Juha Saunavaara

IN SEARCH OF SUITABLE
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

JAPANESE CONSERVATIVES IN OCCUPATION PLANS AND POLICIES 1942–1947

Faculty of Humanities,
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IN SEARCH OF SUITABLE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Japanese conservatives in occupation plans and policies 1942–1947

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**Abstract**

The emergence of a cabinet and political parties that could be called democratic was one of the focal objectives for the Allied Occupation of Japan that lasted from 1945 until 1952. Cooperation with the local political actors was also necessitated by the model of indirect rule through domestic institutions that was adopted. The occupation authorities were actively seeking suitable political leadership to govern Japan and were ready to intervene in the development of Japan’s domestic politics for the sake of achieving their goals. Great efforts were, however, made not to distract the democratic façade that covered the undemocratic and non-transparent behind-the-scenes orders. It was important to make the selection of the new political leadership to appear as something that originated from the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

This dissertation offers the first narrative identifying and analyzing the characteristics of the occupation authorities’ policy concerning the Japanese conservatives at the beginning of the occupation. The study emphasizes the importance of understanding the planning period’s influence on the actual occupation policy and introduces a wartime discussion concerning the Japanese conservatives. The process of sorting out the most suitable Japanese leaders in 1942–1947 can be divided into several phases. What was considered suitable varied during different times, but what was expected from the suitable Japanese leadership remained rather unchanged. The planners of the occupation looked for moderate conservatives: who were to be thanked for Japan’s prewar steps toward democracy; who were not to be blamed for the war; and who were to help in the reconstruction process. At the beginning of the occupation, the occupation authorities sought for cooperative conservative statesmen who would be ready to follow the wishes of the occupier and yet claim the reforms as their own initiatives. After the first postwar general election in April 1946 this rule had to be connected with the conservative parties. Finally, the occupation authorities began to search for suitable middle-of-the-road conservatives who could, together with the right-wing of the Socialist Party, continue the previous cabinet’s work while ensuring the social stability and the success of reforms in the changing situation.

**Keywords:** allied occupation, conservative parties, Japan, planning, policy, politicians, politics and government, United States, 1942–1947
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Oulu 7.4.2010

Juha Saunavaara
Abbreviations

ACJ Allied Council for Japan (Tokyo)
AFPAC United States Army Forces in the Pacific (also USAFPAC)
ATIS Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (SWPA/SCAP)
BAE Hans H. Baerwald Papers
CAC Country and Area Committees (US State Department)
CAD Civil Affairs Division (US War Department)
CATS Civil Affairs Training Schools (CAD)
CHS Civil Historical Section (SCAP)
CIC Counter Intelligence Corps (SCAP)
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
Cl&E Civil Information and Education Section (SCAP)
CIS Civil Intelligence Section (SCAP)
CINCAFPAC Commander-in-Chief United States Army Forces in the Pacific
CLO Central Liaison Office
CUSSDCF Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files: Japan: Internal Affairs 1945–1949
DOS Department of State (US)
DS Diplomatic Section (SCAP)
ESS Economic and Scientific Section (SCAP)
FE Office of the Far Eastern Affairs (US State Department)
FEA Foreign Economic Administration (US)
FEAC Far Eastern Advisory Commission (Allied Powers)
FEC Far Eastern Commission (Allied Powers)
FECOM Far East Command (US)
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (US)
FCC The Federal Communications Commission (US)
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
G-2 Intelligence Section, General Military Staff (SCAP)
GHQ General Headquarters (As in GHQ/SWPA, GHQ/AFPAC, GHQ/SCAP, GHQ/FECOM)
GJPA Great Japan Political Association (Japan)
GS Government Section (SCAP)
IDACFE Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East (US State Department)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRAA</td>
<td>Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAPS</td>
<td>Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIS</td>
<td>Interim Research and Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW</td>
<td>Inventory of the Justin Williams’ Collection at McKeldin Library.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)</td>
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<td>LS</td>
<td>Legal Section (SCAP)</td>
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<td>MGS</td>
<td>Military Government Section (AFPAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Division (US War Department)</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>MacArthur Memorial Archives</td>
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<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives (US)</td>
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<td>NDL</td>
<td>National Diet Library (Japan, Tokyo)</td>
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<td>NRS</td>
<td>Natural Resources Section (SCAP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (US)</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Occupied Areas Section (US, Navy Department)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCCIO</td>
<td>Office of the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>OJP3RRP</td>
<td>The Occupation of Japan, Part 3. Reform, Recovery and Peace 1945–52</td>
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<td>OJUSPD</td>
<td>The Occupation of Japan – U. S. Planning Documents 1942–1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSS/SDIRR</td>
<td>OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports (Part 2. Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OWI</td>
<td>Office of War Information (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>Pacific Ocean Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Office of the Political Adviser (SCAP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPB</td>
<td>Political Parties Branch (GS, Public Administration Division)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWC</td>
<td>Postwar Programs Committee (US State Department)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;A</td>
<td>Research and Analysis Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Record Group (UN National Archives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAPIN</td>
<td>SCAP instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFE</td>
<td>SWNCC interdepartmental subcommittee on the Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SID</td>
<td>Strategic Intelligence Digest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIJ</td>
<td>Record of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Division of Special Research (US State Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWPA</td>
<td>Southwest Pacific Area (Allied Powers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Territorial Subcommittee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFPAC</td>
<td>United States Army Forces in the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARCOS</td>
<td>War Department, Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>YE-5</td>
<td>Hussey Papers</td>
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Japanese words are Romanized according to the revised Hepburn system. While long vowels are indicated by macron, these do not appear in such well-known place names as Tokyo and Kyoto. The convention of writing the Japanese family name before the given name is followed throughout the dissertation. However, the order is reversed for Japanese scholars who follow the western tradition of writing their names when publishing in English.
1 Introduction

How to deal with the Japanese conservatives stigmatized by the war and the failure of the prewar democracy, while simultaneously starting reforms that demanded a workable administrative machine?\(^1\) This was one of the questions the occupation authorities faced in fall of 1945. The political leadership of the new democratized Japan was to consist of political parties which would form a government representing the will of the people. The role of individual politicians and parties was, however, unsettled. The wartime planning acted as a guide to the occupation authorities eager to launch the democratization of Japan’s political institutions. According to my hypothesis, the occupation authorities were not passive bystanders but active and target-oriented actors intervening in the careers of individuals and the development of organizations during the first years of the occupation. The occupation authorities, in other words, did not only produce the framework in which the party evolution and eventually the cabinet building could take place, but participated directly in these processes by guiding them toward their own aims. These aims and the methods through which they were aspired were dynamic and changed over the course of time.

Democratization and regime removals through foreign intervention have been subjects of great academic interest during the recent years. This interest is derived largely from the developments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Several studies have raised the occupation of Japan onto a pedestal as an example of a successful democratization project.\(^2\) Yet, scholars of the occupation of Japan have emphasized the unique internal and external characteristics of the process that took place in Japan in 1945–1952. Based on this view, the Allied occupation does not offer any unambiguous models that could be applied as such in a totally different political, economic, and social context.\(^3\)

This does not, however, deny the value of the occupation of Japan as an interesting case study of democratization. As Kenneth B. PYLE argues, the clearest form of external influence on domestic politics is outright invasion and occupation. According to him, there has never in the history of any modern nation been a greater external impact on a nation’s domestic institutions than what Japan

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\(^1\) The occupation machinery in Japan differed from the model adopted in Germany and premised on indirect rule through existing Japanese institutions. Takemae 2003, 113.
\(^2\) Dōjidaishi Gakkai 2004, iii; Stradiotto 2006 passim.
\(^3\) U.S. Plans for War and Occupation in Iraq are a Historical Mistake. An Urgent Appeal from Students of the Allied Occupation of Japan. January 24, 2003; Dower, October 27, 2002.
experienced following its surrender. Therefore the democratization process, involving the steps of the removal of an authoritarian regime; installation of a democratic regime; and the consolidation, or long-term sustainability of the democratic regime, cannot be studied without the understanding of the constant presence of the external authority. However, I would like to emphasize that the purpose of this study is not to consider the moral aspects of the dilemma of forcing people to become free. It is not my task as a historian to take the role of a judge, although the study touches on the problems of the legality of democratization and the barriers against the success of forceful spreading of the democratic ideals, introduced by John D. MONTGOMERY in his analysis of what he calls “Artificial Revolution” on behalf of democracy.

One could try to justify the study of the occupation authorities’ policy toward the Japanese conservative politicians and political parties that emerged immediately after the defeat, with their role as the predecessors of the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyū Minshutō, 自由民主党) that has dominated the Japanese political party front after its formation in 1955. It is important, however, to recognize that although this study can contribute something to researchers with an interest in the Jiyū Minshutō, it is not a defined aim of this study. Furthermore, this study does not describe the early postwar conservative parties as inevitable pre-stages of their more famous successor but treats them as independent political organizations that sought to attain and maintain political power within government in their given time.

Although the final collapse of the Japanese empire that led to the acceptance of the unconditional surrender was a fast and, at least to some extent, surprising process, the occupation was not erected out of nowhere. This study contributes to the research trend acknowledging the importance of the wartime planning for the post-defeated Japan as a part of the intellectual background for the Allied occupation of Japan together with, for example, the New Deal and Cold War anti-communism. Like all the studies dealing with the Allied Occupation of Japan,

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4 Pyle 2007, 218.
5 Stradiotto describes the process of democratizing a country as a continuum and build his argument on Samuel P. Huntington’s theory. Stradiotto 2006, passim.
6 Montgomery 1957, 1–9, 46, 196–197.
7 Encyclopedia Britannica defines New Deal as the domestic program of the administration of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt between 1933 and 1939, which took action to bring about immediate economic relief as well as reforms in industry, agriculture, finance, waterpower, labor, and housing, vastly increasing the scope of the federal government’s activities. Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/411331/New-Deal. Read on August 7, 2009.
This research also touches on issues related to the allocation of work and power between the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo and the United States State and War Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the President of the United States in Washington. This study is based on an assumption that the Supreme Commander and his headquarters were extraordinarily independent in their practical policy formation and implementation at the beginning of the occupation. Thus, the Ministries in Washington as well as the international organizations the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC), its successor the Far Eastern Committee (FEC) and Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) were in many cases just rubber stamping already made decisions.

Joint Chiefs of Staff was established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the US forces. The JCS was directly responsible to the President as Commander in Chief and had no direct responsibilities to the secretaries of war or of the navy. This did not, however, erase the fact that the JCS generals had close working relationships with the secretaries of their individual services. The JCS relationship to the secretary of state was never clearly defined but nevertheless was an operative one. The joint chiefs also worked closely with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and reviewed and commented on all SWNCC papers where military operations were a prime factor. The JCS continued in existence after the war was over and played an important role in devising American national policy as military advisors and planners. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume I 1945–1947 by James F. Schnabel, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, v, 1,7. NARA, RG 218, Records of Historical Division, box 3.

After the Soviet Union proposal suggesting the creation of an Allied control body in Tokyo with veto power was rejected in Washington, the United States State Department proposed the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission on August 21, 1945. The commission had no control functions and was to serve a purely advisory role concerning occupied Japan. A 10-member commission was finally established on October 2, 1945. Takemae 2003, 97.

The Far Eastern Commission assembled in Washington and consisted of the representatives of the eleven major Allied powers (Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. Burma and Pakistan joined in November 1949). The FEC’s mandate was to formulate policies for implementing the Potsdam terms and to review GHQ/SCAP directives and actions. The commission played a minor role in the occupation and was never able to successfully challenge the authority of GHQ/SCAP or Washington, Takemae 2003, 97–99.

The Allied Council for Japan was a four-member (the British Commonwealth, The Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States) advisory body located in Tokyo was to consult with and advise the Supreme Commander. Takemae 2003, 99–100.

Several researchers have introduced similar interpretations. See for example: Kawai 1969, 17–18; Schaller 1985, 63; Finn 1992, 66–68. View agreed also by a decision-maker like Dean Acheson. Acheson 1987, 428.
1.1 Historical Background

The history of Japanese party cabinets began from the cabinet of Hara Takashi (原敬)\(^{13}\) that was established in 1918. Political parties monopolized the premiership between 1924 and 1932 while the political competition was dominated by two conservative parties\(^{14}\). Nevertheless, the party leaders recognized the need to accommodate with the non-party elite groups such as the elder statesmen known as genrō, the House of Peers, the Privy Council, the Court, leaders of the armed forces, and the imperial bureaucracy in order to proceed with their agendas. Parties and individual politicians therefore established relations with these groups. Other pressure groups that were involved in the development of the party politics were prominent rural leaders and large business combines called the zaibatsu. Rural leaders controlled the way the voters in their communities cast their votes and the zaibatsu learned to work through the parties by exchanging financial support for fulfillment of their political aspirations. Although the parties competed for power with the other elite groups during the so-called “Taishō Democracy” in the 1920s, they did not commit themselves to the fight on behalf of the strengthening the legal position of the Lower House of the Diet. According to Gordon Mark BERGER, parties preferred to extent party influence into other ruling organs rather than trying to extend the legal jurisdiction of the state organ they dominated when they endeavored to expand their influence. Thus, it was approved that the precondition of party growth was the acceptance of the institutional framework for political competition and policy making provided by the Meiji Constitution.\(^{15}\) Likewise, the representatives of foreign countries socialized with the elite close to the throne and with the bureaucrats of the foreign ministry and were not actively pressuring changes in the status of Japanese political organs.\(^{16}\)

The growing internationalism and the spread of Western ideologies were typical features for the 1920s Japanese society. These developments also caused a counter-reaction that took organizational form in nationalistic societies. Many of the societies were anti-Bolshevik and drew together conservatives from the business, landowning, and military classes as well as from the conservative

\(^{13}\) First name is sometimes read as Kei.

\(^{14}\) The Rikken Seiyūkai (立憲政友会) was established in 1900 and its name remained unchanged. The name of the anti-seiyūkai faction changed various times from the Rikken Dōshikai (立憲同志会) to the Kenseikai (憲政会) and eventually to the Rikken Minseitō (立憲民政党). Roberts 1991, 134.

\(^{15}\) Berger 1977, vii, 3–4, 9, 12, 16, 30.

\(^{16}\) This issue will be discussed in detail in the coming chapters.
political party elite. However, in addition to these conservative societies that emphasized the national polity and minor changes in the existing situation, there were also more radical nationalist movements which challenged the status quo. The merger of the civilian and military forces was another important development. The top-ranking military officials affiliated with the bureaucratic party forces. This link added significance in the nationalist societies. Namely, the alliance between civilians and military men also developed in the radical nationalist movements creating the growing ground for the 1930s changes in the course of Japan. The culmination of these developments was the third trend which began to appear by 1931 in the form of the rise of terrorism and attempted revolution.17

The wave of the assassinations of leading politicians in the 1930s began when a member of an extremist group shot Premier Hamaguchi Osachi (浜口雄幸) in November because of Hamaguchi’s defense of the London Naval Treaty. The first major plot was uncovered in March 1931. A small number of young Army officers and civilian revolutionaries had planned to put down the party government and overthrow civilian rule by violence. Shortly before the coup d’état was to be undertaken, it was abandoned because of the opposition from certain high army circles. The same forces made another unsuccessful attempt known as the “October Incident”.19

Meanwhile certain radical groups drafted guidelines for a new foreign policy. This development reached its first peak in the “Manchurian Incident” that broke on September 18, 1931 and was engineered by the Kwantung Army. At this situation Wakatsuki Reijirō’s (若槻礼次郎) government was impotent to act because the greater part of the army supported the direct action. A growing number of younger officials of the Foreign Office were also favorable to the army and the cabinet itself split, because certain Minseitō men defended the military position. The opposition party Seiyūkai was even more loaded with leaders who had close contacts with military leaders.20

The succeeding Seiyūkai cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshi (犬養毅) was wrecked in May 15, 1932 because of the so-called “May Fifteenth Incident”. The prime minister was assassinated and several other targets were attacked. This led to an abasement of the parties under the following governments. Although the major parties were given some representation in cabinets, the years between 1932 and

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18 First name is sometimes read as Yuko.
1936 marked a further decline of democracy and impotence of the old parties. Both the Minseitō and the Seiyūkai suffered from the lack of cohesiveness. The Seiyūkai leaders managed to lay aside their factional competition and challenge the government in 1936. The Diet was dissolved and general elections were held. Against the expectations, the Minseitō turned out to be victorious. This win became all but meaningless only less than a week after the election. Namely, on February 26, 1936, 1400 soldiers under the command of young officers attacked various parts of Tokyo. The revolution failed but it had direct effects on the cabinet formation maneuvered by the army.\(^{21}\)

Political parties were more active in their resistance of the military during the next two short-lived cabinets than during the years before. April 1937 witnessed the last competitive election in prewar Japan. The result was a disappointment to the militarists and the cabinet resigned soon after. The outcome was the cabinet of Prince Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿) that had been in the office less than a month when the “Second China Incident” broke out. This was the beginning of the end of old parties. During the last years of their existence, the Seiyūkai and the Minseitō were torn apart by factional struggles. The Seiyūkai split into three competing sections with Kuhara Fusanosuke (久原房之助) and Nakajima Chikuhei (中島知久平) being the two most important factional leaders. The Minseitō’s internal situation was almost as chaotic and it split up a few months before the complete dissolution of the political parties in July–August 1940. This, however, did not affect the composition of the Diet.\(^{22}\)

A majority of the old party men joined the ranks of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association\(^{23}\) (IRAA) which was inaugurated on October 12, 1940. The IRAA was a result of long-lasting discussions. Originally some politicians had seen the formation of a single new party as a way to resist the militant authoritarianism, but eventually the new organization focused on the theory of state unity and a controlled Diet. On December 1940 most members of the Diet


\(^{22}\) Scalapino 1967, 385–388.

\(^{23}\) Tai Sei Yokusankai, 大政翼賛会. It is noteworthy that the role of the IRAA divides opinion. While other historians have argued that the new order marked the culmination of a decade-long trend in which parliamentary influence was reduced to nothing, others have emphasized the continuance of the legal procedures. For example, while the passage of the National General Mobilization Law in 1938 and its amendment in early 1941 meant a surrender of the Diet’s privilege of approving or rejecting much important government legislation, this surrender was obtained only with the consent of the Diet itself, and was not unconditional. Berger 1977, 343.
joined the Diet Member’s Club, but Konoe’s plan to turn this organization into a political party under his leadership failed. The organizational development among the IRAA Diet members continued and led to the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (IRAPS) after the election held in April 1942. The IRAPS was a parliamentary body comprising 98.3 per cent of the House of Representatives. The election had been preceded by the creation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Structure Association which had sought out suitable candidates through the local branches of the IRAA and prepared a list of recommended candidates. However, no matter how much the government wanted to see their candidates elected, they could not prevent independents from challenging them.

The IRAPS was dissolved on March 30, 1945 and replaced by the Great Japan Political Association (GJPA) which was to serve as a political party on the totalitarian model. Despite the objectives of creating a genuinely independent party, the GJPA remained a subservient of the government. The creation of the new organization changed, however, the political composition of the Diet. Previously the IRAPS had been the only existing political organization in the Diet, but only 376 of the 466 members of the House of Representatives joined the GJPA after its formation. Others declared themselves independents or set up new parliamentary groups.

On September 1, 1945, when the 88th Extraordinary Session of the Imperial Diet was convoked, the composition of the Lower House of the Diet was as follows: GJPA 377; Association of Imperial Assistance Diet men 21; independents, 25; and vacancies 43.

After Prince Konoe resigned in January 1939, Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō became the premier. Hiranuma’s government, as well as the successive cabinets of Abe Nobuyuki (阿部信行) and Yonai Mitsumasa (米内光政), were short-lived. Yonai was followed again by Konoe and eventually by Tōjō Hideki (東条英機) who led Japan into the Pacific War. Tōjō resigned in July 1944 and

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24 Giin kurabu, 議員クラブ. 
25 Yokusan Seiji-Kai, 翼賛政治会, occasionally translated also as the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association (IRAPA).
27 Yokusan seiji taisei kyōgikai or Yokkyō.
29 Dai Nihon Seiji Kai, 大日本政治会.
30 Shillony 1981, 75.
31 Yokusō Giin Dōshikai, in reality an arm of the GJPA. Uchida 1987, 306.
32 Uchida 1987, 306.
was followed by Koiso Kuniaki (小磯國昭). Koiso’s government resigned in April 1945. The succeeding Cabinet of Admiral Baron Suzuki Kantarō (鈴木貫太郎) lasted until the end of the war.

Emperor Hirohito made a personal radio broadcast on August 15, 1945 where he informed his subordinates on the unsatisfying outcome of the war. Despite the obscure expressions used by the emperor, this meant that Japan accepted the terms of the unconditional surrender laid down in the Potsdam Declaration. Mainly US-based Allied occupation forces arrived in Japan two weeks after the broadcast and on September 2, 1945 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur, representatives of nine other Allied powers, and the Japanese officials signed the instrument of surrender. The occupation itself is often divided into the early phase, dominated by great demilitarization and democratization programs, and the phase of containment policy called the ‘reverse course’. The NSC 13/2 from October 7, 1948, a major directive of the National Security Council, which was authored by George F. Kennan, the director of policy planning for the US State Department, has often been described as the document that really set the reverse course into motion.

1.2 Research Situation

The historiography of the study of the Allied Occupation of Japan contains certain detectable steps. In the 1950s many of the former occupation officers published their memoirs. In the mid-1970s the United States and Japanese Governments began to declassify vital official records. At the same time several middle echelon occupation officials were preparing reminiscences for publication. Hence, it is not surprising that the end of the 1970s witnessed emergence of several new scholarly works dealing with the occupation. Seminars between the leading American and Japanese scholars of the field that were held since 1975 by the MacArthur

33 After his death, Emperor Hirohito is referred to as Shōwa Emperor.
34 Dower 2000, 35–40.
35 It is noteworthy that for example Justin Williams Sr. denies that there were any radical changes in the policy of democratization. Hence, the concept of reverse course is not unambiguous. Williams 1979, 208–216.
36 Moore 1979, 733; Finn 1992, 206; Kataoka 1992a, 4–5; Tani 1992, 82. To see the actual document see: NARA, RG 84, entry 2829, box 1, folder 3.
37 As the amount of studies increased, need for bibliographies became obvious. Bibliographies dealing with both the English and the Japanese research were gathered. See: Schulman–Ward 1974; Schulman 1980; Nihon Senryōbunkenshū Mokuroku, 1972.
Memorial in Norfolk also contributed a few highly influential publications.\(^{38}\) Despite this expanding activity, Ray A. MOORE argued on behalf of the need for more studies in autumn 1979.\(^{39}\)

TSUTUI Kiyotada noted in 1992 that there were many scholarly works dealing with the events immediately antecedent to the conservative merger in 1955, but there was a dearth of studies documenting the history of postwar conservative parties in the years before this milestone.\(^{40}\) Years later we can notice that this criticism is still valid although the situation has become better. The way in which conservatives are examined and presented in different studies varies according to research tasks and general approaches toward the occupation and its first years. There are at least five different approaches: studies explaining occupiers’ early policy that is somehow connected to the political parties and individual politicians; studies explaining conservatives’ activity especially at the beginning of the occupation; studies treating the early postwar history of the conservative parties as a prologue to the 1955-developments; studies treating the first years of the occupation as a part of general postwar party history; and studies concentrating on influential conservative politicians at the beginning of the occupation.

The most important literature in relation to the current research comes from the group introduced first. FUKUNAGA Fumio’s study (*Senryō-shita Chūō Seiken no Keisei to Hōkai – GHQ Minseikyoku to Nihon Shakaitō*), although concentrating on the relation between the General Headquarters (GHQ) Government Section (GS) and the Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō), comments on many questions dealing with the occupation authorities’ aims and purposes that correspond with my own interests. Furthermore, the utilized source material overlaps in many occasions. Yet, most likely because of the differing emphasis, the sources are treated differently and the interpretations made based on them vary quite often. MASUDA Hiroshi’s book (*Seijika Tsuihō*) dealing with the political purge, a field of study that for decades seems to have remained solely on the shoulders of Hans H. BAERWALD\(^{41}\), is essential as well. The purge was the occupation authorities’ most radical way of intervening in the internal development of the political parties and construction of the cabinets. Besides describing the course of various purge cases, MASUDA also offers explanations.


\(^{39}\) Moore 1979, 721–724.

\(^{40}\) Tsutsui 1992, 119–120.

\(^{41}\) Best known work: *The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation.*
concerning the logic behind the occupation authorities’ actions. Various books about the occupiers’ policy in relation to the birth of the Japanese Constitution also belong to this group.

James BABB approaches the immediate postwar conservative parties from the angle of explaining why some of them were ready to form a coalition with the socialists after the April 1947 elections although they could have controlled the government by themselves. BABB is, in other words, explaining the logic of conservative parties’ activity at the beginning of the occupation. His account emphasizes the differences between the conservative parties, especially in their economic policies, and warns not to exaggerate the occupation authorities’ role.

The collection of articles edited by KATAOKA Tetsuya (Creating Single-Party Democracy – Japan’s Postwar Political System) is an example of studies that treat the development of the political parties during the occupation period as a prologue to changes in 1955. In other words, the focus is on the creation and origins of the Liberal Democratic Party.

The number of general political party histories that introduce the years of occupation is greater than the number of publications belonging in the groups mentioned above. MASUMI Junnosuke (Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945–1955) and UCHIDA Kenzō (Japan’s Postwar Conservative Parties) form the main source of reference from the perspective of the English-reading audience. TOMINOMORI Eiji’s (Sengo Hoshūōshi) and SHINOBU Seizaburō’s (Sengo Nihon Seijishi) are remarkable studies not available in English. These studies, with the exception of Uchida, deal with a longer period of time in which the developments during the occupation are included. These are excellent sources when studying the general structural and ideological developments that have taken place in the Japanese conservative parties since the surrender. However, what is typical for many of these works is the rather minor existence and visibility of the occupier. Naturally one cannot totally bypass the occupation authorities’ role when discussing issues like the purge or the creation of the constitution, but none of the authors try to create any long-term model of the occupation authorities’ policies concerning the conservatives.

43 Although Masaru KOHNO’s approach toward the formation of the Katayama Cabinet differs from BABB, it is still another example of a study that explains the logic of conservatives’ activity without taking the GHQ/SCAP into consideration. See: Kohno 1994, passim.
44 Contributors: Kataoka Tetsuya, Masumi Junnosuke, Otake Hideo, Tani Satomi, Ito Takashi, Tsutsui Kiyotada, and Nagao Ryuichi.
Studies concentrating on certain influential conservative politicians have been made as well. John DOWER’s study on Yoshida Shigeru (*Empire and Aftermath. Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*) and Mayumi ITOH’s work dealing with Hatoyama family (*The Hatoyama Dynasty. Japanese Political Leadership Through the Generations*) do not limit themselves only to their leading characters, but deal also with wider matters in relation to the occupation.

The planning of the occupation forms a separate group of studies. Marlene MAYO (*American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan*) and Rudolf V. A. JANSSENS (*What Future for Japan*) offer detailed information on the structure of the planning organizations and the great variety of discussions that took place in them. The first is a lengthy article concentrating especially on the role of the government’s country and area experts whereas the latter focuses on the influence of images on policies. However, Dale HELLEGERS (*We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution*) and IOKIBE Makoto (*Nichibei sensō to sengonihon*) have completed studies that do not only emphasize the importance of the occupation planning to the occupation policy, but also show the linkage between these two. Although these authors make short references to the plans and evaluations of the Japanese party politics in general, neither of them tries in detail to describe the policy planning concerning the conservative parties and politicians. Hence, these studies do not explain the influence that policy planning had on the actual policy adopted later. In fact, the previously mentioned study of FUKUNAGA is the most in-depth presentation available dealing with this issue.

There are also studies that deal with the United States policy toward Japan or some Japanese entity. For example Henry OINAS-KUKKONEN’s studies, although concentrating on the US attitude toward the Japanese Communist movement, offer a surface against which to reflect the analysis dealing with the conservatives. There are also a great number of research books offering an overview of all the major issues related to the occupation. One cannot deny their importance in the process of contextualizing the individual developments directly linked to the occupation authorities’ policy concerning Japanese conservatives. Usually they are, however, operating on a level where individuals disappear in generalization and, for example, the conservative parties are dealt with as one homogenous entity.

One peculiar feature of the occupation literature is that it has long been written by the participants of the actual events. This aspect is elaborated on the section dealing with sources and methods. Finally, there is the question of why
this topic has not been properly covered before. The general emphasis on the 1955 system is definitely one of the characteristics defining the literature dealing with the postwar Japanese conservatives. Studies of the early postwar period have also tended to focus on the great democratization reforms such as the creation of the constitution. On the other hand, the early occupation policies were often conflicted those adopted after the beginning of the reverse course. Thus, the former members of the occupation machinery who largely formed the first generation of occupation researchers may have found these issues uncomfortable to deal with. This conception is supported by the observations of Yoshida Shigeru and Justin Williams, Sr. They have both suggested that the purge may not have been anything which the occupation authorities felt particularly proud of, rather it was an episode which those responsible did not wish to recall.

Similarly, the political dimension of the writing of history might also have been influenced. In a situation where the United States has been Japan’s most important postwar ally and the Liberal Democratic Party, first led by former purgeeis, has dominated the political life, research opening the old wounds in these relations may not have been the most tempting challenge to face. Lastly, there is an approach taken by TSUTSUI in his comment following the criticism of the lack of studies dealing with pre-1955 conservative parties. When declaring that the purpose of his study is to survey the history of postwar conservative parties before 1955, he similarly limits his analysis mainly to the post-1952 period. This is because of the difficulty to detail the immediate postwar period in which many small parties kept merging and splitting. In other words, the complexity and the fragmentation of early postwar party political development may also have been one reason why it has not awaken greater interest among scholars studying the occupation.

45 Conventionally the 1955 system refers to the standoff between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) majority and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) minority. The system came into existence in 1955, when the conservatives merged into the LDP and the socialists merged into the JSP. By definition, this system was stable and dominated by the LDP. However, certain researchers have challenged the idea of a stable standoff and emphasized the importance of the change that took place in the factors that produced the system. Kataoka 1992a, 3.
47 Tsutsui 1992, 119–120.
1.3 Research Problem

The purpose of this research is to examine the occupation planners’ and implementing authorities’ policy toward the Japanese conservatives and their role in the remodelling of the Japanese political leadership. This aim is approached through analyzing the following questions: What kind of role was reserved for Japanese conservatives in plans for the post-defeated Japan and why? What kind of effects did the wartime policy planning concerning the conservatives have on the actual occupation policy? What were the objectives of the occupation authorities’ policy concerning the Japanese conservatives? How did this policy evolve during the occupation and what were the causes behind the re-evaluations? Who formulated this policy and how did it operate in practice? What kind of differences were there among the occupation authorities concerning this policy?

Certain terms and limitations need to be defined to make these questions understandable, justifiable, and as unambiguous as possible. This dissertation does not try to provide new openings in the study of the often mentioned concepts of “plan” and “policy”. These concepts are practical tools of analysis and they are understood on a rather general level. The classical definition of policy-making based on the model of rational decision suggests that a policy is an outcome of a sequence of interlocked steps such as the preliminary appraisal of the problem; identification of goals or objectives; canvassing of possible policies to achieve the goals; and choice or decision. This means that after the problem is faced, the rational policy maker clarifies his goals, values, or objectives, and then ranks or organizes them in his mind. After that, all the possible ways of—policies for—achieving the goals are listed, and all the consequences that would follow each of the alternative policies are investigated. Eventually the policymaker is in a position to compare the consequences of each policy with goals and choose the policy with consequences most closely matching his/her goals.48

This model is over-simplified and tends to view policy making as though it was the product of one governing mind. Besides the fact that the policymakers are not faced with a given problem but they have to identify and formulate their problem, none of the steps of the classical problem-solving model can actually be completed for complex problems. To clarify and organize all relevant values, to take an inventory of all important possible policy alternatives, to track down the endless possible consequences of each possible alternative and then to match the

multi-fold consequences of each with the statement of goals, is simply impossible. Besides the limitations of the human mind, this is often because of the lack of information, time, and energy that can be devoted to problem solving.\textsuperscript{49}

There are also elements of strategic thinking that challenge the classical model. A decision maker maximizes something in a conventional idea of a rational decision. However, the best policy is not necessarily worth its cost. Therefore the policy maker often satisfies instead of maximizes and tries to find the acceptable level. Another strategy is to deliberately make little mistakes to avoid big ones. One can, in other words, deliberately choose a policy that leaves open the possibility of doing better in a next step, instead of a policy designated to be on target but difficult to amend. A policy analyst may also want to deal inconclusively with a problem—that is to keep a next chance open because he thinks that with the passage of time he will come to know more. Another challenge is related to the target setting. A policy maker does not necessary start his/her analysis on positive objectives like what kind of advantages need to be achieved, rather negative ones like what kind of disadvantages need to be corrected. Similarly, a policy maker can see that policy making is a never-ending process of successive steps. Hence, when designing the policy, it is not the second, but third and forth steps that are in ones mind. Moreover, a policy maker is often aware and takes into consideration that politically feasible policies are only incrementally, or marginally, different from existing policies. Finally, one does not necessarily plan everything to fit with everything else. Instead, a policy maker may plan to break specific bottlenecks as they arise.\textsuperscript{50} These are all necessary matters to take into consideration when reconstructing the processes through which the incentives of relevant political actors, as well as their relative power and strategies, are reflected in the actual political outcomes.\textsuperscript{51} As will be seen, these strategies were present also in the occupation headquarters trying to define its approach toward the Japanese conservatives.

Governmental behavior can also be interpreted through two competing or supplementing conceptual models. According to my understanding these models, one emphasizing policy less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of organizations functioning according to a standard pattern of behavior and the other focusing on governmental politics and bargaining games among players in

\textsuperscript{49} Lindblom 1968, 13–15, 116.
\textsuperscript{50} Lindblom 1968, 24–27.
\textsuperscript{51} Kohno 1997, 12.
government, need to be considered when the decision-making inside the GHQ/SCAP and the planning organizations is analyzed. The actor (GHQ/SCAP), in other words, is not a monolith but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations (various sections) on top of which the leaders sit. This constellation acts when component organizations perform routines. These routines, previously established programs of action, often limit or delay the realization of wishes coming from the top. Reliance on routines cannot be explained by a rational strategic calculus. Likewise, the leaders who sit at the top of these organizations are not a monolith. Rather, each individual is a player in a competitive game called politics that is a mechanism of choice consisting of bargaining among hierarchically positioned players. This means that to explain why a decision was made or one pattern of behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises.52

HELLEGERS defines his study of the origin of the Japanese Constitution as a case study of policy making and has already demonstrated that the planning process involving numerous organizations and individuals with varying aims and motives did not follow the idealized model of rational decision. HELLEGERS states: “Policy planning is never a smooth avenue to a finished product that is acceptable to all. Too many obstacles can deflect planners from their goal, many of which we will see in the following pages. Directives from the top down may impose a particular viewpoint or seek to produce a rationale in support of courses already chosen. The prejudices, passions, strengths, and limitations of those involved affect process as well as product, reinforcing objectivity or skewing input. Area specialist may become captives of their knowledge and experience of a country, which produce in them an inability to see beyond the familiar. If lack of coordination between competing planners shows in discongruous goals and disagreement over the means of reaching them, planning by committee can become a Procrustean process that excises untidy facts, observations, and conclusions for the sake of agreement. And because those developing a policy will most likely not be those implementing it, policy plans often have a decided ivory-tower quality.”53

The other two key terms are “occupation planners” and “occupation authorities”. Occupation planners refers to the officials who worked or had influence on the work of the various wartime committees, sections and research

53 Hellegers 2001a, x–xi.
groups mainly under the United States State-, War- and Navy Departments. The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers and its abbreviation SCAP referred in principle only to General Douglas MacArthur though in practice it was often used as a synonym for the whole occupation machinery working in his subordination. MacArthur played a two-fold role in Japan acting simultaneously as the head of the General Headquarters (GHQ) overseeing the non-military aspects of the occupation, and as a Commander-in-Chief leading the US Army Forces in the Western and Mid-Pacific (AFPAC or USAFPAC). During the first years of the occupation, these headquarters went through several re-organizations. However, in this research the term occupation authorities refers principally to MacArthur himself, GHQ/SCAP Special Staff Sections, POLAD (Political Adviser to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, a body that represented the US State Department in Tokyo) and to the Military General Staff (G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4\textsuperscript{54}) that was shared with both the headquarters headed by MacArthur\textsuperscript{55}.

The meaning of terms like “progressive”, “modern”, and “conservative” have varied in different times and occasions. Earl H. KINMONTH introduces the importance and challenge of perceiving the actual content of these labels in prewar Japanese politics\textsuperscript{56}. Likewise, discussion concerning the nature and characteristics of Japanese postwar conservatism is topical today\textsuperscript{57}. Thus, the concept of “Japanese conservatives” cannot be assumed to be unambiguous. Generally, conservatism is understood as a political philosophy emphasizing the value of traditional institutions and practices. In the case of postwar Japanese politics this concept is often turned inside out. Many of the so-called conservatives have in fact campaigned on behalf of the reform of Japan’s postwar system. It is suggested that after the war the labels of “conservative” (\textit{hoshu}) and “progressive” or “reformist” (\textit{kakushin}) have been used in a manner that do not reflect the political realities.\textsuperscript{58} TAKENAKA Yoshihiko suggests that the hoshu-

\textsuperscript{54} G-1, personnel; G-2, Intelligence; G-3, Operations; and G-4, Supply and Logistics. More detailed description of functions, see: Takemae 2003, 140.

\textsuperscript{55} Kawai 1969, 18–19; Cohen 1987, 81–82; Takemae 2003, 137–142. Organizational chart in 1946, see appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{56} Kinmonth 1999, 332.

\textsuperscript{57} See for example the parts of the discussion introduced in Japan Echo, vol. 34, No. 2 (April 2007); Mikuriya 2007; Takenaka 2007; Yamazaki 2007.

\textsuperscript{58} Chris WINKLER offers a detailed introduction of conservatism especially in the context of postwar Japan. Although the emphasis is mainly on the Constitution of Japan and on conservatism appearing within the LDP, discussion on the objects of the postwar conservatives’ attempts and whether postwar conservatism can or even should be considered “conservative” are meaningful. Winkler 2009, 21–31. See also: Takenaka 2007, 41; Yamazaki 2007, 50.
kakushin\textsuperscript{59} dichotomy of postwar Japan crystallizes around the disagreement over the security policy and the reinstatement of the prewar systems. This emphasis distinguishes the Japanese political landscape from those of Western Europe and the United States.\textsuperscript{60} To define conservatism is an even more complex task to accomplish in the case of the current study because it concentrates on a time when the postwar party lines were still evolving and the political institutions and the agreements which were later to act as yardsticks of one’s political stance had not emerged. On the other hand, MIKURIYA Takashi increases the confusion by concluding that the conservative mainstream that has ruled since the end of the war cannot be said to have had a firm ideological stance.\textsuperscript{61}

The definition of the conservativeness of an individual postwar politician or a political party could be drawn from a political program. Economic policies, treatment of the emperor, and the maintenance of the national polity are examples of issues which might, together with anti-communism and anti-socialism, speak on behalf of one’s conservative nature. Similarly, the party membership of a party can communicate something about its conservative character. One could also argue that since the political parties and politicians that are observed in this study eventually merged to form the party that is in general agreed to manifest the postwar conservatism in Japan, the predecessors contained also at least some kind of conservative character. Furthermore, an attempt could be made to trace their conservative character from their own prewar predecessors. Yet, for the sake of this study, the most important judgment over one’s conservative character was the one given by the occupation authorities\textsuperscript{62}.

Although there were a large number of new, often short-lived, political parties with colorful political agendas emerging at the beginning of the occupation, the Japanese conservatives under examination in this study belonged mainly to the three parties established between November 9, 1945 and December 18, 1945. The Japan Liberal Party (Nihon Jiyūtō, 日本自由党), the Japan Progressive Party (Nihon Shimpōtō, 日本進歩党), the Japan Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyōdōtō, 日本協同党) and their direct heirs (the Democratic Party, (Nihon Minshutō, 日本民主党), the Cooperative Democratic Party (Kyōdō Minshutō, 協同民主党) and the

\textsuperscript{59} These two roughly correspond to terms of right and left used to identify the two sides of a basic dichotomy in Europe. However, since the core meaning of kakushin is a change from the status quo, the term could be applied to some right-wing movements as well. Takenaka 2007, 40–41.

\textsuperscript{60} Takenaka 2007, 40–42.

\textsuperscript{61} Mikuriya 2007, 49.

\textsuperscript{62} Reader should not get confused although certain postwar moderate conservatives were described as liberals during the prewar period.
People’s Cooperative Party (Kokumin Kyōdōdō, 国民協同党)) were above the rest and the occupation authorities recognized them systematically as the most important conservative entities during the first years of occupation. These were also the parties which, together with few non-party-affiliated conservatives, participated in the cabinet building and were identified as sources of continuing political influence. Other groupings did not play or possess a distinctive role in the occupiers’ policy concerning Japanese conservatives. Interpretation according to which the above introduced parties were conservative by nature and superior to other conservative groupings is also made by several other researchers.

The period under examination reaches from the beginning of the planning process to the early summer of 1947. Although the emphasis is on the actual occupation period, this study begins from the analysis of documents related to the planning of the occupation. This decision is based on a hypothesis that it is necessary to study the process leading to the inauguration of the Potsdam Declaration, and the other major planning documents during the summer and autumn of 1945, to be able to understand the situation from where the occupation began. In short, the occupation machinery did not begin its work from scratch but built on the framework created during the wartime planning. There is no unambiguous moment to define the actual beginning of postwar planning for Japan. However, the first months of 1942 are considered as an appropriative starting point because of the significant organizational changes regarding the planning of the postwar world took place at that time. May–June 1947 and the inauguration of the Katayama Tetsu’s (片山哲) Cabinet is chosen as the end of the time span because of the changes that took place in the Japanese political situation, international climate, occupation authorities’ position in contrast with the US State Department, and most of all because it is expected that this period could mark the end of one phase of the occupation authorities’ policy toward the Japanese conservatives.

The structure of this dissertation is chronological as long as the main chapters are concerned. A chronological approach makes it possible to follow causal developments that are bound to the pass of time. One-dimensional adherence to the chronological structure would, however, lead to an obscure text where all details and their significance would be evened out. To be able to avoid the risks of becoming monotonous or meaningless, and to be able to emphasize the distinctive

aspects of the policy and the main explanatory factors behind it, a more, although not purely, systematic approach is utilized in sub-chapters.

1.4 Methods and Sources

Methodological literature contains a great number of concepts describing the various boundaries cleaving the field of history. The so-called traditional history or modernist historical methodology is challenged by what can be called as new history, postmodernism, post-empiricist history or comparable. The debate and juxtaposition between structural history and narrative history writing seem to deal with similar questions as well. This terminological diversity demonstrates on its behalf the complexity of these debates belonging to the field of philosophy of history. To determine one’s own position in this court is thus anything but simple. The greater emphasis on open acknowledgement of a historian’s own subjectivity is, however, one of the main contributions of the postmodernist research of history. Therefore, besides the transparency of argumentation—the easily observable use of sources as evidence to authenticate the made statements—also openness of an author’s person belongs to the requirements of historical writing. The task of self-reflection, the self-critical study of one’s own engagements to set values, moral or political beliefs, literary and aesthetic models, social science theories and methods, and personal desires, cannot be escaped from even if studying a subject that is, as in my case, free from personal participation, geographically distant, time-wise outside one’s own experiences, untied to questions of nationality or national interest and so on. Hence, although this dissertation is not trying to contribute to the above mentioned discussions as such, I, as a historian aware of my role as an author, am trying to make the premises of my conception of history visible.

I agree with the view of Sir Geoffrey Elton, the recognized promoter of the reconstructionist history, that sources and their analytical study are at the core of the research and writing of history. However, despite affiliating to the task of reconstructing the choices and actions of people in the past, I cannot follow Elton

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64 Discussion is enlarged to consist of all social sciences. Lloyd argues the basic operational distinction within the social sciences should be between the study of events and the study of structures. Lloyd 1993, 6.


66 The idea of the relativity of observer and fact is, however, in no way a new discovery. Instead, it was applied to history already by a number of interwar philosophers. Evans 1999, 26.
in his argument according to which the past can be reconstructed as it actually happened.\textsuperscript{67} Instead, as Pentti RENVALL stated already more than forty years ago, one cannot discover any stationary past that would be independent of the present. The past exists only as contemporary knowledge about the past and is thus exposed to changes. All conclusions that are based on the historical sources are only, more or less reliable, hypotheses.\textsuperscript{68} To update this argument to the 21st century one can quote Alun MUNSLOW who argues that: “Post-empiricist history recognises, therefore, that history is a literary performance. It is first and foremost a deliberate and calculated written act on the part of the historian rather than a neutral reflection or correspondence.”\textsuperscript{69}

The conventional analysis of historical sources is based on source criticism that is divided into two larger question groups. One is formed by questions trying to clarify the original position and purpose that a document had in its own time, whereas the other group looks for answers to questions, how those factors influence the reliability, or consistency with the reality, of the information mentioned in the document. The external source criticism, in other words, concentrates on the contextualization of the historical source, reconstruction of the historical situation in which the source belongs, and on the study of the functional circumstances in which it was born. Richard J. EVANS states that the procedure of relating a source to its context depends on what questions are asked of it. One set of questions leads to an examination of one particular set of contexts. Research itself, however, often throws up new contexts of which the historian was originally unaware, but which are of obvious relevance to the project nonetheless. In relation to context and contextualization, Kari PALONEN emphasizes the importance of the identification of the questions that preceded and gave birth to a text that is used as a source. This approach assumes that texts are always written to answer questions and tracing of these original questions is a researcher’s primary task when connecting a text to a proper historical context. The external source criticism is a starting point for the internal source criticism where the information included in—or in some cases the information that was for a reason or another left out from—the source is pondered in relation to the source’s purpose and functional connections.\textsuperscript{70}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{67}] Evans 1999, 65; Munslow 2000, 79–80.
\item[\textsuperscript{68}] Renvall 1965, 55, 57.
\item[\textsuperscript{69}] Munslow 2000, 15.
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Besides placing its interest in the author, authorial intent, and the circumstances in which the source was created, critical study of historical source takes into account also the assumed audience for whom it was made and the possible intermediaries through which it has to travel. For example, due to the hierarchical structure of the occupation headquarters, there was no direct line between the political observer and the Supreme Command. A report or a memorandum prepared by one or several lower-rank officers had to pass through several gate-keepers before, if ever, it landed on the table of General MacArthur. If one wanted to maximize the chances of a policy proposal to pass, one needed to consider the views of the intermediate authorities as well. It is, in addition, necessary to remember that although a document is a direct outcome of its author’s work, it does not necessarily correspond with the given author’s opinions or aspirations. Hence, it is important to consider who or what actually gave the purpose for the document that has remained as a historical source.

One can demonstrate the peculiarity and special challenges related to the study of the GHQ/SCAP material by quoting Russell Brines, a well-connected reporter of the Associated Press, who describes General MacArthur and the decision-making inside his headquarters as follows: “The “old man” made all the basic decisions originating in Tokyo. It was difficult to distinguish between policies originating with him and those developed on a lower level and “sold” to him. He took credit and blame for both...He received information principally from official reports and the verbal commentaries of key staff officers. In both instances, it is to be suspected, considerable editing made them conform to the view of affairs which the general already had made clear was his.”

Furthermore, the criteria by which the validity of the sources is assessed depend also on the type of sources or, rather, the viewpoint from which the information in a source is approached. Two types of approaches to qualitative data—indicator and testimony approaches—can be distinguished. Naturally occurring data, information that is not affected by the act of gathering it, is ideal material to be used as indicators. When a piece of information is used as an indicator, it is considered as indirect evidence about the question one is trying to solve. Within

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71 For example the Government Section documents dealing with the Japanese political parties were often prepared by lower-rank officers like Harry Emerson Wildes or T. Diamantes, signed by Pieter K. Roest or Carlos Marcum, chiefs of the unit in charge of political party observation, and noted by Charles L. Kades before arriving at the chief of the section.
73 Brines 1948, 63.
the testimony viewpoint a source is considered as a testimony about the things one is studying. The same source may, nevertheless, be used as both an indicator and a testimony. For example, Douglas MacArthur’s memoirs that were published 1965 offer his testimony of what happened at the beginning of the Allied Occupation of Japan. However, the same source could be used as an indicator, should I be interested in studying, for example, MacArthur’s personality or attitudes in the United States toward Japan in the 1960s. Similarly, one can consider the January 4, 1946 public office purge directive as an indicator when studying the development of the purge program. Yet, the directive may also be seen as testimony, if the included account explaining reasons for issuing the directive is analyzed against the background of other possible factors that are not mentioned. Both the indicators and the testimonies thus offer meaningful material for analysis, although the type of information they contain and the types of questions they can answer vary.

One’s incapability of revealing the motives of any historical actor is another noteworthy point. Historians read historical actors’ writings, not their minds. This does not, however, mean that one could not study intentions of a historical actor. As Patrick Thaddeus JACKSON argues, the answer to the question “why did these men break into my house?” can be answered without reference to the supposed contents of their heads at all. By looking back to the discussions preceding the action, one can see how characterizations of particular courses of action grappled until some such characterization emerged victorious and justified the subsequent course of action. Empirical research can disclose which arguments were actually utilized and which were eventually successful. It is the explanation of why certain alternatives, enunciated at the given time, passed and others did not, that forms the nucleus of the study of policy. In other words, when explaining the process of policy-making, I provide an account for the victory of the policies actually enacted over other socially plausible alternatives proposed at the time.

Documents cannot be viewed as simple manifestations of their creators’ intentions. The social institutions and material practices which were involved in their production played a significant part in shaping what was said and how it was said. In the case of the study of the occupation, this means that the conventional

74 Alasuutari 1995, 50–51.
75 Jackson 2006, 26.
76 Evans 1999, 80.
ways of reporting and expressing opinions in military, intelligence agency and the State Department documents, and the occupation authorities’ peculiar way of communicating their will to the Japanese Government, need to be considered. When studying reports made inside the occupation apparatus, one has to remember, not only the formalized stylistic models, but also issues like hierarchy between the author and the receiver. It is also noteworthy that only a relatively few memoranda written by the political observers contain clearly stated opinions or recommendations. Instead, an often used method is to refer to a group of unidentified experts who suggest a certain kind of policy to be followed. In the case of communication between the GHQ/SCAP sections and the Japanese Government agencies, one has to remember the occupation authorities’ nominal distance from the decision-making. Seemingly non-commanding technical advice or suggestions included in various documents often possessed the power of a command.  

The line of communication that left no documentary marks needs to be understood when analyzing the meaning of the official GHQ/SCAP documents. For example, the Japanese political parties were not guided by official GHQ/SCAP directives (SCAPINS). In fact, there were only few SCAP orders or official directives related to the political parties. The occupiers directed Japan’s domestic politics through internal guidance. That meant a manipulation of Japanese politicians through informal expressions of will. According to MASUMI Junnosuke, conditions for the success of this kind of system existed because the GHQ/SCAP held the absolute authority and the government as well as the political parties and factions strained to discern occupiers’ will while competing for the GHQ/SCAP’s support.  

Michael SCHALLER brings up the same phenomena but calls it informal guidance. He reasons that by issuing informal “suggestions” to the Japanese Government in place of formal advice, MacArthur claimed the right to not inform the Allied Council for Japan of his actions.  

Justin Williams Jr., a former GS official, describes this system as a doctrine of rule by SCAP pressure rather than by SCAP directive.  

Harry Emerson Wildes’ comments follow that mentioned above. He claims that even if the Government Section and the other occupation offices were carefully refraining from giving

77 Takemae 2003, 115.  
78 Masumi 1985, 76–77.  
79 Schaller 1985, 63.  
80 Williams 1979, 22.
clear and definite instructions, politicians gleaned information from hints of what would be approved and what would be rejected.\(^{81}\)

Thus, the nature of the occupiers’ policy toward the Japanese conservatives cannot be directly read from the GHQ/SCAP fiats. Furthermore, the internal bargaining and details of differences in perception and priorities within the organization are not often captured by the resultant written document.\(^{82}\) Remaining private correspondence together with diaries and memoirs of the participating actors and well-informed outside observers is, therefore, a highly useful resource pool. Memoirs and other introspective sources do, nevertheless, contain certain peculiarities that need to be elaborated.

According to Quentin SKINNER, one should not accept whatever statements historical actors make about their own intentions as a kind of final authority on what they were doing in a particular work. SKINNER admits that any agent is in a privileged position when characterizing their own intentions and actions, but reminds that a writer may not fully understand his or her intentions, or may be self-deceiving about recognizing them, or may be incompetent at stating them.\(^{83}\) Another question in relation to the introspective material deals with the role from which some of the occupation officials have observed their earlier actions. Certain occupation officials locate themselves in a role of a researcher or an outside observer, rather than in the role of an active agent or decision maker, when reviewing the occupation in their later writings. This is done although the style of the text and argumentation refers more to subjective interpretations, perceptions, and experiences, than to any known sources. Hereby the role in which these men state their opinions in respective times is attempted to be made visible. Similarly, the character of a statement, whether clearly based on personal opinion or critical analysis of sources, is attempted to be described when found necessary. The definition of whether a book is placed among the sources or among the research literature depends on how it is used in this research. I am not, however, underestimating the value of academic research conducted by former officers of the occupation headquarters after their active service in Japan was over.\(^{84}\) This kind of critical consciousness is maintained with all research literature. One

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\(^{81}\) Wildes 1978, 114.  
\(^{82}\) Allison–Zelikow 1999, 312.  
\(^{84}\) However, for example Ray A. Moore has pointed out that former GHQ/SCAP officials tend to assert the wisdom and benevolence of American policy in their research papers. He continues that former officials tend to see the occupation as a highly satisfying personal experience rather than as history. Moore 1981, 318–319.
should not forget John DOWER’s notion that many American writers who have been directly or indirectly connected with the United States Government have in considerable part taken a position which coincides with the affirmative official version of postwar US-Japan relations offered by the responsible governments.

This brings one back to the question of researcher’s objectivity. RENVALL argues that the concentration on historical action instead of human feelings leads to a positive outcome on the question of objectivity. An argument that the aims of the human activity and the methods and measures used to achieve them explain much more of the human activity in the given moment than an appeal to superficial and unreachable motives, is agreeable.\(^\text{86}\) This does not, however, mean that one could somehow escape the inevitable subjectivity in the creation of historical knowledge, by choosing a certain kind of research topics. Whatever the topic, a historian not only listens to the evidence, but also engages in a dialogue with it. In the process of a dialogue one must be conscious of the nature of one’s hypothesis. Abandonment of self-consciousness makes room for prejudices and preconceptions that skew the reading of the historical evidence.\(^\text{87}\) The objective historical knowledge would demand a platform above and outside history. Being aware of the lack of such a platform, the historian still authors the connection between event, narrative, understanding and interpretation.\(^\text{88}\)

Narrative is central to history as the vehicle for the creation and representation of historical knowledge and historical explanation. Narration, on the other hand, can be defined as an act that is preceded by the arrangement of given events and facts as an emplotment according to the understanding of their causal connections as held by the narrator. In historical research it is assumed that the causal connection parallels with the actuality of the past events and facts described. Historical narrative is, however, a matter under constant debate. While there is an arm-wrestling between those emphasizing structures over events, and those continuing to believe in the historical narrative that is traditionally considered to explain a certain set of events,\(^\text{89}\) there is also a debate concerning the proper way of writing a narrative. I rest on a view according to which even the so-called constructionist history necessarily consists of a narrative dimension. The

\(^{85}\) Dower 1975, 503.
\(^{86}\) Renvall 1965, 244–245.
\(^{87}\) Evans 199, 198.
\(^{88}\) Munslow 2000, 26.
\(^{89}\) Discussion whether all historical writing is in fact narrative. See for example: Burke 2001, 284; Munslow 2000, 170–171.
selection of a model of chronologically progressing narrative expresses my belief in the equal challenges, limitations, and possibilities in the making of the truth-claims that exists within the narrative and the non-narrative thematic or concept-led approaches.

The postmodern critic of the narrative history seems to be compressible to a question of whether historians re-tell the narrative of past events, or whether they tell narratives that are invented by themselves. Hayden WHITE’s criticism toward historical narrative suggests that the way in which a historical narrative is constructed may tell more about a historian’s emplotment choices than about the past. WHITE suggests that it is down to the historian to match a favored plot structure among our culture’s main form of emplotments—romance, tragedy, comedy, satire—with a chosen set of historical events upon which one wishes to confer a particular meaning. If extended to the nature of causality, this critical attitude takes form in a complaint according to which the causal analysis is undertaken according to a set of pre-formed ideas about what is most likely to be the meaning of one set of events occurring after another. The decision to fix meaning through a particular causal connection will be based, in large part, on the historian’s preference for a particular interpretative outcome rather than the one found objectively in the evidence. I agree with historians arguing that the truth about patterns and linkages of facts in history is in the end discovered, not invented. However, for example, Thomas L. HASKELL adds that this is "not without a process of imaginative construction that goes so far beyond the intrinsic properties of the raw materials employed that one can speak of their being 'made' as well". The Making of these patterns and linkages is, however, what distinguishes history from chronicle.

Although believing in the possibilities of the narrative history, I admit that its critique has brought forth several shortages that need to be avoided. Narratives are far too often stories about the seemingly omnipotent “great men” and their actions. Certainly there are symptoms of this tendency to be seen in the occupation literature that often puts General MacArthur on a pedestal. Hence, although recognizing the general’s unusual status, I am trying to follow the

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91 Munsow 2000, 40.
example TAKEMAE Eiji and to get inside the GHQ/SCAP\textsuperscript{94}. Likewise, it is important not to personify collective entities like the GHQ/SCAP, or the Japan Liberal Party. They do not act, although certain actions can be performed in their name. It is important to preserve the human agency and to recognize the people inside these entities that possess opinions and may even act based on them. Certainly the use of these kinds of terms is occasionally justifiable for the sake of the smooth progression of the text, but the analysis cannot be based on the dialogue or dichotomy between impersonal entities.\textsuperscript{95} As in all history, I should, as a narrator, neither deny nor despise the existence of contingency and accidents in causal stories. I find it also important to openly admit if there are storylines that are not perfectly understood by the narrator. Similarly, it is important to indicate the relative strength or weakness of the argument and the possible tentative nature of a conclusion.\textsuperscript{96}

One should always avoid determinism and remember that the decisions made and policies adopted were not inevitable in their own time.\textsuperscript{97} Therefore they should not be brought forward as such. Furthermore, I should make myself as a narrator more visible. The excess utilization of the passive voice does not work as a method to raise the plausibility of a narrative. In a work of history one should, however, still concentrate on studying the subject matter instead of oneself, a point of criticism addressed toward the postmodernists.\textsuperscript{98} Finally, there is the acceptance of the existence of various narratives. The acceptance of historical narrative as a hypothesis of the past and the acceptance of the legitimacy of various viewpoints from which the certain events and structures can be approached, leads also to the acceptance of various concurrent stories that do not negate each other.

Documents originating from the occupation planners’ and occupation authorities’ activities are the most important sources for this study. This material contains certain characteristics that need to be taken into consideration. The pure amount of the written documents is one of such things. The General Headquarters in Tokyo alone produced a total of 60 million pages of documents between 1945 and 1952\textsuperscript{99}. Naturally only a small portion of this material dealt with the

\textsuperscript{94} Reference to Takemae Eiji’s classic study bearing the same name.
\textsuperscript{95} See: Jackson 2006, 27. Critic toward the ‘great men’ narratives and personified collective entities, see: Burke 2001a, 4, 20; Burke 2001b, 286.
\textsuperscript{96} Evans 1999, 93, 112–115.
\textsuperscript{97} Jackson 2006, 32–33.
\textsuperscript{98} Evans 1999, 173; Burke 2001b, 290.
\textsuperscript{99} Okkonen 2002, 27.
conservative parties and politicians and a significant part of that textual mass is not available anymore. Some sections allegedly “helped” the future historians by burning their records. Nonetheless, when the remained material is brought together with the great number of the State-, War-, and Navy Department documents and the Office of Strategic Service reports, the material pool can be described as huge. Therefore the discovery and mastery of all relevant sources is a hard if not impossible task to accomplish.

In relation to the great number of documents is the problem of knowing what was known by the individuals whose activities are now studied. It is obvious that despite the perpetual lack of time that seems to accompany each and every historian, the time I had to dig out the sources cannot be compared to the often hectic situation in which the occupation authorities operated. Moreover, quite often the information is found from surprising sources where one would most likely not expect to find them. Therefore, one should not assume that the individual decision-maker was aware of all the material produced and available inside the occupation machinery.

The GHQ/SCAP archives are included in the Record Group 331 (Allied Operational & Occupation Headquarters, World War II) in the United States National Archives (NARA). In the National Diet Library (NDL) these records are divided into individual collections based on the staff sections that created them. For example the important Government Section documents have been identified with an abbreviation GS together with a running digits number. The same pattern is followed with the archives of other sections as well. Moreover, the NDL catalogues provide the necessary information to locate the original document from the NARA. The top secret records of the various sections have their own collection. Furthermore, a great number of Record Group 331 documents are included in the published microfilmed collection The Occupation of Japan, part 3. Reform, Recovery and Peace 1945–52 (OJ3RRP).

In addition, the Summations of the Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea, providing month-by-month information from the beginning to mid-1948, are utilized as a valuable source of detailed information concerning occupiers’

100 See: Wildes 1978, 312.
101 Example: To be able to find out that Nakajima Chikuhei’s money was used to back the competitor of Hatoyama Ichirō in the 1939 party election, one should look into the biographical file of his competitor Maeda Yonezo. Department of State (DOS), IRIS, R&A Branch, Biographical Report, BR-J#34, October 3, 1945. NDL, LS 09148; DOS, IRIS, R&A Branch, Biographical Report, BR-J#58, Maeda Yonezo. October 17, 1945. NDL, LS 09148.
activities. Another series consisting of fifty-five monographs is called *the History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan*. However, Harry Emerson Wildes’ criticism toward these sources should not be forgotten. He argues that the summations advertised claims rather than accomplishments. Summation editors were forbidden to seek independent data or to do more than challenge obvious statistical errors. They were also forbidden to interpolate explanatory comment, background, or comparative material. Wildes’ complaints concerning the occupation’s official history includes the following points: no criticism was permitted of the Supreme Commander, or of occupation policies, methods, or members; all policies and actions were to be described as though originated by the Supreme Commander; monographs were to prove that the Supreme Commander quickly and completely fulfilled all duties entrusted to him; no occupation individual was to be mentioned by name and no staff section to be identified; no mention was to made of the FEC or the ACJ and the JCS were to be mentioned in footnote citation; no postwar writings other than those issued by the occupation were to be cited unless unavoidable, no book to be cited if published after 1937 unless specially approved by the Civil Historical Section (CHS) chief in charge of the process. This criticism is already a hint toward the coexistence of the polished official façade and the reality of the occupation policies discussed repeatedly in coming chapters.

The occupation authorities’ personal archives form another significant source pool. For example the Record Group 200 in the NARA contains General Charles A. Willoughby’s personal and official files. Likewise, the NDL possesses microfilmed copies of several personal archives that are located around the United States. The collection contains, for example, papers of Hans H. Baerwald, papers of various occupation officials from the MacArthur Memorial Archives, papers of Charles L. Kades and Justin Williams that belong to the Cordon W. Prange Collection of the University of Maryland and papers of Alfred Rodman Hussey belonging to the University of Michigan Graduate Library.

The papers of the United States embassy in Tokyo and the POLAD belong to the Record Group 84 (Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 1788–1964) in NARA. In the NDL the record of the Department of State relating to the internal affairs of Japan (Decimal File 894) is divided into smaller chronologically succeeding parts. Further, the decision-making inside the US State Department and the POLAD can also be studied by utilizing *Foreign

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Relations of United States. Diplomatic Papers (FRUS) publications and the documents available in the microfilm collection Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files. Japan Internal Affairs 1945–1949 (CUSSDCF). Record Group 59, Harley Notter Files103, is the main entry to the planning documents. However, the documents of the Interdivisional Country and Area Committee and the Postwar Programs Committee can be found, not only from the NDL collections, but also from the published microfilm collection The Occupation of Japan – U.S. Planning Documents 1942–1945 (OJUSPD). Finally, the State Department has also published as collection of key documents shedding light on the course of occupation Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress.

Records of the Office of the Strategic Services form the Record Group 226 in NARA. A part of these documents are also included in the microfilmed documentary collection OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports. Part 2. Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia (OSS/SDIRR). Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the advisory body of the president regarding the strategic direction of the US forces, can be found under the Record Group 218.

The above introduced documents have been studied in the United States National Archives (College Park, Maryland) and in the National Diet Library, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room (Tokyo). Furthermore, various documentary collections have been studied in the Department of History, University of Oulu. Various locations, together with the fact that many of the documents can be found both from the personal archives and from the

103 Harley A. Notter entered the State Department in 1937 as a research associate. During the war he held various positions within offices and committees engaged in postwar planning. He became Assistant Chief of the Division of Special Research in 1942, Chief of the Division of Political Studies in 1943, and Chief of the Division of International Security and Organization in 1944. In addition he served as executive Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, as member of the Committee on Special Studies, and as a member of the Committee on Post-War Programs. After serving as an adviser at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversation, Notter became an adviser in the Office of Special Political Affairs in November 1944. He continued in that position under the successor Office of United Nations Affairs in 1948. He was also an adviser at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 and became Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs in 1949. The records of many Committees became part of the office files of Notter during his compilation of Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–45, published by the Department in 1949. In 1960 the records relating to the various policy and planning committees, the Dumbarton Oaks Conversation of International Organization (August-October 1944), the San Francisco Conference on International Organization (April-June 1945), the United Nations Preparatory Commission (August 1945–February 1946), and miscellaneous material relating to postwar planning assembled by Notter during the preparation of his book, were consolidated by the Department of State into a single lot file, which was accessioned by NARA as the Notter File. NARA, Finding aid, 2001.
institutional archives of the various sections and units, led to a situation where the same documents were disclosed several times from various archival contexts. The question of reference was solved by referring to the archival context in which the notes concerning the document in question were made.

To sum up the characteristics of the GHQ/SCAP material and points that are necessary to recognize when analyzing it, one can quote DOWER who argues that: “Because primary materials on both the Japanese and American sides tend to be grouped by bureaucratic section or department, there is a constant danger that the interrelatedness and relativeness of structures and issues will be ignored; that what officials said or even thought they were doing will be confused with what was actually taking place; and that abundance of paperwork will be equated with relative importance.”

The idea of seeing the occupation as a story of Americans doing things in Japan has been criticized. Similarly, there have been warnings of the danger of relying exclusively on the predominantly American and official sources that shape the interpretation of the occupation. Therefore the source base of official documents is broadened with the writings of persons who affected either in the different planning organizations, in occupation machinery, in the US State Department, or in Japanese politics. The American point of view is represented by: Dean Acheson, Hans H. Baerwald, T.A. Bisson, Hugh Borton, James F. Byrnes, Theodore Cohen, Kenneth W. Colegrove, Kenneth E. Colton, John K. Emmerson, Richard B. Finn, Grant K. Goodman, Joseph C. Grew, U. Alexis Johnson, William C. Johnstone, George F. Kennan, Owen Lattimore, Douglas MacArthur, Donald R. Nugent, Andrew Roth, William J. Sebald, Charles Nelson Spinks, Courtney Whitney, Harry Emerson Wildes, Justin Williams, Sr. and Charles A. Willoughby. These volumes varying from memoirs to academic research provide another angle to approach the decision-making process that first took place in Washington and then in Tokyo. From the side of the Japanese conservative political leaders, diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichirō, Ishibashi Tanzan, and Ukagi Kazushige are studied. Furthermore, memoirs of Kōno Ichirō, Narahashi Wataru, Nishio Suehiro, Shigemitsu Mamoru, and Yoshida Shigeru tell the other side of

104 For example Justin Williams Jr.’s and Hans H. Baerwald’s personal archives contain several key documents that can be found also from the Government Section archives. Furthermore, some of these documents have also been included in published document collections.
105 Dower 1975, 504.
the story, by providing information which was not recorded in official documents or in occupiers’ later writings.

The third group of valuable sources is formed by the well-connected outside observers. Mark Gayn worked in occupied Japan as a foreign correspondent of the Chicago Sun between December 1945 and May 1948. He had discussions with both the Japanese politicians and the GHQ/SCAP officers on a regular basis and his diary markings expose an alternate way to interpret the motives behind the occupation policy. However, when these excerpts are analyzed, Gayn’s alleged leftist political inclinations are kept in mind. The previously mentioned Russel Brines also belongs to the group of foreign correspondents observing the course of the occupation. However, in the case of published diaries there are always some questions concerning their authenticity and scope. Likewise memoirs, written often years after actual happenings, contain problems related not only to one’s possible intentional writing but also to one’s capability to recall complicated issues correctly. Whilst these limitations are worth remembering, they do not pre-empt the usage of this kind of source material.
2 I. Planning Process – The Birth of Dichotomy (until August 1945)

“There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.”

“Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.”

“You will immediately place under control all existing political parties, organizations and societies. Those whose activities are consistent with the requirements of the military occupation and its objectives should be encouraged. Those whose activities are inconsistent with such requirements and objectives should be abolished.”

Three important documents that set out goals for the occupation were the Potsdam Declaration, the US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC-150/4/A), and the Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS-1380/15). These documents defined the aims for the occupation machinery and explicitly stipulated the means for how these aims should be reached. These early roadmaps to demilitarization and democratization were the outcomes of years of planning and drafting.

The framework in which the occupation planning took place was a complex web that consisted of seemingly endless lists of different abbreviations. The following introduction of that framework’s developments provides basic knowledge for understanding this author’s analysis. This introduction is incomplete. However, more complete presentations are available. Thus, the

purpose of this chapter is first and foremost to trace the roots of the policy toward Japan’s conservatives, adopted at the beginning of the occupation.

These premises mean that the focus is on the following kind of questions: Was the question about the conservative politicians important? How much space and attention did they attract? What kinds of estimations were made concerning the history of the conservative parties? What was known about the conservative parties’ and politicians’ status and activity during the war, and how were these factors estimated? What kind of role were the conservative politicians expected to play after the defeat of the Japanese Empire? And finally, how were these planning officers’ ideas and views transmitted to the actual occupation authorities?

As the following introduction of the planning framework proves, this process was not isolated from the war’s general development and the shifts in US foreign policy. The closer and more obvious the day of victory became, the more vigorous the planning became. More detailed plans were needed. In many cases, planning for Japan was influenced by prior decisions concerning Germany. Furthermore, there was always a framework that limited the planning officers’ work. Namely, presidential speeches and decisions that emerged from international summit diplomacy, set guidelines, that needed to be followed.111

Development of the planning organizations

There is no unambiguous definition to clarify when the actual planning for postwar Japan began. TAKEMAE writes that American pre-surrender planning for Japan started already before the war broke out. By this statement he refers to a manual prepared by General Allen W. Gullion in July, 1940. Gullion’s The United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs obtained a lot from a 1920 military report concerning the US occupation of the German Rhineland after World War I and mistakes made there. The greatest single shortcoming that was identified was the lack of an able civil affairs specialist. TAKEMAE emphasizes this manual’s importance to the military-planners of occupations of Germany, Italy and Japan.112 According to Marlene MAYO, the overall planning for the postwar era began immediately after the outbreak of war in Europe. By February 1941, the United States State Department had already

established the Division of Special Research (SR). Members of the traditional geographic-political units of the State Department were afraid of losing their power when the SR was created, because large groups of scholars and other experts were overrunning into the government. There were, nevertheless, men like Stanley K. Hornbeck, a State Department China specialist and Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s political adviser, who kept their seats in the department’s higher level planning groups. Scholars entering into the government and becoming affiliated with the planning of postwar Japan were often well-connected specialists with personal experience of prewar Japan.

Rudolf V.A. JANSSENS brings up another feature of the early phases of postwar planning. Namely, since the outbreak of war in Europe, various private organizations offered their studies about the postwar world to the State Department. Most notable of these was the Council of Foreign Relations. On September 1939 the Council, consisting of distinguished experts from various fields of society, volunteered to aid in the formulation of postwar foreign policy for the United States. The State Department happily accepted the offer. Yet, Secretary Hull did not want to leave the issue solely on the responsibility of independent council and appointed Special Assistant Leo Pasvolsky to work with the problems of the postwar world. This led to the organization of the Committee on Problems of Peace and Reconstruction in December 1939. Within two weeks, however, the name was changed to the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. The committee was headed by Pasvolsky. The Council of Foreign Relations sent reports, written by its various committees, to Washington. Eventually some of the Council’s members joined the State Department’s Advisory Committee in 1942. Hence, due the entwined membership, the border and the direction of influence between the State Department’s planning committees and the Council of Foreign Relations is hard if not impossible to define.

December 28, 1941 can also be seen as the beginning for postwar planning of Asia. On that day, just three weeks after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the establishment of The Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy that is also known as the Second Advisory Committee. The committee began its activities in February 1942. The mission of the Committee

113 Mayo 1984, 6–7.
114 Mayo 1984, 10–11, 13.
was to compose and create reconstruction programs for occupied territories. The committee set up five subcommittees one of which was the Territorial Subcommittee (TS), formed on March 7, 1942, and chaired by Isaiah Bowman, President of John Hopkins University and member of the Council of Foreign Relations.116

TS debated documents that were prepared in the SR by the government officials and influential country and area experts who studied postwar programs and supported the work of subcommittees. Two of these experts who represented the small academic community sharing interest in Japan117, the distinguished scholars of Japanese history George Blakeslee and Hugh Borton, played significant roles in the years of planning. They worked in various State Department’s research groups until the end of war, bringing continuity to the planning process. Besides these two professors who were also members of the Council of Foreign Relations, the group specialized on issues of the East Asia inside the SR also included experts like Earle Dickover, Frank S. Williams, Robert Fearey and Cabot Coville, and Max Bishop118. The aim of the SR was to list potential problems and cast the foundations for future decision-making.119 Later, in January 1943, the SR was divided into the Division of Political Studies and Division of Economic Studies.

The Advisory Committee and its subcommittees continued their work until July 1943. However, in the latter half of 1943 Secretary Hull ordered that the planning for the postwar period should become more focused. This led to an establishment of Inter-Divisional Area Committees which were to plan concrete policies for each area of the world. Eventually nine country and four area committees (CAC) were organized. The Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East (IDACFE) that dealt with Japan was established on October 20, 1943. Blakeslee was nominated as a chairman and Hugh Borton a secretary, of this organization. Originally IDACFE was a rather small group but it grew in 1944 as

117 To see a detailed description of the lack of academic interest and expertise in the prewar United States, see: Perry 1980, 24–26.
118 Earle Roy Dickover started his Foreign Service career as a student interpreter in Japan in 1914. He stayed in Japan until 1937, rising to the rank of Consul General; Frank S. Williams acted as the commercial attaché at the Embassy of Tokyo from 1933 until the war; Robert A. Fearey was a young graduate of Harvard University who came to Japan in 1941 to work as Ambassador Joseph C. Grew’s personal secretary; Cabot Coville was a career Foreign Service Officer who started his career as a foreign language officer in Tokyo in 1927; Max Bishop was a foreign service officer who was placed in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Janssens 1995, 66–68, 119–120.
the State Department expanded its personnel and functions. One significant move took place when Eugene Dooman, former counselor of Embassy of Tokyo and a protégé of the former ambassador of Japan Joseph C. Grew, joined the planning process. These two leading Japan experts had repatriated in August 1942, but had faced difficulties in finding suitable assignments inside the State Department. Nevertheless, in 1944 they were drawn back into the gist of the planning process. The experienced diplomat Grew even replaced Stanley Hornbeck as the head of the State Department Office of the Far Eastern Affairs (FE). In addition to Grew’s appointment, Joseph Ballantine, a former counselor of the American embassy in Tokyo, was made a deputy director.

CAC proposals were forwarded to the Postwar Programs Committee (PWC), which was organized on January 15, 1944. The PWC was the State Department’s highest decision-making body in post-defeat issues. The PWC considered the CAC recommendations, and the ones it approved, became the State Department drafts of occupation policies. Those policies did not, however, become the formal policies of the United States government until they were approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) in 1945.

Consisting of Assistant Secretaries from the Department of State, War, and Navy, the SWNCC was created in December 1944 to coordinate the planning among the civilian and military agencies. The Committee of Three, regular meetings between the three Secretaries, aimed at the same object. In the War Department, planning for the postwar military government in occupied areas was centered in the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) established in March 1943 after the experiences learned from the North African theatre demonstrated the need for efficient solutions to the various civil affairs problems. In addition, the School of Military Government was organized in May 1942 at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, to train military officials for working in the occupied areas. Originally only a minimum of language courses was offered and officers mainly followed a short program about running a military government. This was a

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120 To learn more about Grew’s work between 1942 and 1944, see Schonberger 1992, 17–24.
123 Janssens connects the birth of SWNCC to the strengthening position of the radical views of the Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. He claims that the closer cooperation between the three Departments was due to the outside interference to their planning of the postwar world. Janssens 1995, 252–258.
125 Hellegers 2001a, 159–161.
general course for senior officers and a specialist education was offered for the junior officers in the various Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS). The system for officers trained for the Far East was changed after June 12, 1944. Afterwards the education consisted of a basic training of 6 weeks at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville and 6 months stay at CATS universities. The Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) that translated Japanese military documents and interrogated Japanese prisoners was organized on September 19, 1942. 

The Occupied Areas Section (OAS), formed on January 1, 1943 under name of Op-11x, was the Navy Department’s counterpart to the CAD. OAS, head first by Captain Harry L. Pence then Lorenzo S. Sabin, produced more paper on civil affairs administration in the Far East than CAD, but its direct influence on planning for Japan was negligible. On March 31, 1943, JCS recommended that the War be named primary agent to plan for civil affairs in occupied areas and to coordinate the efforts of any civilian agencies involved during ongoing military operations. Thus, the CAD was in effect a joint Army-Navy agency for civil affairs policy planning. The Navy’s influence peaked in the planning of occupation for the Pacific islands that belonged to the Japanese Empire.

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was another civilian organization involved in research and planning. Established in June 1942, the OSS was an intelligence agency that employed distinguished scholars from the fields of social sciences and the humanities. Besides cooperating with the Military Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Joint Intelligence Committee, its Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) prepared analytical reports and obtained studies from other information-gathering agencies. The information included in the R&A reports was in principle to be used by the military tacticians during the war, and by the military governors during the occupations. Similarly, the Civil Affairs Handbooks and Guides used in the training of the military officials were prepared by the OSS. However, Barry M. KATZ and JANSSENS have emphasized R&A’s significance for intellectual history rather than its limited role and importance in the planning of the occupation. The OSS cooperated closely with the Foreign Broadcast

126 Janssens 1995, 154–156.
127 Mayo 1984, 24; Takemae 2003, 18–19.
128 Hellegers 2001a, 160–162.
129 More concerning Joint Intelligence Committee, see: Acheson 1987, 158, 745.
Intelligence Service (FBIS) that was providing open-source intelligence information. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established this unit on February 26, 1941 to monitor foreign radio broadcasting. The State Department was worried about the possible loss of information if the war caused the American embassies to close. Radio was looked at as a supplemental source of intelligence. The FBIS competed with the OSS and the military intelligence in recruiting the capable staff members who would master rare languages like Japanese. However, the FBIS reports were considered as significant source of information in the OSS R&A and the branches' representatives defended the FBIS against the proposed budget cuts.131

The above mentioned agencies together with the Departments of State, War, and Navy were not the only ones contributing into the planning. The Treasury Department, although not playing as important a role in Japan as in Germany, the President’s Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA132), and the Office of War Information (OWI133) also made notable inputs.134 Still, both HELLEGERS and JANSSENS emphasize OWI’s relatively limited influence on the Pacific front.135 In any case, the role of these organizations was not dominant in the cases related to the formulation of policy towards the Japanese conservatives.

The SWNCC established its own interdepartmental subcommittee on the Far East (SFE). Dooman chaired the SFE and other influential Japan specialists, Blakeslee and Borton above all, were also involved. The strong position of the Japan specialist in the committee was even strengthened by the fact that Joseph Grew was now working as the Undersecretary of State. In short, this group called the “Japan crowd” was in a dominating position when the SFE reviewed former recommendations and formulated its own proposals for Japan. However, the SFE documents only became the official US policy after they were ratified by the SWNCC and the JCS and signed by the President.136 The last important development was the shift during the last months of war in the decision-making power for postwar planning. The State Department began to lose initiative, while

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131 Mercado 2001, passim.
132 About Foreign Economic Administration, see Acheson 1987, 46–47.
133 OWI was founded in 1942 to replace the failing Office of Facts and Figures. Its main tasks were public opinion and propaganda. Among other things, OWI produced summaries and reviews of articles in the press about Japan and ideas about her postwar future. Janssens 1995, 186.
134 Mayo 1984, 8.
the War Department became increasingly influential. The drafts of the Potsdam Declaration, the presidential policy statement, and the military directive were in the final stage revised in the War Department under the close supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, assisted by the economic adviser Herbert Feis.137

2.1 Creation of distinction between party politics and statesmanship

Competing views concerning postwar Japan

The group of individuals who participated in the planning process was neither homogenous nor unanimous. Of the divisions that split the occupation planners, such as the gap between the career bureaucrats and the public experts recruited during the war, the face-off between the ‘China Hands’ and the ‘Japan Hands’ was the most visible and important. Believing that Republican China would be America’s most important ally in postwar East Asia, the China Hands demanded that Japan undergo profound political, social, and economic reforms. The influential members of this pro-China, anti-Emperor, and anti-zaibatsu group were the State Department officials Stanley Hornbeck, Dean Acheson who eventually replaced Joseph C. Grew as undersecretary, and John Carter Vincent who took Dooman’s position as the chairman of the SFE and Joseph Ballantine’s position as the head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. One of the most visible members of this group at the beginning of the actual occupation was George Atcheson Jr. who became the leader of the POLAD.138 Yet there are also claims that despite his background in the China Hand, Atcheson came to be regarded as a “MacArthur man” within a few months of arriving in Tokyo.139

This group drew many of its ideas from academics and Asia experts such as Owen Lattimore, Thomas Bisson and Andrew Roth. Furthermore, Canadian diplomat E. Herbert Norman, who eventually worked for a short period of time in POLAD at the beginning of the occupation, was another influential author whose earlier writings contributed to the discussion.140 Quite a few of the above-

139 McNelly, 2000, 36.
140 Oinas-Kukkonen 2003, 6.
mentioned scholars were tied to the Institute of Pacific Relations that was actively inquiring studies concerning the Far East at the end of the 1930s. A hard stance toward Japanese society was also occasionally taken among the planners of other Departments. Captain H.L. Pence of the Navy Department is often cited because of his propositions concerning the stern treatment of Japan. Wartime opinion polls show that these views reflected that of Americans who wanted to see radical action taken against Japan.

Joseph C. Grew, Eugene Dooman, Robert Fearey, Joseph Ballantine, Cabot Coville, and Earle R. Dickover formed the nucleus of the Japan Hands supporting the so-called soft peace. These men shared the view that although Japanese society contained some anti-democratic features, Japan could prove to be a loyal US ally should the proponents of democracy be returned to power. In their opinion, Japan’s drive for military conquest was not the fault of Japan’s civilian leaders. Blame lay instead with Japan’s military extremists and the other ultranationalists who disrupted the country’s earlier modernization progress. HELLEGERS also emphasizes Japan Hands’ fear and loathing of communism that was in relation to their elevation of stability above everything else and disgust of revolution. Despite their displacement in the State Department just before the beginning of the occupation, Japan Hands did not disappear. The early support they showed for General MacArthur’s policies had disappeared in 1947–48, when the Japan Hands worked through the American council of Japan to pressure the State Department to limit the power and reforms of MacArthur and to re-direct the US policy to see Japan as the key ally of the United States in the East Asia.

The names of Blakeslee and Borton are not usually mentioned under either of these groups. John K. Emmerson, a State Department official who played a significant role as an observer of the political parties during the first few months of the occupation, was also an ill-fitting for this division. Akira IRIYE uses Emmerson as an example when describing the pro-Japan way of thinking. Emmerson himself writes that although a Japan Hand, he had been tainted by

\[141\] Bisson 1940, iv, vi.
\[142\] Iriye 1981, 123; Mayo 1984, 23.
\[143\] Iokibe 2005, 56.
\[145\] Hellegers 2001a, 172, 238.
\[146\] Schonberger 1992, 39, 134.
\[147\] Iriye 1981, 58.
China. Japan Hands were also well connected with the Japanese experts of other countries. British scholar and former commercial attaché Sir George Sansom was one of the influential foreign authors connected with the Japan Hands. There are, for example, several documents showing the exchange of thoughts between he and Dooman and Borton.

IOKIBE offers another kind of division to define the complex web of ideas concerning the status of Japan. He divides the views of the occupation planners into six different policy proposals for the treatment of postwar Japan. From one extreme to another, these proposed policies aimed at: total annihilation of Japan; isolation of Japan; reformistic intervention; positive guidance of Japan; careful intervention; and preservation of Imperial Japan. IOKIBE’s categories are more nuanced than the simple Japan Hand-China Hand dichotomy and contain all the main lines and personnel involved in the planning process. The first one was based on hostile general opinion during the war, but was impossible to be adopted as the Government’s official policy. Isolation of Japan, a policy which is personified into Hornbeck in IOKIBE’s analysis, was not a believable option either. Another end of the spectrum, the preservation of Imperial Japan was supported by those who wanted to see postwar Japan as a counterforce for China and the Soviet Union in East Asia. This policy, described by Professor William C. Johnstone as a balance of power policy already in 1942, could not be discussed openly because of the alliance with these powers in the current war. The careful intervention policy, closely connected to the persons of Blakeslee, Ballantine and Bowman, would have allowed the maintenance of the emperor system and emphasized the guidance and support for the existing Japanese moderate leaders and social balance. This policy would not necessarily demand changes in the Meiji constitution and would leave each nation the right to choose

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148 Emmerson 1978, 255. Emmerson, who had acted as a vice-consul to Taihoku (Taipei) and third secretary of embassy to Tokyo during the pre-war years, was sent to Yanan on October 22, 1944 to interrogate Japanese prisoners of war captured by Chinese Communists. Oinas-Kukkonen 1999, 23–24.

149 See for example; Memorandum of Conversation, July 28, 1943. The Occupation of Japan – U.S. Planning Documents 1942–1945 (OJUSPD) 1-B-20. This connection mentioned also by Mayo 1984, 13–14; Janssens 1995, 80–81, 141.


151 Johnstone 1942, 225–228.

152 Isiah Bowman, geographer and President of the Johns Hopkins University was elected to serve as the chairman of the TS. He had no particular expertise related to Japan. Iokibe 2005, 55, 60.
their own way of governance as long as basic human rights would have been guaranteed.153

The competition and compromises between the two remaining proposed policies eventually formed the nucleus of the planning process. The reformistic intervention policy endeavored, according the principles of unconditional surrender, to make Japan powerless. Implementation of this policy model would demand a long-lasting occupation and it emphasized the change from inside. The misleading way of thinking needed to be changed and this was to be achieved through education. Direct US intervention was considered to be necessary. All the elements which had enabled the aggressive foreign policy needed to be changed from the constitution to the social system. Similarly, the policy aiming at the creation of the democratic and peaceful nation needed to be adopted. This meant that the goal was to set up a republic model of governance and that the Imperial family as a symbol of the old order need to be displaced. IOKIBE places positive guidance between reformistic and careful intervention. In strict definition this policy line contained only Borton and stressed a liberal reform under the cloak of the emperor. His line differed from that of Blakeslee, for example, in his criticism of certain parts of the Meiji Constitution, but they both believed in the usefulness of the emperor system in the rebuilding process. 154 These contradictory approaches formed the framework in which the policies concerning Japanese conservative parties and politicians were formulated.

The roots of the occupation planning and the final occupation policy can be found from the academic and diplomatic circles of the 1930s. Both the Japan Hand and the China Hand had their prophets who published their epistles before or during the war. The father-figure of the Japan Hand, Ambassador Grew, influenced policy-making on many different levels. Not only was he a State Department official, but also a well-known public speaker155 and author. Ambassador Grew’s agenda for postwar Japan becomes understandable when taking a glance into his book originally published in 1944 and based on his diaries and private and official papers from the 1930s. For Grew diplomacy was a matter of personal relationships156 and he had close contacts with men affiliated with the imperial family. Prince Saionji Kinmochi (西園寺公望), some other nobles, including Prince Konoe Fumimaro, and even the emperor were counted as liberal

156 Hellegers 2001a, 88.
and pacifistic forces in Japan by Grew. Count Makino Nobuaki (牧野伸顕), however, was unquestionably the man he praised most. In occupation literature Makino is most often mentioned as Father-in-Law for Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (吉田茂). Extracts from Grew’s book Ten Years in Japan prove that he did not lose his belief in these men’s intention and aspiration to guide Japan into peaceful solutions.157

According to Howard B. SCHONBERGER, Grew carefully selected and edited material which balanced the ruthlessness and brutality of the Japanese military with the alleged basic child-like goodness of the Japanese people who loved and were loyal to the emperor. Thus the book—later consulted as a valuable source by the occupation authorities158—was clearly meant to help lay the groundwork for an American deal with the moderates including the emperor.159

Grew was also ready to act as the guarantor of the Japanese moderates and he wrote: “in the heat and prejudice of war some will deny that there can be any good elements among the Japanese people. Yet those critics, in all likelihood, will not have known personally and directly those Japanese who were bitterly opposed to war with the United States—men who courageously but futilely gave all that was in them and ran the gravest dangers of imprisonment if not assassination—indeed several were assassinated—in their efforts to stem the tide or, let us say, to halt the tidal wave of insane military megalomania and expansionist ambition.”160

Grew’s ideas also gained support among the scholars of Japanese history and politics. Kenneth W. Colegrove was the most noticeable of the academics sharing, not only the belief in the pendulum theory i.e. belief that after the cycle of nationalistic anti-foreign sentiments in the 1930s, the pendulum would eventually swing back towards the international cooperativism as it had done before161, but also a similar social network with Grew. For Colegrove, the real champions of the Japanese democracy were Count Makino, Prince Saionji and Matsudaira Tsuneo (松平恒雄), but he also made positively toned observations on such postwar political figures as Saitō Takao (斎藤隆夫), Shidehara Kijūrō (幣原喜重郎) and Yoshida Shigeru (吉田茂) in his prewar writings.162

158 Hellegers 2001b, 737.
160 Grew 1973, xi.
The main critics of Grew and the chief educators of the China Hands were Owen Lattimore and Andrew Roth. Lattimore’s critique in 1945 focused on the treatment of the holy cows of the emperor and the so-called “old-school-kimono liberals” whose real role and status had been misunderstood. Lattimore attacked the relationship between these groups and predatory militarism and big business. According to Lattimore, it was necessary to expect the new Japanese leadership to be left of center, and at least liberal enough to be friendly with Russia. A few years later Lattimore was named as a prime example of communist infiltration into the higher policy-making levels of the United States Government in a G-2 intelligence report. According to the same report, Lattimore had been training and grooming so-called “Far-Eastern Experts” and managed to placed them in many key positions in government. Andrew Roth shared the critical attitude toward Grew and the policy he represented. Roth’s Dilemma in Japan was first published in September 1945 and it strongly attacked against the use of Japan as a bulwark against communism. Alike, he warned of the conservatives who were trying to prevent the actual reforms. Roth’s criticism was aimed against the Japan Hands and against the Japanese groups they called moderates.

One typical feature of the Japan Hands was their concept of Japanese history. They emphasized an abnormality of the decade preceding the war. Japan had been on route toward a democratic society until the beginning of the 1930s, when extremists took charge and displaced Japan’s pro-western liberal forces. Until then, Japan had cooperated with the Western powers and developed toward a democratic state system. According to the Japan Hands, the situation in Japan could be fixed if Japan’s old moderates assisted in expunging the heritage of the extremists. This concept is introduced in a number of researches papers usually by referring to some of the several memorandums written by Borton. The same interpretation can also be found from the pages of the Civil Affairs Handbooks. For example, in a Handbook concentrating on government and administration, it was stated that: “Nevertheless, the Constitution was sufficiently flexible to admit of a growing tendency in the direction of parliamentary government in the western sense. At its height parliamentary influence, allied with a considerable body of public opinion and aided by dissension in the ranks of its opponents,

163 Lattimore 1945, 29, 46–47, 190.
achieved the ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 in opposition to the wishes of the Naval General Staff and of ultra-nationalist faction in the Privy Council.167

The strength of this construction of history is underlined by the fact that it did not disappear, but continued almost without change even after the war. According to SCHONBERGER, the view of history emphasizing extremism of the 1930s as an aberration in the historical development has also continued in the works of scholars who were trained for wartime intelligence or participation in the occupation.168 IRIYE for his part states that the principles that guided the State Department’s thinking throughout the war were the ones supporting the reconstruction of Japan and the US-Japan relations in a framework of the 1920s internationalism.169

In other words, the Japan Hands looked to the moderate elements of prewar Japan. But the Japan Hands’ plans did not indicate that former Japanese political parties and their leaders were seen as moderates. Grew and Dooman had spent years in Japan witnessing the transformation of the Japanese course. They had had close contacts and had been influenced by circles close to the imperial family. It was these Japanese men whom Grew and Dooman refered to when they talked about the moderates capable of helping in Japan’s rebuilding process.170 DOWER emphasizes Yoshida Shigeru’s role as an informant with great influence on Grew’s view of Japan and belief in the existence of “other Japanese”. Yoshida himself was associated with well-placed individuals gathered around the elite Tokyo Club. It is noteworthy that there is a great similarity between Yoshida’s contacts in Tokyo Club and lists of Japanese moderates made by occupation planners.171 Likewise, John K. Emmerson argued on behalf of the circles close to the emperor who had opposed militarism on January 1942. According to IRIYE, Emmerson, although speaking of new leaders, had in his mind leaders of the 1920s expected to lead the post-war Japan.172

168 Schönberger 1992, 3.
170 See for example: Grew 1973, 27, 32–33, 206.
However, long before Grew and Dooman re-gained power inside the State Department, the Blakeslee-Borton axle was at work with a very similar view of history as its guiding principle. The work-distribution between Blakeslee and Borton was such that Blakeslee wrote papers on the more general aims and objectives whereas Borton concentrated on political questions including the constitution, the emperor and political parties. MAYO explains Borton’s interpretation of history and tendency to contrast the good Taishō 1920s with the bad Shōwa 1930s through Borton’s subjective experiences in Japan during 1930. At that time Borton had performed his research on contemporary Japan and its political system. It is easy to agree with this interpretation. There are unarguable and distinctive similarities between the planning documents and Borton’s book called Japan since 1931 that was published in 1940. In his book published in 1940, Borton expressed his views of the dubious prewar connections between Japan’s political parties and the zaibatsu, the character of certain Japanese politicians, and the general development in Japan as a whole. A few years later he repeated his unchanged opinions, but now in a new role: he was no longer an observer, but a generator of vital policies for postwar Japan.

It is, however, important to notice that Borton was not the only scholar sharing these views. When studying the literature that was referred to by the planners of the occupation, JANSSENS has come to the conclusion that there were three views on political parties to be found. All of them, however, shared the idea that the parties lost their influence on the militarists during the 1930s. According to JANSSENS, Otto D. Tolischus saw the 1920s as the heyday of democracy in Japan under leadership of the political parties. According to this interpretation, the militarists were pushed too far in the domestic and international reforms and thus took over. Charles B. Fahs and Harold S. Quigley had emphasized the unpopularity of the political parties. According to them, politicians accepted huge sums of money, especially from the industrialists and people thought they represented more the interest of trade and industry than those of the average citizen. Robert K. Reischauer presented the third view. According to him, the 1920s were not as democratic or liberal as people like Tolischus.

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maintained. This view maintains that while the parties were in power, the militarists already played a crucial role.175

Borton’s memorandums on 1943 contained concrete lists of Japanese leaders considered suitable. The former conservative party leaders were not included in these lists. Instead, Borton demonstrated his believe in the existence of the moderate elements in July 1943, when he described important political development in Japan at the pages of TS memorandum. Few months later he repeated his view in T 381 memorandum. In this document Borton evaluates the moderate inclinations of the former Japanese Prime Ministers. Judgment is harsh, and only Wakatsuki Reijirō, who resigned in 1931 following the invasion of Manchuria, is considered to have been consistent in his opposition to the military. Former Foreign Minister General Ugaki Kazushige (宇垣一成) is repeatedly mentioned as a moderate statesman who suffered because of his courage to go against the politics of the extremist. His old age is recognized as a problem, but it is estimated that he could lead as liberal government as any of the more moderate civilians. The same was true, though to a lesser extent, in the case of Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa.176

Borton believed, however, that the real moderates and persons who consistently opposed the military clique were to be found among the group of intimate advisers to the emperor. He mentioned Marquis Kido Kōichi (木戸幸一), who since 1940 worked as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and Matsudaira Tsuneo, the Minister of the Imperial Household, as the most outstanding figures among this group.177 This interpretation is nothing new. These men enjoyed the reputation of being the leading pro-Anglo-Americans in Japan already before the war had broken out.178

Among the Japanese parliamentarians, one figure seemed to be head and shoulders above the others. Ozaki Yukio (尾崎行雄)179, a politician without any party affiliation, was hailed as Japan’s greatest parliamentarian. Ozaki was the only parliamentarian repeatedly mentioned by name.180 However, as Joseph

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177 PS, T 366, September 27, 1943, 18. OJUSPD 1-B-28(2).
178 Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, March 28, 1941. FRUS 1941, 113–117.
179 Ozaki had been elected to the House of Representatives in every election since the establishment of the Diet in 1890. Shillony 1981, 19–20.
180 PS, T 366, September 27, 1943, 14. OJUSPD 1-B-28(2).
Grew’s letter from August 1944 shows, he did not share the belief in Ozaki’s capability to occupy a place of power in postwar Japan. This was due to Ozaki’s, his old friend’s, high age and poor condition.181

Most of the former party leaders were not highly ranked in these early estimations. On the contrary, the situation existing prior to the dissolution of political parties in the summer of 1940 was described in a July 1943 report as: “Led by men of mediocre ability, of even less vision, many of them openly corrupt, and unable to win the confidence of the people, the political parties have been a questionable influence in recent years.”182 At the same occasion it was remarked that the Minseitō and the Seiyūkai had been successful in the 1937 elections, but still had not taken any actions against the military’s policy of aggression.183

Nonetheless, there were party politicians who were looked upon as moderates and challengers to military rule. Hamaguchi Osachi, the former Prime Minister and the Minseitō president, and Inukai Tsuyoshi, another former Prime Minister and the Seiyūkai president, were considered strong political figures because they opposed Japan’s militarism. Hamaguchi’s government had adopted conciliatory policy toward China and supported the London Naval Treaty in 1930 despite the opposition of the Navy, the Privy Council and the Seiyūkai Diet members. According to the report, the Minseitō had traditionally been more moderate and more opposed to expansionism than the Seiyūkai. Inukai had fought against militarism and the influence of his predecessor General Tanaka Giichi (田中儀一) inside his own party. Both these politicians were active during the 1920s and early 1930s. They were also martyrs of the democratic movement because they were assassinated by extremists.184

The early occupation planners estimated the potential sources for new moderate leaders of Japan. The intelligentsia, composed of professors from Imperial universities, younger bureaucrats from the Foreign Ministry, former Foreign Service Officers, and representatives of the judiciary, was mentioned as a potential source for new leaders for non-militaristic Japan. The future political role of the business leaders linked with the zaibatsu was seen as questionable.185 It is evident that America’s Japan specialists were searching for Japan’s future leaders from the surroundings the specialist themselves had been most affiliated

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182 PS, T 358, July 28, 1943, 10. OJUSPD 1-B-23.
183 Ibidem.
184 PS, T 381, September, 1943, 12–13. OJUSPD 1-B-28(2).
185 PS, T 381, September, 1943, 19. OJUSPD 1-B-28(2).
with during the prewar era. Planners thus pictured that their own Japanese counterparts, scholars and diplomats, would govern postwar Japan. It is noteworthy that no one participating in the occupation planning, except the US President as the final decision-maker, gained his mandate through popular election. Thus the Japanese party politicians had no counterparts among them.

Borton was skeptical of issues regarding the popular participation and the attitude of the Japanese masses toward the possible political reforms. He considered that because of the limited experience in participation in the political decision-making process, Japanese masses would turn out to be incapable of making intelligent decisions concerning themselves. Because of the former control and regimentation, Japanese people were estimated to be more acquiescent to orders of the authorities than ever before. Estimation led to an approach which suggested that the postwar reforms might have to be instigated by the authorities who would then educate the common people.\textsuperscript{186} In other words, the old elite, considered as liberal and pro-Anglo-American, would return to its pre-militaristic era status with help from the occupiers’ side. It would be this elite’s time-consuming task to educate the masses to understand the principles of democracy.

The Territorial Subcommittee members discussed the preferred means for achieving political aims. Blakeslee and Ballantine promoted a policy of minimal interference in the natural development of Japan’s internal politics. Democratic government was to be established by Japanese moderates. Americans should not try to manipulate or impose on the moderates’ agenda and actions.\textsuperscript{187} In other words, the details were to be left to the Japanese. The occupiers should only indicate the ultimate objectives and suggest the general framework within which the desired reforms should take place.

The views of Japan’s prewar conservative parties and politicians were not only created by repeatedly raising up suspicious and unfavorable details. Another method was the filtering out of the information that might complicate the coherent view. Ben-Ami SHILLONY’s story of Japan’s political development is much more complex than the one found in the official documents. SHILLONY introduces many groups and individuals who were unwilling to follow the lead of the militarists.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{186} PS, T 381, September, 1943, 20, 24–25, 27. OJUSPD 1-B-28(2).
\textsuperscript{187} DOS, Division of Political Studies, T Minutes 53, July 30, 1943. OJUSPD 1-C-3; DOS, Division of Political Studies, T Minutes 54, October 22, 1943. OJUSPD 1-C-4.
\textsuperscript{188} Shillony 1981, passim.
The Diet Members’ Imperial Assistance League was organized in September 1941 under the auspices of the IRAA. Although seventy per cent of the members in the House of Representatives joined this Assistance League, there were certain groups of Diet men who did not. Of the groups who did not, the biggest was the Dōkōkai (Association of the Like-Minded) led by Hatoyama Ichirō (鳩山一郎), the former leader of the Kuhara Fusanosuke branch of the prewar Seiyūkai. According to SHILLONY, most of the thirty-seven members, including Kita Reikichi (北昤吉), Inukai Ken (犬養健), Katayama Tetsu (片山哲), Ashida Hitoshi (芦田均), Ōno Banboku (大野伴睦) and Ozaki Yukio, were known for their moderate and liberal inclinations. It is interesting to find out how differently the occupation authorities evaluated the background of these men after the war. Most of them eventually belonged to the leadership of the early postwar conservative parties.

Besides the Dōkōkai, the other groups who did not join the Assistance League included the League for Strengthening Asia, the Diet members club, and the Comrades Club. These latter groups included many former members of the Social Mass Party (社会大衆党, Shakai Taishūtō). Many of the members of the Dōkōkai and these latter groups competed as non-recommended candidates in the 1942 elections. Two of these un-recommended candidates and members of the Dōkōkai, Ozaki and Ashida, were even arrested during the election campaign. Eventually only nine members of the Dōkōkai were re-elected, among them Ozaki, Ashida and Inukai, who had been questioned for alleged indiscretions.

Why did the occupation planners forget these opposition movements led by former party politicians? Why did the planners only put Ozaki on the pedestal for parliamentarians ready to fight against the extremists’ rule? The obvious explanation is obliviousness. It might have been possible that the planners were simply unaware of other politicians’ efforts. But this was not the case.

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189 Yokusan giin dōmei, 翼賛議員同盟.
190 There had been a factional competition inside the pre-war Seiyūkai between the group led by Nakajima Chikuhei and a group of Kuhara Fusanosuke and Hatoyama. Colton 1948, 941.
191 Although the given name is read as Takeru, GHQ/SCAP documents always refer to him with the forename Ken that is another reading for the same character. For the sake of clarity, this dissertation also refers to him with this reading.
193 Katayama Tetsu was an exception because he joined into the Socialist Party.
194 Kita Giin Dōmei, 興亜議員同盟.
195 Dōnin Kurabu, 同人クラブ.
196 Shillony 1981, 20, 22.
In an April 1941 report, Ambassador Grew mentions the establishment of a fascist party called Tōhōkai\textsuperscript{197} that protested against IRAA’s failure to become a totalitarian party. This same document also contains information concerning other political activity. For instance, Grew’s report cites that the Diet members club was planned to be led by Prince Konoe; that a group of former members of the old Minseitō and Seiyūkai called the Imperial Hotel Club\textsuperscript{198} opposed extending political power to the IRAA; and that the Chuotei\textsuperscript{199} group was made up of former party leaders who openly opposed the appropriations to the IRAA. However, only the Tōhōkai made its way into the PS documents. It is noteworthy that Grew, who transmitted this information, did not show any enthusiasm because of these developments.\textsuperscript{200}

Between April and August 1941, there was an increase in information concerning the active political groupings under the new framework. This increase can be seen in a mimeographed publication of the Military Intelligence Division (MID) of War Department General Staff that was communicated to the State Department’s Adviser on Political Relations on October 7, 1941. According to this publication, Japan’s Diet appeared to be divided into three groups: the military elements in favor of the “new order”; the orthodox nationalistic group made up of the Konoe Cabinet’s supporters, who in general formerly represented the Minseitō and some parts of the Seiyūkai; and, most interestingly, a liberal group composed of a few well-known liberals and former members of the Kuhara faction of the Seiyūkai.\textsuperscript{201} This publication’s observations differ from many traditional views. Not only does this publication claim that there were active liberal politicians, but that they came from the old Seiyūkai, which traditionally was considered the less moderate of the two major parties. In any case, there is not a trace of these observations in future TS documents.

Why did Borton happen to forget Saitō Takao, who was expelled\textsuperscript{202} from the Diet in March 1940 because of his critical stance toward Japan’s China policy?

\textsuperscript{198} Name refers most likely to 帝国ホテル.
\textsuperscript{199} Official Japanese name not known.
\textsuperscript{200} Memorandum, To the Secretary of State, from Tokyo, April 24, 1941. NDL, SIJ-2, reel 1, 894.00/1039.
\textsuperscript{201} Japan, Political Estimate, August 20, 1941. NDL, SIJ-2, reel 1, 894.00/1132.
\textsuperscript{202} Earl H. Kinmonth has introduced the expulsion of Saitō Takao in detail. According to him, Saitō was not unambiguously pacifist or anti-militarist, and in the speech that led to his expulsion he did not criticize military, but the lack of direction being shown in its usage. Moreover, he has emphasized the role of the Socialist as a active exponents of the expulsion. Kinmonth 1999, 345–346.
This issue is another example of the method of intentional oversimplification. Saitō’s expulsion was well-known during the time that the TS documents were written. Grew reported on Saitō’s expulsion; the MID report mentioned it; and even Borton himself had introduced the case in his book published in 1940.\textsuperscript{203} According to Earl H. KINMOUTH, the Saitō case was forgotten for many reasons. Postwar socialists wanted to forget this event because many of their leaders actively supported the expulsion. Some distinguished postwar historians did not bring up the case because Saitō’s actions did not fit their models of the Japanese people as the misled and deceived victims of militarists.\textsuperscript{204} I would like to add the occupation planners to the list of the parties who were willing to forget Saitō’s controversial expulsion. It is uncertain whether the planners knew that the parliament members who voted openly against the expulsion came from the conservative parties.\textsuperscript{205} In any case, the most logical reason for the planners’ failure to recall Saitō seems to be their desire to keep a simple picture of the conservative party men. But this blotting out of the Saitō case did not succeed perfectly. In fact, one’s voting behavior in this case even became a kind of benchmark during the occupation for determining whether individual prewar politicians had been liberal\textsuperscript{206}.

The IRAA elections were also reported unilaterally. Borton’s report in 1943 reveals the number of the recommended candidates who were elected. His report remarks that the former presidents of the Minseitō and the Seiyūkai, Machida Chūji (町田忠治) and Nakajima Chikuhei, who after Japan’s surrender became active and received the occupiers’ attention, were IRAPS advisers.\textsuperscript{207} Yet, the occupation planners showed no interest in successful non-recommended candidates. It is true that I have been unable to find any document that clearly states the name of the Dōkōkai. In October 1945, it was admitted that little was known about the campaigns of the dissident candidates in the 1942 elections.\textsuperscript{208} However, it is clear that the early planners, especially Borton, knew about the

\textsuperscript{203} See for example: Joseph C. Grew to the Secretary of State, March 27, 1940. NDL, SIJ-2, reel 2, 894.00 P.R./147; Japan, Political Estimate, August 20, 1941. NDL, SIJ-2, reel 1, 894.00/1132; Borton 1940, 120.
\textsuperscript{204} Kinmonth 1999, 346–349.
\textsuperscript{205} Complete voting behavior: Kinmonth 1999, 343.
\textsuperscript{206} Besides voting behavior in Saitō case, the endorsement by Tōjō in the 1942 campaign was another touchstone according to which Japanese prewar and wartime politicians were judged. Wildes 1954, 116.
\textsuperscript{207} PS, T 358, July 28, 1943, 24. OJUSPD 1-B-23.
opposition movements led by the former party politicians. Still, it was decided not to mention these opposition movements and their leaders in reports and memorandums. This omission indicates an unwillingness to break with the completely negative image of prewar conservative parties and politicians. This antipathy toward the conservative parties can also explain why Ozaki, who had never been affiliated with any political party, was celebrated as the real champion of Japan’s parliamentary democracy.

2.2 Basic policy documents reflecting conservatives’ past and future

Era of Japan hands domination

Plans for occupied Japan began to take more concrete form in early 1944 with general policies created under the auspices of the Postwar Programs Committee (PWC). Reorganization at the State Department shifted the balance between the Japan Hands and the China Hands. Unsatisfied subordinates succeeded to convince Secretary Hull to remove Hornbeck from the leadership of the newly established Office of Far Eastern Affairs (FE). This move had an effect on the State Department’s China policy, but it also allowed Grew to take charge in FE. At the same time Japan Hands like Dooman, Fearey and Dickover occupied the key positions in recently created IDACFE.209

Before this nomination Grew had toured around the continent helping in OWI’s campaign against unfounded optimism of the American people toward defeating Japan and attacked the Japanese military machine in his speeches. However, the tone of his public speeches began to turn toward the line of the earlier off-the-record comments during the second half of 1943. He began to emphasize the importance of the emergence of “liberal elements” and at the end of 1943 Grew openly defended the emperor differentiating this institution from the military regime. The shift in Grew’s public policy elicited angry criticism among the left-wing progressives and among the Christian groups interested in Japan. Nevertheless, the State Department was now in charge of policy-makers stressing, for example, Japan’s economic importance and the Pacific as an American sphere of influence.210

The planning for postwar Japan was also activated inside the War Department. During its first eight months, the War Department’s Civil Affairs Division (CAD) was busy with problems related to North Africa and Europe. Japan began to take a bigger role in January 1944 onwards. Theodore Cohen stresses the influence of CAD and its leader Major General John F. Hilldring. According to Cohen, State Department Foreign Service officers were incapable of turning out policy over the range of fields and in the detail required. Thus, Hilldring became more independent in his attempt to build up a coherent and consistent policy plan.\(^{211}\)

Hilldring had asked Charlottesville to draw up a draft directive that might serve as the basis for future planning for the occupation of Japan already in July 1943. The draft that was composed without guidance from either War or State Departments was, however, only a general statement following the existing comprehension of the nature of the military occupation. It did not contain any modifications that would have taken into consideration the circumstances related to Japan.\(^{212}\) The CAD and the OAS approached the State Department on February 18, 1944. The two agencies were dissatisfied with the State Department’s earlier performance\(^{213}\) and submitted a set of questions to the IDACFE to be answered before any long-term policy plans were made. These questions followed the lines of the OSS, R&A 1343\(^{214}\) document prepared in November 1943 and forced the IDACFE to show what it really intended. Questions dealing with the political parties were: “\(e.\) Are there any political agencies or political parties of enemy country with whom we can deal to assist in the restoration of essential authority in Japan and in its subsequent administration? \(f.\) Are there any political parties, organizations or groups in enemy country that should be dissolved? If so, which ones?”\(^{215}\)

I believe that these questions and the given answers were an outcome of earlier planning, not the beginning of planning, as suggested by FUKUNAGA. I am, in other words, emphasizing the importance of understanding the longevity of the policy concerning the political parties and its early roots. However, I agree with FUKUNAGA’s conclusion that the later policy plans concerning political

\(^{211}\) Cohen 1987, 14–17.

\(^{212}\) Hellegers 2001a, 163.


\(^{214}\) See: OSS, R&A (#1343), Agenda of Research Requirements for Civil Affairs Administration of Japan, November 19, 1943. OJUSPD 3-A-40.

parties dealt mainly with the dissolution of wartime organizations and were made from the standpoint of demilitarization rather than democratization. Namely, the answers given in spring 1944 concerning the policy regarding the Japanese political parties centered around the removal of ultra-nationalistic and militaristic political organizations. According to the CAC-111 from March 15 and its preliminary version made a few days earlier, there was no political party or agency in Japan at that moment that should be preserved for the postwar period. The IRAA and the IRAPS were mentioned as the only existing political parties and they were considered as subjects for dissolution. The window for reconsideration in the case of the new emerging organization was left open but the weakly organized groups in the Japanese House of Peers were judged to be more like clubs than political parties. Furthermore, these answers were attached with a warning that the military administration should be careful to avoid identification with individuals closely associated to the formulation or the execution of the policies of Japan’s militaristic rulers. The State Department’s answers were a disappointment in the War and Navy because of their incompleteness and ambiguous nature. Furthermore, CAD’s main interest returned to Europe during the second half of year 1944.

The IDACFE plans drafted for the consideration of PWC in 1944 were written within a few weeks of similar papers for Germany. Plans concerning the treatment of postwar Germany were, on the other hand, influenced by a major split between the opinions of State Department and Treasury Department. Henry J. Morgenthau’s Treasury Department was involved in the postwar planning by insisting, for example, the total elimination of German industry. Despite the collisions in various subjects between the Departments, the State Department’s approach concerning the denazification program came rather close with Morgenthau’s views. Arrests of the leaders, dissolution of the Nazi Party and its affiliates, removal and exclusion of Nazis from office, amendment of laws, and control of communication and education belonged in both Departments’ plans. The first specific stipulations regarding the liquidation of the Nazi Party were

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216 Documents that are answering to these questions can be found both from the OJUSPD collection and from FRUS 1944, vol. V. This study refers to the broader OJUSPD collection.
219 Hellegers 2001a, 191.
220 The so-called Morgenthau Plan called for destruction of centralized state power, direct military rule, a zonal occupation and the dismantling of heavy industry. Takemae 2003, 212.
made already before Quebec. This initiative was rejected by President Roosevelt who found it too soft and permissive. Discussions on the nature of the denazification continued at the highest level at Yalta in February 1945 and finally at Potsdam in July 1945. 221 Although Morgenthau’s extreme principles had a much smaller role in the planning of the occupation of Japan than of the occupation Germany, 222, the harsh plans for the post-conflict treatment of the Nazi Party did not promise any relief for the Japanese conservatives. This especially concerned the members the IRAA that was the closest Japanese equivalent to the Nazi Party.

The OSS’ direct influence remained limited in the course of the planning. However, the OSS publications transmitted a message to the future occupiers. Therefore, the content of the OSS studies was not meaningless. The strategic survey of Japan from February 1942 mentioned the Minseitō and the Seiyūkai as Japan’s strongest prewar parties. Yet they were described as vague on political principles and not easily distinguishable. 223 This skepticism was put in more detailed form in the Civil Affairs Handbook 224 in January 1945. According to this handbook, there had been a period of more moderate development after World War I during which the political parties became stronger. However, the old parties, most notably the Seiyūkai and the Minseitō, shouldered part of the responsibility for the failure of Japan’s democracy. This was because their politicians’ poor performance played into the hands of Japan’s military elements. The former conservative parties were criticized for their inadequacy and described as weak and corrupted collections of different economic interests gathered around persons instead of principles. The party politicians were described as persons who sought only for their own good. Yet, the prewar constitution was found sufficiently flexible to admit the growing trend in the direction of parliamentary government and it had not blocked the evolution toward a popularly-controlled parliamentary government. The Handbook did not introduce many persons by name, but Ugaki Kazushige was again presented as an example of a political leader conflicting

221 Plischke 1984, 201–205.
224 Handbooks did not deal with plans or policies and they did not imply any official program of action. They were more like reference source books that contained the basic information needed for planning and policy-making. The part dealing with government and administration also contained chapters related to political parties and other influential political groups.
with the military. Instead, it was further warned in April 1945 that it would be extraordinarily hard to recognize the personnel who should be removed because, unlike the situation in Germany, no comprehensive criteria of political undesirability existed in Japan. The difficulties of determining those who would be reliable, willing, and competent to assist the occupation authorities were approximated to be even greater.

In other words, the former conservative parties and politicians did clearly not represent the elements which the OSS wanted to be found from postwar Japan. On the contrary, in the eyes of the OSS officials these groups contained persons who should be prevented from playing any major political role in the future. The Research and Analysis Branch kept working also in 1945 when the final versions of the surrender terms and the US initial post-defeat policies for Japan were created. Still in mid-May an OSS report introduced all the methods from the no-intervention policy to the encouragement of the social revolution as a possible policy options. Thus, when the drafting of the concrete plan was culminating, the OSS was still discussing principles that were no longer realistic options.

IRIYE concludes that the State Department planners’ suggestions at the end of 1944 assumed that there were liberal forces with whom to cooperate after the war. However, nothing indicates that the negative attitude toward the former conservative party politicians changed in the State Department or in the OSS. Instead, the old view according to which the prewar conservative parties and politicians were undesirable elements was included in policy proposals of CAC and PWC and transferred into the War and Navy Departments. These departments were in charge when the final plans for the occupation were created.

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229 Due to the differences in opinion between the State Department’s Japan hands dominating in IDACFE and Department’s economist, only a few of the papers dealt with economic matters. Economist of the newly created Economic Division who argued on behalf of the economic decentralization disagreed with the Japan Hands, who emphasized the uniqueness of the Japanese economy and considered the zaibatsu as friends of the United States. The economists lacked expertise concerning Japan and, thus, Eleanor M. Hadley was borrowed from the OSS Research and Analysis Branch to write documents related to zaibatsu. Eventually the economic and financial aspects of the occupation of Japan were to undergo severe re-writing during the last year of planning. Hadley 1984, 138–139.
Last minute changes had no effect on policy concerning the conservative parties

Another set of institutional changes occurred during the war’s final year as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was created to coordinate occupation planning. In November 1944, long-time secretary of state, Cordell Hull, retired and was succeeded by Edward R. Stettinius, who appointed Grew as under-secretary of state. On April 12, 1945, Harry S. Truman succeeded the deceased President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had led the US foreign policy as his personal matter. In July 1945, James F. Byrnes, an advocate of a tough peace and an affiliate of the China Hands, took the lead in the State Department. Competition among different interests was severe and new approaches challenged old policy papers. Eventually the final decisions were made inside the War Department, with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy acting as the prime decision-maker. This complex process culminated in three key documents that set the course for the occupation: the Potsdam Declaration, the US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC-150/4), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS-1380/15). Although these documents reconsidered the basic structure and aims of the occupation, they did not question prior evaluations of Japan’s prewar conservative party politicians and the expectations regarding their postwar activities. They would not play a significant role in Japan’s postwar recovery.

Changes took place also in Japan. Koiso Kuniaki’s government resigned on April 5, 1945. Ten days later the Kempeitai, Japan’s military police, arrested Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida was predicting Japan’s defeat and advocated a diplomatic solution. A number of like-minded persons had gathered around him and the group was known to the police by the code name YOHANSEN, an abbreviation for Yoshida Hansen (Yoshida Anti-War).

According to Dean Acheson, President Roosevelt’s virtual exclusion of Secretary Hull from high-policy decisions during the war could explain why the State Department, detached from the practicalities of current problems and power relationships, was lacking concreteness in its plans and became absorbed in platonic planning of utopia. Acheson 1987, 88.


According to Janssens, the major topics that were discussed were the economic policy and the structure of military government. Janssens 1995, 341.

Dower 1979, 227.
Captain Ellis M. Zacharias—one of the architects of the Naval Intelligence operational plan for psychological warfare against Japan that was built on the belief that it was possible to maneuver Japanese leaders of the past back into power, men whose views on advancing Japan’s position in the world differed from those of the wartime leadership—interpreted the installation of Admiral Suzuki Kantarō to the premiership as a subtle sign that Japan was looking for a way out from the war\footnote{Detailed description on Zacharias’ initiatives, see: Hellegers 2001a, 71–78.}, these developments did not have a major effect on the course of the planning.

The US War Department consulted the State Department in April 1945 asking for a policy statement on Japan to be able to form general orders and military statements. The State Department supplied the SWNCC’s subcommittee on the Far East (SFE) with a summary that, with few minor changes, became the United States initial post-defeat policy relating to Japan (SWNCC 150) in early June\footnote{Janssens 1995, 348–352.}. The part dealing with political matters drew heavily from the former PWC papers. It suggested a three-phased postwar treatment of Japan\footnote{It was stated that in order to achieve general objectives the policies of the United States should be considered separately for three successive periods of Japan’s post-war development. First the terms of surrender would be enforced by military government. The second period would be one of close surveillance. The third period would look more towards the ultimate goal of Japan returning into the family of peaceful nations. This view was introduced already in PWC/CAC papers. See for example; PWC-108b/CAC-116b, Memorandum Prepared by IDACFE, May 4, 1944. FRUS 1944, vol. V, 1235. See also: Iokibe 2005, 70.} and repeated objectives of limited, direct, and predominantly American occupation. The text included only two renewals. The emphasis was laid on the permanent disarmament and more importantly, to the suspension of flagrant exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. The part dealing with the economic issues was remodelled to be much more interventionist and reform-minded in the hands of the New Deal economist\footnote{Former Office of Strategic Services Japan expert Edwin Martin was first named as head of PWC’s economic section and eventually he was the key figure in transforming the State Department policy into a radical economic reform for Japan. Martin authored the economic reform section of SWNCC 150/4. Nester 1996, 193.}. SWNCC 150 was the footing for the military planners who prepared the basic directive on military government\footnote{Mayo 1984, 38–42.}.

The Potsdam Declaration, issued on July 26, 1945, was a result of armwrestling between different visions for postwar Japan. While Dooman wrote a draft of public statement for the Japanese\footnote{Draft of Proposed Statement, 5/45, 3–4. OJUSPD 5-A-25.} at the request of Grew, the War
Department drafted its own version and submitted it to President Truman in late June. There was a vivid conversation going on within the State Department, concerning the future status of the emperor and the message that was to be sent about his future position. However, despite Grew’s various efforts to persuade President Truman to make a public announcement concerning the surrender terms, Truman refrained from making any decision before he would have met Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Generalissimo Joseph Stalin in Potsdam. The proclamation generally followed the points of SWNCC-150 that reflected the ideas of the Japan Hand but the proposed version was still made by the officers of the Army General Staff. Eventually the content of the document was still to be changed after the last minute proposals made by the British officials.

The Potsdam Declaration, atomic bombs, and the surrender of Japan led the way to the last rewriting of the general occupation policies between August 14 and August 22. The document that emerged was SWNCC 150/3, a compromise between the views of Japan Hands and their opponents. Once again the biggest changes were made in parts dealing with the economic aspects of the occupation. Changes in direct relation to the status of political parties and politicians were minimal. This version of draft policy statement was delivered to MacArthur along with a copy of the draft military directive. In explicit follow-up terminology of the draft directive, SCAP was told that the occupation would be an indirect one.

The SFE summary had envisaged an initial period of direct rule by military government, but as a result of British amendments, the Potsdam Declaration had implied that existing governmental institutions might implement the Allied policy. On August 1, John Balfour, the British charge in Washington, wrote to the State Department suggesting that it would be preferable for the Allies to work through a Japanese administration. In a memorandum to Grew dated August 6, Joseph Ballantine, the Far Eastern Affairs Division Chief, discussed the contradiction between the complete control by the Allies, as supposed by SWNCC-150/1, and the supervisory role implicit in the modified Potsdam text. He suggested a scenario where, circumstances permitting, the Japanese administrative structure would be used to the fullest extent. All policies would, however, be decided by the Supreme Commander. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had approached

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240 According Hellegers, the Potsdam Declaration closely tracked the draft prepared by the Department of War’s Colonels Charles Bonesteel, III, and James McCormack, Jr., and submitted to President Truman on July 2, 1945. Hellegers 2001a, 121.


Grew with similar ideas already before Ballantine.\textsuperscript{243} Generally Stimson agreed with the idea of Japan’s pre-1931 democratic character and believed in the existence of prominent liberal leaders.\textsuperscript{244} Although Stimson’s diary markings do not reveal any concrete names, there is no indication that he would have referred to any of the prewar party politician when revealing his trust on the existence of liberal elements.\textsuperscript{245} According to IOKIBE, Stimson had identified Shidehara Kijūrō, Wakatsuki Reijirō and Hamaguchi Osachi as prewar liberals when negotiating with Grew already at the end of May 1945. Stimson had formed his positive view of these men in 1930 during the London Naval Treaty negotiations\textsuperscript{246, 247}

When the State Department received notice of Japan’s conditional acceptance of the Potsdam terms on August 10, it finalized a draft Instrument of Surrender. On August 12, the SFE issued a modified version of its summary (SWNCC-150/2) as a first attempt to clarify the principle of indirect rule. Further changes were requested by President Truman. The notice of the unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam terms came on August 14 and planning reached its top-speed. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, SWNCC’s War Department representative, believed that legally the post-surrender policy statement would have to be harmonized with the letter and spirit of the Potsdam Declaration. On August 22, bypassing the SFE completely, McCloy on his own authority inserted the phrase ‘The Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor’, into a revised draft, which was adopted as SWNCC-150/3. The new compromise version retained the reformist vitality of the pro-China faction but acceded to the indirect occupation advocated by the pro-Japan faction.\textsuperscript{248} Thereafter, only minor alterations were made to the plan. General MacArthur received it in substance by radio on August 29. On August 31, SWNCC-150/4 was formalized, incorporating a few last-minute suggestions from the Joint Chief and other agencies, and on September 6, President Truman endorsed the text and forwarded a copy to

\textsuperscript{244} Schaller 1985, 11.
\textsuperscript{245} Diary of Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, July 2, 1945. OJUSPD 5-D-1.
\textsuperscript{246} During the Manchurian Incident Stimson had been in the State Department. Before that he had participated in London Naval Treaty Negotiations as the United States Representative plenipotentiary. Wakatsuki had been Japan’s representative in the negotiations, where as Hamaguchi had acted as Prime Minister and Shidehara as Foreign Minister. Iokibe 2005, 138.
\textsuperscript{247} Iokibe 2005, 137–142.
\textsuperscript{248} Mayo 1984, 44–45; Takemae 2003, 226.
General MacArthur. On 22 September, the White House publicly issued SWNCC-150/4/A as the directive ‘US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’.  

But what was eventually said in the Potsdam Declaration and the SWNCC-150/4/A about the treatment of the Japanese conservatives? The documents shared the premise that the democratic political parties belonged in Japan’s future. They advised encouragement of the democratic tendencies among the Japanese people and demanded the removal of all obstacles to democratization. Yet, the limits of party formation were bound by how the ambiguous term “democratic” was to be interpreted. These documents provided no clear definition of what a democratic party was, nor did they clearly identify any potential action models to be employed to reach that end. Finally, they strongly emphasized the need to exclude the elements responsible for Japan’s aggression, which clouded the future of Japan’s conservative politicians. The basic directives, in other words, obligated the occupation authorities to set up a political party system but did not determine which Japanese should be allowed to participate in it.

The last key policy paper that directed the course of the occupation was the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS-1380/15). This paper was issued in its final form on November 3, 1945. The JCS-1380/15, whose early version was sent to MacArthur by mid September of that year, differed substantially from the SWNCC’s Initial Post-Surrender Policy document. The JCS-1380/15 was a secret document that was more detailed than its predecessors. It represented the views of the China Hands, the military hardliners, and the New Dealers who together advocated giving even greater powers to the Supreme Commander than the Initial Post-Surrender Policy had ordered. The Basic directive, also known as ‘The Bible of the Occupation’ owed to its language and concepts that were used to the ‘US Basic Directive for Germany’ (JCS-1067) that, on its behalf, had utilized the extreme ideas of Secretary of Treasure Henry J. Morgenthau.

Despite the long-lasting effects of the JCS-1380, the document itself told its readers that it was not to formulate long-term policies. On the contrary, the directive underlined the importance of conducting surveys dealing with the

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249 Ibidem.
250 Documents can be found from: Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress. The Department of State. U.S.A. Publication 2671. Far Eastern Series 17. s.l.s.a., 53–55, 73–81. See the quotations at the beginning of the chapter. As also FUKUNAGA observes, there was no clear answer about what were, and what were not, features of democratic parties. See: Fukunaga 1997, 27.
251 Takemae 2003, 212–213, 228.
economic, industrial, financial, social and political conditions in Japan. Encouragement was once again given to the democratic political parties. Yet harsher and more concrete methods to control them were also included in the text, as the following quote suggests: “You will immediately place under control all existing political parties, organizations and societies. Those whose activities are consistent with the requirements of the military occupation and its objectives should be encouraged. Those whose activities are inconsistent with such requirements and objectives should be abolished.”252 This statement reflects a greater willingness to intervene in the party political developments than Blakeslee’s and Ballantine’s suggestion of minimal interference in internal politics or even the SWNCC 150/4’s encouragement of democratic parties. Also, consistency with the US policy replaced the democratic character as the measuring stick for political parties’ desirability. The JCS document reflects a more pessimistic view, apparently assuming that political development would need more guidance than the Japan experts expected.

2.3 Crossing the Pacific – from Washington’s plans to GHQ/SCAP’s agenda

MacArthur and his aides join the game

The occupation machinery had its roots in MacArthur’s wartime headquarters. To speed up the invasion of Japan, MacArthur insisted on the creation of a unified American command in the Pacific. This had led to the establishment of the US Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC) on April 4, 1945. General MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz253 planned the details of the three-phased final attack on the main islands called Operation Downfall254 during spring 1945. ‘Downfall’ was approved by Joint Chiefs in late May and thereafter submitted to America’s top military leaders and President Truman. However, there was also an alternative

253 Admiral Chester Nimitz was the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet. American high command had divided the Pacific into two great theatres the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was under MacArthur’s command, and the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) under Nimitz’s command. Takemae 2003, 11.
254 Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, was originally expected to begin on December 1, 1945. Positive war developments advanced the date by one month. Coronet, the attack on the Kanto was scheduled for March 1946. Takemae 2003, 37–38.
plan created in a time when ‘Downfall’ was already nearly finished. On June 14 the JCS ordered MacArthur to make a plan for peaceful advance in case of Japan’s sudden collapse. The result of this process was ‘Operation Blacklist’, which TAKEMAE calls to “a blueprint for non-belligerent occupation.” HELLEGERS, on the other hand, emphasizes that the document hastily cobbled together in late June relied largely on earlier drafts of the Civil Affairs Division. The Joint Chiefs endorsed MacArthur’s plan which allowed him the de facto authority to implement the Allied postwar policies toward Japan and Korea. The plan was to be activated upon Japan’s acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam terms pre-empted the ‘Downfall’ operations and there was an immediate move to the ‘Blacklist’ alternative. MacArthur’s staff in Manila was in short of properly trained personnel and Japanese language experts. This did not prevent them from drafting new plans on how to cooperate with existing Japanese government agencies, ordered to be saved in Potsdam. In early August JCS recommended MacArthur to become the Allied Supreme Commander. Formally he took up his appointment on August 15. At that date MacArthur reorganized AFPAC and dissolved General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. The Military Government Section (MSG) was established already on August 5 as a special staff appendage of GHQ/AFPAC, to handle the civil administration of Japan. The MSG contained several divisions dealing with different parts of the non-military activities. It was staffed by the US military experts reassigned from Okinawa and the Philippines and trained in civil governance. About one-tenth came from a group of specialists waiting for overseas assignment in the United States. Brigadier General William E. Crist, a China Hand with a background in Military Intelligence, was made a head of the MGS as of August 20. Before this nomination Crist, as MacArthur’s chief military government officer for Japan, was assigned on temporary duty in late July and early August for consultation with planners in the CAD. MGS was a prototype from which GHQ/SCAP emerged in autumn of 1945. MGS was

255 Takemae 2003, 39.
256 Hellegers 2001b, 406.
259 On 9 May, the JCS notified General MacArthur that he would be responsible for military government of the Japanese islands. Hellegers 2001b, 405.
260 Dutch and Australian units were deactivated only after Japan’s formal surrender on September 2, 1945. Takemae 2003, 48.
dissolved on October 2 and its functions were transferred to GHQ/SCAP. Thus, MGS’s divisions were transformed into GHQ/SCAP special staff sections.261

The story of MGS is told in detail by HELLEGERS, who shows how MacArthur’s closest officers defended their own territory and hence from the very beginning reduced the authority of Crist and his MGS to a minimum. Under standard Army procedure for military government, MGS should have been set up as a general staff section, G-5, that would have stood as coequal to the other four general staff sections. Instead, it was established as a special staff section. Thus, its every action was subject to scrutiny by whatever general staff section felt like claiming an interest in what Crist was planning. Their permission became necessary even for the routine sending of a memorandum to MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, making independence impossible for Crist and his men.262

The ‘Blacklist’ documents brought MacArthur’s headquarters into the planning of the non-military aspects of the occupation. Although decisions made in Potsdam caused some fundamental changes, there was a belief in the consistency of the general aims of the occupation. It was stated in a memorandum for the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces Pacific on August 7, 1945 that: “The major policies–permanent disarmament in its broadest sense, dissolution of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations, elimination of undesirable personnel from government and business, and liberalization and democratization of government and of the Japanese economy–seem to me to be quite finally fixed. The only important unresolved question is how these policies are to be carried out.”263 Although HELLEGERS concludes that Blacklist’s plan for military government included nothing specific about democratizing the Japanese political structure264, dissemination of Japanese militaristic, national shintoistic and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda in any form was mentioned to be prohibited. Political activities of any kind were to be subject to the approval of AFPAC Commander-in-Chief. Elements with liberal tendencies and those sympathetic to the objectives of the United Nations were to be encouraged and the Commander-in-Chief was to permit freedom of speech, press and religion and, eventually, freedom of assembly subject to military security and the maintenance of law and order as soon as practicable.

261 Takemae 2003, 47–49, 64.
262 Hellegers 2001b, 419–423.
263 Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, USAFPAC, August 7, 1945. NDL, TS-00018.
264 Hellegers 2001b, 409.
MAYO notes that MacArthur had less time for military government planning than his counterparts on the European front. However, she also mentions that MacArthur appears to have acquired a number of planning documents through his own channels before he was supposedly authorized to have them. MAYO does not specify any of those documents, but according to her, MacArthur was well informed of the controversy in Washington over the final phraseology of the policy statement and military directive. MAYO also introduces some earlier examples indicating that MacArthur had considered the treatment of postwar Japan even months before the final developments took place. However, MAYO was still convinced that Washington was the real source of most of MacArthur’s ideas.265

Conveying the message from Washington to Tokyo

Several official documents transmitted the views from Washington to Manila and then to Tokyo Headquarters. Written memorandums and reports were, however, not the only channels conveying ideas and information. Although most of the key positions in GHQ/SCAP were eventually filled with MacArthur’s closest men and members of the so-called Bataan Gang266, some of the GHQ/SCAP members had a history in the Washington planning agencies. Likewise, there were personal relations between certain key actors, the most interesting being the connection between Grew and MacArthur.

Brigadier General Crist from MacArthur’s Headquarters had arrived from Okinawa to Washington in mid-July 1945. He had been requested by MacArthur to see Grew to ask for his advice on the election of top-notch men to join MacArthur and accompany him into Japan after the invasion as political, economic and financial advisers. Grew himself was asked to come as a political adviser. Grew turned down this offer but recommended Dooman as an outstanding expert of Japan to this position.267 Approximately five weeks later

265 Mayo 1984, 49, 471.
266 Takemae 2003, 11.
267 Grew memorandum of Conversation, July 16, 1945. OJUSPD 5-E-33. Interestingly Grew argued in a private letter on September 1945 that Secretary of State Byrnes asked him to go out to Japan as General MacArthur’s political adviser. Grew claimed that he turned Byrnes’ offer down by referring to poor health, unwillingness to face old friends in Japan as conqueror, and the fact that MacArthur did not want to hear advice, but would conduct his policy despite the disapproving attitude of others. Furthermore, Grew even denied that he would have been aware of any request for a political adviser from the side of MacArthur. See: Grew 1952, 1522–1523.
Grew, now retired from the State Department, renewed his recommendation in a direct letter to MacArthur. Grew praised Dooman’s skills and liability, but admitted that Dooman shared the same enemies as he himself. This was because some of Dooman’s views, which had coincided closely with Grew’s own views. Grew suggested that those views also corresponded with MacArthur’s opinions. According to Grew, he and Dooman had known that the emperor was the only man able to stop the war, and that fundamental changes were needed in Japan before that misguided country could take its proper place among the peace-loving nations. At the end of his letter Grew backed up his argument with a statement that according to his beliefs, Secretary of War Stimson also appreciated Dooman’s qualifications.268

The exact topics Grew and Crist discussed are not known. Similarly, no document has revealed how much of this exchange of thoughts was communicated to MacArthur. Yet, this is one indication that Grew and MacArthur shared a common view concerning the future of Japan. I do not have a full knowledge on how well aware MacArthur was of the documents prepared in Washington during the war, but these few letters would propose that he agreed on a general level with the Japan Hands policy. Anyhow, Grew had been a public figure and one need not to be allowed to read classified memorandums to be aware of his general stand. Eventually, the occupation policy itself demonstrated Japan Hands’ policy line’s influence on the occupiers’ thinking. Later Grew kept sending letters to individual members of the GHQ/SCAP269 and continued his public defense of the emperor for example in the pages of the Newsweek270.

Key planning officers Hugh Borton and George Blakeslee continued in government service in Washington in the immediate postwar era271, but John K. Emmerson, Robert A. Fearay, Charles L. Kades, Frank Rizzo and Theodore Cohen are examples of the transition of human resources from Washington to Tokyo. John K. Emmerson was a former Foreign Service officer who had at one point of his career worked under Grew in Tokyo, but also possessed experience from wartime China. Emmerson was, with his fellow State Department Japanese language students from the mid-1930s Tokyo Max. W. Bishop and U. Alexis

269 He even sent his book “Ten Years in Japan” on October 1945 to the Supreme Commander just in case MacArthur would not have a copy of his own. Letter from Grew to MacArthur, October 3, 1945. NDL, MMA-14, reel 2, (box 5, folder 7 Joseph C. Grew).
270 Reference to Grew’s article in Newsweek, Narahashi 1968, 99–100.
271 Mayo 1984, 14.
Johnson, the first State Department representative in Tokyo and eventually played a major role in POLAD at the beginning of the occupation. He was the officer in charge of evaluating political party activity during fall of 1945. Robert A Fearey, former private secretary to Ambassador Grew, who had participated in pre-surrender planning, also joined in the ranks of the POLAD. Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Kades acted as Hildring’s assistant executive officer in CAD and became the Deputy Chief of GHQ’s Government Section. He was directly involved in every major political reform and Justin Williams Sr. ranks him at the second most important SCAP official after Courtney Whitney. Frank Rizzo was Kades’ close acquaintance and another influential character in GS who had his background in CAD. Theodore Cohen became the Chief of the Labor Division. In Washington he had worked for the Foreign Economic Administration’s Japanese Labor Policy Section. Besides that Cohen had drafted a Civil Affairs guide dealing with trade unions and collective bargaining in Japan’. The guide was based on his Master’s thesis he had written under Hugh Borton’s supervision.

Despite that the majority of the senior officers came from MacArthur’s old headquarters, the middle echelon of the occupation officials largely had a background in wartime civil affairs training. Milo E. Rowell, A. Rodman Hussey, Milton J. Esman, Pieter K. Roest, Justin Williams Sr., Cecil G. Tilton, and Osbourne E. Hauge all had their background in different Civil Affairs Training Schools and Military Government schools. Guy J. Swope on his behalf had graduated from Navy School of Military Government. Thus, they had gained their knowledge of Japan during the war and had been influenced during their training by the opinions of those officials who planned the occupation. Namely, besides the study material, Hugh Borton taught in the Military Government School and Grew and Doomad guest lectured in CATS where Kenneth Colegrove was teaching. These examples make it hard to agree with Harry Emerson Wildes who argues that the United States government trained a military government during the war and threw it away.

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272 Johnson 1984, 79–81, 155, 267.
274 Williams 1979, 61.
275 Takemae 2003, 176, 209.
276 More detailed information concerning their personal background. See Williams 1979, xiv, 52–63, 69.
277 Janssens 1995, 159; Hellegers 2001a, 234, 398.
Finally, many of the occupiers had their background in the wartime Foreign Economic Administration and, for example, Harry Emerson Wildes and Beate Sirota who worked in the GS unit dealing with the political parties, had a wartime affiliation to OWI. Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Hays, the future right-hand man of the Government Section Deputy Chief Charles L. Kades, had even prepared a forty-six-page scholarly paper titled “Forces Influencing the Japanese Cabinet 1885–1945.” while at the University of Chicago Civil Affairs Training School. This paper had been an attempt to point out that important decisions were made by a relatively small group of people operating behind the scenes and subject to a minimal popular control. In his writing Hays referred to well-known US experts of Japanese politics and repeated, for example, Hugh Borton’s ideas. Hays’ basic message was that although Japanese politics was primarily concerned with men rather than with political institutions, the years of 1924–31 had been the time of the party cabinets and he considered years 1929–1931 as the period of greatness of the Diet. Parties were, however, lost the confidence of the people and, eventually, control in the 1930s. Hays believed in better governance if and when the Japanese people would arrive at the sense of political awareness and would be given an opportunity to learn and develop the fundamentals of democracy. He was also supporting the concept where further developments in Japan toward parliamentary government would be initiated on the greatest possible scale by Japanese themselves, instead of submitting them with ready-made solutions.

Nevertheless, the disappointment with prewar parties was also the legacy of the Hays paper for the years of the occupation as can be concluded from the following: “The lack of willingness or ability of the party leaders to recognize that they represented the voice of the people in the government and had a solemn obligation to discharge for the people if the latter were to share in government, are the main reasons Japan has not developed a government by the people and why the latter were ripe to be sold a bill of goods by the military when they took over in the nineteen thirties.”

279 Hellegers 2001b, 632, 645.
281 Williams 1979, 69.
282 Frank E. Hays, Forces Influencing the Japanese Cabinet 1885–1945, April 4, 1945, 1–2, 36–39. NDL, GS(B)00255.
283 Frank E. Hays, Forces Influencing the Japanese Cabinet 1885–1945, April 4, 37. NDL, GS(B)00255.
Conclusion

The occupation planners did not have ready-made questions of where to find appropriative answers. Instead, when picturing the postwar world in their head, they had to first come up with the problems that needed to be resolved. The planners found it important to consider the nature of Japan’s postwar political leadership and to define the desirable future role of the prewar conservatives. The final outcome of the planning was a compromise, containing both positive objects like democratization and negative objects like rooting out the forces that had contributed to the eruption of the war in their own activity. This compromise was reached as a result of governmental politics. The bargaining took place in a constantly evolving institutional framework. Yet, the continuity was also present as the same individuals kept championing on behalf of their views inside the various succeeding organizations. The discussion on the treatment of postwar Japan included elements from wider bargains concerning, for example, the preferred level of government’s interference in the guiding of the economy and the possibility of peaceful coexistence of the United States and the communist Soviet Union in the future. Moreover, there were also features that played a role only in the specific case of Japan. These were, for example, the personal feelings toward Japan and Japanese and the earlier experiences from prewar Japan.

Arguably the number of documents dealing with Japan’s political parties and politicians is limited when compared to the documents concerning the other governmental bodies. This does not mean, however, that parties and politicians would have been forgotten. I believe that this shortage simply demonstrates the strength of the conception of Japanese prewar parties and politicians that existed at the beginning of the planning process. No occupation planner questioned the prewar and wartime activity of the former conservative parties and politicians. No matter how the general policy aims and means evolved, no planner urged any major adjustments in the coming postwar role of the former conservative parties and politicians.

In short, while many felt that the political parties had a place in the democratized Japan, nobody envisioned the old conservative party politicians who had dominated the prewar situation being able to establish themselves as positive political forces in postwar Japan. The Japan Hands had their own answer as to where more appropriate political influence was to be found. Namely, many occupation planners shared the view that there should be a clear distinction made between the self-seeking party politics and what might be called statesmanship or
altruistic work on behalf of the common good. The latter was believed to be a typical feature for the representatives of certain elitist Japanese groups who either corresponded in many ways with the planners who had experience in various ministries, diplomatic corps and academic circles, or who had been affiliated with influential planning offices during the prewar period. This distinction that selected the actors who could contribute to the building of a democratic postwar Japan was the most important legacy of the planning process in the actual occupation policy concerning the conservative political parties.
II. Time of Observation (autumn 1945)

"Although it was clear from the earliest instructions issued by the Supreme Commander that a democratic political party system was presupposed for Japan, those instructions at no time stipulated in any detail the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander for such a system. Policies relating to political institutions set forth in the basic instructions concerned the general nature of government rather than the kind of agencies through which that government should be administered. Nevertheless, inherent in those policies was the conviction that political parties and a political party system were necessary to the operation of democratic governmental institutions in a democratic society. 284

"Shortly after the Occupation began the Great Japan Political Society dissolved itself and in its place arose a number of new parties of which the major ones represented re-groupings of political forces around former leaders or influential members of the pre-Tojo political parties. Thoroughly unrepresentative of and unresponsive to the popular will, boss-determined and venal, these old political factions had never inspired the respect or trust of the Japanese people. Nevertheless the establishment of representative government in Japan required the intervention of a political party system. 285

The first fall of the occupation witnessed the mushrooming of political parties and movements. 286 The occupation authorities’ time-consuming task was to figure out which of these newcomers could contribute to the new democratized Japan. The recognition of the nature and the relative importance of different political movements was, however, only the first step to be taken. The occupation authorities also needed to determine the goal toward which they wanted the political party field to develop. Furthermore, it was necessary to identify and implement the most effective means to achieve the set goals.

284 GHQ, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan 1945 through November 1951, Volume III – Political and Legal – Part F, Development of Political Parties, 1. NDL.
286 Before the end of November, already thirty-five political parties had been publicly organized. On February 15, 1946 the number has increased significantly and there were already 166 political parties in Japan. Political Reorientation of Japan. September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section, SCAP. Section XI., Political Parties, 763. NDL, GS(B)00561; GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political report (1 February to 19 February 1946), no date. NARA, RG 331, box 2134, folder 20.
The History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan introduces the authority vested in GHQ/SCAP. It states that although the basic policy directions issued to the Supreme Commander referred only to the general outline of his responsibilities for a political party system, they gave him extensive power and authority to act in other fields closely related to it. The GHQ/SCAP held power to revise, modify, and abolish certain operations and institutions of the government. The GHQ/SCAP possessed power to regulate, control, or dissolve non-governmental organizations, and to ban individuals from public office. The Supreme Commander was also directed to eliminate the influence of the armed forces and hold power regarding the administration and direction of the economic forces.\textsuperscript{287} The occupation authorities could thus regulate the framework in which the political parties were functioning.

Nevertheless, I agree with MASUMI who concludes that the GHQ/SCAP did not only adhere in its role to set the stage for the parliamentary politics. Parties and politicians who emerged were not always of a character satisfactory to the occupation authorities. The GHQ/SCAP attempted to make them to conform to the expectations of the democratic character, but it was necessary to refrain from unconcealed coercion. It would have appeared undemocratic to use force against the elected representatives who had gained their mandate from the voters. In addition, such conflict would have given a signal that Japan’s democratization had not succeeded properly.\textsuperscript{288} It was because of these reasons why the GHQ/SCAP adopted the method of internal guidance discussed in the introduction. The decision to work through unofficial channels enabled the promulgation of the new freedoms available to the Japanese people, while simultaneously ensuring the progression toward the preferred direction. Even the GS’s own history admits the preference to use suggestions, persuasion and advice instead of formal directives.\textsuperscript{289}

The role played by the Japanese actors divides opinions. Harry Emerson Wildes claims that although the occupation was talking about democracy and new rights, it was in fact dictating the actions of the Japanese governmental bodies. He concludes that although the occupation professed a major purpose of developing

\textsuperscript{287} GHQ, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan 1945 through November 1951, Volume III – Political and Legal – Part F, Development of Political Parties, 9–10, 19. NDL.

\textsuperscript{288} Masumi 1985, 76–77.

\textsuperscript{289} Appendix G, History of the Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, 853–854. NDL, GS(B)00513. (date and author unknown)
initiative and self-reliance, the Japanese were forced to fall back upon their traditional habit of relying upon authority for guidance.\textsuperscript{290} Masaru KOHNO states, however, that the Japanese were not only passive receivers of guidance. He argues that although the basic direction and guidelines for the reform were set by the GHQ/SCAP, some important structural details of the new Japan were left to the Japanese to decide. Thus, from the very beginning the bargaining and negotiations took place between the GHQ/SCAP and the various domestic actors, as well as among the Japanese themselves. Japanese politicians are alleged to have known how to play one group of occupiers against the other.\textsuperscript{291} It is noteworthy that similar discussion concerning the role of the domestic forces has emerged also concerning the occupation of Germany. The older research emphasized the year of 1945 as a kind of fundamental break in German history, whereas more recent researchers suggests that the postwar Germany arose from a combination of occupation policies and German tradition.\textsuperscript{292}

This chapter concentrates on the first four months of the occupation when the occupiers had to decide who should lead the Japanese Government and whether the political parties were let to emerge freely or whether the activity of some or all of them were to be restricted. This was also the time when the GHQ/SCAP had to define the modus operandi regarding the observation, coexistence, and cooperation with the Japanese cabinet, political parties, and politicians. This period is approached through the following questions: what was the occupiers’ role in and attitude toward the formation of the Shidehara Cabinet; how were the first evaluations concerning the newly established conservative parties and their leaders; what were the elements influencing the occupiers’ evaluations concerning the Japanese conservatives; what kind of policy was formulated after the new information was integrated into the legacy of the planning period?

3.1 Tolerable Conservatives – Lack of Information and Alternative

*Establishing occupation – rebuilding government and political parties*

After preparatory negotiations in Manila, the first US Army troops landed on Atsugi Air Base near Yokohama on August 28, 1945. General Douglas MacArthur

\textsuperscript{290} Wildes 1978, 14–15, 31, 339.  
\textsuperscript{291} Kohno 1997, 30. Similar ideas, see: Dower 1975, 488; Moore 1979, 723.  
\textsuperscript{292} Jackson 2006, 115.
followed these troops two days later. The Asia-Pacific war ended formally on September 2, 1945, with the signing of the Instrument of Surrender aboard the USS Missouri. MacArthur’s statement in this plain ceremony encouraged the Japanese to embrace the democratic ideals provided by the victory of the Allied powers. 293 MacArthur’s message to the people of the United States was broadcasted after the ceremony. MacArthur announced his commitment to follow the principles of the Potsdam Declaration that were aiming at the liberation of the Japanese people from the condition of slavery. By nature this slavery had meant the denial of freedom of expression, action and thought which were to be returned after the armed forces were demobilized and the other essential steps were taken to neutralize the war potential.294

President Truman unveiled the ‘US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan on September 22, 1945, and made the United States official principles known to the world. Chief of Staff Richard K. Sutherland issued an AFPAC directive formally renouncing to military rule four days later. The same directive announced that the special staff sections would be created inside General MacArthur’s headquarters to advise the Supreme Commander on civil affairs and ordered the discontinuance of AFPAC’s Military Government Section (MGS). The responsibility for administering the occupation passed from AFPAC’s military staff organization to a new civil administration called GHQ/SCAP on October 2, 1945. Its nine civil staff sections295 roughly paralleled in structure and function with the Japanese bureaucracy. 296 The POLAD accompanied the staff sections as the State Department representative although it was separately located in a Mitsui Bank building in Nihonbashi297. Most of the special staff sections were grouped below the General Military Staff and made directly responsible to the Supreme Commander through the Deputy Chief of Staff. The secretariat and civil staff

293 Takemae 2003, 52–54, 57–60.
295 Government Section, Civil Intelligence Section, Legal Section, Economic and Scientific Section, Civil Information and Education Section, National Resources Section, Public Health and Welfare Section, Civil Communications Section, Statistics and Reports Section. Takemae 2003, 138. See also: Appendix 2.
296 Takemae 2003, 64, 66–67.
297 This was about a fifteen-minute jeep ride away from the headquarters. John K. Emmerson described the situation as follows: “General MacArthur tolerated the State Department within his realm but wanted us at arm’s length and clearly outside of his staff complement.” Emmerson 1978, 256.
groups were created, disbanded, or transferred between the GHQ/SCAP’s general and special staff sections as the need arose.298

The Japanese Government faced some readjustments in August–September 1945. After the Suzuki Kantarō Cabinet resigned, the Imperial cabinet of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko (東久邇稔彦) was formed on August 17, 1945. The Prince was the emperor’s uncle by marriage, and the ruling circles expected his royal pedigree to help prepare the nation for the defeat and occupation299. Despite few minor incidents caused by former army officers and ultra-rightist groupings, the beginning of the occupation turned out to be characteristically non-violent.300 Premier Higashikuni and State Minister Konoe Fumimaro did not participate in the surrender ceremony301 and they met MacArthur only in mid-September. Two days after his deputy, Prime Minister Higashikuni finally got together with the Supreme Commander on September 15. The cabinet went through a re-shuffle two days later when Yoshida Shigeru replaced Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵) as a Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Emperor’s journey to meet the Supreme Commander on September 27 was, however, symbolically the most important event.302 The 88th Extraordinary Session of the Imperial Diet had been convoked as well on September 1, 1945. Wartime political groups were still present during this session303, but they disbanded themselves in the following weeks.304

The indirect nature of the occupation meant that the GHQ/SCAP’s orders and inquiries had to be easily transmitted into the Japanese Government. Initiatives were taken already in the Manila negotiations to solve this question and Japan’s Foreign Ministry created the Central Liaison Office (CLO) as an external bureau on August 26, 1945. The CLO served as an official intermediary between the various GHQ/SCAP sections and their Japanese counterparts. Although the CLO was increasingly bypassed as officials on both sides gained experience in working

298 Takemae 2003, 141.
299 Dower notes that another feature for the Higashikuni Cabinet was the strong YOHANSEN representation. Dower 1979, 548.
300 Takemae 2003, 47, 56–57.
301 Higashikuni and Konoe both shared the royal blood and had hence followed the Emperors example and absent themselves from the surrender ceremony. Non-attendance was a part of the attempt to avoid any suggestion that the Emperor’s sovereignty had been compromised by Japan’s defeat. Takemae 2003, 59.
302 Masumi 1985, 40–43.
304 Uchida 1987, 306.
with each other and the direct operating procedures became established, Yoshida Shigeru, foreign minister and head of the CLO, enjoyed a peculiar influence when functioning as a key intermediary between the Japanese Government and the GHQ/SCAP during the first winter of the occupation. 305

No time, in other words, was wasted on launching of the occupation and the Japanese Government was prompt in its attempt to adapt to the challenges of the new situation. The same was true in the case of former conservative party leaders who planned to continue their political existence in the postwar world. Activities aiming at party formation were already underway when the occupation army landed in Japan. The first conservative movement to go ahead was built around veteran politicians Hatoyama Ichirō, Ashida Hitoshi and Andō Masazumi (安藤正純). Researchers of the party formation have relied on diary markings of different actors involved. Thus, there are various interpretations on who made the original initiative to organize the party and who played the most active role in August 1945. According to TOMINOMORI Eiji, Hatoyama and Ashida met already on August 11, 1945, to discuss the possibilities of the party politics after the war. 306

Other researchers have emphasized Ashida’s and Andō’s activity. 307 Nonetheless, it is obvious that these three, together with Uehara Etsujirō (植原悦二郎), Kōno Ichirō (河野一郎), Yano Šōtarō (矢野庄太郎), and Makino Ryōzō (牧野良三), formed the nucleus of the movement. Their plan was to build a party around the wartime Dōkōkai. In late August there were negotiations to include some progressive influence from the former proletarian parties. Conversations were held with Nishio Suehiro (西尾末広) and Hirano Rikizō (平野力三) representing the moderate proletarians with whom Hatoyama had allied himself during the war. Eventually no agreement could be found and these men were involved in the formation of the Socialist Party 308, which was the first political party to be officially inaugurated on November 2, 1945. 309

A succeeding step was taken toward authors, commentators, journalists, scholars and representatives of the business community. According to SHINOBU Seizaburō, they were asked to join because of the failure in the restoration of the

305 Kawai 1969, 19; Dower 1979, 309; Takemae 2003, 113.
306 Tominomori 2006, 1.
308 Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō 日本社会党) preferred to be known in English as the Social Democratic Party because this had a sweeter ring to American ears. Finn 1992, 41.
old parties. TOMINOMORI argues that the reason was Hatoyama’s will not to see the revival of the prewar parties. In any case, a great number of men who had previously observed party life joined the party movement which gained speed from the establishment of the party office on September 6, 1945. A preparatory conference for the formation of the new political party was held on October 7, and the fifteen-member standing organizational committee was selected five days later. The movement culminated in the official foundation of the Liberal Party on November 11, 1945. Hatoyama was selected to serve as the party president and Konō Ichirō as the secretary general. Hatoyama made his first visit to the occupation headquarters a day after. He met the Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall who was acting for General Richard Sutherland during Sutherland’s leave, and pronounced the party’s platform.

If the liberals represented the minority factions of the prewar conservative parties, the conservative mainstream eventually found its way under the banner of the Progressive Party (Nihon Shimpōtō). The origins of the party were in the GJPA and the road to the inauguration on November 16, 1945, was bumpy and curvy. Besides the leaders of the GJP, the IRAPS, and the majority factions of Nakajima Chikuhei of the former Seiyūkai and Machida Chūji faction of the former Minseitō, the Progressive Party also contained a group of political youngsters elected for the first time in the 1942 IRAPS elections. A disunited background caused problems like the difficulty to choose the party president. It was not until December 16, 1945, when a joint position was found and Machida was selected to fill the vacant presidency. This was preceded by the placement of Nakajima in the list of the potential war criminals at the beginning of December. FUKUNAGA relates the establishment of the Shimpōtō to the establishment of the Liberal and the Socialist Parties, to the coming of elections.

310 Old Minseitō leaders like Saitō Takao, Kawasaki Katsu (川崎活) and Ichinomiya Fusajirō (一宮房治郎) eventually departed from the movement although they had participated in the efforts to create a new Party. This was because of the incapability to settle differences arising from prewar conflicts between the Seiyūkai and the Minseitō. Another reason for Saitō’s unwillingness to be absorbed in Hatoyama’s ranks was his feeling that, in terms of experience in the Diet, he was senior to Hatoyama. Shinobu 1965, 201; Uchida 1987, 312.

311 For example Minobe Tatsukichi (美濃部達吉), Kuwaki Genyoku (桑木厳翼), Kikuchi Kan (菊池寛), Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山), Ishii Mitsujirō (石井光次郎), Hiratsuka Tsunejirō (平塚常次郎). Shinobu 1965, 201; Masumi 1985, 79–80; Tominomori 2006, 4.

312 Hatoyama 1999, 412.


314 Fukunaga 2004, 35.
planned to be held in January 1946, and to the closeness of the beginning of the 89th Diet session.316

The occupation authorities were under pressure to take radical measures against the Japanese political establishment at the beginning of the occupation. This pressure originated from various sources. Public opinion in the United States was hostile toward Japan during the war.317 The deep enmity toward the Japanese establishment did not suddenly disappear and especially opinions regarding the treatment of Emperor Hirohito were judgmental. 318 At the same time Generalissimo Joseph Stalin and Foreign Commissar Vjatxeslav Molotov made the stand of the Soviet Union known. They criticized the US-led occupation as too soft and demanded General MacArthur to be replaced by the international four-power commission.319 The Soviet press did not save its words when it attacked the Japanese political system. The general image of the political parties was negative. They were described as unrepresentative and their dubious relations with big business were highlighted. Japanese ruling circles were considered as a bloc of great landlords, business concerns, and militarists which were all linked to fascist Japanese imperialism. 320 Moreover, it was not only the Soviet Union that criticized the Japanese leadership. For example the representatives of the British Commonwealth demanded radical actions which would include the placing of the emperor among the suspected war criminals.321

The Japanese media was the third source bad-mouthing the old Japanese political leadership and urging actions to prevent its continuing dominance. Reporters and political commentators did not hesitate to express their views in the spirit of press and radio code issued by the GHQ/SCAP on September 19 and 22.322 They attacked politicians claiming that they bore responsibility because of the failure of the democracy. The criticism of the weakness of the prewar Diet was directed against the corrupted politicians who had been affiliated with the military, not against the system itself. Thus, the party politicians were warned not

316 Fukunaga 1997, 34.
318 Emmerson 1978, 232. One reason behind this kind of attitude was surely a vehement press and radio campaign within the United States against the retention of the emperor. See: MacArthur 1965, 280.
320 Harriman telegram from Moscow for Secretary of State, August 31, 1945. CUSSDCF, reel 1, windows 180–181.
321 The Minister in New Zealand (Patton) to the Secretary of State September 20, 1945. FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 719–720.
322 Takemae 2003, 238.
to expect that they would be the automatic choice to fill the postwar political vacuum. T. A. Bisson mentions that the press and radio became ways to express radical reform demands and criticizing the old governmental system. Likewise, former minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu Mamoru claims that the occupation army encouraged the public to criticize the emperor institution and many newspapers and broadcasting stations fell under the control of the communists. Regardless the nominal freedom of press, occupiers’ censorship did exist. Thus, the acceptability of these tendencies tells something about the aims of the censorship. These aims most certainly varied during the occupation, but the Japanese conservatives were definitely allowable targets for criticism in autumn 1945.

The occupation authorities began to interpret the meaning of the guidelines provided by the planning agencies under these circumstances. There was no time for long-lasting soul-searching. Instead, for example in OSS, it was considered that a clear statement for Japan’s rulers was needed to clarify the nature of the political reform. Would there only be a limited removal of war criminals from the post of authority, the establishment of civil liberties, a reasonably honest election, and a return to party cabinets such as characterized the period before 1931—or would the occupier insist upon a fundamental reorganization of Japan’s political structure? It was concluded that in the absence of the Allied statements, the Japanese Government had to seek its own answers to these questions and act accordingly. It was expected that the Japanese Government, unless forced to do otherwise, would act in a way best calculated to preserve the existing power relationships with a minimum of alteration. Initiatives for democratic reforms were, in other words, not expected from the Japanese side.

The OSS Research and Analysis Branch continued to study Japanese parties until the office was disbanded in September 1945. The functions of the OSS were split between the State Department and War Department. The State received the R&A Branch which was eventually renamed as the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS). Although the State Department muffed its opportunity to become the primary governmental agency in the field of intelligence in the

324 Bisson 1949, 33–34.
325 Shigemitsu 1958, 380.
326 According to Bisson, the change in censorship already happened after the first six months of the occupation. Bisson 1949, 33–34.
327 OSS, R&A; (#3258) report, September 21, 1945. OSS/SDIRR, reel 2 document 3.
long-run, the R&A Branch was in any case the first organization to comment on postwar revival of the political parties in Japan in written form. The attention of the US State Department was in general drawn to the recovery of postwar Europe. For example George F. Kennan, one of the most influential characters in the immediate postwar State Department, admits that it was not only hard to tell MacArthur what to do, but also to find out what he was doing. Kennan describes the Supreme Commander’s position as highly independent and declares that the State Department had virtually no power of disposal in Japan. The fact that lines of communication ran through the War Department did not help the situation. The time for major reconsideration came only in 1947 due to the changing international climate.

Although General MacArthur was not under State Department strict advisement and he tended to put only a little of value on opinions of the international bodies which were in principle guiding the occupation, he could not easily diminish the US military chain of command. The Supreme Commander was responsible, by order of rank, to the President, the Commander-in-Chief of US Armed Forces; the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Army Chief of Staff; the Secretary of War; and the Secretary of Army. Despite that MacArthur personally outranked some of the holders of these positions, as a Commander of US Army Forces in the Pacific he was duty-bound to obey their directives. Yet, the basic postwar policy documents provided MacArthur with a great authority in remodeling postwar Japan and his position was strengthened by the fact that the War Department was not emphasizing the importance of Japan. Instead, SCHALLER argues that despite the military’s clamor for control of the Pacific, the strategic planning for this immense region remained chaotic in practice. During the five years leading up to the Korean War, the JCS and the subsidiary planning committees continually ranked East Asia and the Pacific as a third security priority, behind Western Europe and the Middle East. Therefore, despite Under-Secretary Dean Acheson’s claim on September 19, 1945, that the work distribution was clear and the occupation forces were only the instrument of policy and not the determinants of the policy, in practice the position and authority of MacArthur even in relation to the president was a matter of confusion.

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329 Kennan 1967, 268–373.
331 Schaller 1985, 55.
from the very beginning. This was first demonstrated by the discussion following MacArthur’s announcement on September 17 concerning the reduction of the occupation forces.332

Beginning of the Shidehara Cabinet and first evaluations concerning the conservative parties

The months prior to the general elections proposed for early 1946 were considered to be significant for the direction of the political party organization. The elections were expected to determine, not only the composition of the new Diet, but also the rapidity with which the political parties would be capable of assuming a responsible role in guiding future political developments. Surrender and activities aiming at the party formation had, however, not changed R&A's skeptical attitude toward the strength of the civilian elements. At the end of September 1945 it was inferred that the political party organizations were handicapped by the absence of strong roots. It was stated that the heyday of the political parties had been terminated as much by the political corruption, factionalism, and lack of popular support as by the rise of the military. The dissolution of the parties and the establishment of the IRAA, the IRAPS and the GJPA were introduced. It was also notified, however, that two dissident groups split off IRAPS in March 1945. This was considered to indicate that cliques did exist even within the government party.333

The R&A reported the emergence of three new groups as well. The Japan Socialist Party was considered to be the best organized among them. The Japan Liberal Party and another group composed of a heterogeneous collection of the ex-Seiyūkai and Minseitō politicians that was referred to as the Central Party were still considered to be in a nebulous stage. From the Liberal Party leaders, Hatoyama, Ashida and Uehara were recognized. It was stated that Hatoyama was generally considered to be of liberal inclinations, but little was said to be known of his activities during the war. The exception was the commonly reported information that he had resigned from the IRAPS in 1943 and continued to serve in the Diet as an independent member. Knowledge concerning the two others was

332 Details, see: Acheson 1987, 126.
even more inadequate. In the end, despite the recognition of a dearth of information, the party was described to be somewhat left of the old Seiyūkai.\(^{334}\)

The so-called Central Party was supposed to consist of the old Seiyūkai and Minseitō leaders who had been active in government-sponsored parties during the war. Machida Chūji, Ōasa Tadao (大麻唯男), Shimada Toshio (島田俊雄), Kanemitsu Tsuneo (金光庸夫), Maeda Yonezō (前田米蔵) and Nakajima Chikuhei were among the member known by name. Also in this case the R&A did not want to make the final call based on the limited information available but reminded that it was not known whether this group worked closely with the wartime governments of necessity or by choice. It was assumed that the group would adhere more or less to the conservative policies sponsored by the major parties prior to the war. Finally the R&A assumed that the above-mentioned political groupings should be considered only as interim parties.\(^{335}\)

I have not found any evidence that this report would have exerted any major influence on the later occupation authorities. Hence it seems that this first glance of postwar party development suffered the typical destiny for R&A documents and became diminished. On the other hand, the report did not offer any new or radical ideas. This was most likely due to the fact that besides the open-source intelligence information provided by the FBIS, the early postwar R&A documents were based on writings of the people seen as the experts of Japanese politics. Grew, Borton, Roth and others were still the most relied upon sources.\(^{336}\) Another aspect worth of remembering is OSS’s small role in the Pacific already during the war. The press in Washington was writing in May 1945 that neither MacArthur nor Nimitz desired the services of OSS.\(^{337}\) If MacArthur did not want to have help from this organization during the war, he was most likely reluctant to entrust any major role to it after the war was over.\(^{338}\)

The more important last minute document stemming from the Washington-based agencies was, however, a document called ‘Friendly Japanese’. The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department completed and widely distributed this document that listed assumable loyal Japanese who might be

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337 Brigadier General A. J. McFarland, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs in Manila, Pearl Harbor, and Guam, No. WARX 86160, May 22, 1945. NARA, RG 218, entry 47, box 9, folder 54.
expected to cooperate with the Allied occupation forces. Most of the information came from Americans who were former residents in Japan. The list contained many private Japanese Christians, but persons with significant political importance were mentioned as well. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find the listing of the general sources that were used to compile the various short reports, but there is a good reason to believe that, for example, works of Joseph C. Grew and the earlier reports conducted by Borton were consulted. Namely, quite a few of the names promoted by these authors were included in the document that was later used as a source when evaluating Japanese politicians. For example, former foreign service officers like Shidehara Kijūrō and Yoshida Shigeru were included to the list together with men like Prince Chichibu and Matsudaira Tsuneo who were close to the throne.\textsuperscript{339}

GHQ/SCAP did not linger to show its capability, will, and commitment to build a framework in which the governance that corresponded with the occupiers’ definition of democratic character could take place. The Japanese Government was ordered to remove all restrictions on political, religious and civil liberties and discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion on October 4, 1945. This meant that the political prisoners were to be released, the secret police was to be abolished and an unrestricted commenting on the emperor and the government was to be allowed. Moreover, the removal of the top leadership of the Ministry of Home Affairs and certain key police officials was demanded.\textsuperscript{340} The directive released 439 political prisoners and ended the surveillance of 2026 others. It forced the removal of the Minister of Home Affairs Yamazaki Iwao (山崎巌) and 4800 special thought police.\textsuperscript{341} Changes in the cabinet were not, however, limited to only one person, but the whole Higashikuni Cabinet decided to resign a day after the civil rights directive was promulgated.\textsuperscript{342}

An appropriative successor was needed after the Higashikuni Cabinet resigned. But what were the criteria for the new premier? The State Department Research and Analysis Branch concluded that it was necessary to find leading figures who could work in harmony with both the Allied authorities and the Japanese political groups, and who were also willing to swallow the

\textsuperscript{339} P. E. Peabody, War Department, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, September 12, 1945. NDL, LS 24079-LS 24084.
\textsuperscript{340} H.W. Allen, SCAP Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government, October 4, 1945. OJP3RRP 3-C-100.
\textsuperscript{341} Finn 1992, 49.
\textsuperscript{342} Masumi 1985, 45.
embarrassment of receiving forceful orders.\textsuperscript{343} The story according to which Marquis Kido was the prime mover behind the election of Shidehara Kijūrō as a successor of Higashikuni is often repeated in research literature. It is argued that MacArthur was ready to accept Shidehara simply because of this ability to speak English.\textsuperscript{344} However, if looking this situation from the perspective of the legacy of the wartime planning, it is not surprising that Shidehara became the new premier on October 9, 1945. Although several documents show that one’s capability to speak English was a major criterion to evaluate Japanese politicians\textsuperscript{345}, the reasons behind Shidehara’s premiership go far beyond his language skills.

What I found to be more plausible explanation is a model based on an interpretation that Shidehara was one of the most prominent members of the pre-1931 democratic period. As seen before, even Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson named Shidehara as one of the moderate leaders who met the standards of Western statesmen.\textsuperscript{346} Shidehara’s conciliating policies with China and his anti-military policies during the London Naval Treaty were not forgotten in Military Intelligence Section or R&A’s analysis either.\textsuperscript{347} Hence the leadership of the Japanese government was entrusted to a man who represented the group where the planners had indicated the future leadership to be found. This tendency was

\begin{footnotes}
\item[343] DOS, IRIS, R&A Branch, (#3274) report, October 12, 1945. OSS/SDIRR, reel 2 document 8.
\item[344] Finn 1992, 39; Fukunaga 2004, 23–25; Itoh 2003, 75; Masumi 1985, 45. See also William J. Sebald’s quotation of Yoshida Shigeru who claimed that he recommended Shidehara to MacArthur who, on his behalf, was interested only in Shidehara’s English skills and age. Sebald with Brines 1967, 98–99.
\item[345] Some politicians were praised and considered as good contacts because of their language skills by political observers, whereas others with more problems with English had clearly frustrated non-Japanese speaking political observers. See for example: P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Branch, Memorandum for record, November 19, 1945. NDL, GS(A)00117; P. K. Roest, Memorandum for Record. Interview with HATOYAMA, Ichiro (date missing). NDL, GS(A)00117. Eventually the view according to which the ability to speak English was a primary requirement to the Premier lasted long and the issue was discussed even in the early summer of 1947 when Katayama Tetsu’s chances of becoming the Prime Minister was doubted due to his poor language skills. GHQ/FECCOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, CIS, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 17, Section II, Counter Intelligence, June 15, 1947. CIC-9. NARA, RG 200, Willoughby “Personal-Official File”, 1941–50, Civil Intelligence/Periodic Summary, Mar–July 47, box 19. See also: Iokibe 2007, 157.
\item[346] Iokibe 2005, 137–142.
\item[347] GHQ, SCAP, USAF PAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Daily Summary No. 1287, October 13, 1945, 6. NARA, RG 200, box 43; DOS, IRIS, R&A Branch, (#3274) report, October 12, 1945. OSS/SDIRR, reel 2 document 8.
\end{footnotes}
even strengthened due to Yoshida Shigeru’s continuance as the foreign minister. Yoshida was another well-connected representative of the pro Anglo-American clique from the 1930s, and he had made his entrance onto the stage of postwar politics after a suggestion by Prince Konoe. Reciprocally, Yoshida was promoting Konoe to become the leader of the party movement that led to the establishment of the Liberal Party. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, both Shidehara and Yoshida also appeared in the War Department’s list of friendly Japanese expected to cooperate with the occupation. Apparently the Japanese were also aware what the occupation authorities wanted. Namely, Brines argues that the dominant conservative clique linked to the throne selected Shidehara as the man most likely to please the Americans and preserve their own viewpoint.

IOKIBE offers a detailed description on how this selection process, during which both Shidehara and Yoshida first turned down the proposed premiership, took place. Kido and the Privy Council recognized the occupiers’ role as the highest decision-maker and agreed on October 5, about the three basic requirements for the next premier. He should be a person: not opposed by the Americans; not suspected of war responsibility; possessing knowledge on diplomacy. Eventually the occupation authorities’ supposed preferences were also taken into consideration when selecting ministers for the new cabinet.

The civil liberties directive was the first major maneuver taken to establish a framework in which the party political development could take place. Another guideline was the directive of October 7, 1945. SCAPIN 99 was the first and one of the few directives dealing directly with the parties. It demonstrates GHQ/SCAP’s aspiration to be informed with respect to the political party activity. The directive ordered the Japanese Government to submit a list of all political parties in existence since 1935 together with a summary of their accomplishments, rules, platforms, and method of registering membership. Information was also required on all dormant political parties seeking to revive their political organization. Moreover, copies of all existing requirements for forming and

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348 According to Fukunaga, Yoshida was also the second candidate to fill the requirements for a new premier, i.e. not opposed by the Americans, not responsible for war, and familiar with diplomacy. Fukunaga 2004, 23.
349 Masumi 1985, 42-43.
350 Ashida 1986, 213.
351 P. E. Peabody, War Department, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (August 1945). NDL, LS 24079-LS24084.
352 Briness 1948, 47-48, 198.
obtaining recognition as a political party were demanded. The occupation authorities were also interested in the past and present party affiliations of the Diet members and rosters of the government officials.354

The responsibility over the observation of the party political activity was first entrusted to the POLAD. The Office of the Political Adviser was asked to study Japanese political parties, their personnel, aims and history on October 3, 1945. This assignment did not deal only with a single document, but the POLAD was expected to follow the development of the political parties, conduct reports on a weekly basis and give recommendations. POLAD’s studies were expected to contribute to the determination of persons who would be permitted to participate in the government, in insuring that the membership would be held only by persons who might be relied upon to further the purposes of the occupation. POLAD consulted with and received former studies for example from the State Department and the OSS to be able to complete this assignment.355 The decision to allocate the surveillance of the political party activity to the POLAD was made inside the GHQ/SCAP. Still, on September 24 Atcheson stated in his memorandum to the Supreme Commander that he was instructed to follow the directive that outlines the functions and duties of the United States Political Adviser for Germany. This meant that the POLAD’s primary function was to be of all possible assistance to the Supreme Commander in general, in connection with matters of the general United States policies respecting Japan, the United States relations with other countries, and such related matters as the Supreme Commander might indicate.356 It is therefore relevant to consider, why the observation of political parties was trusted to the ill-received POLAD357.

One significant reason was undoubtedly John K. Emmerson who was the officer in charge of observing the political parties in POLAD. Emmerson had prewar experience and connections from Japan and he mastered the language. Emmerson could thus begin the observation rapidly. Copies of Emmerson’s

355 Atcheson telegram to the Secretary of State October 4, 1945. CUSSDCF reel 1 window 203; Bynes, Department of State, Airgram for SCAP and for Atcheson, Political Adviser, October 17, 1945. CUSSDCF reel 1 window 205; GHQ/USAFPAC, Office of the Chief-of-Staff, R.K. Sutherland memorandum for Mr. Atcheson, October 3, 1945. CUSSDCF reel 1 window 218.
356 George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, Memorandum to the Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff, September 24, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 1, folder 1.
357 Views concerning early relations between POLAD and MacArthur and his aides, see: Sebald with Brines 1965, 43; Johnson 1984, 80. See also: Oral History Interview with U. Alexis Johnson, 1975.
weekly reports were supplied to GHQ/SCAP sections and to the United States State Department. Reports were usually accompanied with a summary from George Atcheson Jr. Emmerson, however, emphasizes that as a China-expert Atcheson recognized his lack of Japanese experience and was ready to consult fully and freely with his staff. William J. Sebald, another former POLAD officer describes Atcheson, together with John Stewart Service, as representatives of the “old China hand” in occupied Japan. As mentioned, Emmerson is hard to fit into categories concerning the preferred model of reform in Japan. Emmerson ran into troubles in the years of the McCarthy communist hunt in the early 1950 when he was claimed to have been one of the pro-communists in the State Department. OINAS-KUKKONEN offers, however, another view by describing Emmerson not as a communist but as a foreignservice officer whose wartime recommendation of positive policy toward the Japanese communists was in line with other officials working in China.

POLAD was, however, not the only actor interested in political development in Japan. For example the GS and the Counter Intelligence Section (CIS) interviewed prominent politicians. As a former member of the GS, Justin Williams offers useful insights into the establishment of the section. The GS, formed by eighteen residual officers from the Military Government Section, was weak and inefficient at the beginning of the occupation. Procedures for working with the Japanese counterparts were not settled and the division of labor between various sections was unclear. A conference of working level officials was organized in October to solve the confusion. It was then agreed that the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) would allot radio time to the different Japanese political factions; CIS would compile and disseminate information about particular Japanese persons and organizations; GS would keep abreast of Japanese legislation; and POLAD would make studies of Japanese political movements, parties, actions, and opinions to determine whether they were in line with the occupation objectives. This decision, as will be seen, was only temporary. The

358 Because of this distribution, copies of the POLAD documents can be found from the US State Department archives and among the GS papers.

359 Emmerson 1978, 256.

360 Sebald with Brines 1965, 43.


363 Williams 1979, 6–8. To learn more about the allocation of intra-staff responsibilities at the beginning of occupation, see: S. J. C., GHQ, SCAP, Memorandum for Chiefs of Staff Sections,
GS strengthened and found its leading role after Brigadier General Courtney Whitney replaced Brigadier General William Earl Crist and took over the section in mid-December 1945. Despite the severe criticism toward the inefficiency of the GS political observation, the change toward the more effective policy-making did not necessitate changes in personnel other than the replacement of Crist. Already during the first months of the occupation the most important GS senior officers related to the political parties were Pieter K. Roest and Charles L. Kades.

Lieutenant Colonel Roest acted as the chief of the group studying Japanese political parties inside the GS until his return to the United States in the spring of 1947. Both Roest’s education and civilian expertise suggest that he was an irrational choice to fill this duty. Justin Williams describes Roest as a visionary whose reform ideas were occasionally fuzzy and impractical. Harry Emerson Wildes, Roest’s subordinate, describes Roest as an incompetent occupationnaire who embarked upon a dangerous experiment with the Japanese political parties. Colonel Charles L. Kades is considered to have been the second most influential GS officer after General Whitney. This in spite of Cohen’s claim according to

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364 Williams 1979, 21, 74.
365 Hellegers 2001b, 425.
366 Crist was hospitalized in mid-November but he wanted to continue in his position. Before his final replacement on December 13, 1945, frustrated Crist even recommended that the worthless GS should be dissolved. Colonel Bruce E. Clarke, head of Section’s Korean Branch acted as the chief until the permanent Chief, Courtney Whitney, joined GS on December 15. Hellegers 2001b, 426.
367 Eventually the few remaining functions of the heir of the Political Affairs Division were assigned to the Legislative Division in February 1948. Appendix G, History of the Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, 847. NDL, GS(B)00513. (date and author unknown)
368 Roest had originally graduated from Leyden University Medical School in Holland, but continued his studies in the fields of anthropology, sociology, international relations, law and economics. His work history preceding a period in the Civil Affairs Training School was colorful. It included lecturing in a small college in Madras, India, studying Australian nationalism, conducting research in Java, chairing the social science department in two universities in the United States, and serving as a marketing specialist in the US Department of Agriculture. After finishing his stint in Japan, Roest returned to the Department of Agriculture. Williams 1979, 57–58. However, it should be remembered that many of the leaders of various staff sections lacked training which would unambiguously qualify them to their positions in occupied Japan. For example General Ken R. Dyke, head of the CI&E, was an advertising manager, Colonel Raymond C. Kramer, first head of the ESS, was a corporation executive, and Major General William F. Marquat, Kramer’s successor, was a former newspaper reporter. Wildes 1978, 8.
369 Criticism is given without mentioning Roest’s name, but Williams has concluded that the target was Roest and his successor Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Marcum. Williams 1979, 58. See: Wildes 1978, 29.
which Kades was assigned to MacArthur’s headquarters because CAD’s Hilldring wanted Kades in Japan to keep him informally apprised of the progress of the occupation. In occupation literature Kades is repeatedly described as a committed New Dealer. His stay in Japan lasted until late 1948 and TAKEMAE even combines Kades’ departure to the end of the reform era of the occupation. When analyzing Kades’ role as party political observer it is necessary to recognize his personal leaning as he made no effort to conceal his preference for the Socialist Party. 

Wildes argues that Whitney could have used the services of the two recognized experts of Japanese politics, professors Harold S. Quigley and Kenneth W. Colegrove, but he abandoned this possibility. This was because his preference of military over civilian aid. The criticism Wildes directs toward the incompetence of the GS officials to deal with the party political questions is more or less agreeable. However, his claim that the unclear assignment related to the political parties would have led to a complete standstill of GS guidance to the political parties is not plausible. The Japanese politicians were not expected to plan and manage their own reform as alleged by Wildes. Moreover, as will be seen, Wildes seems to underestimate the GS’s capability to gain information from sources other than the Japanese press. Similarly, even his own examples speak against the claim that the GS officers would have managed to bring themselves apart from the Japanese policy makers and hence followed a role of neutral observer.

The wartime split between MacArthur’s intelligence organizations continued during the first months of the occupation. General Charles Willoughby’s G-2 strictly dealt with military intelligence, whereas General Elliot Thorpe, Chief Counter Intelligence Officer, led the civil intelligence and the counter intelligence operations. The Civil Intelligence Section was organized simultaneously with the other staff sections on October 2, 1945. It operated under the guidelines that were established in the intelligence Annex to Operation “Blacklist” and later

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370 Cohen 1987, 79. Kades was a Harvard Law School graduate who had worked as legal counsel for the Federal Public Administration and the US Treasury Department before going on active duty with CAD. Takemae 2003, 156.
371 Takemae 2003, 156. Also about Kades as a New Dealer, for example: Finn 1992, 87; Masuda 2001, 16–17.
372 Williams 1979, 35.
374 Cohen 1987, 89–90.
supplemented by JCS directives. Thorpe left his position as the section chief in February 1946 and although he was succeeded by Colonel H. I. T. Creswell, the actual power began to move toward Willoughby. The disharmonious intelligence apparatus gelled after CIS became an official component of G-2 in May 1946.

Although it was once argued in the heat of the fight over the allocation of GHQ/SCAP staff responsibilities, that the special staff sections were made up of civil affairs experts trained and experienced in human relations, social sciences, law, medicine, economics, history, politics and government, the lack of knowledge regarding Japan among the high occupation officials is often emphasized. However, it is remarkable that the middle-echelon officers in charge of political observation all had connections to the planning organizations. Therefore I cannot fully agree with Wildes’ critical opinion that specialist trained during the war were mostly thrown away and occupation officials were in almost complete ignorance of prewar political history. Political observers were aware of the outcome of the planning process. Thus, while lacking experience and

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375 Inside CIS the Operations Division formulated directives to the Japanese Government in matters falling with sections jurisdiction. It also channelled requests from other staff sections for Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) information or investigation, evaluated field reports and performed number of liaison functions such as transmitting counterintelligence information to agencies of GHQ. The Operations Division had several subunits. One of them was the Organizations Branch whose task was to investigate the background of organizations subject to possible dissolution. Parallel to the Organization Branch was the Personalities Branch, which compiled and reported information on ultranationalists, secret police, communist and other undesirables in governmental offices. The last of the subunits, the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) was created in October 1945. Canadian E.H. Norman was the first chief of R&A. The branch’s principal project was the production of a periodical summary of work done in CIS. The first such compilation, the weekly “Situation Report – Japan,” was issued on November 4, 1945. After three issues, the name was changed to “Occupational Trends – Japan and Korea.” Norman began to cooperate with Emmerson, his close friend, when this was helping the counterintelligence to list war criminals as one of his first missions in Japan. Later their careers were bound together. Emmerson and Norman worked together in Japan, they left Japan simultaneously in January 1946 and eventually, were both accused in the 1950s communist persecutions. Paul J. Mueller, GHQ/FEACOM, The Intelligence Series, Volume IX; Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP, July 8, 1948, 2–3, 7, 10–14. NDL, The Intelligence Series G2, USAFFE-SWPA-AFPA-FEC-SCAP, ISG-1, reel 12. See also: Takemae 2003, 152–153; Oinas-Kukkonen 2003, 20, 61.

376 Cohen 1987, 90.

377 See: Hellegers 2001b, 459, 749–750; Takemae 2003, 162.

378 Draft Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, GHQ, SCAP, GS, January 24, 1946. NDL, YE-5, reel 1, document 1-E-1.


language skills and while in short of information\textsuperscript{381}, there was most likely a temptation and aptitude to follow the guidelines provided by the experts who participated in the planning.

Emmerson’s first report on October 11, 1945 repeated the wartime planning concept of the prewar and wartime history while simultaneously suggesting positive prospects for the future of a democratic Japan. He argued that after the defeat there were, for the first time in Japanese history, conditions under which it might be possible to evolve a genuine party government. However, this optimism did not reach the former party men as can be concluded from the following quotation: “Leaders of the old Minseito, Seiyukai and Taishuto are long time Diet members with experience of frustration or political corruption. They lack the freshness of viewpoint to face Japan’s new situation. Many of them, whether by necessity or not, have participated fully in Japan’s prosecution of the war.”\textsuperscript{382} According to the report, the new political parties in Japan could at best reflect little more than the efforts of professional politicians, able to work in an atmosphere of considerable freedom, to assure some political power. This was, nevertheless, not to say that all of the political leaders emerging were insincere. Younger untainted leaders were inexperienced but Emmerson referred also to some men of good-will who were seeking the establishment of genuine democracy. Although Emmerson did not specify the composition of this group of men he considered most of them to be too attached to old patterns to be able to change fundamentally.\textsuperscript{383}

Emmerson estimated that the early political activity would be characterized by the formation of a large number of political or quasi-political groups. All of these groups would most likely demand liberalization, democratization, promotion of welfare of the people and restoration of Japan into the family of nations in their announced party programs. However, after a period of time, these groups were expected to amalgamate. Amalgamations were expected to be divided along the usual political lines into the camps of conservatives, liberals, socialists, and communists.\textsuperscript{384}

\textsuperscript{381} For example: Different versions of \textit{Who’s Who in Japan} were the basic source books for both the first list of suspected war criminals and a list of “Friendly Japanese”. G.A. Abbey, POLAD, Despatch No. 701, November 12, 1946. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 10, folder 16; Emmerson 1978, 254.

\textsuperscript{382} John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945, 1. NDL, GS(A)02522.

\textsuperscript{383} John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02522.

\textsuperscript{384} John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945, 2. NDL, GS(A)02522.
The Liberal Party was considered strongly as the party of Hatoyama Ichirō from the beginning and an introduction of his career was included in reports dealing with the party. Hatoyama was introduced as the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the nationalistic Tanaka Giichi Cabinet and as the Minister of Education of the Inukai Cabinet. Besides criticizing Hatoyama’s term as Minister of Education, Emmerson also described Hatoyama as one of the organizers of the nationalistic Veterans Association. The last claim was clearly learned from the interview of communist leader Tokuda Kyūichi and was not repeated afterwards. An exception to this negatively colored information was a notice that Hatoyama had not taken an active part in the prosecution of the war. Still, although the early reports concerning the Jiyūtō mentioned connections to the Seiyūkai, they lacked all references to the Dōkōkai as an origin of the party. Only after an interview with Andō Masazumi on December 8, 1945 was the Dōkōkai’s name first time mentioned. Details provided by Andō were, however, treated only as his opinion. They were not commented on and did not become a part of the occupation authorities’ view of the party’s history. Professional politicians with a few writers, journalist, diplomats and professors were considered to represent the base of the party supporters. The Liberal Party’s program was learned from Hatoyama’s press interviews and party’s meetings where he emphasized political and economic freedoms, reform of the Diet and the election reform. Hatoyama also preferred monarchy over democracy but stated that his party respects rights of the individual and promotes democratic tendencies.

The feature that political parties were evaluated through their leaders seems to have been typical for immediate postwar reporting. Oinas-Kukkonen also pays attention to the fact that the attitude toward communist leader Nosaka Sanzō strongly defined the general approach toward the party. This kind of emphasis was, however, natural when remembering the un-established party

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385 Hatoyama participated also in Saitō Cabinet although not mentioned in Emmerson’s reports. Itoh 2003, 61.
386 Zaigō Gunjin Kai, in 部隊会,
387 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Memorandum (no date). Interrogation of TOKUDA, Kyuichi, released political prisoner, conducted at General Headquarters, Tokyo, October 7, 1945, 4. NARA, RG 84, box 3, vol. V.
388 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945, 2–3. NDL, GS(A)02522.
389 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 10, 1945, 3. NDL, GS(A)0252; Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Liberal Party, June 20, 1946. NDL, MMA-3, reel 82.
390 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945, 3. NDL, GS(A)02522.
structures and platforms. Party leaders were the first suitable subjects of evaluation. Besides, due to the biographical data provided by the State Department, there was some material on which to base one’s analysis.

As the following quote demonstrates, the Liberal Party was not considered as a perfect representative of the new Japan, but it did not cause a need for any immediate action either: “Hatoyama’s party might far better be termed Conservative than Liberal. Certainly he represents no fresh or revolutionary viewpoint. Until the proletarian parties have time to organize and develop a following, the Jiyuto will probably win most support. It is likely that it will emerge from the first elections as the predominant party. It is represented in the present Cabinet by two members, Hitoshi ASHIDA, Minister of Welfare and Wataru NARAHASHI, Chief of the Legislative Bureau.”

Emmerson was not alone with his positive view concerning the development of the Japan Socialist Party. The occupiers were, however, not blindfolded to the problems among the socialists either. The socialists were considered to be a disunited group and the discussion concerning the emperor was expected to cause problems for the party. It is interesting to notice that the disunity was never recognized as a problem of the Liberal Party, although for example Ashida had referred to its existence within the party. Moreover, MASUDA argues that the decision of Ashida and Narahashi to join the Shidehara cabinet was a shock to Hatoyama. Even before their departure there had been a rising rivalry between the clique of Ashida and Andō with the Kōno group inside the party. Kōno himself explains the opposition by the fact that he was nominated although he was the youngest participant of the party formation movement.

The former GJPA began to attract Emmerson’s attention in mid-October due to the rumors of its revival. Members of this group were said to be anxious to mend their political bridges and retain their dominant power in the Diet. Emmerson reported that an alignment of members was beginning to take shape

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392 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945, 3. NDL, GS(A)02522.
393 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945, 2–4. NDL, GS(A)02522.
394 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, October 18, 1945, 5. NDL, GS(A)02522; John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 3, 1945, 1. NDL, GS(A)02521.
395 Ashida 1986, 54.
396 Masuda 2001, 72.
397 Kōno 1965, 180.
398 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, October 18, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02522.
although no formal steps had yet been taken to organize a party. This group was assumed to be split into two factions. One was made up of members of both the old Machida and Nakajima factions in the former Minseitō and Seiyūkai parties. Since this group has chosen to meet in the “A-1” restaurant on Nishi-Ginza instead of in the Diet building, it was known as the “A-1” faction. Among its reported leaders were Matsumura Kenzō (松村謙三)399, Sakurai Hyōgorō (桜井兵五郎)400, Tanabe Shichirō (田辺七六)401, and Tsurumi Yūsuke (鶴見祐輔)402. The “A-1” faction was reported to have sought and obtained the consent of General Ugaki Kazushige to assume the leadership of the party.403

The other faction was reported to be formed by former leaders of the GJPA who the “A-1” faction had excluded from their own circles. This division seemed not to have occurred along the Minseitō-Seiyūkai lines, since both factions included members from both of the old parties. Among the “ousted” faction were politicians like Kanemitsu Tsuneo404, Ōasa Tadao405 and Tsuguno Kunitoshi406. According to a rumor, this group supported Prince Konoe to become the leader of the party. At the same time the group was trying to sound out the GHQ/SCAP’s attitude. Emmerson could not, however, attest to any differences in the policy or ideology between these groups. Instead, he concluded that both groups represented the reactionary political opinion. Thus, no effective leadership in a new Japan was expected to emerge from this block.407

A bit later it was reported that the threat of splitting into several factions had passed and the united former GJPA would take its place as a new political party. General Ugaki was still mentioned as a leader of the party although Machida

399 Minister of Welfare in the Higashikuni Cabinet, Minister of Forestry and Agriculture in the present Cabinet, and former director of the Minseitō party.
400 Former Army Senior Civil Administrator, chairman, Nippon Typewriter Company, and Chief Secretary, the Minseitō Party.
401 President, Fujigawa Electric Power Company, director, Keihin Electric Power Company, Toyo Spinning Industry Company; and director, Parliamentary Bureau, IRAPS.
402 Member of Machida faction of the Minseitō, writer, unofficial envoy to the United States to present Japan’s case against China in 1937.
403 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, October 18, 1945, 2–3. NDL, GS(A)02522.
404 Long-time Seiyūkai Diet member, former vice-speaker of the House of Representatives, director of numerous Japanese corporations, and chief of the Political Research Bureau in the defunct Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association.
405 Minseitō member, former prefectural police chief, government official, officer of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.
406 Member of the Kuhara clique within the Seiyūkai, one-time adviser to Furukawa and Shimotsuke Banks, five-time elected to the Diet from Tokyo, and former chief of the intelligence and propaganda bureau of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association. Kanji-characters not known.
407 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, October 18, 1945, 2–3. NDL, GS(A)02522.
Chûji also had support for the party presidency. Excerpts from Ugaki Kazushige’s diary markings reveal details regarding the party emergence issue. According to Ugaki, the men who eventually participated in the creation of the Progressive Party had already been active in mid-September. Ugaki’s own view seems to have evolved so that he agreed from the beginning of the occupation that a democratic political party would be needed, but the role he considered for himself varied. First he considered himself too old. However, little by little he began to buckle under the requests for a more active role in the party leadership. Ugaki was not running headlong into the politics and he set three conditions for his progress in the party politics. These were the ability to recruit young talented men, the ability to raise the necessary funds and the United State’s capability to prevent the old military men to return into the political circles. According to an excerpt from his diary on October 19, 1945, Ugaki thought that the American side had nothing against the idea of him coming back to political life. Unfortunately he does not specify the origin of this impression. Ugaki was, however, one of the names that came up repeatedly during the planning as a Japanese moderate. The longevity of Joseph C. Grew’s ideas was, in any case, demonstrated in the Military Intelligence Section’s daily summary that referred to Grew’s book while praising Ugaki as a man who the militarists unqualified. Hence the claim that occupiers recognized his name and accepted him as a possible leader is believable.

Alongside the criticism of the domination of the personalities in the decision making process, the lack of definite party policies was the occupation authorities’ most prolonged complaint regarding the conservative parties. Conservatives’ faults were often demonstrated by making comparisons with the Socialist Party program that was considered to be more detailed and coherent. Inexactness was, however, not the only dubious part of the conservatives’ programs that the occupation authorities discovered. All parties but the socialists and the communists were argued to be pledged to a defense of the emperor-centered

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408 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, October 27, 1945, 2. NDL, GS(A)02522; John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 12, 1945, Appendix III. NDL, GS(A)02521.
410 Ugaki 1971, 1657.
411 GHQ, SCAP, USAFPAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Daily Summary No. 67–1315, November 10, 1945, 6–7. NARA, RG 200, box 43.
412 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, October 18, 1945, 1. NDL, GS(A)02522; John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, October 27, 1945, 1. NDL, GS(A)02522.
national polity known as kokutai. Similarly, the anti-communist attitudes were observed by the representatives of the POLAD who participated in the inauguration meeting of the Jiyūtō. They witnessed Hatoyama’s speech where he vigorously opposed communism in Japan. One reason for this was the communists’ opposition to the imperial institution that Hatoyama was defending. Others were the communists’ policy of dictatorship of the proletariat and their attitude toward private property. This kind of statement was against the spirit of the October 4 Civil Rights directive. The occupiers were committed to a certain kind of policy and Hatoyama’s statement seemed to be a vote of non-confidence, especially because POLAD’s document was missing the parts of the Hatoyama’s speech revealed in the Nippon Times article on November 11, 1945. When introducing the gist of the Hatoyama’s speech the Nippon Times mentioned that Hatoyama had started his discussion on communism by stating that he fully appreciated the GHQ/SCAP’s decision to release the communist and gave them an opportunity to express their opinions. After that Hatoyama argued that the inexperience of the people put them into a great risk of being misled by the communists and thus the attack against communism was necessary.

George Atcheson summarized the outcome of the early POLAD studies in memorandums to the Secretary of State and President Truman. Atcheson thought that the strategy used in implementing the American governmental directives had been politically successful beyond the expectations. He praised MacArthur and the ordinary Japanese people who he thought lacked the democratic experience but possessed the correct mood for reform and change. Atcheson considered the outcropping of the various political parties as a good political sign. He recognized the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party as the three parties that had proceeded with the party formation. He did not believe that much could be expected from the new parties for some time, but emphasized their role as the beginning. The Liberal Party was considered to be most vague in policy and its leadership was claimed to be neither effective nor liberal. However, when Atcheson referred to a potential source of problems, he was pointing toward the communist, not the liberals. The left-wing was thought to be promising but lacked experience and organization. Atcheson’s reference to the potential establishment

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413 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 12, 1945, 2. NDL, GS(A)02521. Kokutai is a shortened version of kokka-taisei and it is the euphemism for prewar Imperial rule. Takemae 2003, 221.
414 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 12, 1945, Appendix I. NDL, GS(A)02521.
of the new dominating conservative group under the possible leadership of either Ugaki or Machida hinted, nevertheless, that the conservative party front was still to face some remodeling.\footnote{Atcheson, POLAD, Telegram to Secretary of State, October 30, 1945. CUSSDCF reel 1 windows 242–246; The Acting Political adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to President Truman, November 5, 1945. FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 825–827.}

The question concerning the emperor was still a split between Atcheson and the Japanese conservatives. Atcheson recognized that keeping the emperor in his position would bring many advantages. Continuity would bring stability and prevent political confusion, but Atcheson believed that the Japanese people would never learn and follow the fundamental ways of democracy as long as the imperial institution existed.\footnote{The Acting Political adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to President Truman, November 5, 1945. FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 825–827.} Atcheson’s opinion, however, did not affect the decision concerning the future of the emperor. Changes had taken place in the US State Department but General Douglas MacArthur was inclined to follow the policy suggested by the Japan Hands during the war. In fact, in his memoirs MacArthur even takes credit of changing the course toward the pro-Emperor line when Washington was veering toward the British and Russian point of view.\footnote{MacArthur 1965, 288.} Hence, from the very beginning the occupation’s top leadership shared two views with the conservative politicians: openness to undisturbed and stable development, and related to that, the retaining of the imperial institution.

Despite the organizational incompleteness, the occupation authorities began to follow the development of political currents. The establishment of political parties was generally considered to be a positive thing. The Liberal Party was the first major conservative party to emerge. The first evaluations concerning the party followed in detail those anticipated during the planning period. The party’s program was obscure and the party was built around personal connections instead of any ideology. This seems to be in line with the findings of Oinas-Kukkonen who concludes that the policy regarding the Japanese Communists that existed before the actual occupation, carried through into the early occupation program.\footnote{Oinas-Kukkonen 2003, 22.} It is, however, in no way surprising that at a time when information concerning the new parties was limited and the general situation was constantly changing, the existing model was followed.
3.2 Background and supporters caused concern

Frosty welcoming of the Shimpotō

The inauguration of the Japan Progressive Party (Nihon Shimpotō) on November 16, 1945, attracted the occupation authorities’ attention. The reception was chilly and the newcomer was claimed to be formed by the elements of the defunct GJPA. Hence, the party seemed to fall within the terms of the Initial Post-Surrender Directive which provided for the dissolution of the GJPA and any successor organization. The POLAD had recommended already on November 9, 1945, that the Diet members who were former members of the IRAA, IRAPS, their affiliates, successor organizations or all ultra-nationalistic, terrorist and secret patriotic societies should be prohibited by informal action from standing for re-election.

Members of the new party realized the problems caused by their dubious past. Thus, the war responsibility issue was considered as a deciding factor concerning the future of the party. The spokesmen of the party tried to convince the political observers that efforts were made to oust those most flagrantly responsible for the war. The party sources were predicting that if the war responsibility issue would not hit the party too hard, they would win the coming election and gain approximately 200 seats. The party leadership was not yet chosen but the names of well-known parliamentarian Saitō Takao, and publicist and frequent lecturer in the United States Tsurumi Yusuke came up. It is not surprising that these recognized names were emphasized, when the party was trying to clear its image. For example BERGER states that the politicians realized at the beginning of the occupation how important it was to attract the occupiers and thus downplayed their wartime importance. Moreover, it should be remembered that Japanese politicians did have channels through which they gained information.

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420 The Progressive Party is said to have chosen the name “Progressive” because it sound good in English. GS, GHQ/SCAP report to the Far Eastern Commission, January 17, 1946, 19. NDL, JW-35-01.
421 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 17, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02521.
422 The actual document has not been found, but Atcheson refers to it in his November 24, 1945 memorandum for the Supreme Commander. George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, November 24, 1945, 1. NDL, GS(A)02521.
423 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 17, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02521.
424 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 17, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02521.
concerning the sentiments in the US already during the war. For example Ashida’s
diary reveals that he was aware of the content of wartime books by Joseph C.
Grew and Owen Lattimore. On the other hand, it is possible that the names of
Saitō and Tsurumi were recognized by the political observers, possibly among
many others, because they were already known due to their emergence on the list
of friendly Japanese.

The presentation of Saitō’s name was not only a political trick but, based on
his own statement from March 1948, he was active in the party movement. Saitō
claimed that the movement promoted by himself, Kawasaki Katsu, Ichinomiya
Fusajirō (一宮房治郎), Ikeda Hideo (池田秀雄), and Tsurumi Yūsuke was side-
dtracked by the former GIPA members who captured the movement to serve their
own purpose. Saitō Takao was, however, a name that had prestige. The
occupiers were aware of the Saitō Affair of 1940 and the CIS finished a study of
the case on November 22, 1945. CIS’s Report introduced the development that
finally led to the suspension of Saitō on March 7, 1940. The line-up of the Diet
members on the question of Saitō’s exclusion was considered to be significant
because the affair was to demonstrate their attitude toward issues like the
militaristic policy toward China; freedom of speech and the rights of the Diet
members; and the independence of the Diet itself. It was also suggested that,
although this issue alone was not sufficient to give a proper political label to an
individual, attitude toward the exclusion, however, represented one’s significant
political commitment. The report stated that the defenders of the Saitō were
among the Kuhara faction of the Seiyūkai and in the Social Mass Party. Moreover,
the detailed report even introduced the viewpoints of 82 individual Diet members
in the expulsion case and introduced the difficulties in which for example
Hatoyama, Andō and Ashida, who had all strongly opposed Saitō’s expulsion,
were driven in their party. The occupation authorities did, in other words, have
the information. Furthermore Wildes’ claims that the Diet members who voted to
expel Saitō fell automatically under the political purge and those who voted to

426 Ashida 1986, 10–11.
427 P. E. Peabody, War Department, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, for the Assistant
428 Saitō Takao’s Report to Friends Throughout the Country on My Secession From the Democratic
429 GHQ/USAFPAC, Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence, from Tec 3 Saffell and Tec 5 Scott to Lt.
Pontius, Research and Analysis Section, November 22, 1945, 1–3. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 3,
vol. V.
retain him were praised.\textsuperscript{430} This is only part of the story. It is true that the pro-expulsion voting behavior was counted as a demerit. Occupiers, however, only seldom\textsuperscript{431} emphasized this case as a positive factor speaking on behalf of the above-mentioned prewar conservative party men. Interestingly, the Saitō case was remembered as a merit when the character and history of socialist leader Katayama Tetsu was introduced in spring 1946.\textsuperscript{432}

\textit{Learning to know the conservatives through interviews}

After the inauguration of the Shimpotō, the four major political parties were the Progressive, the Liberal, the Socialist and the Communist Parties. According to POLAD’s study of party principles, all of these parties supported strict execution of the Potsdam Declaration, economic reform, democratic reforms in the government, respect for individual rights, opposition to militarism, fascism and bureaucratism, and international cooperation for the sake of world peace. Divergence was reported to occur in matters related to Japan’s fundamental political and economic philosophy. The two conservative parties differed from the proletarian parties in questions related to the position of the emperor and national polity, and in the dichotomy of free enterprise and planned economy. The difference in the philosophy of the conservative parties was considered to lay in the progressives’ willingness to institute a limited planned economy and a certain amount of control\textsuperscript{433}.

POLAD’s William J. Sebald argues that the occupation authorities did not often solicit the views of the Japanese in the momentous early days of the occupation. Similarly, these opinions of high-ranking Japanese were not incorporated into the policy. Instead, Sebald considers himself as a pioneer who understood the importance of socializing with the influential Japanese.\textsuperscript{434} I cannot fully agree with Sebald’s statement. The various documents from the first months of the occupation, a time when Sebald was not yet even in Japan, demonstrate the

\textsuperscript{430} Wildes 1978, 116.
\textsuperscript{431} Hatoyama’s activity in the Saitō case was mentioned in OCCIO’s report on April 26, 1946, in other words, just before he was purged. H. I. T. C. (Harry I. T. Creswell), GHQ/USAFPAC, Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence, OCCIO to GS, April 26, 1946, 13. NDL, GS(B)03013.
\textsuperscript{433} John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 17, 1945, Appendix, 3. NDL, GS(A)02521.
\textsuperscript{434} Sebald had first gone to Japan in 1925 as a young United States Navy language officer. During the thirties he practiced law in Kobe. Sebald with Brines 1965, 12, 44, 66.
political observers’ willingness to interview and gain personal contacts with the leading Japanese political figures as soon as they were identified. Besides the interviews of the relevant conservative party leaders during the second half of November, the evaluation regarding the conservative parties were affected by interviews of the other influential Japanese individuals and leaders of the minor political movements who were not only emphasizing their own platforms, but also attacking the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō.

The Research and Analysis Unit of CIS arranged an interview of Tsurumi Yūsuke, Political Director of the newly created Progressive Party, on November 17, 1945. Tsurumi had, however, already contacted the CIS on his own initiative beforehand. GS’s Roest noticed that Tsurumi spoke excellent English and described him as a perfect choice for a contact man with the GHQ/SCAP. Besides the party principles and platform, the history of the party formation, the reason for changing the party name, and present and estimated strength in the Diet were discussed. According to Roest, Tsurumi was able to provide ample and often detailed information on each of these subjects. Eventually another interview was agreed to be held within ten days.435

Liberals’ Hatoyama Ichirō was asked to present himself for an interview on November 19.436 The meeting did not, however, happen. Hatoyama’s diary reveals that he was visiting Kōbe and Osaka on that day.437 Eventually Hatoyama was interviewed after his return to Tokyo on November 25, 1945. Roest complained in his lengthy memorandum that half of the time was wasted on translations because Hatoyama did not speak any English. Similarly, an outline of the party platform that was submitted was condemned to contain only glittering generalities. This led to a conversation concentrating only on broad issues and Hatoyama’s personal attitudes. Hatoyama stated his belief in the need of constitutional reform and in the need of the emperor to share sovereign power with the people. Although the party had not come up with the final decision in the matter, Hatoyama was ready to accept the abolishment of the Privy Council and wanted to see the power of the House of Peers to be reduced according to the example of the Senate in the United States. The Liberal Party was also planning

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435 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Branch, Memorandum for Record, November 19, 1945. NDL, GS(A)00117. Wildes argues that each major party had English-speaking members as a liaison officer to propagandize within the ill-informed occupation authority and Tsurumi, a long-time propagandist, was a champion of this game. Wildes 1978, 30–31.
436 W.E.C., GS to G-2 (Japanese Liaison Officer), November 15, 1945 with P. K. Roest, Memorandum for Record, November 15, 1945. NDL, GS(B)03013.
437 Hatoyama 1999, 413.
to introduce a resolution on the punishment of war criminals and keep the door open for further purges among the administrative offices. According to Hatoyama, this could be done only by political power acting through a strong man in the cabinet. While introducing the liberals’ economic policies, Hatoyama openly admitted to his anti-communistic stance. He recognized the fact that the GHQ/SCAP directive had given the freedom to act for the communists and thus the only method available was to warn the people who were immature and lacked the mental resistance of Westerners against wild and destructive doctrines like communism.438

Hatoyama attacked the progressives by arguing that they were a combination of the old politicians, whose leaders were war guilty. He was expecting the progressives to split into three factions. Hatoyama also assumed that the Socialist Party would increase its present number of Diet members but would still be far behind his own party. Roest concluded that Hatoyama was a veteran politician but not without ideals or principles. Hatoyama’s sympathies were definitely on the conservative side and his liberalism was intellectual rather than practical. It seemed likely that his party would play a moderately conservative role in the earlier stages of Japan’s political rebirth, with a good chance of holding the balance of power if the Progressive Party would split up. Roest evaluated, however, that the Jiyūtō’s strength would not be derived from any leadership in ideas or plans, but rather from the people’s inertia. While Roest emphasized the need for further interviews, he disagreed with the impression that Hatoyama was a pure laissez-faire type of liberal.439

Hence, as a person Tsurumi made a better impression on Roest than Hatoyama. Roest’s evaluation of Hatoyama was not the most critical either. Moreover, he did not try to deny Tsurumi’s ability to represent the Progressive Party. In other words, he did not introduce Tsurumi as an image builder, but as an adequate representative of the party. John S. Service was POLAD’s representative in the interview of Hatoyama. His memorandum of conversation revealed the same details on Hatoyama’s statements as did the memorandum of Roest. The interesting part is, however, Service’s conclusion emphasizing the continuity of separation of party politics and statesmanship. Service summarized that: “Mr. Hatoyama is not impressive as a person of great conviction, forcefulness or leadership. Although pleasant in personality, he seemed more of a “politician”

438 P. K. Roest, Memorandum for Record (date missing). NDL, GS(A)00117.
439 Ibidem.

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Hatoyama, in other words, did not belong to a group of which the leadership of new Japan was expected to be found. CIS R&A’s report described Hatoyama as a pleasant man. The nature of this third version of a report based on the same conversation seems to be less critical toward Hatoyama. For example the case of Takigawa Yukitoki’s (滝川幸辰) is introduced in detail, and the author of the document emphasizes that the law was on Hatoyama’s side in the Kyoto University incident in 1933. Moreover, it is specified that Minister of Education Hatoyama consulted with both the presidents of Tokyo Imperial University and Kyoto Imperial University before his final decision to dismiss the professor. Both of these men, the latter even after being forced to resign after this incident, had agreed with Hatoyama’s interpretation. Thus, the third interpretation of the same interview defended Hatoyama’s actions in the case that was later used against him.

The progressives’ strong position activated other groups. The visit of the Shin Nippon Tō (新日本党) representatives in the GHQ/SCAP did not have a great meaning for the party itself. The group was considered as an unimportant and unimpressive representative of the political confusion in Japan and its leaders were estimated to be of low quality. However, this visit becomes interesting when it is considered as an attempt of an anti-communist and pro-emperor party to make the occupiers take action against the old politicians hiding behind the newly emerged political parties. The Progressive Party’s name was not directly mentioned, but it was obviously the main aim of this complaint. The New Japan Construction Party is another good example of a new group that tried to put pressure on the GHQ/SCAP to take actions against Japan’s old leadership. The party itself did not impress Roest who met their representatives.

More worried voices were heard, for example, in a conversation between POLAD’s Emmerson and Morito Tatsuo (森戸辰男) who was a well-known Japanese economist. Morita emphasized the control of the former IRAPS over the

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441 GHQ/USAFPAC, Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence, Research and Analysis Section, To Lt. Pontius from Sgt. Cole, November 28, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 3, vol. V.
442 Official English name not known.
443 P. K. Roest, GS, Public Administration Branch, Memorandum to General Christ, November 18, 1945. OJP3RRP 3-A-86.
444 Official Japanese name not known.
445 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for Record, December 12, 1945. NDL, GS(A)00117.
446 Later socialist Morito became politically active and even served as Minister of Education in Katayama Tetsu’s cabinet from May 1947 until October 1948. Takemae 2003, 369.
majority of the Diet seats and their strong financial backing. Finally, the Japanese press must be included in the domestic forces demanding the members elected in 1942 elections to bear their responsibility for the war.

Both MASUMI and TOMINOMORI have introduced the early postwar connections between Kodama Yoshio (児玉誉士夫), an infamous racketeer who made a fortune during the war and was convicted as Class A war criminal in Sugamo Prison, and Hatoyama Ichirō. Apparently the middleman in this relationship was Tsuji Karoku (辻嘉六). It is claimed that Kodama donated money for Hatoyama’s party without any conditions, but for example Kōno Ichirō’s nomination as the secretary-general of the Liberal Party was made according to the Tsuji’s strong recommendation. The occupation authorities did not connect Kodama and Hatoyama in fall 1945, though. Instead the rumor that Kodama was organizing his own party came up in official reports. However, the relation between the conservative parties and the dubious money became an issue.

The zaibatsu dissolution was one of the main democratization reforms. This process was linked to the postwar conservative parties, because they tried to protect their former supporters. The prewar Seiyūkai and the Minseitō had been financially backed by the largest zaibatsu, Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Parties and cabinets were seen as representatives of the interest of these economic giants. At first the zaibatsu had supported the IRAA as well, but the shift in the anti-capitalist “new economic order” policy made the business hostile toward the Association. There is, however, evidence that the zaibatsu did not lose their power during the war and they even managed to pressure Prime Minister Tōjō to

448 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 12, 1945, 2. NDL, GS(A)02521.
450 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, October 27, 1945, 2. NDL, GS(A)02522.
451 Literally, the “money clique” or plutocracy, in line with similar terms for the “official clique,” or bureaucracy (Kanbatsu), and the “military clique,” or militarists (Gunbatsu). Properly a collective designation, equivalent to the “wealthy estate,” it is customarily applied to the Japanese combines and to persons or families controlling them. Bisson 1976, 1.
452 Policy model suggesting that the management of the nation’s major industries be removed from owners’ hands and placed under state control, and that all other private economic activity be subjected to governmental supervision. Berger 1977, 330.
appoint a seven-man Cabinet Advisory Council comprising leaders of the major zaibatsu.\textsuperscript{454} The composition of the Shidehara Cabinet supported allegations according to which the relations between the political leaders and the zaibatsu had not weakened. Shidehara, Yoshida, Ashida and Finance minister Shibusawa Keizō (渋沢敬三) were all linked to the major zaibatsu through family ties or personal relations.\textsuperscript{455} Yoshida Shigeru openly sought to protect what he called the “old zaibatsu” and argued on October 19, 1945 that they had done much good for Japan in the prewar period. They also had suffered during the war and thus there was no good reason to do away with them. Instead, it was the “new zaibatsu” created in the 1930s that had cooperated with the militarists and benefitted from the war. The press statement was recorded by the occupation authorities.\textsuperscript{456}

The necessity of the radical reform in the zaibatsu system became obvious when SWNCC 150/4/A was published in September 25, 1945. This was followed by a series of voluntary reorganization proposals from the different zaibatsu. At the same time the Economic and Science Section (ESS) was demanding a complete dissolution. Both the GHQ/SCAP and the Japanese Government made further studies until November 6, 1945 when GHQ/SCAP approved a plan based on the moderate voluntary dissolution plans of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto and Yasuda zaibatsu.\textsuperscript{457} This decision did not, however, solve the problem. Namely, it took years before a detailed plan regarding the treatment of the zaibatsu could be finished. The State-War missions of Edwin W. Payley and especially Corwin D. Edwards’ mission on Japanese companies that visited Japan in January 1946 contributed to this process.\textsuperscript{458} Thus some of the conservative leaders appeared in the eyes of the occupiers as the protectors of the old order. Thomas Arthur Bisson, a pro-China economic adviser to the Chief of GS in 1946–1947, represented a view most critical toward the connections between the zaibatsu and the conservative parties. Bisson did not hide his preference of the Socialist Party over the conservatives and described even the postwar

\textsuperscript{454} Roberts 1991, 352.
\textsuperscript{455} Roberts 1991, 367–368.
\textsuperscript{456} The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, October 24, 1945. FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 780–781; Robert A. Fearey, POLAD, Review of Developments in Japan August 26 – November 20, 1945. CUSSDCF reel 1 windows 324, 331.
\textsuperscript{457} Robert A. Fearey, POLAD, Review of Developments in Japan August 26 – November 20, 1945. CUSSDCF reel 1 windows 324, 331; Yoshida 1961, 150.
\textsuperscript{458} Edwards 1977a, 58–63; Takemae 2003, 142.
conservative parties as mere representatives of zaibatsu interests. Bisson was not in a position of great influence during the occupation and his opinions may embody one extreme, but they still refer to the existence of a negative attitude toward the zaibatsu.

While Emmerson argued in his weekly reports that the Progressive Party would remain as the strongest party in the coming election unless some unforeseen development would occur and GJPA candidates were in an advantageous position due to their superior financial backing and party organization, POLAD’s George Atcheson approached the Supreme Commander directly at the end of November. Atcheson voiced that it was already too late to act according to the November 9, 1945 recommendation prohibiting the run for re-election from the Diet members who were former members of improper organizations. He concluded that it was inadvisable to take such a sweeping restriction because of the closeness of the elections, beginning of the campaigning, and the establishment of the new Progressive Party. The modified recommendation proposed that this time only the “influential members” of the nationalistic and militaristic organizations would be included. Atcheson considered it necessary to obtain a roster of the parties to be able to accomplish this goal and the sources of political funds were considered as an important part of the pertinent details required. This statement was attached with a sentence introducing the widely reported rumors that the liberals and the progressives were secretly furnished by wealthy reactionaries. It is obvious that the recommendation, which called for the immediate dissolution to be ordered if the Headquarters should determine that any party is a “successor” to one of the dissolved wartime organizations, was aimed against the progressives. This became even clearer, when Atcheson stated that the POLAD was endeavoring to check the membership of the Progressive Party members from the list of known officers of the former IRAA, IRAPS, and GJPA.

Atcheson also sent a report to the State Department where he expressed his worry over the power of the reactionary oligarchy that had not disappeared. Atcheson estimated that these quarters would not touch the position of the emperor and not much could be expected from a constitutional reform conducted

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460 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 12, 1945, 2. NDL, GS(A)02521; John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, November 24, 1945, 3–4. NDL, GS(A)02521.
461 George Atcheson, Jr., POLAD, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, November 24, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02521.
by them. Simultaneously the brutally frank program of the Communist Party was in fact playing into the hands of the reactionaries. Atcheson clearly placed the Shimpotō, described as a reincarnation of the former Nippon Seijikai, and the Jiyūtō, said to be sponsored and controlled by traditionalists, among the group of anti-communists who were giving lip-service for democracy. Moreover, Atcheson paid attention to the difference in opinion inside the GHQ/SCAP and stated: "The above estimate of the situation does not reflect that of the Supreme Commander, his main commanders or his staff sections. Their view is very much more optimistic." This quote clearly demonstrates Atcheson’s disappointment with the progression of the occupation. The GHQ/SCAP had not reacted to the POLAD’s recommendation to act against the Progressive Party on time. Therefore the only thing that could be done at the time was to minimize the damages.

It is not sure whether Atcheson was aware of the discussion that took place in the GS. In any case, also General Crist referred to the existing decisions regarding the dissolution of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations in November 1945. Similar demands for the political demilitarization continued in December. Like in POLAD, it was considered important also in the GS to collect a database by which one could search for the background of Japanese officials to accomplish these goals.

The Progressive Party’s dubious background and its expected dominance of the political party field led to an intensified debate around the conservative parties. Information was gathered in various ways. Similarly numerous actors were pressuring the occupiers to take action against the newcomer. While the progressives tried to clean their image and convince the suspicious observers of their desirable character, the liberals attempted to differentiate themselves from the progressives. The conservatives’ alleged connections with the dubious sources of funding were added to the list of themes of criticism toward them. The first signs of disagreement among the occupation authorities began to emerge as

462 The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, November 15, FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 854–856.
463 The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, November 15, FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 856.
464 W. E. Crist, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 1945. OJP3RRP 3-A-94 (exact date not marked); GHQ, SCAP, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, December 6, 1945. OJP3RRP 3-A-98. (page or pages missing, author not known)
465 FUKUNAGA claims that the Jiyūtō had more affinity to Shakaitō than Shimpotō. Thus, if his interpretation is believed, the Jiyūtō’s attempt was justified. Fukunaga 2004, 33.
well. Representatives of the POLAD would have liked to see more active and restrictive policy aiming mostly against the Shimpotō and they did not hide their disappointment because of GHQ/SCAP’s lack of action.

### 3.3 Prejudice strengthened during the Diet Session

**Observing the Diet activities**

The GHQ/SCAP was aiming at free election at the earliest possible moment. Before that the Election Law needed to be amended. This was one of the major objects of the Diet session opened on November 26, 1945. At that time the elections were still planned to be held in January 1946.\(^{466}\) In this situation Prime Minister Shidehara followed the strategy he had adopted in coping with GHQ/SCAP. Although a conservative, Shidehara did not question the occupiers’ determination to pursue a drastic transformation of Japan’s political institutions. Instead, he tried to keep the control over the reform initiatives in his own hands and thus pre-empt direct intervention from the occupiers’ side.\(^{467}\)

The cabinet’s first step, the October 11, 1945, decision to extend the suffrage to women and to lower the minimum voting age to twenty, was praised by the Supreme Commander. The government moved on and presented its draft bill for deliberation on December 1, 1945. The draft proposed a system of large constituencies\(^{468}\) to be used for the lower house.\(^{469}\) The government’s proposal was then discussed in the Diet where the new conservative parties held a clear majority.\(^{470}\) KOHNO introduces the political parties’ demands concerning the amendments of the government draft. He concludes that the reactions of the progressives, the liberals and the socialists were consistent with their respective

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\(^{466}\) Memorandum from Christ to Chief of Staff, November 30, 1945. OJP3RRP 3-A-93.

\(^{467}\) Kohno 1997, 34.

\(^{468}\) The proposal divided electoral districts according to prefectural boundaries and allocated the seats based on population without substantially changing the total number of representatives. Districts were to be classified into three categories based on their number of seats. Number of votes a voter could cast varied from one to three depending on the category in which one’s district belonged. Kohno 1997, 35.


\(^{470}\) Situation at the beginning of the Diet Session: Shimpotō had 277 representatives, Jiyūtō had 44 representatives and Socialist occupied only 15 seats. The total number of seats was 466. Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 2, 25. OJP5RRP 3-B-2. The numbers given by different sources differs a bit. This is most likely because of the changes that took place during the session.
electoral strengths and incentives. The latter two had to nominate new candidates without reputation and thus wanted to change the system in which the votes were cast. The proposed draft was not ideal for the Progressive Party, but it was definitely acceptable. KOHNO argues that it was known that the preferred single-ballot plurality system with smaller constituencies which would favor the old establishment was not going to be accepted by the GHQ/SCAP. Hence, the dominant party proposed only minor amendments.471

KOHNO introduces two reasons why the government’s proposal corresponded best with the aims of the Shimpotō. The first reason was Shidehara’s personal ideology that shared a lot with the Progressive Party line. Yet, the more important cause was the fact that no proposal would pass the Diet without the majority party’s support. Shidehara understood this. He wanted to prevent a GHQ/SCAP’s intervention and handle this issue rapidly without a long-lasting Diet debate. The Diet passed the bill amended by the progressives’ proposals on December 15, 1945. KOHNO concludes that Shidehara’s attempt was not successful because the occupation authorities became suspicious and postponed the election on December 20, 1945.472 Again, this endeavor was successful in a way that the amended Election Law was effective for the April 1946 House of Representative election despite the critical voices among the occupiers in regard to it.473

The GS monitored bill’s passage through the Diet but did nothing to influence its substance. The revised law drew an unfavorable review from the Army’s Military Intelligence Service in Washington, leading Major Pieter K. Roest to pen a point-by-point rebuttal474. When the GS staff split on the wisdom of the revisions, General Whitney called for a formal debate, pro and con, and invited members of other staff sections and the Political Adviser’s office to attend. The majority of the senior officers in the GS, led by Major Milo Rowell voted for changing the new law by directive, but Whitney sided with Roest, the ultra-conservative POLAD representative Max Bishop, and a handful of Junior staff: the Election Law would stand as revised by the Japanese. Two days later, on

471 Kohno 1997, 35–36.
472 Kohno 1997, 37.
474 Roest views, see: P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, December 29, 1945, 2. NDL, GS(A)00117.
January 2, 1946, Whitney held a discussion with the GS staff. The result was still four to fifteen for the opposing faction, but Whitney disagreed with the majority.475

The war responsibility question was another issue discussed during the session. The political parties did everything to exempt themselves from the responsibility. The idea of war responsibility investigation was, nevertheless, not abandoned. Such an investigation could also be used to gain an advantageous position in the forthcoming election. The liberals and the socialists, together with some independents, decided to seize this possibility. They agreed on November 27, 1945 to make a common proposal in the Diet members’ war responsibility investigation resolution. According to the proposal, the wartime Diet leaders should rapidly submit their resignation. The attempt was not successful and the discussion culminated on December 1, 1945 when two war responsibility drafts were introduced in the House of Representatives. The Shimpotō’s draft emphasized everybody’s responsibility to conduct soul searching, whereas according to the Jiyūtō-Shakaitō proposal the members of the Parliament were not only commanded to admonish themselves but the leaders of the wartime Diet and members of the wartime governments should feel their own responsibility and resign. Not surprisingly the Shimpotō proposal eventually won the vote.476

These developments were not unseen by the occupation authorities. Emmerson reported that the discussion and decision concerning the war responsibility issue had ascertained that the Diet members were reluctant to vote themselves out of office. He was not satisfied with the handling of the issue and referred to the Japanese who had expressed the hope that the GHQ/SCAP would step in to clarify the question. Emmerson proposed that a GHQ/SCAP directive would clear the atmosphere by setting qualifications for candidates for the next House of Representatives. He concluded that the parties had failed to represent definite ideologies in harmony with the democratic development of Japan during the Diet session.477 Emmerson, in other words, seemed to be frustrated because of the Diet proceedings. He did not, however, express his own opinion straightforwardly but hid it behind the suitable opinions of the Japanese actors.

475 Williams 1979, 74–79. See also: Hellegers 2001b, 495.
476 Shinobu 1965, 209–211.
477 John K. Emmerson, POLAD weekly report, December 3, 1945, 1, 3. NDL, GS(A)02521.
The third major issue discussed during the Diet session was land reform and the amended Agricultural Land Adjustment Law. The Jiyūtō, which was dependent on the farmers’ support, was not ready to accept the proposal as such and referred to the dissatisfaction among the farmers. The party regarded the government’s proposals as too radical. The liberals’ own program was defined in exceptionally detailed form in questions related to the primary production. This program differed from the programs of the socialists and the communists, because it did not include a demand for the complete redistribution of the farmland and the democratization of farmer and fisherman organizations. Instead, the program concentrated on equalization of tenancy farmers’ rents, subsidizing of the producers, reconstruction and deregulation. The Shimpōtō agreed that the planned compensation for the landowners was inadequate. Hence, the opposition of the land reform seems to be equivalent with the support shown for the zaibatsu. The conservatives tried to protect their old supporters.

GHQ/SCAP, although for different reasons, was dissatisfied with the government’s proposal as well. The amendments accepted in the Diet were considered to be minor and in favoring the land owners’ side. Thus, the occupation authorities intervened in the development and issued an order to the Japanese Government for the creation of a comprehensive land reform program. This program, envisaged to transfer the ownership of the land from the landlords to the tenants, was to be submitted to the Headquarters by March 1946. Hereby the views of the occupation authorities and the Japanese conservatives collided in the land reform case. The discussion around the topic strengthened occupiers’ disbelief in the conservative politicians’ willingness to demolish the structures from which they had drawn their support. Yet, although the land reform did not proceed according the conservatives’ plans, they did not lose their support base.

478 Landlords would keep as much as five hectares of land and 40 percent of tenant-land would be released over a five year period. Edwards 1977a, 76.
482 The government would first purchase the land which would then be resold to the tenants for reasonable prices. Edwards 1977a, 76. PERRY has made an introduction on how this SCAP policy came into being. According to him, it was Robert A. Fearey, a former State Department official who was transferred into POLAD, who together with Wolf I. Ladejinsky of the Department of Agriculture wrote a memorandum which eventually changed GHQ/SCAP’s policy toward the land reform issue. The adopted sweeping policy differed drastically of that outlined by Dooman and Ballantine during the planning process. Perry 1980, 161.
According to Alfred B. CLUBOK, the new group of independent land-owning smallholders identified themselves with conservative parties.483

The above introduced were, however, not the only experiences of the parliamentary proceedings that were considered to reveal something about the parties’ character and tactics. The basic Trade Union Law of December 1945 that guaranteed Japanese workers’ right to organize, strike, and bargain collectively was yet another topic wherein the parties had to express their opinion.484 Besides the mere legislative work, other activities were followed closely as well. For example Saitō Takao remained in the spotlight after he had named Prince Konoe as the man responsible for the “China Incident” and called him a war criminal in the Diet session. Different parties were vying for Saitō and the liberals and the socialists claimed that the progressives tried to build up Saitō in an effort to camouflage some of their more dubious members. Emmerson agreed with this interpretation.485

Emmerson also closely followed the development of the Progressive Party’s presidency issue. A decision in this matter was considered necessary to avoid a party split. Emmerson did not believe in rumors that General Ugaki or Prince Konoe would come forward as a party president at the beginning of December.486 However, after Saitō’s Diet speech finally eliminated Konoe from the race and the Finance Minister Viscount Shibusawa Keizo officially rejected the offer to become a party member and potentially the President, appeared Ugaki who had renounced his military rank as the most likely leader of the party.487 The situation changed, however, in few days and on December 15, 1945, a list of potential names for the presidency shrunk to two names. Emmerson stated that Ugaki would not accept the presidency and assumed that the only remaining alternatives fulfilling the two criteria of possessing enough political prestige to maintain party unity and the ability to effectively raise campaign funds were Machida Chūji and Saitō Takao.488 MASUMI argues that it was the capability to collect money that eventually made Machida the party president. He maintains, however, that the

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483 Clubok 1957, 50, 52–53.
484 Edwards 1978a, 72; Dower 2000, 82, 245.
486 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 3, 1945, 1–3. NDL, GS(A)02521.
488 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 15, 1945, 1, 3. NDL, GS(A)02521.
race in the end was between Machida and Ugaki.\textsuperscript{489} Emmerson did not comment and even less supported the accusations denying Ugaki’s suitability to the party presidency that appeared in the Japanese press.\textsuperscript{490} Emmerson did not state his disappointment because of Machida’s nomination either. Instead, Emmerson made his view understood again by placing the criticism in the Japanese people’s mouths. He referred to critics of Machida who, according to Emmerson, could be found even among the Progressives themselves.\textsuperscript{491} The lengthy process of selecting a leader for the progressives thus ended up in a disappointment. Instead of more acceptable alternatives, above all Saitō or Ugaki, the party decided to move on under the command of a criticized prewar party leader.

The Diet work did not change Emmerson’s opinion on the Liberal Party or its leader Hatoyama Ichirō. He kept emphasizing the Jiyūtō’s conservative nature despite the party leaders’ attempts to make a clear distinction between themselves and the progressives. This view was most likely strengthened by Hatoyama’s first speech in the Diet in which he preached the necessity of preserving the emperor and demanded the recognition of the Japanese limitations on democratic government. Emmerson concluded that that the party had failed to win the support that would have ordinarily come to it from the genuine liberals.\textsuperscript{492} Hatoyama kept struggling to convince the occupation authorities that there was a difference between his party and the progressives also in the GS interview.\textsuperscript{493}

The observation of the Diet proceedings was not the only method of staying informed on what was happening in the political parties but interviews continued as well. Some politicians even tried to actively get in touch with the GHQ/SCAP officials. One of the most frequent visitors was Tsurumi Yūsuke from the Progressive Party. Tsurumi’s agenda was two-fold. First, he was struggling to explain his party’s activities in the best possible way. In his rhetoric this was the same as clarifying the true facts of the current political situation. Secondly, he was trying to learn more about the rumors suggesting that there would be a directive ordering the expulsion and disqualification of present Diet members.

\textsuperscript{489} Masumi 1985, 84. \\
\textsuperscript{490} GHQ/USAFPAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff. No. 103–1351, December 16, 1945, 5–6. NARA, RG 200, General Charles A. Willoughby “Personal-Official File” 1941–50, Daily Intelligence Summary (set II), Nov-DEC 1945, box 59. \\
\textsuperscript{491} John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 24, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02520. \\
\textsuperscript{492} John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 3, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02521; John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 10, 1945, 3–4. NDL, GS(A)02521. \\
\textsuperscript{493} P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Branch, Memorandum for Record, December 24, 1945. NDL, GS(A)00117; Hatoyama 1999, 417.
Despite that Tsurumi described himself as the de facto leader of the Progressive Party and kept criticizing the party leadership, excluding Saitō, his own attractiveness was fading. This was because the political observers had found some unflattering information concerning Tsurumi’s opinions from the wartime newspapers. Tsurumi had, for example, stated that Japan was trying to liberate the East Asiatic races and assure racial equality whereas its enemies where striving for territorial expansion.494

George Atcheson Jr. approached the Supreme Commander with a memorandum that provided an overview of the political situation in Japan on December 18, 1945. Atcheson’s theses were strong, far-reaching and yet seemed in many ways to continue the old views inherited from the planning process. Because of the confusing situation, he was not blaming the Japanese people. Instead, Atcheson declared that the Japanese in general were sincere in their desire to fulfill the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. He mentioned that it was natural for each class of the society to try to salvage its own particular interest or attempt to reap an advantage from the new situation. Atcheson thought that the situation was a promising growing ground for socialism and communism, but believed in the resistance of the conservative character of the Japanese people and bureaucrats. The economic insecurity, the general deterioration of morale, and the lack of leadership were the factors which Atcheson cited as deterrents to a swift but orderly development of the genuine democratic ideology.495

Atcheson was ready to pass a part of the blame to the political parties. According to him, the political parties talked of security of livelihood more for the purpose of getting votes than on a practical basis of workable plans. Similarly, he kept criticizing the way how the war responsibility issue was handled by the political parties. This had led to a situation where the Japanese people, lacking confidence in parties, looked more and more toward GHQ/SCAP for positive action. Atcheson claimed that the party leaders carried a burden of war responsibility and he did not believe in political parties’ capability to produce leaders of the new Japan any time soon. Neither was he satisfied with the groups he called pre-1931 statesmen. This group lacked the flexibility of mind that was


495 George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, December 18, 1945, 1–3. NDL, GS(A)02521.
necessary to meet new, pressing, and unprecedented problems. Still, Atcheson recognized that someone had to lead Japan and therefore concluded that Japan’s leaders should be chosen among those who were the least tainted by war. As for the pre-1931 statesmen, their inflexibility was a smaller evil than the war responsibility that tarnished party politicians. POLAD’s leader leaned toward the group recommended by the old Japan Hands during the war in determining who to support among Japan’s potential leaders. Finally he emphasized the importance of GHQ/SCAP’s activity in screening of the suitable future leaders for Japan and suggested informal contacts to be established between the responsible American officials and these Japanese. Hence, while criticizing political parties on duplicity, Atcheson supported the strengthening of the non-transparent informal guidance of Japanese politics.

The Supreme Commander adhered on Atcheson’s proposal, according to which GHQ/SCAP should sift and investigate those Japanese who may be trusted to direct their nation, and asked the POLAD to develop a list of constructive members of Japanese political parties. Eventually Saitō Takao was the only conservative party politician in the tentative list. Moreover, GS’s officials report to the representatives of the Far Eastern Commission that visited Headquarters in mid-January 1946 followed Atcheson’s thesis in detail. Views dealing with the government’s failure to take initiatives and the reactionary politician’s control over the Diet session together with the evaluations of independent political parties followed the lines of Atcheson’s memorandum that condensed the outcome of POLAD’s three-month political observation into few pages. There was, however, one more change to appear on the conservative party map before the end of the year.

*Establishment of the Nihon Kyōdōtō*

Ninety-two Diet members were non-party-affiliated when the 89th Diet session opened on November 26, 1945 and they formed a Nonpartisan Club. Many of them supported the idea that all Diet members should resign. Others were

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496 George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, December 18, 1945, 3–4. GS(A)02521.
497 R. J. Marshall, Chief of Staff, Memorandum for George Atcheson Jr., December 20, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 3, vol. V.
498 GS report to the FEC, January 17, 1946. NDL, JW-35-01. The mission from the FEC arrived in Japan in December and left to return to the United States on the last day of January.
disappointed in the new political parties’ ties with the prewar predecessors. Some of the Nonpartisan Club members began to work for the establishment of a party and eventually this process culminated in the formation of the Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyōdōtō, 日本協同党) on December 18, 1945, just a few hours after the Diet was dissolved. According to Funada Naka (船田中), those of the Diet members who had been officially recommended candidates in the 1942 election were purged before the formation through a suggestion that they should withdraw voluntarily. Thus, only Ikawa Tadao⁴⁹⁹ (井川忠雄) and Yamamoto Sanehiko (山本実彦) remained as the leaders of the party sponsored by Funada Naka and Kurosawa Torizō (黒沢酉蔵).⁵⁰⁰

The first reference to the Japan Cooperative Party was made in the POLAD report a few days after its inauguration. Observers seemed to be aware of the size of the group (26 members) and rated Kurosawa, Funada, and Sengoku Kotarō (千石興太郎) as the leaders of this new party.⁵⁰¹ This is interesting, because both Sengoku and Kurosawa are on Funada’s list of leaders who had to withdraw prior to the party formation. Therefore, if the claimed suggestion existed, it was not given by the POLAD. Likewise, an intelligence report from January 14, 1947, states that these men are likely to be declared ineligible for future office. Thus, they were still assumed as active participants.⁵⁰² Finally, the cooperatives’ significant loss of manpower in the January 1946 purge also seems to suggest that no pre-emptive purge was made.

While possessing certain fragile ideas on Kyōdōtō’s policy, political observers considered the moment too early and the knowledge of the program and membership too incomplete, to evaluate the party’s popular appeal or future.⁵⁰³ To gain more information, Ikawa and Funada were interviewed on December 24 and 27, 1945.⁵⁰⁴ While Emmerson followed the development of the party political activity, Russel L. Durgin, another staff member of the POLAD, studied the development of cooperative movement in Japan. However, the number of representatives and the name of Sengoku were the only contributions of Durgin’s

⁴⁹⁹ Spelled as Wikawa Tadao in most of the documents.
⁵⁰¹ John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 24, 1945, 3–4. NDL, GS(A)02520.
⁵⁰² CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 5, January 16, 1946, 2. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
⁵⁰³ John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 24, 1945, 3–4. NDL, GS(A)02520.
study that were related to the new political party.\textsuperscript{505} Moreover, there was some uncertainty whether the leaders of the party, could actually claim to represent the cooperative movement as a whole.\textsuperscript{506}

More detailed information was available at the end of the year\textsuperscript{507}. The introduction of the party platform was rather similar in both the documents prepared by POLAD’s Emmerson and the GS’s Roest. The Cooperative Party was said to uphold the emperor system and criticize the communists’ policies in this matter while still advocating the democratic provision of the constitution. The party emphasized the cooperative principle as a base of the industry, economy and national culture. It opposed the nationalization of industries, with the exception of such utilities as telegraphs, telephones and railways. Finally, the cooperatives’ close ties with the socialists were mentioned when the origin of the party was explained.\textsuperscript{508}

Emmerson did not clearly state his stance toward the newcomer and the Kyōdōtō was missing on Atcheson’s January 4, 1946, list of the four principal political groups as well\textsuperscript{509}. It is hard to understand why the Kyōdōtō, considering its size, was left outside. Either Atcheson really did not find the new party to be important or then the explanation is in the character of the report. This report seems to be only a collection of paragraphs and sentences copied directly from earlier reports. Thus, the absence of the cooperatives may be explained because of its late formation. In Roest’s memorandum the party that was reported to have joined the critics of the progressives and the liberals was evaluated in a more detailed way. The formation of the Kyōdōtō was regarded to be a significant step in Japanese politics. The cooperatives were considered as a moderating force and they were expected to play a major role in the future development of the structure.

\textsuperscript{505} POLAD, Russell L. Durgin, Memorandum, December 24, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 11, folder 16.
\textsuperscript{506} POLAD, George Atcheson, Jr., Despatch No. 168 to the Secretary of State, January 5, 1946. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 11, folder 16.
\textsuperscript{507} Roest’s memorandum on these interviews is dated as late as January 16, 1946. However, based on the content, also this memorandum was most likely prepared before the January 4, 1946 since there was no mentioning of the effects of the January 4 purge directive. Moreover, the document lacked markings of the postponement of the election that took place already in January 12, 1946. P. K. Roest Memorandum for Chief, GS, January 16, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-135.
\textsuperscript{509} The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to President Truman, January 4, 1946. FRUS 1946, vol. 8, 88.
of the economic system in Japan. The party’s own estimation was that it would have 80 to 100 members in the next Diet. In short, neither the party nor Roest in his early analysis drew a parallel between the Kyōdōtō and the conservative Shimpotō and the Jiyūtō. Instead, the cooperatives were seen as a competitor to these conservative groups.\(^{510}\)

The most enthusiastic reception of the Cooperative Party can, however, be read in the press review comments of the Allied Translation and Interpreters Service (ATIS\(^{511}\)). According to ATIS’s summary, the new party was on the verge of supplanting the Socialist Party as the strongest single liberal party in the new Diet. The Cooperative Party was expected to be strong in small communities and better equipped to capture a share of the conservative votes than the socialists. Furthermore, the cooperative movement’s decision to go into the election on its own was regarded as a possible factor in swinging the election toward the more progressive elements.\(^{512}\) Although ATIS was not determining the course of the occupation, this report further demonstrates that at first the Kyōdōtō was considered as an important political force closer to the socialists than the main conservative parties.

**Structural changes inside the GHQ/SCAP**

The Public Administration Branch, a group inside the GS responsible for activities related to political parties, went through two reorganizations in December 1945. First it was organized into three working units of Planning, Legislative, and Foreign Affairs. Later the branch was divided into two major groups, one for planning and another for operations. The former was making studies and recommendations and concentrated on long-term objectives. The latter took the action required to discharge the responsibilities assigned to GS and formulated policies and directives concerning the Japanese governmental operations. The operations group was divided into three units of the Internal Affairs, External Affairs and Judicial Affairs. Inside the Internal Affairs Unit,

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\(^{511}\) ATIS was established in September 1942 under the staff of G-2. Service was led by Sidney F. Mashbir. The Services wartime duties included different translation and interrogation tasks, radio interception and culling information from different written documents. One of the main jobs of ATIS in occupied Japan was to translate Japanese daily newspapers. Goodman 2005, 44; Takemae 2003, 18.


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Major Roest was responsible for control of the political parties and societies. Charles L. Kades continued as Branch Chief.513 The replacement of General Crist with Brigadier General Courtney Whitney in mid-December was, however, the most significant of the changes inside the GS. Whitney was Douglas MacArthur’s friend and close ally already from the prewar Philippine years. Despite that Whitney overruled the opinion of the majority of his subordinates in the Election Law amendment quarrelling514, he was, nevertheless, ready to listen to his aides and delegated a lot of responsibilities to his deputy Kades.515

The personnel changed in POLAD as well. Emmerson was transferred from Japan to the United States at the end of January 1946. He was appointed as the Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs in the Department of State. According to TAKEMAE, the reason for his transfer was the emerging difference of opinion with George Atcheson that had begun in October 1945. OINAS-KUKKONEN argues against this interpretation. He backs his conclusion with quotes from the State Department documents where Atcheson praises Emmerson’s work and on excerpts from Emmerson’s memoirs where he describes his being on good terms with Atcheson. Emmerson’s task of following the political situation in Japan shifted to William J. Sebald.516

Thus, the division of labor was redistributed in issues dealing with the Japanese political parties and politicians. One cannot deny the importance of the POLAD and especially John K. Emmerson in fall 1945. POLAD’s era of influence remained short, but Emmerson’s weekly reports were the first detailed studies about the development of the political parties. Emmerson is most often mentioned because of his connections to the Japanese communists. However, even if he was a supporter of the positive policy toward the communists, he did not abandon the basics of the Japan Hand thinking. Although Atcheson, Service and Bisson were openly critical toward the imperial system, Emmerson shared the view of the Japan specialists and did not favor the abolition of the emperor system.517 Emmerson also disagreed with Norman on the case of Prince Konoe

513 Charles L. Kades, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, December 26, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(B)01168; Williams 1979, 21.
514 Williams 1979, 74–78. MacArthur began to rely even more and more on Whitney after his long-time chief of staff Rickhard K. Sutherland departed from Japan. Sutherland was frustrated and disappointed because MacArthur decided to work exclusively through the chief of staff but intended to rely upon aides and section chiefs. Hellegers 2001b, 488–489.
515 Itoh 2003, 76.
and Marquis Kido. For Emmerson, Konoe was a man who together with Grew tried to prevent the war in summer 1941. Similarly he believed that Konoe, Kido and Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori (東郷茂徳) tried to end the war in 1945.518 Emmerson had not, in other words, lost his trust in the old Japanese elite. The prejudice toward the prewar conservative parties and their successors seemed to be another aspect of Japan Hand thinking he still carried.

Conclusion

The occupation authorities concentrated on the observation during the autumn of 1945. The themes through which the Japanese conservative parties and politicians were evaluated during the coming months arose but the final interpretation was left for the future. While representatives of the elitist group recommended by the Japan Hand were allowed to take the lead in the government, the conservative political parties, led by well-known career politicians, were described as groups lacking concrete democratic programs. They were argued to have gathered around strong individuals instead of principles and they seemed to feel kinship toward the zaibatsu and land-owning classes. In summary, it can be concluded that the legacy of wartime planning was significant. Another aspect, speaking on behalf of the continuity between wartime planning and the early occupation policy, was the personnel who were leading the political observation. They all had some kind of relations to the wartime planning. It is interesting that even the Japanese side remembered the views of the old Japan Hands. Namely, when Ugaki praised a US Army Captain, who had interviewed him, as being able to understand Japan, he drew an analogue to Joseph C. Grew’s thinking.519

The first signs of in-house fighting appeared in the GHQ/SCAP. Besides the content, the disagreement also dealt with the structure. It was not clear who had the responsibility over the policy dealing with the Japanese conservatives and what the decision-making and implementation practices were. However, in the time of turbulence the option with the smallest risk was chosen. The easiest option for the occupation authorities was to trust the political leadership to a

518 George Atcheson Jr., Report to the Secretary of State, November 17, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2829, box 1, folder 2; POLAD, George Atcheson Jr. report to the Secretary of State, November 19, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2829, box 1, folder 2; E.H. Norman, Memorandum, November 5, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2829, box 1, folder 2; E.H. Norman, Memorandum for the Office in Charge, November 8, 1945 NARA, RG 84, entry 2829, box 1, folder 2; Emmerson 1978, 240, 273.

519 Ugaki 1971, 1660.
group that was recommended by the experts. Even among those who did not consider the prewar statesmen as suitable leaders in the long run, there was a readiness to accept the lesser evil. In any case, it was emphasized from the beginning that the teaching and learning of the principles of democracy would take time.
4 Purging Undesirable Conservative Elements (January 1946)

“In order that the forthcoming elections may provide a full opportunity for democratic elements in Japan to obtain membership in the Imperial Diet denied them during the years of Japan’s militaristic nationalism and aggression and in order to eliminate from the new Diet the influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, any person who comes within the categories described in Appendix A shall be disqualified as a candidate for any elective position in the Imperial Diet.”

Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.”

UCHIDA Kenzō argues that neither the Emperor’s speech on August 15, 1945 nor the formal surrender ceremony on September 2, 1945, separated the prewar from the postwar in the political parties’ case. Instead, it was the inauguration of January 4, 1946, double-directives that made the difference. The GHQ/SCAP directives “Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies, and Other Organizations” or SCAPIN 548 and “Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office” or SCAPIN 550 are commonly referred as the purge directives. They caused radical changes in the political circumstances and composition of the Japanese political leadership. The purge was the first GHQ/SCAP act that had a severe direct impact on the structure of the

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The SCAPIN 550 refers to the letter of the Potsdam Declaration as an origin of its justification. The spirit of the Potsdam Declaration seems, however, to differ remarkably from the purge order that was referred to as a political purifier directive only a few days after its inauguration. The change in the aims and means of the purge has been discussed by both Hans H. BAERWALD, a former purge officer and a long-time sole authority of the study of the purge, and MASUDA Hiroshi, whose comprehensive study of the purge of certain politicians opens new perspectives to the operation of the purge as a whole.

The purge was initially thought of as a part of the demilitarization program and various individuals were to be removed from public office for the sake of future world peace. The program, however, became associated with the second major occupation project, the democratization. The purge became a mechanism for banning persons deemed inimical to the growth of democracy in Japan. Simultaneously the nature of the purgees changed. Since the removal of those who had deceived and misled the Japanese people to world conquest had been the original objective, the purgees had represented those who caused the war. When the emphasis was placed on the growth of democracy, the persons purged under the directives were in effect defined as being anti-democrats. According to BAERWALD, the purge was solidly based as long as the first objective remained primary. Nevertheless, as the second objective came to be emphasized, the entire objective of the purge became ambiguous. The second approach assumed that democracy was a concept having a definition so crystal-clear that its supporters and its antagonists could be distinctively determined. Also MASUDA criticizes the non-transparent purge and argues that it lapsed into a political tool and its essential criteria and logic was twisted.

The purge was not a short-term reform but a years-long process. The purge and the de-purge orders reflected the change in the general objectives of the

523 Obviously the progressives had lost Ōta Masataka (太田正孝) and Sakurai Hyōgorō (桜井兵五郎) in December 1945 when they appeared on the list of suspected war criminals. The scale of the blow caused by the purge was, nevertheless, totally different. John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 10, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02521.
524 Fukunaga 1997, 52.
525 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 4, January 9, 1946, 1. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
526 Baerwald 1959, 1–3, 10.
527 Masuda 2001, 14–16.
occupation. Hence, it is surprising that the key occupation officials have dedicated only a few paragraphs to the issue in their memoirs and reminiscences.\textsuperscript{528} Douglas MacArthur mentions the Potsdam Declaration as an origin of the purge and claims to have doubted the wisdom of this measure. MacArthur alleges that he put the purge in operation with as little harshness as possible.\textsuperscript{529} Courtney Whitney follows his boss’ argumentation. He states that MacArthur interpreted the guiding directives liberally, and tried, through non-punitive methods, to permit a new untainted leadership to arise in Japan.\textsuperscript{530} While General Charles A. Willoughby praises the purge as a business handled with enormous tact and restraint, he also downplays the effects of the purge and questions the criticism of the categorical approach.\textsuperscript{531} Glibness and minimalistic handling of the issue awakens the question of whether the occupation leadership wanted to forget the purge in which they removed from public life several of the political leaders who were later to become prime ministers and other high governmental officials. Besides trying to blot out the entire existence of the purge, these memoirs simplify its complexity and brazen out the continuous arm wrestling among those guiding the purge policy.

Conservatives suffered the most among the political parties established during the autumn of 1945. It is therefore warranted to consider whether the purge activities were somehow aimed against them. Or was the purge a vote of no confidence for the incumbent conservative government? The relation between the purge and the Japanese conservatives is approached through three different perspectives and the sub-chapters are divided in accordance. The first subchapter introduces the development of the purge directives and explains how the strengthening of the conservative parties affected their birth and inauguration. The second part deals with the occupation authorities’ immediate estimations concerning the impact of the purge on the conservatives. The confused political situation led to various evaluations and proposals for how to proceed in the new situation. The last question under study is the reasonability of a claim that the political purge directives reflected the occupation authorities’ negative attitude toward the Japanese conservatives.

\textsuperscript{528} Yoshida 1961, 148; Williams 1979, 39.
\textsuperscript{529} MacArthur 1965, 298.
\textsuperscript{530} Whitney 1977, 283.
\textsuperscript{531} Willoughby 1956, 311–312.
4.1 Conservatives’ impending domination precipitated the purge

Content of the purge directives

The SCAPIN 548 dealt mainly with organizations and associations whereas the SCAPIN 550 concentrated on individuals. The directive handling of the issue of abolition of political parties, associations, societies, and other organizations obligated the Japanese government to prohibit the formation and activity of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose activity, would be the resistance or opposition to the occupation forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in response to the SCAPINS. Likewise, organizations that supported or justified the Japanese army’s aggressive actions abroad; arrogated Japan’s leadership of other Asian countries; discriminated against foreign persons in Japan; or opposed free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries were to be dissolved. Military or quasi-military training; perpetuation of militarism or martial spirit; and terrorist activities of a different rank were banned as well. A tentative list of the organizations which were considered to fall under the terms of this directive and hence to be immediately dissolved were given in an appendix. The occupiers urged the Japanese Government to do everything to seize and hold in custody all the property of these organizations. In addition, the government was ordered to obtain and submit lists of persons who had served as officers in any of the dissolved organizations and the enactment of appropriative laws and ordinances to carry out the terms of the directive were demanded.  

The SCAPIN 550 ordered the Japanese Government to remove from the public office and exclude from the governmental service all persons who had been active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression or influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terrorist, or secret patriotic society, its agency or affiliate. Besides these general descriptions of the undesirable organizations, the IRAA, the IRAPS and GJPA were mentioned by name and the influential participants of their activity were ordered to be purged. The text of the directive emphasized the urgency and importance of these measures. The postponement of one’s removal came into a question only when an individual was

absolutely required to insure the demobilization of the Japanese armed forces or to carry out the provisions of the directive in question. Besides introducing the methods and the importance of preventing the undesirables from entering into the governmental service and the Diet, the directive that borrowed a lot from the purge policy in Germany \(^{533}\) introduced removal and execution categories in its appendix A.\(^{534}\)

Category A contained the arrested and suspected war criminals. Certain specified positions among the career military and naval personnel, special police and officials of the war ministries formed the category B. Category C included the influential members of the ultra-nationalistic, terrorist and patriotic societies but persons influential in the activities of the IRAA, the IRAPS, and the GJPA constituted their own category D. The categories E and F were dedicated to the officers of the financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansions and the governors of the occupied territories. Finally there was the ambiguous category G which dealt with the additional militarists and ultra-nationalists.\(^{535}\)

The categorical approach was highly controversial because it equated ones position, authority and power. In other words, the occupancy of a certain position automatically meant that the occupant had held a certain power and embraced certain thoughts. The Japanese government offered an alternative to this approach. It was suggested that instead of using categories, a special commission would investigate the careers and activities of persons in question in order to arrive at a decision concerning their status under the purge directive. BAERWALD concludes that the approval of such a proposal would have changed the designation process from administrative to judicial. Utilization of the Japanese government’s model would have complicated and slowed the process. Speed of implementation was considered to be an imperative factor in making the reform effective. Hence the practical problems justified the use of an administrative rather than a judicial process in the implementation of the purge, despite the


concurrent preaching of the concepts of Anglo-Saxon justice and the respect for individual rights.\textsuperscript{536}

\textit{Troublesome childbearing and delivery of the purge directives}

The removal of the ultra-nationalistic and militaristic elements from the top of Japanese society was an openly stated goal of the Potsdam Declaration and the other guiding documents. However, the demilitarization was the most urgent project to start with at the beginning of the occupation. Identification and taking into custody of the suspected war criminals belonged to this process. The emergence of the first plans dealing with the purge did not, however, take too long either. The commander Dever S. Byard, onetime assistant corporation counsel of New York City, worked under the supervision of Charles L. Kades during October and November 1945. Kades later became the officer bearing the primary responsibility for eliminating the authority and influence of active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.\textsuperscript{537} The first drafts of Commander Byard’s plan were apparently distributed around the GHQ/SCAP at the end of October or early November\textsuperscript{538}.

The implementation of the purge diverted from the course of the more or less paralleling de-Nazification and de-Fascization in Germany and Italy from the very beginning. The departments under G-2 had taken charge of these projects in Europe whereas in Japan the GS played the first viola.\textsuperscript{539} The G-2 did not succumb to the leadership of the GS free-willingly and a split developed within the GHQ/SCAP over the Byard-Kades draft purge directive. The rift was bound to the fundamental question related to the nature of the occupation and it emerged between those who believed that Japan should be drastically reshaped and those who believed that a slight face lifting would suffice. Opposition of the drastic purge included the four military staff sections, spearheaded by Major General Charles A. Willoughby, assistant chief of staff, G-2.\textsuperscript{540} Their stance was not, 

\textsuperscript{536} Baerwald 1959, 42–45.
\textsuperscript{537} Wildes 1978, 53–54; Williams 1979, 38.
\textsuperscript{538} CI&E’s Captain Arthur Behrstock was commenting on them already on November 6, 1945. Captain Arthur Behrstock Memorandum to Commander Byard, November 6, 1945. NARA, RG 331, box 2053.
\textsuperscript{539} Cohen 1987, 89; Finn 1992, 87–88. See also: Williams 1979, 38–39.
\textsuperscript{540} Williams 1979, 38. See also: Tominomori 2006, 31–33.
however, built on belief in the existing democratic tendencies but on the possibility of a conflict with the communist world in the future.  

Correspondence between the GS and the G-2 in November 1945 confirms this disagreement. The GS sent a report to several staff sections and the POLAD on November 10, 1945. This report contained a list of organizations that should be dissolved on the basis of existing documents. Recipients were asked to express their opinion and offer recommendations concerning the proposal. The G-2’s reply came on November 19, 1945. Sidney F. Mashbir, the Commanding Officer of ATIS, prepared comments that were concurred in and forwarded as an expression of G-2’s opinion. According to Mashbir, the proposed memorandum was too sweeping and contained organizations whose character might not necessitate their dissolution. He noted the hardship to define the actual purposes of prewar and wartime organizations and suggested that prior to the issuing of the proposed order, steps should be taken to ascertain the present status and the past and present professed and actual purposes and activities of all organizations proposed to be disbanded.

The G-2 was the only staff section that did not concur with the GS proposal. The GS proceed on December and submitted its study dealing with the abolition of certain political parties, associations, societies and other organization to the Chief of Staff. The GS’s General Crist introduced the critique from G-2’s side, but highlighted the wide support for the GS proposal and emphasized that the dissolution had to be forthright and sweeping to be effective. According to Crist, only a little serious harm would be done if a few harmless societies were dissolved in the process. The proposal calling for an enactment of an Imperial Rescript was dismissed as well because it was thought that the Supreme Commander’s orders would never need to get backing from Imperial Rescription to be effective. Crist thus supported the occupation authorities’ independent role as the sole authority of the purge and was ready to accept a few innocent victims for the sake of greater achievements.

The drafting of the directive for removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel also began in November 1945. There is a draft among GS archives.

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541 Shinobu 1965, 246.
543 S. F. M. (Sidney F. Mashbir), Check sheet from G-2 to GS, November 19, 1945. NARA, RG 331, box 2053.
544 W. E. C. (William E. Crist), GS, Memorandum to Chief of Staff, December 1945. NARA, RG 331, box 2053.
which demonstrates that a major part of the eventual SCAPIN 550 was already written over a month before the actual inauguration. Unfortunately the Appendix A of the document dated as November 1945 which should contain a list of categories of persons who must be removed and excluded from public office, has not been located.\textsuperscript{545} Lieutenant Commander Marshall Goodsell’s memorandum to Colonel Kades also lacks the appendix that contained the second draft of the directive dealing with the political disarmament, but is at least equipped with proper dating referring to November 18, 1945. This memorandum testifies that the first draft was already distributed to the CIS and to the POLAD. Furthermore, it refers to a CIS document called “Removal of Military Personnel Directive” that was already written earlier.\textsuperscript{546} A CIS draft memorandum from November 19, proposes that certain persons falling under the terms of proposed criteria should be removed from the public office on or before January 1, 1946. For example all cabinet ministers who had held such a position at any time between January 1, 1930, and August 15, 1945, and all members of the IRAA, IRAPS and GJP were among them. The rest were to be removed before May 1, 1946. The draft also contained a category VI, “Unclassified Personnel” that served the same purpose as the category G in the final directive.\textsuperscript{547}

Colonel Harry I. T. Creswell received the GS draft directive of removal of certain undesirable persons on December 5, 1945. This was followed by Creswell’s and Colonel Mashbir’s memorandum to Willoughby where they criticized the draft. They concluded that the spirit of the proposed directive went hand in hand with the principles of the Potsdam Declaration, but it would be important to implement the provisions of that policy in a practical manner. Categories banning persons from holding public or certain private offices were considered too broad in the proposed directive. Intelligent officers found Japan economically, financially, and politically leaderless except for a mere handful of liberals without political experience and a dissident group of radicals who would promptly cause complete and utter confusion and chaos. Besides the practical reasons, Creswell referred also to the principal reason when arguing against the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{545} H.W. Allen, GHQ, SCAP, Draft Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, November 1945. NDL, GS(A)02536.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{546} M. Goodsell, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum to Colonel Kades, November 18, 1945. OJP3RRP 3- A-98.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{547} Draft, GHQ, SCAP, AG 000.1 (19 Nov 45) CIS, Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government, November 19, 1945. NDL, GS(B)00192. Most likely the above-mentioned insufficiently dated draft is written after November 19 because the style and the wording of the document are closer to the final purge directive.}
proposal. He claimed that the proposed directive assumed everybody guilty until proven innocent. It was hence violating the democratic processes the occupiers professed to advocate. After playing the handy moral judgment card, Creswell finally predicted that the reinstatements which would be necessary to prevent anarchy, would make the Supreme Commander look ridiculous. He recommended that the directive should not be issued.548

Willoughby stated on the following day that the narrow view of the relentless application of the punitive features of the Potsdam Declaration had to be tempered to develop Japan into a democratic nation and ultimately an adherent of the United States. He referred to the failures of punitive features applied to Germany and warned against repeating them.549 The GS did not let the G-2’s opposition stop the process, but approach Chief of Staff a day after. Once again Crist emphasized other staff sections’ concurrence and added that the informally consulted POLAD agreed with the GS-proposal as well. The non-concurrence of the G-2 was discussed at length. Crist stated that the acceptance of the G-2’s reservations and modifications would emasculate the proposed directive and vitiate the policies of the Allied Powers as expressed in the Potsdam Declaration and in the basic JCS directive on the US policies to be followed in Japan. Crist did not believe that the failures of the Military Government in Germany arose from the punitive features of the JCS 1067, but from the occupation authorities’ failure to enforce the directive to the letter.550 Similarly Crist discredited G-2’s argument that the years of 1937 and 1941 should be selected as critical years in determining when those in office either made or prepared for war. According to the GS interpretation, the warlike methods were used since 1931. Eventually the GS dismissed all G-2 proposals and recommended to MacArthur that the proposed directive be approved as written.551

548 Harry I. T. Creswell, GHQ, USAFPAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, ATIS, Memorandum to General Willoughby, December 5, 1945. NARA, RG 331, box 2053.
549 C. A. W. (Charles A. Willoughby), G-2, GHQ, USAFPAC, Check Sheet from G-2 to Military Govt. Sec., December 6, 1945. NARA, RG 331, box 2053.
550 General Christ’s opinion might have been influenced by the trip he made to occupied Germany prior to his official nomination as the head of the Government Section.
551 W. E. C. (William E. Crist), GS, Inclosure to the Chief of Staff, December 7, 1945. NARA, RG 331, box 2053. Eventually the Appendix A of the SCAPIN 550 set the period between July 7, 1937 and September 2, 1945 as the time when certain positions mentioned in the category E were to entitle its holder to the purge. Likewise, the SCAPIN 548 ordered the Japanese Government to submit the name, address, and the position held by each person who had served as an officer of the dissolved organization since July 7, 1937. However, the questionnaire that formed Appendix B of SCAPIN 550 obliged the Japanese actors to introduce their work history; positions of authority or trust; history of military, law-enforcement, intelligence organization service; and publications from January 1, 1931 to
While the GS and the G-2 battled over the general course of the purge, the POLAD approached the issue through the Diet and the political parties. This was not surprising when considering the Political Advisers’ assignments. POLAD’s Atcheson argued on behalf of the political purge already on November 9, 1945 by suggesting appropriative means to be taken to insure that the reactionary Diet members would not return to office after the election. Atcheson did not believe that the election would produce a democratic Diet. This was because the weakness and inexperience of the democratic political party organizations would prevent any effective competition with the reactionary politicians. Atcheson’s proposal to solve the problem was anything but transparent. Atcheson hypocritically stated that the interference in the election was naturally out of question as a matter of principle, but argued that the Potsdam Declaration justified the occupation authorities to give non-public oral instructions to Premier Shidehara that the present Diet members were obstacles to the revival of democratic tendencies and should not stand for re-election.552

At the end of the month Atcheson thought that it was already too late to act according to this proposal because of the election campaign and the establishment of the Progressive Party.553 The POLAD, however, recommended that a list containing Diet members nominated by the IRAPS and those active in the GJPA be prepared. This initiative was put aside when it was learned that the CIS was already making such a list. The Political Adviser furnished the CIS with the material in its possession.554

The POLAD was not the only group worrying the outcome of the election if the GHQ/SCAP was not to intervene in the development. At the end of November 1945 the Office of the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer (OCCIO) prepared a memorandum recommending that steps need to be taken to bar persons who furthered the war against the Allies from the election to the next Diet. GS’s Crist


552 George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, Memorandum for Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff, November 9, 1945. NARA, RG 331, entry 1897, box 1, folder 2.
553 George Atcheson, Jr., POLAD, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, November 24, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02521.
554 George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff, December 10, 1945. NARA, RG 84, box 3, vol. V.
did not warm up to these initiatives. He believed that the part of the problem raised by the OCCIO was already answered in a proposed order to the Japanese Government on dissolution of nationalist, militarist and secret organizations. Similarly, a paper prepared by the GS and discussed with all interested staff sections on December 1, dealing with the removal of undesirable persons from public office, had solved similar questions. Anyhow, as also revealed in a memorandum of December 6, 1945, the purge was expected not only to carry out the demands of the controlling directives but also to exclude undesirable persons from the coming Diet.

Discussion about political purge did not stay inside the Dai Ichi building. Japanese newspapers reported on December 21 that the GHQ/SCAP would take steps to disqualify from the candidacy to the House of Representatives former leaders of the IRAA and its successor organization. An alternative rumor proposed that all the Tōjō-recommended Diet members who were elected in the 1942 elections would be disqualified. At this occasion the POLAD referred to its old suggestion of banning from candidacy the Diet persons in certain categories. Atcheson believed that such an act would be welcomed by a large percentage of the Japanese people. He recommended that the directive dealing with this matter should be issued with minimum delay because the rumor was already spreading. Hesitating would mean that the parties could not select candidates, campaign issues would remain confused, and the constructive process of establishing a democratic form of representative government could not begin. Atcheson also recommended the postponement of the election for at least a month.

The progressives were expected to emerge as the biggest party if the purge directive would not materialize. They would gain 200 or more seats whereas the liberals and the socialists would get 100 to 150 seats each. Hence, the total number of seats of these two would outnumber the progressives. The potential disqualification of the IRAA, the IRAPS and the GJPA members was expected to cause an almost fatal blow to the progressives. Even the leaders of the Shimpotō thought that the rumored directive would have a destructive influence

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556 GHQ, SCAP, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, December 6, 1945, 2. OJP3RRP 3-A-98. Page(s) missing at the end of the document, no signature.
557 George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, Memorandum for Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff, December 24, 1945. NDL, GS(A)02520.
558 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, December 24, 1945, 1–2. NDL, GS(A)02520.

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on their party. The purge seemed, thus, to offer a way to assure that the old order would not continue in the new Diet.

The question of banning the wartime leaders from the race for the Diet seats was also discussed when the GS determined whether the December 1945 Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives would provide a basis for a free and democratic election. Pieter K. Roest considered, at the end of the month, that the law made free election possible but hinted that a forced elimination of wartime leaders from the race might be the only way to induce the people to choose new representatives. Roest was more straightforward immediately after the purge directives were promulgated. He concluded, and a group of other GS leaders concurred, that the vast majority of the totalitarians and war-collaborators of the old Diet had been in the Progressive Party. Roest claimed that the main danger for the next Diet was gone because the purge had hit the leadership and the members of the party hard. He argued that as an outcome of the purge, the whole question of Election Law had to be judged in a somewhat different light. It was no longer a question of whether it would give new men a chance, but whether it would give every group an equitable chance for success.

Eventually MacArthur approved the purge orders and personally decided that they should be issued on January 4, 1946. The purge had a direct effect on the election plans. The Japanese government had selected January 22, 1946 as an election day, but the need for postponement became obvious after the release of the purge. On January 12, 1946 the GHQ/SCAP issued a directive that approved the election to be held only after March 15, 1946. Thereupon the Japanese Government decided to hold the election on March 31. This decision was overruled at the end of February since further postponement was needed in order to finish all the actions presupposed by the implementation of the purge directives. Finally, on February 25, it was announced that the first postwar general elections would be held on April 10, 1946.

559 Gayn 1981, 44.
560 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, 29 December 1945. NDL, GS(A)00117.
561 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, 5 January 1946. NDL, GS(A)00071.
562 Finn 1992, 83.
563 Uchida 1987, 323.
564 Summation of non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 4, 19. OJP3RRP 3-B-4; Summation of non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 5, 31. OJP3RRP 3-B-5.
Interpreting the meaning of the purge directives

At first the interpretation of the purge directives and the role of the purgees were unclear. For example Tsurumi openly admitted in press that the purgees were talking about their comebacks only a few days after they were purged and some of them were planning to guide the newcomers who aspired to make their debut on the political scene. Thus, the promulgation of the purge directives was only the beginning of series of conferences between the occupiers and the representatives of the Japanese Government for the purpose of working out an acceptable interpretation of the directives. The Japanese Government questioned the advisability of following the Appendix A as such. It was argued that the positions of a large number of persons, whose names appear on the list of the leading members of several objectionable organizations, had actually been only nominal and sinecure. Many of them had, in fact, acted openly against militaristic nationalism. Appeals were not listened to and on February 9, 1946 cabinet announced that with the utmost likelihood those persons who ran for office in the 1942 elections as recommended candidates would fall into the Category G. It was hoped that such persons would refrain from declaring their candidacy in the upcoming election. Even the non-recommended candidates were asked to exercise sufficient self-restraint. No official GHQ/SCAP document, however, provides such a direct connection between Category G and the 1942 elections. The official interpretation of the various categories was made in mid-February, but category G took until March 10.

The Japanese Government’s announcement was followed by a rumor according to which a GHQ/SCAP spokesman would have said that the cabinet had interpreted the directives more strictly than GHQ/SCAP had expected. The statement was repudiated by an official denial but an unfortunate impression of

565 Yoshida Shigeru acted as the representative of the Japanese Government and tried unsuccessfully to meet the Supreme Commander immediately after the directives were promulgated and the GS's Courtney Whitney received him only five days later. Iokibe 2007, 212–214.
567 GHQ, SCAP, Richard J. Marshall, AG 091.1 Staff Memorandum No. 2, January 21, 1946, Informal and Confidential. NDL, GS(B)00909. (date unknown but the archival context and the content of the document refer to January 1946.)
568 Masumi 1985, 95; Uchida 1987, 323.
569 Uchida 1987, 323, 337.
indecision had been given. Occupation leadership had tried to prevent this kind of event with a January 21 staff memorandum which presupposed that no interpretation or opinion relating to the application of the purge order be given to any Japanese national or organization. All Japanese making such inquiries were to be referred to the Japanese Government.

The GHQ/SCAP issued a statement on February 18, to clarify the directive concerning the abolition of political parties, associations, societies and other organizations. Imperial Ordinance defining 120 organizations determined to be dissolved was published a week later on February 24. Twenty-seven of these organizations were mentioned in SCAPIN 548 whereas the rest ended up on the list after the evaluation of the Japanese Government. Article 5 of the ordinance provided that political parties must report pertinent details in matters of names and addresses of the party officers, histories of personnel, and the names and addresses of the monetary patrons and the amounts of their donations if in excess of 1000 Yen.

Eventually three separate groups in the Japanese government conducted a review of the public office holders and applicants during 1946. The first group consisted of the chief of the Cabinet Secretariat and other officials of the cabinet and the Home Ministry. This group was to examine the qualifications of candidates for the April election. The second committee was established subsequent to the issuance of the Imperial Ordinance No. 109, on February 28 which translated the terms of the SCAPIN 550 into Japanese Law. The committee, also headed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi Wataru, had two tasks. It prepared the March 10 and May 16 interpretations of the initial purge directive and screened all high-level officials in the various ministries. The third committee came into existence in June.

It has been envisaged in an OSS memorandum on April 9, 1945 that it would be difficult to identify the personnel who should be removed from different offices and posts after the defeat. It was noted that the situation in Japan differed a

570 GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political report (1 February to 19 February 1946), no date. NARA, RG 331, box 2134, folder 20.
571 GHQ, SCAP, Richard J. Marshall, AG 091.1 Staff Memorandum No. 2, January 21, 1946. NDL, GS(B)00909.
574 William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, March 5, 1946, 2. NARA, RG 84, box 11, folder 24.
lot from that in Nazi Germany. There were no comprehensive criteria of political undesirability in Japan and the determination of those who would be liable to assist in the occupation would be hard. Removal of all high officials, even if desirable, was seen as an inoperative option because many of the most dangerous elements had held relatively minor positions.\(^{576}\) However, the criteria that were destructive from the conservative politicians’ point of view were created in the form of lists of war criminals and categories of the purge directive. Yet, just like the OSS officials had visioned, this matter and those criteria never became unanimously accepted even among the occupation authorities. The final decisions on who should be displaced were made only after the beginning of the occupation in autumn 1945. The need to purify the Japanese Diet from the reactionaries who were active in conservative political parties was one reason behind the inauguration of the purge directives already on January 4, 1946, i.e. before the first postwar House of Representatives election.

4.2 Purge caused damage especially among conservatives

The purge’s effect on the future of the Shidehara Cabinet

The immediate effects of the purge directives were significant. They caused rearrangements, resignations, removals, and promotions inside the government, the Diet, and the political parties. Some of the ministers of the Shidehara Cabinet fall under the purge terms and this fuelled criticism against the cabinet which did not resign but went through various reshuffles. The most important changes were the transfer of Mitsuchi Chūzō (三土忠造) to lead the Home Ministry on January 13 and the nomination of Murakami Giichi (村上義一) into the Ministry of Transportation on January 26. Narahashi Wataru was made the Chief Cabinet Secretary on January 13 when he also left the Liberal Party.\(^{577}\)

The occupiers observed the cabinet’s problems. POLAD’s Atcheson was first to react. He sent a secret memorandum to MacArthur already on January 4, 1946,
where he suggested that in the event of a resignation of the Shidehara Cabinet, the leaders of the Socialist Party be entrusted with the formation of the new government. He reasoned that because of the lack of experienced leadership, it would be wise to place the responsibility for government squarely upon the shoulders of an organized political party. The socialists were the only major group relatively unaffected by the purge among the political parties. Moreover, Acheson concluded that although the party’s leadership was untried, the party appeared to be the most hopeful political party from the standpoint of serving the objectives of the occupation. The party also seemed to enjoy an important degree of popular confidence and support of the press. Despite adding that the cabinet should also contain outstanding individuals or representatives from other groups, Acheson clearly stated his preference of the socialists over conservative groups.

Emmerson’s report dealing with the short life-expectancy of the cabinet came three days after the promulgation of the directives. He referred to evaluations according which the prime minister had lost the confidence of the people and new leadership was needed. Likewise, the opinion according to which the GHQ/SCAP would inevitably be forced to take more direct part in the administration of Japan seemed to increase among the Japanese. This time Emmerson also ventured to express his opinion exceptionally directly in the form of a recommendation: “In the present situation, it would therefore seem to be the wisest course to direct power into the hands of those who will have some intensive to accomplish constructive results. The political parties are on trial; if there is hope in democratic government for Japan, then political parties under leadership untainted by war responsibility, should be given the opportunity to prove themselves.” In other words, Emmerson’s trust on the Shidehara Cabinet was fading and he agreed with Acheson’s December opinion that the war responsibility was the most aggravating de-merit that needed to be removed from the new leadership. Finally, he also seemed to support occupiers’ active role in directing the re-distribution of political power.

This weekly report turned out to be the last prepared by Emmerson. The State Department transferred him to Washington in mid-January and he sailed back to the United States with the FEAC mission representatives at the end of the

578 POLAD, George Acheson Jr., Memorandum for the Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff, January 4, 1946. NARA, RG, 84, box 10, folder 16.
579 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, January 7, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02520.
580 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, January 7, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02520.
month. This departure did not paralyze POLAD’s political observation. William J. Sebald arrived at Japan in early January and inherited Emmerson’s assignment. The role of Max Waldo Bishop, a representative of the pro-Japanese viewpoint, likewise began to be more significant. Russel L. Durgin often acted as an interpreter and political analyzer when POLAD interviewed Japanese politicians who actively looked for chances to introduce their viewpoint to occupiers.

Max W. Bishop’s talk with Narahashi Wataru on January 8 is an example of a new surge of contacts. Narahashi, at that time still the Chief of Cabinet Legislative Bureau, introduced three different views existing inside the cabinet regarding future actions. They were a resignation en bloc with no further participation, a re-shuffle with five or six new members, or a resignation en block with the purpose to form a new cabinet under Shidehara that would include some political party representation. Narahashi favored the third option, and argued that Shidehara was the only man under whose leadership impartial and honest elections could be held. Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru was the only politician Narahashi could regard as equal with Shidehara among the entirely politically neutral forces capable of assuring the principles of fair play. Apparently Narahashi sensed that the occupiers’ side might consider the option of supporting a sole political party cabinet and hence disclaimed such a possibility. He argued that the political parties, socialists as well as everybody else, would inevitably try to capitalize on the situation should the government be entrusted for them.

581 OINAS-KUKKONEN and TAKEMAE interpret the reasons behind this change differently. TAKEMAE suggests that the emerging disagreement between Emmerson and Atcheson caused the transfer. OINAS-KUKKONEN argues against this interpretation. He emphasizes proof according to which Atcheson valued Emmerson’s work and their personal relations were good. Discussion concerning the preferred governmental solution immediately after the purge directive was inaugurated seems to support OINAS-KUKKONEN’s view. Oinas-Kukkonen 2003, 61–62; Takemae 1987, 350.

582 A US Naval Academy graduate who had served as a language officer with the US embassy in Tokyo from 1925 to 1928. He had returned to Japan in 1933 to practice law in Kobe. In 1939 he joined the Navy as a Lieutenant Commander. Takemae 2003, 151.

583 Sebald had been hired as an expert of Japanese law, but Atcheson urged him to learn as much as possible about the political situation in Japan. Sebald with Brines 1965, 42.


585 POLAD, Max W. Bishop, memorandum to the Secretary of State, February 18, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 10, folder 16.

586 POLAD, Max W. Bishop, Memorandum of conversation, January 8, 1946. NARA, RG 226, box 390, XL 36630.
Besides POLAD, Narahashi was eager to socialize with the members of the Government Section as well. He entertained several officers of the GS Public Administration Branch during the first half of January. After becoming the Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi invited the whole branch to a dinner that was held in the home of Ishibashi Shōjirō (石橋正二郎), the head of the Japanese Bridgestone Rubber Company.\textsuperscript{587} Harry Emerson Wildes argues that such parties were in fact frequent and the guests were entertained lavishly. By providing female companionship and other entertainment, Narahashi established channels through which he could informally approach various occupation authorities. Of the individual officers Wildes mentions Charles A. Kades with whom Narahashi could speak French.\textsuperscript{588} It should be remembered that the general tone of Wildes’ book is highly critical toward the occupation. There are, however, certain aspects backing his claims. Namely, Narahashi introduces his warm ties with the occupiers in a boastful manner in his later book. Besides mentioning, for example, his influence on POLAD’s Atcheson and Sebald, Narahashi introduces his friendly relations with Kades and Alfred R. Hussey from the GS.\textsuperscript{589}

Besides being an informant, Narahashi was considered to possess remarkable political power as well. An account at the end of the January 1946 introduced Narahashi and Yoshida as the two most influential members of the cabinet who might overshadow even Premier Shidehara in the inner cabinet circles. The US State Department analysis of the situation that was based on FBIS reports saw also eye-to-eye with arguments made by Narahashi. It was concluded that if the Shidehara Cabinet was to fall, there would probably be no individual or group prepared with personnel, parliamentary support, and a workable program to assume the responsibility for forming a new and better government. While the Shidehara Cabinet could show only few accomplishments, the political upheaval attendant upon successive cabinet changes would add to the already excessive political confusion. Moreover, since the general elections were soon be held and followed, presumably, by the formation of a cabinet based on the resulting

\textsuperscript{587} Charles L. Kades, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, January 21, 1946. NDL, GS(B)01167. Besides being affiliated with Narahashi, Ishibashi was Hatoyama Ichirō’s important financial supporter and his home in Azabu was the Jiōto’s de facto office during the early days of the postwar period. Later Ishibashi’s daughter married Hatoyama’s son and sealed the alliance between the two families. Itoh 2003, 77–78. See also: Briness 1948, 197.


\textsuperscript{589} Narahashi 1968, 64–65, 92, 95. Later, in December 1973, Kades criticized Narahashi and argued that some GS officials, most notably Hussey and Carlos Marcum, liked and promoted the assumed protégé of Shidehara, while others mistrusted him. Hellegers 2001b, 781–782.
balance of power in the Diet, the continuance of the Shidehara Cabinet was considered to be more desirable than its immediate demise. Despite that POLAD recommended a cabinet build around the non-conservative political party, despite Shidehara’s new cabinet nominees were disappointment to the GS, and despite Japan’s domestic forces demanded the resignation of the cabinet, the occupation leadership trusted in Shidehara. Shidehara offered to resign but he was forced to continue by an ultimatum communicated through Foreign Minister Yoshida according to which MacArthur would never accept him as a premier should he resign in January 1946. Hence the occupation did not only use power to remove unwanted persons but also to pressure the suitable persons to stay in power. The GHQ/SCAP considered the leadership of the old Shidehara-Yoshida line as the only possible choice prior to the first postwar House of Representatives election. An extract from Ashida Hitoshi’s diary backs up this conclusion. The Health and Welfare Minister Ashida belonged to the supporters of the cabinet resignation, but thought that the GHQ/SCAP was afraid that the extreme left would fill the vacancy left by the resignation of the Shidehara cabinet. What the occupiers did not, however, allow was Shidehara’s wish to announce a statement which would explain the nature of the criteria-based approach. Shidehara was concerned over the great losses of the Shimpōtō and wanted to explain that the purge affected everybody fitting in one of the categories regardless of one’s personal activity.

**Conservative parties in the shifting sands of the purge**

Among the political parties, the leadership of the Progressive Party was the most seriously affected by the purge in its initial stage. The party had held majority

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593 FBIS report that was based on open source intelligence information suggested that Narahashi and Yoshida forced Shidehara to decide in favor of resignation. Yet, the occupation authorities forestalled Shidehara Cabinet’s plans to resign. DOS, Office of Research and Intelligence, Division of Far East Intelligence, Situation Report – Japan. R&A 3479.2., January 23, 1946, 8–10. OSS/SDIRR reel 2 document 19.
594 Ashida 1986, 64.
during the December Diet session, but only 27 of its wartime Diet members remained unaffected. The first estimations did not promise a lot for the party and GS’s Roest stated on January 5 that: “The leadership and many of the members of this Party are now disqualified. It is highly probable that the Party will disintegrate as such, although some of its members may form a new Party or run as Independents.” Emmerson attested a few days later that there was a consensus according to which the progressives could not continue to exist as a party. The intelligence authorities were a bit more cautious but concluded that the purge toppled the Progressive Party from its dominant position and lessened the chances of any single party gaining a majority in the coming Diet election. Roest agreed with this conclusion. In mid-January the GS still adhered to reports indicating that two groups were forming within the party. Besides, the progressives were claimed to have realized their weakened position and therefore oppose the formation of a coalition party government. The Progressive Party president Machida Chūji and a number of other influential party members resigned on February 18, 1946. This was also the day when the GHQ/SCAP issued a statement asserting that the continued political activity of an individual affected by the purge directive might bring the political party of which he was active within the terms of the political parties’ directive and require its dissolution. Minister of Commerce and Industry Ogasawara Sankurō had announced his decision to resign the party already on January 25. Eventually Saitō Takao was the only senior party member who escaped the purge. Saitō was not selected as the new party president. This position was left vacant and the party continued under the leadership of the Executive Committee until the elections.

The leaders of the Shimpotō did not, however, give up easily. The time between the promulgation of the purge directive and its execution on February 28, 1946, was a period of struggle. Tsurumi Yūsuke did his utmost to convince the occupiers that even if the principle behind the purge was agreeable, it should not

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595 Baerwald 1959, 84; Uchida 1987, 323–324.
596 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, January 5, 1946. NDL, GS(A)00071.
597 John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, January 7, 1946, 1. NDL, GS(A)02520.
598 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 5, January 16, 1946, 1–2, 4. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091; GS report to the FEC, 26, January 17, 1946. NDL, JW-35-01.
599 GS report to the FEAC, January 17, 1946. NDL, JW-35-01.
600 Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 4, 27. OJP3RRP 3-B-4; Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 5, 32. OJP3RRP 3-B-5; D. R. N. (Donald R. Nugent), C, CI&E to OCCIO, April 3, 1946, 2. NDL, BAE-122.
be too strictly enforced. Tsurumi wrote a letter to MacArthur on January 10, he met CI&E’s General Kermit R. Dyke on January 16 and managed to talk with William J. Sebald, Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson, George Blakeslee and Emmerson on that same day. The last discussion originated a document introducing the purge’s possible adverse effects on the political situation in Japan. The document was requested by Blakeslee who was visiting Tokyo as a member of the FEAC Commission. POLAD’s Sebald continued this discussion in a report where he expressed worried remarks concerning the future of Diet activities if the most experienced politicians were to be lost. He considered that a backbone of experienced leaders should be available to guide Diet activity and prevent the emergence of a kind of zoo that was characteristic of the prewar Diet.

These ideas found their audience from the new leadership of the Civil Intelligent Section. CIS’s H. I. T. Creswell thought that the purge had gone too far and numerous good men were lost for the future leadership of the country. He urged that the occupation headquarters should make exceptions in such cases. His proposal, however, crashed in Whitney’s stubborn resistance of any kind of exceptions which might cause disturbance in the follow-through of reform. Whitney thought that it was better to chance a few injustices and a few unnecessary losses to the national scene than to yield the firm control the GHQ/SCAP appeared to have secured in that matter. Whitney also criticized the officers who had a long background in Japan. Whitney did not deny their value to the occupation, but emphasized their tendency to be biased in their judgments in cases where persons they had known before were involved. It is not unambiguous against whom this criticism was aimed but POLAD officers and Blakeslee might have been its targets.

It is interesting that while POLAD’s Sebald and the CIS were criticizing the lost of many capable leaders, they simultaneously warned against underestimating the Shimpōtō in the coming election despite the damage caused by the purge. Reports of the political activity of prefectures indicated that the party and the

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601 Tsurumu Yusuke to William J. Sebald, Tokyo, 25 December 1947, 1. NDL, GS(B)03626; Max W. Bishop, POLAD, Transmitting Memoranda Prepared by TSURUMI Yusuke, February 11, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02520.
602 William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, February 18, 1946, 2. NDL, GS(A)02519.
other conservative political elements continued to be potent political forces. The nature of the new candidates was questionable because there were rumors that the old leaders would do their utmost to prevent any major change in Japanese politics. They would act behind the curtains and manipulate their henchmen whom they would push to the surface as new candidates. The change of personnel would not, in other words, necessitate any change in policy. It thus seems that Sebald and representatives of the CIS were not speaking on behalf of the Shimpotō while advocating the importance of the experience but took merely a conservative stance and warned against too radical changes imposed by the GS that was running the purge.

Representatives of the GS Public Administration Branch interviewed the Executive Director of the Progressive Party Saitō Takao on February 21, 1946. Interviewers were aware of the interviewee’s anti-militaristic actions in the prewar period and felt it relevant to explain why the purge directive must necessarily include some healthy tissue to be cut away from the infected parts of the body of politics. Saitō accepted the explanation and was convinced that nobody in his party believed that the purge would be motivated by the individual resentment or the private grudge. Saitō’s personal position was secured and Wildes concluded that Saitō was definitely not on the list of those to be excluded. This conclusion typifies the positive image of Saitō that seems to have existed among the political observers. The image was most certainly strengthened by Saitō’s alleged insistence not to follow the old policy of soliciting funds from the business houses on the promise of favors to be returned after election. Generally it was thought that the resignation of Tsurumi as the chief secretary and the party whip, together with Machida and other senior members, appeared to have forced a complete house-cleaning within the party that was not expecting to win the majority in the coming election. Instead, Saitō showed the green light for the conservative coalition but doubted the probability of cooperation with the communists or the socialists. Some kind of limitation of conservative cooperation was, however, Saitō’s critique of the leadership of the

604 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 9, February 13, 1946, 5. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091; William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, February 18, 1946, 2. NDL, GS(A)02519.
605 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 5, January 16, 1946, 3. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091; CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 11, February 27, 1946, 4. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
606 P. K. Roest, GS, Public Administration Division, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 24, 1946, 1–2. NDL, JW-93-06.
Liberal Party who sought to control the possible coalition.\textsuperscript{607} Roest and Wildes thus continued the GS’s positively toned reporting on the purge while others were already warning against the continuity of the old order even if the façade would be polished.

The Liberal Party sustained damages as well but only 10 of its 50 Diet members were purged.\textsuperscript{608} Emmerson reported that the Jiyūtō had lost certain party leaders including the president of the Policy Affairs Research Council Andō Masazumi\textsuperscript{609}, but the impact was not as severe as the one faced by the Shimpōtō. The cabinet’s difficult situation, together with the rapid change in party strength, led to the immediate rumors about rapprochement between the liberals, the socialist and the cooperatives. Some kind of coalition was rumored to be built around these parties under the possible leadership of Marquis Tokugawa Yoshichika (徳川義親), Kagawa Toyohiko (香川豊彦) or Hatoyama Ichirō.\textsuperscript{610} The GS’s report to the visiting FEAC delegation emphasized that the liberals were keen to capitalize on the new political situation and opened a campaign to form a government by criticizing the present cabinet. After it became evident that the cabinet would not resign, the Liberal Party was ready to support Shidehara, but only until the forthcoming election. If the prime minister was not going to resign at that time, the liberals would move to overthrow him.\textsuperscript{611}

More information was gathered through interviews of Kimura Takeo (木村武雄) on January 15, 1946, and Hatoyama Ichirō with Kimura on January 21, 1946. On both occasions the representatives of the Jiyūtō expressed their belief that the purge would not greatly affect their party. They claimed that the Jiyūtō consisted mostly of the anti-war elements and welcomed the postponement of the election. The delay was considered as a positive thing that would benefit their party. Participating occupiers were interested in potential substitutes for Shidehara. The

\textsuperscript{607} P. K. Roest, GS, Public Administration Division, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 24, 1946, 2–3. NDL, JW-93-06. Saitō’s critique was most likely aimed at Hatoyama Ichirō. Hatoyama, however, counted on Saitō’s support in a later interview and even claimed that Saitō had regrets because of not joining the campaign of the liberals at the very beginning. Harry Emerson Wildes, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Report of interview with Hatoyama Ichirō, March 21, 1946, 1. NDL, JW-93-08.

\textsuperscript{608} Baerwald 1959, 85; Uchida 1987, 324.

\textsuperscript{609} Besides Andō, the party eventually also lost Matsuno Tsuruei and Makino Ryozō from its leadership. Hoshijima Jirō was selected as Andō’s successor. Masuda 2001, 74, 78.

\textsuperscript{610} John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, January 7, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02520; CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 5, January 16, 1946, 1–2, 4. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.

\textsuperscript{611} GS report to the FEC, January 17, 1946, 20. NDL, JW-35-01.
US State Department had transmitted biographical information concerning Hatoyama, Kagawa Toyohiko, and for example Narahashi Wataru to POLAD in mid-December 1945. Now POLAD’s Sebald and Mr. R. Yasui from the Counter Intelligence Section inquired about Kimura’s views concerning Kagawa. Kimura described him as a sincere socialist with a firm belief in the cooperative principles—as a man with a following and a chance to be elected, but also as a theoretician lacking any influence on political leaders. Hatoyama was also asked for his opinion as to what group would have been the most practical successor to the Shidehara Cabinet, had it fallen because of the January 4 directives. Hatoyama reaffirmed previous rumors and stated that a coalition between the liberals and the socialists would have been the best successor. He, nevertheless, supposed that the differences arising from the distribution of the cabinet positions would at that moment prevent the formation of such a coalition.

At the beginning of February Hatoyama continued to bring his party apart from the progressives by stating that the conservative rivals bear a major share of responsibility for the war. Therefore the popular conservative front, alleged to be established as a counter-attack against the rumored leftist united democratic front movement comprising the communists, the left-wing socialists, and other leftist political groups, was impossible. Whether or not this stated willingness to depart from the conservative cooperation was sincere, is questionable. Namely, at least Ashida Hitsohi claims in his diary on February 14 that the Kyoto Branch of the Jiyūtō and the youth members in Tokyo were against any collaboration with the progressives, whereas Hatoyama felt some inclination toward it. Voices of this internal struggle were also heard among the political observers. The

613 According to Mark Gayn, a well-informed foreign correspondent who worked for the Chicago Sun during the first years of the occupation, several officers in the GHQ/SCAP supported Kagawa as potential prime minister. Gayn even claims that a critical reporting related to this Christian social worker was banned in mid-January. Gayn 1981, 98.
615 GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political report (1 February to 19 February 1946), no date. NARA, RG 331, box 2134, folder 20; William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, January 29, 1946. GS(A)02520; William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, February 4, 1946. GS(A)02520.
616 Ashida 1986, 72.
GHQ/SCAP monthly summation states that there were several local branches that had expressed their dissatisfaction in Hatoyama and his aides. The opposition did, however, calm down and the local branches of Osaka, Kyoto and Toyama decided to back the party leadership according to the result of their consultative referendums.  

Hatoyama’s earlier statement looked even more peculiar after he initiated an anti-communist front that would be free from any party engagement during the second half of February. He announced that the Liberal Party would be willing to cooperate with anyone, regardless of one’s party affiliation, so long as one agrees on the point of being anti-communist. The reception of Hatoyama’s proposal was not enthusiastic in either the Shimpō or in the Kyōdō. Saitō Takao labeled Hatoyama’s remarks as ambiguous and abstract. The cooperatives felt that Hatoyama’s idea needed further clarification on specific issues. Other conservatives, in other words, took some distance from Hatoyama’s risqué initiative. The socialists were strongly against the motion and condemned this kind of policy as reactionary. The Communist Party counterattacked by labeling the Liberal Party as feudalistic imposters.

The proposal of the anti-communist activities initiated a set of new interviews. Hatoyama met H. I. T. Creswell on February 24, 1946 but there are no documents to clarify the content of those talks. CIS’s weekly analysis made few days later suggested that the reason behind Hatoyama’s statement could have been an attempt to gain a wider personal base of support. Hatoyama was, in any

617 Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 5, 33. OJP3RRP 3-B-5: Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan No. 6, 36. OJP3RRP 3-B-6.
618 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 11, February 27, 1946, 3. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091; Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 5, 36–37. OJP3RRP 3-B-5. The February 22, 1946 statement was not the first time Hatoyama openly expressed his anti-communistic feelings. Hatoyama’s anti-communist sentiments were reported in detail already in November 1945. Hatoyama claimed in an interview of the various occupation officials that the communists were aided by the Soviet Union. According to Hatoyama, it was this aid that made it possible for the communists who were just released from prison to buy a 500000 Yen rotary press. The rumor of the printing press was well known. Sir George Sansom, former British ambassador and a well-known authority of Japanese matters, belonged to the FEAC Committee that visited Tokyo and he kept asking about the printing press that was claimed to have been purchased by the Communists. Charles L. Kades, as a representative of the Government Section, denied these rumors originated by Hatoyama and stated that the GS had no evidence that the Communist Party would be financed by the Soviet Union. P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Branch, Memorandum for Record, December 24, 1945. NDL, GS(A)00117; John S. Service, POLAD, Memorandum of conversation, November 25, 1945, 1, 3. NARA, RG 84, box 11, folder 18; GS report to the FEC, 17 January 1946. NDL, JW-35-01.
619 Hatoyama 1999, 430.
Hatoyama was back in the GHQ/SCAP headquarters on March 11, 1946 to participate in a conference called by the CIS for the purpose of gaining information concerning Hatoyama’s past records. Representatives of the GS Political Parties Branch were also present. Hatoyama explained that he had been an involuntary member of the IRAA before resigning the organization and repeated his claim of the desirability of the informal anti-communist organization. Similarly he repeated his allegations concerning communist support from the Soviet Union. Hatoyama criticized the press because of partiality and questioned the extent to which the freedom of press and speech should be reached. Hatoyama was confident concerning his chances of forming the post-election coalition cabinet and even gave some potential names of preferred ministers.

Although the Jiyūtō’s position strengthened in comparison with the progressives, developments following the purge directives revealed the weak spot of the party. Accusations concerning the former political bosses’ control over the new candidates were associated with the liberals as well, but the destiny of the party was most of all connected to the future of the Party President Hatoyama Ichirō. After the purge Hatoyama emerged as the only conservative politician outside the incumbent government who could take political initiatives. However, while overshadowing, for example his progressive counterparts, Hatoyama’s wartime connection to the IRAPS was critically discussed in the press. His position became even more vulnerable after the cabinet decided to approve the request of the Kyoto Imperial University to reinstate the professor Takigawa Yukitoki to his former position. This was considered to be embarrassing for Hatoyama who acted as the Minister of Education in 1933 when Takigawa was dismissed. Hatoyama’s importance to his party was summed up in Sebald’s conclusion, according to which it would be doubtful whether the Jiyūtō could survive should Hatoyama be disqualified.

The rist impression concerning the cooperatives’ situation was very moderate. Emmerson counted Sengoku Kotarō as their only loss and the party was reported

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620 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 11, February 27, 1946, 3. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
622 GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political report (1 February to 19 February 1946), no date. NARA, RG 331, box 2134, folder 20.
623 William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, February 18, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02519.
to be active in the coalition building with the socialists.\textsuperscript{624} This optimism, however, faded away in a few days when the eventual impact of the purge directive became clear. The Kyōdōtō was described as a party with little strength already in mid-January and it was considered to be dependent upon an alliance with the more promising socialists to further their cause. The collapse of Diet strength seemed to affect the general evaluation regarding the party. A GS report summed up that the cooperatives seemed to have an unrealistic, if not naïve, attitude toward politics.\textsuperscript{625} The cooperatives’ situation was described as desperate in mid-February since they had almost lost their entire leadership.\textsuperscript{626} Thus the purge rapidly dropped the Kyōdōtō among the less interesting and less important political parties. The party, or what was left of it, was still attached to the socialists but the occupation lost its interest in this group for months.

4.3 Negative attitude’s influence on the content of the purge

\textit{Occupation authorities’ contribution to the content of the purge}

Even if the Potsdam Declaration predicted the purge, it did not clearly state who was going to be purged. Development from the relatively ambiguous references to the misleaders of the Japanese people to the concrete lists and categories introduced at the beginning of January was a complex process. It is evident that the conservatives, even if not the only victims\textsuperscript{627}, suffered the most of these actions. It is therefore valid to ask whether this happened by accident, or were there some negative attitudes toward the Japanese conservatives that affected the content of the purge. In any case, MASUDA seems to suggest that the GHQ/SCAP’s purge hit its aim when the Shimpōtō lost its leadership and the Jiyūtō and certain parts of the Shakaitō were shaken as well.\textsuperscript{628} While searching for answers, one can try to identify new purge-related aspects that were initiated by the GHQ/SCAP and analyze how the occupiers interpreted the letter of the guiding directives. Secondly, it is possible to identify the main purge officials and

\textsuperscript{624} John K. Emmerson, POLAD, weekly report, January 7, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02520.
\textsuperscript{625} GS report to the FEC, 17 January 1946. NDL, JW-35-01.
\textsuperscript{626} William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, February 18, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02519.
\textsuperscript{627} Baerwald counts that the socialists lost 10 of its 17 representatives in the wartime Diet. Baerwald 1959, 86.
\textsuperscript{628} Masuda 2001, 25.
look for available expressions and evaluations of their attitude toward the Japanese conservatives.

Two categories of criteria constitute the heart of the purge program. The first category defined those positions which were to be classified as entailing sufficient authority and influence on the warrant that the purgees were not to be permitted to hold them. The second category of criteria defined those positions which were sufficiently important in the pre-surrender imperial Japanese government and within the framework of Japanese society for their occupants to be designated as purgees. If there, in other words, was a wish to attack postwar conservatives, the purge categories were to include positions that the postwar conservatives had most likely held in the prewar and wartime era. Similarly, a strict prohibition of various positions from the purgees’ would play against the continuing role of the conservatives.

Wildes argues that the occupation barred all persons specified in the JCS directions sent to MacArthur, but added other categories not definitely stated in those instructions. Category G was a new and biased purge instrument which opened up a wide range of subjective evidence whose validity varied with the official who administered the purge. Kades has claimed in 1984 that category G was his idea but BAERWALD claims that there are sufficient evidences to indicate that the objective of expulsion of anti-democratic elements from Japan’s leadership could be noted in the early policy statements.

The origin of the purge directives can obviously be found from the JCS 1380/15. The directive dealing with the removal of undesirable personnel was a combination of paragraphs a from clause 7, Part I that concentrates on arrest and internment of Japanese personnel and paragraph b from clause 5, Part I which deals with the political and administrative reorganization. The norms of the undesirability can be found from the latter, whereas the former seems to contain all the categories from A to E. Hence the categories F and G are initiatives taken by the occupation authorities. The phrasing of the certain categories was also rewritten and the lists of specific positions which automatically made one purgeable were sharpened. No considerable enlargement of the content can be found at

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629 Baerwald 1959, 12.
632 Baerwald 1959, 9.
633 JCS, Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS-1380/15), November 3, 1945, 136. NDL, GS(B)00291; Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel From
least from the categories dealing with the non-military personnel. More significantly, a special category listing only certain positions of leadership in the IRAA, the IRAPS and the GJPA as incriminating was established. BAERWALD argues that this compromise was indicative of the measures employed to maintain a balance between what higher policy directed and what the exigencies of the situation dictated. The application of the purge down to the influential member level of the Imperial Rule organizations would have cut deep into the political leadership resources of Japan.634 Thus, the occupier in fact saved certain conservatives who had been lower rank members of the Imperil Rule organizations.

There is an interesting document to be found among the GS papers dealing with the above-mentioned organizations. The report is titled “Examination of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association; The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and the Political Association of Great Japan”. The archival location of this document refers to January 1946 but it lacks information concerning both the author and date. If it was written or known among the GS officials during the first weeks of 1946: it is an extraordinary document. Namely, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is introduced there as an organization built as a public non-partisan organization, excluding the idea of forming a fascist political party for the nation. The Political society is argued to have assumed a critical attitude toward the government after the fall of Saipan in June 1944 and the GJPA is claimed to have represented the culmination of growing antagonism against the dictatorial rule of military and bureaucratic factions. Moreover, the document also consists of a list of independent members outside the IRAPS. The most interesting names mentioned in this list are Hatoyama Ichirō, Inukai Ken and Andō Masazumi, who were all eventually purged.635 This kind of interpretation of the character of the Imperial Rule organizations might explain the purge directive’s gentle treatment of them. However, there is not enough evidence to be sure that this document was made in January 1946 and not for example during the following autumn when G-2 expressed new interpretations concerning the nature of these organizations.

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634 Baerwald 1959, 18.
635 Examination of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association; The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and the Political Association of Great Japan. NDL, GS(B)00909.
Categories F and G were constructs of the occupation, and the category F was in large part superfluous because most of the persons falling under it were purgeable under other categories as well. Therefore one can concentrate on the following question: Why did the occupation authorities want to create Category G that differed so remarkably from the rest of the categories? The controversial category G, designated as a catchall, was the only category in which the interpretation of the criteria determined whether or not an individual should be purged. Thus it endowed a great power upon those who were reviewing the careers of the Japanese leaders with a view of their eligibility under the purge. Particularly the last clause in paragraph 3 of the category, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, could be used to remove the political opponents of individuals empowered to administer the purge.

The comparison of the November 19, 1945 draft and the Appendix A of the final SCAPIN 550 shows that the wording of category G changed a bit either in late November or in December 1945. In other words, just when the discussion of the conservative parties predicted dominance in the coming Diet was actualized. The category of unclassified personnel changed to the category of additional militarists and ultra-nationalists. The first two clauses dealing with the persons who denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime and persons who instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against the opponents of the militaristic regime, remained unchanged. The above-mentioned third clause was, however, prolonged. In November this clause contained any person who had shown himself by speech, writing or action to be a supporter of militant nationalism or expansionism. The final clause was completed with a sentence including also any person who had played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression. Moreover, the phrase “support of militant nationalism and aggression” was amended to conclude the active exponents of those condemnable developments.

The occupation authorities, in other words, did not initiate new categories that would have contained large groups of people or, more precisely, positions automatically necessitating the purge. The development was, in fact, reversed.

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637 Baerwald 1959, 20–21.
They scaled down the clause dealing with the Imperial Assistance organizations but created a new category G that enabled limited and controlled purge actions to be taken toward smaller groups or individuals. These actions required only the political will of the occupier, because category G could be used to purge a vast number of politically active people.

SCAPIN 550 ordered that the purgees identified in Appendix A were to be removed from public office and excluded from the government service. Exclusion was meant to last until the letter of the Potsdam Declaration would be fulfilled. Besides explaining the terms of “government service” and “exclude from government service” the directive paid special attention to clarify that any person who comes within the categories described in Appendix A should be disqualified as a candidate for any elective position in the Imperial Diet.639 The sentence dealing with the Imperial Diet is a new supplement to the draft of November 19, 1945. However, the idea that the purgees are barred from election to public office was included in the draft.640 The wording has changed a bit since JCS 1380/15 which referred to persons who would not be allowed to hold public office or any other position of responsibility or influence on public or important private enterprise.641 Hence the occupation did not bring anything completely new in positions denied from the purgees.

People in charge of the purge

Before examining the key occupation officials’ attitudes toward the Japanese conservatives, it is necessary to identify the most important purge officers. The purge was led from the Dai Ichi Building. This is true although POLAD’s William J. Sebald, who unequivocally states that the purge was an operation in which POLAD did not contribute in any significant way, makes a mistake.642 Namely, the POLAD had a major influence on the occupiers’ view concerning the political parties, which on the other hand, affected the purge.

640 Draft, GHQ, SCAP, AG 000.1 (19 Nov 45) CIS, Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government, November 19, 1945. NDL, GS(B)00192.
641 Joint Chief of Staff, Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS-1380/15), November 3, 1945, 136. NDL, GS(B)00291.
642 Sebald with Brines 1965, 86.
G-2 did its utmost to influence the content of the purge, but eventually it was the leaders of the GS who decided the content of the January 1946 purge directives. Williams states that General Whitney, although far to the right in American policies, had an aversion to Japan’s conservatives. This was due to the disagreement between Whitney and the conservatives over various occupation reforms and the latter’s attempts to discredit Whitney in the international press. Williams’ examples refer, however, to the developments and personal dislike that developed only during and after the premiership of Yoshida Shigeru.643

Williams states that whereas, for example MacArthur professed to take a neutral stance toward the Japanese political parties, Charles A. Kades made no effort to conceal his preference for the Socialist Party. Kades’ attitude toward the Japanese conservatism was hostile and he tried to drive the conservatives from the center of the government during the first years of the occupation.644 MOORE concurs with the argument that Kades was committed to a social democratic model for Japan645. Similarly, MASUDA considers Kades as the most important occupation official in the context of the purge and agrees with the interpretation that Kades sympathized with the socialists and was hostile toward the conservatives. However, he also emphasizes the role of Frank Rizzo646, Kades’ close aide, as the officer in charge of the purge.647

It was evidently possible to remodel the political party field through the purge, especially due to the establishment of category G. Similarly, it is undeniable that the GS was the central force behind the purge and its leadership was occupied by persons sharing a negative attitude toward the conservative parties and politicians. It can thus be concluded that there was a possibility and most likely a will to weaken the position of the conservative parties. Under these circumstances it seems natural to assume that the negative attitude influenced on the content of the January 4, 1946, purge directives. This kind of conclusion would, however, require stronger proof that has yet to be found. If not supporting the argument that the key purge officers’ negative attitude had an impact on the content of the purge,

643 Williams 1979, 90–91.
644 Williams 1979, 35–38.
645 Moore 1979, 724.
646 Frank Rizzo was a managing partner in an investment bank before entering the Army in 1942. He was assigned to the GS at Kades’ personal request. Rizzo replaced Kades as Deputy Chief of Section when the latter retired in late 1948. When Courtney Whitney left Japan in 1951, Rizzo took over as Section Chief. Takemae 2003, 156.
647 Masuda 2001, 17–18, 46, 177. There are indications that Kades’ dislike extended to the certain right-wing socialists as well. Finn 1992, 169.
the findings of this study do not argue against such a claim either. At least the attitude in the GS did not restrict the scope of the purge and the blow suffered by the Japanese conservative parties. Later there will be clearer cases where the occupiers’ negative attitude toward a certain politician or group influenced individual purge cases.

Conclusion

The policy guiding the purge program officially originated from a negative objective, i.e. from a disadvantage that needed to be corrected. However, it turned out that the purge was not only a process aiming at the expulsion of those who had misled the Japanese people into the war. The purge had also a positive objective. Namely, it was a non-transparent mechanism used to create a new political leadership endorsed by the occupation authorities. This objective was not admitted during the occupation and it seems to have been a hard issue to deal with for many occupiers even after the actual occupation was over. It is important, however, to notice that the occupation authorities did not initiate any new major criteria against Japanese conservatives. Instead, they wanted to micromanage the composition of the political leadership. This possibility was assured by creating a legitimate method to remove persons who were found undesirable from the occupation authorities’ perspective.

The purge directives would have been enforced, in one form or another, whether or not the Japanese conservatives would have formed the government and established new political parties in autumn 1945. The Potsdam Declaration and the other guiding documents obliged the GHQ/SCAP to act. Further, the visible side of the decision-making process was built on a convention that the GHQ/SCAP pronounced directives and the Japanese Government implemented them. Although the occupation authorities wanted to do more than they could openly admit, they were, nevertheless, confined to promulgate official directives. The intention to decide who was, or at least who was not, allowed to lead Japan was hidden inside the directives, especially in category G of SCAPIN 550.

The preparation of the purge directives revealed the bargaining between the various sections inside the GHQ/SCAP. Yet, the increased political activity during the first weeks of 1946 did not challenge the cornerstones of the occupiers’ policy. The purge was not an extraordinary or unforeseen burst of negative force aimed against the conservatives. Despite that a note of discord surfaced in the POLAD, the GHQ/SCAP continued to back the Shidehara-led coalition. The rapid changes
in the relative political strength encouraged some political observers to express their preference of the Japanese parties more openly. For example the POLAD’s Atcheson and Emmerson kept the flag flying on behalf of the socialists and the GS’s Roest condemned the pre-purge Shimpotō as a party of reactionaries. Neither the Shakaitō nor the conservative political parties were, however, trusted in the occupation leadership that wanted to keep the situation as it was at least until the coming election.

The strength of the conservative parties contributed to the timing of the purge and to the timing of the first postwar House of Representatives election. The purge was considered necessary before the Diet election could be held. If the election were to be held without any intervention in the situation that existed at the end of 1945, the Shimpotō was going to be victorious. This was not acceptable since the party consisted of unwanted elements that did not fit in the occupiers’ plans for postwar Japan. The first evaluations of the immediate effects of the purge proposed that the threat caused by the progressives were buried. The new leading concentration of political power was considered to rest in the rumored cooperation between the Jiyūtō and the Shakaitō. Nevertheless, the situation changed surprisingly fast and rumors connecting the liberals and the progressives who regained their strength due to their organizational depth, emerged. The analysis of this development is continued in the following chapter. The Kyōdōtō remained as a natural partner of the socialists in the occupation authorities’ estimations, but the group’s relative importance and political observers’ interest in it was waning.
5 Setting the Course for a New Japan (spring 1946)

"With the exception of the Communist Party, all major parties have announced their approval of the new Constitution, despite difference of opinion on minor points. It appears safe to anticipate a whole-hearted support for the document, irrespective of which major party may gain preponderant influence in the coming election."

"Admittedly, the occupation's task was to uproot the old leadership and lay the basis for a genuinely popular government. But was the mantle of Japan's democratic future to be allowed to fall on the shoulders of a Social Democratic or a Communist Party leadership."

"The position in which the Japanese Government finds itself in deciding what to do about HATOYAMA can be roughly stated as follows: a) his selection as the new Prime Minister will be greeted by cries of annoyance and sharp disapproval by a large section of the Allied press and governments; b) another group who will attack his selection are those Japanese politicians and newspapers who either feel that by his elimination they may gain political advantage, or who are merely fishing in trouble waters; c) on the other hand, HATOYAMA is the leader of the most powerful single political party in the next Diet, and is, therefore, legally eligible to become Prime Minister of Japan."

The GHQ/SCAP showed in the purge who it did not find suitable to lead the new democratized Japan and especially the creation of category G kept the window open also for further punitive actions. The spring of 1946 was to culminate in the first postwar House of the Representatives election and the creation of a cabinet embodying the composition of the Diet and the freely expressed will of the people. The occupation authorities faced two important tasks: they needed to identify the suitable political parties and leaders and to ensure that these actors would eventually form the cabinet. Naturally all this had to be done without breaking the

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649 Bisson 1949, 31.
650 H. I. T. C. (Harry I. T. Creswell), GHQ/USAFPAC, Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence, OCCIO to GS, April 26, 1946, 13. NDL, GS(B)03013.
democratic façade emphasizing the role of the Japanese people as the sole origin of the make-up of the democratic institutions.

These tasks were performed within a new structural framework and partly with new personnel. Namely, the composition of the occupation’s political observation machinery changed radically in spring 1946. POLAD’s John K. Emmerson returned to the United States and the vacuum caused by the departure was filled by William J. Sebald and Max W. Bishop. The US State Department also planned to send George Atcheson Jr. into Korea in February 1946, but General MacArthur was unwilling to let Atcheson go and appealed on the necessity of keeping him in Japan651. However, the POLAD’s role as an important political observer began to weaken simultaneously with these changes.

The civilian departments, especially the State Department and the Treasury Department, were unsatisfied with their role in Japan. These departments insisted that the primary responsibility within the United States Government for the formulation of the government policy with respect to the administration of the occupied areas had to rest with the civilian departments of the government. A part of the solution negotiated between the War Department representatives and the Acting Secretary of State was that the political adviser would be assigned in the Supreme Commander’s staff and hence to be subjected to MacArthur’s authority and control. MacArthur concurred with the proposal at the beginning of March and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State approved it. On March 16 the State Department was ready to give MacArthur free hands to proceed to the integration of the POLAD into the staff sections of the GHQ/SCAP. Practical details of integration were left to be worked out on the ground and the definite instructions from Washington were considered unnecessary.652

The State Department clearly expected that the integrated POLAD would work as a political section. Thus, the Department that desired to retain the title of Political Adviser for its designated representative assumed that its officers would take a leading role in political reporting. Moreover, it was hoped that the flow of information from Tokyo would improve. Nevertheless, only the part of the deal

651 WARCOS to CINCPAC W-95995, February 9, 1946. NDL, TS 00022; CINCPAC to WARCOS reference to W-95995, February 10, 1946. NDL, TS 00022. This refers to McNelly’s conclusion that although Atcheson was a member of the China Crowd he came to be regarded as a “MacArthur man” within a few months of arriving in Tokyo. McNelly 2000, 36.

652 JCS, Memorandum by the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, JCS 1638, March 3, 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 37, folder 4; Message to SCAP from the Chief of Staff, WAR 91800, January 7, 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 37, folder 4; War Department message, State Department Cable for Information of War Department, 16 March 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 37, folder 4.
that referred to the re-establishment of the office in Yokohama as a consular office went as planned.\footnote{War Department message, State Department Cable for Information of War Department, March 16, 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 37, folder 4.} The allocated duties of the Diplomatic Section (DS) established on April 18, 1946, had nothing to do with political observation. Instead, the duties related to the newly established Allied Council of Japan, chaired by the Political Adviser, were expected to take a major part of the time of Atcheson, Bishop and possibly even Sebald.\footnote{The Political Adviser in Japan, Atcheson to the Secretary of State, April 23, 1946. FRUS 1946, vol. 8, 214–216. See also: Williams 1979, 128.} Therefore, the POLAD’s importance in relation to the political parties and politicians began to gradually decline. Sebald, who inherited the position of the Political Adviser after Atcheson’s death in a plane crash in August 1947, admits that the Supreme Commander did not consult him for political advice.\footnote{Sebald with Brines 1967, 65. Concerning the role of DS and its restriction to deal only with matters in relation to external affairs, see also: Williams 1979, 128.}

Rearrangements continued inside the GS on February 1, 1946 when the Public Administration Division that consisted of the Chief, the Deputy Chief and six branches was created.\footnote{Charles A. Kades and Frank Hays continued as the Chief and the Deputy. The branches were: Governmental Powers Branch, Legislative and Liaison Branch, Local Government Branch, Opinions Branch, Political Parties Branch, and Review and Reports Branch. Koseki 1998, 77.} The Political Parties Branch (PPB) was to observe and otherwise work in the field of the political parties and other related societies, associations and organizations. Lieutenant Colonel Pieter K. Roest continued as the Chief of the Branch and he was assisted by Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes\footnote{Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes had studied economics and received his doctorate in 1927. His colorful working career consisted of stints as a traffic engineer, journalist, and high school teacher. Moreover, he had spent a year teaching economics and political science at Keio University in Tokyo. This experience left him with ideas on changes needed in Japan, particularly to the political party system and popular rights. During the war he joined OWI.} and Miss Beate Sirota.\footnote{Beate Sirota was a twenty-one year old civilian who arrived in Japan in late December 1945 with a group of experts who were replacing enlisted men returning home. Sirota had lived in Japan from 1929 to 1939. During the war she monitored Japanese radio for a Federal Communications Commission program in foreign broadcast intelligence and wrote propaganda beamed to Japan in OWI, Hellegers 2001b, 580–581.}

KOSEKI Shōichi links these changes directly to the creation of the new constitution. The new structure was also the structure of GS’s constitutional convention.\footnote{Koseki 1998, 77.} Another change was the arrival of ten civilian

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653 War Department message, State Department Cable for Information of War Department, March 16, 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 37, folder 4.
654 The Political Adviser in Japan, Atcheson to the Secretary of State, April 23, 1946. FRUS 1946, vol. 8, 214–216. See also: Williams 1979, 128.
655 Sebald with Brines 1967, 65. Concerning the role of DS and its restriction to deal only with matters in relation to external affairs, see also: Williams 1979, 128.
656 Charles A. Kades and Frank Hays continued as the Chief and the Deputy. The branches were: Governmental Powers Branch, Legislative and Liaison Branch, Local Government Branch, Opinions Branch, Political Parties Branch, and Review and Reports Branch. Koseki 1998, 77.
657 Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes had studied economics and received his doctorate in 1927. His colorful working career consisted of stints as a traffic engineer, journalist, and high school teacher. Moreover, he had spent a year teaching economics and political science at Keio University in Tokyo. This experience left him with ideas on changes needed in Japan, particularly to the political party system and popular rights. During the war he joined OWI.
658 Beate Sirota was a twenty-one year old civilian who arrived in Japan in late December 1945 with a group of experts who were replacing enlisted men returning home. Sirota had lived in Japan from 1929 to 1939. During the war she monitored Japanese radio for a Federal Communications Commission program in foreign broadcast intelligence and wrote propaganda beamed to Japan in OWI, Hellegers 2001b, 580–581.
659 Charles L. Kades, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 1, 1946. NDL, GS(B)01167; P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 25, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-166.
experts from Washington. Professor Kenneth W. Colegrove, a conservative political scientist with prewar experience from Japan and good connections with other influential prewar authors of Japanese politics, was one of them. He was expected to act as the political consultant on Japanese constitutional matters. These Far Eastern specialists were assigned to assist Kades but they never really rose to a position of special influence. However, Colegrove kept in touch with Joseph C. Grew in Washington and reconstituted his warm relations with men like Count Makino in Japan. Colegrove also got invitations for the GS people to the imperial family, and praised General MacArthur’s policy toward the drafting of the new Japanese Constitution to President Truman after returning to Washington in July 1946.

The structure of the intelligence apparatus was under adjustment as well. First CIS’s liberal-minded leader General Elliot Thorpe was replaced by Colonel H. I. T. Creswell who shared many of the opinions of G-2’s General Willoughby. Then, in May 1946, the CIS was absorbed to the G-2. While these internal changes took place, the external circumstances framing the occupation evolved. February and March of 1946 witnessed speeches that referred to great changes in the United States’ foreign policy and relations with the Soviet Union. There had been collisions in the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and a hunt for the

661 Colegrove arrived in Tokyo at the beginning of March 1946 and was given office in the GS of which he shared with Thomas A. Bisson and Dr. Cyrus H. Peake. Bisson, a left-winger belonging to the Institute of Pacific Relations, had been in Tokyo in autumn of 1945 but re-assigned to Japan at about the same time as Colegrove. In his ideological stand Peake, the third newcomer who participated in the drafting of the constitution at the beginning of February, was somewhere in between of these two extremes.


663 Joseph C. Grew who was glad to hear that their old friends in Japan, especially Count Makino and Count Kabayama were doing well. Colegrove also passed Grew’s ideas to their Japanese friends. Grew to Colegrove, July 6, 1945. NDL, MMA-14 (RG 10) Personal Correspondence VIP File, reel 2, box 5, folder 7 (Joseph C. Grew).

664 McNelly 2000, 63.


666 Masuda 2001, 45.

667 CIS’s merge with G-2 on 3 May 1946 marked a sharp turning point in the conduct of counterintelligence in the occupation. The second major branch of the Operations Division, General Activities (G/A), was generally responsible for counterintelligence concerning rightwing activity as opposed to the S/A Branch’s interest in Communist and other leftists. The S/A was essentially a research and analysis group, whereas G/A handled the majority of the CIS action papers. Paul J. Mueller, GHQ/FECOM, The Intelligence Series, Volume IX; Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, July 8, 1948, 66–67. The Intelligence Series G2, USAFFE-SWPA-AFPAC-FEC-SCAP, ISG-1, reel 12.
communistically inclined advisors had begun to shake the US State Department already during the autumn and winter of 1945. The situation inflamed after a Soviet atom spy ring was exposed on February 3, 1946, and Generalissimo Joseph Stalin stated that communism and capitalism were incompatible. These developments were followed by George F. Kennan’s famous long-telegram that described the Soviet Union as a totalitarian and expansionistic state. The same views were stated publicly by Winston Churchill who met President Truman and gave his famous “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946.669

Although JACKSON demonstrates how both the Fulton speech and the long telegram were rhetorical operations making room for a new policy concerning Germany670, and Charles Kades’ claims that he was not aware of the Iron Curtain speech at the time671, the occupation of Japan did not take place in a vacuum. When Averell Harriman visited Tokyo in late January and early February en route to the United States from his recently ended ambassadorship in Moscow, he warned MacArthur of the Soviet Union’s actions in Eastern Europe. Harriman praised the Supreme Commander, reported about the anti-emperor sentiments among the Soviets, and promoted the idea of acting before the Soviet member of the ACJ would get instructions from Moscow.672 Thus, the echoes of the changing tone in international politics were also heard in Tokyo. Not only on the occupiers’ side, but also among the Japanese as demonstrated by the views of a long-term behind-the-scenes power holder of Japanese politics, Izawa Takio (伊澤 多喜男). Izawa, who was connected to both the Prime Minister Shidehara and the Foreign Minister Yoshida673, reportedly thought that the war between the United States and the Soviet Union was inevitable and supported the idea that the future premier should be an anti-Russian to clarify Japan’s position on this issue.674

668 Charge d’affaires at the embassy in Moscow. Harbutt 1986, 129.
670 Kennan interpreted the Soviet Union as a non-Western other that was essentially outside the legitimate range of actors in international relations. The threat caused by the Soviet Union represented a challenge to Western civilization, to which Germany was now considered to belong. Jackson 2006, 135–136.
671 McNelly 2000, 86.
672 Hellegers 2001b, 511.
674 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 5, January 16, 1946, 3. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
This chapter is divided into three sub-chapters. The first part deals with the writing of the new constitution, the single most important reform of the early phase of the occupation. It demonstrates how the occupiers evaluated the conservatives’ contribution to the amendment work and, more importantly, shows that the conservatives were not considered as a threat to the draft constitution written inside the GS. The second sub-chapter concentrates on discussion prior to the April election and reveals the occupation authorities’ insistence to hold the early election despite the conservatives’ victory looked inevitable. The last sub-chapter exposes occupation authorities’ role in the development that led to the purge of Hatoyama Ichirō and the inauguration of the first Yoshida Shigeru cabinet.

5.1 Conservatives were not a threat to the new constitution

Despite its longevity, the current Constitution of Japan is based on a draft that was prepared in a week. Drafting of the original proposal was done by a small group of American officials within the GHQ/SCAP Government Section. The constitutional reform was, however, anything but straightforward and numerous steps were taken before the Japanese Diet accepted the new constitution and it received the emperor's ratification on November 3, 1946. Due to its importance, the creation of the Constitution of Japan is already well researched. Hence, this study only shortly introduces the main events by referring to the available research675 and concentrates on the specific questions relevant to the study of the occupation authorities’ policy toward Japanese conservatives.

From the Konoe affair to the Shidehara Cabinet’s adoption of the GS draft

The question of constitutional reform popped up already during the first months of the occupation because of the so-called Konoe Affair. Originally the meeting of Prince Konoe Fumimaro and General MacArthur on October 4, 1945, was not supposed to deal in any way with the question of the constitution. However, according to a largely accepted explanation, Konoe’s interpreter mistranslated a

part of the conversation. Because of this mistake, MacArthur’s answer was misunderstood and Konoe felt that he had been commissioned by the GHQ/SCAP to initiate a constitutional reform. This error led to a process during which Konoe met POLAD’s Atcheson, gained the emperor’s nomination as the Special Assistant in the Office of Privy Seal, and gathered a research group to study the amendment. As a result, there was a month-long misconception that Konoe was the occupiers’ choice to reform the constitution. The situation was cleared only after the highly criticized GHQ/SCAP denied his special role on November 1, 1945. However, for example, Theodore McNELLY claims that both MacArthur and Acheson felt it first appropriate to deal with Konoe who had been highly regarded as a liberal politician by former Ambassador Grew. The change in mind occurred only after association with Konoe became an embarrassment to the GHQ/SCAP. Prince Konoe was arrested on December 6, 1945, as a suspected war criminal. Ten days later he committed suicide.\(^{676}\)

The GHQ/SCAP announcement clarified that the possible amendment of the constitution belonged to the jurisdiction of the Shidehara Cabinet. The cabinet had opposed the attempt to separate the constitutional reform from its jurisdiction and established a commission to study problems related to the constitution. An important step toward the government’s activation in this matter was taken in October 11, when Prime Minister Shidehara met General MacArthur. At this meeting MacArthur introduced five reforms he wanted to be instituted. The reforms dealt with the female emancipation, encouragement of labor unions, liberalization of education, development of system of justice, and democratization of Japanese economic institutions. The constitutional reform was not among these reforms, but MacArthur referred to the liberalization of the constitution that would unquestionably be involved in their implementation.\(^{677}\)

Eventually the Commission for the Investigation of Constitutional Problems\(^{678}\) was organized outside the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation which had

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\(^{678}\) The Kenpō Mondai Chōsainkai. Members of the Committee: Minobe Tatsukichi (美濃部達吉), an eminent scholar of Meiji constitutionalism, former professor of constitutional law at Tokyo Imperial University and former member of the House of Peers; Nomura Junji (野村淳治), professor emeritus of law at Tokyo University; Shimizu Toru (清水藤), Vice President of the Privy Council; Miyazawa Toshiyoshi (宮沢俊義), Minobe’s successor in Tokyo University; Kiyomiya Shiro (清宮四郎), a professor at Tohoku University; Kawamura Matasuke (河村又介), professor at Kyushu University; Ishiguro Takeshige, Chief Secretary of Privy Council and latter Chief of the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation; Narahashi Wataru, Chief of Bureau of Legislation who moved to the post of
already conducted preliminary investigations on the impact of the Potsdam Declaration upon the Constitution of Japan. The committee was chaired by Matsumoto Jōji (松本烝治), Minister without Portfolio. Originally the committee considered that its task was to study the Meiji-Constitution and questions related to the potential amendment of it. It was not planning to create a new constitution.679

Matsumoto isolated his committee from contacts with the GHQ/SCAP. This arrangement fit the occupiers well because it preserved the fiction that the Japanese Government was acting voluntarily. The committee held meetings between October 27, 1945 and February 2, 1946, but they were suspended for the duration of the Diet Session in December. Individual committee members worked with proposals for amendment while the Diet held meetings and these proposals were reviewed in a meeting on December 22. The committee was not unanimous but Matsumoto began to independently prepare a draft that supposedly reflected the consensus emerging within the committee. Matsumoto’s draft was finished on January 3, 1946 and he went ahead to introduce his ideas to the emperor on January 7, despite they were approved by neither the committee nor by the cabinet. The rest of the committee learned about this presentation to the throne only two days later. Despite disagreements with a group of younger members of the committee led by Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Matsumoto tried to railroad his views through and distributed his outline to the committee on January 26. Although the plenary session of the committee had not given its full support to the Matsumoto draft, the chairman introduced it to the cabinet three days later. The cabinet spent the rest of January and the first week of February on unfruitful and faint conversation over the proposal. While the cabinet was discussing the Matsumoto draft, a draft by Miyazawa leaked to Mainichi that published it on February 1. The welcoming of the proposal, understood as an official view of the commission, was chilly. The cabinet made only minor reference to this issue and Matsumoto introduced his draft to the emperor again on February 7. A day later, after having translated his draft into English (“Gist of the Revision of the Constitution) along with a short accompanying explanation, Matsumoto presented them to the GS. The draft was not approved by the Japanese government and

HELEGGERS considers that it was only a trial balloon used to gauge GHQ/SCAP’s reaction.\textsuperscript{680}

The Moscow conference and the decision to organize the Far Eastern Commission to replace the ineffective FEAC changed GHQ/SCAP’s attitude toward the constitutional reform. The mandate of the new organization was much broader than the one of FEAC. Another change in conditions was the receiving of the first guidelines from Washington concerning the governmental and constitutional reform. The secret State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee document (SWNCC-228) was transmitted to the GHQ/SCAP at the beginning of January. This policy paper described the major defects of the existing political system and recommended goals for the US policy. The proposals contained the creation of a fully representative legislature, guarantees of fundamental civil rights, popular sovereignty, and the drafting and adoption of constitutional amendments or of a constitution in a manner which would express the free will of the Japanese people. The letter of the SWNCC-228 emphasized, however, that the Supreme Commander should order the government to take such actions only as a last resort.\textsuperscript{681}

The GHQ/SCAP was in principle incapable of making any initiatives without consulting FEC but MacArthur was reluctant to leave the question of the constitutional reform to the Allies.\textsuperscript{682} The FEC and the ACJ contained elements that were hostile toward the emperor institution and MacArthur wanted to keep these influences out of the amendment process. Therefore GHQ/SCAP started its own project aiming at the new constitutional draft without any consultation with the FEC. General Whitney submitted a memorandum to MacArthur on February 1, in which he indicated that the Supreme Commander had authority from the Allied Powers and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to proceed with the constitutional reform.\textsuperscript{683} Two days later MacArthur introduced the three principles which were to form the base for the drafting conducted by the GS. These principles dealt with the perpetuation of the emperor system; banning of the war and maintenance of an army; and demolition of the feudal structures. The Public Administration Division convened on the day after and began its work. The GS created its own

\textsuperscript{682} For example DOWER unequivocally states that MacArthur decided to take over the constitutional drafting because he wanted to protect the emperor. Dower 1999, 362.
\textsuperscript{683} Complete argumentation, see: Courtney Whitney, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, February 1, 1946, 1. OJP3RRP 3-A-151.
draft that MacArthur approved for presentation to the Japanese government on February 11.  

The government’s delegation was assuming to hear comments on their own amendment proposal submitted five days earlier when they arrived at the meeting with the occupiers on February 13, 1946. Instead, they were to hear about the draft conducted by the GS. Secret negotiations concerning the GS proposal, during which General Whitney even hinted the possibility of changing the Japanese leadership to one that would agree with the proposed draft, began after that. Matsumoto informed the government about the change in the course only on February 19, 1946. The government began to revise the draft under pressure to make quick decisions. The GS representatives were, however, unsatisfied with the proposed changes included in the Japanese translation of the original GS draft that was received on March 4. The behind-the-scenes negotiation culminated finally in the thirty-hour-long marathon session in the Dai-Ichi Building, where no senior official of the Japanese Government participated. Eventually the occupation authorities got what they wanted and the draft was published in the name of the Japanese Government on March 6.  

GHQ/SCAP’s right to approve the new Japanese constitution on March 7 without any consultation with the FEC was questioned by some members of the commission and even the US State Department informally approached the War Department on this question. MacArthur adhered, however, to a controversial interpretation according to which the draft was an outcome of the cooperation between the occupation headquarters and the Japanese Government that had followed his initial direction made to the cabinet already five months earlier. The standpoint corresponded with the War Department suggestion according to which a view that the Japanese government had proceeded with the constitutional reform prior to action in FEC might be plausible. In short, the occupation authorities

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686 Related correspondence, see: Message from CINAFPAC Command Tokyo to War Department, 070620Z, March 7, 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 139, folder 2; War Department Message to CINAFPAC Tokyo, WAR 80049, March 9, 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 139, folder 2; Message from CINAFPAC Command Tokyo to War Department, 120949Z, March 12, 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 139, folder 2; Political Affairs Bulletin No. 2, March 1, 1947. NARA, RG 331, box 5242, folder 31. This interpretation was problematic because Kades had denied, in front of the visiting FEAC members on January 17, 1946, that the GS would consider amendments to the constitution or that it would have studied the constitution from the standpoint of making revisions to it. Similarly, MacArthur told the
did not duck out but showed immediate support for the Shidehara Cabinet that eventually bowed to the occupiers’ wishes and adopted the draft prepared by the GS.

Conservative parties’ drafts and their evaluation

Besides the government committee, there were several groups and individuals preparing their own drafts of the new constitution. Political parties, including the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō provided drafts as well. These proposals were evaluated by the GHQ/SCAP. The Kyōdōtō’s failure to provide its own draft addresses the party’s state of abasement. TOMINOMORI argues that the occupation authorities had no expectations concerning the political parties on the issue of constitutional reform. Similarly, for example the POLAD’s pessimism toward the conservatives’ reform capability in autumn of 1945 suggests that the hopes concerning the conservative parties’ constitutional drafts were rather plain.

The POLAD gathered and studied the private constitutional reform proposals that were published in January and February 1946. The outcome of the study was a memorandum entitled “Comparative Analysis of the Published Constitution Revision Plans of the Japan Progressive, Liberal, Socialist and Communist Parties, Two Private Study Groups, and Dr. Takano Iwasaburo” that was sent to the Secretary of State on March 7. The first information concerning the political party activity related to the constitutional reform was, however, introduced by Sebald already at the end of January.

The Jiyūtō plan for revision of the constitution was made by the Special Investigation Committee that had worked since November 1945. Sebald restrained from commenting on the content in any loaded expressions when introducing the draft. By quoting Hatoyama’s statement published in the Asahi he, nevertheless, emphasized the importance of the emperor question to the party.

FEAC members that the issue of constitution was taken out of his hands by the agreement in Moscow. HELLEGERS also introduces views according to which the meeting with the FEAC members had a catalytic effect by making Whitney to consider whether the GS could indeed take initiative in the constitutional reform. Hellegers 2001b, 513.


Tominomori 2006, 19.


William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, January 29, 1946. 3. NDL, GS(A)02520. Sebald returned to the question of the emperor in his latter analysis of the Shakaitō’s constitutional drafting and concluded that all the major parties agreed that the emperor should be kept in some form or
The Shimpotō draft was published on February 14 and commented on by Sebald two days later. Sebald clarified that the document was still under study but his first impression was positive. He concluded that the proposal appeared to be much more liberal than what was anticipated due to the previous indications. Sebald even suggested that if the tentative impressions prove to be correct, it might indicate that the Progressive Party, formerly labeled as ultra-conservative, were capable of adopting democratic principles. Thus, the progressives’ draft was a positive surprise that Sebald associated with Saitō Takao whose views he assumed the draft was mirroring.691

A memorandum dealing with the GS Political Parties Branch shows that its members were also studying the major parties by comparing their drafts for constitutional reform.692 However, no document revealing the conclusions of such a study has been found. On the other hand, the positively toned GS report dealing with the interview of Saitō on February 24, 1946 referred only to the unfinished character of the document and thus the proposed draft was neither frowned upon nor praised.693 Interestingly, the CIS periodical that referred to the same interview criticized the progressives’ draft. Namely, the draft was judged as a reactionary instrument in spite of the lip-service to democratic principles. It was further claimed that while the draft abolished the peerage system and the Privy Council, it preserved in general the sovereign powers of the emperor and evils of the imperial system. Moreover, the draft was alleged to contain paralleling limitations to the rights of the people with the existing constitution.694 CIS’s criticism might have echoed the attack of the Japanese press against the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō drafts that were deemed as reactionary proposals that reminded the old Meiji-Constitution.695

The comparative study made by the POLAD concluded that, generally speaking, the progressive and the socialist drafts succeeded and the liberal draft failed to establish the essentials of democratic government. Even the former,
however, lacked precision and explicitness on certain key points. The main
differences between the parties were considered to lay in questions concerning the
status of the emperor and the nature of Japan’s economy.\footnote{Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of the Acting Political Adviser in Japan, no date. FRUS 1946, vol. 8, 170–172. The study of the constitutional reform continued inside the State Department Office of Research and Intelligence until late June 1946. The value of the consideration of political parties’ drafts were seen in their role as the representative of the thoughts of those who were expected to implement the new constitution in the future. DOS, Office of Research and Intelligence, R&A 3788, June 25, 1946. OSS/SDIRR reel 3 document 10.} In other words, the
constitutional drafts produced by the Japanese conservative parties divided
opinions among the occupation officials. However, especially the Shimpotō draft
surprised some political observers who were not expecting any non-reactionary
initiatives from their side. Obviously the revision plans were criticized, pre-
eminently by the CIS, but this was the case with all the Japanese drafts.

Nevertheless, besides offering their own solutions, the Japanese conservative
parties expressed their opinion concerning the government draft. This was
something the occupation authorities were especially eager to learn more about.
As the constitution was the single most important reform initiated by the
occupation, the conservative parties publicly stated and informally expressed
opinions concerning it oriented occupiers’ attitude toward conservatives. The
GHQ/SCAP wanted a confirmation on questions, who would support the stable
and quick advancement of the constitutional reform and who could ensure it even
after the coming election and the predicted formation of a party-based cabinet.

**Conservative parties’ reaction to the GS draft**

Political parties were fast to comment on the February 1 draft published by the
Mainichi. Although the government’s spokesman Narahashi Wataru denied the
authenticity of the document and the press was violently critical toward it, both
the liberals and the progressives expressed their support of the draft. The parties
did not object the intention to submit the proposed draft that would not change the
position of the emperor to the Diet. The liberals’ Makino Ryōzō (牧野良三)
\footnote{GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political report (1 February to 19 February 1946), no date, 2–3. NARA, RG 331, box 2134, folder 20.} even
opposed any unnecessary postponement in this matter whereas, for example, the
cooperatives and the communists argued against the premature actions in the
constitutional reform.\footnote{GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political report (1 February to 19 February 1946), no date, 2–3. NARA, RG 331, box 2134, folder 20.} The Mainichi story was almost missed by the GS. However, after Dr. Cyrus H. Peake, one of the GS new Far East specialists,
learned about the leaked draft from a colleague in POLAD and Joseph Gordon translated it, the final judgment was harsh. The proposal was found to be extremely conservative, but nobody seems to have paid attention to the fact that the conservative parties supported it. In any case, this kind of attitude on the behalf of the conservative politicians was surely not a surprise.

The enthusiastic welcoming of the GS-made government draft published on March 6 among the Japanese political parties was well notified. With the exception of the communists, all major parties announced their approval of the new constitution. The Shimpotō, the Jiyūtō, the Shakaitō and the Kyōdōtō emphasized the importance of the new democratic constitution and praised the government’s draft. Despite claims of congruent features between the government proposal and parties’ own drafts that were alleged to be identified, Saitō Takao declared that the government’s plan was more progressive than any of the revision plans of the different parties. This welcoming convinced POLAD’s Sebald who concluded that it appeared to be safe to anticipate a whole-hearted support for the document irrespective of which major party might gain preponderant influence on the coming elections.

The GS also began to pin down the opinions of the various parties and politicians after the intense drafting process was over. Especially the views of the Jiyūtō and its leader Hatoyama Ichirō were found to be a matter of great interest. The liberals’ Kōno Ichirō was interviewed first, as a substitute for Hatoyama who was ill, on March 9, 1946. Kōno stated that the three basic principles of the new constitution: the renunciation of war; the rights of the people; and the preservation of the emperor system were fully accepted by the party. Therefore, the Jiyūtō supported the constitutional draft even if it did not include many of the ideas introduced by the party.

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698 Hellegers 2001b, 515–516. Koseki suggests that the occupation could have censored the Mainichi article and hints that the revelation of the Matsumoto draft was in fact a convenient development for occupation. It revealed the incapabilities of the government and made room for the latter GS draft. Koseki 1998, 77–78.
699 Comments from February 2 do not contain any reference to the political parties and other commentaries have not been found. Courtney Whitney, HQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, February 2, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-152.
701 Small working sub-committees were created inside the GS to prepare different parts of the constitutional draft. Political Parties Branches Pieter K. Roest, Harry Emerson Wildes and Beate Sirota formed the Civil Rights Committee. Koseki 1998, 80.
702 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, PUD, PPB, Report of Interview, no date, 3. NDL, GS(B)03182.
constitution was further verified by the March 11 interview of Hatoyama Ichirō. Hatoyama stated that both personally and as a party leader he supported the proposed draft in principle although some minor changes were to be made. 703

The GS’s main conclusions seem to parallel the findings of the POLAD. The government draft was received well in the Japanese press and only the communist press contained negative tones. The same was true with the political parties as well. All the major political parties excluding the communists showed unreserved support for the draft. However, some critical interpretations concerning the parties’ statements about the constitution were also introduced. The conservatives’ sincerity in endorsing the draft was questioned by the press. 704 These claims may have affected the CIS officials who remained critical toward the conservatives and condemned the progressives and the liberals as representatives of a group which believed that the old constitution required only a new interpretation. The support was expressed because the parties realized that the outward resistance would be useless in the face of GHQ/SCAP approval. Hence the political parties considered it smarter to wait for more appropriative times to campaign against the revision. 705

Most certainly the Japanese conservative politicians were capable of the kind strategic thinking they were criticized of. Similarly, the occupation authorities were aware of this kind of window-dressing. The question is, however, how important were the motives behind the conservatives’ support for the new constitution? Namely, it did not make a great difference to the occupation authorities whether the conservatives supported the new constitution because they genuinely supported it or because they found it useful at the given time. The crucial issue was that the occupation authorities believed that they could guide and control the development of the constitutional reform through the Japanese conservatives. Furthermore, conservatives abstained from public attacks against the new constitution that, together with the rumors dealing with the occupiers’

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703 Harry Emerson Wildes, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, March 21, 1946. NDL, JW-93-08.
role as the origin of the government draft\textsuperscript{706}, made the GHQ/SCAP vulnerable, for example, to FEC’s criticism.

It could also be argued that it was not only smart but possibly also easy for the conservatives to approve the draft constitution. The GS draft legitimized the support and protection of the emperor, a matter used earlier to describe the reactionary character of the conservatives. Thus, the undisturbed accomplishment of the constitutional reform emerged as a common goal for the occupation leadership and the conservative political parties. SCHALLER introduces similar ideas and concludes that: “The SCAP-drafted constitution, which retained the emperor as a symbol of the nation, strengthened the aura of a link between the American program and conservative hegemony.”\textsuperscript{707} In other words, if and when the matters related to the constitution were central in occupiers’ examination aiming at the recognition of the political parties that were suitable for the purposes of the occupation, the conservative parties scored well.

Finally, there are two features introduced by HELLEGERS in the handling of the constitutional issue that need to be mentioned. First, there was the will to control the change that typified the occupation policy as a whole. General MacArthur did not mind, although the opinion polls in Japan showed that the majority supported an election of a special committee or convention to revise the constitution. Such a convention could not have been controlled by the GHQ/SCAP and the outcome might have been disagreeable. Second point: the pressure to produce tangible evidence of the reformation of Japan\textsuperscript{708}, connects well to the following chapter dealing with the April 1946 election. The GHQ/SCAP needed manifestations of success and it was ready to make compromises as long as the prestige of the occupation remained unchallenged.

### 5.2 No postponement even if conservatives were to win election

The first postwar House of Representatives election held in April 1946 was supposed to be a great triumph demonstrating the success of the democratization

\textsuperscript{706}See for example: Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea. Report No. 16, April 3, 1946, 3–4. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, Natural Resources Section, Library Division, Publications, 1945–51, entry 1828, box 9091.

\textsuperscript{707}Schaller 1985, 48.

\textsuperscript{708}Hellegers 2001b, 546.
process. Considered as a manifestation of progress and Japan’s spiritual revolution, it was important that the election proceeded without interruptions.\textsuperscript{709}

\textit{Opposition against the early election}

The letter of JCS 1380/15 encouraged the GHQ/SCAP to hold free elections at the earliest practicable date.\textsuperscript{710} The definition of the earliest possible date was not simple. Instead, it was a matter reflecting various interests and aims. The original plan to hold the House of Representative election in January 1946 was abandoned and the examination of candidates to determine whether they were affected by the January 4, 1946 purge directives delayed them further. The screening of the candidate qualifications began on January 30 in accordance with the Home Ministry Ordinance Number 2.\textsuperscript{711} While the Japanese Government’s Screening Committee was sorting out who would be allowed to run, the GHQ/SCAP made its own preparations. The importance of the coming election was emphasized to the military government officers who were instructed by the GS officials in matters of the Election Law and duties related to the supervision of the election.\textsuperscript{712} Furthermore, the GHQ/SCAP re-checked the questionnaires filled in by the candidates and checked by the Japanese government. Candidates were then put into three categories of cleared, doubtful or barred.\textsuperscript{713}

The postponement of the election from March 31 to April 10 was decided on February 25, 1946. This decision was approved by the major political parties although the liberals showed a mildly critical attitude toward it. Criticism was based on a claim that the delay would continue the unrest among the Japanese people. The Jiyūtō’s willingness to hold an early election was, however, most likely bound to the progressives’ and the cooperatives will to postpone it. The latter two needed time to reorganize themselves after the purge whereas the Jiyūtō

\textsuperscript{709} Fukunaga 1997, 66; Masuda 2001, 81–82.
\textsuperscript{710} JCS, Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS-1380/15), November 3, 1945, 136. NDL, GS(B)00291.
\textsuperscript{711} Masumi 1985, 95.
\textsuperscript{713} CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 19, April 24, 1946, 1. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
had suffered less. On the other hand, the Kyōsantō that opposed the whole idea of the early election considered the ten-day delay meaningless.714

Despite the occupation authorities’ eagerness to demonstrate the peaceful and stable development of the democratization process, the atmosphere in Japan did not remain calm when the polling day came closer. Three days before the election seventy thousand leftist demonstrators gathered in Hibiya Park, Tokyo to demand the overthrow of the Shidehara cabinet, creation of the people’s government, end of the starvation, and a democratic constitution by the hands of the people. Incited by the rally, some fifty thousand people proceeded to the prime minister’s residence where police had to shoot their pistols after the crowd broke through the gate of the residence. Eventually the US military police had to intervene and restore order. Finally a delegation that was led by the communist leader Tokuda Kyūichi (徳田球一) was permitted to enter the residence.715

The FEC shared the Japanese communists’ view concerning the timing of the election. The commission decided to send a letter to General MacArthur and ask for delaying the general election on March 20, 1946. The FEC’s criticism was based on three arguments. First, the early election would give advantage to the old reactionary parties because the more liberal elements did not have enough time to circulate their views and organize support. Hence the election result might not reflect the freely expressed will of the Japanese people and an outcome might be something with which the Supreme Command might not be able to cooperate. Second, FEC’s members thought that it was difficult to expect the Japanese people to express their views of their political future during the existing uncertain period when the whole of the future economic structure of Japan was still in doubt. Finally, the issuance of the draft constitution only few weeks before the election was considered to be distractive. The issuance of the draft might give an undue political advantage to the political parties preferring this draft. Due to these arguments, the FEC wanted to know whether MacArthur shared their apprehensions; whether MacArthur would consider it possible and desirable to postpone the election; and whether MacArthur, in the case of not agreeing with the postponement, would be willing to publicly prescribe that the forthcoming election would be regarded as a test of the ability of Japan to produce a responsible and democratic government and that further elections would be held

at a later date. MacArthur answered on March 29, by invalidating all three proposals.

It was not, however, only the Soviet representative of the FEC who disagreed with MacArthur’s plan. Even Major General Frank R. McCoy, an old friend of MacArthur who had promised to support the Supreme Commander when nominated as the chairman of the FEC, criticized MacArthur for rushing through the process from the general election to the enactment of the constitution. General McCoy sent his own message immediately after the FEC’s dispatch. The content of his personal note was almost congruent to the one of the commission with the exception of a sentence referring to the fact that the draft constitution was an election issue favorably influencing the party in power. MacArthur’s reply to McCoy was almost the same as he gave to the FEC. This time he only added that the postponement of the election has been supported only by the communist elements. Members of the FEC found it hard to tolerate MacArthur’s actions and asked him to send a representative to Washington to report on events and conditions in Japan. MacArthur replied only on May 4, 1946, declining to send anybody. The US State Department tried to make MacArthur change his opinion, but eventually they were forced to dispatch MacArthur’s unresponsive letter to the FEC on May 29. This was more than a month and a half after the original request.

Besides the FEC and the ACJ, also the international press criticized the early election. Especially the Soviet press attacked the democratic character of the House of Representatives election. Most of the candidates were described as reactionaries combined by the protection of the monarchy and anti-communism. The early date of the election was considered to favor these old forces. Critical tones were reported to have emerged, however, also for example in New Zealand and in England. The reasons behind the dissatisfaction were the same as in other instances.

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717 Koseki 1998, 147.


719 Moscow via War, SECSTATE, message unsigned, April 4.1946. CUSSDCF, reel 1 windows 497–498; Moscow via War, SECSTATE, message unsigned, April 11, 1946. CUSSDCF, reel 1 windows

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Low turnout percentage was one of the domestic worries speaking against the early election. It was estimated that only 50–60 percent of the people would go to the polls on April 10. Even concerns were expressed that the total vote cast would remain so sparse that the new Diet would not truly be representative of a majority of the people. It was further expected that at best only half of the female voters would go to the polls. The number of politically conscious women was considered to be few and most of the women voters were expected to follow the political leanings of the head of the household. Simultaneously, especially the progressives and the liberals were claimed to have taken an indifferent attitude toward women voters. Rumors concerning the high absentee rate were alarming because this realization would contest the credibility of the election as proof of progress of the democratization. Besides the hardship of daily life, the low interest was supposed to be related to the large number of unknown candidates; the low level of political education and experience; distrust toward politicians; and the parties’ ineptness to arouse public enthusiasm.

Statesmanship over party politics

Evaluations made in spring 1946 clearly demonstrate how the distinction between the assumed Japanese statesmen and party politicians that originated from the planning period still existed inside the GHQ/SCAP. In short, one Japanese conservative was not as good as another in the eyes of the occupiers. POLAD’s Sebald repeatedly questioned the prowess of the political parties and the House of Representatives formed by them. Likewise, Guy J. Swope, head of

663–664; Gallman telegram, London, SECSTATE, April 15, 1946. CUSSDCF reel 1 windows 675–678.


721 William J. Sebald, POLAD, February 12, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02520; William J. Sebald, POLAD, March 27, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02519; William J. Sebald, POLAD, April 2, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02519.

722 Guy J. Swope, the one-term New Deal congressman, was a self-made man having no more than an elementary school education. His prewar work history was colorful, including positions of a department-store controller, budget secretary in the governor of Pennsylvania’s cabinet and governor of Puerto Rico to name only a few. Swope graduated from the Navy School of Military Government, served as executive officer in the Military Government of Saipan, and gave special lectures at the
Legislative Branch, concluded in mid-January 1946 that a large-scale representation of the non-aligned Diet members would be desirable. A large party representation would result only in building up the self-seeking political leaders. It was thus proposed that the politicians without connection to the political parties would be somehow less self-seeking.

The party politicians’ alleged lack of political leadership and the use of prewar history as its verification remained as an issue. Sebald concluded that the prewar political behavior might be used as a guide to the probable pattern of the Japanese democracy in the immediate future. According to Sebald’s analysis, statesmen had been outside the Diet while, with few exceptions, the prewar Diets had lacked political party members who possessed and exercised statesmanlike and constructive leadership. He also followed the pattern of criticizing the prewar parties because of their ineptness, corruption, and lack of ability and a concrete program. Sebald notified the important role of the political education in correction of these shortcomings but expected it to take some time to be effective.

Sebald’s conclusions that were repeated in a CIS report followed the old Japan Hand argumentation by denying the existence of the political leadership among the political parties while hinting that such ability had emerged outside the Diet.

These ideas were not new, but they were topical. The difference between the party politics and statesmanship was demonstrated in comparison between Hatoyama Ichirō and Shidehara Kijūrō. There were two dominant views concerning the line-up of the future cabinet prior to the election. One rumor suggested that the Shidehara Cabinet would attempt to sustain its political life even after the election. Both Jiji and Mainichi released stories proposing a post-election alliance between Baron Shidehara and the Progressive Party. Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi Wataru was identified as the key figure behind political maneuvers which might result in Shidehara’s assumption of the}{

Navy School of Military Government, Princeton University. Swope quit his GS post in July 1946 but returned a few months later to head the National Government Division. In the fall of 1947 he became chief of the Political Affairs Division. When Swope left Tokyo for the second time in February 1948, the remaining functions of the Political Affairs Division were assigned to the Legislative Division which then became the Parliamentary and Political Division. Williams 1979, 54–55.


725 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 15, March 27, 1946, 5. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
presidency of the Shimpotō. Shidehara could then arrange a partner-like relationship with the Jiyūtō and form a coalition cabinet under his control.\(^{726}\)

Another rumor proposed that a new party including elements from the progressives, the liberals, the cooperatives and the right-wing socialists was going to be established to support Shidehara’s premiership.\(^{727}\)

The other main player in speculations concerning the post-election coalition building was Hatoyama Ichirō, the president of the Jiyūtō. Although Hatoyama divided opinions, a coalition between his party and either the Shakaitō or the Shimpotō, was reported as a likely prospect. Hatoyama himself gave a public statement to the press on April 4, where he declared the liberals’ optimism concerning the election results. The liberals expected that either enough right-wing socialists, along with the progressives and independents, would join them to enable the Liberal Party majority government, or a liberal-led coalition government would be established with the same forces. The liberals anticipated internal problems within the Shakaitō and trusted in the support of the right-wing socialists. Hatoyama even referred to a gentlemen’s agreement with leaders like Hirano Rikizō, Nishio Suehiro, Matsumoto Jiichirō (松本治一郎) and Mizutani Chōzaburō (水谷長三郎) who had departed from the common plan to establish a party in autumn of 1945 only to prevent the socialists to swing too far to the left. Hatoyama further suggested that the minister-caliber politicians existed among the right-wing Shakaitō leaders, but doubted that any politician suitable for such an important position could be found from the ranks of the progressives.\(^{728}\)

POLAD’s Sebald did not hide his preference if the choosing of the new prime minister was to be made between the two leading candidates. Sebald doubted whether any of the acting party heads possessed necessary attributes of leadership required to fulfill the position of premier in a purely party or coalition cabinet. His report also contains the following rather straightforward comparison: “…the vulnerable character of Hatoyama’s past dealings in contrast with Baron

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\(^{726}\) CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 17, April 10, 1946, 5. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.

\(^{727}\) William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, April 9, 1946, 4. CUSSDCF reel 1 windows 659–662.

Shidehara’s admittedly great prestige and impeccable character. Moreover, Shidehara was believed to enjoy the support of the Supreme Commander. Sebald expressed similar views later in the pages of his book. Two decades after the actual events he concluded that the purge left few Japanese leaders of capacity available for top positions, but two outstanding men did arise to give the country the stability it needed at a crucial period. One was Shidehara Kijūrō and the second was Yoshida Shigeru. Sebald describes these two as patriotic Japanese who were “among our good friends”.

Claims by Narahashi Wataru further suggest that the occupation authorities supported the incumbent cabinet. Narahashi alleges in his memoirs that when he appealed to the unidentified occupation authorities on behalf of the ministers condemned to be purged just prior to election, the GHQ/SCAP encouraged the Shidehara Cabinet not to resign before an agreement would be reached regarding the successor cabinet. According to Narahashi it was recommended that he would resolve the crisis. When he argued that it was a task of the leading party’s president, the representative of GHQ/SCAP referred to the possibility that the president might be disqualified. Narahashi insists that Shidehara was against the proposal, but he decided to proceed and declared on April 11 that the Shidehara Cabinet would not resign. Although Narahashi’s claim is rather obscure and possibly motivated by his personal interests, it fits in the developments that took place spring 1946. Based on the findings of HELLEGERS and claims of Jiyūtō’s Secretary General Kōno Ichirō, Narahashi’s unofficial personal contacts with the occupation officials did not show signs of cooling down during the spring. Thus, if the occupation authorities really wished to advise Shidehara to stay in power, Narahashi was a likely intermediary.

Eventually Narahashi could not solve the post-election cabinet crisis and he ended up in political seclusion for a year. This was because he irritated the general public, his conservative associates, and the occupation authorities. The Japanese press and political rivals criticized Narahashi because of his attempts to keep

729 William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, April 9, 1946, 4. CUSSDCF reel 1 windows 659–662.
731 Sebald 1967, 67.
733 According to HELLEGERS, Narahashi became the main source of information during the period of uncertainty over the cabinet’s reply to the GS draft because the honesty of Yoshida Shigeru’s aide Shirasu Jirō was doubted. Hellegers 2001b, 536, 781–782.
734 According to Kōno, Narahashi was really close to GHQ at the time of post-election cabinet negotiations. Kōno 1965, 183.
Shidehara in office. The Shakaitō leaders had nothing good to say about Narahashi735 and conservatives attacked Narahashi after he tried to sit in two chairs and to secure his own position as the Chief Cabinet Secretary no matter whether Shidehara or Hatoyama would become the next premier.736 The occupation authorities began to take distance from Narahashi as well because his friendship became a burden. Narahashi was claimed to enjoy the distrust of many reputable Japanese and his support would possibly result in embarrassment. Therefore, although Narahashi bragged that his friends in GHQ/SCAP would protect him737, the CIS was in fact collecting unflattering material concerning Narahashi’s wartime past in China and his attempts to silence press criticism directed against him.738

Assumptions concerning the dominance of the conservative parties and the undesirable character of Hatoyama were strengthened through studies of party finances and election budgets. Studies revealed that the Jiyūtō was leading the race with a clear margin and Hatoyama was claimed to have personally provided more than half of his party’s electoral funds.739 This money was rumored to be dirty. Namely, a confidential informant argued that Hatoyama had connections with a group of capitalists to whom he had promised favors after nomination as prime minister. Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi was mentioned as the intermediary between Hatoyama and this group.740 Whether or not these accusations were believed or not, they did not make Hatoyama’s image any cleaner. The Shimpotō problems were also realized in the case of election funds since the party was reported to have abandoned a plan to support its candidates

735 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief of Section, April 19, 1946, 3–4. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2.
737 GHQ/USAfpAC, Special Intelligence Branch, Intelligence Division, CIS, Memorandum for Colonel Crewell thru: Colonel Duff, April 26, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03313; GHQ/USAfpAC, Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, Check Sheet from OCCIO to GS, April 29, 46. NDL, GS(B)00313.
738 GHQ/USAfpAC, Special Intelligence Branch, Intelligence Division, CIS, Paul Rusch, Memorandum for Colonel Creswell through Colonel Duff, May 3, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03313; CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 17, April 10, 1946, 5–6. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091; CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 22, May 15, 1946, 3. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
739 Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan No. 6, 36. OJP3RRP 3-B-6.
740 GHQ/USAfpAC, Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, Report from H. I. T. Creswell, OCCIO to Roest, GS, March 11, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03013; GHQ, USAfpAC, Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence, Summary of Information, March 9, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03013.
from general party funds. However, the Home Ministry statistics showed a rapid increase in party funds in the second half of March.741

The last pre-election hit for Hatoyama’s image came after an incident mobilized by the Chicago Sun foreign correspondent Mark Gayn on April 6, 1946. Hatoyama, together with the leaders of the other major parties, was invited to a gala affair at the Tokyo Press Club. First the party leaders were asked about the party platforms and the constitution, but eventually the event became a bitter attack against Hatoyama. In the center of this offensive was Gayn who had received a translated copy of Hatoyama’s book published in 1938 and called Sekai no kao742 from occupation officials and distributed parts of it to other foreign correspondents. Gayn describes the interrogation that followed as a savage performance. Confused Hatoyama was struggling with his English and tried unsuccessfully to bring himself apart from the book and the content of the carefully selected unflattering passages.743

Gayn’s source may have been in the Civil Information and Education section because archival sources reveal that CI&E’s Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Nugent744 sent a confidential report to the OCCIO three days before the Press Club incident. This report contained excerpts from Sekai no Kao and Nugent’s conclusion according to which it should be studied whether Hatoyama was to be purged and the Jiyūtō be dissolved. Nugent himself believed that the excerpts of the book testified against Hatoyama. He stated that it might be presumed that Hatoyama’s prewar views had an important influence on public opinion and that they helped to deceive and mislead the Japanese people into the embarking world conquest.745 Whether or not Nugent passed the material to Gayn, his complaint is an example evaluation by a conservative anti-communist against Hatoyama.

741 Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan No. 6, 31, 35–36. OJP3RRP 3-B-6.
742 Face of the World. Itoh explains that the book was in fact not written by Hatoyama, but by Hatoyama’s speech writer Yamaura Kanichi (山浦貫一), former reporter of Jiji Shimpo. Itoh 2003, 92–94.
744 Donald R. Nugent followed the liberal Brigadier General Kermit R. Dyke as the head of CI&E in May 1946. Nugent held a degree in education and a PhD in Far Eastern History from Stanford University. He published in the field of Pacific region and taught in Japan from 1937 to 1941. Upon returning to the United States in 1941, he joined the Marines and underwent training in Japanese and psychological warfare. Nugent was a conservative anti-communist who is said to have been acting on secret instructions from Washington in mid-April 1946 to avoid attacks on the emperor system. Takemae 2003, 180–182, 243.
745 D. R. N. (Donald R. Nugent), C, CI&E to OCCIO, April 3, 1946, 2. NDL, BAE-122.
Conservatives’ victory presumable and acceptable election result

General MacArthur did not yield under the pressure to postpone the election. Instead, he emphasized the need of the State Department to follow his policy. MacArthur sent a message to the Secretary of State through the War Department on April 10, 1946 where he stressed the importance of the unified American attitude supporting Japan’s initial democratic effort under the occupation. MacArthur, in other words, wanted to make sure that if and when comments were to be asked, the State Department would give support to the early House of Representatives. The Supreme Commander admitted that most likely the majority of the new Diet members would be elected among the candidates of the Progressive and the Liberal Parties and the various independent groups. This was not, however, to be misunderstood. MacArthur emphasized that the understanding of the Japanese psychology and the existing circumstances were necessary and apparently in Tokyo there was such a capability. Disappointment was also expressed because of the apparent indications that some quarters in the United States considered the communist and the so-called left-wing socialists as the only true liberal elements in Japan. MacArthur stated that a careful scrutiny of the principles advocated by the Shimpotō, the Kyōdōtō and the Shakaitō fail to reveal any doctrine which might even remotely be considered as inimical to the development of democracy. The clear divider was drawn between the communist and the non-communist. This line had nothing to do with terms like democratic or reactionary which were misused in Japan by the Soviets and the communist leaders. One example of the acceptability of the non-communist forces was their support of the government’s draft constitution. It is noteworthy that Hatoyama’s Jiyūtō was not mentioned among the non-communist contributors to the democracy. Another interesting point is that the wording of MacArthur’s message to the State Department originated from the POLAD.747

746 War Department, Classified Message Center, Incoming Classified Message, Message from CINCAFPAC Command Tokyo Japan to War Department, C 59765, April 10 1946. NARA, RG 218 (Chairman’s File, Admiral Leahy, 1942–48), box 8, folder 44.
747 Max W. Bishop sent the same text directly to the Secretary of State also on April 10. General Whitney and General William F. Marquart from the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) received copies of the telegram number 171 that can be found from the POLAD archives and from the Foreign Relations of the United States 1946, vol. 8. The document collection contains a note according which Bishop had reported that General MacArthur would have expressed his complete concurrence with the views in the telegram and favored the idea of giving a copy of it to General McCoy. Another point affirming that the telegram 171 existed prior to the CINAFPAC message was the mentioning of the serial number of the telegram. The War Department, Classified Message Center, Incoming Classified
But why did the occupation authorities wish so stubbornly to hold an early House of the Representatives election despite the criticism? The wish to force the adoption of the constitution without the FEC’s intervention was obviously one reason behind the decision to arrange an early election. The earlier there would be a new Diet, the earlier it could begin to discuss the matter of the constitution. In addition, there was also the domestic initiative to form a special National Assembly to enact the constitution. This potential complication was also possible to avoid should the Diet approve the constitution. The occupation authorities, in other words, preferred the Imperial Diet to establish the constitution as quickly as possible.748

According to KOSEKI, the draft constitution was not mentioned too often by the candidates in their campaign speeches.749 What is more important, however, is the occupation authorities’ conception concerning the constitution’s role as the theme of the election. When General Whitney rationalized on February 1, 1946 that MacArthur had a right to proceed with the constitutional reform, he referred to the constitutional reform as a potential cardinal issue in the coming election.750 Similarly, General MacArthur wanted to have the House of Representatives election as a plebiscite over the question of the constitutional reform. In his later analysis MacArthur considers himself as having been successful in this attempt.751 The occupation leadership thus considered that the election victory of those sympathetic to the new constitution would also attest to the general support for the constitution itself. According to Sebald’s analysis such an expression of support became, however, unnecessary. He concluded already on March 12, 1946 that the position of the emperor and the constitutional revision plans appeared to be no longer live issues in the election campaign because of the almost unanimous approval given by the political parties.752

Another possible reason not to withdraw from holding the early election is MacArthur’s will to keep the strings through which the occupation was guided in

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749 Koseki 1998, 132–133.
750 Courtney Whitney, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, February 1, 1946, 1. OJP3RRP 3-A-151.
751 MacArthur 1965, 300–301.
his own hands. Yielding in this question might have changed the balance of power more toward the Far Eastern Commission. Moreover, as KOSEKI has pointed out, the question of the House of Representatives election demonstrates the nature of MacArthur’s relations with the US State Department and even with the War Department. Eventually MacArthur compromised with the FEC’s criteria for the adoption of the new constitution formed on May 13, 1946. In other words, General MacArthur abandoned the plan to pass the constitution in few weeks by the Diet. He did this even without a letter from President Truman although the representatives of the SWNCC had considered such a letter as the only way to persuade MacArthur to submit to the FEC. 753 Eventually it became possible for the Japanese Diet to amend the draft, but the political situation changed a lot between the pre-election debates and the opening of the 90th Imperial Diet on June 21, 1946.

These are, however, not the only explanations why the GHQ/SCAP wanted to hold the controversial election. Thomas A. Bisson, a pro-China believer who supported profound reforms in Japan 754, argues that the supporters of the early election thought that the purge of pro-militarists and ultra-nationalists from the political life, coupled with the establishment of civil liberties, was all that was needed to pave the way for a free election. In addition, he claims that the lack of a strong middle-of-the-road political force between the views of the socialists and the communists on the one hand, and the ultra-rightist outlook of the Progressive and the Liberal Parties, made the occupiers to prefer the latter and the early election. 755 Despite Bisson’s description of the course of the occupation as seeming to be purposefully critical, his analysis concerning the suitability or at least the acceptability of the conservative political parties is correct. In the pre-election situation, the conservative political parties were the only realistic choice in sight to lead the first party-based postwar cabinet. The occupation authorities were ready to accept them but the acceptability necessitated, however, certain changes in personnel that are discussed later.

The growing anti-communist sentiments among the occupation authorities could indeed explain the willingness to proceed with the early election despite the

754 Thomas Arthur Bisson was an ardent New Dealer with connections to China Hands like Owen Lattimore, Andrew Roth and Philip Jaffe. After graduation he spent four years in China, became a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association and visited Chinese Communists outpost in Yenan during his 1973 trip to Far East. Williams 1979, 70–71.
anticipated conservative victory. Namely, the anti-communist ideology was openly echoed by certain members of the POLAD. Since the beginning of 1946 the US State Department received reports dealing with the Japanese political parties in which the general tone differed from the earlier ones. OINAS-KUKKONEN has discussed this change in POLAD’s line under a title of “Bishops attack.” This definition refers to Max Waldo Bishop, a political liaison officer who had close connections to G-2 because of the participation in the Intelligence Liaison Group. Bishop represented the so-called pro-Japanese viewpoint. He was a former Japanese language officer, with a prewar experience from Japan. He felt that much misunderstanding was being created among the Japanese by the occupation officials who knew little or nothing about the Japanese people and their problems.

In mid-February Bishop praised a highly critical analysis of the left-wing faction of the Shakaitō. Willoughby’s G-2 is the most likely origin of the analysis that was primarily a warning concerning the left-wing’s factions attempt to transform the Shakaitō into a militant proletarian party. Bishop was also active on the day of the election by submitting an anti-communist and anti-Soviet telegram to the State Department that defended the non-communist Japanese political forces.

POLAD’s Robert A. Fearey, a Harvard-trained Japan specialist and former private secretary to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, shared Bishop’s prejudice toward communism. In his reappraisal of the United States security interest and policies in regard to Japan, Fearey warned that the existing pro-American, pro-democratic, anti-Soviet and anti-communist tendencies could be completely reversed. According to Fearey’s analysis, the adverse economic conditions and the withdrawal of the American forces were the likeliest causes of such a change. The threat of the rising communism was the central theme of the memorandum and the readmission of a significant number of persons excluded by the January 4

756 Oinas-Kukkonen 2003, 59.
757 C. A. Willoughby, G-2, to George Atcheson Jr., November 29, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 1, folder 1; George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, to C. A. Willoughby, December 6, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 1, folder 1; C. A. Willoughby, G-2, to George Atcheson Jr., December 8, 1945. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 1, folder 1.
758 Sebald with Brines 1965, 43.
759 Max W. Bishop, POLAD to the Secretary of State, February 15, 1946. FRUS 1946, vol. 8, 140–141.
760 Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan, to the Secretary of State, April 10, 1946. FRUS 1946, vol. 8, 191–194.
761 Takemae 2003, 151–152.
purge directive was one of the long-range steps that needed to be taken to prevent such a development.762

Together with Bishop and Fearey, also Sebald showed signs of worry because of the communist activity during spring 1946. Sebald’s criticism dealt with the continuing complains of the right-wing socialists, the liberals, and the progressives concerning the large amount of space devoted by the Metropolitan dailies to the activities of the Kyōsantō. Sebald claimed that one result of this heavy dosage of communist information was a growing anxiety on the part of the conservative Japanese that the ultra-nationalistic fervor may again be encouraged to grow in counteraction to the extreme left. Sebald claimed that besides Akahata also Yomiuri and Asahi steadfastly agreed with the communist program.763

OINAS-KUKKONEN concludes that Bishop, together with Fearey and Sebald, wanted the anti-communist forces to be supported. He continues that Bishop’s ideas became more accepted in the POLAD after Emmerson’s departure for Washington. Finally he shows that the thoughts of the above mentioned were rejected in Washington by the Division of Japanese Affairs and its leading officials Hugh Borton and John K. Emmerson and by the War Department. Bishop’s ideas were, moreover, criticized also in the State Department Office of Research and Intelligence. Hence the United States’ positive attitude toward the Japanese communists continued longer than the previous research has assumed.764 OINAS-KUKKONEN’s perception is noteworthy. However, for the sake of this study it is more important to consider the importance and the influence of these initiatives on General MacArthur and the other occupation leadership that was implementing its own agenda rather independently in Tokyo. The GS took the leading role in decision-making after December 1945, but MacArthur’s agreement with Bishop’s defense of non-communist forces, proposes that the POLAD’s voice was heard at least to some extent.

Another reason speaking on behalf of the agreement between General MacArthur and the POLAD’s new line is the basic nature of these ideas. OINAS-KUKKONEN concludes that Bishop relied heavily upon the claims of the communists’ political rivals and mentions the right-wing socialists and the

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764 Oinas-Kukkonen 2003, 65, 70, 72. Conclusion mainly based on two documents: Department of State, memorandum of conversation, April 12, 1946. CUSSDCF reel 1 window 665; DOS, Office of Research and Intelligence, R&A 3440, April 1, 1946. OSS/SDIRR reel 2 document 24.
Kyōdōtō as sources of information.\textsuperscript{765} Other sources reveal that for example the liberals’ Kōno Ichirō was also spreading warnings about the dangers of communism among the political observers.\textsuperscript{766} However, it should be noticed that none of the previously mentioned conservative critics of the Kyōsantō activities tried to defend or prize Hatoyama, the most visible Japanese anti-communist. In fact, in relation to the political parties and political leadership not only Bishop but the whole POLAD policy line was committed to the old Japan Hand way of thinking. Hence the ‘Bishops attack’ seems to be in fact a development addressing the return of Japan Hand thinking in its purest form. As mentioned before, John K. Emmerson followed these ideas with the one major exception he made in his attitude toward the Japanese communists and their usage for the occupation. This is to say that although Grew had turned down General MacArthur’s offer and Dooman was not accepted by Washington, the Japan Hand continued to blossom inside the State Department’s representative in Tokyo. Therefore, there is no reason to overemphasize the change in the international climate when explaining the change in the POLAD’s course caused by the changes in personnel.

After everything went smoothly on April 10, the Supreme Commander did not hesitate to praise the outcome of the election. MacArthur stated on April 23, 1946, that given the opportunity to express freely their popular will, the Japanese people had responded whole-heartedly and rejected both the extremes of right and left. They had taken the wide central course which would permit the evolvement of a balanced program of government designed best to serve the interest of the people. The Supreme Commander declared that the democracy had thus demonstrated a healthy forward advance. One interesting argument on behalf of this claim was that the attention that the professional politicians had all but disappeared.\textsuperscript{767} The weakening of the strength of the old party politicians was, in other words, considered as a factor contributing to the future democracy of Japan. Yet the attitude toward the independent candidates seems to have confused the occupier. Namely, when Sebald gave credit to the Japanese press after the successful election, he thanked them not only because of the considerable space devoted to the election campaign and emphasis of the minimum abstention, he

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\textsuperscript{765} Oinas-Kukkonen 2003, 63–65.  \\
\textsuperscript{766} Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, PUD, PPB, Report of Interview, no date. NDL, GS(B)03182.  \\
\textsuperscript{767} Message from CINAFPAC Tokyo to War Department, Z-32814, April 23, 1946. NARA, RG 218, box 139, folder 2; Whitney 1977, 263–264.
\end{flushright}
also mentioned that the newspapers had emphasized the desirability of voting party tickets and urged voters to avoid independents.  

The incomplete voter registration lists were criticized after the election but only the Communist Party expressed disapproval of the election by demanding a re-election on the grounds of registration problems. Hence, the conservatives were not trying to deny the glory of the occupiers’ big moment. Sebald concluded that the election results showed that the majority of the Japanese were conservative by nature, but emphasized that the huge vote polled by the politically inexperienced Shakaitō clearly demonstrated an under-current of desire for change on the part of many people. This continued the tradition from the first months of the occupation where the Shakaitō was praised but its heydays were considered to be somewhere in the future.

Atcheson’s attack against the communists who protested against the election demonstrates well the importance of the flawless image of the election. Atcheson alleged that the comparison of the subject matter and the language employed in the protest with articles appearing in the Soviet press and the points raised by the Soviet member at meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, suggested that the Japan Communist Party’s line was directed from Moscow. Later William D. Leahy who was acting as the aid of the President wrote a letter where he, besides assuring that MacArthur has the support of the top-level Washington leadership, also expressed a wish that any unnecessary public criticism of a member of any nationality and public criticism of the policy of any member nation should be studiously avoided by the American member of the Council.

In short, the GHQ/SCAP did not seriously hope or expect that the Shakaitō and other reformist side groups would seize the initiative in the election (as proposed). I argue that it was known and accepted that the conservatives would win the election. Most certainly not everybody inside the GHQ/SCAP found the conservatives as a perfect match but they were considered as a realistic choice that was good enough for the purposes of the occupation. Thus, the occupation authorities decided to move forward despite the conservative domination in the coming Diet. Furthermore, the occupation authorities recognized certain non-

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768 William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, April 17, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 11, folder 24.
769 William J. Sebald, POLAD, weekly report, April 17, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 11, folder 24.
770 George Atcheson Jr., POLAD, Despatch No. 423 to the Secretary of State, May 17, 1946. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 10, folder 15.
771 William D. Leahy, the White House to Douglas MacArthur, July 25, 1946. NDL, MMA-14, reel 3.
772 Masuda 2001, 83.
party-affiliated conservatives as more desirable than the old career party politicians who were heading the existing conservative parties. This problem was, however, solvable.

5.3 Conservatives were acceptable, Hatoyama was not

Kenneth E. Colton wrote in 1948 that the Hatoyama group had by far the best and the cleanest legislative record of the conservative groups between 1937 and 1943. Moreover, in the history of the non-military activities, Hatoyama and his like-minded were recognized as having been generally persona non grata to the ruling powers in wartime Japan because of their strong defense of the parliamentary government against the rising tide of military influence. Still, Hatoyama and many of his followers were purged in May-June 1946.

TOMINOMORI claims that GHQ/SCAP treated the bureaucracy softly during the purge, at least when compared to its treatment of conservative party men. This leniency allowed former bureaucrats to emerge as the leaders of the conservative parties. Furthermore, he alleges that the purge of Hatoyama Ichirō, together with the purges of Miki Bukichi (三木武吉) and Kōno Ichirō, made room for the former bureaucrats to seize power in the Jiyūtō that had just won the election. What TOMINOMORI does not deal with is the striving force and motivation behind these changes. Therefore, the following pages introduce how the emergence of the Yoshida Shigeru and Shidehara Kijirō rule inside the largest conservative parties was in fact an outcome of the complex process in which the occupiers’ target-oriented policy played a significant role. The post-election development in April and May 1946 did not, however, proceed as the occupation authorities had hoped and they were forced to adjust their policy based on the changes in the political currents. Yet, the outcome was satisfactory to the leaders of the GHQ/SCAP.

\[\text{773 Research analyst GHQ, SCAP. Colton 1948, 940.}\]
\[\text{774 Colton 1948, 941.}\]
\[\text{775 GHQ, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan 1945 Through November 1951, Volume III – Political and Legal – Part F, Development of Political Parties, 128. NDL.}\]
\[\text{776 Tominomori 2006, 20–22.}\]
\[\text{777 Ray A. MOORE’s argument suggesting that Yoshida’s rule was unwelcomed is thus not agreeable. Interestingly MOORE himself wonders at the reason for the occupation authorities claimed negative attitude toward Yoshida who had a background as one of the statesmen of the Anglo-American school supported by the Washington planners. MOORE explains his interpretation by referring to the GS that}\]
Rocky road to Hatoyama’s single-party cabinet proposal

Registration for candidacy in the House of Representative election ended on April 3, 1946. After a few withdrawals, there were a total of 2770 candidates running on the day of election. Of these, 2626 had never held office before, and 97 were women. The number of parties totaled 262. A clear majority of these minor parties were in fact single-member parties and the number of independents went up to 773. The Jiyūtō was the biggest party if the number of candidates running with the party ticket is used as the measurement. Those eventually elected included 140 liberals, 93 progressives, 92 socialists, 14 cooperatives, 5 communists, 38 minor party members and 81 independents. Runoff elections were held later in two districts because the last contested seat received less than the legal minimum. The group of 466 Diet members contained 379 new faces. Yoshida Shigeru, the former Foreign Minister and the new leader of the Jiyūtō, became the Prime Minister of Japan six weeks after the election, on May 22, 1946. Both Shidehara and Hatoyama had, thus, failed in their aspiration to become a premier.

The cabinet announced through its spokesman Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi that, since the result of the election did not accord a clear majority to any single party and since the cabinet considered the establishment of the draft constitution its primary responsibility, it would seek support among the several political parties for its continued existence. This proposal was opposed by the Liberal, the Socialist, and the Communist Parties. In addition, the Progressive Party refused to consider the admission of Shidehara into its ranks until he would resign from the premiership. Despite this wide opposition, Shidehara stated on April 16 that the cabinet would not resign irresponsibly before a stabilizing political force that could proceed with the constitution would be created. At the same time Narahashi began pursuing his strategy of uniting the minor parties and independents around the Shimpotō.779

The progressives, however, changed their mind. Narahashi met with the Executive Council Vice-Chairman Inukai Ken who moved to install Shidehara as party president. At Narahashi’s residence on the morning of April 17, Shidehara and Executive Council Chairman Saitō Takao came to an agreement that the

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sought to encourage the socialist parties to form a strong, anti-conservative, center-left coalition. Moore 1979, 728. See also, Saunavaara 2009.


incumbent premier would join the party and assume the party presidency while still in office. Simultaneously Narahashi tried unsuccessfully to approach the right-wing socialists. IOKIBE hints that also this idea might have originated from the GS. He argues that the GHQ/SCAP aspired at the continuance of the Shidehara Cabinet that would have gained the Shakaitō’s approval. However, the Shakaitō condemned the attempt of the Shidehara Cabinet to form a government party and the first meeting of the joint committee of the Jiyūtō, the Shakaitō, the Kyōdōtō and the Kyōsantō was held on April 19, 1946. On the same day Welfare Minister Ashida Hitoshi resigned from the cabinet. Finally the progressives declared that Shidehara would be nominated only after the resignation of the whole cabinet, which eventually took place on April 22. Shidehara was officially installed as the president of the Shimpotō on the following day.

But when and why did Shidehara decide to join the Shimpotō? Support for the continuity of the Shidehara rule, especially if Hatoyama was the competing option, and the desired emergence of a party cabinet, suggest that Shidehara’s decision was a pleasing development from the perspective of the GHQ/SCAP. When Yoshida approached the Chief of Staff through G-2’s General Willoughby on April 10, he hinted that Shidehara might resign after successful conclusion of the Diet installment but denied that Shidehara would have any plan to assume the offered position as the leader of the Progressive Party. Hence, the development was going in an uncertain direction because the occupation authorities did not believe that suitable leadership was to be found from the Diet. If the occupation authorities decided to intervene, a recommendation to Shidehara to pursue the continuing premiership as a nominal head of a political party would have been a logical step to take. No indisputable evidence proving the GHQ/SCAP’s guidance is, however, available. This is not surprising. Namely, if such a recommendation was given, it was certainly unofficial and secret by nature. Saitō Takao argued in his March 3, 1948, statement that Shidehara’s application to join the party came suddenly. Thus, according to Saitō, Shidehara took the initiative. Rapid and

780 Masumi 1985, 99–100; Iokibe 2007, 266.
781 Iokibe 2007, 268.
783 IOKIBE argues that for Macarthur the realization of the amendment of the constitution was the biggest issue, and thus he favored the continuation of Shidehara’s rule. Iokibe 2007, 268.
784 Willoughby, GHQ, AFPAC, G-2, report to Chief of Staff, April 10, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-208.
785 Saito Takao’s Report to Friends Throughout the Country on My Secession From the Democratic Party and the Establishment of a New Political Party, March 1948, 5. NDL, GS(A)02534.
unexpected changes of mind might point toward external input in the decision-making process, but it arguably does not prove whether the pressure originated from the GHQ/SCAP or, for example, from the direction of Narahashi.\(^{786}\)

Initiatives were expected from Hatoyama after the cabinet resigned. The president of the biggest political party aimed at the coalition of three major parties. His attention was first directed at the disjointed Shakaitō where the left-wingers insisted upon the installation of a socialist premier. The three-party coalition became impossible but the socialists decided upon cooperation with the Liberal Party outside the cabinet on condition that Hatoyama would not form a coalition with the progressives. Katayama Tetsu informed this decision on April 30 after which Hatoyama visited Shidehara to express his determination to obtain the socialists’ extra-cabinet cooperation deal and to form a single-party cabinet. The final policy agreement between the Jiyūtō and the Shakaitō was reached on May 3. The decision was informed to Shidehara who, as the incumbent prime minister, was to recommend his successor to the emperor.\(^{787}\)

**Occupation authorities observing the cabinet crisis**

Although the relative strength of the major parties was in accordance with the pre-election predictions, the formation of the new cabinet turned out to be a complex process. The GHQ/SCAP followed the different phases of the coalition building. POLAD’s Sebald reported on April 17 that the well-informed Japanese political observers\(^{788}\) recognized three probable courses. Most observers were of the opinion that a coalition cabinet should be formed from among the Jiyūtō, the Shimpotō, and the Shakaitō, but found it difficult to decide who would head it. Some emphasized Hatoyama’s right as a president of the plurality party whereas

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\(^{786}\) Narahashi Wataru claims that he persuaded Shidehara to become the party leader. Narahashi 1968, 136.


\(^{788}\) The confused political situation encouraged many Japanese to seek their way to POLAD to express their opinions concerning the situation. Most likely these initiatives were not without politically motivated aspiration to persuade the occupier in the hoped preference. The POLAD’s archives reveal that during the hectic days preceding the cabinet resignation, for example Fukushima Shintaro (Japanese character not known), secretary to Baron Shidehara; Kamekawa Tetsuya (亀川哲也), free-lance writer, scholar and a close friend of Ozaki Yukio; and Viscount Inoue Tadashirō (井上匡四郎) all endeavored a change to express their views for the representatives of the POLAD. JDE, Office Memorandum, April 19, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 10, folder 16; Russel L. Durgin, Draft, Memorandum of Conversation, April 18, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 10, folder 16; Russell L. Durgin, Memorandum of conversation, April 18, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 10, folder 16.
others supported the non-party-affiliated Shidehara. The second option was built around the new government party movement comprising the Progressive Party, elements of the Liberal and the Socialist Parties, independents, and the suitable minor party members. The new majority party would support Baron Shidehara as prime minister. The Shakaitō would remain as an opposition party in the third possibility that was favored by the left-wing of the party. The right-wing was not afraid of losing the party identity if it joined the coalition and was considered to support the coalition either with Shidehara or Hatoyama. The cabinet was reported to be divided upon the issue of its future course of action. One section, headed by Foreign Minister Yoshida, was alleged to support the immediate resignation en bloc. Home Minister Mitsuchi Chūzō and Ministers Narahashi Wataru and Ishiguro Takeshige were, however, presumed to advocate the formation of a new party headed either by Shidehara or by Mitsuchi.789 The CIS’s daily report that utilized the CI&E Section’s press analysis backed these accounts, without contributing any new perspectives.790

Shirasu Jirō, the Vice-President of the Central Liaison Office, was one channel through which the different stances inside the government were learned. It was, however, understood that despite opposing claims, Shirasu was a messenger of Yoshida Shigeru. Shirasu indirectly suggested that the continuity of the Shidehara Cabinet in power should be prevented. This was done by warning that the failure to resign would set a bad precedent which might be followed by the future cabinets. Furthermore, the failure to resign might weaken the power of the Supreme Commander by supporting the critics of the early election. Shidehara’s refusal to resign might send a message that the election had been premature and Japan was not yet ready for normal parliamentary practices.791 These were certainly warnings well noted in the GHQ/SCAP. The continuing cabinet crisis was threatening to wipe away the meaning of the celebrated freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

A week after his previous assessment of the situation, Sebald stated that there had been considerable criticism toward Shidehara, Narahashi and Ishiguro in the

790 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 18, April 17, 1946, 1–2. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091. The same process is also described in the State Department Office of Research and Intelligence situation report. The Division of Far East Intelligence was, however, belated in its April 26 report that described the situation that had existed more than a week earlier. DOS, Office of Research and Intelligence, Division of Far East Intelligence, Situation Report – Japan. R&A 3479.8., April 26 1946, 1–3. OSS/SDIRR reel 2 document 27.
791 Courtney Whitney to Commander-in-Chief, April 19, 1946. NDL, GS(B)02514.
press and among the political circles because of the manner in which Baron Shidehara was urged by his advisers to accept the presidency of the Progressive Party. Sebald also mentioned the Shakaitō as the leading force behind the four-party anti-Shidehara cabinet block and predicted problems for Hatoyama. He stated that the people in the occupation headquarters admit that they are unable to find sufficient evidence to disqualify Hatoyama, but doubted the liberal leader’s chances due to the various allegations concerning his unsavory past. The GHQ/SCAP’s acceptance of Hatoyama as the next prime minister would, according to Sebald, make the Supreme Command vulnerable to attacks from the Soviet Union, China, and possibly the American press. POLAD’s political observer also referred to information, according to which the socialists would have informed the liberals that they would not accept Hatoyama as the next premier. The logical choice was thus Katayama but, in need of a compromise candidate, Shidehara might also be considered. Finally Sebald introduced three new names, Ashida Hitoshi, Yoshida and Ozaki Yukio, as the other possibilities for the premiership.

The GS Political Parties Branch was interested as well. According to Roest, the developments of April 18 and 19 seemed to rule the progressive-liberal or the progressive-socialist coalition out of the question, and to make the three-party coalition highly improbable. On the contrary, the liberals were practically driven into the arms of the socialists. Roest assumed that the latest developments in the Shimpotō and Hatoyama’s uncertain position strengthened the socialists who had refused to enter any deals which might not be in consistency with their party principles. Hence, the non-party-affiliated Shidehara-rule was problematic if not impossible and the clumsy entrance into the political party world caused a strong opposing reaction.

The socialists’ Katayama Tetsu, the leader of the party of the moment, was then interviewed to figure out the existing political currents. Katayama was straightforward when expressing his party’s opinion concerning the possible premiers. As a person Shidehara was not infeasible but as a political party leader he was considered unacceptable. Hatoyama, although being easier to deal with

792 WJS (William J. Sebald), POLAD, Memorandum for GA (George Atcheson Jr.), April 24, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 12, folder 2.
793 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief of Section, April 19, 1946, 1–2. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2.
than his assistants\textsuperscript{794}, was absolutely unacceptable. Moreover, although the socialists insisted on being the center of the new government or otherwise remaining outside the cabinet, they were not anxious to head it. Instead, Katayama gave five names in preferred order with whom the Shakaitō was willing to work presuming that the future premier would follow the party’s economic policies. The list contained the Minister of Education Abe Nosei (also read as Yoshishige, 安倍能成), Yoshida Shigeru, Ashida Hitoshi, Shidehara Kijūrō and Mitsuchi Chūzō. The latter two were, however, acceptable only if they would disassociate themselves from the Shimpotō. Roest’s final evaluation concerning Katayama was really positive and he found the suggestions for premiership reasonable and worth further investigation.\textsuperscript{795}

Katayama showed a way out from the cabinet crisis that must have looked tempting. The composition of the coming cabinet was, nonetheless, a matter sensitive to rapid changes. The Shakaitō’s Nishio Suehiro was interviewed by the Political Parties Branch on April 23, just four days after Katayama, and the preferred assembly of the cabinet had already gone through some adjustments. The detailed plan for establishing a government was built around the Shakaitō, the Jiyūtō and the Kyōdōtō. The socialists were now bargaining on behalf of Katayama’s premiership and forwarded Matsudaira Tsuneo, Minister of the Imperial Household, as a compromise. Nishio presumed that Matsudaira’s chances of becoming selected were good in a situation where the socialists propose Katayama and the liberals suggest Yoshida, assuming that Hatoyama would be disqualified. The party had cooled on the idea of Abe as the prime minister and ranked him below Katayama, Yoshida and Ashida. Among the liberal candidates, Yoshida was better than anyone else and the Shakaitō was ready to cooperate with the liberals under him. Finally Nishio cleared his own and his party’s position on the political map, by denying his close connections with Hatoyama and by expressing his worry concerning the Soviet Union and communist pressure.\textsuperscript{796} Nishio was, in other words, hinting that the cabinet crisis could be solved and the main obstacle for the new three-party cabinet would disappear if a piece of the puzzle, called Hatoyama Ichirō, was removed.

\textsuperscript{794} Most likely referring to Kōno Ichirō and Miki Bukichi who, according to MASUDA, approached the Shakaitō on behalf of the Jiyūtō. Masuda 2001, 77.

\textsuperscript{795} P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief of Section, April 19, 1946, 3–4. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2.

\textsuperscript{796} P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, April 23, 1946. NARA, RG, 331, box 2142, folder 2.
names of the conservative substitutes for Hatoyama were certainly easier to accept to the occupier than the incumbent Jiyūtō president.

A few days later the same perception was expressed even more directly. This time it was the turn of the Kyōdōtō’s Ikawa Tadao to visit Roest on the night of April 25, and emphasize Hatoyama’s role as the reason for the deadlock situation in coalition negotiations. Roest concluded: “The Socialist’s unwillingness to take Hatoyama as the price of Liberal collaboration intensified the desire of all parties concerned to find out whether Hatoyama would be “purged”, for in that case the problem would be solved automatically. Hence Wikawa came to ask for a hint as to SCAP’s intentions on Hatoyama’s case, since the Japanese government through Chief Secretary Narahashi had twice stated they were passing the case back to SCAP.”

Thus, the Japanese side was now requesting an action that was already supported by many inside the GHQ/SCAP. Yet the remaining problem was the lack of appropriative reasons based on which Hatoyama could be purged and the road through the crisis could be cut.

Besides the rise of critical voices among the competing parties, Kōno Ichirō suggests that there was a clique even inside the Jiyūtō echoing the doubt of whether the Hatoyama Cabinet could be established or whether it was necessary to compromise. According to Kōno’s interpretation, this was the voice of the plot near to the GHQ/SCAP. That the dislike GHQ/SCAP felt toward Hatoyama was recognized as an obstacle inside the Jiyūtō is also verified by Ishibashi Tسان’s diary entries. Hatoyama himself criticized the Shidehara Cabinet that had not taken action in cleaning up his name on April 27, 1946.

The emergence of familiar and acceptable conservatives under whose leadership the center-left parties were ready to cooperate, most likely increased the occupation authorities’ temptation to intervene in Japan’s domestic politics.

797 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, April 26, 1946, 1. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2. Apparently Roest was afraid of being blamed to have put words in Ikawa’s mouth and did his utmost to ascertain that this was not the case. Roest stressed that he did not give any hints concerning the preference of the occupation authority. Instead, he had only referred to the Supreme Commander’s official hands-off policy on Japan’s internal political development which was clearly expressed in a press statement of that day. According to Roest, Ikawa’s reaction was frustrated and he even forewarned of the possibility of the progressive-liberal coalition that might emerge if the Liberals were to adhere in their demands concerning Hatoyama.

798 Kōno 1965, 182.


The nomination of the suitable conservatives that the occupation authorities were hoping to see at the helm of the Japanese Government would most likely not cause restlessness among the groups right from the communists. Still, the occupation authorities did not purge Hatoyama at the end of the April, rather they unsuccesfully tried to pressure him to withdraw from the insistence of the premiership through unofficial channels and by urging the Japanese Government to purge him.

**Purge of Hatoyama and acceptance of Yoshida**

Although both Shirasu and Yoshida transmitted foreboding comments to the occupation headquarters concerning Hatoyama’s chances of becoming the prime minister of Japan, he was reluctant to accept any of the lesser cabinet-posts and proceeded with the plan to form a one-party cabinet. Shidehara entered the Imperial Palace with the petition to select Hatoyama. Then he proceeded to the GHQ/SCAP to present a state document regarding the selection of the successor cabinet. General Whitney’s reply declaring that Hatoyama had already been purged by the directive from the Supreme Commander, however, nullified Shidehara’s attempt.

The public discussion and the behind-the-scenes negotiations among the various GHQ/SCAP sections concerning Hatoyama’s destiny had continued since the beginning of the occupation and intensified at the end of April. Speculation heated, for example, because of the publishing of Hatoyama’s political questionnaire in Stars and Stripes. The Questionnaire belonged to the Japanese government files that were limited from the foreign correspondents. The revealed unflattering information was considered damaging for Hatoyama’s prime-

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801 MASUDA argues that Creswell and Willoughby informed Hatoyama through Yoshida and Shirasu about the circumstances and tried to persuade him to restrain from trying to become installed to the premiership. On the other hand Narahashi claims that Yoshida took advantage of MacArthur’s liking of bureaucratic policy and did not warn Hatoyama although he was aware of the purge movement. Instead, Narahashi argues that after Yoshida heard the wishes of MacArthur, he privately, withdrew to a villa in Oiso. Thus, the one who warned Hatoyama to be careful was Narahashi who Yoshida even staged as the plotter of the purge. However, even if the intelligence apparatus informed Hatoyama, it was not only—maybe even not mostly—because of their kinship toward Hatoyama but because of their will to protect the prestige of the occupation that was threatened if the direct intervention was to materialize. Masuda 2001, 48. See also: Narahashi 1968, 118–119, 137–138.


ministerial hopes. Also rumors about dubious money connections popped up again. Hatoyama and Narahashi were the most popular targets of these claims.

The dispute around Hatoyama reached its culmination during the last days of April and the first days of May 1946. First the Office of the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer transmitted a memorandum dealing with the applicability of the January 4 directive with respect of Hatoyama to the GS on April 26. According OCCIO, factors speaking on behalf of the purge of Hatoyama were: his role as the chief secretary to the cabinet under premier Baron Tanaka Giichi; his suppression of free thought and speech in education while minister of education during the first half of the 1930s; his pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist statements found in Sekai no Kao; militaristic and nationalistic statements made in Hatoyama’s elections documents of record in the Tōjō elections of 1942; and his recommendation by Tōyama Mitsuru (頭山満) and two other high military and naval figures in that election. The defense of Hatoyama’s case rested in his support of free speech and opposition to the military in the Saitō Takao case in 1940; his non-membership in the IRAA; his opposition to the IRAA; his withdrawal from wartime politics; his strong pro-constitution stand in the April 1942 election when he stood as a non-recommended candidate for the Diet; his explanation of his membership in the IRAPS; his support by Ozaki Yukio; and his recognized opposition to the Tōjō cabinet.

It was considered undeniable that Hatoyama had been acceptable to the leaders of the Tanaka Cabinet and administration which pushed expansionistic foreign policy and repressed all communistic activity. Hatoyama’s actions as a minister of education were, however, considered as an invalid argument against him. Allegations were built around the case of dismissal of professor Takigawa, where Hatoyama had not taken any initiatives but acted on the basis of existing laws. According to Creswell’s interpretation, Sekai no Kao did not attest Hatoyama’s political advocacy of either Fascism or Nazism. The various quotes that were analyzed did not prove what they were alleged to prove. Instead, the

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804 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 18, April 17, 1946, 1. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
805 For example, on April 26 CIS’s Creswell learned that a president of a large construction organization alleged that Kodama Yoshio had paid two bribes of five million yen each through Tsuji Karoku to Hatoyama before entering Sugamo prison. Paul Rusch, GHQ/USAFPAC, Special Intelligence Branch, Intelligence Division, CIS, April 26, 1946. Memorandum for Colonel Crewell Thru: Colonel Duff. NDL, GS(B)03313.
806 H. I. T. C. (Harry I. T. Creswell), GHQ, USAFPAC, Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence, OCCIO to GS, April 26, 1946, 1. NDL, GS(B)03013.
often incompletely translated statements were an indication pointing toward a strongly patriotic Japanese political statesman who is not militaristic or expansionist but in some respect surprisingly observant. Similarly, the election documents were not clear proof of militarism or ultra-nationalism either. They were seen as Hatoyama’s attempt to prove to the voters his patriotism coupled with a plea for the constitutional government. Toyama Mitsumura, head of the Black Dragon Society, and the two former military leaders had incontrovertibly been listed as endorsers of Hatoyama in his campaign document. In contrast to these endorsers, the second of the 1942 documents was endorsed by the unimpeachable liberal Ozaki Yukio and other like-minded people. Hatoyama’s actions in the Saitō case were considered to be significant. He had boldly defended Saitō who belonged to the Minseitō and had temporarily drifted apart from the Seiyūkai led by Kuhara Fusanosuke (久原房之助). Hatoyama also managed to make his closest allies, almost all of whom were still active in the Jiyūtō, to follow him in opposition of the expulsion. Hatoyama’s non-membership in the IRAA was stated to have been recognized even by his opponents. Hatoyama admitted his short-term membership of the IRAPS but only as a way to protest against government policy. Furthermore, he dispute allegations that he would have been the director of the IRAPS. Hatoyama’s withdrawal from active politics prior to Pearl Harbor was recognized as being incomplete. His continued activity first in the Dōkōkai and later in a group called Korakukai was acknowledged. Moreover, Hatoyama was stated to have taken a strong pro-constitutional line in 1942 and he was connected to attempts to overthrow Prime Minister Tōjō in 1943.807

Hatoyama’s personal record, as far as political bribery and participation in political deals was concerned, was admittedly anything but clear. However, when all these factors were examined and considered, Creswell concluded that available records did not prove that Hatoyama would fall within the purview of the SCAPIN 550. The motive behind the study was, nevertheless, to state whether or not Hatoyama was an acceptable choice to the premiership. Creswell’s answer to this question was following: “It is believed that while the cumulative evidence does not place him absolutely within the purview of the January 4 directive (SCAPIN 550), it does make his eligibility for the premiership questionable. His removal from the succession to the premiership would have a salutory affect upon

807 H. I. T. C. (Harry I. T. Creswell), GHQ, USAFPAC, Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence, OCCIO to GS, April 26, 1946, 2–11. NDL, GS(B)03013.
Japanese politics in forging a more realistic re-alignment of political parties, for the break up of the JIYUTO (Liberal Party) would almost inevitably follow, with an alignment of Liberal elements of that party with the SHAKAITO (Social Democratic Party) and the most conservative elements with the SHIMPOTO (Progressive Party).” The settlement in the Hatoyama question was thus considered as a factor that would affect the composition of the whole political party field. Creswell’s approach was practical. He argued that there was no legal basis to purge Hatoyama, but assumed that his removal would have positive corollaries.

The options available in Hatoyama’s case were in fact expressed more directly in the draft version of the report that was informally submitted to GS on the afternoon of April 24, 1946. Namely, an argument: “As long as he lives, HATOYAMA will be a factor in Japanese Politics” was edited out from the final summary. Similarly, a paragraph: “He is the dilemma which has caused all the heartburning and excitement of the last few days. The choices are clear; HATOYAMA’s case may be settled in one of the two ways, either to purge him under G category of the 4 January directive, or to let him continue to be a factor in Japanese political life.” was abolished from the conclusion.

The GS studied the report of April 26 but came to a different interpretation. The GS leaders kept insisting that Hatoyama was an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression within the meaning of the category G of SCAPIN 550. Therefore the purge was not only desirable but also legitimate. The fact that the purge of Hatoyama had not been executed by the Japanese Government caused annoyance. General Whitney recommended on May 2 that a memorandum obligating the government to explain why the responsible officials who had failed to purge Hatoyama should not be removed, be submitted. Paul J. Muller, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, approached Counter Intelligence with an urgent message on the same day. The OCCIO was informed that the GS had evidence based on which it was recommending the purge of Hatoyama. The OCCIO was asked to conduct an immediate investigation and submit recommendations whether the prosecution of Hatoyama should be undertaken.

808 H. I. T. C. (Harry I. T. Creswell), GHQ, USAFPAC, Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence, OCCIO to GS, April 26, 1946, 13. NDL, GS(B)03013.
809 Copy of a report informally submitted to GS in the afternoon of April 24, 1946, 8–9. NDL, GS(B)00907-00908.
810 Courtney Whitney, GHQ, SCAP, GS to C-in-C, May 1, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03013.
811 Courtney Whitney, GHQ, SCAP, GS to C-in-C, May 2, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03012.
812 GHQ, SCAP, Check Sheet from the Chief of Staff to OCCIO, May 2, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03012.
The zenith of the GS study of Hatoyma was achieved on May 3 when Frank Rizzo recommended him to be purged based on a twelve-page memorandum titled “Report on Hatoyama, Ichiro”. This document depicted Hatoyama as a politician whose education and political experience gave him the potential to make an effective fight for the cause of liberalism in Japan. Unfortunately he had failed to accomplish this over his long public career. To the contrary, it claimed, Hatoyama had aided the forces of obscurantism, reactionism and militarism throughout his career. Activities that the OCCIO had interpreted as liberal or at least non-harmful were mentioned as incriminating factors. Besides introducing Hatoyama’s flaws in the foreign and domestic policies, the memorandum also contained proof of his improper character. The final sentences of the document left no room for questions concerning Hatoyama’s preferred political future: “Behind Hatoyama is a well organized and effective political machine which has already succeeded in winning 140 out of the 464 Diet seats; behind him and closely connected with him are some of the cliques which led Japan on the path of aggression and which oppose everything for which the Allies stand. Hatoyama as Prime Minister and as leader of the forces of reaction would infuse those elements with new faith in their final success, would insure their retention of power, and would undermine the occupation forces’ achievements of the last eight months. Hatoyama, shadow of the past, persecutor of minorities, counsel for the defence of aggression, should go. There is no place for him in a new Japan.”

Eventually the Supreme Commander’s decision to intervene was made only after Shidehara recommended Hatoyama. The GHQ/SCAP wanted, nevertheless, to create an illusion that SCAPIN 919, an English-written directive purging Hatoyama, would have preceded the recommendation. The directive was therefore backdated and when Whitney sent a letter to the foreign minister as a reply to Yoshida’s inquiry of the Supreme Commander’s view of Hatoyama premiership, Whitney superfluously insisted that the headquarters did not know about Shidehara’s move and they issued SCAPIN 919 prior to that time.

Nishio Suehiro claims that he already heard about the purge of Hatoyama from a newspaper reporter on May 3. During the same conversation, the reporter insisted that there was a strong will inside the GHQ/SCAP to erect a cabinet of Katayama Tetsu after Hatoyama was purged. Demands for the Shakaitō cabinet

813 Frank Rizzo, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, May 3, 1946. NDL, GS(B)00907-00908.
815 Nishio 1968, 68.
also emerged in the Tokyo press, but the occupation authorities did not publicly comment on how it expected the post-Hatoyama purge cabinet building to continue. Shidehara met Katayama on May 5 and suggested a socialist-led coalition cabinet to be formed. The socialists were first trying to build a four-party coalition including the Jiyūtō, the Kyōdōtō, and the Kyōsantō. After the attempt failed the socialists aimed at a one-party minority cabinet. That was not, however, recommended by Shidehara to the emperor. There is no evidence that the GHQ/SCAP showed any support for the socialists’ attempts, or commented on Shidehara’s decision to withhold recommendation of the Shakaitō minority cabinet.

The search for a substitute for Hatoyama began already in the meeting organized originally for the sake of the inauguration of the Hatoyama cabinet. A list of requirements that Hatoyama’s follower was expected to fullfil included: close contacts with the GHQ/SCAP; international acceptability; a firm faith in the constitution and capability to draw the question to the end; smooth relations with the Imperial Court; and a level of personality necessary for Hatoyama’s substitute. Andō and Makino Ryōzō recommended Ashida Hitoshi, but Miki Bukichi shot this proposal down by referring to Ashida’s role in the Shidehara cabinet. Kōno Ichirō proposed Matsudaira Tsuneo but agreed with Matsuno Tsuruhei who brought up a name of Kojima Kazuo. Kojima was old party politician and behind-the-scenes manipulator from the prewar Seiyūkai. Matsuno, together with Hatoyama, met Kojima on the following day, but he refused because of an illness. Hatoyama decided then to try Matsudaira. He did not, however, know the second contestant personally and asked Yoshida Shigeru to negotiate on his behalf. The first contact with Matsudaira was promising and Yoshida suggested Hatoyama to begin formal negotiations. It was then agreed that Hatoyama would meet Matsudaira but the situation took an odd turn. Matsuno suddenly told Kōno that he had managed to convince Yoshida to run. Kōno passed this information to Hatoyama. Ashida Hitoshi started his own campaign at the same time colliding with Secretary-General Kōno Ichirō, who was in the position to mediate between the clique of Hatoyama, Matsuno, Tsuji and himself, and the regular party members.

816 Osbourne Hauge, Information Management Branch, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, May 9, 1946. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2.
817 Fukunaga 1997, 72. See also: Nishio 1968, 68.
wishing to learn about the party’s new course. One of the hardest critics of Köno was indeed Ashida who claims in his diary that inside the party there were many supporting him for the party presidency and describes the former as a Rasputin-like manipulator working through Tsuji Karoku.

The surprise caused by Yoshida’s sudden emergence among the possible candidates was not long-lasting. Kojima and Matsuno backed Yoshida and purged Machida Chūji wholeheartedly encouraged him. Shidehara, on his behalf, was persuading Count Makino Nobuaki to support the idea. Makino, Yoshida’s father-in-law, had already met Yoshida and recommended that he not to take the job because of the lack of party political experience and support. Makino was first reluctant to agree to the idea of Yoshida running for office but eventually yielded and thus made Yoshida’s party presidency possible. The negotiations between Matsuno and Yoshida were finished on May 14 and Köno received Yoshida’s official approval on the day after.

Although Yoshida describes himself as a political novice in his memoirs, he was well aware of the political situation. He sent a letter to General MacArthur on May 15 informing the Supreme Commander of Shidehara’s plans to propose him to the throne as the next prime minister. He also asked the general for his opinion on the matter. MacArthur’s response was short and straightforward: he did not oppose the idea and wished Yoshida luck in his bid for the premiership. Having cleared the way for Yoshida’s premiership, the occupation authorities were careful not to further distract the already fragile claim according to which the Japanese themselves were selecting the new premier.
Harry Emerson Wildes claims that the occupiers were susceptible to the magic of big names and the field from which the party presidents were drawn was limited. They were elderly men preferably of high prestige in diplomacy like Yoshida and Shidehara. Furthermore, the former GS official argues that the Japanese political manipulators sought such men as screens behind which they might operate and mentions Yoshida’s selection as an example.\textsuperscript{825} This side of the coin is undeniable. The experienced Japanese politicians realized that the prewar moderates formed the pool from which the occupation was assuming to find suitable leaders to implement desirable democratic reforms\textsuperscript{826}. Hence, both the Japanese and the American behind-the-scenes manipulators were planning to use the group of so-called moderates to guide politics toward their own aims. In the nomination of Yoshida the country’s principal office was given to a man who, according to Brines’ wording, was another acceptable Japanese.\textsuperscript{827}

\textit{May 1946 as a part of the occupiers’ policy concerning the Japanese conservatives}

The existing interpretations of the purge of Hatoyama Ichirō emphasize either the importance of the power struggle among Japanese politicians or the role of certain GHQ officials. There is some doubt that the purge would have been implemented had Shidehara recommended Hatoyama earlier. Similarly, Home Minister Mitsuchi Chūzō’s decision to withhold two documents that supported Hatoyama, rather than submit them to GHQ/SCAP is alleged to have contributed to the purge. Finally, it has been noted that Narahashi Wataru provided material to the CI&E together with the communists which facilitated the purge of Hatoyama while supporting the second Shidehara Cabinet.\textsuperscript{828} Narahashi himself accuses Yoshida

\textsuperscript{825} Wildes 1954, 108, 137. Yoshida was one of the most prominently mentioned candidates for the premiership among the occupation authorities. In fact, Yoshida’s name as the likely prime minister came up among the experts of the US State Department already at the time of the collapse of the Higashikuni Cabinet and his succession to the premiership was considered possible in the future. Yoshida’s prospects of becoming the Prime Minister of Japan we discussed immediately after the resignation of the Shidehara Cabinet as well. DOS, IRIS, R&A Branch, R&A 3449, November 9, 1945. OSS/SDIRR reel 2 document 15; DOS, Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, Division of Biographic Intelligence, R&A 3767, June 14, 1946. OSS/SDIRR reel 3 document 6.

\textsuperscript{826} For example Ashida Hitoshi’s diary entry from May 24, 1946 reveals that there was a rumor according to which the GHQ/SCAP wanted a relay of Shidehara, Yoshida and Ashida as the leaders of Japan. Ashida 1986, 113.

\textsuperscript{827} Briness 1948, 201–202.

\textsuperscript{828} Itoh 2003, 84–102.
of a crooked and selfish game. MASUDA, who offers the most complete argument on the purges, emphasizes the role of the GS left-wing New Dealers in Hatoyama’s purge. Yet, others stress the central role played by the foreign correspondent Mark Gayn.

While all of these theories are worth examining, attention needs to be paid to two critical questions. Why was the occupation leadership willing to follow the guidelines of the GS, and why did the GS New Dealers first purge one conservative (Hatoyama) and then accept another (Yoshida)? In any case, the nominal justification of the Hatoyama purge was built from scratch and, with a similar creativity in use, a case would have also been possible against Yoshida. Only MASUDA seems to offer a compelling answer to the first question. He contends that Hatoyama’s over-confidence, typified by his open attack on the communist party that the GHQ/SCAP had legalized, explains why the occupation’s upper echelon sided with the GS. Furthermore, the occupation authorities used Hatoyama’s case as a lesson to the Japanese on the power of the GHQ/SCAP and the relationship between the victors and the vanquished. MASUDA’s first observation is especially important. The open anti-communist statements most certainly irritated the occupation authorities since they opened the door for criticism originating from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it does not seem that Hatoyama paid for his own mistakes—that the purge grew from seeds that he himself had sown. MASUDA claims that it might have been possible for Hatoyama to advance to the premiership had he adopted a more effective way of dealing with the occupation authorities as Yoshida did. That is to say that his open

829 Narahashi alleges that Yoshida did not warn Hatoyama before the purge. Likewise, Yoshida was free-willing to work as a negotiator with Matsudaira. Narahashi claims that Matsudaira later told him how Yoshida more or less recommended him to turn down the offer to accept the problematic task. In other words, in Narahashi’s explanation Yoshida is an ill-minded thief of power who did not protect Hatoyama, sabotaged negotiations with other candidates, and only faked being disinterested in power. Narahashi 1968, 119–120.
830 The Japanese translated versions of all the major documents introduced in this chapter related to the purge of Hatoyama can be found from Masuda’s detailed description of the course of events. Masuda 2001, 22–68.
831 Itoh 2003, 89–92, 97–98, 100. Harry Emerson Wildes belongs also to a group emphasizing Hatoyama’s poor relations with the GS and especially the influence of the leftists among the GS officials as reasons behind his purge. Wildes 1954, 58–60, 136.
832 FINN argues that Yoshida escaped the purge because his prewar record was not well known. This explanation is not plausible when his central position in the Shidehara Cabinet is taken into consideration. Furthermore, for example, Mark Gayn seems to have been well aware of his past as Baron Tanaka’s vice-minister for foreign affairs in the 1920s. See: Finn 1992, 144; Gayn 1981, 223–226.
challenge and contradiction to the stated GHQ/SCAP policy sealed his destiny and forced him to delay his ascent to the office of prime minister until 1954.834

Whatever Hatoyama might have said or done after the beginning of the occupation, his chances of escaping the purge or becoming the prime minister in May 1946 were minimal, if not nonexistent. The nucleus of Hatoyama’s purge and Yoshida’s nomination lies in the occupiers’ negative attitude toward the political parties and the dichotomy between party politics and statesmanship outside the Diet. It was not Hatoyama’s eagerly expressed anti-communism that brought about his purge; in fact, the top leadership of the occupation was also anti-communist. Rather, it was his background in prewar party politics that spelled his doom. In the case of Hatoyama, the upper echelon of the GHQ/SCAP agreed with the New Dealers, although for different reasons, and found the purge desirable and eventually necessary. The views of these two groups clashed with regard to Yoshida’s appointment. Charles L. Kades and other New Dealers were against the conservative coalition835, but the emergence of the Yoshida Cabinet was wholeheartedly welcomed by General MacArthur and his closest conservative aides836. They had the will and eventually the power to place Yoshida, a moderate conservative statesman already recommended in the “Friendly Japanese” document837 at the beginning of the occupation, in charge of the first party-based cabinet.

A Civil Intelligence Section memorandum of early May suggested that, “It is most probable that a government headed by Yoshida would be similar in policy and practice to the recent Shidehara cabinet.” This, in my view, was what the Supreme Command wanted: the continuity of the cooperative and anti-revolutionary Shidehara policy under the party cabinet supported by the alleged freely expressed will of the Japanese people. The new leadership was expected to ensure social order and thus protect GHQ/SCAP from external criticism and provide a firm ground for the occupation reforms such as constitution revision.

835 MASUDA alleges that one reason behind Hatoyama’s purge was GS’s preference of the Shakaitō and hence Kades’ plan went wrong when Yoshida formed a conservative coalition cabinet. KATAOKA argues that Yoshida’s emergence as the prime minister was a highly unwelcome development at the GS because of Yoshida’s resistance to the new constitution. Kataoka 1992, 158; Masuda 2001, 22, 42, 61.
836 When dealing with the GS, it is worth remembering that its leader Courtney Whitney was a politically reactionary businessman. See: Johnson 1984, 88. General MacArthur on the other hand, opposed the New Deal. Schaller 1997, 10.
837 P. E. Peabody, War Department, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (August 1945). NDL, LS 24084.
Backing Yoshida while remodeling the Jiyūtō

Officially the GHQ/SCAP practiced a policy of non-intervention but the occupation authorities not only accepted the Yoshida Cabinet but defended it, for example, against the communists’ attacks. It also continued to curtail party politicians’ influence. Namely, an attempt to make room for a group MASUDA calls bureaucratic politicians was not limited on the purge of Hatoyama.

Further evidence on the GHQ/SCAP’s support and commitment to conservative rule was gained on May 20, 1946. Yoshida’s first steps as the ‘to be’ prime minister were waver ing and he did not get along well with the party politicians gathered around Hatoyama. He was not able to form a coalition with the Shakaitō and the Kyōdōtō after receiving the mandate to form a coalition on May 16, but formed a purely conservative Jiyūtō-Shimpotō cabinet. The Yoshida Cabinet with Shidehara Kijūrō as its state minister came into being on May 22, 1946. The new coalition was immediately challenged by the radical left-wing elements and the occupation authorities were forced to express their attitude toward the new government.

Mass-demonstrations that were mobilized by the communists had continued during the cabinet crisis. The great demonstration on May 12, 1946 that gathered people to the grounds of the Imperial Palace was a prelude to the May 19 “Food May Day”, when 250,000 people gathered in front of the palace and latter continued to the premier’s residence. The GHQ/SCAP interfered in the impending situation and demonstrated thus its support of conservative rule. Furthermore, the Soviet Representative of the Far Eastern Commission suggested on June 12 that the composition of the Japanese Government was incapable of ensuring the fulfillment of Japan’s obligations under the terms of surrender. He demanded removal of the ministers Ishibashi Tanzan, Hoshijima Nirō,

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839 官僚政治家
840 See for example discussion around the selection of a Minister of Agriculture. Masumi 1985, 110–111.
842 Finn 1992, 112.
843 Williams 1979, 258; Gayn 1981, 231–232. General MacArthur’s anti-violence statement of May 20 was later followed by Prime Minister Yoshida’s policy speech emphasizing the maintenance of the social order. For example the G-2 considered that the two announcements were natural sequels to each other but only the latter faced severe criticism. CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 27, June 19, 1946, 1–5. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi (一松定吉⁴⁴⁴) and Ōmura Seiichi (大村清一) as they should fall under the terms of the purge directive.⁴⁴⁵ The GS studied their status but did not initiate any further actions although Hoshijima was criticized because of his close connections with Hatoyama.⁴⁴⁶

The purges that were motivated by the occupation authorities’ antipathy toward the career party politicians continued after Hatoyama was removed. The occupiers’ had both the will and the means to remodel the Japanese political leadership. Hatoyama’s closest gophers who followed him as the power-holders inside the Jiyūtō were next in the firing line. One of them was Hayashi Jōji (林譲治), four-time elected Diet member who lived in Hatoyama’s house. First Hayashi, described as Hatoyama’s errand boy, was recommended to be purged under SCAPIN 550 by Military Government Company of the Kochi prefecture. The counter intelligence found Hayashi not purgeable but the GS’s Dr. A. J. Grajdanzev recommended Hayashi’s purge. Eventually, on May 28, 1946, the Public Administration Division decided to abandon the case. What is, however, the most interesting part of this process, is Hayashi’s close connection to Hatoyama that seems to have been the main argument speaking on behalf of his purge.⁴⁴⁷

Although the Jiyūtō’s Uehara Etsujiro was eventually not found to be purgeable⁴⁴⁸, the rest of the party leadership suffered severe hits as Secretary-General Kōno Ichirō and Miki Bukichi who was selected as a Speaker of the House, were found applicable to Category G of SCAPIN 550. While Hatoyama considered these purges as the continuation of the plot of the previous cabinet⁴⁴⁹, MASUDA’s interpretation emphasizes three points. First, the GHQ/SCAP, especially the GS together with the CIS and the G-2, played a subjective role in the process. Secondly, the Public Purge Screening Committee, and especially its leader Narahashi Wataru performed a special role. Thirdly, Yoshida secretly participated in both of these purges. MASUDA believes that Yoshida could have

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⁴⁴⁴ Also read as Hitotsumatsu Sadakichi.
⁴⁴⁵ WDSCA to CINAFPC Tokyo Japan, Message, WAR 91476, June 15, 1946. RG 218 (Chairman’s File, Admiral Leahy, 1942–48), box 8, folder 43.
⁴⁴⁶ GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, June 17, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-293.
⁴⁴⁷ Headquarters, 81st Military Government Company, Kochi, Shikoku, APO 24, Captain Korb, Memorandum, March 22, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03008; Public Administration Division, Note to Commander Swope, May 28, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03008.
⁴⁴⁸ Confidential, UEHARA, Etsujiro, May 19, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03652.
⁴⁴⁹ Hatoyama 1999, 448.
prevented the purges should he have wanted to save the two strong figures of his own party.\textsuperscript{850}

MASUDA’s description of the course of action is detailed but his reading of the reasons behind the various actions and the possibilities that the different actors had, differs from those introduced in this study. MASUDA’s claim that the purge of Kōno and Miki, the two non-recommended candidates of the 1942 election and opponents of the rise of military authority, continued the line of Hatoyama’s purge, is agreeable. Furthermore, these purges functioned as measures to bring the desired political power in Japan. Therefore MASUDA is right when abandoning Kōno’s own explanation, according to which he was purged due to his resistance of the GHQ/SCAP’s property tax initiative.\textsuperscript{851} Finally, there is no reason to doubt that the GS New Dealers would not have wanted to clean the political world from the influence of behind-the-scenes ‘kuromaku’ financial interest and hence urged the purge of Kōno who was close to Tsuji Karoku.\textsuperscript{852}

According to my interpretation, Kōno and Miki were purged because they represented the remaining old party-political influence inside the Jiyūtō: the remaining Hatoyama influence on the party. Thus, even if preferred to do so, the new Prime Minister Yoshida would have been unable to prevent these purges. Kōno’s claim that there was a document in which the Japanese Government asked certain Japanese to be purged, speaks on behalf the initiative from the Japanese side. Nevertheless, the existence of such a document is based only on Kōno’s own testimony. Furthermore, Kōno mentions in his autobiography also the claim he heard from Hayashi, that the occupation army was planning the purge of Miki, Kōno and a third person.\textsuperscript{853} This claim backs the interpretation according to which the occupation authorities’ side was active. MASUDA’s reading on Yoshida’s significant role relies much on a claim made in the GHQ/SCAP document according to which the new premier had the final decision-making power over the purge.\textsuperscript{854} However, in this occasion the hands-off policy was most likely a dead letter and the assurance of the power possessed by the Japanese Government was only a façade as seen in the purge of Hatoyama.

The GHQ/SCAP was informed already on May 20 that Miki would be purged but that the formal notification awaited the action of the prime minister. The

\textsuperscript{850} Masuda 2001, 70, 104–105.
\textsuperscript{851} Kōno’s view, see Kōno 1965, 202.
\textsuperscript{852} Masuda 2001, 83–84, 104.
\textsuperscript{853} Kōno 1965, 204, 208.
\textsuperscript{854} Masuda 2001, 91.
Japanese Government did not officially request the exemption of Miki as an indispensable person under paragraph 9 of SCAPIN 550. Instead, there were at least two efforts made to induce the occupation authorities to waive action in this case on the plea that Miki was needed in the Diet for the good of the governance. Furthermore, on June 20, 1946, Yoshida turned to Courtney Whitney asking for the possibility of retaining the purgees. Still, MASUDA builds his interpretation concerning Miki’s case to the lacking official request. Should Yoshida have asked formally, he might have been able to save Miki. MASUDA also argues that the Japanese side worked independently before the occupier because some of the GHQ/SCAP decisions are dated a day after they were taken by the Japanese Government. One should, however, remember that Hatoyama’s purge was humiliating for the GHQ/SCAP because it was forced to intervene openly in domestic politics. After that the occupation authorities did their utmost to hide their role behind the purges. As also MASUDA notes by referring to well-connected Narahashi, the will of the occupation authorities could surely have been transmitted through unofficial channels to the suitable Japanese prior to the inauguration of official documents.

Whoever initiated these purges, both the GS and the G-2 supported them although the only argument that was found to judge Köno as unsuitable person to sit in the post-election Diet was the assumed intention of his Diet speech in March 1940 that did not even contain any clearly incriminating statements. Miki passed the screening for the candidates running in April election but at the end of May the occupation authorities found evidence from the Personal History Files of the General Affairs Section of the Diet Secretariat that could be used against him.

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855 Original documents: GHQ/USAFPAC, Check Sheet, from G-2 to GS, June 1, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03332; GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for Record, June 5, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03332; GHQ, SCAP, CHEK SHEET, from GS to C of S, June 6, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03313.
857 C.W (Courtney Whitney) to C-in-C, June 20, 1946. NDL, GS(B)01751.
858 Masuda 2001, 89, 91–92
859 Masuda 2001, 86, 103.
860 Masuda 2001, 78.
861 Similar ideas expressed also by Harry Emerson Wildes states that despite its denials, the occupation pulled the strings of the purge administration. The Japanese government was told whom to expel. Sometimes this was done with a written command, more often by verbal suggestion. Wildes 1978, 56.
862 G-2 to Government Section, June 18, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03182; CW, GS to G-2/CIS, June 21, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03182; General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Check Sheet, from G-2 to GS, June 1, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03332; GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for Record, June 5, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03332; General Headquarters, SCAP, Check Sheet, from GS to C of S, June 6, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03332.
Thus, although there was also a pressure from the ACJ and its Soviet representative\footnote{Both Kōno and Miki were included in a list of The Soviet Union Representative of the Allied Council for Japan that mentioned 31 elected Diet members which were demanded to be purged. Thereupon the records of the elected Diet members were re-examined. Prior to July 12, 1946, three were purged and two were removed at the recommendation of GS. The remaining 26, with the exception of Narahashi Wataru, were cleared. The case of Narahashi remained doubtful and pending for a week because information concerning his alleged Army connections in Beijing was awaited. Final agreement was reached on July 23, 1946 when the GS also agreed to clear Narahashi as non-purgeable. Lt. General K. Derevyanko, ACJ, Tokyo, Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Chairman, ACJ, envoy Atcheson. No. 40193, June 1, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-277; Frank Rizzo, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, June 10, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-284; Pieter K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Affairs Division, PPB, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, July 12, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03313; C. W., GS to G-2/CIS, July 23, 1946. NDL, GS(B)00907.}, the actual reason for these purges could be interpreted from the satisfied tone of the GS report describing the Liberal Party that was stripped from the influence of Hatoyama, Kōno and Miki.\footnote{Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Liberal Party, June 20, 1946, 8–9, 11–12. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.}

Conclusion

The occupation authorities’ main tasks in spring 1946 were to identify the suitable domestic decision-makers to lead the party-based government and to ascertain that the preferred political elements would occupy the seats of the new cabinet. The occupiers were active in both of these tasks. The attitude toward the draft constitution was the most significant among the yardsticks used in evaluation. This was a test which the conservatives passed with good grades. The Shidehara Cabinet introduced the GS-draft as its own constitutional proposal. The major conservative parties failed, together with the rest of the Japanese groups and individuals, to create a satisfactory draft but they were not to cause problems or to challenge the smooth progress of the constitutional issue.

The GHQ/SCAP wanted the early House of Representative election to demonstrate the success of democratization process. The anticipated election victory of the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō was not considered as a reason to postpone the election. Namely, the occupier was ready to accept certain weaknesses or imperfectness in the government as long as the stable progress of the most important reforms was secured. What made it easier to proceed was also the possibility to intervene in the development if found necessary later. However, General MacArthur was not determined to cooperate with whatever cabinet
emerged from the April election as stated by COHEN. The occupation authorities looked for conservative rule under prewar statesmen like Shidehara Kijūrō or Yoshida Shigeru, but they were not to accept career party politicians as the leaders of the new cabinet.

Therefore the occupation authorities were forced to ban Hatoyama Ichirō after the plan to continue under the Shidehara rule failed. The inauguration of the Yoshida Cabinet was a satisfying solution for the GHQ/SCAP. For the Supreme Command Yoshida Shigeru represented the same desirable political influence with his predecessor. The purge of Hatoyama and emergence of the Yoshida Cabinet manifests the victory of what was considered as desirable prewar extraparlimentary statesmanship over the party-politics, still seen as self-seeking and corrupt activity. Thus, the situation in June 1946 demonstrates the influence of the wartime planning on the occupation policy concerning the conservative parties.

I cannot agree with DOWER who suggests that although the Yoshida group, anticipating that the United States would endeavor to promote democratization in the defeated Japan, had overestimated the moderating influence of their erstwhile benefactor in Washington, Joseph C. Grew. The same goes with an interpretation expressed by MOORE, who divides the years from 1942 until 1952 into three stages of development. He argues that the first phase that was dominated by the Japan Hands lasted until the summer of 1945. This stage came to an end when the Japan Hands had to step aside and their plans were modified by actors who believed in more punitive peace with Japan. The extensive intervention and radical changes required in every sphere of the Japanese society during 1945–1948 reflected this harsher view of Japan that had won out in the struggle among Washington planners in late summer 1945. According to MOORE, this meant attacks on prewar politicians whom Grew and Dooman considered Japan’s more liberal leaders. Finally, MOORE dates the beginning of the last phase in October 1948 and the signing of NSC 13/2.

Instead, the influence of the Japan Hand remained. The course set by the occupation planning was followed faithfully at the beginning of the occupation and Japan’s new leadership was successfully drawn from the groups of people suggested by Grew and the like-minded. It is therefore not surprising that Grew

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865 Cohen 1987, 311.
866 Dower 1979, 294.
867 Moore 1979, 730–734.
praised the situation in Japan and the policy adopted by General MacArthur to
Kenneth W. Colegrove in summer of 1946. The General had pushed through a
successful policy that pleased Grew despite the harmful and ill-conceived
directives from the State Department that had been emptied from the Japan Hands,
the men with expert knowledge and capability to understand the problems in
Japan.868

868 Grew to Colegrove, July 6, 1946. NDL, MMA-14 (RG 10) Personal Correspondence VIP File, reel
2, box 5, folder 7 (Joseph C. Grew).
6 From Hands-off Policy to Disappointment (summer and autumn 1946)

“When the Yoshida Cabinet was formed in May 1946, the Liberal and Progressive Parties were dominated by old-line politicians...carry-overs from the pre-war political scene...Their position of party leadership was challenged during the summer and fall of 1946 by the younger party members, who forced the adoption of structural changes within both parties and, as a result gained a voice in, but not control over, party decisions. Commensurate with the raise of the younger party members, distinct cleavages develop within both parties between the elder leaders and the young members. There was also a tendency for the younger members of both parties to unite in support of their position against the combined front of the two parties’ leaders.”

“Thus it appears that the future is none too bright for the rebellious group of conservatives. Once more boss-politics has dominated – at least for the time being.”

The Japanese political elite was in the whirlwind of reforms following the first postwar House of Representative election. The prolonged cabinet crisis was settled after the premiership was thrust to Yoshida Shigeru whose fitness was not evaluated by the electorate. The leadership of the Jiyūtō, the Shimpōtō and the Kyōdōtō was replaced. The Liberal Party moved from the era of Hatoyama Ichirō and Kōno Ichirō under the nominal leadership of Yoshida Shigeru871. However, the selection of Ōno Banboku as the secretary-general represented the continuity of the old order. Namely, Ashida Hitoshi described Ōno’s nomination as a decision consent with the will of Hatoyama and Tsuji Karoku872. Changes also took place among the progressives. The former Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō was made the party president, whereas the former Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi Wataru disappeared from the political struggle for almost a year. The progressives entered into a coalition with the liberals and both Shidehara and

870 Pieter K. Roest, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, February 14, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 8.
871 Officially elected as the party president on August 18, 1946.
872 Ashida 1986, 117.
Saitō Takao joined the ranks of the Yoshida Cabinet. The party management was entrusted to Secretary-General Tanaka Manitsu (田中萬逸) and Chairman of the Executive Board Inukai Ken. The rampage among the cooperative leadership had begun already after the January 1946 purge orders. The structure of the party changed on May 24, 1946, when the Cooperative Democratic Party (Kyōdō Minshutō, 協同民主党) was formed. The new party was an amalgamation of the old Nihon Kyōdōtō and two minor parties that prior to the actual merger established a short-lived Kyōdō Minshu Club (協同民主クラブ). Yamamoto Sanehiko (山本実彦) acted as chairman of the new party. A few weeks later on June 15, 1946, the party was yet again augmented with new influential members when Miki Takeo (三木武夫) and Matsumoto Takizō (松本瀧蔵) left another new group called the Nihon Minshutō Jumbikai (日本民主党準備会) and joined the Kyōdō Minshutō.872 Furthermore, a group called the Shinseikai874 emerged on July 19, 1946 and brought together conservatively inclined independents and minor party members. Organizational instability was a distinctive feature to this group that reconstructed itself as the People’s Party (Kokumintō, 国民党) on September 25, 1946, while constantly negotiating on a party merger with the representatives of the Kyōdō Minshutō.875

These new structures were not long-lasting. Intra-party struggle existed among all the major parties and a great number of independents and minor parties caused a state of flux when larger groups tried to absorb them. This turbulence lasted until the April 1947 general election which UCHIDA considers as a kind of coming of age for postwar political parties.876 The following chapter will introduce the occupation authorities’ policy toward the conservatives at the time when the four-month-long 90th Extraordinary Diet promulgated the new Japanese Constitution, the controversial land reform bill was enacted, organizational and operational reforms concerning the Diet were drafted877 and the political left-wing shook the government and the foundations of the new social order with a general strike movement.878

The labor unrest took a new organizational form. In August two competing labor federations came into being. The Japan Federation of Labor (Sōdōmei, 総同

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871 Uchida 1987, 328–331; Fukunaga 1997, 81–82.
872 Original kanji-characters are not certain. However, most likely written as: 新政界.
873 Fukunaga 1997, 82.
875 Detailed description of the process leading to the promulgation of the Diet Law, See: Williams 1979, 144–159.
876 Masumi 1980, 112–113; Uchida 1987, 331.
盟），与 somewhat less than 1 million workers was under leadership of the right-wing of the Shakaitō. Its communist rival was the Japan Congress of Industrial Unions (Sanbetsu Kaigi, 産別会議). The Sanbetsu boasted a combined membership of 1.6 million workers. Both of these organizations soon connected economic democratization with the political democratization. The Yoshida Cabinet barely averted a serious strike of railroad workers in August 1946 only to face a threat of a seaman’s strike in September. The strike movement spread further to the fields of newspapers, radio and electric workers. Moreover, coal and other industrial walkouts appeared in October-November. These demands were channeled into a political direction focusing mainly on the opposition of the Yoshida Cabinet. The vote of non-confidence against the cabinet was never initiated but a resolution demanding the dissolution of the House of Representatives was introduced on December 17, 1946. The domestic opposition of the government culminated in the general strike that was planned to begin on February 1, 1947. Nevertheless, already prior to that, the cabinet ran into troubles with the expanded application of the purge directives on January 4, 1947.

The amalgamation of the POLAD to the GHQ/SCAP did not stop the organizational changes among the units interested in Japanese political parties and politicians. When the Political Adviser was no longer interested in political parties, the Political Parties Branch of the GS Public Administration Division was bearing the main responsibility over the observation and began to publish semi-monthly reports concerning political parties. After a structural reform took place inside the GS at the beginning of August 1946, the unit was called the Political Parties Division. Pieter K. Roest continued as its chief and Harry Emerson Wildes and Beate Sirota as the other members of the group. A few months later the unit was called the Political Affairs Division. Moreover, the division of labor inside the GS was unclear. The need to review the purge decisions had absorbed the entire efforts of the Opinions Division after the April 1946 election and necessitated the organization of a new division to take care of the task. Accordingly a new purge division was established in August 1946. Initially it was called the Public Administrative Division. The newcomer was then

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881 Johnson 1984, 87.
trying to figure out its areas of responsibility in the squeeze of the other GS units. 883 The intelligence apparatus under the command of G-2’s Charles Willoughby did not lose its interest in the conservative cabinet and political parties either but continued to offer its own readings of the political situation that often departed from those of GS units. Organizational reforms appeared also inside the intelligence machinery when the Civil Intelligence Section that amalgamated with G-2 on May 3, 1946 was reactivated on August 26 under Willoughby’s command884.

This chapter concentrates on following questions: How was occupiers’ attitude toward the Yoshida Cabinet?; What kind of conclusion did the occupation authorities draw when they re-evaluated the political party situation in summer of 1946?; Did they intervene in the activities and internal-development of the conservative parties during the autumn of 1946?; What were the reasons behind the decided intervention or non-intervention?

6.1 Promising signs – re-evaluation of conservative parties

The GS analyzed the previous developments and considered the future prospects of the political party field after the cabinet crisis was over. The Political Parties Branch’s study took the form of a series of reports finished between June 20 and August 6, 1946. The series contained Harry Emerson Wildes’ articles covering the five major parties and Beate Sirota’s articles dealing with minor groups and independents and women representatives885. The importance of these reports was emphasized by Pieter K. Roest886, and they can be seen not only as conclusions summing up the past, but also as a starting point to a new period. Interpretations made in these reports did not only legitimize the already made actions but demonstrated the expectations inside the GS. Opinions expressed in these reports can be compared with those introduced in another contemporary party political recapitulation made by Charles Nelson Spinks in summer of 1946 and with views expressed later in the general papers summing up the history of the occupation. Although I have not found any evidence speaking on behalf of the importance of

884 Aldous 1997, 8.
885 These reports are introduced in Japanese by Fukunaga. See: Fukunaga 1997, 78–81.
886 Pieter K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, September 16, 1946. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.

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Spinks’ article, the views of this ultra-conservative Japan expert and intelligence specialist do tell us about the other available assessment of the situation.887

The Jiyūtō redeemed from Hatoyama and his henchmen

Article dealing with the Liberal Party was issued first. The role of a crook was reserved for Hatoyama Ichirō and to his henchman Kōno Ichirō in Wildes’ version of the Jiyūtō’s history. The so-called Hatoyama clique was described as a group of practical politicians looking for private advantages. Wildes’ alleged that these men with close connections to the zaibatsu captured the Liberal Party and bypassed the other two groups—Saitō Takao and other old-line parliamentarians with a comparatively undistinguished record, and Yoshida Shigeru and other career bureaucrats—also involved in the party formation. The Hatoyama faction thus possessed full control over the party. Despite bureaucracy and career officers together with the big business interest and even the imperial palace were recognized as forces influencing the party, Wildes concluded that eventually: “The Liberal Party under the Hatoyama regime was a personal political machine operating primarily to further the ambitions of Hatoyama Ichiro.”888

The distinctively centralist party organization was seen as another manifestation of Hatoyama’s personal power. Wildes argued that the party’s by-laws were framed to guarantee the power of Hatoyama, who as the party president appointed the executive committee, a secretariat, members of the standing committee, and set up special committees. There was, in other words, no provision for audit or for control over Hatoyama’s actions.889 Wildes defended the already executed purge of Hatoyama and criticized the Japanese Government because of the confusion caused by their incapability to remove Hatoyama in time. After describing the various maneuvers of persuading Yoshida to accept the party presidency and his struggle with the professional politicians, Wildes reached another major point. He argued that Kōno Ichirō emerged as the sole leader of the

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887 Assessment of Spinks introduced by Takemae. Dr. Charles N. Spinks earned a PhD in political science from Stanford University, taught at the Tokyo University of Commerce from 1936 to 1941, and worked for the Office of Naval Intelligence’s Far Eastern Office from 1942. Spinks joined CIS in 1946 where he directed research and analysis until moving to Diplomatic Section in 1948. Takemae 2003, 151.

888 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Liberal Party, June 20, 1946, 1–4. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.

889 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Liberal Party, June 20, 1946, 6–7. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.
party after the purge of Hatoyama. Wildes concluded that the Jiyūtō that was stripped of the influence of Hatoyama, Kōno and Miki Bukichi might be on a path to a closer rapprochement with the Progressive Party. At the same time he emphasized that the anti-Yoshida faction remained within the party and hinted that there was a movement gathering strength for a sweeping reform within the party. To make the situation even more confused, there were also rumors about the continuance of Hatoyama’s influence on the Jiyūtō as well as among the independents and smaller groups.

The severity of the Political Parties Branch’s attack against Hatoyama and Kōno in summer of 1946 becomes obvious when Wildes’ report is compared with the latter history of non-military activities of the occupation or with the document called The Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. These documents are not only shorter and poorer in detail, but their general tone differs. Spinks’ article, likewise, does not penalize the duo in a similar manner but repeats the old criticism toward the Japanese political parties. Spinks also mentions the Jiyūtō as a shade less conservative than the progressives and alludes that General MacArthur’s Headquarters were placing considerable confidence in the ability of conservative Japanese forces to effect desired reconstruction in Japan.

It is hence worth asking why the Political Parties Branch attacked with such a verbal force and what kind of actions, if any, were recommended to be taken by the occupation.

The occupation authorities’ need to defend their actions was surely one point contributing to the harsh criticism of Hatoyama and others linked to him. By discrediting this group, Wildes retrospectively legitimized the purge actions conducted in May and in June. It is noteworthy that the new leadership, i.e. Yoshida Shigeru, was not criticized, if not praised either. However, by discrediting the old party leadership, Wildes made the beginning of the Yoshida

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890 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Liberal Party, June 20, 1946, 8–9, 11–12. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.
891 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, July 24, 1946, 6. NDL, JW-41-03.
era in the Jiyūtō look like a step forward. Similarly, the report did not recommend any immediate actions to be taken but mentioned the potential reform movement inside the party. This hinted that all the necessary operations on behalf of the occupation authorities were accomplished when the old undesirable leadership was swept away. Should Wildes have wanted to see more changes take place in Jiyūtō, this would have been the time to suggest them.

*Inukai Ken and signs of change inside the Shimpotō*

Wildes’ interpretation of the origin of the Shimpotō suggested that Shimada Tōchio (島田俊雄) and Machida Chūji were the invisible forces inspiring party formation whereas Saitō Takao had been the most useful among the front men because of his prewar reputation. Wildes argued that the party had originally consisted of the Minseitō and the Seiyūkai cliques but also claimed that Ashida and Andō attempted to make Hatoyama the president of the party. This claim was new in the occupation authorities’ documents and might have been an attempt to dramatize the role of Hatoyama. Wildes argued that the attempt was eventually unacceptable for Saitō who had a personal feud with Hatoyama. The Political Parties Branches’ description of the pre-purge Shimpotō emphasized the behind-the-scenes decision-making. In the post-purge situation attention was paid to the fact that despite his liberal reputation, Saitō abstained from joining an intra-party group that demanded liberalization of the party rules and compliance of the purge directive while the party leadership was still hoping for relaxation to the terms of the directive. Saitō was criticized also because he nominated only one member of this group to the party’s General Affairs Committee and did not use, what Wildes calls a magnificent opportunity to stand for political regeneration. Instead, Saitō followed the old Machida-Tsurumi policies, forgot the women voters, and remained vague on farm and labor problems. This was an exceptional burst of criticism toward a politician who was commended, for example, in the United States State Department evaluation in mid-June.

After describing the weakness of Saitō, Wildes brought forward the power of Inukai Ken. Inukai, a protégé of Shidehara and the leader of the youth group inside the party, had virtually complete control over the party matter in the post-

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election situation. Wildes described Inukai’s close relation to his father, the assassinated Inukai Tsuyoshi, and Shidehara but doubted his personal devotion toward democratic principles. Instead, Wildes’ interprets that Inukai shared the opportunism typical of the party. He did not, however, deny Inukai’s talents and predicted that the history of the Shimpotō was for some time to come likely to be the history of Inukai.896 The role of Inukai, emphasized now for the first time, was to be one of the major topics for the coming months.

The party organization and the possibilities of the local branches were criticized also in the case of Shimpotō. Wildes stated that neither the rules nor the by-laws of the party reveal truly democratic principles. The most striking conclusion stated that: “neither democracy nor legality of party authority is taken very seriously at the party’s Headquarters.”897 Yet, Shidehara was not criticized and no immediate intervention was recommended to be taken to guide the party.

It is interesting that the weakness of the local party organizations of the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō was the only remark the Political Parties Branch made to them. Namely, A. J. Grajdanzev, a member of the Local Government Branch, conducted a study at the beginning of June 1946 that was based on the analysis of the election behavior to resolve whether the local organizations of the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō were still paralleling those of the prewar Seiyūkai and Minseitō. By using complex statistical analysis Grajdanzev, who was later labeled as the communist infiltrate by Willoughby’s G-2898, concluded that the postwar Jiyūtō and Shimpotō were equivalent to their prewar predecessors. They had succeeded in preserving their organization in prefectures although especially the progressives had lost heavily to the more progressive political movements in the cities.899 Yet, it was not these arguments that were used to describe the reactionary character of the conservative parties. Instead, the role of the party leadership in Tokyo was emphasized. It was not the organization but the leadership that was used as the main yardstick according to which the political observers evaluated the parties. This seems to suggest that they also emphasized the importance of

896 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, The Progressive Party, June 22, 1946, 8–11. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.
898 See: GHQ, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff. Charles A. Willoughby, Memorandum to the Chief of Staff. Leftist infiltration into SCAP, March 5, 1947, 7–10. NDL, MMA-5 (RG-23), roll 13 (no. 920), box 18.
899 A. J. Grajdanzev, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, Memorandum for the Chief, Local Government Section, June 7, 1946. NDL, GS(A)00037.
controlling the party leadership in the guiding of the development of the conservative parties. Nevertheless, the discussion concerning the desirable composition of the local chapters emerged alongside the debate on their role inside the party machines later in the autumn of 1946.

The degenerating Kyōdōtō and indications of a desirable development

Wildes argued that the Cooperative Democratic Party had diverged from its original cooperative ideological roots and was now in hands of the professional conservative politicians. The struggle between the agrarian faction, led by Kita brothers Katsutarō (北勝太郎) and Masakiyo (北政清/北正清) from Hokkaido, and a group of the party chairman Yamamoto Sanehiko and the secretary-general Ikawa Tadao that tried to broaden the party base by admitting urban representatives, was Wildes’ report’s main theme. The report ended in the ousting of the old agrarian faction from the managing committee to the central committee that possessed only nominal powers. The process was described as undemocratic and possible because of the intense use of the wealth of Yamamoto to invite experienced Diet members like Miki Takeo.900

Wildes alleged that the reorganization of the party represented a shift from the cooperative theory to the practical application of political machine rule. The direction of the new course was clear for Wildes and he concluded: “Analysis of the Diet members allied with the Co-Operative Democratic Party indicates its strongly conservative nature.” The GS political observer was not ready to agree with some radicals who branded the party as fascist, but claimed that the cooperative democrats supported traditional Japanese ideals while cloaking those ideas in modernized terminology. The party, in other words, followed the propagandist pattern of the prewar totalitarian theorist but simultaneously used Western terminology to describe their purely Japanese purposes. The protection of landlordism and large land holdings as well as the conservative stand upon the emperor system was described as a part of the program that also included anti-communism as an official party doctrine.901 The conservative nature of the party was also agreed by Spinks.902

900 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Co-Operative Democratic Party, July 15, 1946, 1–2, 7–12. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.
901 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Co-Operative Democratic Party, July 15, 1946, 10, 13–15. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.
902 Spinks 1946, 251.
The fact that the Kyōdō Minshutō was dealt with in its own report instead of among the minor parties, shows that it was considered as a major political player. This is, however, the only even slightly positive tone that can be found from the Political Parties Branch’s report. During the summer of 1946 the cooperative democrats were going in the wrong direction in their development. Professional politicians’ old-style tricks, money politics, and the death of the political principles were features used to describe the party’s situation. Moreover, the party leaders, notably Ikawa, were claimed to have an unfortunate addiction to exaggerating the party’s influence and its prospects. More bad news came when party chairman Yamamoto Sanehiko was designated a purgee in July. Yamamoto protested his designation and was not determined to be culpable under the provisions of the purge until February 14, 1947. However, he withdrew from active political duty by December 1946. In short, no constructive or reform-minded initiatives were expected to emerge among the members of the Democratic Cooperative Party.

Some of these Political Parties Branch’s views were soon to get brighter. Wildes reported already in early July 1947 about the more promising signs inside the conservative parties. First there was news concerning the Diet discussion around the constitutional revision. The communists’ opposition was not anticipated to prevent the passage of the government draft. However, it was expected that the socialist and the liberals would suggest amendments during the Diet procedures. Yet the growing discussion of the constitution issue was deemed as a healthy sign. It was considered to serve to prove that the document, when finally approved, would be basically Japanese in intent and design. While hoping to hide the role of the GS as an author of the government draft, the occupation authorities were not expecting initiatives like the private draft of Inukai Ken that favored a unicameral Diet, demanded inclusion of liberal economic clauses and objected to a situation in which the term ‘symbol’ was used to refer to the emperor instead of ‘sovereign’. These initiatives were seen as possible indicators of the opinion of Shidehara as well as the younger elements within the party. It was not clear whether Inukai’s suggestions demonstrated a

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903 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Co-Operative Democratic Party, July 15, 1946, 15. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), reel 82.
904 History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan 1945 Through November 1951, Volume III – Political and Legal – Part F, Development of Political Parties, 134. NDL.
905 CIS, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea, Report No. 26, June 12, 1946, 1–2. NARA, RG 331, SCAP, NRS, entry 1828, box 9091.
shift in the progressive policies, but Wildes concluded that: “In any case, the Inukai proposals, while not yet accepted by the Progressive Party membership, are encouraging signs of democratization of political thought since Inukai’s action was wholly spontaneous and was in no way inspired by foreign pressure or by outside influences; it demonstrates an independence of thought unusual in Japanese political thinking.”

Inukai’s skepticism concerning Japanese peoples’ inability to govern themselves was mentioned as a kind of restriction of excitement, but Wildes recognized democratization movements also inside the other major parties. There were some anti-Hatoyama and anti-Kōno groups in the Jiyūtō and especially a group of younger members was expected to give a significant contribution to opposition of the continuance of the Hatoyama-Kōno influences. For example the inauguration of the Prime Minister Yoshida as the president of the Liberal Party was regarded as a victory for the anti-Hatoyama representatives. Furthermore, for example the socialists’ Katayama Tetsu was also challenging the old oligarchies’ rule inside the political parties. Inukai discussed his initiatives with the representatives of Shakaitō and FUKUNAGA interprets Inukai’s draft as Shimpotō’s plan to cast their skin and shorten their distance to the Shakaitō. This interpretation is believable. In any case, the initiative got a warm, if not enthusiastic, welcome in the GS.

Although the Political Parties Branches reports concentrated on describing the past of the conservative parties, they were also the beginning of the period of optimism. Distinctive features to this period, many of which were hinted already in the previously discussed evaluations, were belief in the intra-party democratization movement among the two largest conservative parties and rapid emergence of Inukai Ken as the front man of the movement. Reports written in summer of 1946 did not directly give support to the Yoshida-Shidehara leadership, but the new course appeared in good light when compared to the heavily

906 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to Chief, Political Parties Branch, August 6, 1946. CUSSDCF reel 1 window 830. See also: General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Activities, APO 500, Memorandum for information, April 21, 1947, 8. NDL, GS(B)03106.
907 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to Chief, Political Parties Branch, August 6, 1946. CUSSDCF reel 1 window 830; Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea, No. 11, 29. OJP3RRP 3-B-11.
908 Fukunaga 1997, 76.
909 Inukai was not included in the GS list of the most important political leaders that contained more than 250 names and introduced their party affiliation as of February 14, 1946. Harry Emerson Wildes, Politicians. NDL, GS(A)00039.
criticized past. The Kyōdō Minshutō was an exception among the major conservative parties because the recent developments inside the party were described unequivocally as steps toward the worse.

6.2 Age of optimism – cooperative cabinet and progressing parties

Promising intra-party democratization movements

The GS showed great interest in the democratization movement inside the political parties during the autumn of 1946. In those days Japanese political parties were considered as entities controlled by a small oligarchy. Therefore the democratization and liberalization of the structure of party organization was considered to be at the center of the establishment of the democratic party-system. Besides the abolishment of old boss-rule, the occupation authorities paid attention to the election of the party president; freedom of the local branches, and the transparency of party finances. At the same time the Political Parties Branch and its successors led by Pieter K. Roest eagerly promoted an enactment of the party law and the election law revision for the sake of reducing the number of small political parties. Besides, the enthusiasm for the democratization movement inside the conservative parties owed a lot to the identification of new leadership assumed to undertake these changes.

Even the basic assumptions through which the Japanese conservatives were evaluated were challenged in August 1946. The CIS finished a lengthy report titled “War Politics in China” at the end of the month. The study was an effort to attain an understanding of the history, organization and activities of the IRAA, IRAPS and GJPA; their relationship with each other and with the Japanese Government; and the positions of various individuals within the associations. The report concluded that these associations were neither secret nor terroristic. Its authors made a great effort to convince their readers that “militaristic”, “ultranationalistic” and “totalitarian” were not automatically appropriative terms to describe these organizations. CIS also took a skeptical stance toward the simple usage of these associations as yardsticks when deciding on the purgeability of Japanese individuals. It seems that there were two goals behind this questioning

911 GHQ/USAFPAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, CIS, August 15, 1946, passim. NDL, GS(A)02368.
of the premises of the purge policy. Besides trying to change the content of the
purge policy to be less inimical toward the former members of these organizations,
the intelligence apparatus tried to strengthen its own position especially in
comparison with the GS. The intelligence side’s attempt was concurrent with the
attack of the New York Times correspondent Burton Crane against General
Whitney’s GS. Crane accused that General MacArthur’s otherwise superb
accomplishments had been marred by a few serious blunders caused by his
subordinates who were pinkos or susceptible to communist propaganda.
According to Crane, the purge of Hatoyama Ichirō—with whom Crane dined
frequently even after the purge—was one of the major blunders of the
occupation.913

These attempts did not radically change the way the past of conservative
parties and politicians was interpreted in autumn 1946. The GS did not re-
evaluate the legitimacy of the purge of Japanese conservatives. Instead, the
positive tone describing the activities of those who had survived the purge
strengthened. Inukai Ken continued his bold Diet speeches on July 29, 1946,
when he remarked that a daring clean-up was needed in both the government and
the economy. He demanded that ideological manifestations and formalities be put
aside and believed that the policy called moderate right-wing socialism, and the
various policies stemming from it, had already voluntarily joined hands within the
sphere of tasks of the newer conservative camps.914 On the following day Harry
Emerson Wildes finished his memorandum concerning Inukai, the man of the
moment.

Wildes described Inukai as politician who had been influenced by two great
men. First, it was the late Inukai Tsuyoshi who guided the political thinking as
well as the everyday life decisions of his son. Then, after the assassination of the
former, it was Shidehara Kijurō, another friend of China and a close friend of his
father, who became Inukai Ken’s political advisor. Hence, although recognizing
Inukai as respectable candidate for premiership, Wildes described his leader’s
abilities as weak and his tendency to lean on experienced political adviser
significant. Finally Wildes concluded that Inukai’s current strength was tied to
Shidehara and expressed the eventual passing of Shidehara and emergence of
some less friendly influence as the one fear to be entertained. Ashida Hitsohi and

913 GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the record, August 9, 1946. NDL, BAE-124.
Ken, (page numbers of the document are incoherent). NARA, RG 331, box 2275D, folder 44.
Nishio Suehiro were mentioned as a possible replacement for Shidehara but it was the voice of his father that Inukai Ken was assumed to echo and that influence was: “in the main a democratic influence, although perhaps a conservatively phrased one, and it works for good neighborly relations with China and with the West.”

The Nishio connection was elaborated upon in the mid-monthly report finished a day later. The report revealed that Inukai cooperated with Nishio and other right-wing socialists to establish a political alliance that could control the Diet. The coalition was also to include the cooperative democrats. The three-fold problem including Inukai’s insistence on Shidehara’s premiership, the socialists’ demand on acceptance of a completely socialist program, and the allocation of cabinet seats was, nevertheless, considered insurmountable. Therefore, despite the rumors concerning the resignation of the Yoshida Cabinet, it was believed that the socialist-progressive-cooperative forces would not seriously challenge it. Inukai himself was confident concerning his own position and believed in the serious splitting of the Liberal Party and desertion to the Progressive Party.

Harry Emerson Wildes’ description of the Progressive Party leader is laconic in his latter book first published in 1954. It is thus important to recognize that although he reminisces Inukai equal to Tsurumi Yusuke as another smooth talker and propagandist who press-agented his party of old-line political bosses as democratic youth corps, this was not the view of the Political Parties Branch in autumn 1946. It was most likely the purge of Inukai in spring of 1947 that made Wildes, who admittedly was still not the greatest boaster of Inukai, to forget the optimism this politician once caused among the political observers. Similarly, the intra-party democratization recognized during the second half of 1946 is described only as half-hearted movements that did not make the parties democratic.

Inukai’s name popped up also when Justin Williams Sr. had a discussion with Professor Harold S. Quigley. When Williams, the new leader of the GS Legislative Branch in charge of reforming the Diet’s organization and procedures,
complained to a temporary employee of G-2 that powerful politicians were bent on keeping the Diet weak and ineffectual, Quigley raised the name of Inukai as the only exception. Although Quigley did not possess any significant influence inside the GHQ/SCAP, this was again evidence showing that Inukai’s initiatives were noted with a positive tone. Namely, the build-up of the Diet’s influence was considered as a highly welcomed development. Some proof of this was received in August when Higai Senzō (樋貝詮三) was forced to resign as the speaker of the House of Representatives after he failed with Ōno Banboku and Hanashi Shingorō (葉梨新五郎) in an attempt to railroad the reversal of a decision reached by the Constitutional Committee of the Lower House.

Like the GS, also the G-4 was interested in Inukai’s family. They inquired about an article compiled in the GS and a message bringing forward Inukai Tsuyoshi’s views that conflicted with the military. The G-2 and its Civil Intelligence Section were also interested in Inukai. The CIS had in fact begun a close study of Inukai Ken already in May 1946, with particular emphasis laid upon the Chinese phase of his career. Inukai had served as parliamentary councilor of the Ministry of Communication from 1937 onwards until resignation in February 1940. Resignation was due to his nomination as a member of the suite of the Japanese Ambassador to the puppet Nanking government. In June 1940 he was appointed as Japanese delegate for the negotiation of a peace treaty with China. Inukai’s term remained short and he was successfully running as a non-recommended candidate in the 1942 election. On November 4, 1946, CIS came to a conclusion that Inukai was working hard to remold the conservatives. He was alleged to lead the party together with Shidehara and Kawai Yoshinari and

920 Williams 1979, 144, 148.
921 See for example, McNelly 2000, 62–63.
924 GHQ/USAFPC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, CIS, Special Projects, Summary of information, November 4, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03107; GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Activities, Memorandum for information, April 21, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03106.
925 See eulogy for Inukai Takeru given by Kōno Mitsu (河野密); more on Inukai’s activities in China, see: Boyle 1972, passim.
described as deeply colored with the socialist tendencies. His aim was said to be the steering of the Shimpotō to the major party position right of the Shakaitō.926

Inukai’s activities in China were approached through a series of interviews. CIS’s lengthy report dealing with Inukai’s role in the so-called Wang Ching-wei peace movement927 was compiled on November 6, 1946. Information that released Inukai under the provisions of category G of SCAPIN 550 was considered essential to dissolve the uncertainty over the politician whose name would necessarily come up if there were to be any cabinet changes. Furthermore, based on the testimonies of center and left-wing politicians, it was concluded that all the features pointing to the liberal direction in the Progressive Party stemmed from Inukai.928 His position in the Wang Ching-wei movement and non-purgeability were also mentioned in a draft from November 15 that can be found from the GS archives.929 Inukai Ken was, in other words, considered as a positive force steering his party toward a democratic direction in autumn of 1946. However, as the political situation changed, his activities in China were to be judged with different goals in mind in spring 1947.

Internal struggle and demands of the intra-party democratization movement emerged also inside the Jiyūtō. Wildes concluded that the party was seriously divided and mentioned Yoshida only as a nominal leader. The actual power was in the hands of Hiratsuka Tsunejirō (平塚常次郎), the Minister of Transport, Ōkubo Tomejirō (大久保常次郎), a Central Executive Committeeman, and Ōno Banboku930 (大野伴睦), the party’s secretary-general. This group was described as a political heir of the Hatoyama-Kūno machine. Ex-Welfare Minister Ashida Hitsohi was considered as a rebel against this clique and he was argued to plan secession and an alliance with the progressives. Ashida’s inability to mix well with various kinds of people was, however, mentioned as a reason for disassociating him from the younger elements. Furthermore, Ashida was claimed

926 GHQ/USAFPAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, CIS, Special Projects, Summary of information, November 4, 1946. NDL, GS(S)03107; GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Activities, Memorandum for information, April 21, 1947. NDL, GS(S)03106.
927 In March 1940 Imperial forces established a puppet regime in Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, a Nationalist leader who had defected from Chiang Kai-shek’s Republican ranks. The Japan–China Basic Treaty of November 1940 recognized the Wang regime as the sole legitimate government of China. Takemae 2003, xxx.
928 H.R.J., GHQ/USAFPAC, Check sheet, From Special Projects Section to CIS (Opns), November 6, 1946. NDL, GS(S)03107.
929 In March 1940 Imperial forces established a puppet regime in Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, a Nationalist leader who had defected from Chiang Kai-shek’s Republican ranks. The Japan–China Basic Treaty of November 1940 recognized the Wang regime as the sole legitimate government of China. Takemae 2003, xxx.
929 Draft memorandum dealing with the clearance of personnel for government service under SCAPIN 550, November 15, 1946. NDL, GS(S)00186.
930 Sometimes read also as Ōno Takashi.
to lack the confidence of Shidehara as well. The third recognized group was formed by freshmen Diet members under Kuriyama Chōjirō’s (栗山長次郎) leadership. This group was reported to demand a wholesale housecleaning, not only of the Hatoyama-Kōno clique but also of the Ashida bureaucratic influences. Temporary alignment with the Ashida group was, however, considered possible in order to defeat the bigger evil. The GS political observers assumed that the old leadership took this challenge seriously and suggested that rumors distributed by Yoshida, Hiratsuka and Ōkubo hinting toward Hatoyama’s quick return to political life were aimed to smother the disruption movement.931

P. K. Roest was satisfied with the course of events in mid-September and mid-October 1946. Politicians’ power was reported to grow in comparison with the bureaucrats. There were also indications that Japan had begun to realize that government must be based upon the foundation of strong, independent, and socially conscious political parties. A part of this progress was the decline of the number of small political parties that mushroomed before the April elections. Moreover, there were signs of success of the movement toward the greater intra-party democracy. Although the movement against the behind-the-scenes deals inside the Shimpotō was not considered as a challenge to the existing machinery, the changes in the Liberal Party bylaws that were accepted in the party meeting were considered as a clear indication of change in party management. The revolt of certain younger members under the guidance of Ashida had led to a concession by the more conservative leadership in the question of election of the executive committeemen. The younger members had insisted that all the committeemen together with the secretary-general and the party president were to be elected by the Diet members of the party. Although they did not achieve their goal, a compromise according to which two-thirds of the committeemen were chosen by the Diet members and the general assembly was to approve the secretary-general nominated by the president, was considered as an important victory.932

Information concerning the situation in the Jiyūtō was received at the beginning of October when Kuriyama Chōjirō came to see Roest and Wildes at his own volition. Although there are no official documents verifying it, Kuriyama had also met Wildes before. Ashida’s diary reveals that Kuriyama met Wildes on

931 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, July 31, 1946, 2–3. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2.
932 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, September 20, 1946, 1–3. NARA, RG 84, box 11, folder 16; P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, October 11, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 10, folder 16.
August 28 to report the democratization movement inside the Jiyūtō. After a discussion with Kuriyama, Wildes expressed sympathy toward the cause of the group going against the old bosses of the Jiyūtō.933 Kuriyama’s message was full of optimism although he assumed that many of the old members of the party executive committee would be re-elected in the forthcoming election. Kuriyama described himself as the leader of the group of younger liberals consisting of 75 to 100 members and assured that they were capable of an open conflict if the conservative faction would fail to hear their wishes. An ambitious politician testified also that the control of Hatoyama, a man who requested Kuriyama to run for the Diet, was declining and Yoshida Shigeru’s position was strengthening. He was also confident that the influence of behind-the-scenes manipulator Tsuji Karoku and his money was declining. This was partly due to a rule according to which each Diet member contributed five percent of their Diet salary to the party treasury to free the party from complete dependence upon big business interest.934 This was exactly the kind of message that the officials of the Political Affairs Division wanted to hear. Yet the thirst of knowledge was not appeased and Roest and Wildes dined with Kuriyama and Ashida only a few days later.935

Desirable developments were thus occurring and Pieter K. Roest took a part of the credit to the Political Affairs Division. His account of Division’s contributions to the democratization of Japan reveals that:“By diplomatic suggestions to party leaders and by providing inquiring members with information about party organization in established democracies, a demand for democratic internal party organization has been fostered and has already led to some significant changes for the better. Leaders are being forced to hear the views of the ordinary members both in Tokyo and in the branches.”936 Roest thus signaled at least two different messages. First, no violent intervention into the development of the conservative parties was needed because the more sophisticated guiding models were working. Second, the Political Affairs Division was capable of taking care of this kind of guidance.

The Political Affairs Division did not link the democratization movement with the Cooperative Democratic Party. The party’s strive to form an amalgamation with the Shinseikai was, however, closely observed. The leadership

933 Ashida 1986, 130.
934 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the record, October 2, 1946. NDL, JW-41-14.
935 Ashida 1986, 284.
936 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, September 13, 1946, 2. NDL, JW-41-10.
of the Kyōdō Minshūtō was alleged to be opportunistic and more interested in building up a major party, sufficiently large to warrant a demand of a cabinet seat to their leader Yamamoto, than to create a party based upon a sound ideological foundation. After the deal with the Shinseikai that converted into the People’s Party collapsed, rumors about merger negotiations with the progressives spread. Azuma Takashi (東隆) and Kita brothers, three key figures and original party members from Hokkaido, were expelled from the party as being without discipline. These three had insisted that the party should restrict its ranks to those holding firm belief in cooperative principles. However, the Kyōdō Minshūtō was not the only subject of merger rumors. Another rumor suggested the merger of the Liberal and Progressive Parties while Inukai Ken was claimed to operate as a chief of movement aiming at coalition with the younger members of the liberals and certain right-wing socialists. The situation was further confused by an alleged plan according to which Yoshida was to become the chief of a new party whereas Shidehara and Saitō were to become its advisers. Roest noted but did not comment on these rumors in one way or another.

The GS Political Affairs Division’s optimism concerning the development of the Japanese conservative parties, excluding the Kyōdō Minshūtō, was not shared by everybody. At the beginning of October the U.S. State Department Office of Research and Intelligence finished its study aiming at providing an evaluation of the degree to which a new political leadership capable of replacing the purged politicians and the military leaders and of achieving and maintaining the reforms required for the attainment of United States objectives had developed in Japan. Three questions were considered pertinent to any attempt to evaluate the degree to which such new leadership was developing in Japan. They were: To what extent is any given political party capable of presenting an integrated and coherent program for the achievement of a democratic and stable Japan?; To what extent, given the opportunity, is such a party capable of assuming responsibility for the

937 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, September 20, 1946, 2. NARA, RG 84, box 11, folder 16; P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, October 11, 1946, 3. NARA, RG 84, box 10, folder 16.
938 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, September 20, 1946, 2. NARA, RG 84, Box 11, Folder 16; P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, October 11, 1946, 3. NARA, RG 84, box 10, folder 16.
implementation of its program?; To what extent does the organization of the party make possible the emergence of a new leadership?\textsuperscript{939}

The premise of the study was that the American policy had both created the need for new political leadership in Japan and limited the field in which such leadership could operate affectively. Political tradition, especially competition with bureaucracy and peoples’ low level of political education, were mentioned as a drag on the emergence of the new leadership. Progress was hence expected to be slow. Although the intra-party developments that took place in late summer and early autumn of 1946 were recognized, the general remarks were pessimistic. It was concluded that: “The void created in the Progressive and Liberal parties by the extensive disqualification of experienced leaders has not yet been filled. Trends in the direction of the assumption of control by rising new leaders exist in both parties, but in neither does this potential shift in leadership seem to promise, at this time, an improvement in the quality of party leadership or a strengthening and clarification of party programs.”\textsuperscript{940}

As FUKUNAGA concludes, the criticism of the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō was severe in this document whereas the evaluation concerning the Shakaitō was favorable.\textsuperscript{941} Namely, both of the conservative parties in government were still considered as spheres of influence of the prewar interest desiring to salvage as much of the prewar political and economic structure as possible. In contrast, the socialists’ program was assumed to reflect an ideology of Japan’s future. Their problem was the poor capacity of the leadership and internal conflicts over questions of strategy, particularly concerning the cooperation with the communists. Finally, the evaluation regarding the Cooperative Democratic Party was crushing. The party, due to the heterogeneous character of its membership and policies, was described as a manifestation of political confusion rather than a potential source of new political leadership.\textsuperscript{942} The State Department did not, in other words, share the opinion of the Political Affairs Division. This is not necessarily surprising when remembering the earlier views of two influential characters Hugh Borton and John K. Emmerson who were now acting as Chief

\textsuperscript{939} DOS, Intelligence Research Report, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, R&A 4118, October 1, 1946, 1, 3. OSS/SDIRR, reel 3, document 19.
\textsuperscript{940} DOS, Intelligence Research Report, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, R&A 4118, October 1, 1946, 1–2, 25. OSS/SDIRR, reel 3, document 19.
\textsuperscript{941} Fukunaga 1997, 83–84.
\textsuperscript{942} DOS, Intelligence Research Report, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, R&A 4118, October 1, 1946, ii–iv, 4, 21. OSS/SDIRR, reel 3, document 19.
and Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs. They did not believe in changes inside the Japanese conservative parties and preferred the Shakaitō as a solution seized in an unspecified time of the future. All in all, the State Department’s evaluation looked like a re-run of the opinions expressed a year earlier. The lack of plausible alternatives emerging from the political parties seemed to also speak on behalf of the current cabinet leaders who were only loosely affiliated with the party politics.

**Various reasons for hands-off policy**

The autumn of 1946 can be described as a period when the official hands-off policy concerning the development of Japanese political actors was temporarily implemented in practice as well. But how much of this was due to the optimism concerning the inborn democratization movements inside the conservative parties and how much on politics of the cabinet they formed. Was the policy that the Yoshida Cabinet was practicing in accordance with the wishes of the GHQ/SCAP the best constraint against the occupiers’ harsher guidance?

The occupation authorities wanted the government to push through reforms like the amendment of the constitution with pace and efficiency. As a response, the majority of the political parties supported the main points of the government draft. Reform of the constitution culminated in the almost unanimous approval of both Houses of the Diet, approval of the Privy Council, and the promulgation of the new constitution on November 3, 1946. The GS followed the Diet proceedings closely and Yoshida’s success in winning Diet approval for the new constitution was recognized by General MacArthur during his meeting with the British Ambassador Sir Alvary Gascoigne on November 14. When Gascoigne mentioned rumors about the imminent downfall of the Yoshida Cabinet, MacArthur credited the results which Yoshida and his ministers had obtained.

While the constitutional issue progressed, the GHQ/SCAP refrained from political intervention. Thus, one can ask whether Hiratsuka Tsunejirō was right when he claimed that Yoshida had an agreement with MacArthur that the purge orders would not be applied until the constitutional reform would be executed. There is also proof in the official documents, that Yoshida had informally asked

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944 Fukunaga 2997, 75–78.
946 Köno 1965, 216.
MacArthur not to purge any of his ministers because this would endanger the stability of the cabinet.947

The enactment of the land reform bill was another manifestation of the conservatives’ capability to deliver what was aspired. The land reform issue was first a matter of debate among the members of ACJ. Dr. Wolf I. Ladejinsky948 from the Natural Resources Section (NRS) incorporated some of the points made by W. MacMahon Ball, the British Commonwealth representative of the council, to the NRS draft directive. MacArthur insisted that this reform also be presented as a Japanese project. Therefore NRS Chief Hubert G. Schenk read the draft directive aloud to Wada Hirō, the Minister of Agriculture, and told him to revise the Japanese legislation accordingly.949 According to Mark Gayn this was a common strategy to freeze out the Allied Council. Usually Major General L. J. Whitlock, Deputy Chief of Staff, summoned the Japanese officials before him, read the directives for them, and ordered them to comply with them.950 Negotiations continued through the summer of 1946 and the bill approved by MacArthur was submitted to the Diet on September 7, 1946. After that the process was complicated by the opposition of the GS Local Government Division and especially Andrew Grajdanzev, who found the reform too radical. Eventually General Whitney pressured Schenk to make the Japanese Government officials change the draft they had earlier written with Schenck’s own NRS. In this occasion Schenk warned the Liberal Party delegation not to fail in carrying the legislation or otherwise the Supreme Commander would be obligated to issue a formal directive. Finally the law was enacted without incident on October 21, 1946, and MacArthur issued a public statement praising the land reform program.951

There were also other occasions when the Japanese government showed its willingness to work based on the will of the occupier952 and other instances where occupation officials threatened to issue a directive instead of negotiations and

947 C. W. (Courtney Whitney) GS to C in C, June 26, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03113.
948 According to Williams, Wolf I. Ladejinsky who was on loan from the Agriculture Department in Washington was the kind of official MacArthur wanted on his staff. Ladejinsky masterminded the successful land reform program in Japan, and then returned to the US. But at MacArthur’s request he returned to Tokyo for further work on land reform. Williams 1979, 270.
950 Gayn 1981, 453.
952 Williams 1979, 234, 247.
discussions if their guidance was not followed.\textsuperscript{953} One reason why it was important to show that everything happened through the Japanese government might have been connected to MacArthur’s presidential aspirations. If the occupation was to boost his chances, it needed to be effective and successful in reaching its goals, but also based on American democratic and capitalist values and ideals.\textsuperscript{954}

Threatening extreme views denying the principles of personal freedom, initiative, and values were themes of General MacArthur’s speech on September 2, 1946, when he warned the Japanese of the dangers of communist propaganda. MacArthur defended forces supporting the development toward moderate democracy and advised not to judge everything old as reactionary.\textsuperscript{955} Thus the decision not to disturb or even support the conservative forces might also have been motivated by the communists’ increased activity especially among the trade unions. For example, foreign correspondent Mark Gayn argues that the GHQ/SCAP prevented the collapse of the Yoshida Cabinet when it interfered in the newspaper strike\textsuperscript{956}.

More support for the conservatives was shown a few weeks later when Political Adviser George Atcheson defended MacArthur’s decision to isolate the occupation from the communist activities. He interpreted that MacArthur had encouraged the Japanese leaders who, though conservative by nature, were sincere in their desire and effort to hasten the democratization of Japan by stabilizing political thought to the point where neither the extreme right nor extreme left could prevail.\textsuperscript{957} Atcheson’s former subordinate John K. Emmerson argued, however, that the United States acts in Japan should not be conditioned by the fear of communism. Emmerson reacted to allegations that the Japanese Government hoped to utilize the deterioration in the relations between the US and the USSR to strengthen the idea of Japan as a potentially useful ally in a struggle against the Soviet Union. Emmerson believed that it was possible for Japan to enjoy friendly relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union and argued against the idea of occupation leaning towards the very elements it was set

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{953} Finn 1992, 123.
\item\textsuperscript{954} Schaller 1985, 46; Schonberger 1989, 52.
\item\textsuperscript{955} Statement First Anniversary of Surrender, September 2, 1946, PRJ (political reorientation), vol. 2, appendix F21, 766–767. NDL, GS(B)00570.
\item\textsuperscript{956} Gayn 1981, 337.
\item\textsuperscript{957} The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, (Extracts) Tokyo, September 18, 1946. (Received October 7.) CONFIDENTIAL. No. 607, FRUS 1946, Vol. 8, 315–316.
\end{footnotes}
Yet, Emmerson was now in Washington and not exercising his influence inside the GHQ/SCAP as he had done a year before. EDWARDS describes the rift in opinion between POLAD and Washington by stating that the State Department faced an odd situation where its own agent in Tokyo began to identify US interest with the Japanese old guard. EDWARDS does not unambiguously define who formed this group but claims that the GHQ/SCAP supported the old guard parties. EDWARDS describes the rift in opinion between POLAD and Washington by stating that the State Department faced an odd situation where its own agent in Tokyo began to identify US interest with the Japanese old guard. EDWARDS does not unambiguously define who formed this group but claims that the GHQ/SCAP supported the old guard parties. In short, a complex web of reasons speaking on behalf of the non-intervention policy can be discovered. It is possible that the occupation authorities wished to support conservatives because they were the counterforce to the communists. Also, as suggested by FINN, it is possible that the restraining of intervention was based on a strategic decision to postpone further reform until the constitution had passed the Diet. Besides, the constitution was not the only reform program that the conservative cabinet implemented under the occupiers’ behind-the-scenes guidance. Still, the various messages emphasizing the possibilities of the endogenous democratization movements inside the conservative parties did exist and most like contributed to the emergence of the hands-off policy.

6.3 Disappointments and search for new solutions

The US State Department officers were not alone when criticizing the development of Japanese political actors. More critical voices began to emerge also inside the GHQ/SCAP. Already in mid-July 1946 Dr. John M. Maki from the Governmental Powers Branch compiled a memorandum where he recommended that a close surveillance over the political activities of the Japanese Government be instituted. Maki criticized the hands-off policy in regard to matters of purely internal governmental or political nature. He argued that the stoppage of the flow of fundamental directives guiding the Japanese Government sent the wrong kind of message and claimed that it was not unnoticed by the Japanese who did their best to avoid the adherence to the spirit of the original directives. Maki suggested that the leaders of the Japanese Government re-gained the initiative from...
GHQ/SCAP as far as the control of the Japanese internal political and governmental situation was concerned. He recommended the establishment of a small committee to follow Japanese political development and direct interventions in forms of interrogations, conferences, and most of all in the form of issued directives on matters of basic political importance. Maki was not an influential person and his memorandum was just an expression of his individual beliefs, but more critical voices were to emerge during the autumn of 1946.

The Shimpotō’s representatives’ assembly announced a new party program of modified capitalism on December 28, 1946 and the party convention adopted the principles of the selection of party executives by vote and of making public party funds on January 31, 1947. These developments spoke on behalf of the still existing energy inside the endogenous reform movement led by Inukai Ken. Yet, there were also strengthening signs of disbelief in the conservative parties’ capability to change themselves. The conservatives’ ability to guarantee social stability and effective government also came into question.

Conservatives were discrediting the occupation

Continuous rumors suggesting that purgees would return to political life irritated occupation authorities. Especially whispers concerning the early reinstatement of Hatoyama Ichirō were numerous and circulated by various politicians starting from Premier Yoshida. The GS acted on August 16, 1946, to prevent these rumors and asked the CIE to give the widest possible publicity in the Japanese press to a message banning such allegations. It was stated that the purgees who talked about

961 John M. Maki, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the chief, GS, July 15, 1946. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2.
962 FUKUNAGA introduces the ideological base of the movement that besides Inukai, centered on Kitamura Tokutarō (北村徳太郎), Ishiguro Takeshi, and Kosaka Zentarō (小阪善太郎). Their idea of social solidarity opposed liberal laissez-faire principles but also deviated from socialism. Their program consisted of national cooperation for the sake of rebuilding the fatherland and citizens’ welfare, establishment of a civilized state and democratic system to secure citizens’ political freedom and denial of all self-righteousness and violence. The principle of social solidarity drastically amended capitalism and materialized in various policies concerning economy, labor, social education etc. The modified capitalism included, for example: stopping inflation caused by absorption in gaining surplus, protection of proletarians’ living with social benefits, establishment of coordinated economic planning, democratic state control of heavy industry and monetary circulation, workers’ participation on management and the open door enterprise management, and separation of capital and management. Fukunaga 1997, 104.
963 Masumi 1985, 135; Fukunaga 1997, 125.
964 Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 14, 73. OJP3RRP 3-B-14.
their impending return to public life, or continued to exercise influence on the councils of their political party, were violating the spirit of the directive which removed them. Allegations referring to the continuing decision-making power of the purged politicians who worked either behind the scenes or in a position that did not fall within the definition of the purge directives were even worse than the unfound stories about the de-purge.

Namely, there was evidence referring to Hatoyama’s continuing activity behind the Liberal Party that overlapped with the positive news about the intra-party democratization movement. Secretary-General Ōno Banboku was described as Hatoyama’s loyal follower and a friend who consulted Hatoyama on party matters. Uehara Etsujirō, Ōkubo Tomejirō, and Hiratsuka Tsunejirō were also recognized as Hatoyama’s gofers. Furthermore, the link between the money of Tsuji Karoku and Ishibashi Shōjirō and Hatoyama was still emphasized and openly admitted by Tsuji. A newcomer in the list of discriminating features of Hatoyama was a link built between him and the old Black Dragon Society. The diary of Hatoyama reveals various meetings with the Liberal Party politicians and, for example, with Prime Minister Yoshida. Some of meetings took place even in the foreign minister’s residence occupied by the premier.

It was not only the connection itself that occupation authorities found humiliating but also the openness and the impudence on how Hatoyama’s influence was demonstrated. Certainly the intelligence apparatus knew when Hatoyama met with other non-purged political leaders. Yet, the public recognition

965 GHQ, SCAP, GS, PAD, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief GS, July 24, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-323; P.K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, July 31, 1946, 1–3. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2; Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, July 26, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-323; Courtney Whitney, GS to CIE, Memorandum, August 16, 1946. NARA, RG 331, box 2134, folder 20; Tokyo News Letter, Far Eastern Press, Tokyo, Japan, August 9, 1947, Civil Affairs: Purged Hatoyama Rumoured to Be Future Premier.

966 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, July 31, 1946, 1, 3. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2; Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the record, October 2, 1946. NDL, JW-41-14; Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum for the record, August 6, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03438.

967 Kokurūkai (黒竜会) is translated either as the Black Dragon Society or the Amur River Society because the characters for Amur River are “black dragon”. The society was founded in 1900 and its chief founder was Uchida Ryōhei (内田良平). Its original program contained for example ideas of Japan becoming the leader for the prosperity of the Asian race, abolish the defects in a constitutional administration, expansion abroad and reform at home. Scalapino 1967, 350–351.

968 Memorandum for the Chief, GS, August 9, 1946. GS(B)00907-00908.

of this practice was seriously tainting the success story of the democratization of Japan. Hence, a newspaper article on September 6, 1946 revealing that Yoshida had spoken with Hatoyama on political issues a few days earlier with his own initiative and with the presence of other Liberal Party leaders \(^{970}\), caused immediate action. Shirashu Jirō, Vice-President of Central Liaison Office and Yoshida’s close aide was instructed to ascertain the nature and scope of Hatoyama’s political activities and to submit a report to his office.\(^{971}\)

Although the occupiers increased interest cancelled one meeting between Hatoyama and influential members of the Jiyūtō, warnings were ineffectual\(^ {972}\). For reasons that were not understood by Mark Gayn, Hatoyama came to meet him and Leon Prou, a French correspondent, on December 9, 1946. In this talk Hatoyama openly admitted that the chief cabinet secretary has consulted him a number of times to ask for advice. Furthermore, he gave the names of the other cabinet ministers who had come to seek his guidance and told that the occupiers listened to his conversations with Yoshida after tapping his wire. Hatoyama also gave credit to the occupation policy and statements of MacArthur and Atcheson that had convinced him on the occupation’s support of the conservatives. After the meeting Gayn ran into Colonel Kades to report about Hatoyama’s visit.\(^ {973}\) On the following day Kades wrote a memorandum for General Whitney where he repeated everything he heard from Gayn.\(^ {974}\)

The indifference of the Japanese politicians concerning warnings of not communicating with the purgees and especially Hatoyama led to a meeting on December 11, 1946. The occupation authorities, represented by Whitney, Kades and ten other GS staff members, conferred with Chief Cabinet Secretary Joji Hayashi and Yamada Hisanari (山田久就), Chief of the Political Affairs Division of the Central Liaison Office. On this occasion General Whitney expressed a strong objection to the Japanese Government officials who violated the purpose of the January 4, 1946, directive by consulting with persons who had been ruled as unfit to hold public office. Whitney did not mention Hatoyama’s name, but mentioned several times a purged political leader who had been consulted on

\(^{970}\) Hatoyama’s diary verifies that he met with Yoshida on September 4, 1946. Hatoyama 1999, 467.

\(^{971}\) Courtney Whitney, Report from GS to C-in-C, September 9, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03012.

\(^{972}\) Hatoyama’s diary reveals that the number of influential visitors remained high and for example Prime Minister Yoshida visited on October 4, 1946. Hatoyama 1999, 470, 473–474.

\(^{973}\) Gayn 1981, 472–475. Hatoyama’s diary markings confirm that the meeting took place. Hatoyama 1999, 494.

political matters and who openly informed to the representatives of the press, American correspondents, that for example Hayashi sought advice in the administration of government from him. This time Whitney did not only ban such activities, but threatened the Japanese Government with changes in occupation policy. He played the Soviet Union card and emphasized that the Supreme Commander had shown tolerance, understanding, and justice in his policy toward Japan despite that there were elements among the Allied powers demanding the utmost harshness in dealing with Japan. Now this policy was endangered because certain Japanese leaders had tried to fool the Supreme Commander. Whitney warned Hayashi and through him the rest of the government of attempting this ever again. Two months later, when the rights of the purgees were still uncertain to the representatives of the Japanese Government, astonished Carlos Marcum referred to this December meeting and described it as the worst castigation that he had seen any government official receive.

Discussion concerning party finances was another factor casting shadow over the conservatives. Wildes complained on October 11, 1946 that the examination of reports of financial receipts and expenditures submitted by the party officials and by individual politicians indicated that these reports were incomplete and untrustworthy. The governmental body under whose jurisdiction these matters belonged was considered to have failed in its duties. Besides castigating the control body, Wildes attacked the political parties. He argued that investigations revealed, among other things, the wide discrepancy between sums received and those disbursed by all major political parties. The sums of money officially circulated in the political world were surprisingly small. This was, however, explained with three different points: Politicians’ reports were not truthful; contributions were made in sums less than 1000 yen for the deliberate purpose of evading the election laws; and contributions were made privately in cash with the purpose of avoiding the necessity of reporting. Hatoyama was linked both to the cash distributed off-the-record as well as to the zaibatsu money. Hence the

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975 The increasing anti-conservative influence of the Soviet Union in the guidance of the occupation policy was used to persuade the Japanese conservatives into occupiers’ demands for example in the case of the purge extension as well. See: Douglas MacArthur to Yoshida Shigeru, December 26, 1946. NDL, GS(B)01753.
976 O.I. Hauge, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for Record, December 11, 1946. NDL, GS(B)00185.
findings of this investigation also pointed toward the continued activity of the purged politician.978

The case of Chizaki Usaburo (地崎字三郎) was another example of money-related issues besmirching conservative politicians’ reputations in autumn of 1946. The GS was interested in the Shimpotō Diet member already in mid-August 1946 because he had financed virtually the entire campaign of his communist rival in Hokkaido and donated a remarkable sum to the Communist Party headquarters as well. Chizaki claimed that he was supporting his communist rival because he had known the candidate’s mother. Political observers were, however, more interested in learning about the rumors according to which the contribution would have been hush money in order not to have his military record exposed. The CIC area unit in Hokkaido performed an investigation of which the findings were rather straightforward. According to the October 4, 1946 report, Chizaki donated at least 114,166 yen directly or indirectly to the Communist Party, its members and various affiliated organizations. This was not believed to be the total amount of donations. Several reasons were found for Chizaki’s financial relations with the communists. He tried to avoid the exposure of the inhumane treatment of Chinese prisoners of war, Koreans, and Japanese who were employed during the war. He also tried to avoid the exposure of his connections with the Naval Labor Organization known as the “Fuso-Kai” as well as the manner of which he accumulated wealth through Army and Navy contracts during the war. Moreover, Chizaki had tried to use the communists for his own political ambitions and he had dubious connections to certain newspaper men in Hokkaido. Investigators had also dug up Chizaki’s past in the IRAA.979

Despite the case against him Chizaki looked strong, he was purged only in April 1947. Wildes later argued that the Chizaki report, complete with verified data, was suppressed with other similar stories because MacArthur was not to be disturbed. Wildes claims that General Whitney misunderstood the situation in Japan, lacked interest in the Japanese leader-follower system, the oyabun-kobun kankei, and tried to cure the evil by reforming political parties. The role of the

978 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the record, October 11, 1946, 1–2. NDL, JW-41-15.
979 C.W., Check Sheet, request for investigation, from GS to G-2/CIS, August 16, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02962; J.L. Kennedy, Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps, Area 37, APO 928 to Commanding Officer 441st CIC detachment, GHQ, AFPAC, APO 500, 4 October 1946. NDL, GS(B)02962.
underworld racketeers and hoodlums and their relations with the political leaders became topical only a year later.\textsuperscript{980}

\textit{Losing faith in inborn changes among conservatives}

Conservatives were discrediting the occupation and there were factors speaking against the odds of the inborn changes. The GHQ/SCAP did not remain passive in this situation. Attempts to break away from the practices in the organization and operations which defeated the objective of democratizing political activities took form in the amending of the Political Parties Law. A series of informal negotiations between the Home Ministry and GS officials, initiated mainly by Pieter K. Roest, resulted in a set of informal recommendations that were approved by the Supreme Commander on December 9, 1946. Their main object was to reduce the number of the splinter parties and to elevate the political parties’ responsibility to correspond with the demands of the new constitution. Proposals aiming at the democratization of the internal party organization were made as well. In practice this was to be achieved by renewing the methods of electing the party officials in all levels of functioning. Furthermore, an adequate bookkeeping, transparency in party finances, and greater autonomy for regional offices were demanded. Recommendations were followed by a further exchange of opinions between Roest and home ministry officials.\textsuperscript{981}

Based on these proposals the Home Ministry submitted a draft of a proposed bill in the first week of January 1947. This draft was found deficient in many respects and created a vigorous debate inside the GS\textsuperscript{982}. The Home Ministry submitted a revised version that incorporated some of the GS demands shortly before the April 1947 elections, but the bill was not submitted to the Diet. This was because the ministerial change had taken place. Uehara Etsujirō, the new Home Minister and the Liberal Party leader, opposed the bill and the negotiations on this issue were resumed only in June 1947. At that time the government had changed and main negotiating partners were the leaders of the political parties.\textsuperscript{983}

\textsuperscript{980} Wildes 1978, 172–179.
\textsuperscript{981} Fukunaga 1997, 119–120.
\textsuperscript{983} Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, Report of Government Section, SCAP. Section XI., Political Parties, 798–801. NDL, GS(B)00561.
The occupiers’ decision to seek the democratization of the political party field through the amendment of law was not necessarily a vote on no-confidence to the endogenous reform movements. It might have also been initiated to encourage the existing movements inside the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō. However, whatever the occupation authorities’ motivation was to engage in arm-wrestling with the Home Ministry bureaucrats, it revealed the desired changes and the occupiers’ level of commitment to have them implemented.

Like the Political Parties Law, also the extension of the purge to cover local government officials, high-ranking economic posts, and influential figures in media divided opinions inside the GHQ/SCAP. GS interpreted that all purge matters belonged under its jurisdiction while for example the CIS attempted, unsuccessfully, to emphasize its responsibilities in the removal and exclusion of the undesirable personnel. The GS that had won MacArthur’s agreement to the purge extension on August 19, 1946, tried to extend the purge without any official SCAPIN. In late August the GS handed to the CLO an informal memorandum wherein the Japanese Government was directed to prepare a comprehensive plan for the exclusion of undesirable persons from the local government offices and from all other influential political and economic posts. The Japanese Government was told to work out their own initiative without consulting with any staff section of the GHQ/SCAP. Kades stated in a conference held on October 1, 1946 that the informal method of accomplishing an extension of SCAPIN 550 to regional officials plus the economic purge and the purge of information organs was for the purpose of circumventing the difficulties which a formal directive would present vis-a-vis the Allied Council for Japan. Everything proceeded according to the GS plan and CLO’s Yamada Hisanari provided a draft which combined extensions to both SCAPINS 548 and 550. However, suddenly the Japanese Government reversed its position and asked that a formal directive be issued. Kades claimed that the ESS officials convinced the Japanese that the extension could not be carried without a formal directive and threatened such person with court-martial should they be identified. To make things even worse, the purge extension issue came out in the newspapers at the end of September.

985 Finn 1992, 125.
986 J. F. A., Memorandum of Conference, October 1, 1946. NDL, GS(B)00906.
Prime Minister Yoshida informed to General MacArthur on October 22, 1946 that as a result of suggestions from the GS to extend the application of the purge to local public offices and economic positions, he had instructed the CLO to submit the government’s proposals to the GS. He believed that the proposals were in accordance with the principles of the suggestions although they might differ in details. Yoshida also used this opportunity to refer to a comment made by a United States congressman and proposed that anarchy, chaos, and communism would follow, should the purge be too wide. Finally the Japanese Government announced the extension of the purge to include the important political, economic, and press positions on November 21, 1946 and the Imperial edict from February 28, 1946 was revised on January 4, 1947.

BAERWALD alleges that the expansion of the purge criteria to local levels demonstrates the shift in the objective of the purge from removing the misleaders of Japan to creating the conditions for a new leadership. Official policy insisted that the purge was to remove those who had misled the Japanese people and the enlargement of purge criteria to a local level meant that the purgees were to be the local officials who had been members of ultra-nationalistic and militaristic societies. In principle their purge rested upon their unproved participation in the war effort. The application of the enlarged purge criteria which included local governmental posts was, however, delayed until the screening of candidates for the general election of April 1947. This is argued to have helped the conservatives to push through legislation in early spring of 1947. The criteria of the economic and public information media purge were obscure and complex. Within the original purge criteria, the economic purge was incorporated as a new category under the catchall G clause. The public information media purge was complicated by the fact that neither SWNCC nor JCS directives had included public information media as a field from which the undesirable leadership was to be removed. In fact, the origin of the purge was in the efforts of the Japanese newspaper unions to remove ultranationalists and militarists from managerial posts at the beginning of the occupation.

This purge extension meant that General Willoughby had failed in his attempt to convince MacArthur and others involved that the IRAA, the IRAPS and the

988 Yoshida Shigeru to General of the Army Douglas MacArtur, October 22, 1946. NDL, MMA-14, reel 6.
GJPA were neither secret nor terrorist. He tried to persuade the Supreme Commander to believe that an office in those societies should not per se be considered as a basis for purge. Selective screening was instead considered essential to promulgation of democratic principles. The base of this opinion was in the findings of the studies of the new CIS Conformance Branch991 completed in autumn of 1946. Willoughby even proposed that the list of organizations purged under SCAPIN 548 and the Category G of SCAPIN 550, be revised by CIS in light of its studies.992 Willoughby admitted the GS’s good work for example in the constitutional reform, but found it necessary to revise the purge policy for the sake of preventing subversive movements. According to Willoughby, there was not only a risk to disqualify the political and technical intelligentsia, but also the astonishing tranquility of the occupation of Japan was in danger of being deteriorated. Willoughby placed the preservation of the public peace over the letter of the Potsdam Declaration as the basis of the occupation policy.993

In the GS the purge extension was expected to weaken the influence of those individuals and groups which have stood in the way of a liberal political development for Japan.994 Later researchers have also connected the enlargement of purge criteria and the destruction of the conservative party machine in their analysis.995 But was the purge extension an act taken against the Japanese

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991 At the time of CIS’s transfer to G-2 in May 1946, the tasks related to the purge were divided between the Compliance Branch and the Research and Analysis Branch. These branches merged in October 1946 into the new Conformance Branch under the Operations division. The new Branch existed only from mid-October 1946 until January 16, 1947. During those three months the Conformance Branch completed three major studies. A documented staff study on extension of the purge and two large studies called ‘The Brocade Banner – the Story of Japanese Nationalism,’ and ‘War Politics in Japan,’ which were both designed to aid in the formulation of policies on screening individuals and organizations. Paul J. Mueller, GHQ/FECOM, The Intelligence Series, Volume IX; Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, July 8, 1948, 68. NDL, The Intelligence Series G2, USAFFE-SWPA-AFPAC-FEC-SCAP, ISG-1, reel 12.

992 Paul J. Mueller, GHQ/FECOM, The Intelligence Series, Volume IX; Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, July 8, 1948, 68. NDL, The Intelligence Series G2, USAFFE-SWPA-AFPAC-FEC-SCAP, ISG-1, reel 12; GHQ/USAFPAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff; Memorandum to Chief of Staff, December 18, 1946. NARA, RG 331, box 2055, folder 6; GHQ/USAFPAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, C. A. Willoughby to Chief of Staff, December 19, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 10, folder 16.

993 C. A. Willoughby to Chief of Staff, report, December 19, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02368; G-2 (CIS) C. A. Willoughby, G-2 (CIS) to GS, Check Sheet, 6880(unidentifiable digit), December 19, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02368; C. A. Willoughby, G-2 to CI&E, ESS, GS, D/CS, CS, Check Sheet, December 23, 1946. NDL, GS(A)02368.

994 At least one page missing, author not known, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum to the Chief, January 3, 1947. OJP3RRP 3-A-442.

conservatives? Although Inukai was quoted to have stated that the directive was a desirable step providing a golden opportunity for the young members of local branches to run in place of the old members who had dominated local politics in the past\(^{996}\), most of the conservatives were not looking forward to this reform. Purged conservative leaders had been substituted with local politicians in spring of 1946. Many of them were removed after the extension\(^{997}\). The economic purge had implications on the funding of the conservative parties, but that was not the main reason behind the economic purge planned from the very beginning of the occupation.

When the local office purge was planned it was certainly clear that it would affect the composition of the parties’ local branches. It is hence tempting to think that the local office purge was an outcome of the diminishing trust in conservative parties’ capability to democratize their own structures. This kind of conclusion would, however, underestimate the importance of other local actors and groups\(^{998}\) whose undemocratic character was considered to obstruct the democratization process. In any case, the local purge was a slow method of influencing the existing course of the centralist parties. Besides the purge of the substituting candidates, the purge extension seems, however, to have worked as a catalyst for the rediscovery of the purge as a method of direct intervention. Namely, the enlarged criteria did not only offer new grounds for a purge of national-level leaders, but was also followed by a series of purge cases of which arguments had nothing to do with the purge extension.

*The beginning of the end of the Yoshida Cabinet*

The question of whether the conservatives were any longer the most fitting to lead the Japanese Government rose simultaneously with the incipient signs of distrust toward the possibilities of the intra-party democratization movement. Mark Gayn claims in his diary that a number of political thinkers in the GHQ/SCAP were on the verge of shifting their support from Premier Yoshida to the Shakaitō at the end of November 1946. He argues that the top level of the Shakaitō, with only few exceptions, was loaded with war criminals. The GHQ/SCAP knew this but was

\(^{996}\) Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea No. 14, 73. OJP3RRP 3-B-14.

\(^{997}\) According to FUKUNAGA the Jiyūtō lost 30 Diet members prior to April 1947 election. The number of the successor of the Shimpōtō was even greater reaching total of 42. The combination of Kyōdō Minshutō and the Kokumintō lost 11 Diet members and Shakaitō one less. Fukunaga 1997, 88.

\(^{998}\) See for example: Bisson 1949, 38–42.
willing to forget it because of the growing feeling that Japan could not be content with conservative solutions. A step toward the left was needed and the socialist right-wingers supplied an ideal answer. They spoke the language of social reform and their strength lay in labor unions, but they neither wanted to destroy the basic structure of old Japan, nor make friends with the Soviet Union or the native communists. Gayn proposes that the best indication of these feelings was GHQ/SCAP’s refusal to press the purge of the socialist leaders. Furthermore, Yoshida was also giving only a little pressure because he was seeking to arrange a compromise with the Shakaitō right-wingers under which he would give them a few seats in his cabinet.999

There was, for sure, fertile soil for growing dissatisfaction. The Jiyūtō-Shimpotō axel looked incapable of securing the stable development that the occupation authorities preferred. The communist labor movement activities were not only disturbing production and peace in the workplaces but also contained a political dimension that crystallized in the demand to overthrow the Yoshida Cabinet. A sign of the cabinet’s incapability to control the strike movement was received when it requested the GHQ/SCAP to submit a key industry strike ban.1000 Domestic criticism toward the Yoshida Cabinet concentrated on the continuing inflation and the financial policy of Finance Minister Ishibashi Tanzan1001. These issues caused worry also inside the GHQ/SCAP and the Shakaitō, that selected the right-wing leaders Katayama Tetsu and Nishio Suehiro to act as chairman and secretary-general in September 1946, began to look like an option to be reckoned with. Despite the Yoshida Cabinet’s willingness to act according to the GHQ/SCAP’s guidance, FUKUNAGA also mentions the cabinet’s preservation of the old regime and the resistance showed toward the undertaking of the democratization policy as reasons why the GS start to look toward the Shakaitō.1002

The GS was interested in learning more about the Shakaitō and the leaders of the party were actively looking into possibilities to make their views heard. In early November the Political Affairs Division wanted to hear about the Shakaitō’s hopes concerning the coming local elections and the party reorganization. The

999 Gayn 1981, 466.
1000 Fukunaga 1997, 102.
1001 Inflation grew continually worse during the early occupation. From the time of surrender until 1947 the note issue had risen from 30 billion to 220 billion yen and wholesale prices were approximately ten times higher in 1947 than at the beginning of 1946. Edwards 1977a, 156.
socialist leaders used the opportunity to differentiate their party from the communists-style use of strikes as a political weapon and emphasized the anticipated losses of the two conservative government parties due to the purge extension.\textsuperscript{1003} Party unity was still, however, a feature not attached to the Shakaitō. The conflicting views became obvious in the non-confidence resolution issue.\textsuperscript{1004} The Shakaitō’s left-wing, led by Mizutani Chōzaburō, cooperated with the communists to organize a mass-movement to overthrow the Yoshida Cabinet but Nishio’s right-wing faction was against the use of extra-parliamentary force. Furthermore, the opposition of both the Kyōdō Minshutō and the Kokumintō reduced the right-wing socialists’ enthusiasm to demand a vote of non-confidence in the cabinet. Eventually the Shakaitō, together with other the opposition parties, converted its demand to the dissolution of the Diet.\textsuperscript{1005}

This idea came from the cooperative democrats who had received cabinet’s unofficial request to refrain from participation in the overthrow movement. Leaders of the Kyōdō Minshutō hesitated to introduce a non-confidence vote because they were afraid that the public might misinterpret this action as an attempt of the party to join the leftist movement. Instead, they initiated a resolution asking for dissolution of the diet. Although the resolution was roundly defeated in the Diet on December 17, 1946, Pieter K. Roest argued that the winner of the situation was the Shakaitō. He concluded that the socialist were not ready to take over the full responsibility of government and would be satisfied with a coalition cabinet in which they would form the economic core. In asking for dissolution, the socialists had solidified their popular support, increased their chances for future unity of action among non-government parties, and put pressure on the Yoshida Cabinet.\textsuperscript{1006} Despite Mizutani’s statement assuring socialists’ readiness for premiership\textsuperscript{1007}, Roest seems to have agreed at least

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1003} Beate Shirota, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the record, November 4, 1946. NDL, GS(A)00036.
\textsuperscript{1006} Misao Kuwaye, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the record, December 17, 1946. NDL, JW-41-21; P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, December 18, 1946. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 8.
\textsuperscript{1007} DOS, Office of Research and Intelligence, Division of Far East Intelligence, Situation Report – Japan. R&A 3479.23, February 14, 1947, 7. OSS/SDIRR, reel 4, document 9.
\end{footnotesize}
partially with Ashida Hitoshi, chief spokesman for the governments parties, who opened a door for Shakaitō-led cabinet but considered the timing too early.1008

The Yoshida Cabinet and the Shakaitō launched a coalition juggling in the middle of the promotion of the overthrow movement.1009 According to MASUMI, Yoshida and his secretary had met surreptitiously with Hirano Rikizō and Nishio already on August 4, 1946. Nothing was, however, mentioned about a coalition. A second secret meeting had been held in November. The topic of the coalition came up only during the third secret meeting arranged on December 28. At that time Yoshida offered the post of minister of commerce and industry and the ministerships in the newly established labor and construction ministry. Nishio demanded that the Yoshida Cabinet would resign en masse prior to the establishment of a coalition. While Yoshida negotiated with the socialists, anti-coalition executives of the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō made arrangements to sweep away all non-party cabinet members1010. Yoshida, Nishio and Hirano held their fourth secret meeting on January 8, 1947. Yoshida agreed to a full cabinet resignation, but Nishio brought up two additional conditions; resignation of Finance Minister Ishibashi and inclusion of the Kyōdō Minshutō and the Kokumintō in the cabinet. Rumors concerning the attempt to establish a coalition were already circulating. Sanbetsu, that represented unionism under the guidance of the communist, announced opposition to such a plan on January 10 and influenced thus the opinions of the left-wing socialists. Nevertheless, the Shakaitō’s Central Executive Committee approved the effort to establish a coalition on January 14, 1947. Nishio and Hirano conferred with Yoshida from the evening of January 15 to the early hours of the following morning. Yoshida offered four cabinet posts but the Shakaitō demanded five and repeated demands concerning Ishibashi and the participation of centrist parties. On that occasion Yoshida alluded to the possible purge of Nishio, Hirano, and three other leaders of the socialists. Nishio interpreted this as a threat and hardened his position. The discussion ended and the Shakaitō executives decided against participation in the coalition.1011

1009 Fukunaga 1997, 114.
1010 According to FUKUNAGA, secretaries generals Ōno Banboku from the Jiyūtō and Tanaka Manitsu from Shimpotō who were against the insertion of the Shakaitō into the coalition got together and agreed on a clean sweep of the non-party-affiliated bureaucratic ministers. Fukunaga 1997, 115.
The National Labor Union Joint Struggle Committee that represented thirty-three organizations including Sanbetsu and Sōdōmei was established at the same time. The expanded organization proclaimed on January 18 that it would declare a general strike beginning at midnight February 1, 1947. The GHQ/SCAP had acted already on January 16 when the relevant government agencies were orally advised to take measures to bring the strike under control. The occupation authorities’ activities continued on January 22 when both Finance Minister Ishibashi and the representatives of unions were called into the general headquarters. An unofficial memorandum regarding the question of the general strike was read to them and the union representatives were instructed to reply to it by January 25. Some representatives argued that they could not cancel the strike without an official directive. However, the imposition was partly successful. The Sōdōmei followed Shakaitō’s decision to avoid the general strike and informed its decision to obey the cancellation instruction on January 25. Nevertheless, the communists, Sanbetsu, and some other labor unions did not back up but expressed further demands for the government.1012

Yoshida’s and Hirano’s second attempt to form a coalition occurred when negotiations in the general strike issue stalemated. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi called on chairman Katayama on January 29. The Shimpotō’s Shidehara was also present in a conference where Yoshida outlined four conditions for a coalition government. He insisted that the coalition would be organized with all parties on an equal footing, the Shakaitō would be entitled to four cabinet posts, participation of the Kyōdō Minshūtō and the Kokumintō would be difficult for the time being, and Ishibashi would remain in office. The Shakaitō was not ready to accept these conditions and the Central Executive Committee meeting rejected them.1013 This was followed by GHQ/SCAP’s two significant interventions in Japanese domestic issues. First came the general strike cancellation order that was released on January 31 and then, on February 6, MacArthur demanded a new general elections to be held.1014 The question of holding a Lower House election in the coming spring had been debated among the government parties during the autumn of 1946. The progressives had first supported the idea of an election that would likely demonstrate their increased strength vis-à-vis the liberals. However,

1012 Masumi 1985, 115–120; Fukunaga 1997, 117.
1013 Masumi 1985, 120–121.
1014 Masumi 1985, 128, 132.
the controversy had been settled on November 5, 1946, when both parties officially expressed their opposition.1015

The third effort to establish a liberal-progressive-socialist coalition began around the time of MacArthur’s demand. The proponent on the government side was Finance Minister Ishibashi Tanzan who started negotiations with the Shakaitō’s Nishio on February 6, 1947. Talks lead to an agreement that was put onto paper in the early morning of February 13. The content was not very different from the compromise proposed prior by Hirano. Negotiators made a schedule concerning the Yoshida Cabinet’s resignation and the formation of the succeeding coalition cabinet. However, this attempt failed as well because of opposition from the right-wing of the Jiyūtō and the left-wing of the Shakaitō.1016

Occupation authorities observed the coalition reform movement and the G-2 reported already on December 19, 1946, that four important economic posts, including the Minister of Finance, were offered to the Shakaitō. This is, in other words, even before the issue first came up according MASUMI. The intelligence report claimed that this was already the second time for such an offer. Furthermore, it was suggested that two non-party-affiliated ministers might be replaced with the liberals and the progressives to compensate for the cabinet seats that would be lost to the socialists. The plan was reported to have Yoshida’s tentative agreement but Shidehara was argued to oppose it mainly because he disliked changes. The intelligence apparatus was not sure whether this proposal would be accepted, but affirmed that this kind of negotiations were taking place. Interestingly, the intelligence report also insisted that the designers of the plan had the advantage of evidently having no political ambitions. Who these designers were, was not specified.1017

A CIS periodical summary that was compiled six months later described the series of coalition efforts in a way that strongly resembled MASUMI’s interpretation. The construction of the first two coalition efforts contains similar dates and descriptions of events. Yoshida, who was argued to have informed his party colleagues of his coalition intentions with the Shakaitō only on January 13, 1947, was alleged to have desired the coalition. He could not, however, control

1017 Charles A. Willoughby, GHQ, SCAP, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Spot Intelligence report, December 19, 1946. NDL., G2-02647.
his party and Secretary-General Ōno Banboku was claimed to have threatened to remove Yoshida if he was not to follow his party’s wishes.\textsuperscript{1018}

Yoshida’s problems and the widening split between him and the boss group of Ōno, Okubo Tomojiro and Hayashi Jōji was also emphasized in earlier G-2 summations. According to the G-2\textsuperscript{1019}, the Hatoyama camp planned to oust Yoshida in spring of 1947. The third coalition proposal was attached to the limited reshuffle\textsuperscript{1020} of the Yoshida Cabinet that took place on January 31, 1946. The cabinet reshuffle was argued to have antagonized especially the younger progressives because their party was ignored when the Jiyūtō grabbed the main ministerial posts. This led to an agitation of new the conservative party that was, however, blocked by Shidehara’s opposition and the Supreme Commander’s letter advising an early election. Shidehara’s counterattack included a proposal to admit two middle-of-the-road supporters of the new-party plan into the cabinet. Kimura Kozan was made Minister of Agriculture on February 15 and Tanaka Manatsu (田中萬逸) became the Minister without Portfolio on February 26. Finally, the new party movement was sidetracked because of the revival of coalition negotiations with the Shakaitō.\textsuperscript{1021} The last coalition attempt was later described as an effort of older conservatives in both the Liberal and the Progressive Parties to put out the fire raised by the young Turks rebellion. Namely, on February 11 Shidehara comprehensively denounced Saitō and Inukai for prodding the new party, condemned it as a vote of non-confidence for himself, and demanded that the emphasis be placed on a renewed coalition effort that was to fail in a few days.\textsuperscript{1022}

\textsuperscript{1018} GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 17, Section IV, June 15, 1947, 24–25. NARA, RG 200, entry 23310, box 19.

\textsuperscript{1019} Although I have found only a G-2 summation submitted on mid-April 1946, the document itself is based on reports written during the first months of the year.

\textsuperscript{1020} Wada Hirono and three non-party members Tanaka Kōtarō (田中耕太郎), Zen Keinosuke (膳桂之助) and Ōmura Seiichi (大村清一) were ousted together with the Liberal Party’s Hiratsuka Tsunejirō. They were replaced by the Liberal Party Ishii Mitsujirō (石井光次郎) and two non-party men Takahashi Seiichirō (高橋誠一郎) and Masuda Kaneshichi (増田甲子七). Moreover, Uehara Etsujirō became the Minister of Home Affairs and Hoshijima Niro took his place as Minister without Portfolio.

\textsuperscript{1021} GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 15, April 15, 1947, 106–109. NARA, RG 200, Willoughby “Personal-Official” File 1941–50, box 19.

\textsuperscript{1022} GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 17, Section IV, June 15, 1947, 25–26. NARA, RG 200, entry 23310, box 19.
But how was the occupation authorities’ attitude toward the coalition attempts and cabinet reshuffle and what kind of role did they play in the above-introduced efforts? It is clear that there was a possibility to re-direct the course of Japanese politics. Yoshida even sent a letter to MacArthur on January 28, 1947, and directly asked whether to go with the coalition or reorganization. 1023 No answer has been found and based on the GHQ/SCAP’s way of action it is highly unlikely that such advice, if ever given, was written on paper. Nevertheless, the cabinet was reshuffled three days later without including the Shakaitō. Therefore one could assume that if advice was given, it was not the coalition with the socialists. Although Nishio Suehiro has later assumed that the occupiers’ suggestion might have been behind Yoshida’s strive for a coalition with the Shakaitō, the fragmentary document base does not prove that the occupation authorities would have been more than active observers of the coalition attempts in December 1946 and at the beginning of the following year. The GHQ/SCAP did, however, demand the new election to be held. It was time for the Yoshida-Shidahara clique to leave office, but this was to be done only after the general election. The next chapter describes how the occupation authorities reshaped the conservative lines according to their own preferences to ensure a desirable cabinet.

Conclusion

Although the secession from intervention was not complete, the summer and autumn of 1946 can be described as a period of hands-off policy. The occupation authorities’ behind-the-scenes guiding did not disappear but the Japanese conservatives were saved, for example, from political purges. What caused this change? Was it General MacArthur’s willingness to back Yoshida and the conservatives because of the determination to maintain a safe government, as argued by Mark Gayn?1025 Or was it cabinet’s inclination to cooperate and enact GHQ/SCAP’s reforms that, according to DOWER, went against the conservative grain.1026 Maybe this satisfaction was due to the inborn movements that seemed to take care of the democratization of the political party field and opened doors for cooperation with the non-conservative forces. Most likely all of these factors

1023 Yoshida Shigeru to General MacArthur, January 28, 1947. NDL, GS(B)01753.
1024 Nishio 1968, 79.
1025 Gayn 1981, 463.
1026 Dower 1979, 310.
played a role in creation of an optimistic atmosphere that seems to be often forgotten in the latter reminiscences.

Reports written in the U.S. State Department were delayed and often described the situation that had already drastically changed. A February 1947 situation report described the situation that had existed in the previous autumn. It did it, however, pretty well. The report concluded that the old-line politicians’ position in party leadership was challenged during the summer and fall of 1946 by the younger party members, who forced the adoption of structural changes within the conservative parties. This was not, however, the whole truth. On the day when the State Department Division for Far East Intelligence’s report dealt with the challenge of the old order, GS’s Pieter K. Roest already proclaimed that the rebellious conservative groups had lost and the boss-politics was to continue.1027 The first signs of the occupation authorities’ hesitation concerning the outcome of the intra-party democratization movement were already seen at the end of 1946. Likewise, discussion on the future cabinet base emerged. Even if the GHQ/SCAP did not intervene in the coalition negotiations this time, the occupiers were certainly interested in learning more about the available alternatives for the Yoshida-Shidehara line.

Despite the structural changes inside the GHQ/SCAP, routines in information gathering and ways of informing the desired course to the Japanese Government were established. The competition between the various sections continued but nobody was capable of challenging the GS’s dominating position, for example, in the purge-related matters. The occupation authorities were not too enthusiastic to tackle every minor problem built into the conservative government as long as the main objectives like smooth progress of the constitutional issue and the guarantee of social order were reached. Yet, as can be seen in conservatives’ contacts with the purgees, attitudes toward these demerits turned more critical if they sprang up to tarnish the occupation’s clean image.

1027 See quotations at the beginning of this chapter. DOS, Office of Research and Intelligence, Division of Far East Intelligence, Situation Report – Japan. R&A 3479.23, February 14, 1947. OSS/SDIRR reel 4 document 9; Pieter K. Roest, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, February 14, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 8.
7 Supporting Middle-of-the-road Conservatives

“What MacArthur wanted, and failed to get was a united Japan working out her problems along a middle-of-the-road course. He was a political conservative and an economist capitalist. He wanted evolution, not violent change. His ideas of government and industry were essentially American. Although he demanded economic controls as a temporary means of handling resources, he proclaimed free enterprise as his eventual goal. One of his consistent policies was the reiterated proposal that Japan reject extremes in all fields and concentrate upon moderation.”

"Mr. Katayama’s selection as the new Prime Minister emphasizes the 'middle of the road course' of Japanese internal politics. Of no less importance is the searching effort made to find a workable formula to mold the several political viewpoints into a government which can best serve the public needs. These internal political developments reflect basic democratic principles and practices and show how far Japan has progressed on the road of free government.”

The occupation policy was not static, but evolved constantly. Both domestic and international developments at the beginning of 1947 forced the GHQ/SCAP to re-evaluate the direction toward which it was guiding Japan and with whom this change of course was best to be implemented. Available methods to re-direct the policy of Japanese Government and mold the political parties reached from advice and unofficial orders to purge orders. However, when implementing new policies, the occupation authorities needed to make sure that they did not demerit the already made decisions. This meant that, for example, Yoshida and Shidehara could not be criticized too openly. If they were to be criticized by GHQ/SCAP, the critics of the occupation and the early election could have gained proof of their claims.

The changing international situation—the Truman administration was backing away from China and many of the allies of the United States were facing economic crisis that detracted from their possibilities to contribute to the fight against communism—caused turbulence in Washington. MacArthur sensed

1028 Briness 1948, 69.
1029 Press release on selection of Tetsu Katayama as Prime Minister, May 24, 1947. Appendix F – Statements by General MacArthur, 797–798. NDL, GS(B)00571.
that there was an increasing possibility of political consensus among the leaders of the War Department, the armed services, and the State Department. The united front might cause more intensive external supervision of the occupation, diminish the Supreme Commander’s influence and threaten, among other things, to destroy Japan’s value as the general’s presidential springboard. These developments worked as an alarm to the GHQ/SCAP. 1031 MacArthur proclaimed in his New Year’s statement that the great majority of Japan’s leaders had displayed an exemplary approach to the realism of Japan’s problems and reminded the Japanese people of the importance of their new political responsibilities. 1032 In his February 1947 message to the Congress of the United States, MacArthur stated that the process of destroying Japan’s war-making power was completed and Japan was already governed by a form of democratic rule. The Supreme Commander also argued that history had pointed out a lesson that the military occupations served their purpose at best only for a limited time. 1033 The meaning of the last clause became clear at an uncharacteristic luncheon with the representatives of the foreign press on March 19. On that occasion General MacArthur suggested that the occupation had progressed sufficiently to justify peace treaty negotiations in the immediate future. 1034

While MacArthur emphasized the success of demilitarization and democratization, especially his economic policies were criticized. Navy Secretary James Forrestal, Commerce Secretary Averell Harriman, Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and former President Herbert Hoover formed the nucleus of a group criticizing both the cost and the direction of the occupation policies in Germany and Japan. In their eyes General MacArthur was destroying the Japanese economy. This was indefensible because Germany and Japan played a major role in plans emphasizing the restoration of the suffering economies of the capitalist world. They were not considered only as bastions against Soviet expansion but also as catalysts sparking the regional recovery. 1035 Members of the State Department’s Japan-Korea economic division also reappraised the occupation’s economic premises under the direction of Edwin F. Martin. They

1031 Schaller 1985, 95.
1033 Summation of Non-Military Activities No. 17, 19. OJP3RRP 3-B-17.
emphasized the importance of boosting production in Japan. At the same time Newsweek magazine and its foreign editor Harry F. Kern and Tokyo correspondent Compton Packenham started a public attack against MacArthur’s occupation and especially the economic purge.\textsuperscript{1036} This, together with the criticism, for example, on the part of Joseph C. Grew, is most likely what BAERWALD means when stating that the purge extension was against the will of the influential friends of the old Japan.\textsuperscript{1037}

MacArthur was neither blind to criticism nor to the economic problems in Japan. When he justified his stance toward the early peace settlement, MacArthur concluded that the occupation consisted of three phases: military, political and economic\textsuperscript{1038}. According to Supreme Commander, the military objective was already accomplished and the political phase was approaching such completion as was possible under the occupation. MacArthur acknowledged that although the complete democratization of Japan was not yet fully accomplished, there was little more left to do except to watch, control and guide. After that he expressed his concern over the economic phase. In MacArthur’s argumentation, however, it was the delay in concluding a peace treaty that would further cripple the Japanese economy and make more aid from the United States necessary.\textsuperscript{1039}

MacArthur’s competition with Washington is not the most interesting aspect of the growing interest in the economic situation. Namely, BORTON argues that MacArthur took new interest in economic matters in the spring of 1947 when some of his advisers concluded that the adverse economic condition threatened the success of entire occupation. This, as also agreed with by BABB, convinced the occupation authorities that Yoshida’s Cabinet and the Liberal Party were obstacles to the smooth implementation of reform.\textsuperscript{1040} Another argument working as a basis to this chapter is MASUMI’s conclusion that the GHQ/SCAP looked for a substitution for Jiyūtō and had a strong interest in the formation of the new conservative party because it was extremely dissatisfied with the Yoshida

\textsuperscript{1036} Kern and Packenham contributed to the organization of the American Council for Japan that was an influential pressure group led by the old and remaining Japan Hands of the State Department. Council influenced George F. Kennan when he was drafting the National Security Council document 13/2 of October 1948. Schaller 1985, 93–95; Schonberger 1989, 39, 134–150. See also: Newsweek, January 27, 1947. NDL, YE-5, reel 12, document 104-A-98; Newsweek, February 10, 1947. NDL, YE-5, reel 12, document 104-A-100.

\textsuperscript{1037} Baerwald 1959, 25; Schonberger 1989, 38–39.

\textsuperscript{1038} Schaller 1985, 95.

\textsuperscript{1039} Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan No. 18, 21. OJP3RRP 3-B-18.

\textsuperscript{1040} Borton 1955, 414–416; Babb 2002, 228.
Cabinet’s inability to bring the February 1 general strike under control. Namely, despite its earlier assurance, the Yoshida Cabinet could not stop the general strike movement and MacArthur was forced to issue a cancellation order that sullied his own reputation as well as that of the occupation.

BABB claims that the general election was a substitute promised to the socialist after an intervention to the general strike movement and aimed to bolster the position of the moderates. FINN argues that MacArthur had been planning elections well before the labor crisis. However, he agrees that the general forecasted a large rise in the number of the socialist seats and a small increase for the communists, with corresponding losses by the Progressive and Liberal Parties. Besides wanting to clear the electoral slate with the advent of the new constitution, MacArthur probably thought that the moderate left had a big electoral opportunity because the Yoshida cabinet was weak and unpopular. When describing the situation prior to the 1947 election, FINN also refers to the known GS preference for the socialists that might have boosted the influence of the moderate left. The forecast concerning the losses of the conservatives against the Shakaitō seemed to be, in any case, a safety bet because an opinion poll made by Asahi Shimbun in January showed that the cabinet’s support rate had fallen under thirty percent. Support rates of the individual parties showed that the Jiyūtō (26 percent), the Shimpotō (12.9 percent) and the Kyōdō Minshutō (4.5 percent) received altogether a few percent less than the Shakaitō. These numbers were enough to convince at least Ugaki Kazushige that the conservative parties were inevitably going to face losses especially when compared to the Shakaitō. Furthermore, Ugaki was among those Japanese who recognized, not only how important it was to MacArthur that everything seemed to progress well in Japan, but also the limits of American support and funds to Japan.

There were changes also inside the GHQ/SCAP. On one hand, Theodore Cohen who had been criticized by the G-2 because of pro-leftist implications.

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1042 Finn 1992, 142.
1043 Babb 2002, 228.
1045 Fukunaga 1997, 118.
1046 Ugaki 1971, 1692, 1695.
1047 GHQ/FECEM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Charles A. Willoughby, Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, Leftist infiltration into SCAP, March 5, 1947. NDL, MMA-5 (RG-23), roll 13 (no. 920), box 18.
and red-baited in the American press after the general strike ban was removed from ESS’s labor Division. He was succeeded by James S. Killen, a former American Federation of Labor official with pronounced anti-communist sentiments, who took over as Division chief. On the other hand, Carlos P. Marcum replaced Pieter K. Roest as the head of the Political Affairs Division. Marcum was also among the occupation officials in the teeth of G-2 because of his alleged leftist leanings. G-2 argued that Marcum had been the prime-mover inside the GS for extending the purge beyond what was considered desirable. Marcum, who had already once left Japan and CIS just to return to the GS, was alleged to have shown an arrogant, uncompromising, and unreasonable attitude especially in his dealings with Japanese officials of the CLO. It was criticized that Marcum had taken upon himself and GS sole responsibility for the screening and purging of Japanese personnel. Marcum’s background and suitability into his position were described in a negative light. Obviously the G-2 was trying to influence the occupation policy through discrediting individuals and it was ready to spread exaggerations and even pure lies. However, it can be asked, what was the meaning of these changes in personnel? Was this a sign of a will to compromise and draw back the reforms in economic issues where the pressure was more significant, whereas Japanese domestic politics was still a ground where the GHQ/SCAP could operate without major disturbances?

This chapter describes the occupation authorities’ policy adopted at a time when party merger rumors eventually culminated in the establishment of two new conservative political parties which wanted to identify themselves in the political center. These parties ran side-by-side with the Jiyūtō, the Shakaitō, the Kyōsantō and the decreased number of the minor parties and independents in five separate elections held in April 1947. As an outcome of the House of Representatives election, the socialists made substantial gains winning 143 seats and the negotiations that followed led to the establishment of Katayama Tetsu’s coalition cabinet on June 1, 1947. New moderate conservatives thus immediately demonstrated their capability to cooperate with the right-wing of the Shakaitō.

1049 GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Charles A. Willoughby, Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, Leftist infiltration into SCAP, March 5, 1947, 14–16. NDL, MMA-5 (RG-23), roll 13 (no. 920), box 18.
1050 Election of governors together with election of mayors and village heads on April 5; election for the House of Councillors on April 20; elections for the House of Representatives on 25 April; and elections of prefectural assemblymen on April 30. Fukunaga 1997, 126–127.
7.1 Welcoming the Democratic Party and the People's Cooperative Party

The occupation authorities were not planning to lose their grip on the development of the Japanese political parties despite the glowing statements concerning the progress of the democratization process. The GS’s year started with a conclusion that the coming months would offer a unique favorable opportunity to move forward in the encouragement and support of the liberal political tendencies in Japan. Open interference was found undesirable but a policy of drift was considered to include even greater dangers than an implied intervention. The following will enlighten the forms of guidance that took place when the party mergers plans led to the establishment of new conservative political parties. The People’s Cooperative Party (国民協同党 Kokumin Kyōdōtō) was established on March 8, 1947, as an amalgamation of the old cooperative democrats, the People’s Party and four members of the Independent Club. This was followed by the establishment of the Democratic Party (民主党 Minshutō) on March 31. The Minshutō consisted of the old Shimpotō, Ashida-led group of former liberals, and members from the smaller parties.

The occupiers observed the cooperative party formation

The potential merger with other political groups was discussed when the representatives of the cooperative democrats met with the GS Political Affairs Division officials at the end of 1946. Ikawa Tadao admitted on November 6 that the party’s prestige had suffered from the failure of Yamamoto Sanehiko’s efforts to merge with the Shinseikai that thereupon transformed itself into the Kokumintō. Ikawa also told that the official talks with the progressive elements of the Shimpotō, the Inukai and Kawai Yoshinari (河合良成) groups, and the Jiyūtō, the Ashida and Hoshijima groups, were called off. Unofficial foraying conducted by individual members was still, however, continuing with the blessing of the party leadership. One recognized problem preventing the rapprochement was the question over the new party’s name. While the progressives preferred the name of the Democratic Party, the cooperatives were not ready to give up with the “cooperative” in the name. Ikawa considered the situation in general promising.

1052 At least one page missing, author not known, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum to the Chief, January 3, 1947. OJP3RRP 3-A-442.
because the local party chapters were doing well and the ousting of the Kita brothers, who had then failed in their own party attempt, were likely to be repealed.1054

Matsumoto Takizō reported about an effort to organize an amalgamation of the centrist forces called “Yato Renmei” (Outsiders’ Association1055) on mid-December. This was to be formed by amalgamating the Kokumintō, the Kyōdō Minshutō, some independents, the right-wing members of the Shakaitō, and the left-wing members of the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō. The purge of Yamamoto was claimed to have been looked upon as good riddance by several party members and it was assumed to bring the actual leaders Ikawa, Matsumoto, and Miki Takeo to the front. The Ikawa-led amalgamation negotiations with the Kokumintō were underway again and the People’s Cooperative Body was suggested as a compromising name acceptable for both parties. Pieter K. Roest noted that the new group would be too large for anybody to ignore but questioned whether those engineering these transactions would provide leadership capable enough to hold together such a mass of political odds-and-ends as the parties involved represented.1056

The amalgamation movement between the Kyōdō Minshutō and the Kokumintō was revived on February 10, 1947, when Miki Takeo discussed with the Kokumintō’s Okada Seiichi (岡田勢一) on merger problems. Previous negotiations had broken up because of disagreement concerning the name and the appointment of the party president. While the negotiations progressed, the cooperative democrats lost one of their leaders on February 18 when Ikawa Tadao passed away.1057 On the same day Miki and Matsumoto visited the GS and expressed their belief in the merger of the Kyōdō Minshutō and the Kokumintō in the following days. The end of February was given as a deadline after which the merger would not be effected. The variable that still disturbed the final decision was the possibility of amalgamation with the opposition group inside the Shimpotō called the Shinshinkai (新進会 New Progression Society). The merger combining the two parties and the Shinshinkai group would have created a party

1054 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Record, November 14, 1946. NDL, GS(A)00036.
1055 Official kanji-characters not know. Most likely 野党連盟.
1056 Misao Kuwaye, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the record, December 17, 1946. NDL, JW-41-21; P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, December 18, 1946. NARA, RG 84, entry 2828, box 22, folder 8.
1057 Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan No. 17, 32–33. OJP3RRP 3-B-17.
with approximately 120 Diet members.\textsuperscript{1058} According to the progressives Inukai, the latter option was preferred by Miki\textsuperscript{1059}, whose participation in the negotiations can be verified also from Ashida Hitoshi’s diaries.\textsuperscript{1060}

Eventually the formation meeting of the People’s Cooperative Party was held on March 8, 1947. The new party held 78 seats in the Diet. The party president was not elected, but the party adopted a committee system with Miki Takeo acting as the chief secretary. The party statement condemned both the conservatives’ endeavoring to maintain the old privileges and the left-wingers who involved the people into an ill-considered strife, neglecting the people’s fate by forcing them to be organized by classes. Instead, the new party defined itself as a party taking the middle way without distortion of either the left or the right wings.\textsuperscript{1061} This image was, however, already questioned by the founders of the old Kyōdōtō. At the end of February the Kyōdō Minshutō was accused to have abandoned its agrarian principles and become merely an opportunistic office-seeking clique. The Kita brothers protested against the new party and created the Japan Farmer’s Party\textsuperscript{1062} together with the three other Diet members.\textsuperscript{1063}

Miki and Matsuno quickly informed the GS political observers about the merger and the future course of the party. Roest concluded that the platform\textsuperscript{1064} of the party was without one minor point; that of the former Kyōdō Minshutō. He interpreted that the cooperatives dominated the new combination. Yet, he came to a positive conclusion that the party’s political complexion was less indefinite than might have been expected of such a miscellaneous group. This was analyzed to be due to the fact that all the members were middle-of-the-roaders and the party was expected to take its place between the progressives on the right and the socialists on the left. Moreover, no clear-cut factions that would disturb party work were recognized.\textsuperscript{1065}

\textsuperscript{1058} P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Record, February 18, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00064.
\textsuperscript{1059} P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 27, 1947, 2. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 9.
\textsuperscript{1060} See for example: Ashida 1986, 159, 161.
\textsuperscript{1061} CIE and GS, GHQ, SCAP, Political Affairs Bulletin No. 3, March 15, 1947. NARA, RG 331, box 5242, folder 31.
\textsuperscript{1062} Official Japanese name not known.
\textsuperscript{1063} Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan No. 17, 33. OJP3RRP 3-B-17.
\textsuperscript{1064} The main points introduced by Asahi were: practising national politics in the Diet, reconstructing Japanese economy based on cooperative principles, contributing to the world’s peace and culture built on humanism. Fukunaga 1997, 124.
\textsuperscript{1065} P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the record, March 18, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 9.
I can thus agree with FUKUNAGA that the GS welcomed the birth of the centrist Kokumin Kyōdōto. The continuity of the old, earlier-criticized regime was, however, a noticeable feature of the newcomer. No signs of GHQ/SCAP’s participation into the process as a guide, antagonist, or protagonist have been found. Apparently the occupiers were just interested observers of the merger process. This is not surprising since the expectations concerning the possibilities of the cooperative party movement had not been too high and the party had not caused disturbance in either the Diet or in the field of extraparliamentary activities. There were, in fact, signs that the new party was a moderate force willing to compromise with its principles for the sake of cabinet representation. TOMINOMORI interprets that the establishment of the new party was a step toward conservatism and a step away from cooperativism. However, if the step was taken, it was most likely toward the direction of political opportunism. An example of this approach was Miki’s continued negotiations with Ashida Hitoshi and others planning to form yet another new political party.

*Formation of the Minshutō and the reborn expectations of change*

According to MASUMI’s description of the establishment of the Minshutō, the progressives Chizaki Usaburō paid almost daily visits to Ashida Hitoshi’s patron Sugawara Michinari (菅原通済). Chizaki requested Ashida to join the new party even without any followers. Likewise, Ashida was promised to be elected as the president of the Democratic Party that was to be established. Sugawara called together the Shimpotō executives and made them draw up an old-style petition guaranteeing that Ashida would be made the president. Ashida then left the Jiyūtō on February 23 and ended up writing a declaration establishing the new party with Inukai Ken. Ashida conferred with Sugawara on the following day on money-related matters. Ashida secured his financial standing but Sugawara made him delay the declaration of the new party. The central party organs of the Progressive Party expressed their support of the realization of a new major progressive party on March 10, 1947. The Supreme Executive Conference of the Progressive Party approved the formation of a new party on March 22 and the regular Diet Members Assembly made the final decision to dissolve the Shimpotō.

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1066 Fukunaga 1997, 124.
on March 26. The inaugural ceremony of the Minshutō was then held on March 31. Instead of a presidential system, it was decided that the party administration would be managed by the Supreme Executive Committee occupied by Saitō Takao, Ashida Hitoshi, Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi, Kawai Yoshinari, Kimura Kozaeemon, Inukai Ken, and Narahashi Wataru. Shidehara was made a supreme adviser whereas Ishiguro Takeshige became the secretary-general and Yano Shōtarō became the chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council. With a total of 145 members, it became the leading party in the House of Representatives.1069

Ashida Hitoshi and the GS Political Affairs Division interpreted the development differently. According to his diary, Ashida left the Jiyūtō only on March 23 and this was preceded by several obstacles. On February 12 he made a truce with the Liberal Party leaders and a few days later turned down Miki Takeo’s offer by referring to the support he had inside the Jiyūtō.1070 At the same time Pieter K. Roest lost his confidence in the reformistic forces inside the conservative parties. The liberals held strongly onto Ishibashi although he himself had agreed to resign. This was claimed to be due to the fact that money for campaign purposes kept flowing from the black-market brokers who had profited enormously from the inflation caused by Ishibashi’s financial policy. Yoshida was reported to have confessed that he had no power against the decision of the Liberal Party bosses. Roest concluded that the Hatoyma faction led by ŌnoBanboku had won the Ashida’s anti-boss faction. Similarly, the new party movement inside the Shimpōtō was facing problems. The party bosses who had first been cool toward the movement had adopted a friendly attitude and captured the leadership of the movement after it showed dangerous vigor. Shidehara stopped the movement and demanded concentration on the coalition building. Moreover, Roest notified Ashida’s change in the course and described Ashida’s statement to keep the interest in the Jiyūtō as a chicken-hearted statement. Finally Roest concluded: ‘Thus it appears that the future is none too bright for the rebellious group of conservatives. Once more boss-politics has dominated—at least for the time being.’ 1071

1069 Masumi 1985, 135–138. Concerning the structure of the party leadership, see also Uchida 1987, 331–332.
1070 Ashida 1986, 159, 161.
1071 Pieter K. Roest, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, February 14, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 8.
Roest did not believe in the words of Kosaka Zentarō (小阪善太郎) either. Kosaka came to the headquarters on February 11 to promote the Shinshinkai. The Shinshinkai was alleged to be a group formed by the Progressive Party members who opposed the government’s policy, the failure of the coalition cabinet, and the behind-the-scenes methods of Premier Yoshida. Kosaka tried to convince GS officials that the movement was supported, for example, by Saitō Takao and recognized by the managing committee of the party including Shidehara. Roest concluded, however, that this movement would be to no advantage except to the progressives and others would not support it. Therefore, the coalition movement had run its course and left—not a changed cabinet, but a clarified picture of the political and economic issues at stake in Japan. According to Roest, the socialist were doubtlessly the gainers, as far as public support was concerned. However, it was only the elections that could determine how much—or how little—the change really was.

More old-style boss politics was witnessed on February 19 when Shidehara spontaneously made a proposal to the liberals concerning the outright merger of the two organizations. Growing disbelief in spontaneous change strengthened also after the interview of Inukai Ken on February 27, 1947. Inukai spoke surprisingly freely, a point also noted by Roest, and described the development taking place in the two major conservative parties. Inukai described Ashida’s weaknesses, revealed his own dual role as an adviser of both the young progressives’ Shinshinkai and the group of older party leaders, and even openly admitted that the candidates named to succeed the purgees were chosen by the party bosses and instructed to follow their predecessors’ policies. Roest thus concluded: “The Progressive Party is not likely to change in form or substance in spite of all the merger and New Party talk. It is still the vehicle for Mr. Inukai’s ambition and Baron Shidehara’s Toryism. By deftly playing both ends against the middle, Inukai, ”advisor” of both the rebels and the “bosses,” sees to it that the

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1072 P. K.Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Record, February 11, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00064; Pieter K. Roest, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, February 14, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 8.


1074 Ashida wrote on February 26 that the fire of the merger movement had burned off and he had decided to keep the status quo at least until the election. Ashida 1986, 167.
Party remains intact, and will make a bid for an even stronger Diet position than it has now.”

In his prediction concerning the post-election development, Inukai introduced a model where the progressives and the liberals would form a union. This was not, however, to cause any major changes. Likewise, Kosaka had also predicted that Yoshida and Shidehara would remain at the head of the regime, although the right-wing of the Shakaitō would be included in the new cabinet. The Shimpōtō was described at the end of February as a party that would not change on its own. The unchanged situation within the party referred also to the continuance of the Yoshida-Shidehara line in the government. Furthermore, although the summation of the non-military activities of February 1947 introduced six chief merger plans, none of them were considered to seriously oppose Yoshida as a prime Minister or imply a cabinet change.

A month later the situation was totally different and the new Democratic Party had seen daylight. According to Roest, this was mostly due to the activities of the already once forgotten Narahashi Wataru. Roest describes Narahashi’s role by stating that: “He has galvanized the sickly Progressive Party to new life, and within three weeks transformed it into the most promising political party in Japan.” But what had happened during this month?

Narahashi, a former Cabinet Secretary who had tried to create the Democratic Party already a year earlier, announced his intention to become active in a new

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1075 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 27, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 9.
1076 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 27, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 9; P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Record, February 11, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00064.
1077 Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan No. 17, 26–32. OJP3RRP 3-B-17.
1079 Narahashi’s activities during the 1946 cabinet crisis were introduced in a GS study that dealt with the minor parties. Narahashi had been active after April 1946 elections and tried to absorb the independents within the Progressive Party under Shidehara’s leadership in order to uphold the Shidehara cabinet. This was, according to Harry Emerson Wildes, done with the silent approval of the purged party founders Shimada Toshio (島田俊雄) and Tanaka Takeo (田中武雄). Widespread press hostility and strong public opposition to what was considered as Shidehara’s bid to retain power in defiance of the results of the election was mentioned as a reason that forced Narahashi to withdraw from the public arena. Narahashi’s program was, nevertheless, taken over by Shidehara’s Legislative Bureau Director Ishiguro Takeshi who sought to make the program more acceptable by stressing his desire to work through such younger leaders as Nagai Gen (長井源) and Inukai Ken. Ishiguro planned a party that would link the Liberal left and the Socialist right. The attempt was eventually a failure and Wildes named it as the Narahashi-Ishiguro fiasco. Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, July 24, 1946. NDL, JW-41-03. 
party movement on February 18, 1947. He joined the Progressive Party on March 6. This immediately revitalized the earlier attempts. Narahashi’s behavior was still found to be vigorous and over-confident causing irritation almost to the point of being intolerable. The inauguration of the Minshutō on March 31 proved, however, many of his statements that were made two days earlier to be correct and the sense of mission was considered to explain some of the egocentrism.\(^{1080}\)

Narahashi argued on March 29 that after he joined the Progressive Party, he rekindled the suppressed desire for change. This was followed by the enlisting of the support of Ashida and Inukai. Narahashi also claimed that he had made Yoshida the party president, but the latter failed together with Shidehara to control the reactionary elements. Hence Ashida and Inukai attempted to create a new conservative party with New Deal policies. According to Narahashi, it was after these endeavors turned out to be unsuccessful that he decided to cut off his political exile. Roest was suspicious, which is not surprising when remembering the various promises about the birth of a genuinely democratic conservative party he had already heard many times. Narahashi was asked why the new party had not shown any intention of getting rid of the bosses, against which the younger members had rebelled. The same problem was rephrased also in the form of question on what to do with Shidehara. Narahashi named himself as the only man in Japan who knew how to handle Shidehara who would be nominated as senior adviser. Ashida and Inukai would help him to organize the younger members and the party rules would be democratized so that the rank and file would elect the party officers. Finally Narahashi informed that the new party could cooperate with the socialists and mentioned Nishio Suehiro as the Shakaitō leader with whom he had a full understanding. Although Narahashi did not mention himself as the future premier, he stated his intention to control Japanese politics in the future.\(^{1081}\)

Roest concluded that Narahashi was unquestionably Japan’s most vigorous political personality of the day. Moreover, the chief of the Political Affairs Division thought that if Narahashi could convey his self-assurance to the Japanese people, they would quickly overcome their existing malaise and get to work. Therefore, although mentioning over-eagerness and over-strong self-assertion as Narahashi’s dangers, Roest seemed to have found a substitute for Inukai. The GS

\(^{1080}\) P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memo for the Chief, GS, March 31, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 9.

\(^{1081}\) P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memo for the Chief, GS, March 31, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 9.
was, in other words, well aware of the role played by Narahashi in the process of forming the Democratic Party. Latter his name was, however, erased from the official occupation history. The history of the non-military activities introduces only Shidehara and Inukai as the leaders of the two groups, the first one trying to merge with the liberals and the second attempting to modify and revivify the Progressive Party as an independent political force.\textsuperscript{1082} This is most likely due to the fact that although the birth of the new moderate force was welcomed by the occupation authorities, Narahashi was eventually not allowed to direct its course. Similarly, Roest found him soon to be replaced from the GS unit in charge of issues concerning the political parties.

Information concerning the new party and the general political situation was collected also by interviewing Ashida Hitoshi who also met GS officers on March 29. There is no memorandum available concerning this meeting, but according to Ashida’s diary, three young officers were interested in learning more about the character of the new party and its relation with the Shakaitō. In his answers Ashida spoke on behalf of the cooperation between the new party and the socialists, but made it clear that the new party was not aiming at socialism.\textsuperscript{1083} This was exactly what many of the occupation authorities wanted to hear. The Minshutō, in cooperation with the right-wing socialists, seemed to offer a plausible alternative to the incumbent cabinet that would enjoy wide support among the Japanese, conduct new economic policies, and still not pursue too leftist ideas. There were, however, a bunch of open questions: Could the desired parties win the House of Representatives election?; How could it be ensured that the truly reform-minded and otherwise acceptable persons would eventually lead the Minshutō?; How could it be made sure that they would form the cabinet with the right-wing socialists?

\textsuperscript{1082} GHQ, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan 1945 through November 1951, Volume III – Political and Legal – Part F, Development of Political Parties, 64–66. NDL.
\textsuperscript{1083} Ashida 1986, 181–182, 315.
7.2 Election law revision – runaway for centrist coalition

The making of the new election law

The Law for Election of Members of the House of Representatives that was accepted in December 1945 remained short-lived and was re-written before the second postwar general election in April 1947. Japanese conservatives began to study the revitalization of the middle-side election districts already in autumn of 1946. Initiatives were taken in the name of strengthening the stability of the political power, but the actual motivation had much more to do with the worry caused by the advancement of the Shakaitō and the Kyōsantō. The Jiyūtō secretary-general met with a leading Home Ministry official in mid-October and talked about the election law amendment. The first negotiation between the government parties concerning the adoption of the middle-sized election districts were held on November 30, 1946. This question was also touched on during the discussions dealing with the Political Parties Law between Pieter K. Roest and Home Ministry officials in mid-December. At that time Roest expressed his strong opposition. Roest also met with the representatives of the Jiyūtō agitating on behalf of the reform and warned them of the dangers of gerrymandering when they kept insisting that the smaller electoral districts were desirable although they could not explain why.  

Uehara Etsujirō from the Liberal Party was installed as Home Minister on February 1, 1947 cabinet reshuffle. His predecessor Ōmura Seiichi had drafted a proposal calling for 53 election districts and unrestricted plural voting, but Uehara expressed his support for a system of single-member districts and a single-entry ballot already in his inaugural press conference. Like the conservatives who preferred this system in December 1945, also Uehara was aware of the probable opposition. Thus, as a compromise, he proposed the adoption of medium-sized districts and a single-entry ballot. Roest was fast to announce that these changes in election districts and ways of election were unacceptable to the GHQ/SCAP. This did not prevent Uehara from repeating his

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1084 The law provided a limited plural vote for two or three of the candidates competing for 10 to 14 seats in each of Japan’s 46 electoral districts. Takemae 2003, 263.
1086 Misao Kuwaye, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the record, December 18, 1946. NDL, JW-41-23.
proposals to General Whitney on February 12. Uehara argued that the single-member districts were the best solution in eliminating the amplitude of the small parties and would make the elections focus more on policy issues. Uehara also repeated his compromise proposal and warned against the increasing number of the communists who would be elected if the law was not to be revised. Whitney rejected the proposal but when Premier Yoshida met with General MacArthur a week later, the receiving was much warmer. On March 14, Whitney expressed his intention to leave the issue to the discretion of the Diet.\textsuperscript{1088}

The process following Whitney’s letter to Yoshida was not straightforward. The Bill for Partial Amendment of the House of Representatives Election Law was placed first on the House of Representatives agenda and scheduled for passage by a plenary session of the Lower House on March 23, 1947. Certain technical amendments to the law had been agreed on already in December 1946 during the previous Diet session. All the political parties had supported them but because the lack of time had prevented the necessary deliberations in the House of Peers, the bill was now re-submitted to the Diet. This time, however, the socialists, the people’s cooperatives, the communists, and the independents played time in various methods and held the bill in the Election Law Committee. Thus they prevented the House from conducting business on that day. The same agenda was scheduled and the same result was realized during the following three days. The House of Representative’s Negotiating Conference refused to alter the agenda so as to permit other important bills to be acted upon separately by House, and the non-government parties steadfastly refused to allow the election law bill to be reported out of committee. The underlying cause of this impasse was the Liberal and the Progressive Parties’ well-known plan to introduce a special amendment in the plenary session of the House. This would have increased the number of electoral districts for the House of Representatives from 53 to 117 and would have limited the number of votes cast by any elector to one. According to the majority parties’ plan, the committee was to approve the uncontested technical amendments. Then, following the committee chairman’s report to the plenary session, they would introduce and pass their amendments without committee deliberation.\textsuperscript{1089}


\textsuperscript{1089} GHQ, SCAP, GS, Japanese Election – April 1947, June 20, 1947, 8. NDL, GS(A)00049. See also Williams 1979, 175–176.
The legislation was shelved due to the continued deadlock and, for example, the leaders of the Shakaitō visited the Political Affairs Division to gain moral support for their cause and filibuster tactics.\textsuperscript{1090} The excited deadlock situation\textsuperscript{1091} opened only on March 27 when the cabinet extended the 92nd Diet for four days and the government parties agreed to the socialists’ demand to deliberate all amendments proposed to the law in the Election Law Committee. The Shakaitō members in turn, agreed to give up their obstructionist program. The committee discussed the amendments of various groups and cast a vote in which the government parties’ amendments were victorious. The election law bill, as amended in committee, was passed by the House of Representatives on March 30, 1947, and by the House of Peers on the following day.\textsuperscript{1092}

\textbf{A change that would prepare the way for a desirable cabinet}

Why did the GHQ/SCAP that had followed the developments in detail\textsuperscript{1093} decide to accept a snap revision that was expected to support the conservative political forces? In any case, for example, the State Department Office of Research and Intelligence did not believe in the revision at the end of February 1947 and concluded: “The 1947 House of Representatives elections will be probably be held under the existing election law. It would be virtually impossible for the 92nd Diet to revise the election law in time for the forthcoming elections, even if the various parties could agree on a revised draft. Therefore, the 1947 elections will be conducted under a system that is considered unsatisfactory by almost all parties. On the other hand, the hasty passage of an ill-considered revised law might result only in more unsatisfactory election procedure.”\textsuperscript{1094}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Record, March 25, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00062.
\item According to Justin Williams’ report on afternoon March 26, 1947, the House of Representatives was in a state of civil war. General disturbance, destruction of property and even violent behavior had led to a situation where the police had been unable to control the situation and the Speaker was preparing to request GHQ/SCAP to submit military police to assist the Diet guards in the maintaining of order. Justin Williams, Report, March 26, 1947, 4:45 P.M. NDL, GS(A)00061.
\item GHQ, SCAP, GS, Japanese Election – April 1947, June 20, 1947, 8. NDL, GS(A)00049; Helen Loeb, GS, Legislative Division, No. 49 (92), The Diet, March 28, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00061.
\item Legislative Division’s Helen Loeb gave daily reports concerning the recent developments in the Diet during the hectic days of February and March. See for example: NDL, GS(B)02420.
\item DOS, Office of Research and Intelligence, Division of Far East Intelligence, Situation Report – Japan, R&A 3479.24, February 28, 1947, 4. OSS/SDIRP reel 4, document 11.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The decision to leave this issue to the Japanese Government was hard to accept for many of the GS officials who opposed the revision. According to Williams, it was only MacArthur’s declaration of GHQ/SCAP’s neutrality that kept Kades from throwing his weight against the conservative Yoshida Cabinet’s move to revise the law. Political Affairs Division’s Pieter K. Roest, likewise, stuck to his earlier interpretation despite the occupation’s official acceptance of the proposed amendments. He insisted that the new system downgraded the average level of candidates, reduced voter’s choice and especially the number of women candidates, and played against parties like the Shakaitō and the Kokumin Kyōdōtō that were not evenly supported throughout Japan like the government parties. Finally he concluded that: “While there is nothing undemocratic about the proposed system it is, in comparison to the existing system, definitely advantageous to the parties now in power, and unfavorable to minority representation and to women.”

Roest’s dislike of Uehara motivated him to propose on May 1, 1947 that the prime minister should be informed that Uehara was considered as unsuitable for ministerial office by the GHQ/SCAP and his appointment for any high governmental office was to be disapproved. Roest even proposed that the four major political parties which were expected to participate in coalition government negotiations should be provided with copies of this statement.

Alfred R. Hussey Jr., Special Assistant to the Chief, GS, and Cecil G. Tilton, Chief of the Local Government Section, were not only against any rigging of the election law by the party in power but warned the occupation not to allow its name to be used by the conservatives. Besides describing the conservative parties’ corruptness and hinting that the return of the old political pattern of the ‘20s and the ‘30s was possible, they argued that the great mass of politicians of the right, and particularly the members of the Liberal and the Progressive Parties, were making use of the General’s letter to Yoshida. It was used to demonstrate the Commander in Chief’s friendliness toward and support of the Prime Minister and

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1095 Masumi 1985, 139.
1096 Williams 1979, 36–37.
1097 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, March 17, 1947, 2. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 9.
1098 Pieter K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, May 1, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03652.
1099 This warning of the future of the democratic institutions was repeated by Guy J. Swope, the Chief of GS Governmental Powers Division. Guy J. Swope, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum to Chief, GS, March 22, 1947. OJP3RRP 3-A-502.
to block all efforts to form a coalition cabinet designed for the sole purpose of holding a general election. GS officers claimed that prior to the publication of this letter a movement aiming at the formation of a 5-party coalition cabinet under the premiership of Ozaki Yukio had progressed. The publication of General MacArthur’s letter was seized upon by the liberals and the progressives as a means by which to defeat this move. The major argument in use was that the Supreme Commander had given his unqualified approval to the Yoshida Cabinet as the one to conduct the election.\footnote{1100}

Furthermore, rumors suggesting that the GHQ/SCAP had ordered the introduction and passage of the proposed amendments to the election law began to spread. According to the story, the high GHQ/SCAP officials had ordered the measure in view of the international situation and they sought to block the increase of the number of the communists in the Diet. This was followed by General Whitney’s letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, where he especially stated that the revision was not demanded by the occupation authorities. The letter was, however, immediately discredited by another rumor declaring that Whitney’s letter was merely for the record and it could be forgotten since there was a verbal understanding from a high GHQ/SCAP source, about which perhaps even the GS knew nothing. Home Minister Uehara, Baron Shidehara, and others close to Prime Minister Yoshida were mentioned as the most active circulators of these rumors.\footnote{1101}

One possible explanation for the occupation authorities’ eagerness to allow the law to be amended might have been the fear of communism. A CIS summary states that, besides the selfish party gerrymandering, there was a strong urge to paralyze the Communist Party behind the revision.\footnote{1102} The Supreme Commander might have ignored the GS criticism because he believed that the change was a necessary act against the Japanese communists. If the fight against communism was indeed a motive behind the acceptance of the conservative election law...

\footnote{1100} Alfred R. Hussey and Cecil G. Tilton, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 14, 1947. OJP3RRP 3-A-469.
\footnote{1101} GHQ, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Summary of Information, 31 March 1947. NDL, GS(A)00061; GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 15, April 15, 1947, 110. NARA, RG 200, Willoughby “Personal-Official” File 1941–50, box 19.
\footnote{1102} GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 15, April 15, 1947, 111. NARA, RG 200, Willoughby “Personal-Official” File 1941–50, box 19.
amendment, it was a victory for Kita Reikichi and others propagandizing on behalf of the view according to which Japan was to contain only two political parties, the one that is pro-American and its pro-Soviet Union competitor. OINAS-KUKKONEN claims that despite the communist leaders’ optimistic statements, the Americans had observed the communists’ growing difficulties in managing their campaigns. Therefore, at least after the election law amendment, the Kyōsantō’s poor election results were not surprisingly bad to the American observers. Thus, the fear of communism was a possible, if not too probable, reason to withdraw and let the conservatives proceed.

The occupation authorities’ non-intervention decision was more likely bound to the policy concerning the Shakaitō and the conservative parties. The socialists’ behavior during the election law dispute was interesting. The Shakaitō’s Katayama Tetsu had admitted already on December 9, 1946 that the possible return to the smaller election districts would act as a deterrent upon a drive for dissolution of the Diet, as the smaller district system would almost certainly favor the conservative parties. On February 10, 1947 the Shakaitō’s members of the Election Law Committee stated to Roest that their party wanted to see the 1945 election law also be used in the forthcoming election. They favored the idea of revising the political parties bill and the election law, but were skeptical on what would happen to those laws in the hands of the conservative majority. Katayama Tetsu stated on March 24 that the Shakaitō had not deviated from its original position against any major changes in the election Law. Yet, the party gave up and four days later Helen Loeb concluded that the socialists had not denied the desirability of changing the election law bill, but just insisted that it should be done in accordance with Japanese parliamentary practices.

One explanation for the change of opinion may lay in the conclusion made by the GS’s Roest. Namely, it was argued that if the socialists expected to become

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1103 T. Diamantes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Record, February 25, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00064. Later for example Yoshida continued to sketch a future in which the battle against the communism would define also Japan’s position. Check Sheet from G-2, C.A.W to Diplomatic Section, April 19, 1947. RG 84, box 22, folder 8.

1104 Oinas-Kukkonen 2006, 199–205.

1105 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for Record, December 10, 1946. NDL, GS(A)00035.


1107 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Record, March 25, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00062.

1108 Helen Loeb, GS, Legislative Division, No. 49 (92), The Diet, March 28, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00061.
the plurality party, they should favor the proposed change since it would work to their advantage. Roest was, however, counting that even if the argument was true and the Shakaitō would achieve greater Diet representation, they would still need support from other non-governmental parties in the future. This was because they could most likely not gain the working majority by themselves.\(^{1109}\) This conclusion offers another view to the question of why the occupiers let the amendment advance. Namely, what Roest’s analysis did not deal with was the possibility of a coalition between the Shakaitō and one or both of the conservative government parties. Roest’s analysis, aimed to discredit the proposed change, suggested that the reinstatement of the prewar electoral system would create a situation where the Shakaitō would most likely be the biggest party but still constrained to cooperation with the conservatives. This was, according to my interpretation, exactly what the Supreme Commander looked for.

Although Williams claims that the occupation authorities neither championed the cause of the Japanese conservatives nor sought to place the Japanese liberals at a disadvantage, he interprets that Whitney’s decision to leave the issue to the Diet was his way of counterbalancing the efforts of his subordinates to throw the weight of GHQ/SCAP on the side of the opposition parties.\(^{1110}\) This is a step toward the allegations that the occupation authorities were working on behalf of the conservatives in the election law issue. Bisson claims that the loitering in the purge favored the conservatives and interprets that the GHQ/SCAP intervened directly on behalf of the old parties, for example, by granting Yoshida permission to revise the election law. In pre-election press conferences representatives of the GHQ/SCAP made statements where the electorate was pressured to choose between two ways of life. In Bisson’s view, this was an attack against the communists but also the socialists who were in opposition as well. Furthermore, Bisson regards GHQ/SCAP as the only power that could have protected the rights of the solid opposition minority by preventing the amendment of the election law.\(^{1111}\)

Besides the controversial Bisson, also SCHALLER and TAKEMAE note that GHQ/SCAP permitted the election law revision that was designed to add a few seats to the conservative column and favored the old guard machine politics.\(^{1112}\)

\(^{1109}\) GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, P. K. Roest, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, March 17, 1947, 2. NARA, RG 84, Box 22, Folder 9.

\(^{1110}\) Williams 1979, 175, 225–226.

\(^{1111}\) Bisson 1949, 53–57.

\(^{1112}\) Schaller 1985, 48; Takemae 2003, 321.
However, the most complete explanation is offered by FUKUNAGA who introduces various reasons why the line of non-intervention was taken. First, the aims of reform of political systems were achieved in the constitutional issue and Japan’s autonomy was thus valued in the amendment of the election law that was considered to be Japan’s domestic question. Second, expectations were put on the Shakaitō while the communists were not considered as a threat with their five Diet seats. Thirdly, the GS was relieved because the conservative merger seemed to have failed. Besides, the Shakaitō belonged to the major parties that were to gain advantage from the smaller election districts. Thus, although the occupier did not initiate the amendment, the decision not to interfere was an element fitting to the occupation authorities’ plans. According to FUKUNAGA, the non-intervention policy was, together with the extended purge, a part of the building of the establishment of the middle-of-the-road political force that included the Shakaitō and was expected to stabilize party politics.\textsuperscript{1113}

I agree with FUKUNAGA that the allowance of the election law revision was a part of the policy building a favorable breeding ground for the coalition of the Shakaitō and the conservative parties. However, I doubt that the belief in the failure of the conservative merger contributed to the decision of non-intervention. In any case, the occupier did not intervene even after the Shimpotō dissolved itself and the formation of the new Democratic Party became obvious. The occupation authorities had nothing against the success of new conservative forces and Ashida Hitoshi even called the revision of the election law a greeting card to the new party in his diary\textsuperscript{1114}.

\textbf{7.3 Remolding the Democratic Party leadership}

\textit{The purge of the Minshutō leadership}

Although the creation of the Minshutō had been troublesome, the first steps of the new party made its past look like a smooth progress. A few days after its formation on March 31, and just three weeks before the House of Representatives election, four of the party’s executive committee members were purged. First to be designated on April 4, 1947, was Narahashi Wataru, who was quickly followed by Inukai Ken. This was succeeded by the purge of other party leaders closely

\textsuperscript{1113} Fukunaga 1997, 123–124.
\textsuperscript{1114} Ashida 1986, 180, 315.
affiliated with Inukai. Ishiguro Takeshige, former chief of the legislative bureau, minister without portfolio in the Shidehara Cabinet, and chief cabinet secretary in the Yoshida Cabinet, joined the Shimpotō on September 20, 1946. After the formation of the Minshutō he became the secretary-general of the party until the government announced that he fell under the terms of the purge directive on April 9. A couple days later Chizaki Usaburō, the newly-elected secretary-general who had served only for a day, was purged as well. Despite the continuing rumors about Chizaki’s murky money connections, he was purged on the grounds of being the president of the Otaru Shimbun newspaper during the years of 1937–1941. Hori Shigeru (保利茂), designed to be purged by the Japanese cabinet on April 11, 1947, was still another example of a Minshutō leader whose purge status changed suddenly. After passing the screening of the 1946 general election and gaining the green light for the candidacy in the 1947 election, he unexpectedly fell under category G of the purge directive because of the recommendation he received from IRAPS in the 1944 by-election. Finally Ashida Hitoshi inherited the windy position of the secretary-general on April 11, 1947.

These purges had a huge impact on the Minshutō. UCHIDA argues that the party, that was dominated by the Ashida–Inukai faction, took a step back just when the new platform and structure would have dissipated the image of the old Shimpotō. The contemporary Japanese press predicted, likewise, a swing to the right and the collapse of the so-called revolutionary faction as a consequence of the purge of Narahashi, Inukai and other Minshutō leaders. When guessing the

1115 Guy Wiggins, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Summary of Information, April 10, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03117; Pol, series 785, Yomiuri Shimbun, Mr. Ishiguro Takeshige, May 18, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03117.
1116 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the records, March 13, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02961; Guy A. Wiggins, Memo for Record, March 25, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02961; Guy A. Wiggins, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for record, March 28, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02961; Japan Review Vol. 1, No. 13, April 18, 1947, 1–5. NDL, G2-01777. Chizaki Usaburō’s name was again topical at the end of February 1947. At that time Inukai admitted that Chizaki had offered a large sum of money to the Progressive Party, but assured that the money was not accepted. Instead, he accused the liberals of receiving huge sums of money from contractors who contributed to the party and individuals after receiving guarantees for big contracts. P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 27, 1947, 3–4. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 9.
1117 Masuda 2001, 148, 158.
1118 Masumi 1985, 139; Masuda 2001, 112.
1119 Uchida 1987, 332. The new platform advocated, for example, preservation of the spirit of constitution; establishment of a new democratic political system, speedy rehabilitation of production, stabilization of the masses’ standard of living on the basis of a comprehensive economic plan. Fukunaga 1997, 125–126.
force behind these purges, the pointing finger was directed toward Prime Minister Yoshida and his party.\footnote{Add Morning, Democratic Camp Badly Shaken as Result of Purge of Leaders, Jiji Press, April 5, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00063; Item 4, Is Hatoyama behind the Purge?, Mimpo, April 13, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00063; Item 15, Democratic Party Will Swing To Right, Yomiuri, April 10, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00063; ITEM 16, Democrats To Carry On Despite Purge of Inukai, Jiji Shimpo, April 10, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00063; GHQ, SCAP, CI&E, Analysis and Research Division, Press Analysis, April 11, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00063.} Narahashi and some of the other purgees were also convinced that their purges were motivated by political consideration on the part of the Liberal Party.\footnote{Letter from Wataru Narahashi to General Whitney, April 20, 1947. NDL, GS(B)01753; Wataru Narahashi to General Whitney, April 27, 1947. NDL, GS(B)000202; Letter from Wataru Narahashi to General Whitney, May 19, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03312. Similar views expressed also by other purgees, see: Uchida 1987, 332–333.} The Japanese Government Central Screening Committee and its leader Matsushima Shikao (松嶋鹿夫) who had close connections to the Liberal Party were also among the suspected political manipulators.\footnote{Masuda 2001, 112–113.} Prime Minister Yoshida denied these allegations.\footnote{Letter from Whitney to Prime Minister (Yoshida), April 21, 1947. NDL, GS(B)01753; Letter from Yoshida Shigeru to General Whitney, April 22, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03312.}

Still, for example, BAERWALD believes in the significance and usefulness of the screening committees in the politically motivated purge. He argues that the widely held contention that these removals were politically motivated was supported by two principal lines of argument: Shidehara resented the revolt within the Progressive Party against his leadership which had been headed by Ashida Hitoshi and the leaders now purged; Yoshida was anxious to see a union between the two conservative parties and he believed that it could more readily take place if Shidehara’s leadership remained unchallenged.\footnote{Baerwald 1959, 51–52, 84.}

The purges of the Minshutō leadership remolded the conservative party front significantly but were these changes pleasing to the occupation authorities? Did the occupiers participate or even initiate these moves, or were they passive followers of the show ran by Yoshida? Further, if they were participating, why did they want to get rid of these politicians, and if they were bystanders, why did they allow Yoshida to take the initiative and purge his conservative competitors? It is noteworthy that for example the purges of Inukai and Narahashi discredited many of the earlier decisions of the GHQ/SCAP. They had been screened, cleared, and even defended against the Soviet pressure in summer and autumn of 1946. Besides, why should one assume that the GS was not involved in these purges, as
claimed for example by MASUDA\textsuperscript{1125}, when it is obvious that it had coordinated the purge operation before and was heavily involved, for example, in the purge of Ishibashi Tanzan just a few weeks later. Finally, one should ask why Ashida Hitoshi was not purged although his status under SCAPIN 550 was very reminiscent of Chizaki and Ishibashi. It is unconvincing to assume that the occupation authorities who had been highly interested in guiding the political party development during the first one and a half years of the occupation would have let these actions to be taken without their blessing.

KATAOKA's interpretation concerning the April 1947 purges is noteworthy. He proposes that the purge was designed to create a moderate force between the communists and the decimated conservatives. KATAOKA argues that MacArthur called two elections in close succession, in 1946 and 1947, to see that the Shakaitō would emerge triumphant and force the reluctant socialists to form a coalition government with the Ashida-led Minshutō. KATAOKA also claims that MacArthur spared Ashida from the purge and gave him the mandate to enter the coalition. Interpretation concerning the meaning of the April 1946 election is not agreeable, but the discovery that the GHQ/SCAP used the purge for its own political aims is important. The occupation authorities wanted to see the emergence of a new middle-of-the-road conservative force capable of cooperating with the Shakaitō.\textsuperscript{1126} However, before the purge of the Minshutō leadership can be analyzed in detail, it is necessary to recognize the features of the political situation that existed prior and during the purges.

After his flamboyant comeback to the political life, Narahashi was soon mentioned among the four potential nominees for the premiership should Yoshida resign prior the forthcoming elections. The GS asked the CIS to provide all the available information concerning Narahashi and the three others on March 27, 1947. In Narahashi’s case the main interest was in facts proving or disproving charges that he had engaged in high-level intelligence work in China\textsuperscript{1127}. The GS

\textsuperscript{1125} Masuda 2001, 116–125.
\textsuperscript{1126} Kataoka 1992, 18, 156.
\textsuperscript{1127} At the very end of the 1930s Narahashi was operating in China. He established relations with army leaders and representatives of the Southern Manchurian Railways Company when working as the manager of the Beijing Grand Hotel. In 1942 Narahashi was successfully running for the House of Representatives in the so-called Tōjō-elections where the electorate was encouraged to vote for candidates recommended by a political instrument under the control of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki’s government. Narahashi associated with the former Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō and the leading Rikken Seiyūkai politician Hatoyama Ichirō when trying to establish a firm foothold in politics. Narahashi got to know Hatoyama through Ishibashi Shōjūrō, the head of the Japanese Bridgestone
was also interested in getting a copy of Narahashi’s 1942 election statement.\textsuperscript{1128} Four days later GS’s Guy A. Wiggins concluded that investigations of the charges against Narahashi failed to reveal any information that would bring him under the provisions of the purge ordinance. However, doubts concerning unflattering features of Narahashi’s character continued.\textsuperscript{1129}

Narahashi seemed to have been aware of his threatened position. On April 2 he visited Carlos P. Marcum, the new Chief of the Political Affairs Division, and accused that Prime Minister Yoshida would use the purge for party political purposes by purging the leadership of the Minshutō. Narahashi likewise transmitted information that Yoshida had four days earlier met the purged Hatoyama with whom the non-purged politicians were ordered not to socialize with. Narahashi further alleged that Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Jōji (林譲治) would have several days earlier informally told certain newspapermen that the leaders of the Democratic Party would be purged. Hayashi’s actions caused irritation and there is an unsigned document in the GS archives dated for April 2 in which it is advised that the government be instructed not to give any publicity to the purging of Narahashi before GHQ/SCAP have okayed it.\textsuperscript{1130}

Narahashi’s worry was not groundless and he was purged on April 4, 1947. His purgeability was claimed to be based on his managerial position in the Beijing Grand Hotel that tied him to the Army and to the content of the 1942 election bulletin.\textsuperscript{1131} This was, however, only the façade. GS archives contain a memorandum from mid-May 1947 that included a claim according which the acting Chief Secretary of the Central Screening Commission would have admitted that Narahashi was purged without definite grounds due to the necessity of eliminating him prior the elections. This confession was made during a conversation aiming at finding acceptable grounds for the already executed purge.\textsuperscript{1132}

\textsuperscript{1128} Guy A. Wiggins, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for record, March 27, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03313; Request for information from GS to CIS, March 27, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03313.
\textsuperscript{1129} Guy A. Wiggins, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Narahashi Wataru, April 1, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03313.
\textsuperscript{1130} Carlos P. Marcum, GHQ, SCAP, GS, April 3, 1947. NDL, BAE-11; Unsigned and undated report.\textsuperscript{1131} Rubber Company, who was Hatoyama’s important financial supporter. Masuda 2001, 113–115. See also: Itoh 2003, 77–78.
\textsuperscript{1132} Additional Information Re Narahashi Purge, May 18, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03312.
MASUDA’s interpretation of non-participatory GHQ/SCAP lands the responsibility on the shoulders of Yoshida and the screening committee’s Matsushima. His reading is built on Hayashi Jōji’s statement to reporters on April 1, 1947 and on Guy Wiggins’ conclusion concerning Narahashi’s non-purgeability. MASUDA also puts a lot of importance on Carlos Marcum’s statement according to which the GS would like to have any details verifying the implications and allegations which Narahashi made concerning the political usage of the purge and the connection between Yoshida and Hatoyama. Marcum was not, however, promising that the occupation authorities would do anything by themselves. When introducing the background of the purge MASUDA also introduces the history of the colliding interests of Yoshida and Narahashi and the competition between the Ashida group to which Narahashi was linked and the Shidehara group with which Yoshida was looking forward to cooperate. He argues that Narahashi could have escaped the purge should the GS have shown a more vigorous attitude and explains the non-intervention with Narahashi’s infamy in political circles. The GS, in other words, was ready to accept Narahashi’s purge because of the rumors about Narahashi’s socialization with the GHQ/SCAP officials, together with his connection to dubious money, made him a burden.\textsuperscript{1133}

The disgust felt toward Narahashi’s person is most certainly true. I further agree that the GS would have been able to prevent the purge. For example, the time frame would not have been a problem since there were three days between the leak of the Screening Committee’s decision and the purge. Besides, among the GS papers there is a copy of the purge directive according to which Narahashi was designated as falling under the provisions of Imperial Decree based on the purge directive. The dating of the document refers to March 31, 1947\textsuperscript{1134}. This hints that the occupation authorities were aware of the movement against Narahashi even before Hayashi’s leak.

While announcing the purge of Narahashi, the Central Screening Commission revealed the names of an additional 12 members of the Minshūtō listed as ‘pending’ as to their candidacy in the coming elections. These members were to be the subject of further studies. Three party leaders Inukai Ken, Ishiguro Takeshige and Kawai Yoshinari were included in this list. In \textit{Jiji Press} Narahashi’s purge was considered to be a serious setback to the so-called

\textsuperscript{1133} Masuda 2001, 116–125, 128–137, 140–141.
\textsuperscript{1134} Copy of purge directive, to be signed by the Prime Minister on March 31, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03313.
revolutionary faction of the Democratic Party. It was estimated that this group might even collapse, should Inukai run into troubles with the purge.\textsuperscript{1135}

Inukai’s purgeability had been discussed in autumn of 1946. At that time Inukai was cleared from the accusations concerning his past in the Wang-Ching wei Peace movement by CIS and by GS. Furthermore, he was not purged in November 1946 despite belonging to a list of the Soviet representative of FEC that introduced Diet members who had compromised themselves with the militarists.\textsuperscript{1136} However, this matter was under reconsideration in April 1947. The GS began its own investigation and requested questionnaires of Inukai and some other politicians from G-2 at the beginning of the month.\textsuperscript{1137} Although Inukai was mentioned as one of the most liberal men in the newly-formed Minshutō and his purge was to please the incumbent cabinet, both the first draft of a status report under SCAPIN 550 from April 3 and the second slightly modified version from April 4, concluded that he was purgeable on two, possibly three counts.\textsuperscript{1138} This conclusion was argued to be based upon the CIS study on November 6, 1946. However, G-2 interpreted the message of the November study differently and concluded that the November report found Inukai non-purgeable.\textsuperscript{1139} The G-2 criticized the purge of Inukai after it was conducted. Besides praising Inukai’s success in the building of the Democratic Party despite opposition from the older party leaders including Shidehara, the intelligence apparatus expressed suspicions concerning the political motives behind the purge. The final conclusion stated that: “This office strongly believes that the facts do not support the purge of INUKAI Ken. His purging by the Central Screening Committee is not free from accusations

\textsuperscript{1135} Add Morning, Democratic Camp Badly Shaken as Result of Purge of Leaders, Jiji Press, April 5, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00063.
\textsuperscript{1136} The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Echols). Washington, November 23, 1946. FRUS 1946, vol. 8, 365–367.
\textsuperscript{1137} CW/CLK/CPM/CAW/rg, Request for Questionnaires. NDL, GS(B)00202.
\textsuperscript{1138} Allegations dealt with the paragraph 2Bd, interpretation of Category G by the Japanese Government (any person who held a position of adviser to a foreign government including its local organs within the territories occupied by the Japanese Armed Forces); Paragraph 6, appendix I to Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (any civilian employee who served in or with the military police, the Tokumu Kikan, Kaigun Tokumu Bu or other special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organization); and potentially also Paragraph II 7, Appendix I to Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (any civilian official of the civil service rank of Chokunin or above, or who occupied a position normally held by a person of such rank). Status under SACPIN 550 report, April 4, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03086.
\textsuperscript{1139} Status under SACPIN 550 report, April 4, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03086; Draft of Status under SACPIN 550 report, April 3, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03086; GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Activities, Memorandum for Information, April 21, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03106.
of politics, and, at the least, is based upon an incomplete and partial study of the facts.”\footnote{1140}

The G-2 considered its work with the study of Inukai’s relation to the Wang Ching-wei Government to be completed only on May 8, 1947. In its report to GS, G-2 once again cleared Inukai from allegations concerning his past activities in China and stated that the Japanese Central Screening Committee erred in its decision to bar Inukai from public office. It was then recommended that the Japanese agency be advised to review the purge of Inukai in light of the information submitted in the report.\footnote{1141}

**Occupation authorities had power to allow or deny the purge**

I am not trying to deny Yoshida’s capabilities or willingness to actively promote the purge of the Minshutō leaders. It is also true that Yoshida tried to patronize his own supporters by appealing, fruitlessly\footnote{1142}, on behalf of Matsuno Tsuruhei but skipped this option in the case of his conservative rivals.\footnote{1143} However, the purge was still a play in which the role of the director was earmarked to the GHQ/SCAP. The GS and the new leader of the Political Affairs Division Carlos Marcum\footnote{1144} were in charge of the purge inside the headquarters. Marcum’s role was also understood by Yoshida who tried to make Kase Shunichi (加瀬俊一) as his personal representative in the purge issue and a behind-the-scenes link with Marcum.\footnote{1145} The pecking order was also made clear in the GS administrative memorandum on April 8, 1947. Concerning the purge policy, it was stated that the GHQ/SCAP had the right to review any case at any time to determine whether the

\footnote{1140}{GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff. General Activities, Memorandum for Information, April 21, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03106.}
\footnote{1141}{GHQ/USAFPAC, Check Sheet. From G-2 (P.S.B for C.A.W) to GS, May 8, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03106.}
\footnote{1142}{See: Letter from Yoshida Shigeru to General Whitney, March 23, 1947. NDL, GS(B)01753; Letter from Courtney Whitney to the Prime Minister of Japan (Yoshida), March 30, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03008.}
\footnote{1143}{Masuda 2001, 139.}
\footnote{1144}{The date when he started is not clear, but based on the way how Roest and Marcum use the title of Chief, Political Affairs Division, the replacement took place between March 31–April 3, 1947.}
\footnote{1145}{Carlos P. Marcum, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, February 20, 1947. NARA, RG 331, entry 1372, box 2053, folder 5. Marcum wanted to ascertain that GS had only one voice concerning the purge and thus limited other GS officials’ right to give statements on this issue. Jack P. Napier, Chief Purge Officer, GS, Memo for purge personnel. NARA, RG 331, box 2053, folder 2. No date but the content and the location in archives would refer to late April 1947.}
decision of the Japanese Government was correct.\footnote{GHQ, SCAP, GS, Administrative Memorandum No. 4, GS, April 8, 1947. NDL, Hussey papers 2-C-13.} An Introduction of the purge of Ishibashi Tanzan is a great way to demonstrate where the ultimate power lay\footnote{Conclusion on behalf of the interpretation that Ishibashi was purged because of his postwar policy, see: Finn 1992, 127–128; Kawai 1969, 93–94; Tominomori 2006, 22.}.

No question was raised of his fitness for office when Ishibashi became the finance minister of the Yoshida Cabinet on May 22, 1946. No word of criticism was expressed due to his past career as the managing director, chief editor and president of the publication called Oriental Economist. On the contrary, Raymond C. Kramer, conservative chief of the ESS suggested already in October 1945 that it was the desire of the GHQ/SCAP that the Oriental Economist resume publication at once. He also recommended that proper facilities necessary for printing of the Oriental Economist should be provided at the earliest practicable date.\footnote{R. C. Kramer, ESS, Memorandum to Central Liaison Office, October 1, 1945. NDL, BAE-112-25; Ishibashi 2001, 54–55.} A few months later Ishibashi was mentioned among the eight prominent publishers and journalists included in POLAD’s tentative list of members of the Japanese political parties who might be depended upon for constructive work.\footnote{R. J. Marshall, Chief of Staff, Memorandum for George Atcheson Jr., December 20, 1945. NARA, RG 84, box 3, Volume V. Concerning Kramer’s conservative ideology, see: Schaller 1985, 67.}

However, after a few weeks in office, the evaluation concerning Ishibashi changed dramatically. The GS concluded on June 17, 1946 that Ishibashi was purgeable and fell in Category G of SCAPIN 550. Nine days later General Whitney recommended that the Japanese Government should be informally informed that Ishibashi was to be removed. It was exactly his position in the Oriental Economist, now claimed to have consistently supported the policies and activities of the ultra-nationalist and militarist groups, that was used to justify the purge. The actual reason for recommendation, although claimed to be a consideration entirely apart from his undesirability under the terms of the political purge directive, was the reported lack of harmony with known policies of the Supreme Commander on financial and economic problems. These accusations were originating from the ESS whose representatives were almost in daily contact with Ishibashi. For example the G-2 did not find Ishibashi purgeable\footnote{C. W. GS to C in C, June 26, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03113; Frank Rizzo, Memorandum for Record, June 26, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03113; Frank Rizzo, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, June 17, 1946. OJP3RRP 3-A-293. Ishibashi’s meetings with ESS representatives, see: Ishibashi 2001, 116–125.} and
eventually these accusations were not enough to make Ishibashi purgeable in summer of 1946.

Leaders of the Jiyūtō youth group worked as go-betweens in mid-September 1946 when they informed Ishibashi that the GHQ/SCAP felt antipathy toward him. This launched a series of conversations concerning the relationship between Ishibashi and the occupation authorities during which Ishibashi recognized the ESS as his main critic. The events that finally led to the purge began to roll in March 1947 when Colonel Marcum first demanded a report showing which of the public information media companies were found to fall within Category G. A few weeks later, on March 20, 1947, he unambiguously insisted that the Oriental Economist, missing from the Japanese government’s list, be added into the blacklist of companies which fall under the mandatory provisions of the purge ordinance. The reason for such insistence can be found from the status report under the purge directive that was completed a day later. Ishibashi’s role in the Oriental Economist was the claimed cause necessitating the purge, but the actual motivation can be found from the following note attached to the document: “ISHIBASHI’s economic policy has been to permit a continued rise of prices despite the government’s stated intention of controlling inflation. This policy greatly benefits Japan’s major industrialists and financiers who by liquidating only a small percentage of their material assets can during this period of inflation pay off their commitments particularly their debts to the government in devalued currency. This is possible since their material assets remain constant while their debts contracted in terms of yen decrease in direct proportion as the value of the yen decreases. As official spokesman for this policy of aiding the favoured few at the expense of the vast majority of taxpayers ISHIBASHI has become the center of attack by opponents of the present government. Much of this criticism of the government can be traced to ISHIBASHI and his policies.”

Although Ishibashi was a persona non grata for the GHQ/SCAP, the GS pressure did not persuade the Japanese Government. When the Central Screening Committee announced its purge ruling on April 4, 1947, Ishibashi, the recently

1153 Status report, Ishibashi Tanzan, March 21, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03113; T. Tsukahara, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for Record, March 21, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03113.
1154 During his visit to GS Ashida was asked who would likely to follow Yoshida as the president of Jiyūtō should he withdraw. Ashida mentioned Ishibashi as one possible successor. Ashida 1986, 181, 315.
nominated manager of the Jiyūtō’s election campaign, was listed as pending.\textsuperscript{1155} There was nothing unclear in Ishibashi’s status for the GS and the section did not lack energy when trying to demonstrate the dubious nature of the publication formerly headed by him. An outcome was a lengthy memorandum completed in April 30 that was aimed at justifying the end of Ishibashi’s political career. The Public Service Qualification Division demonstrated in this twenty-page document filled with excerpts from the Oriental Economist that the publication supported the policies of the militarists’ and the ultra-nationalists whereas Ishibashi personally contributed to the propaganda of imperialism in his writings on the editorial pages. The actual memorandum lacked any references to Ishibashi’s postwar career, but they were to be found from the appendix that demonstrated how Ishibashi had sabotaged GHQ/SCAP’s economic reforms, operated to the advantage of the propertied classes and weakened the taxes’ deflationary impact with his currency policy. These views and the conclusion that Ishibashi was to be purged were accepted by General Whitney on May 1, 1947.\textsuperscript{1156}

Members of the ESS wanted to get rid of the problematic finance minister and they submitted information concerning Ishibashi to assist the GS in the event that an appeal would be made by the Japanese Government. However, the information ESS was submitting had nothing to do with either the Oriental Economist or Ishibashi’s prewar and wartime activities in general. On the contrary, the ESS submitted a list of complaints concerning Ishibashi’s actions as the minister of finance.\textsuperscript{1157} Yet, when the GS ordered the Japanese Government to purge Ishibashi on May 7, 1946, no word in relation to his postwar role was mentioned.\textsuperscript{1158} Although the real motives came up in the talk between Ishibashi and Yoshida on May 17, 1947, the Japanese Government followed GHQ/SCAP’s example when reasoning the purge of Ishibashi.\textsuperscript{1159} Thus the façade according to which Ishibashi was removed because of his prewar career was kept to the end.

The usage of the Oriental Economist as a scapegoat and a reason to justify Ishibashi’s purge was hard to accept not only for Ishibashi, but also for several

\textsuperscript{1155} Add Morning, Democratic Camp Badly Shaken as Result of Purge of Leaders, Jiji Press, April 5, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00063.
\textsuperscript{1156} Jack P. Napier and Guy Wiggins, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Record, April 30 1947. NDL, GS(B)00855-00856; Secret, Appendix I, Mr. Ishibashi’s Obstruction on Extraordinary Tax Legislation. NDL, BAE-128.
\textsuperscript{1157} W. F. M., GHG, SCAP, Check Sheet from ESS to GS, May 1, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03111.
\textsuperscript{1158} Courtney Whitney, GS, Memorandum for Central Liaison Office, May 7, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03111.
\textsuperscript{1159} Ishibashi 2001, 191.
leaders of Japanese politics and media. Ishibashi appealed to the members of the screening committee on May 12, but it did not prevent his purge on May 16, 1947. It is noteworthy that after the GS had ordered the purge, the Oriental Economist was included in the Japanese Government’s blacklist of undesirable publications. Thus, it became possible to conclude that Ishibashi’s purge was not forced by the occupation, only accelerated, and eventually the Japanese Government would have removed him without the GS intervention.

The occupation authorities’ intervention in the case of Ishibashi was harsh and left clear evidence to be analyzed. Yet, it was not one of a kind. There are, for example, claims that the GHQ/SCAP was pressuring the purge of Narahashi as well. According to Narahashi’s secretary, Shidehara claimed on April 2 that he visited Yoshida and the premier argued that if the screening committee would not have decided to purge Narahashi on April 1, it would have been done by the GHQ/SCAP. Thus, the cabinet had no choice but proceed with the purge. Although Narahashi himself blames Yoshida for a politically crooked game, he also alleges that the purge was an operation made in the name of the Japanese Government but controlled by the GHQ/SCAP. Furthermore, even if the occupiers did not initiate the purges, they most certainly held the power to allow or deny initiatives suggested either by the Japanese Government or individual political actors.

**Occupiers purged Shidehara’s allies not his enemies**

But if the GHQ/SCAP was behind the wheel, why did they abandon the new leaders of the Democratic Party? I argue that to be able explain the decision to purge Narahashi and especially Inukai, whose personality was less irksome, it is necessary to understand the occupation authorities’ conception concerning the

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1161 Ishibashi to Messrs. of the Central Screening Committee, May 12, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03111.


1164 Narahashi 1968, 82, 84.
nature of Minshutō leadership. Interpretations, according to which the GHQ/SCAP began to look into a substitution for the Jiyūtō and Yoshida at the beginning of 1947, fit poorly in an explanation model which alleges that the occupation authorities allowed the unpopular prime minister to remove his middle-of-the-road conservative rivals. It is hard to rationalize why the occupation authorities would have wanted to purge, or let Yoshida to purge, the pioneers of change supporting new economic policies and cooperation with the Shakaitō? Why did the GHQ/SCAP approve, for example, the purge of Inukai if they really believed that he represented the revolutionary force fighting against the old Yoshida-Shidehara line and championed on behalf of modified capitalism.

It is true that, for example, the previously mentioned Guy Wiggins believed in Inukai’s role as the leader of the more liberal and progressive faction of the Minshutō and concluded that his purge would strengthen the control of Shidehara and his old-guard clique.1165 Likewise, G-2 did place Inukai and Shidehara in different camps in mid-April.1166 Yet, Inukai was strongly connected to Shidehara in GS evaluations made during the second half of 1946. Similarly, in February 1947 Narahashi and Ishiguro were mentioned as supporters of the Shidehara group. Despite Inukai’s demands for reform, his close relations with Shidehara as well as with Narahashi and Ishiguro were emphasized.1167 The Strategic Intelligence Digest report from February 1, 1947, concluded that Inukai regarded Shidehara as “a second father” to whom he will always apply for advice.1168 It is thus not surprising that the disbelief in change within the Shidehara-Inukai-dominated Shimpotō emerged among the GS political observers. Three months

1165 Guy A. Wiggins, status report, April 4, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02945.
1167 The Summation of Non-Military Affairs from February 1947 divides the Progressive Party in four factions. They are, first, the Official Group desiring a union controlled by conservative forces with Shidehara or Yoshida as head. This group was alleged to be led by Shidehara and supported by Narahashi and Ishiguro. The second so-called Minseito Group consisted of the former Minseitō politicians, who preferred conservative leadership but who did not approve the Narahashi-Ishiguro influence. This group was claimed to support the State Minister Saitō Takao as the party president. Thirdly, there was the Reformist Group that had begun as a movement of Tsurumi Yusuke and developed into a personal coterie headed by Inukai Ken. Although the demanding of various reforms belonged to the history of this group, Inukai’s close relations with Shidehara as well as Narahashi and Ishiguro were still noticed. The group was considered to contain for example Chizaki, Kawasaki Hideji and Hori Shigeru. Finally, there was the Super Party Group aiming at the formation of one great conservative party and headed by Agriculture Minister Kimura Kozaemon and Welfare Minister Kawai Yoshinari. Summation of Non-Military Affairs, No. 17, 31–32. OJP3RRP 3-B-17.
later Harry Emerson Wildes, now in the Special Projects Division, prepared a memorandum where he still insisted that Inukai, Narahashi, Chizaki and other purgees had been working in Shidehara’s interest, not against him.\textsuperscript{1169} It can therefore be concluded that although the contemporary Japanese press and later researchers have mentioned the gulf between Shidehara and the purgees as an explanation for the purge, the occupation authorities did not necessarily believe in its existence.

If Inukai was considered as Shidehara’s ally, his purge made sense. An attack against Shidehara would have exposed the occupation to criticism. Power was once trusted to Shidehara and it could not be taken away from him and Yoshida by criticizing their past. Nevertheless, the cutting off of Shidehara’s influence through the purge of his aides occupying the leadership of the new Minshūtō, was a plausible method to ensure that the unsuitable elements would not disturb the occupation authorities’ effort to erect a middle-of-the-road government.

\textit{Installing a leader satisfactory to everyone}

If it was neither Shidehara nor Inukai or Narahashi, who did the occupiers wish to see leading the Minshūtō? According to FUKUNAGA and MASUMI, Ashida Hitoshi emerged as the desirable leader of the party. As evidence both historians refer to Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi, according to whom Ashida had claimed that there was a proposal from GHQ/SCAP that he should become president of the Democratic Party because he was the most appropriate person for the reorientation of Japan.\textsuperscript{1170} Ashida’s diary reveals that Nakano Arinori (中野有礼) who was a frequent visitor in the GHQ/SCAP had also observed willingness to replace Yoshida with Ashida and delivered this conclusion to Ashida and his patron Sugawara Michinari on February 3, 1947.\textsuperscript{1171}

There is no undisputable documentary evidence that any representative of the GHQ/SCAP would have promised support for Ashida. Yet, besides Ashida’s claim to Hitotsumatsu and a claim according to which G-2’s Willoughby would have found Ashida unpurgeable because of his importance to the existing political situation\textsuperscript{1172}, there is also circumstantial evidence speaking on behalf of such promise. Ashida had entered the postwar political world with a connection to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1169} O. I. Hauge, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum to the Chief, May 21, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02945.
\textsuperscript{1170} Masumi 1985, 138; Fukunaga 1997, 125.
\textsuperscript{1172} Ashida 1986, 195.
\end{footnotesize}
Hatoyama that had weakened after his decision to join the Shidehara Cabinet. Then Ashida broke away from the influence of Yoshida when he deserted the Jiyūtō and joined the democrats. Finally, Ashida was not connected to Shidehara but the Shakaitō leaders had indicated him as one acceptable conservative leader a year earlier. Thus, in the eyes of the occupation authorities Ashida appeared as a lonely gunman who could make some changes in a village badly in need of new order.

Ashida Hitoshi’s past as a member of the IRAPS and as a counsellor to the cabinet information bureau from September 1937 to August 1940 was known already in November 1946. These were not, however, considered as positions making him a subject of removal under SCAPIN 550. At the beginning of February 1, 1947, Ashida was described in Strategic Intelligence Digest (SID) as one of the most able and learned members of the present Diet, and because of his experience and ability, he was assumed to have potential influence on social reform and liberalization in Japan.

Ashida’s status under SCAPIN 550 was, nevertheless, re-evaluated at the beginning of April 1947. Guy A. Wiggins recognized Ashida’s role, together with Inukai, as the leader of the more liberal and progressive faction of the Minshutō and concluded that the purge of these two would strengthen the control of Shidehara and his old-guard clique. Yet, in the final analysis Ashida’s role was considered as pending because the Japanese Government was compiling a list of public information organizations, certain positions which would bring the holders thereof under the provisions of the purge order under category G. According to Wiggins, it seemed probable that the Japan Times and Mail would be included in this list and thus make Ashida, editor of the newspaper from 1933 to 1939, a subject of purge. Eventually Ashida’s newspaper was not on the list where—as demonstrated by the Ishibashi case—it could have been included by force. It is thus worth considering what saved Ashida and what kind of role the occupation authorities played in this matter. In any case, Ashida’s diary reveals that Hussey warned him on the potential problems concerning the Japan Times and Mail.

1173 P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief of Section, April 19, 1946, 3–4. NARA, RG 331, box 2142, folder 2; P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, April 23, 1946. NARA, RG, 331, box 2142, folder 2.
1174 Draft memorandum dealing with the clearance of personnel for government service under SCAPIN 550, November 15, 1946. NDL, GS(B)00186.
1176 Guy A. Wiggins, status report, April 4, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02945.
already on March 29, 1947 and IOKIBE mentions also Charles Kades as a GS officer possessing great expectations concerning Ashida.

BAERWALD builds his explanation concerning the Japan Times and Mail’s escape of purge on two premises. First, the public information subcommittee reasoned that although the Japan Times and Mail was considered as the official organ of the Japanese Foreign office, it was published in English and its circulation and substantial influence was limited. The second, and the more interesting, explanation is bound to Ashida’s role as one of the leaders in the less reactionary wing of the Progressive Party. Namely, BAERWALD concludes that Ashida’s removal after the screening committee’s designation of the fellow progressives Chizaki, Inukai, Ishiguro and Narahashi probably would have doomed the efforts of that group to revitalize the party. Following this conclusion, the former purge officer states that the occupation was willing, on occasion, to give primary consideration to the political situation rather than to rigidly enforce the purge criteria. In my view these occasions occurred regularly.

Even if Ashida was the GHQ/SCAP’s choice to lead the Minshutō and the Japanese press put expectations on him, the issue of party presidency was difficult to be solved. Inukai, Narahashi, and Ishiguro had planned to kick Shidehara upstairs to the position of supreme political adviser. However, after they were purged, Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi and the two other cabinet members who had been dissatisfied with Shidehara’s shelving, moved to install Shidehara as party president. The reaction from one group supporting Saitō and another that supported Ashida precipitated a three-way contest. Both Ashida, as secretary-general, and Shidehara, as representative of the members of House of Representatives, presented opening speeches at the May 5 Democratic Party Diet members’ assembly while Supreme Executive Committee member Saitō analyzed the current political situation. According to MASUMI, all three acted as if they were the new party president. Hitotsumatsu and his allies tried to propose a

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1177 Ashida 1986, 182.
1178 Iokihe 2007, 315.
1179 According to BAERWALD, the task of determining which information companies had contributed to the ultra-nationalistic, jingoistic, and chauvinistic thought fell to the special information subcommittees. Two considerations guided their selection. The first was the company influence as determined by magazine or newspaper circulation figures, number of books printed, or number of movies and theatrical productions offered. The second was the frequency with which the company’s efforts had been concerned with propaganda activities. Baerwald 1959, 38–39.
1180 Baerwald 1959, 39, 96.
1181 Ashida 1986, 186; Hatoyama 1999, 520.
compromise lineup of Shidehara as president, Ashida as vice-president, and Saitō as supreme adviser, but this attempt failed and the selection of the party president was postponed. Thus, when the Shakaitō began negotiations regarding the coalition, the party was split into two opposing camps. Shidehara’s group opposed the Shakaitō-Minshutō-Jiyūtō coalition, while the Ashida’s group favored it. Eventually, the party organs backed Ashida’s line on May 8, 1947. The party convention approved the collaboration with the Shakaitō and the Jiyūtō and selected Ashida as party president on May 18. Shidehara was selected as honorary president, and Saitō as the highest adviser.

There is no direct evidence of the occupiers’ interference in the selection process. Saitō claimed, however, that the head of the party was created by eccentric mechanical means. This hints toward irregularities. Moreover, Saitō alleged in March 1948 that Ashida professed himself to be the president of the party by unfair means even though he did not enjoy the support of the party majority. This might refer to the GHQ/SCAP, but can, likewise, be a burst of frustration on the side of a politician leaving the party that never fulfilled his political ambitions.

Marcum thought on May 9 that there were three factions within the Democratic Party. These were led by Shidehara (40% following), Ashida (35% following) and Saitō (25% following). Saitō was believed to be more inclined to support Ashida and Shidehara’s position was considered extremely weak in the case that Katayama’s coalition plan would materialize. When the Shakaitō’s Katayama Tetsu met with Charles Kades on May 14, he told that the selection of the Minshutō president would have a major impact on the coalition government negotiations that had begun after the general election. According to Katayama, Shidehara’s presidency would mean that the Jiyūtō pushes him to the premiership, whereas Ashida’s election as the party president of the Minshutō would make Katayama’s chances of becoming premier strong. According to my understanding, the Supreme Commander wanted to see a moderate conservative-moderate socialist government be established. Thus, Katayama’s testimony gave the occupiers good reason to work on behalf of Ashida’s party presidency.

1182 Masumi 1985, 145.
1183 Saito Takao’s Report to Friends Throughout the Country on My Secession From the Democratic Party and the Establishment of a New Political Party, March 1948. NDL, GS(A)02534.
1184 Carlos P. Marcum, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for record, May 9, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00562; Carlos P. Marcum, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum to Chief, GS, May 9, 1947. OJP3RRP 3-A-557.
Therefore, Ashida’s claim is plausible that due to the refusal of Shidehara and Yoshida to cooperate with the socialists, the people at GHQ/SCAP wanted him to work with the Shakaitō in bringing stability to the political situation.\textsuperscript{1186}

UCHIDA considers that the presidency of Ashida meant that the young Shinshinkai group of Kitamura Tokutarō (北村徳太郎), Kawasaki Hideji (川崎秀二), and Kosaka Zentarō, who had replaced the purged Inukai as leaders, had seized the initiative within the party.\textsuperscript{1187} Various observers had, however, already managed to become disappointed in Ashida at the time of his nomination. Namely, the Asahi published a report on May 16 according to which Ashida had become the president of the Democratic Party under terms of a deal that looked forward to making Shidehara the prime minister. According to Harry Emerson Wildes and Osbourne Hauge this was not a first sign pointing toward the interpretation that Ashida was playing a politically crooked game and splitting the renovationary movement. Ashida was claimed to have stressed the need for renovating the Minshutō in the interest of democracy while actually associating with and working for the interest of the old-line reactionary figures. Wildes dug up several statements from Ashida that had all demonstrated democratic tendencies while still leaving the backdoor open for conservative politics. Ashida was blamed of giving only lip-service to cooperation with the Shakaitō while in fact still holding strong connections to the Liberal Party. Moreover, he had declined to work in cooperation with Saitō Takao—praised as one of Japan’s oldest and venerable parliamentarians\textsuperscript{1188} —and thus divided the anti-Shidehara strength.\textsuperscript{1189}

Despite Ashida had, according to his own words, received confirmation that the GHQ/SCAP was not looking to purge him and considered his case to be revealed\textsuperscript{1190}, Guy A. Wiggins completed a memorandum justifying the purge of Ashida on May 14, 1947. The announced reason for the memorandum describing Ashida’s faults was the probable purge of Ashida and the possible criticism against the GHQ/SCAP that might follow the removing of one of the few remaining leaders of the Minshutō. At this time the various excerpts from the pages of the Japan Times and Mail were considered to show that throughout the last two years of Ashida’s presidency, the newspaper advocated military

\textsuperscript{1186} Masumi 1985, 145–146.
\textsuperscript{1187} Uchida 1987, 333.
\textsuperscript{1188} Report, Saito Takao, April 2, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03481. Saito was also introduced in Nippon Time’s men of the moment on May 12, 1947.
\textsuperscript{1189} O. I. Hauge, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum to the Chief, May 21, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02945.
\textsuperscript{1190} Ashida 1986, 196–197.
imperialism and attempted to create a climate of opinion among its readers favorable to war with the Western Powers. Furthermore, the position as a councillor of the cabinet information bureau known long before was now interpreted in a new way. The nomination to this position was understood as evidence showing that Ashida’s policy as the president of the Japan Times and Mail had been at least acceptable to the government of that time. Ashida mentioned the re-occurring rumors about his purge also in his diary. However, the excerpt from May 15 is still optimistic. The belief in the bright future was based on a piece of information that reached Ashida through co-betweens according to which the occupation authorities wanted to see new leaders substitute Yoshida and Shidehara.

The Ashida case reached its culmination on May 30, 1947. On that day Jack P. Napier, Chief of the Public Service Qualifications Division repeated Wiggins’ claims. The Japan Times and Mail was described as an unofficial organ of the government that enjoyed substantial financial backing and wielded significant influence among those who contributed most to the formation or implementation of government policy. Napier thus invalidated claims made in a statement that was prepared by Ashida’s supporters. In Napier’s opinion the Japan Times and Mail had neither been free from the government’s influence nor un-influential among the Japanese reading public due to its small circulation. Napier criticized the small number of aggravating articles the Japanese Government’s Public Information Media Committee had found from the pages of the Japan Times and Mail and referred to his division’s media analysts who thought a much greater number of articles speaking on behalf of the unwanted character of the paper could be found. Napier’s stance was that Ashida should be purged due to his role in the Japan Times and Mail. At the same day Harry Emerson Wildes claimed that the Japanese press was predicting Ashida’s purge because Ashida had been associated with Hatoyama Ichirō. The purpose of Wildes’ memorandum is unclear but most likely the description of Ashida’s loyalty to Hatoyama, especially when compared to Saitō’s resistance toward Hatoyama, was weakening his position.

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1191 Guy A. Wiggins, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the record, May 14, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02945.
1192 Ashida 1986, 196.
1193 Jack P. Napier, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, May 30, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02944.
1194 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, May 30, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02944.
Despite these expressions of will speaking on behalf of the purge, Ashida was not removed. A status report, also dated May 30, 1947, classifies Ashida as not purgeable under SCAPIN 550. This decision was based on the fact that the Japan Times and Mail was not included in the Japanese Government’s Public Information Media Black List. I do not believe, however, that this was the reason for sparing Ashida from the purge. Most likely this had more to do with the developments inside the party and in the coalition-cabinet negotiations. Namely, Ashida was now described as the leader of the revolutionary faction that competed victoriously against the more conservative elements headed by Shidehara who had resigned after the defeat.\footnote{Ashida Hitoshi, Status under SCAPIN 550, May 30, 1947. NDL, GS(B)02944.} Also, based on the party vote on behalf of joining the Katayama cabinet that was taken at that day, Ashida had showed his commitment to the middle-of-the-road course by guiding his groups into the desired coalition. Ashida was thus saved by the bell rung as a sign of the birth of the centrist coalition.

Discussion concerning the purge continued even inside the GHQ/SCAP after the wished outcome was achieved. One interesting initiative was taken by Roger M. Baldwin who expressed his disappointment in the purge procedures in June 1947. One of his critiques was that too much had been left to favoritism and to the chance to reach political enemies. Napier who commented on these accusations assumed that Baldwin was referring to the cases of Narahashi, Inukai, and Chizaki and assured that all cases in which a purge action had been directed by the Japanese Government had been reviewed by the Public Service Qualification Division. Thus, the Japanese Government had been instructed to reverse its action whenever it appeared that an unreasonable judgment had been made.\footnote{Jack P. Napier, Chief, Public Service Qualifications Division, Memorandum to Commander A.R. Hussey, Jr., August 8, 1947. NDL, GS(B)00854. Other purge-related discussion, see: Douglas F. Scott, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Record, June 13, 1947. NDL, BAE-159.} Napier, in other words, assured that there was a watchdog looking after the actions of the Japanese Government to prevent it from using the purge as a political tool. However, nobody was controlling the occupation authorities’ instrumental use of the purge.

Finally, the occupation took an interesting stance concerning its role in the purge of the Minshutō leadership. Namely, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan describes how the character of the Democratic Party was modified by the purge. In a part dealing with political parties it is stated that: “In removing many of the party’s more conservative members the third phase of
the purge strengthened the relative strength of the more ardent supporters of the party’s new program of modified capitalism.” Thus, Narahashi and Inukai were recognized as the representatives of the conservative elements inside the new Minshutō.

7.4 New cabinet fit the bill

The platform and issues raised during campaigns for the April 1947 elections did not surprise the officials of the GS Political Affairs Division. While the liberals concentrated on differences between socialism and capitalism and the demerits of state ownership, the democrats spoke on equal participation of labor and management and advocated temporary economic controls over certain key industries. They also criticized the finance ministry’s policy, insisted on balanced finance policy, and stressed their character as the middle-of-the-road moderate alternative for the liberals and the socialists. Denigration continued as well and the conservative rivals were claimed to be connected with dubious election fund donors. As a result of interviews conducted on April 21–22, Marcum reported that the representatives of the biggest parties expected that the Jiyūtō would receive the greatest number of Diet seats. Results of the four elections held in April 1947 were pleasing to the GHQ/SCAP. In his message to the people of Japan on April 27, 1947, the Supreme Commander praised the Japanese electorate because they had rejected the allurement of both extremes and chosen a moderate course. The most prominent sign of the new course was the fact that the Shakaitō became the biggest party in the Diet after the House of the Representative election on April 25, 1947. Although the Shakaitō held only one third of the seats in the lower

1198 Carlos P. Marcum, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for Record, May 15, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00059.
1200 Carlos P. Marcum, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for record, April 23, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00060.
1201 Finn 1992, 149.
house and the conservative government parties formed a majority\textsuperscript{1202}, both Katayama Tetsu and Nishio Suehiro were fast to announce that political initiatives would be taken by the biggest party in the future. This did not, however, mean that the premiership would automatically be entrusted to them.\textsuperscript{1203} Based on pure mathematics, the election result meant that the old conservative coalition could continue in power. Yet, the outcome of the several weeks’ negotiation was the formation of Katayama Tetsu’s coalition government including the Shakaitō, the Minshutō and the Kokumin Kyōdōtō. The question to be asked is whether the occupation authorities’ policy concerning the conservatives somehow influenced the formation of the Katayama Cabinet. However, before answering, a short review of the May 1947 discussions, that the intelligence apparatus divided into four phases, is necessary\textsuperscript{1204}.

**Negotiations leading to the cabinet formation**

The occupation authorities did not linger in their reaction to the election result. The GS interviewed Nishio already on April 29. Among the obstacles to the formation of the coalition cabinet Nishio mentioned the opposition faction of the Jiyūtō that was represented by Ōno Banboku and Ōkubo Tomejirō. This faction was alleged to support Shidehara behind the scenes although in public they did not oppose coalition with the Shakaitō. Nishio, considered as the most influential figure among the socialists, was short-spoken on the premier issue. The GS was interested to know whether the socialists would cooperate under Shidehara, but

\textsuperscript{1202} As a result of April general election, Shakaitō received 143 Diet seats and became the biggest party, followed by Jiyūtō with 131, Minshutō with 126, Kokumin Kyōdōtō with 31, Kyosantō with 4 seats. Hayashi 1984, 260. Slightly different number, see: Babb 2002, 228.

\textsuperscript{1203} Kohno emphasizes the absence of institutionalized rules regarding the coalition building procedure under the circumstances of divided electoral rule. The socialists had won the largest number of seats, but there was no guarantee that they would be part of the coalition, let alone that their leader would be the prime minister. Kohno 1994, 152–153. See also: Fukunaga 1997, 133–135; Masumi 1985, 141–142. This kind of situation, which had been discussed already among the GS drafters of the new constitution in early 1946, had emerged. Lieutenant Milton J. Esman objected to the changes made to the chapter on selecting the prime minister. He argued that, because of the splinter parties and the improbability of one party gaining a clear majority in the Diet, the emperor and not the Diet should appoint the prime minister. This idea had been overruled by Kades and others not willing to give discretionary power to the emperor and his advisers. Williams 1979, 112.

\textsuperscript{1204} CIS periodical summary from mid-June 1947 described the negotiations in detail, see: GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 17, Section IV, June 15, 1947. NARA, RG 200, Willoughby Personal-Official File, 1941–50, entry 23310.
Nishio emphasized the public opinion that was against another Shidehara Cabinet. Nishio also expressed his belief in Ashida’s support of the coalition cabinet. The Shakaitō’s Hirano Rikizō was interviewed on May 2 and he assured that the party supported the coalition with the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō where Katayama would act as the premier. The possible conservative coalition was, however, unacceptable. 1205

All parties were in turmoil. Nishio was leading the orchestra in the Shakaitō, but the liberals were not sure about their standing. The situation within the Minshutō was clearly bound to the race for the party residency. Shidehara’s group favored the conservative coalition whereas Saitō and Ashida followed the younger parliamentarians’ line and insisted a coalition including the three big parties. Under these circumstances the representatives of the Shakaitō called a meeting with the representatives of the Jiyūtō, the Minshutō and the Kokumin Kyōdōtō on May 9 1206. The formation of the 4-party coalition cabinet was approved in principle but the concrete plan was left to the later meeting of secretary generals and the issue of premiership was postponed. In this situation the GS drew a memorandum that introduced the three major coalition possibilities. The most probable was the 4-party coalition with Katayama as premier. The critical question of a plan including the Shakaitō, the Minshutō, the Jiyūtō and the Kokumin Kyōdōtō was considered to be the one dealing with the economic posts in the cabinet. This plan was alleged to be favored by the Ashida faction of the Democratic Party. The 3-party coalition possibility with Katayama as premier was argued to be favored by a faction of the Shakaitō. Yet, the coalition that would have meant the existence of the Liberal Party opposition was considered possible only in the event that the Shidehara and Ashida factions would split on the issue of a liberal–democratic coalition. This was seen as an unlikely development. The third possibility was a conservative 2-party coalition headed by either Yoshida or Shidehara. Carlos Marcum’s preferences were obvious since he concluded that it was reasonable to assume that the 4-party coalition provides the best assurance for a successful government and this was recognized by all major parties. 1207

1206 The Shakaitō was represented by Chairman Katayama and Secretary-General Nishio, the Jiyūtō was represented by President Yoshida and Secretary-General Ōno, Supreme Committee member Saitō and Secretary-General Ashida participated from the Minshutō and Secretary-General Miki and Standing Central Committee Chairman Okada Seichi were speaking on behalf of the Kokumin Kyōdōtō. Masumi 1985, 143.
Shakaitō provided a policy agreement draft to the meeting of the secretary generals of the four parties on May 12. Four days later the agreement was almost achieved. However, prior to that, Katayama met with Kades with the intermediation of Tsuru Shigehito (都留重人) on May 14. The discussion dealt with the Shakaitō’s left-wing faction and coalition participation, but this was also the time when Katayama expressed his view concerning the influence of the Minshutō presidential issue on the coalition formation. Katayama also revealed the five ministerships his party was demanding. Kades encouraged the socialists and affirmed that the occupation authorities were ready to support the policy of restricted capitalism. On the same day the leaders of the left-wing faction of the Shakaitō disassociated themselves from the communists. GS observers found this to be an answer to the critique of the Jiyūtō and as an act on behalf of the formation of the 4-party coalition.\footnote{Hayashi 1984, 266; Masumi 1985, 143–144; Fukunaga 1997, 137–138.}

Opinions were still divided in the Jiyūtō executive meeting on May 17, but the election of Ashida as the president of the Minshutō on the following day smoothed the path for the conservative-socialist coalition\footnote{Apparentl Yoshida postponed the meeting with Katayama from May 17 to May 19 while waiting the decision concerning the Minshutō presidency. GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 17, Section IV, June 15, 1947, 27. NARA, RG 200, Willoughby Personal-Official File, 1941–50, entry 23310.} . The liberals’ Yoshida demanded, however, not only the ousting of the communists but also the left-wing faction of the Shakaitō in his meeting with Katayama on May 19. The socialist leaders could not accept this proposal although Yoshida bluffed that the GHQ/SCAP would not accept left-wing socialists as members of the cabinet\footnote{GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 17, Section IV, June 15, 1947, 28. NARA, RG 200, Willoughby Personal-Official File, 1941–50, entry 23310; Ishibashi 2001, 192.}. The speaker and vice-speaker of the Lower House were elected on the evening of May 21. The socialists and the democrats jointly nominated a socialist, Matsuoka Komakichi (松岡駒吉), for the speaker and a democrat, Tanaka Manitsu, for the vice-speaker. The liberals nominated their own candidates. On May 23, 1947, the socialists suggested to other parties that the election of the prime minister be held as soon as possible. As a result, for the first time under the new constitution, both the upper and lower house almost unanimously appointed Katayama Tetsu as prime minister. He attended the palace inaugural ceremony alone and held all
ministerial positions concurrently. The meeting between the new prime minister and General MacArthur was agreed on the same day.\(^\text{1211}\)

On May 24 MacArthur released a statement where he expressed his satisfaction over the selection of Katayama that showed that Japan had selected the middle-of-the-road line. The Supreme Commander was especially happy because Katayama was a Christian. The Liberal Party then rejected the renewed coalition proposal on May 28 and the Democratic Party voted on May 30 to join the Katayama-led coalition.\(^\text{1212}\)

Nishio Suehiro visited GS’s Charles Kades on the following morning to sound out the acceptability of the proposed cabinet members.\(^\text{1213}\)

The Katayama Cabinet, consisting of seven ministers from the Shakaitō, seven from the Minshutō and two from the Kokumin Kyōdōtō, was formed on June 1, 1947. According to FUKUNAGA, Ashida Hitoshi, who became the vice-premier and foreign minister, and Miki Takeo, the secretary-general of the Kokumin Kyōdōtō who was made the minister of communication, the two strongmen of the coalition, overtook a place where they were able to keep an eye on the cabinet.\(^\text{1214}\)

A few days later Katayama thanked MacArthur for his solicitude shown toward the formation of the cabinet, and promised that the policies of the new cabinet would be submitted to the Supreme Commander before publication.\(^\text{1215}\)

\(^{1211}\) According to Kohno, the democrats agreed to vote for Katayama on condition that the liberals be included in the coalition. The liberals did not nominate their own candidate because he would not have a chance against Katayama without the democrats support. And the democrats were unlike to vote for a liberal candidate because they wanted to become the dominant partner of the cabinet, not only to participate in it. Thus the liberals had no choice but to vote for Katayama. Katayama received 420 out of 426 votes. Kohno 1994, 150–151. See also: Masumi 1985, 146; Finn 1992, 149; Fukunaga 1997, 138–139;.

\(^{1212}\) GHQ/FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary, Civil Censorship, Counter Intelligence, Public Safety, Summation. Issue no. 17, Section IV, June 15, 1947, 28. NARA, RG 200, Willoughby Personal-Official File, 1941–50, entry 23310. See also: Hayashi 1984, 267.

\(^{1213}\) Nishio 1968, 143.

\(^{1214}\) Fukunaga 1997, 140.

\(^{1215}\) Tetsu Katayama, Prime Minister to General of the Army Douglas MacArtur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, June 3, 1947. NDL, MMA-14, reel 6.
The occupation authorities’ role in the formation of the Katayama Cabinet

The occupation authorities followed the development of the cabinet formation closely, but did they limit their field of activity to observation? BABB alleges that it is easy to exaggerate the occupation authorities’ role in Japanese politics at the time, given that they had the power to intervene in politics and did so at critical junctures. He notifies that the occupation authorities were frustrated with the Liberal Party under Yoshida, and had begun to place their hopes on the new conservative Democratic Party under the leadership of Ashida. Yet, BABB adheres to an interpretation according to which the pre-existing differences between the conservative parties were a stronger factor in the birth of the center-left coalition than, what he calls, SCAP wishful thinking.

BABB explains the birth of the Katayama Cabinet with the division between those conservatives who favored heavy industry and state involvement in the solution of social and economic problems, and those who focused on the defense of the rural and traditional status quo. According to BABB, the war augmented this division and moved the industrializing conservatives, i.e., the democrats closer to the socialists. Therefore, he concludes, it was not surprising that the democrats moved away from the traditional conservatives and formed a coalition with the socialists. BABB, in other words, disagrees with evaluations made by the political observers during the occupation period and, for example, SCHALLER, according to which the two biggest conservative parties were distinguished by personality issues and ties to specific business interest rather than ideology or programs.

KOHNO concludes that one should not overemphasize the idiosyncratic historical context in explaining the Katayama Government. According to him, the unusual environment influenced the range of options open to each party, but did not undermine the basic logic of party competition and strategic bargaining of coalition building. KOHNO introduces a series of rational actions that the

1216 Interviews demonstrating GS attempts to analyze the results of the elections and the development of the cabinet formation. See for example: John K. McLean, GHQ, SCAP, GS, National Government Division, Memorandum for the Chief, Legislative Division, May 23, 1947. NDL, GS(A)00059; Carlos P. Marcum, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Political Affairs Division, Memorandum for the record, April 25, 1947. NDL, JW-91-10. GS cooperation with the intelligence apparatus, see: GS to CIS/G-2, Request for information, April 29, 1947. NDL, BAE-17.
1219 See for example: Schaller 1985, 48; Schaller 1997, 11.
conservative parties took until their strategy turned out to be disastrous when MacArthur’s endorsement of Katayama put an end to the prime ministerial selection process. According to KOHNO, the conservatives had no reason to suspect that MacArthur would intervene and hints that MacArthur might, in fact, have endorsed any nominee, not only Katayama, chosen through the newly established democratic process. In my view, the last suggestion is not plausible and the role played by MacArthur’s statement well demonstrates that the formation of the Katayama Cabinet is most likely not the most suitable example to study whether the western theoretical models fit in the Japanese context. An in-depth analysis concerning the birth of the middle-of-the-road cabinet is impossible if the existence of the GHQ/SCAP rule is faded out and coalition building is understood as a game with only domestic players.

The danger in seeing the GHQ/SCAP as an omnipotent actor without whose initiative nothing would have happened in occupied Japan is obvious. Yet, based on the evidence available, I am inclined to agree with a group of researchers who emphasize the occupiers’ role in cabinet formation. FUKUNAGA is cautious in his interpretation and concludes that the GS was pleased with the Shakaitō’s position as the biggest party and additionally the formation of the Katayama Cabinet was an unexpected pleasure for MacArthur and the GS. TAKEMAE and the previously introduced KATAOKA attest, however, to the occupation authorities’ active role in championing on behalf of the formation of the Katayama Cabinet. MASUMI finds MacArthur’s praising of Katayama and the victory of the middle-of-the-road course in a situation where only the premier was elected as an implicit order for formation of the centrist cabinet. According to HAYASHI Yumi, who emphasizes the difficulty of adopting a policy against the occupation authorities’ will, the GHQ/SCAP and especially the GS demanded and worked on behalf of the formation of the cabinet. One part of this play was acted out when Kades protested against the anti-coalition talks of Katō Kanjū (加藤勘十) who represented the left-wing of the Shakaitō. A second concrete example of support was MacArthur’s promise that Hirano Rikizō

1220 Kohno 1994, 156–158.
1221 Fukunaga 1997, 142.
1223 Masumi 1985, 146.
1224 Certain socialists were also under the GS magnifying class and Hirano Rikizō was one of them. A GS memorandum recommended on January 15, 1947 that the Japanese government be advised that Hirano was not acceptable. Hirano’s former career was criticized and a clear distinction between him and Katayama Tetsu had been made. The right-wing socialist was criticized also on May 1947 when a
would be spared from the purge that would possibly have a devastating influence on coalition formation. 1225 Russell Brines alleges that Katayama was given the premiership to quiet the labor. He does not specify who was the author providing the seat but argues that MacArthur hailed the victory of the middle-of-the-road forces because he feared the communists and rejoiced because of their bad performance. 1226

It is not hard to believe that the GS political observers supported Katayama’s premiership. Various GS officials had supported the Shakaitō from the very beginning of the occupation, but the time had not been considered to be ready for their leadership before. OINAS-KUKKONEN argues that the occupier knew about the widening gulf between the communists and the socialists already prior to the April 1947 elections. 1227 This was surely a development that diminished suspicions and made the party look like an even more plausible alternative as the main government party. Similarly, the features of Katayama’s person were found to be respectable. Already in the summer of 1946 when the Political Parties Branch conducted a far-reaching evaluation of party politics in Japan, Harry Emerson Wildes mentioned modesty, sincerity, and sympathy for the underprivileged as Katayama’s outstanding characteristics. Furthermore, the memorandum described Katayama’s deep Christianity that had guided him to discover the principles for national betterment; his struggle as a champion of the minority cause, most of all as an advocate of women’s rights; and his dedication to the party principles that was strong enough to overcome his personal ambitions. The case of Saitō Takao’s expulsion was mentioned as an example where the usually passive theorist voted against party will and against the expulsion, and became suspended from his own party. 1228

The occupiers’ support of the formation of the Katayama Cabinet fits well in the explanation offered here for the occupation authorities’ policy concerning the Japanese conservatives. If the occupation authorities tried to remold the great creativity was made to find a reason to justify Hirano’s purge. Wiggins warned the GS not to repeat CIS’s mistake of not purging Hirano and concluded that the January extension of the purge criteria offered a valid basis for purging Hirano without reversing any previous decision on his cause. GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum, January 15, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03040; Courtney Whitney, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for Central Liaison Office, May 31, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03039; Guy A. Wiggins, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Record, May 14, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03039

1226 Brines 1948, 206–209.
1227 Oinas-Kukkonen 2006, 205–206.
1228 Harry Emerson Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, August 6, 1946. NDL, JW-41-07.
conservative front toward the moderate center, it is only natural that they supported the formation of the cabinet between these conservatives and the socialists under the leadership of its right-wing faction.

The Jiyūtō was described as the party of Ōno Banboku, Ōkubo Tomejirō and Hayashi Jōji where Yoshida was only the nominal head. Ōno was brought forward in the GS report as an autocratic and unenlightened leader who refused to accept the importance and dignity of the Diet and the equality of women. Since Yoshida was found to be too weak to make his party suddenly change its course in the coalition issue, i.e. demanding the ousting of the left-wing socialists, the blame was put on Ōno. The GS explanation was that the latter attempted to stalemate the cabinet discussion and force a compromise in which Baron Shidehara would have been called upon to form the cabinet. Thus the failure to include the Jiyūtō in to the cabinet was explained as a development that was not a setback for the cause of the occupation.

The weakened People’s Cooperative Party that had lost Diet members to the Democratic Party in March 1947 and disappointed in the House of Representatives election was described as a bonsai—an attractive ornament that will never grow very large—at the end of May 1947. The party was claimed to have followed the platform of the Shakaitō during the election campaign. What was once understood as selling one’s principles was now credited as Miki Takeo’s and Matsumoto Takizō’s success in broadening the appeal of the party from the farmers to an increasing number of professional people and intellectuals. The GHQ/SCAP was not expecting to see any major role to be played by the party, but it gave mass to the centrist forces that were now expected to lead Japan.

What was expected to change after the Katayama Cabinet was formed? I argue that the reporter writing the editorial article for The Times on May 27, 1947 was right in many points when suggesting that the selection of Katayama did not change the course of Japan because he was forced to abandon his more advanced ideas to ensure the support of the Democratic Party. Furthermore, the result of the elections manifested only about the dissatisfaction against the Yoshida Cabinet’s

1228 MASUMI makes a similar conclusion and emphasizes the continuing power of the Hatoyama faction. Masumi 1985, 143.
1229 GHQ, SCAP, GS, Status report, May 27, 1947. NDL, GS(B)03333.
failure to solve the economic crisis, not against its conservative character.\textsuperscript{1232} The occupation authorities were not looking for a full-scale socialist reforms but a minor corrective-action that would produce a government capable of assuring the social order in Japan\textsuperscript{1233} and the smooth progress of the policies initiated by the occupier.

\textit{Conclusion}

Although the endogenous emergence of the new conservative middle-of-the-road movement was already doubted, the formation of the Minshūtō and the Kokumin Kyōdōtō was warmly welcomed by the occupation authorities. The success of these parties in the forthcoming election was a desirable development since they were seen as a moderate force capable of cooperating with the Shakaitō. The GHQ/SCAP allowed the revision of the election law that was expected to favor the Shakaitō and the biggest conservative parties. The outcome of the election was presupposed to be a broadly-based coalition government of the right-wing socialists and the moderate conservatives that would secure the stability of the society without questioning the premises of the occupation authorities’ position and policy.

Despite praising the achievements of the democratization process, the GHQ/SCAP did not give up its guidance of Japanese politics. I argue that the purge of Narahashi and Inukai together with other Minshūtō leaders like Ishiguro and Chizaki was not against the occupation authorities’ will. If they did not initiate the purge, at least the occupiers accepted the purge of politicians who either represented unacceptable character or preached reform while still working on behalf of the continuity of the old order inside the Minshūtō.

The occupation authorities wished to see Ashida leading the Minshūtō. This was not least because his party presidency was considered as a stepping stone toward the formation of the desirable cabinet. The Yoshida-Shidehara line had served its purpose well as was demonstrated by the introduction of the new constitution. Nevertheless, it is surprising how few protests there were against the departure from this line in the United States. The forces that had propagated on

\textsuperscript{1232} American Embassy, Everett F. Drummright to Secretary of State (Original and four copies to Department, Copy to U.S. Political Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo), June 3, 1947. NARA, RG 84, box 22, folder 8.

\textsuperscript{1233} The support rate of the Katayama Cabinet after the inauguration was close to seventy percent. Hayashi 1984, 259.
behalf of these prewar statesmen did not visibly protest against the political shift, but concentrated on criticizing the economic purge and its effects on the Japanese business elite. Maybe Joseph Grew, Eugene Dooman and forces behind Newsweek were convinced that Japan could be properly guided even if their old friends were not in the cabinet. Thus the major task was to make sure that the GHQ/SCAP would see eye-to-eye with them on the question of the direction toward which Japan was to be guided.

In short, the occupation authorities faced a problem at the beginning of the spring 1947: a bottleneck that needed to be broken. The former policy supporting the Yoshida Cabinet was untenable and it was necessary to establish a new government. The overthrow of the old leadership did not cause great in-house bargaining inside the GHQ/SCAP, since nobody was defending it. Although the shift from the Yoshida-Shidehara axel to the Katayama-Ashida pair seems radical it did not shake the premises of the occupiers’ policy. What the occupation authorities searched for and found, successively, in the Shidehara, Yoshida and Katayama Cabinets was a suitable leadership that followed their instructions and possessed the capability to implement them in a way that did not embarrass the GHQ/SCAP.

Newsweek’s Harry F. Kern visited Japan in June 1947. He met with Japanese senior statesman but concentrated in his latter article to criticize the purge of the zaibatsu executives and other economic programs. Schonberger 1989, 138–139.
8 Conclusion

The emergence of a cabinet and political parties that could be called democratic was one of the focal objectives for the Allied Occupation of Japan. Furthermore, cooperation with the local political actors was necessitated by the model of indirect rule through domestic institutions. It is thus not surprising that the occupation authorities were actively seeking suitable political leadership to govern Japan. As suggested in my hypothesis, the occupation authorities were ready to intervene in the development of Japan’s domestic politics for the sake of achieving their goals. Great efforts were, however, made not to distract the democratic façade that covered the undemocratic and non-transparent behind-the-scenes orders and other forms of informal guidance. It was important to make the selection of the new political leadership to appear as something that originated from the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

The GHQ/SCAP worked in the name of democracy but it did not seek the most democratic leadership—it aspired to the most suitable leadership. What the occupiers wanted from the Japanese conservatives at the beginning of the occupation was political leaders who would obey their orders and guarantee the effective implementation of the various reforms that would supposedly eventually lead to the adoption of democracy. This meant that the government had to be able to ascertain the social stability in Japan and not expose the occupation to any domestic or international criticism. In other words, the cabinet that the occupiers erected needed to appear as a legitimate political actor. Likewise, the process that led to the establishment of the cabinet had to demonstrate the principles of parliamentary democracy. Namely, the democratization of Japan did not take place in a vacuum. I claim that the various Departments of the United States Government and the multinational supervisory organizations did not play a central role in the remodeling of the Japanese political leadership at the beginning of the occupation. Nevertheless, their existence kept the GHQ/SCAP on its toes. What the occupiers could do to protect themselves against the criticism of their policy and to ensure their independent position, was to ascertain that the democratization process seemed to progress and appeared democratic.

The process of sorting out the most suitable Japanese leaders in 1942–1947 can be divided into several phases. What was considered suitable varied during different times, but what was expected from the suitable Japanese leadership remained rather unchanged. The planning period was a time during which the search was still on a theoretical level simply because of the result of the war was
still unclear. While identifying and formulating questions in need of answers, the planners of the occupation recognized the importance to define the nature of the desirable postwar leadership. Besides introducing provisions that the new leadership should meet, the planners mentioned politicians who could possess the expected capabilities. None of them, however, expected or desired to see the representatives of the prewar party politics to play a role in postwar Japan. Instead, the faction that believed in the existence and usefulness of the extra-parliamentary Japanese moderate political elite was victorious in bargaining concerning the desired political leadership. They insisted that Japan was to be built in cooperation with the statesmen who were capitalist in their economic thinking and anti-revolutionist by nature. This distinction between altruistic statesmanship and the self-seeking party politics was the planning period's most important legacy to the occupation. It was transmitted to Tokyo through written documents, through personal connections, and through personnel that received their education concerning Japan in an environment where the ideas of the occupation planners were present.

The question of finding the new leadership concretized during the first autumn of the occupation. The model of rational decision would have required that the ill-organized occupiers would have studied all alternatives and the possible outcomes before relying on any Japanese actors. At the hectic beginning this was, however, not possible. The existing conception of desired political leadership was not challenged and the responsibility of governing Japan was entrusted to Shidehara Kijūrō and other non-party-affiliated moderate conservatives recommended by the planners of the occupation. The new conservative political parties and their leaders received an evaluation that emphasized the same weaknesses that were attached to the prewar parties as well. Although adhering to the suggested policy, the occupiers began also to observe the political developments in Japan. Americans were active, but so were many Japanese who wanted to be heard. By providing positive information concerning themselves and critical observations concerning their competitors, various conservatives tried to win the sympathy of the GHQ/SCAP. Due to the secret nature of private conversations between Japanese politicians and occupiers, it is hard to say how many of the actions implemented by the occupation authorities were originally proposed by the Japanese.

Although the purge that was launched on January 4, 1946, derived its justification from the Potsdam Declaration and was claimed to aim at the removal of those who had misled the Japanese people to the war, the second, publicly
denied aspect of the purge was the selection of the desired political leadership. Instead of adhering only to the negative objective of correcting disadvantages, the GHQ/SCAP used the purge to achieve positive results as well. The purge had a huge impact on Japanese political leadership by disqualifying a great number of undesired prewar conservative party politicians who were on the verge of clinching a dominating position in the postwar Diet. After this mechanism of direct intervention was first used, it did not disappear but remained as the most severe device in the occupiers’ arsenal of methods to guide Japanese politics and politicians.

Spring 1946 was a time when the occupation authorities struggled, not only to push through some of their most remarkable reforms, but also to put the leadership they found acceptable in charge. The occupiers could not nominate the new leadership as such power was in appearance held by the Japanese electorate. The culmination point of this phase was the purge of Hatoyama Ichirō and the elevation of Yoshida Shigeru as a substitute prime minister. In May 1946 the GHQ/SCAP rejected one conservative, a career politician who had led his party to an election victory in the first postwar general election, but accepted another who was an aristocratic former bureaucrat.

The summer and autumn of 1946 can be described as the period of re-evaluation and cautious contentment. The leadership in power was cooperative and the political observers were stimulated by the indications pointing toward the inborn democratization movements among the conservative parties. Nevertheless, the occupation authorities were sensitive to react in changing currents and their support of the government began to fade simultaneously with the strengthening of domestic opposition at the end of 1946. The GHQ/SCAP did not feel sympathy toward the communist leaders marching in front of the protesting masses, rather they were disappointed in the conservatives who could not control them. The occupation authorities were not aiming at a government with a communist or purely socialist program. Instead, to assure the desirable progression of the occupation, a new type of conservative leaders were brought forward with the GHQ/SCAP’s support.

The leadership that had served its role as the guarantor of the reforms, amendment of the constitution among them, was put aside for the sake of creation of the middle-of-the road regime that was to ascertain stable development and a firm ground for the occupation policy. The chain of events in spring 1947 describes well the great diversity of channels through which the occupation authorities intervened in Japanese politics. Behind these acts was a group of
conclusions. First the GHQ/SCAP found the centrist coalition to be desirable in the future. This design necessitated conservatives who would be capable of and willing to cooperate with the Shakaitō. In the eyes of the occupiers the Jiyūtō did not contain desirable forces and it was assumed that the Shidehara Kijurō and Inukai Ken clique would push through only titular changes in the formation of the Democratic Party. Narahashi Wataru was not an acceptable choice to control the Japanese Cabinet either. Eventually Ashida Hitoshi was found to be an option free from linkage to the leadership now replaced: as a conservative acceptable to, and willing to work with, right-wing socialist; and as a politician satisfactory to the GHQ/SCAP. Based on these conclusions, the occupation authorities took both public and secret actions. They accepted the new election law that was to strengthen the Shakaitō but also protect the conservative majority. After that the GHQ/SCAP, if not initiated, at least accepted the purge of Inukai, Narahashi and several other leaders of the newly established Minshutō. These purges paralyzed the Shidehara–Inukai influence and made room for Ashida who redeemed the occupation authorities’ trust by leading his party into a coalition with the right-wing of the Shakaitō. Finally, the public expression of support for the election of Katayama as premier was an example of a statement that carried numerous meanings. Namely, this statement was, among other things, a message to the conservatives to seek their way in cooperation with the Shakaitō and forget the possibility of returning to the purely conservative coalition.

In short, the planners of the occupation looked for moderate conservatives: who were to be thanked for Japan’s prewar steps toward democracy; who were not to be blamed for the war; and who were to help in the reconstruction process. Then, at the very beginning of its term, the GHQ/SCAP sought for cooperative conservative statesmen who would be ready to follow the wishes of the Supreme Command and yet claim the reforms as their own initiatives. After the first postwar general election this rule had to be connected with the conservative parties. Finally, despite the fact that the cooperation with the Shidehara and Yoshida Cabinets had borne fruit, the occupation authorities began to search for suitable middle-of-the-road conservatives who could, together with the right-wing of the Shakaitō, continue the previous cabinet’s work while ensuring the social stability and the success of reforms in the changing situation. Because the cabinets of Yoshida and Katayama were based on the political party coalitions, the occupation authorities did not hesitate to manipulate the relative strength of the various factions and individuals inside the conservative parties to ensure the desired outcome in the cabinet building process.
The legacy of the planning period and the changes in Japan’s domestic political currents are examples of external impulses to the occupation authorities’ policy. Yet the adopted policy was not adjusted only based on extraneous stimuli that surfaced. To unfold this policy, one has to understand the mechanism of decision-making inside the GHQ/SCAP. The middle and lower echelon political observers communicated daily with the Japanese political actors and wrote reports that transmitted information concerning Japanese politics and politicians. General MacArthur and his closest aides made decisions based on this information and remained relatively far from the domestic political leaders. Japanese politicians tried to influence those writing reports and some, especially Yoshida Shigeru, tried to bypass the middlemen and do business with MacArthur and General Coutney Whitney. When decisions were made, they did not necessarily take the form of a directive, but usually went down to middlemen who unofficially transmitted the will of the Supreme Command to the Japanese involved. Thus, the role of the intermediaries cannot be forgotten when the decisions and actions forming the occupation authorities’ policy is analyzed. Furthermore, The GHQ/SCAP was not a monolith possessing one all-embracing will expressed to the Japanese through one mouth only. Instead, the policy concerning the Japanese conservatives was a compromise of in-house quarreling. The evolution of remodeling of the Japanese political leadership cannot, however, be compressed into the form of frequently mentioned competition between the GS and the G-2. Other units participated in this competition as well and, for example, the POLAD played a crucial role in it at the very beginning of the occupation. Moreover, the participating units consisted of various, often competing opinions inside them.

This dissertation offers the first narrative identifying and analyzing the characteristics of the occupation authorities’ policy concerning the Japanese conservatives at the beginning of the occupation. The study emphasizes the importance of understanding the planning period’s influence on the actual occupation policy and introduces a wartime discussion concerning the Japanese conservatives. The made conclusions also contests, or through new alternative interpretation at least challenge, certain existing interpretations. The most prominent new accounts explain the GHQ/SCAP’s role and decisions in relation to the purges of politicians and emergence of new cabinets both in spring 1946 and in spring 1947. The purge of Hatoyama Ichirō and his aides in front of the Yoshida Cabinet, together with the politically motivated purges of certain Minshutō leaders were actions that irreversibly changed the structure of Japan’s postwar political structure. These events may not have ever happened without an
external authority’s’ active participation. Likewise, several periodizations made earlier have turned out to be incomplete or misleading. For example the distinction between the so-called reform period and the succeeding reverse course seems far too broad when approached through questions under examination in this study. Namely, all the changes in the occupiers’ policy concerning the conservatives introduced in this study belong under the category of the reform period. Finally, it should be noted that a number of questions in need of further research have come up.

A rather obvious question is what happened after the formation of the Katayama Cabinet. Although the GHQ/SCAP supported the emergence of the new middle-of-the-road regime, it lasted less than seventeen months. The cabinets of Katayama Tetsu and Ashida Hitoshi were soon followed by a continuum of the Yoshida cabinets that outlasted the occupation’s tenure in Japan. It is therefore valid to ask how these developments are bound to the changes in occupation authorities’ policy concerning the Japanese conservatives. Likewise, the de-purge of the conservative politicians needs to be further examined while taking the circumstances of the original purges that are introduced in this dissertation into consideration. Another field that ought to be studied is the relation between the GHQ/SCAP and the financial supporters of the conservative parties and politicians. The behind-the-scenes maneuverings and corruption has often been described as a feature of Japan’s postwar political system. Thus, the relationship between the occupier, whose role as an invisible instructor paralleled in many ways the Japanese financiers who were using the parties and politicians for their own purposes, and this group of influence looks an interesting, if not a certainly challenging, subject of research.

History is a narrative written by historians and it tends to emphasize features of the past that best explain the development that had led to the existing situation. However, the decisions that were later disproved and the aims that were later re-evaluated, together with the ways of action that were buried down the road, need to be remembered. This dissertation tells a story without ‘good guys’ with one respectable goal in mind. Namely, the making of Japan’s postwar political leadership at the beginning of the occupation was neither a straightforward nor unchallengeable process. The political democratization was an idealistic aim but the occupation authorities’ approach to changing Japan was practical. The

1235 42 percent of those seated in the lower house after the first post-occupation Diet election held in October 1952 had been purgees. Schaller 1997, 38.
evaluation of whether or not the remote-controlled party and cabinet formation was justified remains, nevertheless, outside the scope of this study.
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IN SEARCH OF SUITABLE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

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