I love you from the heart,
Motherland, joyous land
If only I could rest in your bosom!
I have not passed from your soil,
I have not drunk from your waters,
What a pity it is that an enemy
Has separated me from you.

Every time I look at your joyous skyline,
I take a little comfort.
When I smell the fragrance
Of your blossoming flowers.

Motherland, joyous land,
The tears of a generation,
Unhappily separated from you,
Are our gift to you today.

There is here, o great motherland,
A generation of orphans!
Who you must know,
Cannot stray from the course you take!1979

Only a few days after the election, on the 21\textsuperscript{st} October, a petition had been addressed to the Undersecretary of State from Paphos. While indicating opposition to the notion of comprehensive, liberalizing constitutional change for Cyprus, the letter sent did make demands as to purely Turkish institutions stating:

2. We are very sorry for the abolition of our Sheri Courts which existed in 1878 at the British Occupation and further strengthening of same by Royal Degree in 1882 as well as in Lausan Treaty. We humbly request that they may be re established …

3. We request that we may be allowed to elect a Religious leader known under the name of “Mufti”. 1980

A more formal and comprehensive approach was made at the beginning of 1931 when, Zeka and Necati addressed a new memorial to the British authorities, in which they demanded the democratisation of the governance of the Evkaf and its separation from religious affairs; the reconstitution of the Müftülük; the reconstitution of the Şeri courts, or if this were deemed to be impractical, the transference of their functions to the Turkish judges of the courts of justice; and the reconstitution of Turkish Family Law in accordance with the modern laws that had been adopted in Turkey. Korkut states that it was once the British officially rejected these demands that they decided to hold a National Congress where these matters would be addressed.1981

1979. Ibid., 16\textsuperscript{th} March 1931
In the interval it was becoming ever more apparent that Necati and his followers and associates represented not simply opposition to the established Turkish Cypriot elite, but opposition espousing an incontrovertibly nationalist line, which with conflict continuing to escalate with the colonial authorities, was reaching fever pitch by March, 1931. Illustrative of the new, increasingly self-confident expressions of Turkish nationalism was the March 12th issue of Söz. The main headline sarcastically chided, “Those who love despotism and oppression should each hang a collar of pride around their necks!” Below this was added: “The Nation has broken the chain restraining it and arisen from slavery to liberty.” Behaeddin Bey authored another long article in Söz, entitled “Accountability in the eyes of the national conscience.” It focused largely on attacking Dr. Eyyub for failing to join ranks with the nationalist camp on the question of the Lycée, accused him of trying to gratify the British by acquiescing to the appointment of a British headmaster, and consequently of betraying his own nation.  

Striking also was a poem published on the following page of the same issue called, “To the Noble Turks of Cyprus.” It was signed simply “Doğan” In fact, however, these verses appear to have been originally penned in 1925 by Professor Manizade, at the time still a young medical student studying in Vienna. It read:

Wake up, look! Turks of Cyprus the future awaits you,
The promised suns have dawned for you on our horizon...
Unite all Turks of Cyprus, like a single steel arm,
May the heart of the Turks of Cyprus beat as one.

This land is a gift, to you from your grandfathers,
Be its guard so that they do not take it away from you.
Protect your national spirit, protect your “national home”,
So that the groan of this noble nation is calmed.
Young and vigorous minds, full of ideals,
No longer to be crushed by the fists of foreigners...
If you want to be free, first you must free them.
Look there crying, how hurt the young hearts are...
Walk you Turks of Cyprus free yourselves at last from oppression,
You have broken your chains; look the horizon is open to you.

May the cries of our youths, now be quietened,
So that the whistles of those owls at the “National Kaaba” are silenced.

Interesting also was another editorial written, this time, by Ahmet Raşid. Though inspired once again by the disputes over education, the strain of nationalism in his piece was palpable. Raşid explained that the desire of the community to control its schools was most important because they lived as Turks under a foreign administration and needed a strong national education to maintain their existence. He explained: “If we had been an independent nation, if we did not have above our heads a foreign hand that threatened our

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1983. In a small booklet of verse composed in his lifetime, Manizade includes a virtually identical poem, which he registers as having written in Vienna in 1925. MANIZADE 1997, 33–35.
identity we might think differently [but] we can never afford to forget, the need not to overlook the fact that we live under a foreign administration and that it will not be as loyal and compassionate as that of a mother government.” This then was why he contended, they needed, “first and foremost a national system of education,” the components for which were, “to be found in the motherland [and] in the Great Turkish soul.” Foregoing a national education, he insisted, would result in a national catastrophe for the Turkish Cypriots.1985

This issue of Söz published also a letter recently penned by Mustafa Kemal and recalled how he and his brothers-in-arms had saved the Turkish nation from its enemies; and stressed that the revolution they had undertaken was a “Turkish” one which equated the value of a single Turk with the value of the whole world.1986

As might be expected, the 23rd of April celebrations, commemorating the anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the national sovereignty of the Turks that this represented, were particularly enthusiastic in 1931 and not just in the capital town either. A confidential police report from Limassol noted how, “the schoolboys and girls under their school-masters and mistresses marched through the town with flags and singing national songs,” how clubs and minarets were illuminated at night and a speech delivered by Mehmet Turgut (Sarca), then the headmaster of the Limassol boys school, at the “Turkish Club”.1987 According to the police account, he, “criticised the Sultans and praised Moustafa Kemal Pasha who saved and liberated the Turkish nation and requested the people to celebrate this day every year with more enthusiasm. He then shouted “Long live Moustafa Kemal Pasha” three times.”1988

It was likely no coincidence in timing that Necati had published in the press of the 23rd of April an announcement to the, “Honourable Turkish Cypriot People,” calling upon them to send delegates to a national congress that would discuss how best to defend their “national rights”.1989 Necati was to state that Münir Bey had been invited too, and to indicate that though initially he had held hopes for cooperation with Eyyub Bey, to whom he had reached out after the elections, the latter had “deserted” the nationalist camp, and had not, therefore participated either.1990 This Congress duly gathered in Necati’s family home on the 1st of May, 1931. After its deliberations, the Congress proclaimed its resolutions that were published in the press and duly transmitted to London:

1. The Congress takes cognizance of its right to enjoy the same powers and privileges enjoyed by other communities in connection with Secondary Education, which it asks most earnestly and fervently. It strongly requests and prays that the laws in force governing this matter may be fully respected, that the bodies constituted under the Law may carry out their duties and exercise their powers quite freely, that the sources of revenue to be utilized for the development of Secondary Education may be maintained as special funds for the Lycées, as heretofore, and that the Government may seriously consider an support the possibility of securing increased sources of revenue.

1985. Ibid., 1931.
1986. Ibid. 1987. While this “Turkish Club” referred too was clearly in Limassol, we see from club records that Mehmet Turgut was also a member, (member no. 56), of the Kardes Ocağı KO-BO-E.
1988. Turgut later also delivered a similar speech at a coffee shop. Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 23rd April 1931. SA1/1576/1929/3, 285.
2. The Moslem people of Cyprus having very deeply felt the religious need for a Mufti and the great want of a Spiritual Head, as in the case of other communities, the Congress revives the office of the Mufti, which existed for many centuries and which exists in all Moslem communities living in all parts of the world, as a post free from every effect and influence, to be held by a person to be elected by the community. It also considers it imperative that the privileges and rights which are enjoyed by other communities in this respect, and which were possessed by the Turkish community until 1928, when they were abolished contrary to its will and consent, should be acknowledged anew, that the cost of the organisation of Muftiship should be defrayed from the Evkaf Treasury, which belongs to the community, that a law should be enacted prescribing the Mufti’s qualifications, duties and powers, and that the duties and powers which are at present being unlawfully carried out and exercised by the Delegates of Evkaf, one of whom is a non Moslem, should be included in his duties and powers.

3. The Turkish National Congress of Cyprus warns the Government of the necessity of maintaining the independence of the Sheri Court, which is a privilege and an acquired right of the Moslem community, supported by Treaties, and of defraying their cost from Public Estimates, as before, and expects that the Government should take a course of action, showing respect, thereby, to the rights of the community. In case this proves impossible to be obtained, after strong representations, the Congress is convinced that it is justified to ask that the jurisdiction of these Courts, which are being maintained unindependently and abnormally, which are not inspiring confidence to the community on account of heir position, which are unable to protect and secure the regularity and perfectness of the family rights, which, as Courts, are found under the influence of the Evkaf Department, and which are entitled to exercise a very limited jurisdiction, should be transferred to Law Courts, to be exercised by the Turkish Judges attached to such Courts. The Congress insists on this, and considers it imperative that a Code should be published governing the cases to be tried in these Courts, whatever their form may be.

4. The Congress having taken into consideration the fact that the Islamic Evkaf are purely the properties of the community, and an institution dedicated by its ancestors for charitable and educational purposes, is convinced that the administration thereof is vested in the community. Therefore, in the charitable, religious and educational interests of the community, it considers it most necessary and imperative that the Islamic Evkaf Institution should be relieved from its religious duties and be converted into a purely financial institution, that such religious duties should be transferred to the Mufti, who is the proper authority for the performance thereof, that the administration of the said institution should be entrusted to a Governing Body composed of six Turkish members to be elected by the Cyprus Turkish National Congress, once every three years, and of one British member to be appointed by the Government, that the said institution should be managed as a Bank and be governed by a law similar to that governing the Municipal Corporations, and that the Moslem Religious Properties Order in Council of 1928 should be repealed. This Governing Body will hold office for three years, on the expiration of which it will be re-elected by the said Congress: Provided that in case the Congress cannot meet on account of any reason the said election will be made by the Central Committee of the Congress. ...

6. The Congress, relying on the express right of the Community, and also on the satisfactory statement made by the Honourable Colonial Secretary in the Council during the Session of 1931 in connection with the right and freedom of the Turkish Community to elect a Mufti, does elect and declare Ahmed Said Effendi of Paphos, the Advocate, to be the Mufti and the Spiritual Head of the Turkish Community of Cyprus, and requests that the Government may recognise this election.

1991. Enclosure No. 2 in Storrs to Secretary of State, 4th June 1931. CO 67/239/14, 31–34; These were reprinted in the Söz of 7th May 1931.
Further details of the proceedings, which had been presided over by Behaeddin Bey, were printed in the nationalist press. Aside from Necati and, to a lesser extent Zeka, it is clear that other prominent nationalists played a key role in deliberations, most importantly it seems, the oft-mentioned Fadıl Bey, Ahmet Raşid, Said Bey and Con Rifat. However, other less prominent figures, such as a certain Behçet who was representing the village of Kojünye, were also noted to have been active participants. That the proceedings were not a total charade, and that debate did occur, was confirmed by the argument of a certain Yusuf Ziya Efendi who contended that the Müftülük and the Fetva Eminliği was one and the same thing. All the same there was apparently little support for the position he took.1992 The nationalists portrayed the Congress as a continuation of the transformation begun with the elections of the previous year, designed to redeem the “national honour and rights.” Söz declared that it should be a source of great pride for the Turkish Cypriots.1993

Within the same despatch in which the Congress’ resolutions had been enclosed was forwarded also the text of a manifesto issued by the new Müftü on the 6th of May, 1931. His exhortations were published in the following week’s press as well.1994 Said’s manifesto declared:

> With the help of God, and with the support of the people I have been elected at the Congress held on the 1st May, 1931, to be the Mufti of Cyprus. On this date a new era has been inaugurated in the life of the Turks of Cyprus. ... My guide in religious matters will be the Koran and the Hadis, and my principles in social and national life will be the principles of civilization which led the civilized world to the summit of prosperity. It will be my firm desire to improve and elevate the religious sentiments and the morals of the community. My only supporter in these important tasks is the continuous confidence and assistance of the people. The awakening and the self consciousness displayed by the people to my great satisfaction and pleasure, have actuated me to accept this difficult post. I am aware of the limits, extent and importance of this post, and I swear to-day in the name of every thing which is sacred to me that I shall not shrink from making every sacrifice in this respect, even if it be at the cost of my life, and that I shall not cease, even for one moment, from trying to promote the general interests of the people. But, I must add that I expect that the people also should perform the duty that is incumbent on them, so that my efforts should be remunerative. All communities that fell under foreign rule succeeded in maintaining and defending their existence and honour only by making such sacrifices and by close cooperation. This is the way of salvation for us, too.1995

The significance of this congress was played down by the British and the pro-British Evkaf camp and it has been wholly disregarded by many authors since.1996 The tendency of its opponents at the time was to try to mock it. Nonetheless, the nationalists were not dissuaded. Söz responded to critics by declaring that, “The Turks of the island have finally taken control of their own destiny,” and that they would never again allow it to be held by the incompetent. Echoing the language of developments in Turkey a decade ear-

1993. Ibid.
1994. Ibid., 14th May 1931.
1996. To his credit, Georgallides is not one of the many who made this error. On the contrary, he recognised Storrs’ failure to understand the significance of political developments in the Turkish community. See GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 482–484.
lier, it pronounced that, “This decision is the national pact of the island’s Turks.”\textsuperscript{1997} The following week’s issue of Söz was dominated both by a copy of a letter of Necati’s addressed to the colonial authorities, and by an article that the political leader had penned. In the latter Necati complained forcefully about the functioning of the Evkaf, the abolition of the Müftülük and the position of the Şeri courts, and insisted that these should all be under the control of the community. Necati condemned the recurrent political scheming of the Evkaf repeated at every election, and remonstrated that the Turks of the island had had enough of the interference in politics of this institution and would no longer go through the Evkaf in order to draw the attention of the Government.\textsuperscript{1998}

On the 28th of May Söz described how the newly elected Müftü was greeted by crowds of well-wishers in Nicosia. He travelled in a convoy headed by Dr. Pertev’s car, and in which the Müftü sat in Necati’s car, together with Behaeddin Bey, Con Rifat Bey and the owner of the vehicle himself.\textsuperscript{1999} Particularly fervent praise was given to a speech delivered by Fadıl Bey to the waiting crowds, described by the journal as “electrifying”.\textsuperscript{2000} The Turks, of their own accord and on their own initiative, had elected a new Müftü. The significance was much more political than religious, and, as his championing by so many of the leading nationalists indicated, it was the political symbolism of this action that was being capitalised upon.

Such developments signalled the resistance of the Turkish Cypriot community to arbitrary British rule. Inspired by the concept of popular sovereignty that had been championed earlier by Young Turks and that was now enshrined in the constitution of the Turkish Republic, these people were politically demanding their communal rights as an expression of their active and observable sentiments of Turkish nationalism. It was no coincidence that Ahmet Raşid was denouncing the Evkaf for its pro-British politics, insinuating that they were complicit in British efforts to anglicise the Turks through “de-Turkifying education”, and simultaneously stressing that this institution, the Evkaf, belonged to the Turkish Cypriot community, not the other way round.\textsuperscript{2001}

To some degree, despite the increasing disparagement of the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkey, these men regarded the Kemalist transformation as a continuation of the awakening of the nation that had begun with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Twenty two years on, Söz was to publish an article noting the importance of remembrance of “Our Great National Days”, arguing that it was with the Revolution of 1908 that, “The Turkish world awoke,” with, “the exalted spirit of our great nation,” to be later, “manifested in the person of Mustafa Kemal.”\textsuperscript{2002} The evolutionary advance of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was becoming increasingly evident.

Though he once again tried to belittle their activities, the content of Storrs’ secret and lengthy despatch to London of 4\textsuperscript{th} of June 1931 indicates that he himself was coming

\textsuperscript{1997. Söz 14\textsuperscript{th} May 1931.}
\textsuperscript{1998. Ibid., 21\textsuperscript{st} May 1931.}
\textsuperscript{1999. Ibid., 28\textsuperscript{th} May 1931.}
\textsuperscript{2000. Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{2001. Söz 22\textsuperscript{nd} January 1931; Similar charges continued to be made during the 1930’s. An article by a Turkish Cypriot published in the Cumhuriyet newspaper going so far as to state that there was, “systematic activity towards Anglicisation and the danger of assimilation.” Attachment to Palmer to Secretary of State, 1\textsuperscript{st} May 1936. CO 67/265/3, 92.}
\textsuperscript{2002. Söz 24\textsuperscript{th} July 1930.}
round to the reality that all was not well as far as concerned his established policies. He wrote:

6. The attitude of the Greek members, always disagreeable and sometimes trying, has been ineffective for so long as the Government could rely on loyal Turkish cooperation. This is no longer available as the Greeks, taking advantage of personal and party rivalries within the Turkish community, have been enabled to buy or otherwise persuade a recently elected Turkish nonentity, Nejati Bey, to vote with them, thus effectively blocking the passage of the Customs Bill, of a Village Authorities Bill introduced to remedy the evil reported in my confidential despatch of the 17th April, 1931, and other measures. There is every reason to suppose that Nejati Bey can be counted upon for full participation in all steps taken to embarrass the Government. He has recently joined Mr. Theodotou, a Greek member of Council of the extreme left wing, in moving a resolution for the abolition of the post of Director of Education as at present constituted and for substituting therefore a Greek and a Turkish Director. No ardent supporter of the Union movement could wish for anything better and if the resolution is brought under debate it would of course be carried. Nejati Bey has travelled through the country stirring up Turkish national feelings. On the 1st May he assembled a meeting of Turks from all parts of the Island to appoint a Mufti as political and religious leader and a committee to take over the Evkaf Department. This meeting, composed of some 140 persons, was entitled a National Congress and manifestos, of which I enclose copies, were issued by the Central Committee and the “Mufti.” Needless to say this was followed by the strongest possible protest from Turkish notables, preachers and representatives of villages.

Cautioning also of increased communistic activity, Storrs noted:

[T]he effect of their activities is to increase the general unrest and to render still more imperative the necessity for strengthening the position of the Legislature. As recently stated by Mr. Stavrinakis the constitution now centres round the person of the worthless Nejati Bey.

8. I trust that I have said enough to convince Your Lordship that the unsatisfactory character of the existing constitution has now to be acknowledged in practice as it always has been in theory. The chance of political agitation coinciding in one of its periodical seasons of strength with week Turkish representation has brought matters to a head. All the Greek elected members are confidently expecting an early change in the constitution: one has gone so far as to set the date for the middle of September next.

9. I have in the past asked repeatedly that the leaders of the Greek party should put forward representations regarding the form of constitution which would satisfy them. They promise to submit considered views but none are ever forthcoming. The fact is that they are afraid lest they should get what they ask for in this connection and that Union with Greece would then recede into the background. I confess that my efforts, not less than those of my predecessors, to secure a true Cypriot policy have failed so far.

10. To summarize the position:-

The Legislature is now controlled by the Greek elected members.

No cooperation can be hoped from them either in financial business or in any direction which might strengthen the Government with the country.

It may therefore be necessary to seek recourse to Orders in Council.

2003. Storrs to Secretary of State, 4th June 1931. CO 67/239/14, 26–27.
The Turkish and communistic movements, while mischievous, are in no way alarming. Their importance lies only in the fact that disorder, if it arose, might take somewhat longer to quell than would otherwise be the case. A united and loyal Turkish community has always been regarded as a useful safeguard in troublous times, but this cannot at present be guaranteed. The communists would of course take such action as would promote and prolong disturbances.

11. Finally, I draw attention to the inevitable conclusion that the question of remodelling the constitution may have to be revived at the end of this year. I trust that I may be afforded the opportunity of discussing that aspect of the position with Your Lordship on my forthcoming visit to England.

What exactly would later pass in conversation between Storrs and the Secretary of State we do not know, but Shuckburgh minutted on the matter on 18th June 1931 that Storrs did not appear insistent on revising the constitution. He stated: “I had a short talk with Sir R. Storrs on the subject a few days ago. He gave me to understand that he did not propose, for the present at all events, to revive the question of altering the Constitution. On the other hand, he expressed the hope that we should be prepared, if need arose, to assist him by enacting essential legislation (e.g. next year’s Budget) by Order in Council.”

Two days earlier, H. R. Cowell had minutted:

The Secretary of State will no doubt wish to discuss this question with Sir Ronald Storrs. My own view, however, is that so far nothing sufficiently serious has occurred to justify a change in the decision taken last year and recorded on 40011/1930. The difficulty is that any change in the constitution could have no hope of success unless it involved a drastic reduction in the powers possessed by the Elected Members. So long as the present spirit prevails amongst the Turks in Cyprus, there is no hope that any constitution, however ingenious its provisions, can be worked efficiently unless it gives the Governor complete ultimate control of legislation and finance. On the other hand, the present constitution can still be made to function more or less imperfectly, since we always have in the last resort the power of legislation by Order in Council. If the Elected Members should unite to reject the Budget, presumabably it would be carried by Order in Council as was done on a previous occasion, and the ordinary routine administration of the Island can be carried on even if a number of desirable legislative acts which it is not worth while to enact by Order in Council must remain unpassed.

I should therefore be inclined to continue a waiting policy. There seems some reason to hope that the funds, and therefore possibly the enthusiasm of the extreme opponents of the Government are on the wane. If it should be found necessary in the future to use the power of legislation by Order in Council with undue frequency, I would suggest the enactment by Order in Council of a provision similar to that contained in the Ceylon constitution which enables the Governor to declare any Bill, Motion, or Vote to be of paramount importance, whereupon such Bill, Motion or Vote will have effect as if it had been passed by the Council. The enactment of such a general provision would no doubt cause a good deal of protest, but it would be strong defence to point out that this provision exists in the far more liberal constitution of Ceylon, where political obstruction has never reached the point with which we have lately become familiar in Cyprus.

2005. Shuckburgh to Wilson, 18th June 1931. CO 67/239/14, 4.
6.4 Graeco-Turkish Alliances and a “Lost Opportunity”

Though the 1930 elections were to return on the Greek, as well as Turkish side, a more blatantly nationalist selection of members to the Council, international developments acted to dampen any danger of the collision of the rival ethno-nationalist camps. Specifically, what was underway by 1930 was a new era of detente between Greece and Turkey. In June of 1930 the two states had signed the first in a series of agreements to solve their outstanding disputes, soon after which Venizelos, once again Premier of Greece, had been officially invited to visit Turkey. His state visit to Turkey in late October 1930 was a diplomatic success that was announced by the signing of treaties of friendship and cooperation. Turkish Prime Minister İsmet Paşa was to pay a return visit to Athens the following year, just weeks before the outbreak of the October Revolt. With their motherlands on such cordial terms, it would not be befitting for the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus to be in conflict with one another, and the new era of friendship between Greece and Turkey that had now dawned was duly reflected in Cyprus too.

With the new atmosphere in relations between Greece and Turkey, this should, from a British perspective, have meant a long overdue re-evaluation of policy. The potential threat of an anti-colonial front developing on the island should have been a matter of concern, indeed one that might well have called for a much more astute use of the policy of divide-and-rule. Now was not the time for them to have unrealistically ignored the new force of Turkish nationalism, less so to confront it head on, for this only served to improve the chances of alliance between Greeks and Turks on the island. Storrs deserves much of the blame. Despite the passing of time, his description of Necati as the “Thirteenth Greek” who had, “voted with the traditional enemies of his race,” and the contradictions contained in his appreciation given in the passage below from his memoirs of 1937, reveal that even retroactively he was unable to properly grasp the political position of the Turks of Cyprus. Storrs wrote:

Even now it was possible, with patience and sympathy, to carry on so long as the three Turkish Moslem members could be trusted to vote with the Government. Unfortunately the Turkish Consul, Assaf Bey, a strong Nationalist and Kemalist, had succeeded in creating a small but active element of opposition to the loyal Turkish majority. I discovered his intrigues and reported them to the Government, who procured his recall, but not before he had so influenced the Turkish electorate that the Greeks were able to secure the election of a Turk who could no longer be counted upon to support the Government. Though a man of straw, he nevertheless possessed in effect the casting vote of the Legislative Council. This completely upset the balance of power.

Storrs legitimately registered the role played by Asaf, but failed to understand that it was only a single factor involved in the rise of Turkish nationalism, nationalism that both preceded and outlived his stay on the island. Not only the depth, but also the scope of political change was greater than Storrs recognised. The, “loyal Turkish majority,” at least

2009. Ibid., 588; McHenry suggests that the recall of Asaf was not pressed on Turkey as strongly as Storrs insinuated, and that in reality, “The fact that the Turkish Government transferred him with so little prompting is illustrative of the importance which Atatürk attached to friendly relations with Great Britain.” McHENRY 1987, 178.
by Storrs’ standards of loyalty, was no more, having been supplanted by a larger “majority” that had voted out the government’s most loyal adherent. As to Necati, certainly he was prepared to work with the Greeks, but was just as willing, if not more so, to confront them when he believed it to be necessitated by “Turkish” interests and this “Thirteenth Greek” was popularly regarded as much more representative of Turkish nationalist sentiment than Storrs’ loyalists ever were. Assuredly the Greek political leadership had expressed its desire for persons bearing Necati’s independence from Government to be elected, and had recognised the evidence of such, “progressive Turks who wanted to get rid of the Evkaf’s tutelage.”\(^{2010}\) Undoubtedly they were not likely to have been displeased by the subsequent defeat of Münir, but this scarcely proves that Necati was their “puppet”. It was this very same “puppet” who shortly before joining forces with the Greeks to defeat the Government in the critical spring session of 1931, had insisted that Greece had no claim to Cyprus, that its geographical and historical attachment was to Turkey, and to the fury of the Greek members of the Council had said that, “as this island is part of Asia Minor those who are strangers in it may go to Greece[!]”.\(^{2011}\) While Necati did not call for an end to British rule, in the face of the cries for enosis, he did demand that the rights and autonomy of the island’s Turks should be respected.

Kızılıyürek’s contention that: “Necati bey had not been afraid to vote with the Greek Cypriots and had put an end to the Anglo-Turkish alliance that had continued since 1882,” rightly emphasised the role that Necati played in disturbing the British potential to manipulate the balance of power. Yet, standing on its own, this interpretation is nonetheless a little misleading. As we have noted, it was only a few years earlier that in a similarly critical vote Münir Bey had himself voted against the government, and more generally, the impression left that it was unprecedented for the Turks to have voted with the Greeks is deceptive.\(^{2012}\) Doros’ pronouncement that: “For the first time, on 28 April, 1931, a Turkish representative … voted with the Greek Members in the Legislative Council,” is at best simply wrong, at worst a travesty of the truth.\(^{2013}\)

Even so, Necati, it must be reiterated, was evidently more willing to lead on the Turkish side a movement for broader and sustained cooperation with the Greek Cypriots. According to Georghallides, he had visited and given assurances to Archbishop Kyriillos on this matter, and he freely expressed his willingness to cooperate with Greek Cypriots in his interview with Ali Süha, (even though this left him open to charges of being co-opted by them).\(^{2014}\) The Greeks too were to work on the issue of intercommunal cooperation. Rossides, “declared his respect for Turkish national sentiments and aspirations,” but argued that this need not preclude their cooperation.\(^{2015}\)

A Greek Cypriot pamphlet of 1931, published in Athens in the days following the revolt, was especially illustrative of the changed political perception of the Turkish Cypriots. Despite the fact that the comments and claims it made pertaining to enosis and especially to the Turks’ potential reactions to this were way off mark, the fact remains

\(^{2011}\) Minutes of the Legislative Council 1931, PART I, 13–18.
\(^{2013}\) DOROS 1955, 350.
\(^{2014}\) GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 483; ÖZKAN 1967.
\(^{2015}\) GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 612.
that there is displayed a discernibly different tone towards the Turkish Cypriots. It declared:

Nothing is more characteristic of Sir Ronald’s peculiar mentality, than his systematic efforts to sow discord between the native elements. To this end all means are employed. A disproportionate representation is given to the Turks in the councils and public services; the revenue from the school-tax is unequally divided between the Greek and the Turkish schools; preference (often amounting to a scandal) is given to Mussulmans in the award of the few available scholarships for higher studies; even in the official communications the Turkish text precedes the Greek, and the same rule is followed in the inscriptions on public buildings or offices, and the street signs. The Government has made itself ridiculous by persisting in the retention of the Turkish fez in the uniform of the island gendarmerie, although the gendarmes themselves, both Greeks and Turks, by a common accord and by repeated petitions, have asked for the abolition of this antiquated head-gear, so hot and unprotecting in the long months of heat and so unsuitable at all times as affording no protection for the eyes. The gendarmes have gone so far in their entreaties, as to offer to make good the cost of substituting caps with visors for the unspeakable fez.

On the other hand the success of this policy à la Abdul Hamid of ‘dividing in order to rule’, required the perpetuation amongst the Mussulmans of the ‘theocratic’ mentality, which in former times had prompted the Turks of Cyprus to persecute and even massacre their Greek fellow-islanders. This explains the fury against Kemalist Turkey, which animates the immediate entourage of Sir Ronald, going to the length of prohibiting the illumination of the minarets on festivals ordained by the Turkish Republic, whereas certain Arab Festivals, now completely forgotten amongst Mussulmans, are decreed public holidays.

Fortunately, all these manoeuvres have thus far proved unsuccessful, because the Cypriot Turks, under an external simplicity, possess much good common-sense and are aware that it would be neither just nor advisable to continue to oppose the will of five-sixths of the population. They do not seem disposed to lend themselves to any further colonial exploitation to the prejudice of the Greeks, with whom they suffer in common from the evils and prodigality of the present administration and to whose mentality they stand much nearer than to that of their British masters. And it was with great mutual satisfaction that the two native elements of the island population greeted the recent entente cordiale concluded between Turkey and Greece. Moreover, the Cypriot Mussulmans have commenced to understand that their longstanding rights and privileges will suffer no loss, will be secure and respected in case of union with Greece. They know well enough that in Greece today there are special laws protecting the religion, the schools and the civic rights and liberties of the Mussulman minority in Western Thrace, under the aegis of the League of Nations, and that these laws have ever been respected.

In consequence of this new spirit amongst the Cypriot Turks, it has frequently come to pass in the Legislative Council that the Turkish deputies, in spite of official pressure and threats, have joined forces with their Greek colleagues to defeat certain arbitrary measures; and during the recent events, the Mussulman minority generally has sided with the persecuted Greeks in a noble and touching manner.

Seeing the poor success of his attempts to reconcile the Turks, Sir Ronald turned to another element (not indigenous) of the population and made great efforts to win over the Armenians of Cyprus as a counterpoise to the Greeks.2016

An engrossing account of the politics of Cyprus penned by a former Foreign Minister of Greece, Evangelos Averoff bears the title “Lost Opportunities.” Averoff’s book focuses
on the failure to make work the agreements reached in 1959 in Zurich and London, and embodied in the bi-communal, partnership Republic of Cyprus founded in 1960… hence the title. Yet, as he himself alludes, badly managed political upheaval in Cyprus was not a new feature, and as such his words can be fittingly used also to describe the opportunity lost by the island’s inhabitants, Turks and Greeks, to assert their will at the beginning of the 1930’s.2017

Aside from his slight exaggeration of the propensity in the past of Turkish members to vote with the government, Georghallides’ analysis of the new state of affairs that dawned at the beginning of the 1930’s is most apt and makes up for the deficiencies in realism of the interpretations of the pamphlet quoted above. He explained:

Undoubtedly in 1931 the elected members’ influence on official policies increased mainly owing to the ending of the virtually automatic Anglo-Turkish combination following Nejati effendi’s election. Storrs’s unwillingness to adapt the nexus of Anglo-Turkish relations to the reality of the election of two Kemalist deputies and the ensuing disputes with the Turkish leaders had, from the Greeks’ point of view, a beneficial effect on the work of the Council. Although Nejati showed himself to be as opposed to the prospect of enosis as his immediate predecessors, Munir and Irfan beys, he broke ranks with the British on communal matters regarding which he was in conflict with the authorities; and on other issues joined the Greeks for a perceived common good. … on some occasions he even carried with him the more conservative Dr. Eyioub who, not wholly reliably, represented the old order of things. Acting together, the Cypriot representatives succeeded in imposing modifications to the details of Government bills and even in jettisoning proposals repugnant to Cypriot opinion. Thus the political forces inside the Chamber had lost the almost total rigidity that had frustrated and angered the Greeks.2018

Here perhaps was a major opportunity for the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus to build long-needed bridges of political alliance, to cooperate against colonial rule, and perchance in time to build thereby the foundations of a common “Cypriot” cause. Not only were there Turkish Cypriots willing to openly defy government, but they had now also widespread backing in doing so. Furthermore, the state of relations between Turkey and Greece was uniquely congenial to their joining forces, and was warmly acknowledged as being so by both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot press and politicians alike.2019 This “window of opportunity”, however, was to be slammed shut with the Greek-led revolt

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2016. Enclosure in Storrs to Secretary of State, 23rd March 1932. CO 67/244/8, 123–124; The claim that the Turks had a higher proportion of public posts, one touched upon earlier, was a valid one, though as revealed by British statistics, not as clear-cut as sometimes portrayed. Yes, the Turks did have a higher proportion of such employees than the Greeks. As of January 1st, 1928 the Turks held 36% of posts in the civil establishment, as compared to 56% held by the Greeks, but those of the category of “Roman Catholics and Maronites were in fact most out of proportion, amounting to about 3 times the proportion of the population they constituted. Furthermore, in terms of salaries the case was also not quite as much in the Turks’ favour as thought. Clearly the most significant figure here was that of the English salaries, which were on average above £600 per employee. For the Armenians the corresponding figure, to the closest pound, was, £151 per person, for Roman Catholics and Maronites, £193 per person, for Greeks £112 per person and for the Turks, only £101 per person. See table in Nicholson to Secretary of State, 5th October 1928. CO 67/226/15, 3 and Report of the Census of 1931.

2017. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA 1986, vii and 419.
2019. See for example, Söz 31st December 1931; Georghallides too supports this analysis and provides similar examples from the Greek as well as Turkish Cypriot press. GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 418–420, 474 and 476.
that erupted in October of 1931, and by the repressive regime that was thereafter imposed by Britain. As Georghallides concedes, the more moderate Greek political wing had failed to grasp this propitious opening, and left it to the radicals to take the initiative.\textsuperscript{2020}

Clearly in the lead-up to the October Revolt the Turkish community was not becoming less, but rather more nationalist. With only weeks to go before the outbreak of the October Revolt, the opening lines of a new poem by Ahmet Ratip exclaimed:

\begin{displayquote}
I cry, I moan like a grieving bird; \\
In a prison surrounded on all four sides by the sea, \\
Sometimes I turn to my soul and say “that’s enough, be silent!”.
\end{displayquote}

It says “I will be silent only in the blessed Motherland.”\textsuperscript{2021}

All the same the existing political dynamics furnished an opportunity for common cause to be made by Greek and Turkish nationalist forces on a non-maximalist basis that might in time have developed into a broader anti-colonial platform, wherein a Cypriot as opposed to a Turkish or Greek, Orthodox or Moslem identity might slowly, incrementally have come to predominate. Necati, unlike most his rivals, did not shirk from collaborating with Greek politicians, but rejected on the anniversary of his victory that in any way this meant he supported enosis. He explained his role in the Legislative Council to a crowd gathered to hear him speak as follows: “I always work for the good of my nation and I use my vote accordingly. I voted many times with the Government and many times with the Greek Members whenever I thought it was for your good. You must not [however] think that Nejati wants the Union with Greece because he has voted with the Greeks.”\textsuperscript{2022}

The first post-election Legislative Council meetings of 1930 passed without any major crisis for the Government, the Turks notably voting with the government on the Appropriations Bill, though doing so, “in exchange for the non-imposition of fresh taxes.”\textsuperscript{2023} It is worth mention though, that the general attitude taken by Necati in debates was much more critical than the government had been accustomed to in recent times, a fact that did not bode well for the British. In the Council he not only criticised the Government’s financial policies, but strongly condemned their actions in relation to the Şeri courts and the Müftülük, which, he argued, contravened Article 27 of the Treaty of Lausanne.\textsuperscript{2024} The following year’s Legislative Council meetings, however, quickly brought the point home that the Government could no longer expect an easy ride. As Storrs was to convey, Necati gave a joint notice with Theodotou of a motion which resolved to bring education under the control of Cypriot officials, abolishing the posts of the Director and Assistant Director of Education and creating instead separate offices for the management of Greek and Turkish schools, no longer to be staffed by British officials with burdensome wages. A concerned Acting Governor, Henniker-Heatton, asked London in a confidential despatch of 7\textsuperscript{th} August, 1931, for, “guidance as to the limitation on motions of which members of the Legislative Council may give notice for debate,” and notified that as to the above joint motion, “the immediate difficulty was treated by not finding room for the motion on the Order Paper during the last Session.”\textsuperscript{2025}

\textsuperscript{2020} Ibid., 640.  
\textsuperscript{2021} Söz 3\textsuperscript{rd} September 1931.  
\textsuperscript{2022} Report by Local Commandant of Police in Nicosia, 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1931. SA1/1576/1929/3, 384.  
\textsuperscript{2023} GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 547.  
\textsuperscript{2024} Minutes of the Legislative Council 1930, PART IV, 156–170.  
\textsuperscript{2025} Henniker-Heatton to Secretary of State, 7\textsuperscript{th} August 1931. SA1/698/1931, 10-12.
Also notable at the outset of this session had been the official members’ abstention on a resolution to include an expression of the Greek members’ desire for enosis in the address in reply to the Governor’s opening speech. According to Georghallides the British goal here was to placate the Greek members and thereby avoid their resignation from the Assembly.\footnote{2026} It might be speculated as well, however, that the British were also passing on a message to the Turks… that they would, if they contemplated causing trouble, find themselves devoid of British support in the face of Greek demands. Yet, if the British expected the nationalist wing of the Turkish Cypriots to forfeit its opposition to their administration, they were mistaken. On the contrary nationalist opposition to the British appears to have been enflamed further by this action.

An article published on the front cover of Söz, entitled, “We are between two fists!” was most forthright on this subject. It stated: “The English and the Greek Cypriots who outwardly appear to be at each other’s throats, have in truth united and worked together at the most critical times.” Noting that the Turks had made important sacrifices in the past so as to maintain their loyalty to the British, it complained:

> While making all these sacrifices there was only one thing that we expected [in return] which was that we would not one day be surrendered to a ruler such as Greece. However, the position taken by the Government in recent years shows that it is almost, in fact, laying the foundations for the rule of Greece to be introduced and take root.

Thus the forces of the Government and of the majority are like two fists turned towards us. To avoid being “crushed” and “ruined” by these two fists the Turks must, it was implored, immediately unite amongst themselves.\footnote{2027}

Yet evidently the call being made for intra-community unity fell on deaf ears. A furious Ahmet Raşid soon after censured the “Evkafçılar” for maintaining their pro-government stance. Declaring that the Evkafçılar had historically gained in strength at the expense of their own community’s interests, he sarcastically admonished them for having had interpreted the need to politically work with the government to mean that, “all forms of communal honour and wealth, rights and interests,” were to be abandoned to the whim of the government. The government would thereby be satisfied by the passivity of the Turkish Cypriots, while the Evkafçılar would receive ample rewards for their services. Times, however, had changed. The nationalists, he insisted, would not succumb to this policy.\footnote{2028}

Nevertheless, in the Council Eyyub, at least, gave indications of being willing to return to his more rebellious past. In the Legislative Council, to the chagrin of the official members, he backed Necati’s position that the post of Müftü should be restored, and also that it should henceforth be popularly elected, though he was less supportive on other matters relating to the Şeri courts and the Evkat.\footnote{2029} At this juncture though, with the government under mounting pressure to yield to Turkish Cypriot demands for greater communal autonomy, it was the Greek members of the Council who failed to provide the necessary support. Georghallides defends the abstention on the grounds that it reflected, “respect for an exclusively Moslem concern,” yet surely they, like Necati, could if they had wished inter-
interpreted the matter as more than a communal religious matter. Was it not an effort to gain communal liberties from the colonial regime? Was it not, then, one wonders, more likely in lieu of the fact that the British had given support to them in the draft address in reply, for which Bishop of Kitium Nicodemos Mylonas was to express profuse thanks, that the Greeks members had abstained?

All the same, the nationalists’ anger with the pro-enosis resolution quite quickly dissipated. As talk turned once again to the worsening economic predicament of the island, they prepared to register their opposition to the Government in alliance with the Greeks. With the effects of the Great Depression biting at the finances of Cyprus, and the Government having been late to appraise its consequences, concerns grew during the first months of 1931 as to how to balance the budget. In order to meet the shortfall the Government proposed an increase in taxation that was contained within the Customs, Excise and Revenue Bill first introduced to the Council on April 28th.

In debate Necati came out strongly against the introduction of higher tariffs, which under existing economic circumstances, he protested, should have been reduced rather than increased as proposed. When it came down to the vote that evening, both Necati and Eyyub abstained themselves, and with Zeka Bey being on leave, (and one Greek member having resigned his seat), the nine Government members of the Council were faced by defeat, all eleven Greek members voting against them. Storrs’ was once again incensed, particularly by the lack of support from the Turks.2034

Both Greeks and Turks had supported as an alternative the reduction of the cost of Government administration, the savings to be sought by reducing expenditure on official salaries. To this Storrs eventually capitulated, but his tactical move was insufficient to ameliorate the outcry that arose when in late August 1931 the first news broke of a Customs Order-in-Council, overriding the will of the Legislative Council and of general public opinion and imposing fresh taxation. The fact that the Government had not obtained the backing of the Turks in imposing the new customs tariff, may, to some extent, be fairly attributed to the populists’ triumph in the previous year’s elections. Yet, even if Münir had maintained his seat and the populists had been defeated, past practice should have indicated that on such publicly unpopular votes, the Government was not necessarily assured the votes of the “loyal” Turks. Hill’s mimicking of the official perspective that the proposals had been defeated by the collaboration of, “one of the Turks (a puppet whom the Greeks, thanks to the intrigues of the Turkish Consul Assaf Bey, had got elected to the Council),” is an unforgivably shallow appreciation for a scholar of his repute. The reality was that the Legislative Council, flawed as it was, was more representative of public opinion, both Greek and Turkish, than was the executive led by Storrs. The position taken by Necati was perfectly understandable from this perspective, without any need to put forward unsubstantiated allegations as to his integrity as explanation.

2033. Ibid., 570.
2034. Ibid., 573–574.
2035. Ibid., 587–591.
2036. HILL 1952, 460.
Conspiratorial theories as to the October Revolt are sometimes intimated. What is consciously or unconsciously insinuated is that the Revolt was part of a grand plot by the British to avert the threat to their rule that an alliance of Greek and Turkish Cypriots posed; divide-and-rule having failed, the alternative was to put an end to the liberal constitution and rule by fiat. In light of the fact that Britain had long been wary of this eventuality; that in the years preceding the revolt they had been intensively debating the need to change the constitutional set-up in Cyprus, and that in its aftermath they were to describe it as a “godsend,” it is not too difficult to comprehend why such ideas are floated.\textsuperscript{2037} Dawes recorded, (and the Secretary of State noted his concurrence), that almost the whole fifty years of the British Occupation had been wasted because of a defective constitution, and that therefore the, “riots of 1931 were in one respect a godsend as they braced us up to abolish it.”\textsuperscript{2038} Kızılürek, amongst others, echoes the logic of these remarks when he asserts that, “The British administration used this uprising as an excuse to abolish the Legislative Council and suspend the Constitution.”\textsuperscript{2039} Ahmet An goes even further, declaring: “According to my personal evaluations, the insurrection or uprising of 1931 was not simply the feat of Enotist Greek Cypriots, but was of foreign origins and probably was instigated by the incitement of the British administration.”\textsuperscript{2040}

The fact that over seventy years on key Colonial Office files on the Revolt remain sealed, adds fuel to the flame;\textsuperscript{2041} and comments such as that of a minute in one open Colonial Office file stating that a trusted member of the police force, Mr. Dowbiggin, who had been studying the role of the British in the Revolt, and had been asked to report his findings by the Colonial Office, had been given, “access, of course, only to the Command Paper,” are bound to raise eyebrows too.\textsuperscript{2042} Nevertheless, the fact remains that available evidence, at least that which is in the public domain and accessible to academic researchers, does not adequately corroborate any potential conspiracy theories. Were there to have been such a conspiracy, one would expect the studious British schemers to have some form of set plan for the aftermath of the riots, but, as indicated by a confidential

\textsuperscript{2037} Dawe to Secretary of State, 28th November 1933. CO 67/251/3, 4.
\textsuperscript{2038} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2039} KIZILÜREK 2002, 220.
\textsuperscript{2040} AN 1997/a, 182.
\textsuperscript{2041} For example, the Colonial Office documents contained under the references CO 67/239/4 and CO 67/242/5, (Available details of files in the British National Archives can be found on their online catalogue accessible at: http://catalogue.pro.gov.uk/), stated to cover the period of 1931–1932, are scheduled to remain closed documents with “no description available” until the 1st of January 2033. Brief descriptions of some files are, in fact, given, but their contents are not accessible, and from the titles of such files, Gürel makes what he frankly admits is a very tentative suggestion that the October Revolt was perhaps orchestrated from Egypt and/or Greece. [GÜREL 1984, 138]. Georghallides, who also made wide use of the British archives, on the other hand, noted a similar difficulty as to a file related to Turkish Consul Asaf’s activities in 1930. [GEORGHALLIDES 1985, 466]. There are, in addition to documents destroyed by statute, to be found certain missing files and pages amongst registered archival volumes, yet to do justice to British record keeping, and the general accessibility of sources, one must acknowledge the plethora of evidence that is available despite its potentially embarrassing nature for British authorities. The wealth and quality of valuable academic study resulting from research conducted in the British National Archives attests amply to this fact.
\textsuperscript{2042} Gallagher to Henniker-Heatton, 19th July 1932. CO 67/245/1, 59.
telegram of the 17th November 1931 from the Secretary of State to Storrs, this was not the case.2043

In the final analysis the insurrection of 1931 was an all-Greek affair. There was no effort to incorporate the Turkish Cypriots in such organization, and had there been they would undoubtedly have failed. Had they been directed against the illiberal British regime per se, there is a chance that a common platform might have been formed, at least with the populist wing of the Turkish leadership that undoubtedly was in the ascendency. It was not just the Greeks who had fumed at the British decision to ignore the elected representatives of the people, but the Turks too. Söz went so far as to question on the front page of its issue of 17th of September 1931 whether with a government, unlike those in other areas of the world, failing to make an effort to alleviate the suffering caused by the Great Depression, and ignoring the pleas of Legislative Councillors chosen by the votes of the people, it should be questioned if there remained any meaning in the people’s representatives continuing to sit in the assembly.2044

A few voices of reason in the Greek press were to lament that the Turks had not been invited to join a common front for common purposes, and the veteran politician Ioannis Kyriakides was at one point to publicly champion the idea.2045 However, the undeniable reality was that the objectives ultimately pursued by the Greek Cypriot leadership, that were eventually endorsed by even the more moderate politicians, were once again to be directed to the goal of enosis, and as such there was no way that the Turkish Cypriots would partake in such efforts. On the contrary, they unanimously and unequivocally denounced them.

There are strong grounds to believe that despite Venizelos’ opposition to such intrigues, the Greek Consul in Nicosia, Alexis Kyrou, (himself of Cypriot origins), played a significant role in instigating the political upheaval of October, 1931.2046 Storrs had been complaining of his activities for some time, but the Foreign Office had supported a more subtle approach to that of having him declared persona non grata and abruptly recalled. Venizelos’ apparent assurance that Kyrou would be withdrawn “soon,” appeared to confirm the wisdom of their diplomatic approach to the matter.2047 A secret telegram sent by Storrs on the 21st of October revealed, however:

Reason to think but no proof that Kyrou who returned here 1st October is responsible for turn in political events. After one month wrangling between Greek elected members of the Council and National organization as to the form of protest against Customs Tariff Bishop previously opposed to resignation resigned 17th October and issued violent Unionist manifesto followed by vague seditious utterances. Bishop known to be closely associated with Kyrou. Strongest passages in manifesto are not in the Bishop’s style and are attributed to Kyrou. Bishop known to be in debt now appears to have funds from unknown source. National organisation bankrupt. Members who have not resigned indignantly ascribe Bishop’s

2044. Söz 17th September 1931; Further Georgallides relates that the revelation in London in July 1931, just a few months before the October Revolt, that the surpluses paid by the Cypriots on the tribute were not to be returned, “caused uproar among the Cypriots.” [GEORGALLIDES 1985, 25]. McHenry concurs, stating that, “The Cypriots viewed this admission as yet another instance of British duplicity, and it further inflamed the political atmosphere on the island.” McHENRY 1987, 86.
2047. STORRS 1937, 590–592.
independent volte face to mysterious influence. I have no doubt that Kyrou is involved and that his instant removal would alleviate the situation. 2048

By the time the message had been decoded in London it was too late for the removal of Kyrou to have had any impact on the course of events. Storrs confirmed, however, that he himself had no doubts about the objectives of the uprising. Another secret telegram sent the same day declared:

Truth is that purpose of these disturbances is 100% Unionist and represents desperate attempts of rival politicians to achieve publicity for Union and break tendency toward understanding and cooperation for which purpose exploitation of criminal propensities and youthful enthusiasm has on this occasion passed completely beyond its authors’ control and degenerated, to satisfaction of extremists, into exhibition of primitive mob violence. 2049

No matter that financial grievances and imperialistic attitudes had aggravated the situation, no matter that some may have been unaware of the consequences of their actions, others just swept by the tide; nor that communists, belatedly also became embroiled in the revolt, Storrs’ remark that, “in the final riot the only cry employed was that of Enosis,” is essentially accurate in reflecting the primary objective of this insurrection. 2050 That the British were fundamentally correct in the assessment that enosis was the principal goal of the uprising, is positively confirmed by the manifestos, speeches and resolutions issued by Greek Cypriot leaders in the lead-up to and during the riots 2051 Though it should not be overlooked that other factors were also pivotal in inciting to revolt, (especially economic discontent), there is little to wonder at as far as concerns the fact that the Turks were not participants. Inferring that their non-participation was solely a consequence of “loyalty to the British” is once more too shallow an appreciation.

The Governor transmitted another secret telegram on the 22nd in which he communicated how matters had finally come to a head:

Large procession led by three Greek Elected Members of the Council demonstrated for 3½ hours last night, Wednesday, before Government House threw stones thereat, kept Police at bay with missiles, and finally set fire to Government House which was burned to the ground. Leaders had no control from the outset. Crowd could be kept from its purpose neither by warnings nor eventually by baton charges. That having failed after further warning Police opened fire and dispersed crowd. A few civilians wounded one seriously and some Police injured. At present Capital quiet. I have summoned troops. Disturbance show signs of spreading. I am requesting Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, send aircraft carriers or cruiser Larnaca and asking for troops by air from Egypt. My leave cancelled. All cyphers thought to be destroyed. 2052

The same day Söz published a warning to the Turkish Cypriot populace not to get involved in the insurrection. It insisted that in the face of developments the Turks should get on with their own business, fully obey the laws of the land and orders of the Govern-

2048. Storrs to Secretary of State, 21st October 1931. CO 67/237/11, 67; Storrs’ charge of complicity between Kyrou and Mylonas was repeated in a secret despatch sent soon after, in which he further argued that the latter had proposed, “to embark privately on a course of action designed to lead to his arrest in the hope of martyrdom.” Storrs to Secretary of State, 22nd October 1931. CO 67/240/13, 30.
2049. Telegram from Storrs to Secretary of State, 22nd October 1931. CO 67/240/10, 134.
2051. See enclosure in Storrs to Secretary of State, 11th February 1932. CO 67/243/1, 148–152.
2052. Telegram from Storrs to Secretary of State, 22nd October 1931. CO 67/240/10, 135.
ment, and take great care to avoid being caught up in this Greek Cypriot movement.\textsuperscript{2053} Necati himself had published an open letter in the press calling upon the Turks to stay calm and obey the authorities. He wrote:

\textit{To the respected Turkish Community of Cyprus.}

... The recent activities in Nicosia of our Greek compatriots especially those of the night of the 21st October are not directed to our community but are events which occurred between Greeks and the Government. Therefore our duty in such an excited and extraordinary time is to maintain our perfect quietness and impartiality in a most serious manner and not to interfere with these activities directly or indirectly, but to be busy with our work and to leave the matter entirely to be dealt with by the responsible authorities. At the same time I am convinced that it is for the general benefit of the community to bow, as always, to all measures to be adopted and orders to be given by the Government in such extraordinary circumstances and by controlling our actions more closely to take safe and careful steps which will not allow of any misunderstanding whatsoever.

The safety of the country and the peace of our community invite us to be alert and careful in every respect and to refrain from any miscalculated act.

I expect this from the quietness and peacefulness of our respected community and repeat that there is no ground for fear or anxiety.\textsuperscript{2054}

His message was duly acknowledged by the British and Storrs was to register in his official report on the disturbances that: “The goodwill of the large Moslem population and the other minorities towards the Government never wavered throughout the disturbances, though they suffered the hardships of the curfew orders and other restrictions in common with their fellow townsmen.”\textsuperscript{2055} Hakikat even reported, (though this is hard to confirm from any other source and may well have been simply an attempt by the editors to emphasise the pro-British loyalty of the Turks), that some Turks of Nicosia had actually prepared to attack the Greek rioters but had been prevented from so doing by the police.\textsuperscript{2056}

According to Storrs’ report, the guiding light of activities that led to the revolt was the Bishop of Kitium, Nicodemos Mylonas. Pursuant to the issuance of the Imperial Order in Council amending the Customs tariff, Mylonas resigned from the Legislature on 17\textsuperscript{th} of October 1931. He was shortly followed, somewhat reluctantly it seems, by the other Greek members of the Council, who had in fact been debating their response to the Imperial Order under the leadership of Mylonas since the 12\textsuperscript{th} of September.\textsuperscript{2057} At a meeting together with the other elected members Mylonas had read to them a revolutionary manifesto, upon which, though they agreed in principle, they had wished to deliberate upon further. It left no doubt as to the underlying goal of their actions... enosis:

Looking therefore steadily at the bright star of new Bethlehem and of our national salvation we have one and only one way to walk, the way which is narrow and full of sorrows but leads to salvation. We should hoist under the light of the day the flag of union and in the kiln

\textsuperscript{2053} Söz 22\textsuperscript{nd} October 1931.

\textsuperscript{2054} “Notes on Points of Fact in ‘The Question of Cyprus’ ” enclosed in Henniker-Heatton to Parkinson, 27\textsuperscript{th} September 1932. CO 67/244/8, 22–23.


\textsuperscript{2056} Hakikat, “A Loathsome and Caluminous Pamphlet”, enclosure in Govern Storrs to the Secretary of State, 23\textsuperscript{rd} March 1932. CO 67/244/8, 59.

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of our continuous endeavours standing close together round it, reconciled and setting aside our differences we should with sacrifice and every means pursue our national liberation by getting united with mother Greece. In the name of God, the Protector of justice, morality and liberty, of these benefits in life which are insulted by the foreign tyrant, in the name of the eternal ideal for a united Greek Fatherland, let us be obedient to the voice-law, voice-order which comes down from the Mount Sinai of the National Legislations.2058

From the 18th to the 21st of October Mylonas had delivered a series of fiery speeches, calling for resistance to British rule and bringing pressure upon the remaining Greek members of the Legislative Council to promptly resign; they finally did so on the 21st. As news spread of their resignation excitement mounted and a crowd of several thousand gathered in Nicosia outside the Commercial Club. As on the occasion of prior gatherings during the previous days, they had been summoned by the ringing of Church bells. From here they proceeded, led by both Church and lay leaders, to march to Government House. Dionysios Kykkotis, the ranking priest of the most important church of the town had meanwhile, “declared revolution.” Arriving at the building armed with Greek flags and sticks: “A noisy demonstration ensued with cheering and clapping and continuous shouts of ‘Enosis’ (union).”2059

Slowly, however, things got out of hand, and, as Storrs himself confirmed, the leadership lost control of the course of events.

In the uproar Theodotou was heard to exclaim “The Governor justly (διχαίως) refuses to see us.” A few stones were thrown and some windows broken and, as I learnt afterwards, a Greek flag was hoisted on the roof of the house. It became increasingly clear that words would not move the crowd to go and that its enthusiasm and determination would not easily be exhausted. About an hour after their arrival, i.e., about 9.30 p.m., the leaders, realizing that they had no control, decamped. It seems that quite a number of the crowd followed them and thereafter the crowd tended steadily to diminish though the movement was difficult to follow and there was much coming and going, and shifting of position. ... Large groups of people stood about and jeered and threw stones at any police that passed.2060

As the evening progressed so too did the vehemence of the demonstrators. Stone throwing increased, and the Colonial Secretary’s car was set on fire. According to the Governor’s report attempts were then made to set fire to the house, only after which the order to fire upon the rioters was given. Though the crowd thereafter dispersed, it was too late to save the building, which, “was completely burnt out,” in a matter of minutes.2061

By the following day demonstrations and rioting had spread to other quarters of the island, some of the most violent to be held in Limassol, where the District Commissioner’s house also fell victim to arson.2062 With the help of military reinforcements, however, Storrs was gradually able to reassert control over the island, the towns being secured by the 27th, the villages soon after. Meanwhile, six civilians lay dead and thirty wounded, and all of the most prominent Greek Cypriot political leaders had been deported.2063

2058. Ibid., 33.
2059. Ibid., 7–10.
2060. Ibid., 11.
2061. Ibid., 12.
2062. Ibid., 15–16 and also 22–29.
2063. STORRS 1937, 599.
In the interval, following the arrest and decision to deport the “Nicosia ringleaders”, including Hadji Pavlou, Kykkotis and Theodotou, the communists also became embroiled in the disturbances. Storrs reported that:

The news of the arrests did not become general in Nicosia until about midday when a crowd gathered at the Archbishopric and a meeting was held there to discuss what measures should be taken to force the Government to liberate the ringleaders. At this meeting a reconciliation, engineered by Emilianides, was concluded between the communist leaders and the church. Vatiliotis, the Moscow-trained communist, kissed the hand of the Archbishop and promised him the support of his party in the immediate struggle against the Government.2064

Adams describes this involvement in, “The 1931 imbroglio,” as, “a costly mistake for the young Communist Party of Cyprus.” He states that the Comintern was particularly critical of their “inept” role ending-up lending assistance to the nationalists albeit in the name of, “anti-British protest,” and under the banner of autonomy rather than enosis.2065

In July of 1932 another booklet was published in Athens. Entitled, “The Question of Cyprus: Remarks of the Central Committee for Cyprus on Sir Ronald Storrs’ Report,” it rejected the findings of the Governor’s official account of the disturbances, pronouncing, amongst numerous other things:

[I]t is naive (to put it mildly) to believe that a few demagogues or mischief-makers could arouse an entire population and especially a population so peaceable and law-abiding (and withal absolutely unarmed) as the Cypriots. This idea is disproved by Sir R. Storrs himself in various passages of his Report, in which he admits that the members of the Legislative Council, the priests and other “demagogues” were unable, at critical moments, to restrain the people and were themselves swept off their feet by the popular ebullition. It is, indeed, impossible for a few agitators to create an uprising like that so graphically described by Sir R. Storrs on pp.9 and 10 of his Report.2066

The argumentation of the above extract bears much weight, yet the comments then made as to the Turkish Cypriots, (given below), do not comply with the facts:

[W]e cannot allow his statement to pass unchallenged, that the “goodwill of the large Moslem population toward the Government never wavered throughout the disturbances”, if by that he wishes to imply that the Mussulman minority were not in favour of union with Greece, for that is not the case. During the whole period of the disorders there was not the least exhibition of anti-Greek feeling, or any single instance of betrayal by Moslems to the authorities of those, who had compromised themselves in the disturbances. On the contrary, one of the most prominent Moslem leaders, Misirli Zadé, member of the Legislative Council for Kyrenia-Nicosia, issued a manifesto during the disturbances, calling upon his fellow-Moslems to remain quiet, “because our Greek brethren are only demanding what is their right.” The goodwill and co-operation between Greeks and Moslems in Cyprus has of late been strengthened by the complete reconciliation recently brought about between Greece and Turkey, which has convinced the Moslems of Cyprus that in the event of the union of their island with Greece, they will enjoy the same liberal rule and the same absolute equality of political rights with the Greeks, as the Moslem of Western Thrace.2067

2065. ADAMS 1971, 18–19; See also DEDEÇAY 1981, 10.
2067. Ibid., 40–41.
This passage was just as, if not more misjudged than analyses prepared by the British. It blatantly contradicted on several fronts the evidence. Most critically, the suggestion that the Moslems were in favour of the union of Cyprus with Greece, is completely absurd, a fallacy with no basis. Georghallides’ reference to a leading article published in the Greek Cypriot press at the outset of the Graeco-Turkish rapprochement, most probably penned by Greek Cypriot deputy Nikolaos Lanitis, is revealing in more than one way: Lanitis, he says:

[C]onceded that the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus were nationalists; therefore, co-operation between them for the achievement of freedom was difficult. Now, however, the Greeks were not asking the Turks to accept that ‘union with Greece would bring happiness to the whole of Cyprus, irrespective of race or religion’. The Greeks were interested in coordinating their positions in the Legislative Council only on matters of administration.2068

True, detente between Greece and Turkey had continued to contribute to easing the inter-communal atmosphere in Cyprus.2069 Yet neither Necati, nor any other Turkish Cypriot leader, had, as insinuated, in any way acquiesced to enosis, and the Turkish Cypriots certainly did not laud Greece’s treatment of its minorities. This point was amply illustrated by an article entitled, “The Turks of Thrace and M. Venizelos,” published in the Söz. The article dismissed outright the reporting of Venizelos trip to Thrace in the Greek Cypriot press, which had portrayed the people of the region as receiving the best of treatment. Söz responded in the following manner: “We will not prevent the Foni tis Kiprou newspaper from one way or another making propaganda in favour of the administration of Greece; however, as we understand that this article was published partly so as to sway the Turks of Cyprus and so as to save our people from any miscomprehension, we are publishing below, word for word, the article printed in Yeni Adım, and addressed to Prime Minister Venizelos by a fellow newspaper published in Thrace.”2070

Another, oft-quoted unofficial report on the disturbances by an eminent British academic, Arnold J. Toynbee, was also unfortunately flawed in its appreciation of events.2071 Despite the fact that colonial officials were not satisfied with his endeavours, in Henniker-Heaton’s words, “as he considers it his mission to persuade the Cypriots and the outside world that they are oppressed,” Toynbee had nonetheless incorporated many of the changes that had been “suggested” to him, having first sent proofs of his article to the Colonial Office prior to publication.2072 Indeed, his own understanding in some ways seems to have been just as misconceived as that of the British officials with whom he differed. Notably, his belief that the Turkish Cypriots did not have any “very real” objections to enosis showed a distinct failure to comprehend Turkish Cypriot sentiments.2073

Turkey was not uninterested in developments either. The Turkish consul sent a report of the abolition of the Legislative Council to Ankara and, as noted, Storrs too was to
record how greatly surprised he was to find on his visit to Turkey how well informed the leading Turks were of developments in Cyprus. Yet though Turkish political leaders did thereafter, on occasion continue to express concern as to the treatment of the Turkish Cypriots, there was no question of them encouraging opposition to British rule, especially as in the lead-up to the Second World War, Turkey continued to seek to improve relations with Britain. Turkish Foreign Minister Aras even went out of his way to assure the British that any Turkish Cypriots who were anti-British could not be considered Kemalists, and were, on the contrary, to be considered enemies of Turkey. It has been intimated by Gürel that the Turkish authorities may have been following a two-track policy of repudiating any desire to encourage Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, while underhand using their consuls on the island to do just this. His supposition, as he indeed recognises, however, can only be confirmed once full access is available to the documents of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Without further evidence, though, it does appear that the Turkish authorities’ role in fostering Turkish nationalism on the island was limited, largely perhaps to the individual, unsanctioned efforts of some of their consuls.

Though most would bow to the crackdown that followed insurrection, willingly or unwillingly, continued Turkish emigration during the 1930’s indicated that “the motherland” maintained its attraction. The most prominent nationalist figure to leave in the immediate wake of the October Revolt was Ahmet Raşid. Though almost all the other leading nationalists chose in the short term to stay, despite the new era of repression, Raşid appears to have been so disillusioned as to make the jump across the waters to Anatolia. Others, including Remzi and Con Rifat ultimately followed his footsteps. In an open letter announcing his departure, Raşid insisted that this should not be interpreted as meaning that he was abandoning the struggle; He was just taking the struggle to other quarters, for, he stated: “I believe that every individual has the duty of making sacrifices for his fatherland and nation. This duty starts from the cradle [and] continues until the grave”. Accordingly, Söz published fervently nationalist letters sent from Turkey by Raşid. The first of these announced: “I am now on the sacred soil of the motherland, longing and yearning for which I carried in my heart as a sacred aspiration for many years.”

2074. See Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, 12th December 1931. BCA 30.10.0.0/42250-234.577-15; See also Storrs to Secretary of State, 13th April 1932. CO 67/247/4, 24–26.
2075. Ibid., 281–282.
2076. GÜREL 1984, 193.
2077. At least one nationalist leader, Con Rifat, is reported by his daughter to have been placed under close police surveillance following the revolt, and it is possible to speculate that Raşid may have wished also to free himself from such harassment. FEDAİ 1986, 232.
2078. Söz 19th May 1932.
2079. Ibid., 29th September 1932.
6.6 The Resilience of Turkish Nationalism in the Aftermath of Insurrection

Even though in January of the following year the Governor was still predicting some possibility of further unrest, the British had by then essentially brought matters under control. Numerous leading Greek Cypriots had been detained or deported or imprisoned for their roles, and a financial levy imposed upon Greek Cypriots in the towns and villages that had partaken in some form or other in the Revolt. The urban areas were made to bear the brunt of the cost of reparations, the Governor and others continuing to maintain that the pastoral populace was still composed of loyal innocents. By early November Storrs had already begun to get round to considering new legal measures to eliminate the risk of future political agitation. The six immediate measures he proposed to introduce, and which were generally followed-up upon in one way or another, were:

(i) To forbid flying flags save on Consulates without express Government authority.

(ii) To place syllabus and discipline of all elementary schools in the hands of the Government and obtain as far as possible control of secondary education.

(iii) To vest appointments village authorities in Government exclusively.

(iv) To ensure candidates for higher ecclesiastical appointments are not exposed to political pressure, that priesthood be protected from lay interference and Church funds from misappropriation.

(v) To strengthen Press Law.

(vi) To revise Public Procession Law.

As the British themselves acknowledged, repressive measures such as the banning of unauthorised meetings of more than five people, the censorship of the press and post, and of course the abolition of the Legislative Council and general restrictions on political liberties were invariably to be imposed on Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. As such, however, they caused resentment amongst the Turks too, who felt the added injustice of punishment for disturbances in which they were in no way implicated.

Though the focus of criticism in the Turkish Cypriot press was on the Greeks and their demands for union with Greece, the British were chastised too for having created through their indecisive stance the impression that enosis was nigh. It was further pressed that the British administration, and the future constitution of the island, should now take greater account of the just demands of the Turks who had amply demonstrated their...
loyalty. But the sense of agrievement felt by people in Cyprus was not relieved. Hopes were still expressed a year after the revolt in the Turkish press that the arrival of the new Governor, Sir Reginald Stubbs would afford an opportunity for Turkish grievances to be addressed, but they were not; not by Stubbs, who remained for barely a year, or by his successor, Herbert Richmond Palmer, who was to remain in the post until 1939, and was himself replaced by William Battershill who governed the island through the war years. The British were not to comply with such wishful thinking. Instead, as Kızılıyürek explains, the British:

[B]egan to take measures to counter the nationalist tendencies of both communities. Particularly, importance was given to control of the education system; the importation of books and teachers from Greece and Turkey was banned. Sections and subjects of the curriculum that encouraged Turkish and Hellenic nationalism were removed. In the hope of guarding the Turkish Cypriot community from the influence of Kemalism and imprison it within a traditional religious identity, the name of the “Turkish Lise” was changed to the “Moslem Lise”. For the colonial administration conserving traditional values in opposition to national values, meant the reproduction of their efficient structure of power.

Kaymak vividly describes his first-hand experience of restrictive measures taken to stifle the nationalist sentiments of the Turks including the prohibition of the singing of nationalist songs, the forced removal of portraits of Atatürk and İnönü from classroom walls and the banning of the use of textbooks from Turkey.

In the aftermath of the Revolt the British cracked down on the clubs too, regarded, with much good reason, as having served as centres of sedition rather than as purely social enterprises. Extensive powers were given to the authorities to regulate the clubs, including the right to refuse registration to those considered seditious. Having recognised that the clubs had constituted, “a source of danger” in the past, the British were now determined to rein them in. Though the more numerous and generally more politically active Greek clubs would suffer most, their Turkish counterparts did not go unscathed either. Kardeş Ocağı itself came under considerable pressure, receiving stern warnings from the District Commissioner about the club’s general disposition. All the same, the Kardeş Ocağı continued throughout the 1930’s to be a centre of nationalist disaffection, not only harbouring prominent nationalist individuals on its premises, but also continuing to play a leading role in activities incorporating the general public. Was this club acting as a tool of Turkey? Landau’s research refutes the suggestion: He states that, “during the 1930s, although several associations with Pan-Turk leanings were active outside Turkey – with such suggestive names as Turan or Altın Ordu (The Golden Horde) in Bulgarian Thrace or Kardeş Oçağı (The hearth of brethren) in Cyprus, where it was supported by the Turkish newspapers Söz and Ses – there is no evidence to suggest that the Government

2086. Ibid., 5th and 10th November and 31st December 1931.
2087. Ibid., 20th October 1932.
2088. KIZILYÜREK 2002, 220.
2089. KAYMAK 1981; Plümer, a student at the time, asserts that a dictatorial regime was adopted, one that prevented even the use of the word “Turk”. [PLÜMER 2001, 15]. That all nationalist displays were banned in the schools is confirmed by the Report of the Department of Education for the School Years 1930–31 and 1931–32, 7. Enclosed in CO 69/42.
2090. Enclosure in Stubbs to Secretary of State, 11th February 1933. CO 67/250/8, 11–12.
2092. Minutes of the Kardeş Ocağı, 27th February 1937. KO-KOH-KD.
of Turkey itself officially supported them. Indeed, during the 1930s government circles expressed reservations about these manifestations. So concerned were the nationalists’ opponents by the Kardeş Ocağı that they wished to establish a club of their own with Evkaf backing to counter its effects. In a secret despatch of December 1938, in which he attempted to convince the central government of the need to provide greater financial assistance for the Evkaf, Governor Palmer cited the Evkaf’s financial limitations as an obstacle to the establishment of such a loyal pro-British club. He stated:

Moslem young men of Nicosia have sought the assistance of Evkaf to erect a club house, and although it would be of great advantage politically and socially that there should be a young men’s club in Nicosia directly sponsored by Evkaf, as a counter attraction to the “Kardash Ojagi” club which is at present supported by a Turkish Nationalist group, and used by the latter to develop their influence over Moslem youth, the Delegates do not see their way financially to giving any assistance.2094

Having conveniently side-lined the Turkish Cypriot nationalists from authorised politics in the process of their clampdown, the British continued through the 1930’s to rely almost exclusively on the support of Münir in matters “Moslem”, completely ignoring the changes witnessed in the Turkish Cypriot community, and the fact that Münir was not popularly supported. They largely disregarded the continued rise of Turkish nationalism, still living the illusion, (as they had with the Greeks), that it was an insignificant phenomenon. Despite the fact that the British were deluding themselves, convinced by the placid surface of the waters that all was well, the evidence available from their own correspondence points to the fact that they had in fact only temporarily suppressed nationalism, both Greek and Turkish. In one despatch sent soon after the revolt, Storrs gleefully noted how Greek Independence Day had passed with none of the characteristic disturbances, but he also, if only fleetingly, indicated that protest continued, albeit in a more concealed form. The example he himself gave of people wearing blue and white garments on this occasion, actually illustrates underlying feelings and thoughts of the people.2095

That repressive measures would put an end to nationalist agitation, and that in fact the great majority of the population, Turkish and Greek, was in fact perfectly content with British rule as it was, was nothing but a mirage. Coyle’s view that the British had used in the crackdown, “a sledgehammer to crack a not too large, if obdurate, nut,” expresses well the fact that British measures had been over-the-top.2096 It was not maybe that there was no basis for certain measures, but that the excess of the measures employed was in the long-run self-defeating, bound to backfire. It is beyond question that many, outwardly at least, succumbed to pressures and threats; (government employees were apparently too frightened, for instance, to openly read copies of Söz), but sentiments could not so easily be erased.2097 Söz and others persisted, despite the threats they faced, to propagate the

2093. LANDAU 1995, 75.
2094. Palmer to Secretary of State, 30th November 1938. CO 67/301/9, 11.
2095. Storrs to Secretary of State, 30th March 1932. CO 67/243/2, 17; By 1936, such symbolic expressions of nationalist feelings were being taken more seriously by the British, the Governor communicating his desire to limit the use of certain colour combinations on badges and the like and suggesting the use of the insignia of Richard the Lion Heart to be incorporated as an emblem for Cyprus so as to strengthen the historical connection of the island with the British in the minds of the populace. Palmer to Secretary of State, 11th December 1936. CO 323/1401/8, 21–22.
nationalist creed. Only two months after the Revolt, Söz, for example, printed an article to do with a new Pan-Turkist newspaper called “New Turan” which it announced was published by, “our co-racials living in Finland,” and published a poem, “The Turanian Girl”, which had appeared in the said journal. A few months later it printed yet another poem entitled “Turanian March” which it had apparently picked-up from the aforementioned Turkish “Yeni Adım,” or “New Step”, Magazine of western Thrace. As McHenry puts it, “While there is no doubt that the new regime left little room for political activity, it is equally evident that policies aimed at severing the emotional ties between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationalism failed miserably.”

Occasional, related calls to Anglicise the populace, to introduce an, “English atmosphere,” and, “breed a class with a tradition of public service,” did not bear sufficient fruits. In Attalides’ words, such efforts actually, “increased rather than effectively curbed nationalist opposition.” Governor Palmer himself, though also championing making Cyprus more “British”, appeared, though infrequently, to recognise the gravity of the task of eradicating the nationalist challenge, acknowledging candidly on one occasion that though the sentiments of the politically minded might have been pushed under the surface, no longer brazenly exposed, “yet at heart they are unchanged.” He supported the policy of increasing education in English and the number of English masters, so as to try to break the hold of Greece and Turkey. Nonetheless he was realistic, and quite blunt, regarding the financial contribution needed to transform society, stating: “If we want to make the place British, we shall have to put money into it – there is no escape.”

The continued surfacing of Turkish nationalism on a communal as well as individual basis during the 1930’s; despite the repressive measures, signified that Turkish nationalism had in fact become much more resilient than had, and still has, been generally acknowledged. The British cracked down particularly hard on schools, eliminating to the best of their ability, the teaching of national culture and values from their curricula, yet it is well documented that Turkish, as well as Greek teachers continued to clandestinely socialize their students with nationalist values. Rauf Denktas recalls how in the mid-1930’s Mehmet Turgut Sarıca would defiantly teach the Turkish Cypriot students the Turkish national anthem. Kaymak professes that he refused to implement the British order to cut-off the Turkish flag from classroom maps, and recounts how when the British tried to force them to sing a Turkish-language version of the national anthem he would sing along, though with different verse, which derided rather than exalted the British. Fevzioglu even makes the claim that the “Milli Cephe Partisi,” or “National Front Party,”
continued to function in secret up until the Second World War, and the biography of Necati that it functioned in secret till 1943.  

Indication that Turkish nationalism was no longer purely a limited elite phenomenon can be sought in the fact that emigration proceeded a pace during the 1930’s, even though by now Necati and other leading nationalists, even Remzi who had originally given the strongest support, were arguing firmly against it. Official British testimony that these human outflows were the result of economic motivations, (the belief being that a better economic future would be available in the young Turkish Republic), was somewhat warranted. Economic conditions in Cyprus were not much improved during the 1930’s, and the Colonial Office can not but have been concerned and embarrassed by having to note references to its poverty in the British press, one extract from the Times of London describing Cyprus as, “an island so poor, and for long periods so neglected, as to be known as the Cinderella Colony.” Nevertheless, economic concerns explained only partially the tendency to leave. As the British themselves grudgingly came round to realizing, emigrants, “were also no doubt influenced by propaganda of a nationalistic complexion directed against the Moslem policy of the Cyprus Government.”

Turkey’s stance on the matter appeared somewhat confused. Less definite than before, it wavered during the 1930’s between continuing to support emigration, and discouraging it. While still a parliamentarian in Turkey Hüseyin Sirri Bey came to the island and advised in a speech at the Kardeş Ocağı, (of which he was made an honorary member), that the Turks should not emigrate, particularly as they could one day prove useful where they were to Turkey. Turkish records show also that by the late 1930’s the consulate in Cyprus was actually refusing to accept Turkish Cypriot applications to emigrate, apparently fearing that were any encouragement to be given it would lead to a large and detrimental exodus. Youths who crossed the Mediterranean in small sailboats on their own initiative were being returned to the island.

Yet, hundreds, probably thousands were to follow in Ahmet Raşid’s footsteps over the next few years, some having gained legal sanction to emigrate, others doing so illegally. The British were duly concerned, particularly by a wave of emigration that occurred during 1934–35. In response, and to some effect, they introduced a heavy deposit that had to be paid by any person wishing to emigrate in order to deter Turks from abandoning the island. Dawe recognised that this was a political decision, and pointed the finger once again at the Turkish consul for efforts to encourage the Turks to leave the island.

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2109. FEVZİOĞLU s.a., 19; BİRİNÇI 1997, 20.  
2111. “The Cypriots’ War Record.” Extract from the Times, 15th April 1940. CO 67/308/9, 154; That these reports were warranted is granted by Nancy Crawshaw who argues that it was the British acquisition of bases so soon after the takeover of Cyprus which was the main cause of the island’s, “economic neglect.” CRAWSHAW 1978, 20.  
2112. Palmer to Secretary of State, 24th February 1939. CO 67/290/3, 46.  
2113. Extract from the Police Intelligence Report, December 1934. CO 67/258/10, 6; NESIM 1986, 30; Beratlı makes the claim that Mustafa Kemal had him sent to the island for this very purpose, but, once again, there is no source given to confirm such a significant claim. BERATLI 1999, 128.  
2114. Report of the Turkish Consulate in Cyprus, enclosed in the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, 14th September 1938. BCA 30.10.0/10445-124.887-3.  
2115. See enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 28th November 1934. CO 67/258/10, 13–14; See also extract from Police Intelligence Report on Cyprus, December 1934. CO 67/258/10, 6–7 and Battershill to Secretary of State, 7th August 1935. CO 67/260/19, 33–34.
Though the signals from Turkish authorities might have been jumbled, economic prospects in Turkey had by the mid-1930’s improved considerably. Unlike in the wave of the early 1920’s, the Turks emigrating this time round, seem to have faced comparatively less hardships, and therefore tended to encourage others to follow in their footsteps. The attraction of a new life in the Kemalist homeland was now especially powerful for the Turkish Cypriot youth.

Meanwhile, despite intermittent censorship, the press and more broadly the media continued to play a vital role in the upholding of nationalist feeling during the 1930’s. Governor Battershill was to note how, “The most effective medium of publicity in Cyprus is the newspaper, which is read in almost all coffee shops in the villages of the Colony.” When considered together with Henniker-Heaton’s comments at the beginning of the decade that, “Every village has its one or two schoolmasters or dismissed masters to read the news and propound meanings,” this is strong grounds for believing that the impact of the written word, especially of the nationalist press, was indeed much more powerful than official circulation figures might suggest. Furthermore, new means of communications, the radio in particular, were allowing greater and greater numbers to continue associating themselves with Turkey. Dedeçay states that the first electrically powered radios began to enter the coffee shops and homes of the wealthier inhabitants of the island in 1930. According to her figures, there were in that year 72 licences given for radios. The Kardeş Ocağı clearly had a radio that members communally listened to in the early 1930's, though precisely when it first entered the premises cannot be ascertained from the club’s records. British reports from 1936 noted how fifty Lycée students had skipped school on the “national” occasion of the 29th of October, Republic Day, and had gathered in the house of the chief sanitary inspector, Aziz Bey to listen to Atatürk’s radio broadcast. In 1938 it was reported that the increasing number of wireless sets was becoming a problem, and cautioned that this medium of communication needed to be brought under control as it was, “one of the most dangerous channels of propaganda.” Example was provided too: “A case recently occurred in which a Turkish grocer of Nicosia erected a loud-speaker on a municipal lamp-post on the occasion of the formation of the Turkish Republic.” By 1945 there were 6,700 licensed radios on the island capable of receiving broadcasts from surrounding countries, though unable to listen to

2117. Dawe to Allen, 17th May 1935. CO 67/262/5, 4.
2119. Battershill to Secretary of State, 22nd September 1939. CO 323/1663/11.
2121. Rauf Denktaş is amongst those who describe the excitement with which broadcasts from Turkey were listened to. DENKTAŞ s.a., 24.
2122. DEDEÇAY 1988, 45.
2123. Ibid.
2124. The club’s register of decisions recorded that on the 10th of December 1935 it had been decided to buy a new radio, and that money would be raised for this purpose by holding a raffle in which the grand prize would be the club’s old radio. Minutes of the Kardeş Ocağı, 10th December 1935. KO-KOHL-KD.
2126. Report by the Committee on Nationalist Propaganda in Cyprus, 28th November 1938. CO 67/288/11, 38; Suggestions were in fact made as to the need to establish a local radio station so as to counter radio propaganda, though some time passed before this materialized. CO 67/288/11.
Cypriot broadcasts from Cyprus itself until 1948. 2127 By then, film also had become a threat. In fact, fearing that it might lead to disturbances the British had a decade earlier already banned the showing of a film that in the wake of Atatürk’s death paid homage to this uniquely revered national leader. 2128

Numerous other examples confirm that there were British efforts to suppress demonstrations of Turkish nationalism during the decade. In his memoirs, İhsan Ali, for example, recalls how the authorities refused permission to the Turkish clubs and associations to fly their flags at half-mast following the loss of Atatürk. 2129 And, when Necati distributed free exercise books to students, imprinted with what was described as the “national emblem of Turkey”, the British Director of Education was forced to prohibit their use in elementary schools. 2130 As the British too tardily seemed to recognise, however, most such measures actually rebounded fuelling nationalist fervour. 2131 They could not anyway have really hoped to control all the channels available for the diffusion of nationalist sentiments and for association with Turkey even if they wanted to; only if perhaps they were to introduce truly draconian measures, measures that ran against the grain even in London. The British themselves reported how by the end of the decade, the Turks were buying up portraits of Atatürk and other leading statesmen and how a publication about Atatürk, entitled “Our great loss”, imported by Nicosia merchant Şükrü Veysi, (later to be Honorary Secretary of the Kardes Ocağı), had sold-out within an hour. 2132

It was only by the late 1930’s that the British really came to gradually acknowledge that Turkish nationalism was a mass sentiment and a force that needed to be more seriously reckoned with, rather than one to be ignored, and by the early 1940’s that they began to permit greater free expression of Turkish nationalist sentiments and even gave implicit backing to the establishment of Turkish Cypriot associations that espoused nationalist values. 2133 Hence generalizing as to British support for Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, depicting British imperialism as being “thrilled” by the rise of Pan-Turkism in Cyprus is not just misleading but also inaccurate. 2134

Clearly for quite some time the British did continue to delude themselves, as evidenced a few months after the revolt by Dawe’s overconfident minute concerning the Governor’s report in April of 1932 that the anniversary of Greek independence had passed quietly. Dawe wrote: “This illustrates what can be done with a little firmness in Cyprus.” 2135 Slowly, however, more realistic, if still intermittent recognition of the scope of nationalism, and of the surge of Turkish nationalism particularly, did begin to emerge. By the mid-1930’s Palmer began to half-heartedly acknowledge the changes that had been taking place in the Turkish community, disclosing in one secret despatch of April 1934 that: “as the older generation of Turks is gradually disappearing and dwindling, and as the younger

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2127. DEDEÇAY 1988, 45 and 83.
2128. In a Foreign Office file entitled, “Turkish nationalist propaganda in Cyprus,” Sir Percy Loraine conveys in a letter to Governor Palmer, the, “dissatisfaction”, expressed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry in relation to the banning of the film. [Loraine to Palmer, 30th December 1938. FO 371/23296, 2]; Reporting on his district, Kyrenia’s commissioner informed that Atatürk’s death, “caused considerable sorrow among the Moslem community”, who held services in his memory. Enclosure in Governor to Secretary of State, 10th March 1939. CO 67/299/2, 270–271.
2129. ALİ 2002, 16.
2130. Enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 6th April 1939. CO 67/295/4, 79.
2131. Battershill to Secretary of State, 22nd September 1938. CO 323/1663/11.
2132. Enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 6th April 1939. CO 67/295/4, 79.
generation tend to become Kemalists, we cannot in any case return to the old method of controlling Cyprus for long.”

Dawe himself, in fact, steadily became the most realistic British interpreter of the state of Kemalism and nationalist sentiment amongst the Turkish Cypriots, and of how to attend to the political implications. In May, 1935 he minuted, “I think that a good deal of the Kemalism among the Cypriot Turks is due to the personal unpopularity of Münir Bey. It is beginning to look doubtful whether the support which past Governments have given to that rather unsound person has been politically worth while.”

In early 1936, he further acknowledged, “the issue of the Old Turk v. The Kemalist.”

He soon became the chief critic of what he came to see as Governor Palmer’s excessive reliance on the former.

The Governor had declared that he did not think it would be appropriate, “to restrict the jurisdiction of the Religious Courts in Cyprus” and communicated to London:

I should strongly deprecate any legislative action being taken which might either actually or in appearance tend to interfere with any of the provision of the Sacred Law. It seems to me probable that whatever legislation might be passed on this subject would be liable to be misunderstood by the old school of Moslem thought and deliberately misrepresented by the new school as a vindication of their principles of life and thought. It would almost certainly be hailed amongst those Moslems who are in touch with modern Turkish ideals and views as a victory for Kemalistic intervention in Cyprus.

As you are aware it is essential in Cyprus, for political reasons, not to encourage Cypriot Moslems to look to Turkey for guidance nor to look upon that country as their spiritual home; but rather to attempt, whilst raising the educational and economic standing of local

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2133. Most notable of these was KATAK, (“Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıklar Kurumu”), or the ATMIC, (“Association of Turkish Minorities of the Island of Cyprus”), in whose establishment on 18th April 1943, Münir Bey was to play a leading role, but which nevertheless was not always, as suggested by Kızılürek, under the British thumb or staffed by cadres wholly loyal to the government. A British despatch contradicted such an appraisal. It stated that though KATAK, “is rumoured in Greek circles to be backed by the Government in fact however the movement is now indistinguishably merged in Turkish nationalist politics.”

2134. Kızılürek, particularly in his earlier work, has been one of the most vociferous critics of the British on this score. See for example, KIZILYÜREK 1988, 94.

2135. Minute by A. J. Dawe, 7th April 1932. CO 67/243/2, 2.
2136. Palmer to Secretary of State, 4th April 1934. CO 67/254/4, 12.
2137. Minute by A. J. Dawe, 1st May 1935. CO 67/262/2, 2.
2138. Minute by A. J. Dawe, 10th January 1936. CO 67/263/3, 8.
Moslems, to keep them fully attached to their old customs and religion and to retain them as British subjects looking only to Great Britain for help and assistance.

The bulk of the Turkish speaking Moslem Cypriots have no real and substantial ties of sentiment with Asia Minor and the Kemalist regime, and it is very obvious from the history of the last decade in Cyprus that their political bias towards Turkey is influenced very largely by the degree of support or lack of support which this Government gives to local Moslem institutions, as also the degree in which Government is mindful of Moslem interests and of the fact that the Moslems represent the former governing classes of the Island.

The history of the Greek Enosis movement in Cyprus which, from being a negligible sentiment, was developed by toleration into a permanent embarrassment, affords ample reason for depreciating any similar procedure in the case of Turkish Nationalism, the more so in that our commercial relations with Moslem Egypt and Moslem Palestine are so much more important than those with Asia Minor.2139

Dawe plainly disagreed with Palmer’s reading of the position of the Turks, retorting in his minute: “He thinks that by supporting the die-hard Turks of the old regime he will prevent the Cypriot Turks from becoming Kemalist. In fact, I believe that this attitude is driving all the younger generation into the arms of the Kemalists. The only way to win them over to the British side is to give them a chance of becoming “modern” in Cyprus.”2140

The clues were there, but Palmer, was slow to discern their significance. One report, for instance, noted how during Bayram, ostensibly a religious holiday, “a number of young Moslems were seen to be wearing the Bayram Badge or tie of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, [Sic.] bearing six arrows representing the six aims of the Turkish Republic,” the insignia of Atatürk’s Republican Peoples Party, the same symbol depicted on the banner of the Ses newspaper, (the arrows there emanating northwards from an outline map of Cyprus), and portrayed also, in a somewhat diluted form, on the brand of cigarettes that Özkan was to manufacture in Cyprus.2141 In March 1937 Palmer was still, almost incredulously, to assert that, “99 per cent of the people of Cyprus are perfectly content with the present regime.”2142

By the latter half of 1937, though, Palmer appeared to be finally starting to get the message. He now forwarded to London the opinion that the: “Moslems have in fact reached a critical period in their history in the Island, when a communal effort on their part and some further Government assistance is needed to comprehend the conditions of present-day life and to cope with its problems. The traditional discipline of Islam in Cyprus is weak, and the older loyal generation is passing away.”2143 He conveyed also in a secret despatch his concern to assure the Turkish community that they still had a future on the island.2144

Dawe could hardly conceal his joy that Palmer was apparently coming around. He minuted:

2141. Enclosure No. 1 in Palmer to Secretary of State, 21st January 1938. CO 67/274/5, 9; Cyprus Gazette 1st September 1939.
2143. Enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 17th November 1937. CO 67/281/14, 14.
2. I am glad to see that Sir Richmond Palmer is having some heart-searchings about the problem presented by the Moslem community. In the past the Turks have been a loyal and valuable element from the British standpoint. It was their loyalty which allowed us to work the old constitution for half a century. But the rise of Kemalist Turkey and the spread of western ideas in that part of the world have naturally much affected the minds of the younger generation of Turks in Cyprus. They are beginning to get impatient of British rule and to turn their eyes to Turkey, where many of them have gone.

3. I have long doubted the wisdom of Sir Richmond Palmer's policy in the face of this problem. He has relied, in my judgement, far too much upon Munir bey, Turkish Member of the Executive Council and Director of Evcaf, as the link between Government and the Moslem community. Munir Bey, however, stands for the old regime and is everything which is opposed to modern Turkey. He is for the fez and the veil: while the younger generation of more educated Turks in Cyprus are all for more advanced ideas. He is also personally not popular with his fellow Turks because of his excessive power as Director of Evcaf and as the Governor's chief adviser on Turkish matters. He stands in relation to Turkish opinion in rather the same way as the Duke of Wellington to British public opinion in 1832: and I do not think that as an exclusive channel of contact he forms a really reliable guide to Government.2145

The draft despatch sent in response to the Governor, and apparently prepared by J. B. Williams in consultation with Dawe, stated in the name of the Secretary of State, Ormsby-Gore:

I agree with your view that it is important to make the Moslems in Cyprus feel that Government is taking adequate care of their interests and that they have a definite part to play in the Colony under the British administration. In the past the Moslems have formed a loyal element in the community whose presence has frequently been of much advantage to Government: and it would clearly be wise for Government in the future so to regulate its policy as to assure the maximum of goodwill on their part. The collapse of the old order in Turkey and the rise of the Kemalist republic has created a new problem to which the British administration in Cyprus must, as your despatch implies, seek to adapt itself. It seems desirable that Government should endeavour to make an appeal to the younger and more progressive Cypriot Turks: and it may be that the time has come when, in order to gain their confidence, it would be wise to open up some new channels of contact between Government and the Moslem population.2146

By 1938, concerned by the influence of the nationalist press in Turkey on the Turks of Cyprus, the Governor himself was taking the lead, and asking the British ambassador Sir Percy Loraine what could be done on the matter of reports concerning Cyprus in the Turkish press, especially the Cumhuriyet newspaper, which he described as, “a publication which enjoys considerable circulation in Cyprus,” and which amongst others, the Kardeş Ocağı also subscribed to.2147 References in the local press to “our fatherland” and “our Atatürk” were now also being dwelt upon more than in the past, though they were in fact nothing new.2148 Even Münir’s closest allies, his brother-in-law Fuad included, were now coming in for heavier criticism, their unpopularity recognised by the authorities.2149

2147. Palmer to Loraine, 30th June 1938. FO 371/21935, 13–14; Kardeş Ocağı minutes of 12th January 1936.
KO-KOH-KD.
2148. Palmer to Secretary of State, 24th June 1938. FO 371/21935, 5.
The key turning point in the British perceptions of the true hold of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was only it seems to come in the wake of the visit to Cyprus of the Turkish training ship, the Hamidiye in June 1938, the repercussions of which were to have inspired Palmer’s correspondence with the Ambassador. Men like Necati Özkan had been regarded simply as renegades or rascals whose views were not reflective of the loyal “Moslem” masses. Yet even the Governor, Sir Richmond Palmer, was now obligated to face the reality of extensive Turkish nationalism. The public and passionate outpouring of nationalist sentiment by the Turks of the island appears to have genuinely shocked the British.2150 According to the Governor’s reports, “the entire Moslem population of Famagusta and about 4,000 persons from other parts of the Island,” greeted the ship’s arrival.2151 When the train carrying the crew to Nicosia arrived in that town it:

[W]as met by the Turkish vice-Consul and members of the Kardash Odjaghi Club, while a crowd of about 10,000 who had collected outside the station cheered vociferously. The visitors were conveyed to the Kardash Odjaghi Club where the other officers and cadets who had travelled by car had already arrived. There they were entertained and again a gathering of some 3,000 persons awaited them outside the Club with continual handclapping.2152

Palmer further informed the Colonial Office that:

While the ship was in Famagusta harbour ... continual streams of Moslems such as have not been seen for many years poured in to Famagusta from all parts of the Island to see the vessel. Both in Nicosia and Famagusta the crowds, although large and enthusiastic, were orderly and well-behaved.2153

The Criminal Investigation Department’s report further revealed that the first Turkish Cypriots to have boarded the ship, in welcome of its arrival, included Necati and representatives of the Kardeş Ocağı, and that these persons were to, “behave throughout as if they were Turkish Nationals of some standing particularly Nejatti Ozkan who assumed the attitude of the authorised head of the Cyprus Moslem Community.”2154

The same day, this time in a secret despatch, Palmer noted that Söz, and the newer Ses newspapers had been subject to censorship prior to the visit of the Hamidiye, both because of their “mischievous attacks” on the colonial administration, and to try and prevent their abusing the visit for nationalistic purposes. More importantly he confessed the error of his own prior opinion:

2149. Minute by Shuckburgh, 24th February 1938. CO 67/290/7, 2–4; Minute by A. B. Acheson, 5th March 1938. CO/67/290/7, 4–5; Minute of 8th March 1938. CO 67/290/7, 6–7; Minute of 9th March 1938. CO 67/290/7, 7.
2150. In fact, even the Turkish Consulate appears to have been taken aback. While the previous year’s political report had been written quite pessimistically, castigating the clubs for not doing enough to strengthen and defend national consciousness, and exhorting the Turkish government that means needed to be found to maintain Turkish sentiment on the island. [See Report of Turkish Consulate in Cyprus, enclosed in Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, 14th May 1937. BCA 30..10.0.0/10441-124.886-18], the following year’s report was much more upbeat, noting in glowing terms how the response of the Turks to the visit of the Hamidiye had proved that their loyalty to Turkey was stronger than ever. Report of Turkish Consulate in Cyprus, enclosed in Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, 14th September 1938. BCA 30..10.0.0/10445-124.887-3.
2151. Palmer to Secretary of State, 24th June 1938. FO 371/21935, 1.
2152. Ibid., 2–3.
2153. Ibid., 4.
2154. Enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 30th June 1938. FO 371/21935, 20–21.
3. Until comparatively recently it had not been supposed that the Turkish nationalistic movement in Cyprus really extended much beyond a comparatively small circle of journalist-politicians and their friends who for the sake of personal notoriety – or not impossibly in consideration of some more tangible form of encouragement from propagandist sources – had set about to attack the policy of the Government of Cyprus in relation to the Moslem community. Traces of this influence were found last summer in the criticisms against the administration of the Moslem Lyceum and in the abortive attempts of a number of unemployed adolescents to evade the emigration restrictions by a hazardous crossing of the Mediterranean in open boats in search of an El Dorado in Anatolia. ...

4. A recent and more serious aspect of the Turkish nationalistic movement had supervened in the form of a tendency for “Enosis” and Kemalism to make common cause. ... There is essentially no common community of interest or purpose between the Greek and Turkish speaking elements in Cyprus and, as you are aware, it was for many years only with the support of the Moslem members of the Legislative Council, in the days when that body existed, that Government was enabled to overcome the continuous and solid resistance of the Orthodox opposition. The fundamental difference of outlook and temperament which divide the Moslem and the Greek Orthodox Communities are unlikely to be permanently composed in any political partnership, but a marriage of expediency, engineered by those whose antagonism to Government is strong enough to overbear any too nice scruples of race and religion, might constitute a serious embarrassment if it were popularly to be supposed that the stronghold of the Government’s policy could be taken or threatened by combined assault.

5. The visit of the “Hamidiye”, with the complete temporary sterilization of the normal activities of a large part of the whole Moslem population of Cyprus which it occasioned, has emphasized the potential dangers of an awakening of a Turkish-Cypriot national conscience and has shed a strong light on that aspect of Cypriot character which forms the chief problem in any attempt to seek a road to wider political liberties or to a fuller devolution of public responsibility. ...

7. At the moment it is of course rather difficult to judge how thick the new sediments of Turkish national sentiment which has been left behind this visit may be but a succession of visits by Turkish warships would certainly occasion this Government a degree of anxiety which would increase in geometrical progression.2155

Concern as to “common cause” being made between Greek and Turkish nationalists persisted for some years, though ultimately suspicions of the formation of an anti-government, united front proved unwarranted.2156 There were reports that in May of 1938 attempts were underway to form a joint Greek-Turkish “Political Society”, of seven Greeks and five Turks, including amongst their number Necati and Remzi. According to the Nicosia District Commissioner’s report:

The Society was in due course to address Government, making the following representations against the present system of

Government Administration
Municipal "
Evcaf " and to urge that the status quo prior to 1931 riots be revived with certain reservations so that the various Administrative bodies be elected and not appointed by Government.2157

2155. Palmer to Secretary of State, 24th June 1938. FO 371/21935, 6–9.
2156. Battershill to Secretary of State, 15th March 1940. FO 371/24912, 294.
Though nothing substantial appears to have come of this initiative, Remzi did soon after write a joint letter of complaint about government policies with Greek newspaper editors, but such cooperation was not to lead anywhere significant.\footnote{Attachment to Palmer to Secretary of State, 7\textsuperscript{th} March 1938. CO 67/288/6, 64–65.}

In further secret correspondence Palmer made important charges against Ankara too, stating:

The extent to which Turkish nationalistic propaganda in Cyprus is being aided by funds from Turkish sources is a question regarding which it is difficult to make any precise and categorical assertions. There is, however, good reason to believe that the Turkish Consulate in Cyprus is in possession of funds for the dissemination of Kemalist propaganda and that this Consulate and its entourage are mainly responsible for the encouragement of those elements among the Moslem community who have been engaged in tendentious activities against this Government. Those elements include the local Turkish newspaper ‘Söz’, which is stated to receive a sum of £18 a month from Consular sources, though the statement cannot be proved.\footnote{“The Repression in Cyprus: A Journalist’s Protest”. Letter by K. Paulides et. al. to the editor of the Manchester Guardian, 23\textsuperscript{rd} January 1939. CO 67/301/3, 93.}

Palmer’s unsubstantiated charges were rejected, however, in a personal and secret telegram from Sir Percy Loraine stating: “I have lately had an opportunity for frank, informal discussions of these matters with turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. I found his reactions entirely satisfactory and you may be certain that the Turkish Government neither desire nor would approve any mischiefmaking of the kind you suspect.”\footnote{Telegram from Loraine to Palmer, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1938. FO 371/21935.

2159. Palmer to Secretary of State, 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1938. FO 371/21935, 10.

2160. Telegram from Loraine to Palmer, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1938. FO 371/21935.

2161. Minute of conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister, enclosed in Loraine to Palmer, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1938. FO 371/21935, 280–281; That the complaints may well have been justified, despite Loraine’s assurances to the contrary, is indicated by the policy Palmer had followed in hiring a new English headmaster for the school in 1936. In secret correspondence he stated that he was not particularly concerned about the academic background of the prospective headmaster so long as he was, “a sound disciplinarian.” Palmer to Secretary of State, 1\textsuperscript{st} May 1936. CO 67/265/3, 87.}

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In an extensive minute that he had prepared following his meeting with Foreign Minister Dr. Aras, (and which he forwarded to Palmer), Loraine noted that while about a year previously the then acting Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu had asked, “solely on a personal basis,” if there was any truth in reports , “that some Turkish pupils from a Cypriot school had been subjected to unnecessarily harsh treatment or to unduly severe discipline,” the Turkish government in general had shown utmost concern not to offend British sensibilities.\footnote{Minute of conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister, enclosed in Loraine to Palmer, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1938. FO 371/21935, 280–281; That the complaints may well have been justified, despite Loraine’s assurances to the contrary, is indicated by the policy Palmer had followed in hiring a new English headmaster for the school in 1936. In secret correspondence he stated that he was not particularly concerned about the academic background of the prospective headmaster so long as he was, “a sound disciplinarian.” Palmer to Secretary of State, 1\textsuperscript{st} May 1936. CO 67/265/3, 87.} Aras had told him, he said:

[That the Turkish Government would never dream of lending their countenance to any Turkish nationalistic movement in Cyprus. ... ]

Doctor Aras told me he had never given one thought to Turkish relations with Cyprus; it had never occurred to him for a second that anything could conceivably be amiss with them; if, as I had said, there were these shadows, he was entirely willing to collaborate with me in order to remove them.

There could not possibly be any substance in a Turkish nationalistic movement in Cyprus. Every Kemalist was a friend of England; it was the settled policy of the Turkish Government and the express personal wish of Atatürk that he should be so. Kemalists were not Nazis. There was no attempt by Kemalists to organise minorities in other people’s territo-
ries, as did the Nazis. The Turks of Cyprus had always been a strong element of support of the Government of that island, and the Turkish Government wished nothing but that they should so remain. The only thing which would cause preoccupation to the Turkish Government would be if the Government of Cyprus allowed the young generation of Turks to remain under the obscurantist influence of hojas and such like, and withheld from them the possibilities of liberal education and progress on modern lines of thought and science. If there were persons of Turkish race in the island trying to create an atmosphere either of suspicion or hostility between the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic, those men were the enemies of the Kemalist republic and were almost certainly reactionaries of a definitely objectionable type. ...

There was no grain of ambition or aspiration in the Turkey of today to recover any of her former island properties.2162

The rising star of the Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus at the close of the 1920’s was Missirlzade Necati. A member of a politically active family, he was to prevail, where his relatives had failed, in displacing the traditional pro-British elite. His victory in the Legislative Council elections of October 1930 was the high point of Turkish nationalism in the pre-World War II era. Yet Necati’s triumph was not an individual affair. It resulted both from the exertions of those who campaigned with him, including the leading lights of the Kardeş Ocağ, and from the political transformation of the electorate itself, which though by no means complete, had made significant progress by the end of the 1920’s.

For the British, and for Governor Storrs in particular, the nationalists’ victory, and the concomitant defeat of Münir Bey, the loyal director of the Evkaf, was a major blow. They were jolted, but did not till much later choose to re-evaluate their own over-reliance on the conservative Turkish Cypriot old guard. Instead of attempting to compromise with or even co-opt the new nationalist leadership Storrs stubbornly chose to continue to confront them head-on, no doubt believing that opposition from such “men of straw” would quickly buckle under the pressure. Storrs’ policy meant that issues raised in the pre-election period, calling for greater communal control over education, religious institutions and the Evkaf, continued to generate political opposition to the government from the Turkish community. Half a year after the election the nationalists formalized many of their demands by the holding of a Turkish National Congress, at which, defying the authorities, they elected their own Müftü.

Yet while the Turkish nationalists were more willing to confront the government, the fact that they did not, like the conservatives, rely on government support, meant that they were more willing to cooperate with the Greek Cypriots, at least on the less politically sensitive issues. Improving relations between Greece and Turkey were to enhance such possibilities. Indeed, the collaboration shown between Greek and Turkish members in the Legislative Council in 1931 was to highlight anew how British mastery of the constitutio-

2162. Minute of conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister, enclosed in Loraine to Palmer, 1st September 1938. FO 371/21935, 280; This appraisal may be considered to have been added some credence by a secret despatch sent by Governor Battershill at the outbreak of the Second World War, in which he stated: “The nationalistic sentiments of Turkish speaking Cypriots are not so much irredentist in form as expressive of an intense admiration for the work and ideals of the late Mustafa Kemal. Turkish nationalists in Cyprus refute any suggestion of anti-British sentiment.” Battershill to Secretary of State, 22nd September 1939. CO 323/1663/11.
nal system hung by a slender thread. At this stage, if Greek and Turkish political leaders had taken the initiative to form a broader more permanent anti-colonial front, they may well have laid the basis for a new and productive era of Graeco-Turkish political accord on the island. Instead, however, Greek nationalism on the island was to take its own route, one of open revolt against British rule; one with an objective which could not, and did not find support from the Turkish Cypriots.

Though the October Revolt had been an entirely Greek affair, its consequences were nevertheless to impact upon Turk as well as Greek, the British clampdown removing political liberties and suppressing the rise of Turkish nationalism. Yet, despite the added limitations of the new era, Turkish nationalism continued to surface, confirming that it was not a transitory affair. Slowly, too slowly, the British came to realize what they should have recognised a decade earlier, that Turkish nationalism was by now a widespread, ingrained phenomenon amongst the island’s Turks.

The conventional wisdom, then, assumes that Turkish nationalism on Cyprus could not be observed before the World War II period. Such presumptions, however, are fallacious. They rest maybe simply on the lack of research of the Turkish Cypriot community during the inter-war years and even earlier. Perhaps in some cases they are also somewhat the result of prejudicial judgments regarding the Turkish Cypriots’ capabilities to autonomously develop their own nationalist movement in the face of British opposition and lacklustre interest shown on the part of Turkey.

Whatever their cause, the reality is that there is evidence of a substantial presence of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus between the two World Wars, and noticeable signs of its genesis even prior to the First World War. We have some indications of the development of nationalist sentiment in the pre-World War I period, indications that might well be bolstered through more persistent research. For those who care to acknowledge it, though, the evidence of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, the evidence of the “state of mind” that Kohn designates as being the, “first and foremost” characteristic of nationalism, is thereafter incontrovertible. Nationalists in the 1920’s were espousing their ideas in their newspapers, running effective political campaigns, and ultimately gaining majority support for their positions in elections. Turkish nationalism did not emerge in Cyprus after World War II; it was in fact already there. Virtually every Turkish home on the island was by then already proudly displaying on its walls and mantelpieces photographs of Atatürk, his comrade and successor İsmet İnönü and the Hamidiye. This yearning of the Turks of Cyprus to unite with their motherland became evermore intense and manifest in the post-World War II years as they took to the streets in unprecedented numbers and as the Turkish nationalist movement, with eventual British acquiescence and Turkey’s support, finally came to openly rival that of the Greeks in organization, unity and sense of purpose.

Without question there were differences and personal rivalries within the Turkish nationalist camp in Cyprus, and not just between itself and the conservatives of the Evkaf party. There had been some falling-out between them even prior to the October Revolt, Söz complaining that though Zeka Bey had fought on the side of the people, he was now falling prey to the masterful plans of Governor Storrs. This and other such rifts were

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2163. KOHN 1946, 10–11.
2164. Söz 9th July 1931; Zeka was criticised also for leaving the island to complete his studies. ZEKA 2002, 22.
not new, and would surface quite violently in later decades. Yet all the same, it was increasingly dispute within the nationalist camp, rather than conflict with the conservative, old-guard, that determined the political course of the Turkish Cypriots.

2165. By the late 1930’s Necati was even writing to the General Secretary of the Republican People’s Party of Turkey, asking for assistance in setting up a new newspaper, complaining, somewhat unfairly, that Remzi’s family had been co-opted by the British, and that therefore Söz would no longer publish his articles. [Letter from Necati Özkan to General Secretary of the Republican People’s Party, enclosed in General Secretariat of the Republican People’s Party to Prime Minister, 19th February 1939. BCA 30.1.0.0/A45-36.218-1]. In fact Söz was still being described as having a “[T]urkish nationalist and anti-Government” policy in British secret reports at the outbreak of the war, which noted also that it had been suspended for a month in 1937, (one article having stated that, life on the island was akin to that in a, “prison from which the only escape is to Turkey.”), [Enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 29th October 1937. CO 67/278/5, 51], and had been placed under continuous censorship since June of 1938. “Particulars of Local Newspapers and Periodicals.” Enclosed in Acting Governor to Secretary of State, 16th June 1939. CO 323/1663/11]. For further evidence of the difficulties of Remzi and Söz with the British authorities during this period, see enclosure in Palmer to Secretary of State, 29th October 1937. CO 67/278/5, 49–51 and CO 67/300/4]. After eighteen months of constant censorship, “to which,” the British acknowledged, “no other newspaper in Cyprus is subject,” after his appeal for its lifting was ignored, Remzi’s Söz finally ceased publication at the end of 1939, and he left for Turkey. The Governor informed Acheson of the Colonial Office that, “Remzi Effendi did not apply to have his Turkish passport visaed for return to Cyprus before he left, and steps are being taken to see that he does not return here without prior reference to this Government.” There was no cause for concern, Remzi dying soon afterwards. Battershill to Acheson, 20th March 1940. CO 67/300/4, 10.
7 Conclusion

Cyprus is by no means the only land to have suffered from the ravages of conflicting nationalisms though it does constitute one of the most prominent cases of protracted and grave political dispute, where out of those competing nationalisms none have triumphed, nor, as of yet, been wholly and mutually discarded for the sake of an alternative common political vision. There is no dearth of historical studies that in trying to uncover the origins of such conflict have referred to the role of nationalism, yet too many have been plagued by blatant prejudice, and too few have given more than cursory consideration to the rise of Turkish, as opposed to Greek, nationalism. Though the latter certainly pre-dated the former nationalism, and was in many ways a more evidently powerful force, the dynamics of the political conflict that evolved in Cyprus cannot be properly appreciated unless adequate attention is paid also to comprehending what engendered the development of Turkish nationalism too. It is to a better understanding of this process that this dissertation is dedicated, to which it hopes to contribute.

Undoubtedly the genesis of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus cannot be portrayed as the result of the internal dynamics of the island alone. On the contrary it was to a most important extent the consequence of a historical series of externally based forces that impacted Cyprus from the Ottoman epoch onwards. Yet, it was not an “artificial” creation in the sense of it having no historical foundations and being consciously transplanted to the island as part of some hypothetical grand political scheme, whether of Britain or Turkey. Quite the opposite, in its first wave, the subject of this thesis, it can be considered to have faced considerable impediments created by both the British and Turkish states.

Nevertheless, ideas and sentiments that began to flourish across the seas in the late Ottoman era did begin to be diffused to Cyprus as well. Initially the seeds of nationalism were introduced to the island’s ethnically Turkish population of Moslems as a phenomenon based upon alternately emphasized religious and civic Ottoman features. To these, very gradually, and at first only as a supplementary feature were added the call for political entitlements founded upon the Turkish characteristics of the populace. Thus, while at the time of British occupation in 1878, an incipient Turkish national consciousness in Cyprus could barely be discerned even amongst an elite intelligentsia, the concept of the nation, at least of the Ottoman nation, had begun to be one to which attachment was being made.
Parallel to developments in the decaying Ottoman Empire, where year-by-year the emergence of new nationalist movements were making Ottomanism, and ultimately Islamism, less and less feasible political bases for the future solidarity of that empire’s population, the emphasis on an ethnic Turkish characteristic as being an underpinning for political union began to thrive. In the wake of the success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the idea of the Turkish nation as being the essential foundation of the state and the concept of the popular sovereignty of that nation as being the legitimising basis for political rule of that state gained unprecedented momentum. Concomitantly expressions of sentiments of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus were becoming increasingly apparent. The role of the press in Turkey, followed closely on the island, and of Turkish political parties, organizations and associations which also developed connections with the island’s Turks, was critical in disseminating Turkish nationalism, first to the literate intelligentsia, and, from them, on to the Turkish Cypriot masses.

Throughout the early decades of British rule the Turkish Cypriots never ceased insisting on recognition that the island’s sovereignty was still retained by the Ottoman Empire, though by the beginning of the twentieth century developments in Ottoman territories from Crete to the Balkans were surely making them apprehensive. Piece-by-piece the Ottoman Empire was crumbling and the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in the lead-up to the First World War only served to heighten their insecurity, illustrating the hard truth that they preferred to deny that the Ottoman Empire was only a shadow of its former self, its conquering days long over.

The outbreak of World War I, with the Ottomans and the British ranged against each other, and accompanied by Britain’s unilateral declaration of the annexation of Cyprus, left the Turkish Cypriots in a serious quandary. While invariably accepting the de facto sovereignty established by the British, there were indications that many still felt that de jure sovereignty continued to lie with the Ottomans, and, that many more maintained, if not publicly, allegiance with the Ottomans and hope that they would triumph in this colossal conflict. While the overwhelming majority, nevertheless, continued to acquiesce to British rule, there is evidence that some did not.

The progress of the War, however, was to bring both disillusionment in the chances of this prospect, and enhanced fears that Cyprus might be heading down the path of Crete, that of Union with Greece. At its conclusion the Ottoman Empire had been dismembered, its multinational composition seriously compromised, the much greater part of its inhabitants now Turks. Yet, under the thumb of the victorious allies, the Ottoman authorities did not have the will or even the capacity to attempt to reconstitute themselves as champions of a Turkish nation-state. This was to be the taskuptaken by Mustafa Kemal and his followers. Kemal not only led a successful movement of resistance against occupation from the Anatolian hinterland, but more revolutionarily, discarded the constructs of Ottomanism and Islamism, propelling Turkish nationalism to the forefront of his efforts to mobilize the populace. It was the first time that any Turkish leader had so unequivocally rested his political objectives on “awakening” Turkish nationalist sentiments.

The Turks of Cyprus did not remain unaffected. They displayed keen support for the ultimately successful Kemalist military efforts, and enthusiasm for Kemal’s socio-political goals. Opponents of Kemal were denounced; even those given shelter by the British were disowned by the Turkish Cypriot community. As in the past intra-elite rivalry persisted, but by the mid-1920’s there was no political camp that publicly formed an excep-
tion to the blanket support of the Kemalists and their doctrines. Despite their differences, the press, as one, lauded the feats of the nationalists in Turkey, and placed Mustafa Kemal upon the irreproachable pedestal of the national saviour. And this, despite the fact that it had been Kemal and the National Pact which he had espoused that had defined Cyprus, by default, as being beyond the territorial limits of the new Turkish nation-state that they were establishing. Many, (a more significant proportion than commonly acknowledged), rushed to join up to the new Turkish Republic, emigrating from the island in their thousands. They surely held hope of a better material future in the new Kemalist state of Turkey, but also exhibited Turkish nationalism in the process. That most Turkish Cypriots stayed put, however, cannot be taken to imply that they were therefore devoid of Turkish national sentiment, for even those arguing against emigration frequently based their arguments on the basis of the precepts of Turkish national interest.

By the end of the 1920's a new generation was rising, educated and socialized in institutions where they were imbued with nationalist sentiments, sometimes by schoolmasters from Turkey itself. Always paralleling in education the curriculum of Turkey, this ascendant generation that gained progressive voice in the populace at large represented the greatest challenge to the traditional Turkish Cypriot elite that while never disavowing Kemal and republican Turkey, had focused its loyalties on British patrons and submitted to, sometimes even urged British interference in communal affairs.\[2166\] This new generation was led both by those who had been pioneers of Turkish nationalism on the island in the past and by new, younger leaders, most indispensably Necati Özkan, who themselves matured and first gained political prominence in the Kemalist era. They were promoted and encouraged by a Turkish consul, Asaf Bey, who since 1925 had been an effective advocate of Kemalism on the island; their opponents, on the other hand, the Evkafılar, were sponsored by the Government.

The nationalists’ victory in the Legislative Council elections of October 1930 constituted a spectacular landmark in Turkish Cypriot political history. They had fought the campaign on a populist and nationalist platform and had successfully spurred and mobilized Turkish nationalist sentiments. The days, weeks and months that followed the election confirmed their adherence to the premises upon which they had fought the campaign. Up to the October Revolt of 1931 they spent a year both publicizing their nationalist agenda and confronting the colonial government which they portrayed, with much justification, as an obstacle to achieving “national” objectives, as obstructing efforts to “nationalize” education, to wrest back greater political control of their communal institutions and privileges, and to implement the social policies of the Kemalists.

The persistent resistance of the authorities to their demands was to lead to their organizing a “National” Congress where they not only passed resolutions directly challenging British control over their communal authorities, but also elected a Müftü from amongst their own ranks, openly contesting the legitimacy of the abolition of this post by the British just a few years before. That the demands being made were not those most commonly

\[2166\] While not in itself a nationalist manifesto, the fact that by 1926 a collection of articles and letters written by Ahmet Raik between 1903 and 1913, (including his infamous article published in the journal “Turk” for which he had once been persecuted by the conservatives), was now considered legitimate enough to be printed by the Birlik printing presses and become freely available to the Turkish Cypriot reading public was not only some sort of vindication for this intellectual pioneer, but also symbolic of the changing nature of Turkish Cypriot society. See AN 1997b, 5; See also AFEŞİN 1996, 306–307.
associated with nationalists, such as stereotypical calls for a politically independent nation-state, does not detract from the fact that they were nevertheless based on nationalist sentiments and ideas. Even the election of the Müftü, in theory principally a religious authority, was a reflection of their adamant demand for greater political autonomy, a demand which they based primarily not upon any geographic concentration of population, or even of common religion, but upon their shared Turkish ethnicity.

For the first time so blatantly and protractedly, a significant proportion of the Turkish population, under the leadership of the nationalists, had expressed open displeasure with colonial policies, and increased the concern of the colonial power as to how it could maintain its control over the Legislative Council, an assembly which Necati Özkan soon began to use as a stage from which both to propagate the nationalists’ agenda, and to criticise British administration. Yet, before the Turkish nationalists could put the opportunity of using this political chamber to full use it was abruptly closed in October of 1931 following an insurrection led by Greek nationalists under the banner of enosis. That Turkish nationalism continued to flourish in the authoritarian milieu pursuant to the Revolt, bears testament to the advance it had already made till then.

Notwithstanding the reality that the rise of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus can be attributed to external factors, most importantly to the dissemination of the Turkish national ideal from Turkey, internal developments on the island also played a most significant, if often complementary role. This was especially true in terms of turning what at the outset of the 1920’s was still a phenomenon distinguishable only in quite narrow circles of the Turkish Cypriot populace into a sentiment possessed by broad sections of the masses. Of these developments the progress of Greek nationalism, associated as it was with a strong current of anti-Turkish sentiment, and the spread of education and literacy to ever larger numbers during the early decades of the twentieth century were particularly instrumental.

Though there had been instances of intercommunal troubles during the Ottoman period, they had not been frequent or widespread, and had not been associated with nationalism. While the parameters of contemporary ethnic division between Turk and Greek were set largely by the Ottoman settlement of families from Anatolia, conflict on the island was for centuries predominantly intraethnic rather than interethnic, and the historical record attests not only to numerous instances of political cooperation between the two ethno-religious groups, but also to some degree of symbiosis. By the early nineteenth century, however, the first elementary signs of the later ethno-nationalist discord were beginning to appear as Greek nationalism began to gain hold on the island. Even then the Turks’ reaction was not initially founded on Turkish nationalist sentiments. Religion continued to constitute their key identity, and it was the disloyalty of the Greeks to the Ottoman Sultan, their Caliph that they most vehemently objected to. They themselves, as a subject people of the Sultan, did not seek political rights for their own community, and those communities that did were considered traitorous. Gradually though there emerged amongst the Turks too a few leading lights, a vanguard if you will, who influenced by the rise of the Young Turk opposition, began to espouse the concept of political sovereignty of the people. The idea, spread by the Young Turks, was that the right to rule must be based on the people’s will. At this early stage, though, it was an Ottoman people for which these Turks sought such rights. Being the ethnic group most closely associated with, and most strongly identifying itself with the Ottoman Empire, it is quite easy to comprehend why these individuals were prone to support Ottomanism as a civic national
identity as opposed to basing political demands upon a sectional ethnic identity that would challenge the multi-national foundations of that empire.

By the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, however, Turkism was gradually being propagated, by elements at least, of the Young Turk movement, and there are signs that it was infiltrating Cyprus too. The idea of Ottomanism incorporating all religious and ethnic communities of the island was slowly being supplanted by reference to an Ottomanism that excluded those segments of the imperial population who denied the Empire’s validity. In other words, as Greeks and Serbs, and more generally the Christian millets challenged the authority of the Empire and sought political independence, reference to Ottoman character, rights of the Ottomans, even to Ottoman blood and martyrs, by default excluded antagonistic communities. As, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Moslem components of the empire increasingly began to be affected by nationalism, and to reject Ottomanism, as Albanians and Arabs began to call too for independence, calls for Ottomanism, even what can be described as an Ottoman nationalism, increasingly became restricted to the core of that “nation” to the Turks.

With the end of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, the expression of national aspirations by the island’s Greeks, amply tolerated by the new British authorities, became increasingly vocal and commonplace. Protracted dispute between the new Greek kingdom and the Ottoman Empire furnished further cause and opportunity for these aspirations to be articulated. Time and again, however, such demonstrations of support for enosis were countered by the island’s Turks and resulting tensions and clashes between the two communities became more frequent by the close of the nineteenth, beginning of the twentieth century. While at the end of the nineteenth century the island’s Turks were still commonly appealing to the island’s Greek’s to “come to their senses”, remember that they too were still Ottoman citizens, and sustain their loyalty; by the twentieth, despite a brief interlude in the immediate aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution, there was little hope held out in their pronouncements that their Greek Cypriot compatriots would renounce the dream of enosis. Reading their words carefully, we can see that the intelligentsia at least no longer considered them to be true Ottomans, and so when they called for political rights for “Ottomans” they were doing so essentially for the Turks.

The rise of Greek nationalism on the island had essentially forced the Turks to contemplate and reconsider who they were and for whom they were to demand political rights. The presence of Young Turks in Cyprus, and the dissemination of Young Turk literature had anyway begun to fortify Turkish consciousness, but this was really bolstered by the process of Turkification that followed the Young Turk Revolution. Early Turkist journals propagating ideas of Turkish nationalism were available in Cyprus, ideas that were by the First World War advocated also by clubs and associations established on the island. Yet their reach was still largely limited to a literate urban elite. By 1930 this situation had been radically altered, and no other internal factor is likely to have played as great a part in the spread of nationalism to the multitudes as that of progress in education. By the First World War Turkish education in Cyprus was no longer as oriented to the sacred as before, modernizing reforms introduced in the Ottoman Empire had been adopted in Cyprus too, and curricula revised to include less emphasis on purely pious matters, and more stress on topics such as history and geography where students were brought into closer contact with a Turkish ethno-national identity. Even more important than the changing content of instruction was the change in its scope of impact. In the post-World War I
period the numbers of Turkish Cypriots receiving at least the rudiments of education were increasing considerably, by the 1930’s unprecedented numbers had graduated from both primary and high schools, and many were going on to university education in Turkey, graduates of the Lycée classes admitted to Turkish universities without any further examination as a result of special arrangements with the Turkish authorities.2167 Turkish Cypriot intellectuals had for decades been lamenting the poor state of their community’s schooling, particularly vis-à-vis the Greeks, but by the beginning of the 1930’s they were increasingly holding their own, at least in terms of numbers educated which had risen dramatically both in the rural as well as the urban areas. By the 1920’s, then, the Turkish schools, following the Kemalist curriculum of Turkey that had to some extent already been nationalised during the rule of the Young Turks, had become centres of national socialization, infusing greater and greater numbers with Turkish nationalist sentiments.

With improving standards of education naturally also came higher rates of literacy. This also meant that nationalist ideas and emotions could spread to broader and broader sections of the population, especially through the press. The Turkish Cypriot press, silent during the War years, began to flourish once again in the post-War years, and all local publications adhered to the Kemalist line on one level or another, most quite emphatically so. Despite intermittent and periodic British censorship the press continued throughout the 1920’s to disseminate the Turkish nationalist creed, and even in the villages there were now, if not schoolmasters in all, at least some literates who could relay and interpret their messages to the illiterate.

In a territory the size of Cyprus the urban-rural divide had never been as sharp as sometimes portrayed, but developments in transportation and communication now narrowed the breach considerably. Nationalist politicians based in the urban centres were now more frequently in contact with the rural areas, campaigning, in fact, by 1930, in convoys of cars. They campaigned then not just for the votes of the town-dwelling intelligentsia, professionals and merchants, but also of villagers and peasants, miners and craftsmen and small shopkeepers. The fact that their nationalist platform received such extensive backing is as good an indication as any that Turkish nationalist sentiment had been diffused to the various corners of the island; if not universal, it was at least widely held, both in terms of numbers and of the different sectors of society that shared in it. Literacy and education, developments in transportation, the influx of ideas from overseas, the rise of the nationalist press, both local to the island and in Turkey, clubs and associations such as the Hürriyet ve Terraki and Türk Ocağı, Türk Derneği, and the stimulant of an adversarial Greek nationalism amongst the Greek Cypriots had all contributed to the rise of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus and its spread amongst the community. Together, the interplay of internal and external historical forces had fostered this novel phenomenon of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus that had become apparent well before the Second World War.

There is undoubtedly a noticeable tendency in the literature on the modern political dilemmas of Cyprus to place much blame upon external actors. Many have chastised other states, declaring that, “Cyprus has never been given the chance to resolve its ethnic and political problems on its own”; complained that outsiders have constantly “manipulated” ethnic differences, “to promote their own objectives and design on Cyprus” and that

ethnic divisions are principally the result of, “the policies pursued by interested powers, external to Cyprus.” Pollis stridently rejects the view, “that the dynamics of the rise of ethnonationalisms are located within the borders of the island of Cyprus,” and challenges the assumption that, “The causal factor for the emergence of Greek and Turkish nationalisms … is the historic differences and tensions between two ethnicities.” On the whole this study supports her contention, at least as far as it relates to the rise of Turkish nationalism. As noted in this dissertation, nationalism amongst the island’s Turks was to an important extent consequent to developments, movements, and ideas external to the island. Yet, to argue that this was the case is not the same as contending that Turkish ethno-nationalism on the island was the result of an intentional policy advanced by the Ottoman or Turkish, British, or for that matter, Greek states. Nor does it absolve the Greek and Turkish Cypriots of responsibility for the island’s political woes. Too many contemporary evaluations, however, appear too be doing just this. Implicitly, at least, they often incorporate too powerful an element of denial of the responsibilities of the “innocent” inhabitants of Cyprus themselves; their negative attitudes and actions, their inability to restrain and oppose extremism, their failure to seize available opportunities. So long as the historical responsibilities of the native domestic actors are overlooked, Cyprus will always be unduly prone to be at the mercy of external powers. Nevertheless, this is not to deny that comprehension of such forces were (and will be) critical to any understanding of domestic affairs. What then in our study of international actors? Did they not goad the rise of this nationalism for their own purposes? Was not Turkish nationalism, as some suggest, the calculated result of the policies particularly of Turkey, or of Britain? What of Greece, did she have any impact?

Taking the least problematic of the three principal cases of early state involvement mentioned above, it would be ludicrous to contend that Greece in any direct way encouraged the rise of Turkish nationalism. Certainly it sometimes played an official and especially unofficial role in encouraging Greek nationalism on the island. The formally prescribed government policy during this period was, however, more often than not one of non-intervention, “Greek governments were reluctant, unable or unwilling to suppress agitators from forming patriotic organizations or from conducting unionist propaganda activities in Greece and the claimed territories.” It must be said, however, that Venizelos and others, (largely as a result of dependence on Britain), did at times try quite forcefully to dampen the Greek Cypriots’ expectations that enosis was nigh and instead to look at union as a longer term goal. Thus, while Kyrrou, the Greek consul at the time may have had responsibility for instigating the October Revolt, there is no available evidence that this was official Greek government policy, and, to the contrary, Venizelos publicly and unequivocally criticised this insurrection and, “steadfastly refused to depart from his policy of official noninvolvement in the affairs of Cyprus.” What we can say of the role of Greece vis-à-vis the Turks of Cyprus during this era is only that it contributed to provoking a reactive Turkish nationalism to the pre-existing Greek nationalism on the island. In other words, it had some circuitous impact. On occasion efforts were admittedly made by Greek leaders, including Venizelos himself, to assure the Turks of Cyprus that

2168. KITROMILIDES - COULOUMBIS 1976, 191; POLLIS 1979, 73.
2169. POLLIS 1998, 86.
2170. TERLEXIS 1968, 68.
2171. McHENRY 1975, 17; See also DOROS 1955, 353.
they would have nothing to fear, and would actually prosper in the eventuality of enosis. There is nothing, however, to show that the Turkish Cypriots took such inconsistent and half-hearted assurances seriously, and as such they cannot be considered to have served to hinder or inhibit the rise of Turkish nationalism in any noticeable way.

The case of the Turkish state’s role in the rise of Turkish nationalism on the island is more complex. If we look for roots of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus while the Ottoman Empire still stood we see that until the Revolution of 1908, the Young Turk movement was persecuted by the Ottoman state. Though many Turkish Cypriots therefore viewed adherence to their ideas as disloyalty to the Ottoman state, others were nonetheless influenced by the ideas of these dissidents. The fact that after 1878 the island was no longer administered by the Ottomans, and that many Young Turk exiles used Cyprus as a haven, or at least point of transit, contributed to the easier diffusion of their ideas in Cyprus than in the Ottoman centre; this though was an indirect, unwelcome and unintended consequence of the actions of the Ottoman authorities, who in fact attempted to frustrate the Young Turk movement in Cyprus even under the British. In 1908, however, circumstances changed, and it can be substantiated that the new regime of the Young Turks, which began to raise the standard of Turkish nationalism, particularly as the First World War approached, gave assistance to its supporters on the island. Yet, the most critical analysis needs to be made of the era that followed the Young Turks, once the Kemalists, clearly espousing Turkish nationalism above all other competing allegiances, had established their republic. As with the case of Greek consul Kyrou, there is some evidence that Turkish consuls, present on the island after 1925, most importantly the first of them Asaf Bey, actively cultivated Turkish nationalism. At times too, we see the Turkish government itself taking some direct interest in the efforts of the island’s nationalists, giving encouragement and even financial support to their endeavours. Yet, there is nothing to show that a concerted effort to implant Turkish nationalist sentiment in Cyprus was a charts principle of government policy.

Though Turkey was not, as some have supposed, wholly disinterested in political happenings on the isle and the activities of early Turkish nationalists there, it could, nonetheless be contended that its foreign policy concerning the island in the early Kemalist era was sometimes even detrimental to Turkish nationalism taking root. The Republic had emphatically repudiated irredentist and pan-Turkist goals, and at Lausanne had officially recognised and sanctioned British sovereignty over the island, an understandable outcome being the disillusionment of the island’s Turkish nationalists. In addition, it could fairly be contended that the Turkish governmental policy of encouraging ethnic Turks living beyond the republic’s borders to settle in Anatolia, with those in Cyprus being given a special option to do so by the Treaty of Lausanne, also struck a blow to the development of Turkish nationalism on the island, for though the majority of the Turkish population remained on the island, a significant number, amongst their ranks being many budding nationalists, departed. The case regarding Turkey’s impact upon the growth of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus during the pre-World War II period is, then, a mixed one; one that should not be confused with its policies and bearing in the post-World War II era. For sure we can say that there was no very substantial effort to develop a powerful and assertive Turkish nationalist movement on the island during this period. Though some sympathy surely was felt for the plight of the island’s Turkish population, (and sometimes acted upon), encouragement in some ways, at some times given to its nationalist cadres, Cyp-
rus was never a priority of Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, no matter that latter day nationalists might wish to portray it as having been so.

The British role in the rise of Turkish nationalist sentiment on the island is most controversial and often most misunderstood. Again, a major element of this misunderstanding lies in analysis by those who seek parallels between British policies towards the Turkish population in Cyprus after the Second World War, and policies before this war, where, in reality, they do not exist. Some similarities are discernible. In both cases there is, for example, evidence that Britain tried to use the Turkish community as a counter to the Greek demands for enosis. But critical facets of policy were not identical in the two periods, particularly as far as concerned the British attitude towards the leaders and sympathisers of the Turkish nationalist cause.

A common error is to portray Turkish nationalism in Cyprus merely as the intended output of a British policy of divide-and-rule. Yet, though at certain points there are grounds to maintain that the British utilized such a stratagem, it was not constantly employed, less so constantly successfully employed. Indeed, “the consistency of policy attributed to the British evidences a forgetfulness of events and debates,” that have been in many cases at least, even “within the memories of the writers themselves.” Moreover, even granting the consistent use of such a policy in Cyprus, it cannot be inferred that Turkish nationalism there was an intended and artificial product of British machinations. During the period under consideration in this study the British, in fact, offered no incentives to the Turkish nationalists. On the contrary they did much to try to impede their progress, in some ways more so than in the case of the island’s Greek nationalists. On the whole Turkish education came under tighter British control than Greek, the Turkish nationalist press was often under threat of censorship, if not always directly censored, and most importantly the British asserted substantial control over the nominally autonomous communal institutions of the Turks. It is a proven fact too that during this era the British authorities actively opposed nationalist political leaders and associations. The functioning of clubs with nationalist leanings was frequently hindered, and nationalist politicians unfairly discredited, their activities hampered. During the First World War several potential political leaders of a nationalist movement were imprisoned, and though Turkish nationalists were not so persecuted thereafter, the British gave full backing to the loyal, more conservative, traditional Turkish Cypriot elite in an effort to obstruct the success of the nationalists. The climax of their efforts to this end came in their patent support for Münir Bey in the 1930 elections; yet, despite such British intervention it was the nationalists, personified now most eminently by Necati Bey, who triumphed.

The rise of the Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus, in short, did not occur because it was encouraged by the British, but, in fact, despite their efforts to obstruct it! And, even in the aftermath of their electoral success, the British refused to cooperate with the quite moderate demands of the nationalist camp. Their evaluations of the political sentiments of the island’s Turks had been seriously misjudged. Nationalism amongst the Turks by the 1930’s was not as the British voiced, (and others have parroted), simply, in sum, the artifi-

2172. BRYANT 1998b, 56: To be sure, as with Cyprus, in general too the evidence is not one-sided. Donald Horowitz, who has explored the matter in some depth, wisely concludes and cautions in the context of the colonial promotion of group disparity that, “The relationship between colonialism and ethnicity cannot be captured by sweeping notions of ‘divide and rule.’ “ HOROWITZ 1985, 156.
cial agenda of a handful of disenchanted, self-seeking individuals, but had by now spread to the masses; nor were the nationalist leaders, as frustrated British reports counselled, under the thumb of the Greeks. Only gradually, towards the end of the 1930’s, did the British come to appreciate the error of their judgements and to recognise the true scope and hold of Turkish nationalist sentiment. It was with this realization that in the post-World War II period they adapted their policies in an effort to appeal for the cooperation of those holding Turkish nationalist sentiments. Thus, in relation to the rise of the first wave of nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus, this study does not support unqualified contentions that, “foreign powers, in the pursuit of their own foreign policy goals, adopt policies, initiate and implement measures designed to reconstruct identities in territories outside their borders,” or that, “in order to serve their own national goals,” these powers make efforts, “to socialize and mobilize peoples outside a particular sovereign territorial state into assimilating a previously non-existent ethnic/national identity.”

On the other hand, alluding, as some do, to Turkish nationalism as being omnipresent, endemic to the island since the day the first Turk set foot, is ridiculous. It became observable at a specific juncture in the island’s history, has been transformed since, and may, one day cease to exist, just as it was once non-existent. Neither was there any characteristic indigenous to the island that guaranteed its emergence by the 1920’s; No automatic switch that can be considered to have predeterminedly triggered it once a certain stage of economic or social or political development had been achieved. On the contrary it is quite possible to hypothesize that under a different set of circumstances it may never have materialized, that nationalism in Cyprus might have taken a different form, even that a civic Cypriot nationalism based on a partially shared history and progressively overlapping culture might have emerged as a shared nationalism of both Orthodox Greeks and Moslem Turks. This was not, however, to be so. When nationalism on the island first began to appear at the beginning of the nineteenth century there was already present a chasm between the island’s two main communities; based then on largely religious premises, this gulf was chiefly a consequence of the administrative system of the ruling Ottoman Empire, and was fortified also by other divergences of culture and language. What the emergence of Greek nationalism began to do during the nineteenth century was to widen the pre-existing, if not unbridgeable, breach between the two communities, and politicise it.

The thoughts and sentiments of Greek nationalism that infiltrated the island during the nineteenth century were exclusive. The Orthodox, Greek-speaking population were the “we” the “us”, while the Moslem Turks were the “others”, the “them”. Greek nationalism was not in Cyprus, then, an integrative force for it debarred the Turks from the political group whose rights it stood for. In fact, going further, the historical development of Greek nationalism meant that despite the generally peaceful relations that had been exhibited between the two communities on the island, the “Turk” was now essentially not just the “other” but the “enemy” the “traditional” foe of the Greeks, and the obstacle to the great future destiny that lay ahead of the Greek nation… an obstacle that needed to be surmounted. Turkish nationalism, which developed comparatively later, was in many ways a reaction to this exclusion. At a bare minimum we can say that the exclusive ethnic charac-

ter of Greek nationalism meant that when Turkist ideas first began to infiltrate the island they found a potentially receptive audience.

While some Cypriot Turks had defended a civic Ottoman nationalism that theoretically embraced not only the Greeks of the island but all the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman patriotism proved too weak a bond, and having been rejected by Greeks, as well as other constituent communities of the Empire, was ultimately rejected by the Turks themselves. By the twentieth century, Ottomanism, as well as Islamism, was destined to failure, while Turkish nationalism began to thrive. Ensuing conflicts between Greeks and Turks, in Crete, in the Balkans, and in Anatolia ensured also that Turkish nationalism was associated with antagonistic feelings towards the Greeks, further increasing the political differentiation of the communities on the island and diminishing chances for the advent of a common national identity.

In the period before the rise to power of the Young Turks there had been plentiful examples of cooperation between the Greek and Turkish political leadership, but thereafter too, even though nationalist sentiments proliferated, and political tensions were enhanced, the possibility and practice of political cooperation between the elites was not wholly absent; nor were the masses, who on occasion did face-off with each other in both urban and rural environs, in a constant state of hostility. On a daily basis at least, relations between the two communities were still generally good, but a gradual, incremental process of politically based differentiation, division and opposition was underway. The height of divergence as far as concerned disparate political aspirations came in the post-World War I era, when excitement concerning the potential realization of the Megali Idea and of its component of enosis was at a high, and Turkish nationalist sentiments, largely stimulated by this threat escalated. In Cyprus, though, adherents of both the Greek and Turkish nationalist visions were sorely disappointed. Irredentist Greek nationalists were crushed by the humiliating defeat and withdrawal of Greek troops from Anatolia, Turkish nationalists dismayed by the fact that the Kemalist victory did not result in any positive material political change in Cyprus, but instead to the recognition that Cyprus was now incontestably British and that the new Turkish republic made no claim over it.

By the end of the 1920’s, with neither Greece nor Turkey showing interest in asserting claims to Cyprus, nationalists on the island, the Turks in particular focused on enhancing communal political autonomy vis-à-vis the British authorities. The more conservative and pro-British Turkish Cypriot elite having been displaced by the victory of the nationalists in the elections of 1930, there developed a significant opportunity for nationalists camps, Turkish and Greek, to join forces in a common effort to wrestle greater power over their common destiny from the colonial authorities. Putting aside their differences, this is what they to some extent did do, and with the simultaneous improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey it might have been possible for such political accommodation based upon popular support, if maintained over time, to incrementally augment, not only further trust, but also a common political vision for a common future. Working together, the two camps might well have strengthened a Cypriot identity to which political allegiance attached by the population might, in time, have supplanted aspirations for political association with Greece and Turkey, and led even to a common anti-colonial Cypriot nationalism. Fascinatingly, Henniker-Heatton had advised as much in the fateful year of 1931. While uncharacteristically recognising the contrasting national allegiances of both communities, he had suggested that if they truly wanted freedom, then, “it will be neces-
sary for them to become Cypriots, and then Greeks or Turks or English."\(^{2175}\) As Coughlan ascertained several decades later, “If Cypriot nationalism had emerged as a viable force on the island, it might have helped to counteract the destructive clash of Greek and Turkish nationalism,...” but, “overarching loyalties, especially in support of Cypriot nationalism, were moribund.”\(^{2176}\)

Britain certainly displayed concern at the prospect of a united front between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, dismay and frustration when indications of its germination surfaced. But such an alliance never fully blossomed. At a most opportune of junctures that arose at the beginning of the 1930’s the Greek nationalists chose instead to go it alone, to follow a maximalist programme of enosis, ultimately pursued through insurrection, that put a stop both to the potential for cooperation, and, as a consequence of the British crackdown, also to the relatively liberal political atmosphere within which the nationalists had operated.

As Tzermias elucidates, “Although during their living together, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have developed many a common ‘characteristic’, the course of events until the birth of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, never led to the creation of a Cypriot nation embracing both groups.” As he states, “the notion ‘Cypriot nation’ contradicted the ENOSIS postulate,” and later so also did the Turkish Cypriots’, “watchword TAKSIM (division).”\(^{2177}\) Further, when occasional appeals to common Cypriot patriotism did emanate from the Greek Cypriot side, they were often perceived by the Turkish Cypriots, sometimes with good reason, as being insincere and, in Kelman’s terms, were identified as a threat to their “particularistic identity.”\(^{2178}\)

\(^{2174}\) The conclusions reached here as to Cypriot identity and nationalism are intended only to reflect what developed in the period under consideration in this dissertation. Undoubtedly there have been changes in identity in Cyprus over recent decades and it is not possible to rule out a future evolution towards the development of a more prominent Cypriot identity holding primary political salience amongst inhabitants of both the North and South of the isle. It does appear to some degree, as Kızılyürek argues, that, “After a long antagonism, both nationalisms in Cyprus [Greek and Turkish] seem to have been defeated,” yet their embers might still be stoked, and even if not they are not of necessity bound to be replaced by common “Cypriotism”. [KIZILYÜREK 1993b, 64]; For further evaluation of more recent developments regarding identity on the island, see Leonard W. Doob, “Cypriot Patriotism and Nationalism,” Passim; CALOTYCHOS 1998, 16–20. And for a minor storm in a teacup, (significant nonetheless), that erupted in Northern Cyprus when in October 1996 politician Serdar Denktas, son of Rauf Denktas and grandson of Judge Raif, declared that while his father was a “Turkish nationalist”, he was a “Turkish Cypriot” nationalist, see "Kıbrıslıyz, ama Türküz. Türküz ama Kıbrıslıyz," in Kıbrıs October 1996, 4–6.

National identity is clearly in some state of flux at present, and as the case mentioned above indicates, there is probably some generational dimension to this. In a related manner Volkan argued that a younger generation of Turkish Cypriots born after 1974, “are the new ‘Turkish Cypriots.’ No longer are they ‘Cypriot Turks.’ Born after 1974, they did not have the anxious parents of previous generations. They not only differentiate themselves from Cypriot Greeks, whom they have never met, and of whom they have no overt concern, but they also differentiate themselves from other Turks: Turks who recently came to the island from mainland Turkey, Turks on the mainland, Turks in Azerbaijan, etc. This teenage generation wants to be recognised in their own right.” [VOLKAN 1998, 282, and see also BERATLI 1991, 72–79]. Indeed, it might be appropriate to consider whether there has been an incremental progression towards the development of a distinct “Turkish Cypriot” nation that may be considered within Connor’s category of “offshoot nations”, rather than as an integral part of the much broader “Turkish” nation. [CONNOR 1994, 80]. Further study must, however, be undertaken before more reliable conclusions can be drawn.

\(^{2175}\) Minutes of the Legislative Council 1931, Part I, 53–54.
\(^{2176}\) COUGHLAN 2000, 227.
\(^{2177}\) TZERMIAS 1994, 81–82; Note that the use of the word “taksim” or “partition”, referring to the idea of the division of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece became the most vociferous demand of the Turkish Cypriots towards the end of the 1950’s.
It might be warranted to suggest here that numbers were a problem. More specifically, one might submit that the particular proportion of Greeks to Turks in Cyprus was not conducive to the establishment of a common political ideal, but on the contrary encouraged the maintenance of a nationalist political agenda on the part of the Greek Cypriots, and a counter-nationalist agenda on the part of the Turks. The fact that the Greeks constituted by far the largest group on the island supported the drive to achieve maximalist nationalist goals without consideration to the political aspirations of their Turkish Cypriot compatriots. Had their numbers been, in fact, slightly greater, that is, had they formed say ninety or ninety-five percent of the population, the demographic balance would probably have been such as to leave the Turks with little other option but to bow to their demands, to assimilate or alternatively to emigrate. Some indeed did follow such routes, and the British administration of the island no doubt served to prevent others from doing so too. Yet, still constituting a politically significant proportion of the population, the slow but not politically fatal diminution in their numbers made the Turks only more apprehensive and suspicious of any potential common political front with Greeks. The more even balance in numbers, on the other hand, say a ratio of sixty-five to thirty-five, or greater, may well have fostered a higher degree of political cooperation and effort to seek compromise as to more fundamental issues related to the island’s political status. A more self-assured Turkish Cypriot community, coupled with more sober reflection by the Greek Cypriots as to the substantial number of people on the island unwilling to concede enosis, might then have assisted political conciliation and compromise.

Could the British have done more on this front, could they perhaps have encouraged a Cypriot political identity? Surely, and it might be said that they therefore bear much responsibility for not trying more actively to bridge the gap between the two communities. But to accuse them of having directly thwarted attempts to establish such an identity in the pre-world War II era is misleading. They might not have fostered such an identity, but there is little evidence that either of the two communities were themselves interested in forsaking their rival national identities, or even that they accorded any priority to forging a transcendent identity.2179

If it is evident that a Cypriot nationalism never took hold in Cyprus, it is equally clear that Turkish nationalism itself was never universal. While this thesis argues that Turkish nationalism was becoming “widespread” in Cyprus by the beginning of the 1930’s, precisely how widespread it was can never be accurately quantified. As such there will always

2178. Herbert Kelman’s socio-psychological approach to “The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National Identities,” provides powerful comparative illumination for the case of interethnic relations in Cyprus. From his work we can surmise that there was a failure to develop an inclusive, “transcendent identity,” in Cyprus that would encompass Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. Importantly, he suggests that it would have been critical that this larger identity were not seen to be threatening the, “particularist identity” of each respective group. As he puts it, “It is especially important in the Israeli-Palestinian case or in similar cases of protracted conflict between identity groups. Any attempt, at this historical juncture, to replace the particularistic identities of the two peoples with an overarching identity would be experienced as highly threatening and would meet with great resistance…. Neither is ready to submerge that identity in a larger identity, particularly one that it would share with its former enemy.” It was this same dynamic which no doubt dissuaded many in Cyprus from wholeheartedly accepting a Cypriot identity and which contributed at times to the Turks of Cyprus assuming what Nairn describes as a “siege mentality.” All the same, as Kelman posits, it is not impossible to strike the correct balance, and, “development of a transcendent identity need not threaten the separate identity.” KELMAN 1999; NAIRN 1979, 38.

2179. See, for example, enclosure in Storrs to Secretary of State, 23rd March 1932. CO 67/244/8, 124.
be examples to be found of Turkish Cypriot persons whose statements or actions contradicted the idea of Turkish nationalism being prevalent in Cyprus. Likewise, though there are grounds to maintain that there were many who held deeply passionate Turkish nationalist sentiments at this point in Cyprus’ history, we have no way of gauging exactly how passionately held such sentiments were. However, that we can not mathematically quantify the scope and level of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus at the outset of the 1930’s, that we can by no means claim it to be an absolute, absolutely adhered to by absolutely all members of the Turkish Cypriot community, does not mean that we can not assert its very real and substantive presence as represented by the evidence.

One reputed scholar of the role of nationalism in Cyprus, while himself actually making numerous presumptions on the matter with little reference to primary sources, has stated that, “There is scant information on the early stages and development of Turkish Nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots.” Confronted by the proposition that the rise of Mustafa Kemal may well have spurred Turkish nationalism on the island, he charges that, “the argument smacks of the nationalist penchant for moving the origins of nationalist fervour as far back as possible in history.”2180 The present study does indeed do the latter, and actually traces the rise of Turkish nationalist sentiment to the pre-Atatürk era. However, it does so not as the result of any “nationalist penchant”, but as a result of analysis of the existing and accessible evidence. Indeed, it argues in places that denial of this evidence can itself be indicative of an opposing “nationalist penchant”.

This study demonstrates then that the rise of Turkish nationalism on the island had become appreciable by the time of the October Revolt of 1931. There still remains though ample room for others to bring to light further evidence that will provide us with a more accurate picture of how widespread and strongly held these sentiments were. Further research in progressively accessible Turkish archives, especially once Turkish Foreign Ministry documents become available to scholars, is bound to contribute to a fuller picture on this front. Likewise, the continued use of the Colonial Secretariat archives in southern Cyprus, till very recently virtually inaccessible to Turkish researchers, and little utilized on this topic by others, should lead to the unearthing of still more useful material. Ongoing efforts to catalogue materials in the Turkish Cypriot National Archives, particularly as far as concerns the Ottoman era, should also furnish valuable opportunity for new discoveries related to the genesis of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus.

Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus first became apparent in the form of Ottomanism. Adherence to what might be termed Ottoman nationalism was not very widely held till the twentieth century, and by then the label “Ottoman” was becoming used on the island as a synonym for “Turkish”. During the first decades of the twentieth century adherence to Turkish nationalism gradually grew in Cyprus, until by the end of the first decade following the triumph of the Kemalists in Anatolia, it had become a mass phenomenon. As manifested in Cyprus, Turkish nationalism was then largely expressed as a demand for greater political autonomy on a communal level, coupled with association with the reforms and symbols of the Kemalist Turkish republic.

British resistance to dealing realistically with the nationalists and giving them prominence vis-à-vis their rivals began to decline by the beginning of the 1940’s, but attitudes and policy did not change overnight. This was illustrated in the middle of the Second

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2180. ATTALIDES 1979, 45.
World War when Winston Churchill made a brief stop-over in early 1943. It was the traditionalists who were accorded most prominence in greeting him. None of the official photos kept in the Colonial Office files depicts Churchill being introduced to the nationalist cadres, while in one Münir Bey, still donning the fez, humbly shook the imperial leader’s hand, and in another the co-opted Fetva Emini, (also, like Münir, possessing little communal credibility), stood by, almost as a figurine. Essentially the British never really gave up on the traditional political cadres. They did have overdue second thoughts in the late 1930’s, but they nevertheless did not completely desert their traditional conservative supporters. As they gradually came to recognise, however, this class of supporter was slowly but surely fading away in the face of the persistence of the nationalist movement. In September 1945, war having drawn to a close, a confidential memo advised that Münir Bey should be replaced on the Executive Council so as to enhance public support and confidence in the administration. Münir was frankly described as, “a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary, out of touch and out of sympathy with those whose interests he is supposed to represent.” As the author recognised, the fact that Münir had been kept in power for so long spoke for itself as to the inability of the British to adapt swiftly to the changing socio-political circumstances of the Turkish Cypriot community.

In the post-World War II period Cyprus was to enter a new era of nationalist discontent, an era in which a second wave of Turkish nationalism arose with its own peculiar characteristics, leadership and context. While independence was being granted to countless colonial territories, even to the British “jewel in the crown” of India, control of Cyprus was maintained, belief in its strategic value once more forwarded as the primary British consideration. On the island a familiar pattern once again became evident: while the Greeks clamoured for enosis, the Turks rebutted their claims and looked towards Turkey, their organizations telegraphing their desire for restoration to Turkey to the San Francisco Conference. It was not upon the religious realm that such Turkish Cypriot demands now rested. Ottoman identity was no longer an issue. It was now a robust and pervasive Turkish nationalism upon which demands were being based. In a sense the British were ultimately forced into dealing with the Turkish nationalists. They did not “create” them, but eventually found themselves with no option but to seek their support.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century some form of Turkish nationalism is still observable in Cyprus, yet it has evolved through many stages since the 1930’s, and, which direction it will take in the future remains to be seen. In line with developments related to the uncertain intricacies of Cyprus’ political fortunes, Turkish nationalism, even if in some modified form, may flourish or, alternatively perhaps, a reunified Cyprus might someday lead to the strengthening of a “Cypriot” political identity, even of a “Cypriot” nationalism. Membership of a reunited Cyprus in the European Union may instead gradu-

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2181. Photographs enclosed in CO 67/318/2.
2182. Enclosure in Bevin to Caccia, 17th September 1945. CO 67/327/16, 137.
2183. The British still held out hope in the post-Revolt period of realizing the strategic value of the island, which until then had proved quite a disappointment. Secret War Office communications of 1938 described the island as being a, “most valuable strategic asset for the future in view of the uncertainties about Egypt and Palestine,” though, in fact, it was to play a relatively minor role when war broke out. [Gordon-Finlayson to Under Secretary of State, The War Office, 17th October 1938. WO 32/4237, 4A]. Nevertheless, after the Second World War the Chiefs of Staff once again based their arguments for retention of the island primarily on strategic premises. See Secretary of State to Bevin, CO 67/327/16, 13–14.
2184. Telegram from Wolley to Secretary of State, 30th April 1945. CO 67/323/5
ally fortify a European identity, even invigorate what we might term a European nationalism, or may counter, weaken and eliminate the force of nationalism per se. Most probably, however, for the foreseeable future various identities and nationalist sentiments will compete and co-exist together, both on the island and within the individuals living there too; for the individual can to be sure hold multiple identities and conflicting sentiments that can not be neatly compartmentalized or categorized. However, no matter what competition it faces, or how it potentially evolves, there is little likelihood that in the short-term Turkish nationalism will disappear altogether. As such, understanding its origins and early development, may well contribute to our understanding of how and why it has evolved to be what it is today, and to have political force that it still maintains.
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