Hannu Juuso

CHILD, PHILOSOPHY
AND EDUCATION

DISCUSSING THE INTELLECTUAL SOURCES OF PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN
HANNU JUUSO

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Discussing the intellectual sources of Philosophy for Children

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Faculty of Education, Department of Educational Sciences and Teacher Education, University of Oulu, P.O.Box 2000, FI-90014 University of Oulu, Finland  
Oulu, Finland

**Abstract**

The study analyzes the theoretical basis of the Philosophy for Children (P4C) program elaborated by Matthew Lipman. The aim is, firstly, to identify the main philosophical and pedagogical principles of P4C based on American pragmatism, and to locate their pedagogization and possible problems in Lipman's thinking. Here the discussion is especially targeted to the thinking of John Dewey and George H. Mead as well as Lev Vygotsky, whom Lipman himself names as the most pivotal sources for his own thinking. On the other hand, the study aims at opening up new perspectives and thematizations on P4C from the viewpoint of the continental tradition of thought. The essential principles of P4C connected with reasonableness and judgment are ultimately interpreted as a neo-Aristotelian effort to contextualize philosophy by tracing it back to moderation, the man's ability to consider and solve problems that he meets in practical life *kata ton orthon logon* – by doing right things in the right place at the right time in the right way. This phonetic idea of 'humanizing modernity' combined with the evolution of the adult-child concept is argued to be one of the conditions for the possibility of P4C, yet leaving unsolved the basic problems involving pedagogical action as such.

John Dewey's ideas arising from the critique of the modern philosophy of consciousness, focusing on the significance of philosophy in practical human life and linked to the basic nature of human knowing and intellectual growth and, further, to the ideal of a democratic community, are shown to form the main intellectual sources of P4C. Dewey's philosophy as a general theory of education means a solid linking of the concepts of experience and inquiry to the practice of education. This is based on the naturalistic conception of man according to which man is built in dynamic transaction with his environment, experiencing the true meanings of his ideas in the consequences of his actions as he tries to solve problematic situations. So, inquiry as a method of reflective thinking forms the basis for education based on intellectual growth. A condition for it is a context meaningful for the child in which the paradigm of inquiry can be realized authentically. It is therefore important in education to provide circumstances that stimulate the child's curiosity, initiating a process of inquiry that further enables, through the formation of reflective habits, the development of a democratic community. The purpose of the pedagogical interaction taking place in the process of inquiry is to produce educative experiences for the child, making the pedagogical relationship vanish at the same time. The idea is that in pedagogical action the child's subjectivity, his desire and impulses are adapted to the tradition, yet generating at the same time a prospective, reflective habit, thus freeing the educatee to think intelligently for himself. The study shows the articulation of these principles in Lipman's practical effort to convert the classroom into a community of inquiry, but it also argues that the above-mentioned Bildung theoretical core problem of pedagogical action, related to its paradoxical special characteristics to produce autonomous subjectivity, is not thematized. In connection with this issue, the educational thinking of Kant and Hegel is discussed especially from the viewpoint of philosophy teaching. To provide a new perspective for the discussion, the study outlines the community of inquiry as an “educative space” from the viewpoints of the pedagogical relationship typical of hermeneutic pedagogy and of non-reflective functional structures and phenomena based on pedagogical intuition that are linked to it.

*Keywords*: community of inquiry, educational philosophy, Matthew Lipman, Philosophy for Children, philosophy teaching, thinking in education
Juuso, Hannu, Lapsi, filosofia ja kasvatus. Keskustelua Filosofiaa lapsille -ohjelman perusteista
Kasvatustieteiden tiedekunta, Kasvatustieteiden ja opettajankoulutuksen yksikkö, Oulun yliopisto, PL 2000, 90014 Oulun yliopisto
Oulu

Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksessa eritellään Matthew Lipmanin kehittelemän Filosofiaa lapsille (P4C) ohjelman teoreettisia perusteita. Tarkoituksena on ensinnäkin identifioida P4C:n amerikkalaiseen pragmatismiin palautuvat filosofiset ja pedagogiset pääperiaatteet sekä paikallistaa niiden pedagogiseen toimintaan mahdolliset ongelmistot Lipmanin ajattelussa. Tällöin tarkastelun kohteena on erityisesti John Deweyn ja Georg H. Meadin ajattelun sekä lisäksi Lev Vygotskyn julistavina päänäkökulmoina ja teorioiden järjestyksen ja arvostelukyvyn liittyvät periaatteet tulkitaan viimekäsissä uusaristotelisessa pyrkimyksenä kontekstualisoidaan filosofia palauttamalla se kohtuullisuuteen, ihmisen kykyyn harkita ja ratkaista käytännölliseläisissä elämässä kohtaamia ongelmia kata ton orthon logon – tekemällä oikeita asioita oikeassa paikassa oikeaan aikaan oikealla tavalla. Tämä ’modernin inhimillistämenen’ irrottuminen idea yhdistyneen aikuinen-lapsi käsitteen evoluutioon argumentoidaan P4C:n yhdeksi mahdollisuusvektori, joka jättää kuitenkin pedagogiseen toimintaan sinänsä liittyvät perusongelmat ratkaisematta.


Asiasanat: ajattelu kasvatukseessa, Filosofiaa lapsille, filosofian opetus, kasvatusfilosofia, Matthew Lipman, tutkiva yhteisö
Acknowledgments

The present work has its origins in the early 1980’s. At that time I was working as a young teacher and also started my study of philosophy. My interest in philosophy that was awakened in those times also had a remarkable influence on my pedagogical thought and was obviously also conveyed to my work with children and teacher students at the Teacher Training School of the University of Oulu. This study is part of my effort that started in those days and has continued throughout my career to understand better what education is all about. It is evident, however, that this project would not have been possible even so far as this study is concerned without the contribution of many people to whom I am deeply grateful.

Above all, I want to thank Professor Matthew Lipman and Professor Ann Margaret Sharp. I am in debt to their work and effort without which this study would have been completely impossible in the first place. In the early 90’s they kindly invited me to join the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State University as a visiting scholar. My acquaintance with their aspirations and strong commitment for thinking in education made a big impression on me, occupying a permanent position and inspiration in my thinking.

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Oulu, 20th of July, 2007

Hannu Juuso
Abbreviations


QC


Resp.


Rhet.


TE1


TE2


Theait.

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1 Introduction

Western philosophy (φιλοσοφία) was born about 600-400 B.C in ancient Greece. In general, this ‘love of wisdom’ refers to the tradition of thought which examines the ultimate being of reality, the general conditions of knowing and good society, the existence of beauty and values and the nature of humanity. But does philosophy have any such pedagogical value that it should be practiced with children? This question and the answers proposed to it ever since antiquity have a long tradition in Western educational thought. The best-known philosopher of our times to demand the connection of philosophy to the education of even small schoolchildren is Matthew Lipman (1921- ) from the United States. In his Philosophy for Children programme Lipman's ambitious goal is to question the traditional discourse of the school based on teaching and to move the main attention to such things as thinking, judgment and reasonableness in education. An intriguing and challenging idea as we recognize the crises of modern Western philosophy that began to take place in the twentieth century, or even earlier, leading to repeated questionings of the existence of modern thought and post-modern proclamations of the end of it. From the viewpoint of pedagogical action, on the other hand, Lipman’s shift from teaching to thinking sounds somewhat problematic and perplexing notion. In this ambivalent condition this study explores the theoretical-historical commitments and underpinnings of Philosophy for Children, this over-thirty-year-old and by now a worldwide movement to encourage children to think for themselves.

1.1 Matthew Lipman and the germs of Philosophy for Children

For Matthew Lipman, the idea of doing philosophy with children did not emerge as a sudden ‘out of the blue’ experience, but matured gradually from a mixture of a variety of ingredients.¹ When discussing this topic Lipman himself goes back to his years in the Army in 1943-45, when he acquainted himself for the first time

¹ Lipman describes the early stages of his project in some of his writings. The main sources used here include Lipman’s autobiographical considerations in Studies in Philosophy for Children: Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery (Lipman 1992a), Natasha, The Vygotskyan Dialogues (Lipman 1996), Thinking in Education (Lipman 2003) and some other writings, for example in Metaphilosophy (Lipman 1976), in Critical and Creative Thinking (in 2004 and with Pizzurro in 2001), in and in Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften (forthcoming). Similar materials can also be found in many of his recent interviews (e.g. Naji 2005, de Puig I. & Gomez M. 2002).
with the philosophy of John Dewey (1859-1952). Lipman was especially impressed by Dewey’s ‘practicality’ – as he says – which conclusively made him keen to study philosophy instead of engineering. Early interest in Dewey's thought continued in the front, where Lipman as a young infantryman carried in his duffel bag Ratner’s edition of Dewey’s philosophy. The ideas acquired under those circumstances, guesses Lipman himself, “are especially likely to assume a foundational role with regard to one’s later thinking.”

After military service in Europe, Lipman enrolled as a philosophy major in Columbia University just because he had learnt that Dewey had taught there. When he was studying at Columbia, Lipman was naturally introduced through Dewey to the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), founder of pragmatism, and also to the thinking of George Herbert Mead (1863-1931). Lipman was particularly interested in the relationship of thinking to the social and cultural context, and in the social formation of experience. At that time he acquainted himself through Professor Herbert Schneider with Mead’s social psychological production of the early 20th century, and some years later he was strongly impressed by Mead’s *Mind Self and Society* (1934). The philosophers, according to Lipman himself, who formed a ‘bridge’ from Peirce, Dewey and Mead to his thinking and which Lipman knew in person included Mayer Shapiro, John Herman Randall, Jr., Ernest Nagel and Justus Buchler. Lipman was especially impressed by Buchler’s studies in the nature of human judgment, and for his understanding of the role of judgment in the education of the child.

However, these often perceived links to early American pragmatism are not the only explicit intellectual underpinning of Lipman’s thought. In the late 1940’s, he got hold of Lev Vygotsky’s (1896-1934) article entitled *Thought and Speech*.

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3 Lipman 2004; Lipman 1992a; Lipman (forthcoming). Lipman also met Dewey in person after being invited to visit him because of their correspondence due to Lipman’s dissertation in 1950. At that time Dewey was about 90 living with his wife and two young adopted children at their home in New York. Lipman (1996, xiv) narrates: “As his hearing aid did not seem to be working well, he was content (after inquiring about what the children had had for breakfast) to talk for the two-hour-visit; we were more than content to listen. … Subsequently we had some correspondence, and two years later Dewey’s long life (I recall his saying that the earliest part of it seemed to him to belong to someone else) came to a close.”

4 See Lipman 1996, xiv.

5 Ibid., 8. See also Naji 2005.
published in *Psychiatry* in 1939.⁶ Although this early contact with Vygotsky’s thinking was not explicated in, for instance, Lipman’s first articles in the early 1950’s, he was still left with ‘feeling of connection with him’ which Lipman found again after two decades in Vygotsky’s *Thought and Language*.⁷

In 1950 Lipman defended his doctoral dissertation *Problems of Art Inquiry* advised by J.H. Randall and later that year received a grant to Sorbonne. He stayed on in Europe for two years passing the last semester in Vienna. During this period Lipman discovered the continental philosophy which later quite obviously echoes in many of the ideas of Philosophy for Children (hereafter P4C). Lipman mentions people such as Georg Simmel (1858-1918), Max Weber (1864-1920), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Paul Schilder (1886-1940), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961); and later John Austin (1911-1960), Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951).⁸ Lipman was also acquainted with the work of Jean Piaget (1896-1980) concerning the relationships between thinking and behavior. It is to be noted, however, that – so far as I know – Lipman does not anywhere analyze more systematically the significance of those European thinkers for his own thinking. He says, however, that he was especially impressed by some French writers, such as Diderot (1713-1784), being able to discuss profound philosophical ideas with ease and clarity. In France he also perceived a greater intellectual camaraderie between parents and children thus offering children models of thoughtful dialogue. After returning home from Europe, Lipman began teaching in Columbia in 1954, eventually becoming a Professor of Philosophy there for the next eighteen years as well as in City College of New York.

In the 1950’s Lipman had no particular interest in education. But in the 1960’s “I fell in love with it, just as earlier on, while I was still in military service in World War II, I had fallen in love with philosophy,” he says.⁹ For this reason Lipman also acquired at some time the idea of bringing them together somehow. The P4C project actually only started to take shape in the late 1960’s, at which time Lipman was actively involved in a debate on the relations between children,

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⁶ Actually this was the concluding chapter of Vygotsky’s *Thought and Language* (1931) which was first published in English not until 1962. In the article *The Vygotsky Touch* (Lipman & Pizzurro, 2001) Lipman explicitly speaks about the influence of Vygotsky. In his book *Natasha Vygotskian Dialogues* (1996) these connections are also discussed but here they are more implicit in nature.

⁷ Lipman et al. 2001.

⁸ Lipman 1996, 8.

⁹ Lipman (forthcoming).
the arts and education. He also found himself wondering what possible benefits his college course of introductory logic might offer his students. He began to have serious concerns about its value for their reasoning, suspecting that it came too late. The university revolts of 1968 finally gave him perhaps the most important stimulus towards education. When he noticed that neither the Columbia University administration, nor the faculty, nor his undergraduate students came off particularly well seeming bewildered and unreasonable, Lipman realized that the school system they all had passed through could be the locus of the problem. So he started to think if it was somehow possible to revise his Logic and Critical Thinking course so as to make children think more reasonably, more reflectively, more critically. At about that time he also had an opportunity to observe the tutoring of neurologically impaired children in their efforts in reading. Exercises in drawing logical inferences offered by Lipman’s suggestion helped the children to extract the meaning of the passages. This experience confirmed his hunch of the benefit of instruction in reasoning for children.

1.2 The objectives, problems and structure of the study

Since 1970 a lot of empirical research has been done on P4C in several countries all over the world. In 2005 Garcia-Moriyon, Rebollo and Colom published a comprehensive and critical meta-analysis of it. Most of the more than one hundred research publications that they analyzed were based on either quantitative or qualitative research methods with the purpose of establishing the connections of P4C with social, affective and especially cognitive skills. Despite the many problems, mostly methodological ones, that they discovered in their study, Moriyon et al. point out that they prove indisputably the positive impact of P4C even if applied for no more than one year. The conclusion of the meta-analysis was that children can do philosophy and that this practice helps them to develop higher order thinking skills. Because my own study is conceptual and historical in nature, I do not consider it necessary to discuss this empirical study in any more detail.

The objectives of my study are, firstly i) to identify and analyze the basic philosophical and pedagogical ideas of P4C mostly linked to classic American pragmatism and articulated in the concept of the ‘classroom community of inquiry’,

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10 Moriyon et. al. 2005. More limited research summaries have also been made by the IAPC in 1982 and 1991. See also Morehouse 1995 and Henderson 1988.
and secondly ii) to open up new perspectives, thematic and areas of discussion for P4C based on some of the tradition of continental philosophy and pedagogical thought. Discussing along the lines of these complementary objectives with some of the basic conceptions of pedagogy (like ‘pedagogical relationship’ and ‘subjectivity’) as a bottom line, creates the scarlet thread of this study. My assumption is that only by tracing the connections between pragmatism and the pedagogical ideas of P4C it is possible to achieve a fruitful dialogical connection with the horizons rising from continental thought. This is due, among other things, to the fact that pragmatism was born as a critique of modern European philosophy, above all the epistemological thinking of Kant and Hegel. I am aiming at the other objective mentioned above by re-contextualizing P4C in these environments which are genetically linked to its basic principles but have, I think, been ignored or ‘forgotten’. I assume that in a historical approach, where P4C is discussed in the broader historical context, the principles and commitments of this endeavor could be interpreted more profoundly and explicitly. Through this intertextual reading it might also be possible to point out any problems, conflicts and breaks that its pedagogical assumptions, practice, and grounds may involve. On the other hand it may also help to open up new layers and possibilities in its continual process of self-understanding.

The above-mentioned objectives are further modified as the next four research problems:

1. Which are the explicit mutual sources in the practice of P4C originating in the philosophical as well as pedagogical thinking of John Dewey, George H. Mead and Lev Vygotsky?
2. How does P4C appear in the light of the pedagogical thinking of antiquity and especially of Aristotle’s *phronesis*?
3. How does P4C appear in the light of G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy teaching and the philosophical and pedagogical thinking based on it?
4. How could the pedagogy of P4C be elaborated and enriched further in the light of phenomenological-hermeneutic thought?

In accordance with the objectives of the study, the source materials of the study are divided into two main categories: a) the *core sources* related topically to P4C and b) the *re-contextualizing sources* by which I mean the material through which I discuss with the core materials. The core sources mainly consist of a big portion of Lipman’s written production. He has written fourteen books, co-authored nine more and published over one hundred articles in academic journals.
Through my thesis I am joining in the discourse on the theoretical basis of P4C by producing for it substance arising through the above research problems. Four of the seven main chapters in this study have been published as individual articles in the main publication forums of the P4C movement. They have been contributions to the recent discourse on the philosophical and pedagogical basis of P4C. For my thesis I have chosen, however, a monographic way of presentation, as these contributions are closely linked and complementary to each other from the viewpoint of my research objectives and problems as stated above. By the monograph as the medium of presentation I am thus not referring to any attempt to present a final or comprehensive analysis of the theoretical basis of P4C. By the subtitle of the study Discussing the intellectual sources of Philosophy for Children I am naturally referring to the hermeneutical orientation of my study de facto.

The study consists of seven chapters, an Introduction to them and an integrative Discussion. The second chapter Historical anticipations of doing philosophy with children provides an overview of some of the pioneers of education as well as philosophers who I recognize as having had the same kind of ideas as fragments in their thinking in the history of thought. I suppose that this will help the reader to orient himself to the thematic of the study. In this phase I will exclude Dewey, Mead and Vygotsky, the pivotal figures behind P4C who deserve their own analysis. I will also discuss Hegel in more detail later because of his direct influence on Dewey.

Chapter 3, Philosophy for Children as a quest for thinking in education is expository in nature and deliberately allows Lipman to speak for himself on children, education, thinking, and philosophy. The chapter provides a general review of the leading principles of P4C based on my interpretation after Lipman’s descriptions in various sources. This review works as a necessary framework connected to the problems of the study and reflected in other parts of it.

Important pedagogical and philosophical themes of P4C intersect in the concept of the ‘classroom community of inquiry’, which is why many of the research problems are entwined around it. The fourth chapter A genealogy of classroom community of inquiry provides an analysis of this multi-threaded chiasm of P4C from the viewpoint of John Dewey’s and George Herbert Mead’s philosophical and educational conceptions and, on the other hand, from the viewpoint of Lev Vygotsky’s psychological research results on the relationship between language and thinking. It is common knowledge that the kernel of Matthew Lipman’s educational thinking comes from John Dewey. As Lipman himself says

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…there is no aspect of Dewey’s pedagogy that is explicitly rejected or that is not reflected in the Philosophy for Children approach to elementary school education. Philosophy for Children is built unapologetically on Deweyan foundations.11

When discussing here Dewey’s influence on P4C, I naturally recall these many reflections of it.12 Nevertheless it is my belief that especially Dewey’s philosophical ideas behind his own – as well as Lipman’s – pedagogy combined with Mead’s and Vygotsky’s thinking are not mutually and synthetically discussed before in the context of doing philosophy with children. Even thought my study is not about elaborating the pedagogical theory as such, it is still my pre-understanding that Dewey’s as well as Mead’s conception of education should deserve a closer look also from the perspective of P4C.

Chapters 5-9 are connected with the second (ii) objective of my study. Chapter 5 Ancient paideia and Philosophy for Children discusses P4C in the light of the conceptions of childhood and philosophy of antiquity and also the ideas of reasonableness and judgment that is central to it from the viewpoint of Aristotle’s phronesis. Here I will return to the problematic interpretation of Socrates that I have already reflected preliminarily in previous part of the study, discussing it from the viewpoint of P4C in particular and trying to reconstruct Aristotle’s theoretical connection with Lipman’s project. So far as I can see, this thematic connected with 20th century European philosophy, especially the metatheoretical grounds of the humanistic sciences, is not explicated to almost any degree in Lipman’s works. The fifth chapter has been published as an individual article in Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children in 1999.13

The sixth chapter is entitled Hegel on teaching philosophy. Here I argue on the thoughts presented by Hegel in his correspondence in the totality of his philosophy of spirit, although I do not hesitate to admit in this connection that my knowledge of Hegel is somewhat narrow. A discussion of Hegel is, however, inevitable considering the goals of my work. If I am to perceive the intellectual sources of P4C, I think it is necessary to go one step backwards from pragmatism in history, namely to its European background, in which case it is unavoidable to

12 See e.g. Lipman 1987b; Lipman 1993b; Daniel et al. 1993; Lipman 2004.
bump into Hegel. Chapter 7, *Philosophy for Children in the light of Hegel’s thought*, continues with this theme with a discussion of Peirce’s and Dewey’s relationship with Hegel. My pre-understanding is that by explicating this formation of the theoretical ‘terrain close’ to P4C, I can find new layers in it. The seventh chapter includes some repeating of Dewey’s thinking which is already referred to earlier. This is still necessary to get a grasp of the specific topic under discussion. These two chapters have been published as double article in *Critical and Creative Thinking, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children* in 2002. 14

According to Lipman, the classroom community of inquiry pursues the dictum of Socrates by following the argument to where it leads. Here the role of the teacher emerges as something fundamental. The eighth chapter entitled *Tact and atmosphere in the pedagogical relationship* discusses the indivisible and immediately experienced educational situation of the classroom community of inquiry from the viewpoint of phenomenological hermeneutic philosophy. Here the notions of *tact* and *atmosphere* are argumented as essential, complicated phenomena searching for the dialogue in a pedagogical relationship – and thus working to erase it. I have written this chapter together with Timo Laine and it was published as an independent article in *Analytic Teaching, The Community of Inquiry Journal* in 2004. 15 Although the chapter was written in tight cooperation, Laine is particularly responsible for section 8.4.

Although quite a lively discussion on the philosophical and pedagogical foundations of P4C is going on in the main publication forums in this field, especially the thematic dealt with in Chapters 5 to 8 have remained almost unknown. So far as I can recall, the connections of P4C with Continental philosophy and educational thinking have only been studied sporadically and by few researchers. In the *Discussion* chapter I will briefly discuss the main contributions of this study and from the base of those observations make some critical remarks on current theoretical research of P4C.

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All my studies previously published as separate articles are now published as parts of this study by the permission of the editors-in-chief of the relevant journals and – in the case of the Chapter 7 – by the permission of Timo Laine. Due to the monographic presentation I have made some minor modifications mainly to the introductory sections as well as subtitles of these texts to make them more readable in this format.
2 Historical anticipations of doing philosophy with children

2.1 Introduction

Does philosophy have any place in the education of the child? If yes, then which ‘philosophy’ and whose ‘child’? And finally, in terms of which ‘education’? These fundamental questions are extremely complicated as these ambivalent concepts involved are intertwined with each other and naturally get their meaning in the totality of the socio-historical epoch in which they are being used. It is thus my understanding that it is impossible to define in a universally valid, ahistorical and context-free manner what is ‘pedagogically valuable’, and within its framework, of ‘philosophy’, ‘philosophical knowing’ or ‘child’. If the pedagogically valuable is used to refer, as usually in modern times, to such forms of action and contents in the educational process that are thought to promote or support human growth towards self-determinate ‘autonomous adulthood’, the problem still remains about the meaning and genealogy of that modern notion. As discussed in his recent works by David Kennedy, there is not any unconditioned education of children an sich; it necessarily emerges through our pre-understanding constructed from the social, cultural and philosophical lenses which, as categorical means, form the condition to recognize it.16

In what follows I will provide a brief historical overview on this thematic by discussing cursorily its fragmentary articulation in the texts of a few ancient, medieval and modern philosophers. I wish to stress that my aim is neither to present exhaustively the thoughts on the topic under discussion – which I believe is not possible as such – of these people who lived in different times nor to compare them according to some objective yardstick just due to the above-mentioned conceptual incommensurability. Rather, the purpose of this excursion is to serve as an introductory review to the reader by opening up some of the most important hallmarks as well as intriguing and ambivalent aspects of doing philosophy with children having been implicitly in presence in the history of ideas much before P4C. After all, my belief is that those issues have not vanished anywhere, that they are still prevailing also in current pedagogical efforts like e.g. in P4C. Also, by this preliminary excursion I am referring to the complex evolutionary emergency of

16 See Kennedy 2006a; 2006b.
Western subjectivity, that is, the assumptions concerning the fundamental nature of human being intrinsically interwoven in the image of childhood and thus necessarily having consequences on how the education should be understood.

2.2 Philosophy as searching for good life

In ancient Greece philosophy played an important role in the education of young boys coming from wealthy families. In the dialogues of Plato, Socrates (approx. 470-399 B.C.) challenges these few and privileged to discuss a variety of topics: What are the virtues of friendship, love, courage, justice, temperance, piety, patience or true pleasure? Can virtues be taught? What is knowledge, truth or goodness? Etc. Many of these questions ultimately involve the problem of good life – how should we understand it? Related to this issue that is, I think, also extremely important for education, it is essential to consider what kind of information Socrates was looking for, i.e. what the ontological status of these ‘what is’ questions is.17 Was Socrates looking for a theoretical definition of good life, or practical knowledge committed to the dispositions and life-world of the individual human being? I think the interpretation made at this point is crucial for the way in which Socrates understood philosophy and at the same time the function of the philosopher-teacher – in regard to this specific question – from the viewpoint of education. It is difficult to interpret Socrates, however, due in part to the fact that the main sources are the writings of his disciple Plato.18 It is also known that dialogues written in different times convey quite different images of Socrates.19

17 Cf. Kotkavirta 2002. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his well known attack towards modern philosophy refers to this same ontological problem. “It is only in language that one can mean something by something”, states Wittgenstein (1953,18). Further, it is the just the way we use the linguistic expressions which give them that meaning which they have. Modern philosophical questions, Wittgenstein argues, are like an illness, and the task of the philosopher is to cure himself and others of this illness through a variety of intellectual ‘therapies’. What happens, Wittgenstein maintains, is that through philosophical questioning concerning, for example, concepts like ‘mind’, ‘reality’, ‘space’, etc., we confuse different ‘language games’ which function perfectly well in everyday life. On Wittgenstein’s view, says Curtis (1993), philosophical ‘what is____’ question is disordered use of language. It has its natural and original home in other circumstances where the blank get filled in with a demonstrative or with the name of an object (or family of objects). In philosophical context, however, Wittgenstein thereby would prefer to ask questions like for example “Under what circumstances do we use the word _____?”

18 In addition to Plato, about the life of Socrates was also written by Xenophon (427-355BC).

19 The chronology of Plato’s works – altogether 35 – is contestable. Usually they are divided into three categories: the earliest Socratic dialogues (e.g. Apology, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Ion, Charmides, Crito, Laches and Protagoras), the middle dialogues (e.g. Phaidon, Phaedrus, Meno, Parmenides, Symposium,
Based on Plato’s earlier dialogues, we can assume that Socrates’ philosophy on moral issues was about practical, never-ending process rather than about a universally valid idea of good life assumed to be built as an end product of knowing. As practical knowledge about good life is always ultimately about increased self-understanding linked to personal experience, individual dispositions and unique situations, transferring it directly to another person as universally valid knowledge by teaching was not possible for Socrates. It was perhaps due to this undogmatic basic approach to the nature of knowing that Socrates was known never to write a single line or teach any certain philosophical doctrine. For the same reason Socrates thinks that no-one can possess universally valid wisdom of virtue, as every human being needs to search for the truth and good life individually. Philosophical knowing did not mean to him superb, divine knowledge and its sophistic selling, but constant and persistent investigation of man’s own activity, consideration of its goals and means in the dialogic process of knowing to search for the goodness of life.

So, what does Socrates mean by his ironic statement that the only thing he knows is that he does not know? In addition to its paradoxical nature this seems perplexing, as in some dialogues it does not remain at all unclear how Socrates skillfully directs the discussion. There is hardly any reason to argue that in *Meno*, for example, Socrates does not know the right answer about how to double the surface area of a square. The slave boy finds that he knows about geometry just because of this teleological guidance of Socrates. For this reason I think that this problem of so-called ‘negative wisdom’ is related specifically to those moral questions discussed above and, in this very context, to Socrates’ own relation to

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hecatetus, Republic) and later dialogues (e.g. Philebus, Critias, Laws, Sophist, Timaeus, Statesman). In the history of philosophy, the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues has inspired ever since Aristotle (see e.g. Met.XIII, 1078b) a variety of interpretations of the degree to what his definitions of virtues should be considered as seeking universal validity. In later times, various disputable interpretations of Socrates have been presented by e.g. Marx, Nietzsche, Dewey, Wittgenstein, etc. For more on these thematic, see e.g. Neiman 1991, Pekarsky 1994, Kotkavirta 2002, Martens 1992, Kohan 2002.

20 Plato discusses his own relation to writing in the so-called philosophical excursion of his Seventh Letter (341b – 345c). Plato also refused to write theses on “issues that he was studying seriously”, as “. . . they are namely impossible to describe in words differently from other fields of knowledge.” By a thesis Plato probably means a uniform writing analysing and justifying some generally valid or universal doctrine. It might be that Plato wrote his dialogues for his students only as illustrations of the logic of philosophical inquiry itself. This interpretation, again, is highly problematic e.g. in the light of Plato’s well-known Theory of Forms. For more on this thematic, see e.g. Lindop 2002; Kotkavirta 2002.

21 See e.g. Men 84c.
his interlocutor as the ‘other’. If philosophy meant to Socrates a possibility for something new in each one’s own personal life and building on it, Socrates’ own knowledge of good life – even if he had known what it is for himself – as such does not have any direct connection with it in principle. Although good life, as based on knowing the virtue and acting upon it, is thus an absolutely personal project, it does not even here exclude the importance of a teacher as a positive catalyst. The ‘teachership’ for Socrates as connected with his art of questioning is not about sophistic, persuasive selling of his own knowledge, ‘putting sight in blind eyes’, but about inspiring the pupil’s own capacity to think, the midwifery of wisdom out of the vision already owned by the discussion partner in his immortal soul.23

The idea of not knowing and the maieutics essentially connected with it assume their deep educational meaning in this opportunity for the personally new built, however, on the basis of pedagogical influence. Actually, this dialectic midwifery linking Socrates and his interlocutor seems to rescue his philosophy for education and thus also – in terms of ancient Greece – for genuine growth. For Socrates, it means yielding to philosophical discussion, ‘a well-meaning dispute between friends’, in which he himself acts as a kind of hermeneutic mentor, yet basically unable to decide on what will precisely open up to the discussion partner from his own unique position. Hippocrates in Protagoras only realizes the problems involving the teaching of wisdom when he needs to talk to Socrates. But what Hippocrates finally thinks about this question inevitably remains an open issue, something unattainable for Socrates himself but which still could not have been achieved without him.24 This may be the reason why many of the dialogues written by Plato remain in perplexity, as if they consciously left it to the reader to think about the solutions. The midwifery means to Socrates the leading of the pupil into confusion and conflict as if something new and original can only arise from a genuine experience of this state of aporia. Only becoming aware of his own ignorance awakes him to think by himself.

However, I realize that this practical interpretation of Socrates above can be somewhat problematic. It seems to confront serious problems especially in Plato’s later dialogues such as Republic where, in the VII book, Plato presents his famous cave metaphor and narrates about the dialogue between Socrates and Glaukon.

23 See Rep. VII 518d.
24 See Prot. 337a-c.
Here the above-mentioned dual role of the philosopher-teacher is made explicitly obvious. In philosophical and mathematical matters, thinks Socrates, the pupil has in his own soul the capacity for thought that cannot be put there by the teacher through his teaching. To this ‘theoretical Socrates’, education means, however, the skill “to turn his eyes away from all burning and vanishing, until it is capable of watching the very being and its brightest part”, i.e. that what he has forgotten.25 This metaphysical statement by Plato explicitly assumes the universal and absolute nature of the world also in question of virtue and thus also confronts the ‘practical Socrates’ discussed above. According to this interpretation, the world is already known in advance by the philosopher teacher and ‘child’ as a transitional being – as expressed by Kennedy – with unbalanced dimensions of his soul to be made into adult by the help of the technology of education.26 I will return to these two conflicting images of Socrates and their relation to Plato’s philosophy later in this study.

2.3 Philosophy as the first teacher of the child

Among the ancient philosophers, Epicurus (341-270 BC.) takes a clear stand on the relation between the child and philosophy. Discussing good human life he, according to Diogenes Laertius, starts his letter to Menoeceus:

Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search of it when he has grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young alike ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the

25 Rep. VII 518c. See also Phaidon 72e – 76e; Men 81d – 82a, 85d – 86b. Plato introduces here the so-called theory of anamnesis that has given rise to many interpretations. Usually it is thought to refer to the idea of the soul’s immortality, where the soul has in its original existence been able to see the ultimate reality, the world of Forms, but which talent in its current mode of being is latent. See e.g. Pitkänen 1994, 63-64.

26 Kennedy 2006a, 63-75.
things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed towards attaining it.²⁷

Epicurus – who, according to his own words, acquainted himself with philosophy for the first time at the age of 14 – thought that irrespective of age, man needs to pursue things that lead to peace of mind and happiness. They are all that man needs. Similarly to the practically interpreted Socrates, philosophy is also to Epicurus about practical aspiration for a good life, “an activity that secures happy life through argumentation and discussions.”²⁸ According to Epicurus, happiness is not, however, something dependent on age. In maintaining that it is the foremost goal of human life, Epicurus clearly complies with Aristotle’s eudaimonia. Meanwhile an obvious conflict arises between them, when Epicurus justifies the right of philosophizing for children also by their – and not only adults’ – possibility to attain happiness. By this demand Epicurus seems to reject Aristotle’s deficit conception of childhood but it still remains open what the logical consequences of this possible stand would be for his pedagogical view.

Almost two thousand years later, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), a French nobleman, finds again the meaning of Socratic and especially Epicurean philosophical knowing. In his famous essay On the Education of Children Montaigne openly admires the thinking of Epicurus, especially his original ideas of the meaning of philosophy in education.²⁹ Montaigne strongly attacks the superficiality of medieval education that supersedes a person’s own understanding. He thinks that children should be taught things that nourish their souls, educate their nature and thinking and teach them “to know themselves and to die right and live right”.³⁰ It is very stupid, maintains Montaigne, to teach children “the science of stars and the movements of the 8th celestial” instead of self-knowledge, as life itself is directly present all the time. It needs to be taught first what makes the

²⁷ Laertius 1979, 649. Diogenes Laertius was an Epicurean philosopher who was likely to live in the 3rd century, writing in Greek on Greek philosophy. A good overall picture of the Epicurean philosophy of “living without being noticed” is given when Laertius cites Epicurus’ Sovran Maxims (Ibid. pp. 663-677
²⁸ An example of this is the natural philosophy of Epicurus, in which the basic motivation to exercise it was to overcome the fear of death and to achieve peace of mind in this way. Life becomes enjoyable, when man realises that death is nothing to us while we are living, and when it is, i.e. when we die, we do not exist any more.
²⁹ It is good to note here that Montaigne never was anything like an educator of all people, as he only discusses the domestic education of the nobility. Montaigne wrote his thesis for madam Diane de Foix, Countess of Gurson, with an eye to her son.
³⁰ Montaigne 1990, 65.
child wiser and better, and only after that logic, physics geometry, rhetoric, etc., Montaigne claims. This is why he thinks that philosophy is the first teacher of a child. Its useful teachings are related to what knowing and not knowing are all about, what the purpose of studying is, what bravery, self-control and justice mean, what the difference is between ambition and stinginess, servitude and subjection, despotism and freedom, what the signs of true and solid satisfaction are, or to what extent one should fear death, pain and shame.  

For Montaigne, philosophy is above all practical. It does not mean quarrelling concealed behind the “pale masks of smart quibblers”, but living a human everyday life being “the most joyful, spirited, cheerful and funniest thing that can be”. Montaigne’s philosophy takes, however, a reasonable attitude towards life, knowing how to lose and to give up without getting depressed, conceiving of it as noble recognition of the realities of life. But this very determination of philosophy as something easy, useful and fun also opens it up for children. Montaigne calls for philosophizing with children, as it teaches them – similarly to people at other ages – judgment, an ability to think by themselves and to act at the present time, and not only when life is already over. Instead of the dialectic problems of the smart ones, we shall, Montaigne maintains, take up with children the simple teachings of philosophy, and consider them whenever an opportunity arises. Montaigne thinks that a child is already capable of this when leaving breast-feeding, in fact much better than he learns to read and write.

2.4 Education for reason

Interesting characteristics related to children’s philosophical thinking can also be found in the educational thought of the English philosopher John Locke (1632-
In his writing *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* Locke stands up for the child’s right of rational treatment. In education this does not, however, mean the teaching of rules of deduction or logical operations, but participation in practices that require reasoning. According to Locke,

Right Reasoning is founded on something else than the *Predicaments* and *Predicables*, and does not consist in talking in *Mode* and *Figure* it self. ... if you would have your Son *Reason well*, let him read *Chillingworth*; and if you would have him speak well, let him be conversant in *Tully*, to give him the true *Idea of Eloquence*, and let him read those things that are well writ in *English*, to perfect his Style in the purity of our Language.

Locke thinks that teaching should be able to take into account the children’s age group and their natural inclinations. The children’s curiosity should be encouraged in various ways, so they get rid of the indifference that is lurking for them. Children’s questions – which Locke thinks adults could even learn something from – shall be taken seriously and an attempt shall be made to answer them truthfully and frankly. Locke also lays plenty of stress on the consideration of children’s power of comprehension and on answering their questions in such a way that it leads to new questions.

Locke sees the meaning of doing philosophy with children from the same point of view as Montaigne. Getting absorbed in lengthy theoretical philosophical considerations receives little support from him, as he thinks that the essential thing is its formulation in such a way that it touches and addresses the child himself. This is naturally connected with Locke’s view of the meaning of one’s own understanding to human beings in general. He thinks that anything that somehow serves the growth of our understanding is not only highly pleasing but at the same time useful in directing our thinking forward. According to Jurgen Oelkers, in his principle of *Reasoning* Locke comes to a conclusion that children can understand reasons “only if they have got experiences in understanding, no matter

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35 Together with Berkeley and Hume, John Locke was one of the most important British empiricists in the 17th century. In his main work *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* from 1690 he presents one of his main ideas, i.e. the primacy of experience based on our senses in criticism of the rationalists’ speculative “innate ideas”.


37 Ibid. (italics as in original).

38 Ibid.
how rudimentary these are.”^39 Locke refuses rationalist’s (e.g. Leibniz) ‘innate Principles’ and thus the platonic-christian theory of the soul. Instead, Locke argues the ‘soul’ as an empty, inner space – tabula rasa – which must be filled from outside. Thus Locke’s ‘subjectivity’ is learned because of the outside influence. This paradigmatic sensualistic theory of influence by Locke leads to the crucial question in the practice of modern education concerning particularly the methods of education, that is, how learning could be controlled so that its objectives could be effectively achieved.\(^40\)

Many of Locke’s requirements are repeated in the educational thinking of his Italian contemporary Gianbattista Vico (1668-1744). It is characterized by an effort towards a balance between the liberalization of traditional teaching and the child’s imagination.\(^41\) The emphasis on imagination in education is based on its meaning in efficient teaching. Vico thinks that it enables insight into the matters being studied and thereby thinking originally about them. Even logic and mathematic can free the child’s poetic imagination in addition to learning them, maintains Vico.\(^42\)

Vico is also opposed to the idea of underestimating children’s capacity to think. Children are rational, but they are missing the materials connected with showing and exercising it. Echoing Montaigne and Locke, for Vico this does not by any means mean the teaching of speculative and abstract philosophical criticism – which he sees as the main problem of education in his time – at too early an age. Vico thinks that the main purpose of propositional and impractical philosophical criticism is to purify the fundamental truths not only from all the distortions but also from mistaken suspicions and to expel from the mind secondary ideas based on probabilities. This is extremely damaging, because the exercise of common sense (il senso commune) has, according to Vico, an essential importance in education. This sense shared by “an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the entire human race” is “judgment without reflection”.\(^43\)

Common sense is historically generated from the base of necessities and utilities

\(^39\) Oelkers 1994.
\(^40\) Ibid.
\(^41\) Giambattista Vico was an Italian philosopher who had a great impact on the rise of modern philosophy, cultural philosophy and mythology. He presented his main idea in New Science (La Scienza Nuova, 1725). For education, his most interesting work is On the Study Methods of Our Time (1709), in which he compares ancient and modern education, among other things.
\(^42\) Vico 1994.
\(^43\) Vico 1970, 21, element XII.
of life. As immediately experienced maxims it forms the poetic truth (il vero poetico) of mankind taking shape before any philosophical reflection.

It is exactly the conception of common sense and its relation to reflection expressed in New Science on the basis of which, for Vico, the study of philosophical criticism that has been started too early will lead to the young persons’ inability to participate in the life of the community and to act in a wise and reasonable manner. Education should already concentrate in its early stages on offering such experiences that are relevant to the child’s own life in which their thinking and sound use of reason are possible. This is why, I think, Vico does not include the art of ‘topics’ in the contents of philosophical criticism or even reflection. Argumentation is a necessity and it should already be given preference in early education in the place of philosophical criticism, since the invention of arguments is by nature prior to the judgment of their validity, maintains Vico. Thus it seems that the idea of sound argumentation, i.e. reasoning in the context of the child’s personal experience, is naturally interwoven with Vico’s poetic truth. Children need to be allowed to notice the existence of arguments, to notice that beliefs have their grounds, to be encouraged to realize and identify the probable outcomes of their actions, states Vico. Only in a later phase of youth, after the children’s imagination and memory have been developed, it is the time for philosophical criticism, to get acquainted with the critical logic related to the validity of arguments, for instance.44

The Swiss Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) also emphasizes the central importance of the child’s thinking in education.45 In his letter to Greaves in 1819 he gives this advice to the mother of a small child: “Let the child not only be acted upon but let him be an agent in intellectual education.”46 Pestalozzi thinks that it is good to teach children to read, write, learn and repeat, but it is even better to encourage them to think for themselves; to teach them a habit of reflection – the concept obviously understood differently from Vico - to oppose thoughtless behavior, self-sufficiency and indifference in all circumstances. “To engender this habit, nothing is so effective as an early development in the infant mind of thought, regular, self-active thought.”47

45 Pestalozzi 1994.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
Similarly to Locke and Vico, Pestalozzi does not analyze very much the contents of thinking but stresses the importance of formal education, which meant for him the development of attentiveness, judgment and remembering. On the other hand, he thinks that any topic is suitable for directing the child to think, as the child is interested in everything. Meanwhile Pestalozzi indicates clearly the way in which children’s own thinking shall be supported: it does not mean by any means the talking or explaining of things to children, but entering into discussion with them. Pestalozzi gives quite detailed advice on this. It needs to be noted, however, that for Pestalozzi discussion would appear – largely due to the child-mother setup he examined – to be limited to something between the educator and educatee, while Locke, for instance, lays stress on interlocution between the educatees.

The requirement for independent and critical thinking is quite specifically connected with Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) philosophy of the Enlightenment. Kant’s educational thinking – and at the same time his idea of teaching philosophy as one of its special issues – is linked closely with his moral philosophy, which in turn is derived from the basic aspirations of his epistemological thinking. When Socrates searched for the good life, Kant, on the other hand, reasoned in his ‘critiques’ about the powers of human reason itself. The basic question of philosophy, “Who am I”, is reduced to the conditions of human knowing, doing and hoping.

In his transcendental metaphysics Kant derives the universally valid grounds for knowing in his categories of the pure reason from the ‘existence of being’ as the necessary conditions for the possibility of our observations and experiences. In the same way Kant also tries to reduce the moral activity of the human being to his own will. So, similarly to reason, human will also determines its object. This basic trend of Kant’s ethical thinking is culminated in the concepts of autonomy and freedom. By autonomy Kant means the independence of will from the objects of willing, freedom, as it is only determined by the laws imposed on it by itself. This manner for autonomy to be gives rise to its inevitable obligingness, its unconditional requirement for the observance of self-determined maxims and to suppress natural desires and external aims. Man is capable of controlling his naturally based impulses and moral dispositions through his reflectivity by restricting them and by developing his desire for things that are not objects of his desire.

48 Cf. Salomaa 1931.
instinctively. For Kant this would, however, appear to mean a gradual process of Bildung, slowly proceeding in the chain of generations and reaching for perfection through education.

Uniformity can only result when all men act according to the same principles, which principles would have to become with them a second nature. What we can do is to work out a scheme of education better suited to further its objects, and hand down to posterity directions as to how this scheme may be carried into practice, so that they might be able to realize it gradually.49

The human ability of reflection gives rise to the practical problem of freedom: which objects of willing should we choose and how should we adjust our will accordingly; what we ought and ought not to do? Realization of this possibility to choose leads us to known maxims of the categorical imperative that generate itself, i.e. the free will or autonomy of man: “Only act upon the maxim so that you can hope at the same time that it becomes a general law” and “Act in such a way that you always use the human being, the person of both yourself and all other people, at the same time as an end and never as a tool.” Differently from animal nature, man is thus capable with the help of his own reason to create his own ‘kingdom of ends’ that is independent from the external. So far as I can see, this overall context also determines Kant’s thinking on education and, for instance, his idea of teaching philosophy.

Man is the only being that needs education, states Kant at the beginning of his Education.50 Man, differently from animals acting as directed by their instincts, needs reason of his own to direct his activity. As a child is still undeveloped when he is born to the world, he is not yet capable of this, and therefore needs to be educated. Differently from a child, an adult is capable of controlling and adjusting his impulses, as has an authoritative will over them, his own voice that the child is still missing.51 Thus, for Kant, education means nurturing, tending and feeding of

49 Kant 1992, 9; see also pp. 10-11.
50 Kant 1992, This booklet on education (Über Pädagogik) by Kant is originally based on Kant’s lecture notes that were compiled and published by Theodor Rink – Kant’s disciple and friend – one year before Kant’s death in 1803. The book in question cannot be considered a systematic overall presentation of Kant’s educational thinking. See “Introduction” by Foley Rhys Davids in Kant 1992.
51 According to Tamar Shapiro (2001), the justification of education is not without problems in the light of Kant’s ethics. According to Kant’s categorical imperative, we should namely act in the world as if it were a kingdom of ends, in which every human being shall be basically thought of as an autonomous agent who is capable of deciding on his own business and deeds. We need to respect others’ choices, even if we do not agree with them. The categorical imperative as such excludes the possibility to choose
the child and culture (Bildung) by discipline, instruction and moral training. By discipline the unruliness of our animal nature is restrained from getting the better either as an individual or as a member of the society. By the help of culture our ability as the “possession of a faculty” is “capable of being adapted to various ends”. For man to be able to conduct himself in society, education needs to equip him with discretion (Klugheit), states Kant. By this Kant refers to relations between people (Civilisierung) in terms of cultivated manners, courtesy and tact.52

According to Kant, moral exercise shall belong to education as one of its parts. By it he means the exercise of man’s dispositions in such a way that he chooses good objectives, ones that everyone can accept and which could be goals for everyone at the same time. According to Kant, the seeds in man must be grown by developing and cultivating the natural abilities and talents hidden in him to their full measure. Within the moral law this is the universal duty of man. Children need to be educated not only for this day, but for a better future in such way that is contained in the gradually complemented idea of humanity as a cos-

52 It should be noticed that these same notions were also discussed by some contemporaries of Kant like Schleiermacher and Herbart. See more in Chapter 8 of this study.

on behalf of others, even if they are not capable of making good choices themselves. Based on the categorical imperative, we are under an obligation to promote the good of others, but it still needs to based on their own choices. According to Shapiro, Kant’s categorical imperative would not justify, for instance, intuitive paternalistic activity directed at children. Shapiro argues that on the basis of Kant, it is not the children as such that are an obstacle to their morality but their predicament. “Being a practical agent is hard enough; being an undeveloped one is even harder. Our conduct toward children should express this attitude; it should reflect an appreciation of the additional challenge children face in deciding what to do and what to say.” According to Shapiro’s so called ‘principle of Kantian nonideal theory’, the dependence of children must be thought of as an enemy of the adult. “The kingdom of ends must be a place in which every person’s voice counts, but childhood prevents some from having voices of their own. Nonideal theory shows us how to acknowledge this fact without fully accepting it. It tells us to accord children a special status while striving to make them unworthy of it.” We therefore need to do everything we can as adults to help them to find their way out of childhood themselves, i.e. to find the principles of their own life by themselves. The negative obligation of the adult is not to prevent them in this effort. In practice this means that children shall be treated as human beings who share with us the human problem of justifying our actions. Shapiro thinks that children cannot be to us objects with no possibility for a reason of their own. Our positive obligation is to make it our goal to help children to overcome their dependence. Education needs to make an attempt as far as possible to make children conscious of their natural authority and power in relation to themselves and of its proper exercise. The child shall not be deprived of his feeling of personal responsibility and freedom. Children therefore also need to be made as clear as possible the grounds on the basis of which their activity is restricted. The goal of adults is not to control children but to free them to control themselves. (Shapiro 2001).
mopolitan autonomous being. Autonomy is for Kant a regulative idea that directs education.

Kant thinks that education as an activity is a skill whose origin and concrete actualization can be either mechanical, random and unplanned, directed by the individual conditions at any given time, or it involves the exercise of judgment. According to Kant, “if education is to develop human nature so that it may attain the object of its being, it must involve the exercise of judgment.” Education aiming at autonomy shall proceed in phases so that the child shall first learn submission and positive obedience. Only after this the child shall be allowed a limited amount of freedom and opportunities to think by himself. For Kant this gives rise to one of the major problems of education: “How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?” How to combine the submission of the child to the necessary restrictions and the child’s ability to exercise his own free will? According to Kant, the pupil shall be accustomed to tolerate the restriction of his freedom, yet he must be guided at the same time to use his own freedom right. Without this all education is mechanical and without it the child will never be able to use his freedom after his education is over. Firstly, the child shall already be allowed some freedom at an early age, yet in such a way that he does not hurt himself nor does he restrict others’ freedom through his activity. Secondly, he must be shown that he can only achieve his goal if he allows others to achieve theirs. Thirdly, we must prove it to the child that the only reason he needs compulsion is for him later to learn to use his freedom right independently of others.

When Kant speaks about reason, he reminds that the child needs guidance in it. Here Kant puts the emphasis on the Socratic method. Socrates provides an example of how ideas can be midwifed from the child’s own reason, Kant says.

54 Ibid., 13.
55 Ibid., 27.
56 Ibid., 27-29. Education is, according to Kant, about “The general cultivation of the mental faculties, as distinguished from the cultivation of particular mental faculties. This aims at skill and perfection, and has not for its object the imparting of any particular knowledge, but the general strengthening of the mental faculties.” (Kant 1992, 77, italics as in original) By the general cultivation of the mental faculties Kant refers to understanding (as the knowledge of the general), judgment (as the application of the general to the particular) and reason (as the power of understanding the connection between the general and particular). By the particular mental faculties Kant means such inferior powers of understanding as the faculty of cognition, of the senses, the imagination, memory and power of attention, and intelligence. (Ibid., 78.) They are useless as such and they shall therefore only be developed in connection with higher faculties. For example intelligence divorced from judgment produces nothing but foolishness, states Kant. (Ibid., 71.)
Children shall not, however, be encouraged to constant reasoning nor shall we reason on issues that are beyond their comprehension. Children need not, for instance, be aware of all the principles that are connected with their education, unlike the principles connected with duties which they need to understand. It is up to the adult to try and elicit their own ideas founded on reason, rather than introduce to them their own ones. The Socratic Method should form the rule for the catechetical method, Kant demands.\textsuperscript{57}

Kant focuses, similarly to Locke and obviously influenced by Rousseau, on also taking the child’s age into account from the very beginning in the moral exercise. It shall adhere to the \textit{true} events encountered by the child, considering their causes and consequences. Children have a natural understanding, ‘natural common sense’, which is why they are capable of considering moral issues. As the moral culture is based on ‘maxims’, all will is corrupted if the moral exercise is based on discipline only. Morality does not belong in the domain of discipline. The child shall always understand the principle of the activity at hand and its relation to obligation. The child shall learn to act in accordance with ‘maxims’, not according to random or changing desires or habits, maintains Kant.\textsuperscript{58} Here the small child needs the assistance of teachers and parents, because “maxims’ ought to originate in the human being as such.”\textsuperscript{59}

Kant’s education aspiring for autonomy is tightly connected with the formation of the child’s moral character. The ability to control one’s impulsiveness by means of reflectivity, by one’s ‘own reason’, connects autonomy with obligation – towards one’s own self on one hand, and other people on the other hand. Kant means by this that the child should learn to preserve human dignity in himself and, on the other hand, to respect others’ rights. Kant underlines the meaning of obedience, truthfulness and sociality as principal characteristics of character formation. It is important to offer the child opportunities to establish friendly relationships with other children, for instance. The teacher should also appreciate the child for his nature, not for his talent. Thus human nature is ultimately constituted to Kant in relation to how he acts in accordance with ‘maxims’.\textsuperscript{60} Similarly to Vico, Kant also points out, however, that education involves the child’s nature and not the adult citizen’s nature.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 100-104.
A child should be clever but only as a child. He should not ape the manners of his elders. For a child to provide himself with moral sentences proper to manhood is to go quite beyond his province and to become merely an imitator. He ought to have merely the understanding of a child, and not seek to display it too early. A precocious child will never become a man of insight and clear understanding.\textsuperscript{61}

To conclude, the core idea in Kant’s educational thinking is the requirement for autonomy and, linked to it, for freedom. As the child is not alone capable to restrain and control his natural impulsiveness by means of his own reason, he needs education. In practice this would appear to mean to Kant a paradoxical process of controlling compulsion and freedom that proceeds gradually and takes into account the child’s various phases of life as well as strongly respects the child’s own world of experience. The principles of Kant’s educational thinking are seen particularly well in his ideas of teaching philosophy. Its main aim is not at all to learn philosophy in detached thoughts or pieces of information, but to learn to think on one’s own, to learn to philosophize. I will return this special theme in the case of not only Kant but also Hegel in Chapter 6.\textsuperscript{62}

In the early 20th century, Leonard Nelson (1882-1927), the Neo-Kantian Professor of Philosophy at the University of Gottingen, developed the so-called Socratic Method. In addition to Plato’s early Socrates, Nelson was strongly impressed by the thinking of Kant and Jacob Friedrich Fries. It is quite evident that Nelson was also familiar with the thematic of hermeneutic pedagogy as presented by Herman Nohl and Wilhelm Dilthey, for instance. For Nelson, philosophy is not the art of teaching about philosophers but of making philosophers of the students by getting them to think for themselves, to practice their ‘independent art of abstraction’. Here Nelson heavily leans on Kant’s ‘critiques’ as well as Socrates’ maieutics, still interpreting him quite differently from e.g. Kierkegaard earlier. For Nelson, the Socratic Method was explicitly politically oriented, as it was also meant to enable ordinary people with no academic philosophical background to philosophize with the aim of enriching and informing civic life. Nelson assumed that by following the strict rules of dialogue – which all students had to be committed to in the process of inquiry – the participants will win knowledge about

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 93.

\textsuperscript{62} Quite a lengthy presentation of Kant’s thinking is justified in this introductory chapter, as I think that it is the very thing that opens up the central problematic involving the possibility of teaching philosophy.
their own inner experience – without referring e.g. to the ideas of any former philosopher – and develop insights into the truth concerning a philosophical question. The process is facilitated by a philosopher who steers the dialogue without impinging on the substance of the inquiry. Still the role of facilitator is of utmost importance, because students must be brought to discover and confess their own ignorance thus cutting the roots of their dogmatism. “This art of forcing minds to freedom constitutes the first secret of the Socratic method”, writes Nelson.63 Here Nelson explicitly refers to the Kantian problem of pedagogical action:

If the end of education is rational self-determination, i.e. a condition in which the individual does not allow his behavior to be determined by outside influences but judges and acts according to his own insight, the question arises: How can we affect a person by outside influences so that he will not permit himself to be affected by outside influences? We must resolve this paradox or abandon the task of education.64

Nelson thinks that teaching philosophy is about teaching philosophizing, not about offering solutions but about learning a method connected with achieving them. From the teacher’s point of view, this means responsibilization of students from the very beginning, so that they can finally act independently without their teacher’s guidance. This aim suggested by Nelson can also be formulated in such a way that the pedagogical relationship is – paradoxically – determined by an effort to abolish this relationship as such. In terms of concrete acts, this means, among other things, refrain from answering the students’ questions or from asking ‘philosophical questions’ themselves. Instead, the teacher sets the interplay of question and answer going between students so that they will gradually find the presuppositions underlying their convictions. This way, says Nelson following the key idea of Socrates, the students can be brought “to realize that they actually know what they did not know they knew”.65 The immediate material of philosophy is language presenting concepts through words. In its wealth, says Nelson, reason dwells oncealted but “reflection discloses this rational knowledge by separating it from intuitive notions”.66

63 Nelson 1993 (italics as in original).
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. Martens (1993) cautiously suggests Nelson as forming a kind of bridge between formal (e.g. Hegel) and personal (e.g. Kierkegaard) approaches of teaching philosophizing thus also completing the
In 1922 Nelson together with his companion Minna Specht (1879-1951) founded the one and only philosophical school for children in modern times as well as the academy for adult-education (Philosophisch Politische Akademie, PPA). The school called ‘Walkemühle’ was meant for children aged about 8 to 14. It was situated first near Göttingen but emigrated later in 1933 to Denmark and finally in 1938 to Great Britain due to its radically democratic and anti-Nazi approach. During the war the school was destroyed by a German bomb, but the PPA was re-established in Germany in 1949.

Nelson’s work was continued by his disciple and friend already from the times of Walkemühle, Gustav Heckmann (1898-1996). He developed the Socratic Method into the form of a meta-discussion (Sokratische Gepräch) and as a Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogy at the University of Hannover from 1946 until 1982, worked intensively in the field of teacher education. In those turbulent circumstances of post-war Germany, Heckmann’s concern was to educate independent teachers who will be able through the philosophical inquiry to elicit reasoned judgments among children and adults. Largely due to Heckmann’s efforts, the tradition of Socratic Dialogue revived and spread to schools in Germany and the Netherlands.

2.5 Philosophy and the unique experience of the child

The Dane Soeren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) ideas of the relationship between philosophy and childhood needs to be seen in terms of his critical reaction towards the philosophy of spirit of his teacher Hegel. On the other hand, Hegel’s ideas in this question were largely based on his critique towards the intuitionist thoughts of the contemporary pedagogues (e.g. Rousseau and Pestalozzi) about learning being based on the subjective experiences rising from immediate life situations. As discussed later in this study, Hegel maintains that any more or less coincidental content arising from the life situation of the educand does not provide any grounds for using it as the basis, as it is quite as one-sided as rote learning based only on reception and remembering. According to Ekkehard Martens, Kierkegaard thinks that Hegel’s philosophy, as absolute thinking, destroys per-

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power of human reason. See also Martens 1990, 10. For more on the Socratic Method, see e.g. Saran & Neisser 2004.

67 See more e.g. in Saran & Neisser 2004; Martens 1990.
sonal thinking and the individual existence of man. So Kierkegaard seems to turn back to the subjective. Echoing the ideas of Epicurus and Montaigne, Kierkegaard discusses in particular childhood as an age lost by the adults. Two fundamental false conclusions are very commonly connected with it, maintains Kierkegaard. Firstly, it is thought that the earliest stages of human life are only meaningful in the sense that they provide a basis for the next stages. As these stages of life are not thought to have an internal value of their own, they should be bypassed as quickly as possible. Kierkegaard thinks that this attitude is typical of childhood in particular.

Although family life is an important phase in the child’s development, Kierkegaard also thinks that it involves several restrictions. The parents often see childhood as a hard age, at which time it is their demanding task to attend to the child’s welfare. The parents try to amuse their children by telling them repeatedly the same stories which Kierkegaard thinks are ‘empty’ or by reading passivating stories to them. Kierkegaard thinks, however, that this kind of ‘poetic rinse water’ never gives children the opportunity to ask and think.

Another fundamental mistake mentioned by Kierkegaard is the adults’ aim to equip the children with so-called useful knowledge. The adults tell stories to the children with the purpose of teaching them foreign languages, teaching them something about the conditions in distant countries or to give them advice on listening to music. And the story always ends in the statement “but you do understand, don’t you, that this is only a story.” For Kierkegaard himself, childhood is, however, something uniquely rich and valuable as such. As children are largely dependent on their teachers, the latter should master the Socratic manner of asking and they should also be capable of reproducing their own experience of childhood. The teachers should know what life requires in childhood and when and how to satisfy those requirements.

Traditional moral education of the child and the implantation of useful knowledge means fully atomized knowledge to Kierkegaard. Instead teachers should know how to encourage children to think about issues considered important by them and be able to inspire the desire to ask in them. Special attention should be taken to choose appropriate stories for the children. For children to be

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68 Martens 1993.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
able to experience their lives as meaningful, they should feed their curiosity, astonishment and desire to understand and to bring something poetic into the children’s everyday life. “The whole point is to bring the poetic into touch with their lives in every possible way, to exercise a power of enchantment to let a glimpse appear at the most unexpected moment and then vanish.” Kierkegaard thinks that science cannot compensate for imagination. Imagination of mermaids as well as ‘freedom and dignity’ has – differently from science – a much greater significance in our lives. 

Children’s poetic and intellectual nourishment requires constant sensitivity to what they hear and see. A serious attitude towards children and their existence means that one must live with children openly, freely and confidentially. For Kierkegaard, philosophizing with children is above all about realizing the value of unexpectedness. Philosophizing by allowing unexpected ‘flashes’ leads to the fact that it shall not be planned beforehand and that exercising it in the strictly formal framework of school life, for instance, is impossible.

Bernard Groethuysen (1889-1946) shares Kierkegaard’s idea of the intrinsic value of childhood. He thinks that it is quite erroneous to divide human life into phases that are different in value in relation to each other. In them only adulthood is seen in terms of normality, for which maturity is developed in childhood and from which we diverge in old age. Groethuysen thinks that life needs to be seen as a totality that appears in its full value at its every moment. Old age and childhood manifest life at the same strength as adulthood does. This unity of life leads to the fact that through children’s expressions we do not only understand the value of childhood but also the value of life as a whole. Children also need to be asked what life and the world are. By neglecting children’s observations and understanding, we also deny ourselves the possibility to understand.

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72 Ibid.
73 To show that imagination does not require toys, for instance, Kierkegaard describes his own youth: “When one is a child and has not toys, one is well provided for, because then imagination takes over. I still remember with amazement my childhood top, the only toy I had – what acquaintance was as interesting as this one? Yet it did not belong wholly to me. It had, so to say, its official duties as actual top, and only then in its leisure did it become my diversion. In our day there are complaints that an official holds too many offices, but this one encompassed all.” (Ibid.). On the detrimental nature of science and especially on its relationship to childhood and on the relationship between poetry and childhood, see e.g. Ende 1993.
74 Groethuysen 1994.
75 Ibid.
Groethuysen sees similarities between the child’s experience and metaphysics. The metaphysician aims at understanding the world like a child, trying to exclude his previous knowledge and interpretations. If, however, an adult tries to bring back to his mind what it was like to be a child, he usually interprets his experience in the light of his later experiences. Thus childhood appears to him as something a little obscure and incompatible with later experiences. The child himself does not originally feel this way. If we wish to reach an original and authentic experience of childhood, we shall, according to Groethuysen, listen to the children patiently and attentively and refrain from educating them with our more ‘realistic’ perspectives of the adult world. It may be possible for a metaphysician to return to childhood, as he does not believe in the knowledge of life and as he does not think of children’s interpretations as something based on knowledge.76

Kierkegaard and Groethuysen place emphasis on the child’s philosophical disposition, his sensitivity to achieve an authentic metaphysical experience. Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) goes even further. In his writing entitled On Philosophical Dispositions in Children Jaspers demands that philosophy shall belong to the human being from quite a young age onward. It shall be available to all, but constructed by each and everyone himself, freely created by each and everyone. Jaspers considers that every human being, including children, is able to penetrate into the depths of philosophy. The clearest proof of man’s internal philosophical sensitivity is the excellent questions that children ask. By going straight into the core of philosophy they actually grasp something that the adults often have already lost.77

76 Groethuysen tries to shed light on such a metaphysical initial experience by examining it through a flash-like childhood experience such as that described by Kierkegaard:
“One time ... he realized that alongside of his world there was something else. Soeren Kierkegaard still knew nothing of night at that time. He knew it only at a later date. But one morning he awoke very early and there was a greyish light in the room, also a large bed, and not the slightest noise. He was no longer able to distinguish different directions. He no longer knew what was in front and what was behind, or where the door was, or the window. He abandoned himself completely to the haziness in which all was bathed. It was as if he had discovered something entirely new. It might have been called the soul, or else the sense of being carried along by something, and also the feeling of an absolute solitude. It seems to him now that, it was only then for the first time that he had been fully himself and that, today also, he would have only to forget many things in order to be once again what he was then. There are thus moments in life from which everything happening afterward seems a series of dreams from which one awakens with the same feeling as one about to fall asleep.” (Ibid.)

77 Jaspers 1994. Jaspers gives several examples of children’s philosophical questions. In the first example, a boy yells in amazement: “I keep trying to think that I am somebody else, but I’m always myself”. Jaspers thinks that the child touches here on a universal source of certainty, namely the knowing of
According to Jaspers, it is possible through the experiences of children to discover their philosophy. He expels the possibility of children’s questions and wonderments as random things or adult imitation. Unfortunately, states Jaspers, children do seem to decline when they grow older:

With the years we seem to enter into a prison of conventions and opinions, concealments and unquestioned acceptance, and there we lose the candour of childhood. The child still reacts spontaneously to the spontaneity of life; the child feels and sees and inquires into things which soon disappear from his vision. He forgets what for a moment was revealed to him and is surprised when grownups later tell him what he said and what questions he asked.

Like Kierkegaard, the German educational philosopher Herman Nohl (1879-1960) also criticizes the alienation of school from the problems experienced by the child in real life. Nohl thinks that the school needs to be a place where everyone shall have an opportunity to study life. The child needs to be given a possibility for philosophical wondering and reasoning native to her. Nohl thinks that philosophy itself shall also not be one-sidedly historically oriented or just a theory of knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), in which no-one except the professional philosophers at universities are interested. Rather, philosophy should be cultural philosophy, repeatedly questioning, similarly to Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, the meaning of the life in which we participate. Similarly to e.g. Vico, Nohl also thinks that philosophy shall be based on real life interests and not take the academic requirement for ‘ideal objectivity’ as its basis.78

However, when Nohl’s thinking is placed in the totality of his educational views, it becomes obvious that he represents quite a different position in these ideas if compared e.g. with Kierkegaard, Groethuysen and Jaspers. Even though Nohl considers the subjective life of the child to be the main criterion of peda-

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gogical action, he also finds the teacher as its indispensable moment. As argued by Pauli Siljander, for Nohl this antinomic relation between educator and educatee forms the unique pedagogical relationship where the intentions of both sides are equally constitutive. In this tensional pedagogical relation where the objective encounters the subjective, the educator is responsible to the child in the first place but also as a transformer between the objective and subjective. In this way, for Nohl, the aim of pedagogical action is the sublation (Aufhebung) of that antinomy.

2.6 Conclusion

The excursion above reveals the historical and relational nature of the child-adult relationship as well as ‘philosophy’ and through them also implies the basic problematic of pedagogical interaction. With certain prudence it is still possible to give shape to a kind of main thread – arising exactly from the ambivalence of its elements — in the bottom line of this question. Quite often philosophy has been inclined to manifest itself as pedagogically valuable, when it has been determined as something practical not only from the adult’s perspective but especially from the child’s personal point of view. When philosophy is seen in terms of searching for the child’s own ‘voice’, challenging him in person, and being significant for his everyday life, it has had to be conditioned on a certain implicit conception of child and adult. This might be the cause why philosophy stressing judgment, common sense, insight, personal experience and personal knowledge, imagination, understanding and wisdom – as Martens describes the characteristics of so-called Continental philosophy – has so often also aroused educational considerations. Especially, this thread can be recognized in the existentialism of the 19th century. Asking what good life means from the child’s own point of view, on the basis of the child’s personal experience, constructs a condition for the dialogical encounter between child – as a genuine ‘other’ – and adult. This leads to the idea of doing philosophy in symmetrical connectedness where the process of transformation of

79 Siljander 1988, 33-34.
80 Martens 1993. Continental philosophy as separated from the Anglo-American tradition (i.e. analytic philosophy and pragmatism) is a somewhat unclear conception. According to Solomon – referred to by Martens – it amounts to phenomenology (e.g. Husserl, Heidegger, Merley-Ponty), Marxism, existentialism (e.g. Kierkegaard, Sartre), structuralism (e.g. Foucauls, Derrida), Lebensphilosophie / philosophy of life (e.g. Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset), hermeneutics (e.g. Dilthey, Gadamer, Ricoeur), Frankfurt School (e.g. Habermas) and German Idealism (e.g. Kant, Hegel).
both sides is assumed. This line of thinking culminates in the requirement for the children's right to consider issues of their own lives that are actual at any given moment, here and now. The core of such thinking lies in the fact that it determines childhood as a valuable phase of life *sui generis*, therefore taking an extremely appreciating attitude to the child's authentic experience. These existential emphases together with an anticipation of children’s rights are clearly visible in Kierkegaard, Groethuysen and Jaspers. For them, philosophizing with children enables hearing the child’s unique way of experiencing without involving systematically any active interventions by the educator, or that they are even denied. The difference of the child manifested in this demand needs to be seen as a difference of kind, not as a difference of degree. This pre-understanding of the nature of philosophy and its role in education echoes the rejection of the so-called deficit image of child and thereby questions the constitution of Western modern enlightened subjectivity. In the background of this view lies the assumption that the structure of pedagogical interaction should be symmetrical by nature. The problem still arises if this kind of interaction can be understood as pedagogical in the first place.

Parallel to this symmetrical approach, whenever conceptual propositionality or theoreticallity of modernity aspiring for general validity or axiomatic harmony has been connected more or less implicitly with philosophy, it has had to withdraw from its position in the education of the young. In this respect, analytic philosophy with its logico-linguistic analysis searching for the ‘clearness’ of propositions by their logical consistency and empirical verifiability might be a good example of this vision of human reason. From the child’s point of view, philosophy has lost its touchingness, it has been hidden – in Montaigne’s words – “behind abstract masks as a ghost lurking in the middle of the thistles”. Thus the knowledge that philosophy is searching for seems to remain in an antinomic position in relation to the child looking for meaning or new understanding. It is understandable that philosophy with this kind of an orientation, when directly taught to children, can only have manifested as something that – from the perspective of this subjective approach – spoils the joys of childhood.

From the viewpoint of modern pedagogical thinking, however, the above ‘child-centered’, organic approach leads to quite a problematic situation. At the first glance, if focusing solely on the subjective and personal aspect of philosophizing seems to ignore its objective, non-personal aspect, the status of tradition in education. In this case, on the other hand, the subjective remains in a conflicting and antinomic relation to the objective. Philosophy seems to be ‘romanti-
cized’, losing the basic idea of responsible educative influence, the characteristic of modern educational thinking. In principle, it would thus appear to lose education itself. The decisive condition for this argument seems to be that subjectivity – the nature of human being – is predefined, that it exists before education instead of having been left radically open. For Kant, especially, Socratic philosophizing is not until it is adapted to the child’s immediate (objective) tradition in the process of education means explicitly the active direction of the not-yet-of-age child to ‘autonomous adulthood’. Even though this principle includes the aspect of the ‘child’s nature’ to be taken into account, it still determines childhood as projecting to it the priority of Western rationalistic selfhood. The ‘child’s nature’ is assumed to consist of impulsiveness and incompleteness needing education to attain rational control of her innate desires and appetite. Thus doing philosophy in education serves the intentional formation of the child’s liminal subjectivity towards rational, autonomous citizenship and is seen as a prerequisite for exceeding tradition. The pedagogical interaction comes to be understood as the teleological and causal influencing. The paradigmatic idea of asymmetrical educative adaptation of the dialectic tension formed between its subjective (free will) and objective functions thus leads to a situation called the pedagogical paradox. This antinomy as basically consequential of the dualistic assumption of pedagogical interaction, is, of course, not related only to the teaching of philosophy, as it is manifested in the over all structure of pedagogical interaction of modernity.

The analysis above is coherent with and supported by Oelkers’ idea concerning the Western educational theorizing in general. According to him, it can be captured in two basic paradigms derived either from the concept of ‘influence’ (on body and mind) or from the concept of ‘development’ (of body and mind), “and most controversies in education still have to do with the struggle of these two paradigms.” The modern psychological subjectivity is based, says Oelkers, on the idea of learned mind, constructed ‘inner world’ or Lockean tabula rasa as an opposite to Aristotelian soul as both ‘cause and reason’. This gives rise to the idea of outside ‘influencing’, in educating reasonable citizens for civil society. On the level of educational theory this means that

82 See Biesta 2006, 151.
…”educational” is something happening between persons that constructs inner (mental) states from the outside. Remote objectives are to be attained through constant influence exerted by one person on the other, and this process is essentially regarded as the formation of habits which can slowly but consequently be built up towards the attitudes and the knowledge aimed at. This terminological framework changes both roles, that of the child and that of the pedagogue, lastingly: the child becomes the object of an external construction, the educator becomes a designer, who is no longer required to show consideration for “psychic” preconditions. He is a master of tabula rasa as far as it is under his control.84

On the other hand, the ‘development’ paradigm as exemplified in Rousseau’s Contract Social and Emile, represents “the idea of natural education … which is to reconcile man with his nature by making the development of nature the basic maxim of pedagogical reflection.”85 Rousseau is educating man, not the citizen, and just because nature develops itself in man “the art of education consists in following its track.” According to Oelkers both of these educational paradigms – the idea of active influence as well as the idea of natural development – “presuppose a distinct and demarcated inner space which can open up or close itself to the outside”, also both paradigms being teleological in nature. Their difference is thus of emphasis: influence is concerned with the psychological constructions of inner space; development is concerned with autonomous, inner actions. The problem of both of these paradigms is that they assume ‘inner space’ – the concept rooted in platonic-christian imaginary idea of ‘soul’ – as transparent, available entity which, as Oelkers argues, is still not possible. Education cannot “be regarded as a construction of inner states which, through continuous ‘influences’, gradually, but constantly approach ideal target state.” Also the idea of natural development “is ruinous for any theory of education if it denies any form of ‘influence’ as illegitimate or futile.”86 From the base of his argumentation, Oelkers seems to follow that practical Socrates of Platos’ early dialogues discussed earlier in this excursion. In brief, Oelker’s ‘education’ – if being really educative as reaching genuinely new, not just reproducing the Same – cannot be reduced to teleological action but still reserves the place for an educator.

84 Ibid. (italics as in original).
85 Ibid. (italics as in original).
86 Ibid.
To conclude, it is evident that the pedagogical value of philosophy has to be basically seen as depending on the ontological nature of philosophical knowing and, on the other hand, the nature of human subjectivity implied in the cultural and historical conception of the adult-child relationship thus inherently intertwined in pedagogical action. The position in which we unavoidably come to locate ourselves in relation to these ambivalent, metaphilosophical and subjectivity based elements of education as well as how we, on this basis, understand their internal relations would naturally appear to solve our view of the place of philosophy in pedagogical practice. ‘Dasein’ – to use here this notion coined by Heidegger as an analogical device – articulates and signifies the context, working as an unnoticeable and undefined ‘dictator’ of what comes up to us.\(^{87}\)

As argued by Kennedy, the narration of child reflects the evolution of Western adult subjectivity. It seems to me that the discussion of doing philosophy with children from antiquity to modern times described above confusingly reveals its underlying, antinomian texture where “development of the self is understood as a struggle between darkness and light, good and evil, the animal and the divine, and childhood is the first battleground.”\(^{88}\) Rousseau’s and Kierkegaard’s child-adult reflects a different relation from the one of Locke and Kant, for instance. Just because of this inconsistency we may succeed to shed light on this phenomenon with its underlying conceptual assumptions intertwined in education. Connected to this genealogy also philosophy in educational context seems to have got its contestable nature and position.

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\(^{87}\) Heidegger 1962, 167.

\(^{88}\) Kennedy 2006b, 1.
3 Philosophy for Children as a quest for thinking in education

3.1 Introduction

Education for thinking is at the heart of P4C. According to Matthew Lipman, the strengthening of the child’s reasoning and moral judgment should be the chief business of the school. This provides him an opportunity to connect philosophy and education. In the late 60’s Lipman thought that the most appropriate source of assistance in his urge to reflectivity are logic and ethics, the subdivisions of philosophy. The problem still was how these branches of philosophy could be made available to children.

In this chapter I will discuss the emergence of the main principles of P4C. I will also offer a short review of the curriculum of the program, i.e. the practical reproduction of philosophical tradition to which Lipman refers to when calling P4C as the ‘dramatization of philosophy’. In this relation and in his views of argumentation and knowing, Lipman would appear to adhere to the practically oriented Socratic tradition, but also to certain ideas of classic American pragmatism. Actually this chapter provides a background for the next one especially from that perspective but also for the other parts of this study.

3.2 Schooling without thinking

In the 1970’s, Lipman sensed the problems of the American school system more deeply than before. Although the crisis of the school system was acknowledged quite commonly and there was increased dissatisfaction with Piagetian orthodoxy, the remedies suggested mostly by the conservative circles did not satisfy Lipman. According to them, very little or nothing worth learning was learnt in American schools. Education was only seen as having an instrumental value, it was “like a paper cup – something you acquire for only as long as you need it and throw away when you are done with it.” Lipman thought that the remedies offered

were laughable and naive measures, such as lists of things that every educated person should master.90

On the other hand, Lipman also would not accept the defeatism that had overcome many teachers defending themselves against the criticism leveled against them by blaming unfavorable circumstances. Many people thought that the right things were being taught in American schools with the right methods, but the pupils just could not learn due to numerous simultaneously influential factors such as the television, drugs, sex, family problems, etc.

How can the histories of Rome and Greece seem relevant to our students when their parents don’t bother to vote? It is not we who have lost our way but the world we live in.91

Lipman thinks that both the critics and supporters of the school had adopted a similar, erroneous educational tradition. According to this standard paradigm – which he also calls the normal practice – it is assumed that education is about transferring knowledge from those who know to those who do not know. Knowledge about the world is thought to be clear and without problems. It is also thought that all existing knowledge about the world can be achieved, that the learning of the pupils is only based on the teacher’s knowledge. It is assumed that pupils adopt knowledge by absorbing and storing information in their memory, that “an educated mind is a well-stocked mind.”92 These dominating assumptions lead to a situation that children who begin their formal education are lively, curious, imaginative and inquisitive, but gradually a decline sets in, and by the time they reach fourth or fifth grade they become passive, incurious, uncritical and thoughtless, states Lipman.93

A school following the standard paradigm does not teach how to think about thinking itself, as pupils are only understood to be thinking if they learn what they have been taught. It is assumed that the education of young children should be ‘concrete’ rather than ‘abstract’, that "Early childhood education should be a period of happy play, sensory and physical but not particularly intellectual – as

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90 See Lipman et al. 1980, 3-11; PGS, 17-28; TE1, 1-15. One such proposal that Lipman considered naive was the idea of so-called cultural literacy put forward by E.D. Hirsch in which the purpose was first to construct a list of all the things that an educated person should master and then to teach them at school.
91 TE1, 102.
92 Ibid., 14.
93 Ibid., 9.
though the intellect did not offer its own forms of play and its own forms of happiness."94 According to Lipman, children would still be capable of it and also interested in this very thing. It is likely that children even expect the school to function as a kind of replacement for their natural growing environment, the home, in that it should continue the stimulation of the child’s thinking and speech that already started in the family at an early stage.

What the child discovers in early elementary school… is a completely structured environment. Instead of events that flow into other events, there is now a schedule that things must conform to. Instead of statements that can be understood only by gleaning their significance from the entire context in which they occur, there is a classroom language that is uniform and rather indifferent to context and therefore fairly devoid of enigmatic intimations. The natural mysteriousness of the home and family environment is replaced by a stable, structured environment in which all is regular and explicit. Children gradually discover that such an environment is seldom an invigorating or challenging one. Indeed, it drains them of the capital fund of initiative and inventiveness and thoughtfulness that they brought with them to school. It exploits their energies and gives them back little in return. Before long, children become aware that schooling is enervating and dispiriting rather than animating or intellectually provocative. In short, schooling provides few natural incentives to thinking in the way that the home environment does. A drop-off in student interest is the natural consequence.95

According to Lipman, a school following the standard paradigm is successful in making children efficiently believe that they cannot think on their own and that their intellectual capacity is at its best sufficient to solve the questions and problems presented to them by others. The same applies to attitudes towards fellow pupils in the classroom. The child has learnt an attitude that does not allow approval of others’ experiences and learning from them, as learning and inquiry only appear seldom as collaborative issues. So, the child cannot understand that it is possible to learn new things through shared reflective inquiry by appreciating both his own and others’ experiences, ideas and personalities. In this way, main-

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94 Ibid., 2.
95 Ibid., 10.
tains Lipman, schooling without thinking suppresses the natural curiosity and impulsiveness of the child.

Although there already was an increased emphasis on thinking, cognitive skills and metacognition in the 1970’s – mostly stimulated by the thinking of Lev Vygotsky and Jerome Bruner – Lipman takes a very reserved attitude to the so-called thinking skills programs built on them especially in the United States. According to Lipman, they have not been able to distinguish between the quantity and quality of thinking, the skills of thinking have been isolated from the contents to be learnt, and they have been confused with learning strategies. All the worse, they concentrate on the solving of problems presented by others, and not on independent discovery and rational treatment of problems, the process of inquiry. Such programs in which the pupils are isolated from each other focus on pen-and-paper problems that favor verbally talented pupils at the cost of problems present in the pupils’ everyday environment. Lipman thinks that they are often based on the misunderstanding of teaching (thinking) skills before inquiry, although it should be vice versa: “It is the dialogue that generates the skills; it is not the skills that generate the dialogue.”

Lipman also criticizes the programs for their all-permissive relativism due to a lack of standards of thinking and denial of the logical rules of deduction, evidence presented for truth statements and grounds for judgments. Lipman also thinks that the various programs do not take into account problems involving language issues, and philosophical concepts such as the truth, values and fact are bypassed, so that the pupils’ thinking ends up in difficulties due to a lack of ‘tools’.

In criticism of the standard paradigm, Lipman formulates the next assumptions of critical practice – reflective paradigm – which serve as landmarks for his practical endeavor:

1. Education is the outcome of participation in a teacher-guided community of inquiry, among whose goals are the achievement of understanding and good judgment.
2. Students are stirred to think about the world when our knowledge of it is revealed to them to be ambiguous, equivocal, and mysterious.

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96 Lipman 1993b.
97 Lipman 1994; TE2, 5-6; see also Lipman 1993c.
3. The disciplines in which inquiry occurs are assumed to be neither non-overlapping nor exhaustive; hence their relationships to their subject matters are quite problematic.

4. The teacher’s stance is fallibilistic (one that is ready to concede error) rather than authoritative.

5. Students are expected to be thoughtful and reflective, and increasingly reasonable and judicious.

6. The focus of the educational process is not on the acquisition of information but on the grasp of relationships within the subject matters under investigation.98

The problems experienced in the American school in the 1960’s and 70’s reinforced Lipman’s idea of already starting philosophy teaching at the primary level. In his reflective model of educational practice, he saw an opportunity to accomplish a more profound change in the tradition of puritan school education that he attacked so strongly.

For Lipman, encouraging the pupils to be critical thinkers involves at least the following goals:

1. Thinking in discipline: a history learner needs not only to learn history but also to think historically, a logic learner logically, a psychology learner psychologically, etc.

2. Thinking among disciplines: the pupil must be able flexibly to see connections and relations between the contents of the various subjects.

3. Thinking about disciplines: the pupil must be able to evaluate critically and question assumptions connected with contents.

4. Thinking about thinking: a good thinker must also be able to think about thinking itself.

5. Fostering of concept-formation: all contents to be learnt involve a set of concepts that essentially needs to be understood to perceive those contents. Studying therefore needs to involve definition, classification, identification of relationships and use of criteria, among other things.

6. Fostering of reasoning: the pupil must be guided to coordinate his thinking, to make valid conclusions on the basis of available knowledge and to defend his

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98 TEJ, 14.
views through relevant argumentation, taking the prevailing conditions into consideration at the same time.

7. Strengthening of judgment: the pupil needs to be able to distinguish between true and false, right and wrong, good and evil, etc. According to Lipman, this is how the basis for understanding the general in the individual is created.

8. Facilitating the transfer: it is necessary to develop the pupils’ ability to evaluate similarity, differences and identity and their ability for consideration of context and analogous deduction.

9. Provision of conditions for deliberative discussion
10. Relevance: the studies need to be relevant to the pupil.99

Lipman sees Josiah Royce, a late 19th century logician, as the true pioneer of critical thinking in the United States. According to Lipman, his social philosophy influenced by Plato, Hegel and Peirce had a huge impact on education. For Royce, the community is above all a community of interpretation – a community that shares and creates meanings – quite similarly to Peirce. For the latter, however, it was specifically a community of inquiry in which even logic as such was to be seen as an essentially social phenomenon. Peirce’s thinking is seen a little later in G.H. Mead’s ideas of the social origin and formation of self, which I will discuss later in Chapter 3.100

3.3 Dramatizing the tradition of philosophy

As stated above, Lipman was initially interested specifically in the power of deduction and teaching it to children, although he admits that he did not have a very good idea of them at that time himself. Nevertheless, he wanted to teach children logic, but not the same way it was taught at the university. Lipman thought that children would have surely, and also quite justifiably, been opposed to it. He was thus fascinated by the idea of disguising logic in the form of stories that interest the child, writing a story of children studying their own thinking processes, of children philosophizing in various everyday situations. This lead to the writing of the first experimental version of a philosophical children’s book entitled *Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery* in 1969, and to experimenting with it in a local school in

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100 For the movement of critical thinking and its various trends, see e.g. *TE2*, 28-63.
the following year. The good experiences led to Lipman publishing, together with Ann Margaret Sharp, in 1974 not only the above-mentioned philosophical children’s book, but also comprehensive materials for teachers consisting of hundreds of plans for philosophical discussions and exercises. It started a series of novels aimed at children from day-care age to late teens. Below is the entire P4C curriculum.

At the moment there are many alternative curriculums following Lipman’s genre for example in Australia, Canada, Germany, Taiwan, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Latvia, Sweden, Iceland etc. It is noteworthy that Lipman is often unwilling to point out a final direction or goal for P4C or to give any strict instructions on guidelines for the development of learning materials. He clearly wants to leave such issues for the P4C community to consider on its own. So far as philosophy teaching materials aimed for children are concerned, for instance, Lipman urges to consider and experiment with different approaches. He thinks that learning materials as such are not good or bad, as they should be evaluated for their usefulness for a particular group of children and for ways to develop them in this connection.

101 This pilot project was carried out in the Rand School, Montclair, New Jersey during the 1970-71 academic year. Its ostensible aim was to determine the feasibility of teaching reasoning to fifth-grade children. For a detailed report of the study, see Lipman 1976. The title Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery is a pun on Aristotle whose syllogistic logic goes under the story (see Lipman et al. 1984a).

102 Ann Margaret Sharp joined Montclair State University in 1973 as a Professor of Education. In 1974, with Lipman, she co-founded the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, which prepares educators to teach philosophy to children of all ages. Sharp has co-authored several books including Philosophy in the Classroom (with Lipman and F. Oscanyan), Teaching for Better Thinking: The Classroom Community of Inquiry (with Laurance J. Spliter), Studies in Philosophy for Children: Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery and Studies in Philosophy for Children: Pixie (with Ronald F. Reed) and Growing up with Philosophy (with Lipman). She has also published many IAPC curriculum materials (see Lipman et al. 1980b; 1980c, 1984a, 1984b; 1984c, 1985).
In those novels, fictional children engage in dialogical inquiry into the philosophical puzzles they encounter. The fictional children discover how to reason more effectively, and how to make better judgments by applying their reasoning to life situations. The students begin by reading text aloud. The purpose of this phase is to make children wonder, doubt, ask, or make suggestions for discussion. These suggestions and problems are then discussed by the students guided by the teacher. Usually a variety of problematic issues are encountered and examined. The students are facilitated to deliberate among themselves, and this process of deliberation is then assumed to be internalized by the individual students. For Lipman, these classroom deliberations evoke, among other things, thinking that is skillful

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and deliberate, thinking that employs relevant criteria, is self-correcting, and is sensitive to context, i.e. critical thinking. The classroom dialogue is, says Lipman, something that students find irresistible: they cannot help joining in, contributing their own reflections to the discussion. In this way, according to Lipman, cognitive skillfulness is acquired naturally and in a context, rather than in isolated drills. The curriculum is an integral part of P4C’s attempt to redesign philosophy for children’s use. By engaging the members of the class in reflective reading, reflective questioning and reflective discussion, the novels serve as springboards for the development of philosophical experience.\(^\text{104}\) Novels are expected to arouse children’s interest and curiosity leading to a common inquiry by which the so called multidimensional thinking in the context of philosophical concepts and methods is cherished and finally, through this process is assumed to encourage the students to think for themselves. So the focus is on doing philosophy rather than learning about philosophical systems or philosophers of the past. Lipman emphasizes that this will not vulgarize philosophy but will keep its virtues intact while making sure that they are within the range of children’s capabilities and dispositions.\(^\text{105}\)

Children love tales and stories, Lipman maintains. He trusts in their motive force even if a school is striving for better thinking. Philosophical stories need, however, to be connected with themes and events that are controversial and enigmatic, awakening the children’s curiosity. Their objective is to stimulate the children into philosophizing on the basis of the observations and problems that they are interested in and consider important. On the other hand, Lipman also wants through his fictional characters to model this philosophizing that children are indeed not expected to be immediately capable of. The stories are usually in the first person and the children brood in them on issues such as the grounds for good deduction, ways to analyze things, analogies, or explore the assumptions and implications that they themselves, their friends, parents and teachers make unconsciously in various everyday situations. There are references to concepts such as fairness, truth, goodness, friendship, beauty, space, time, person, rules, real, rights, responsibility, freedom, identity, mind, art and knowledge. So, Lipman assumes that these stories, along with the teacher’s guidance, generate a philosophical dialogue in which the children are expected to learn the vocabulary of thinking. In philosophizing this means the explication of concepts such as grounds, rationality,

\(^{104}\) For a more detailed analysis, see e.g. Lipman 2001.
\(^{105}\) See e.g. Lipman 1994.
criterion, meaning, concept, judgment, question, assumption, distinction, relationship, analogy, conclusion, example, counter-example, evidence, permanence, truth, good, ethical, logical – in other words, starting to use concepts that as such are objects of inquiry and which are all the time applied in highly different contexts in that process.\textsuperscript{106}

The composition of large (500 pages on average) manuals for teachers on the short stories was based on the teachers’ minimal knowledge of philosophy. Lipman emphasizes that by his curriculum he wants to give not only children but also teachers an opportunity to start doing philosophy. The manuals contain mostly two types of materials: on the one hand, they try to orient the reader to the variety of classical philosophical themes that Lipman has spread all over his stories, on the other hand, they contain plenty of plans for discussions related to the main concepts of each theme, exercises for thinking skills and proposals for various practical activities.

Lipman calls his manner of writing philosophy described above the dramatization of philosophy.\textsuperscript{107} Its basic idea can be seen in an attempt to ‘enable the making’ of the rich tradition of philosophy for different people of different ages. In the same way as the painting of an artist or the music by a composer and its performers only acquires its meaning through the audience’s active observations, thinking, sensations and discussions, the potential of philosophy to become made by a human being also grows through its dramatic formulations, says Lipman.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Harry} represents for children a device by means of which the arcane contents of adult scholarship can be decoded and translated into ordinary language. It makes accessible to them a world of coveted meanings that tradition has decreed must be restricted to a small number of adult men.\textsuperscript{109}

Lipman thinks that the poetic work of the Eleatic Parmenides (approx. 510-450 B.C.) and Plato’s dialogues (e.g. \textit{Republic}, \textit{Phaedrus} or \textit{Symposium}) as such meant this kind of dramatic philosophy placed in the context of human everyday life to start with, while an expository manner of expression detached from everyday issues has been mainly typical of later philosophical tradition.\textsuperscript{110} As later

\textsuperscript{106} Juuso 1995b.
\textsuperscript{107} Lipman 2001.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Lipman 1992a.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
dramatizations of philosophy, Lipman mentions, among other things, films on philosophers’ lives (for example, Rossellini’s film *Socrates*), philosophers’ autobiographies (for example, Plato’s *Seventh Letter*, Rousseau’s *Confessions*, Collingwood’s *Autobiography*), memoirs (for example, Hume, Russell, Tolstoy, Jaspers and so on), diaries and correspondence (for example, Marcel’s *Metaphysical Journals* and Weil’s notebooks, Diderot’s *Letters to Sophie Volland*, Leibniz’s letters to Spinoza and Descartes and the correspondence of William and Henry James) as well as many stories connected with imaginary philosophers. Furthermore, philosophy written in a non-argumentative manner (allegories, parables, drama, film, poetry, narratives or short stories), popular presentations of the history of philosophy or the combination of philosophy with various types of performing arts such as theatre, music, dance and opera are, according to Lipman, also such dramatizations. This does not mean, however, that so-called academic philosophy cannot be done similarly by someone studying it. Lipman emphasizes the starting of philosophical studies as Socratic inquiry particularly from the viewpoint of the pedagogically valuable connected with it. So, the essential thing is that the dramatization of philosophy aims at presenting philosophy in such a way that it provides an opportunity for philosophizing which in turn generates educationally important aspirations. From the perspective of this study, it is important to notice that in these central ideas Lipman is strongly influenced by the early pragmatist tradition.

### 3.4 Doing philosophy as rethinking childhood, philosophy and education

Through P4C Lipman wishes to teach a reflective method based on reasonableness to children still in the lowest school grades. Similarly to Socrates, it also means to him a sensitivity to wonder and question the grounds, an ability to stop by the everyday matters of course. Here Lipman sees a kind of natural bond between philosophy and childhood. If things typical of childhood, such as curiosity and wondering, consideration of the nature of things and reality, are connected with philosophy, it is philosophy that offers the best possible context for the child’s own intellectual dispositions, maintains Lipman. This ‘union’ of philoso-

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111 For the traditions of academic and Socratic philosophy teaching, see Fisher 1995; Fisher 1996.
phy and childhood provides Lipman a strong basis for the dramatization of philosophy into the practice of education.

…there is a profound symmetry between philosophy and childhood, but this remains largely inoperative until language comes along and provides mediation (as well as some alienation) between the two. Perhaps it is a symmetry born of the notion that Philosophy for Children seeks to find the roots of one’s being and thinks it has found it in childhood, while children seek to discover the core meaning of their being and think to find it by means of philosophy. 112

It is particularly interesting that Lipman sees his project in terms of a redefinition of education and not only of philosophy. According to Lipman, the essential thing in it is related to the assumptions attached to children themselves, the subjects to be grown. Previously in ancient or medieval times there was no doubt of children’s ability to study, adopt and master intellectual skills, but there was also no trust in their possibilities to reflect upon and evaluate the contents they had studied. On the other hand, this ‘inability’ was connected with the socio-historical situation; the world in which they were living did not contain such a mode of asking and orientation. Learning meant passive absorption and memorizing of the stuff offered by the adult rather than a demand for independent thinking of issues felt to be important by the child itself. Thus adults unacquainted with philosophy did not hear the children’s philosophical mode of speech. According to Lipman

… for many centuries, we know a great deal about what children were required to learn but have hardly any record of childhood speculations about metaphysical, epistemological, moral, and aesthetic perplexities. They were not thought to merit preservation. 113

For Lipman, childhood means a legitimate form of human experience that even philosophy itself has forgotten. Although not all children are philosophers, all philosophers like all other adults have once been children. Philosophical experience is not conflicting with childhood quite as the experience of childhood is not conflicting with adulthood. Lipman thinks that “just as the differences between male and female perspectives constitute no insuperable barrier to their being ex-

112 Lipman (forthcoming); see also Lipman & Sharp 1994, 7.
113 Lipman 1994, 6
perientially shared, so the differences between child and adult perspectives repre-
sent an invitation to the shared experience of human diversity rather than an ex-
cuse for intergenerational hostility, repression and guilt.”

According to Lipman, the recognition of the intrinsic value of childhood is
essentially connected to the questions of children’s right to reason, children’s
capability to engage in ethical inquiry and, finally, children as persons. Person-
hood has been deprived from children due to the dependence on adulthood that
has been used as its criterion. This is based on the assumption that personhood –
just like rationality – is not something given at birth but something gradually
achieved. Lipman tries to question this by arguing that ‘person’ and ‘rationality’
mean a certain kind of ascription rather than a visible external activity connected
with achievement. The question is essential in that denial of the rationality of
children results in an invalidation of the reasons they present, which in turn means
impossibility of doing philosophy with them. Lipman thinks that this meant de-
prival of significance in education, generating the continuation of ignorance, irre-
ponsibility and mediocrity. “Treating children as persons might be a small price
to pay, in the long run, for some rather substantive social gains.”

3.5 Doing philosophy as looking for meaning

Lipman sees philosophizing with children as serving their need to find meaning-
fulness in their lives. Confronted by “Why?” asked by a child, the philosophical
tradition of thinking has a lot to give. This emphasis on the history of philosophy
does not, however, mean its traditional academic teaching to Lipman. Philosophy
is more to him than just its history and critical thinking. In particular, it involves
the wondering of things from the viewpoint of one’s own thinking.

To learn philosophy, one must become actively involved in the life of phil-
osophy and this can only be accomplished by children appropriating the phil-
osophical tradition for themselves, re-enacting it in terms of their own ex-
perience, critically reflecting upon it and incorporating the meanings thus ac-
quired into the ongoing conduct of their lives.

114 PGS, 191.
115 Ibid., 198.
116 Lipman & Sharp 1994, x.
Lipman wants to teach philosophy in a way that does not leave children’s own thinking fragmentary but fascinates them and guides their curiosity in a constructive manner. Children cannot satisfy their hunger for meaning only by studying the knowledge given to them in a ready form by the adults, as children need to be encouraged to think for themselves. In addition to being the most important ally to the democratic social order, it is for Lipman at the same also a skill *par excellence* that enables the formation of meanings.\(^\text{117}\) So, Lipman thinks that it should be possible to convey logic, for instance, in a way that helps children to evaluate their own reasoning and the evidence supporting their evaluations. Neither critical thinking nor logic as such is sufficient for children looking for the meanings of their lives. It does not offer any opportunity for their own unique efforts to understand the richness and ambiguity of the world in such a way that they can, for instance, compare each other’s experiences. If in history studies, for instance, the children had learnt only the critical orientation (i.e. they avoided consciously false conclusions, took a doubting attitude to claims made, and noticed implicit assumptions), but not the philosophical one, they would not be able to grasp the full meaning of history in all its richness and mystery.

If children’s sympathies and imagination are not brought into play so that they can identify with those human beings who were engaged in making history, and if children do not bring to the study of history a sharpened intelligence whose aesthetic, ethical, and metaphysical dispositions have been alerted to these dimensions of human experience, more important to them than it is to a child only force-fed on the data of history.\(^\text{118}\)

Without the motivational and dispositional considerations, states Lipman, education for thinking is bound to be a bloodless and sterile business.\(^\text{119}\) This requirement is linked to the school’s necessary battle to prevent the exclusion of children. Children need to be guided to think in ways that add to their experience of the significance of their own lives, and this is the very thing in which philosophy is useful for *all* children. Lipman thinks that it would be extremely wrong if philosophy only became the privilege of a small aristocracy. Every pupil needs “their own sense of the importance of learning.”\(^\text{120}\)


\(^{118}\) Lipman et al. 1980, 8.

\(^{119}\) Lipman 1992b.

\(^{120}\) Lipman & Sharp 1994, 9.
By studying philosophy by philosophizing on issues that are meaningful to his own life, a child can be introduced through skilful pedagogical guidance to the classical virtues of philosophy at quite an early age. According to Lipman, the virtues or strengths of philosophy that carry over from the traditional academic, higher education version of the discipline into children’s philosophy are as follows:

1. **Ethical Inquiry.** Engaging children in the investigation of problems dealing with the role of moral values and norms in human conduct.
2. **Aesthetic Inquiry.** Getting children to explore problematic issues that involve the relationships between artistic creation, aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic critic.
3. **Metaphysical Inquiry.** Encouraging children to reach for greater and greater generality in their understanding of the world and its ways of working.
4. **Logical Inquiry.** Inquiry into the rules of inquiry, and into whatever principles are appealed to when thinking about thinking.
5. **Epistemological Inquiry.** Having children seek answers to such questions as “What counts as true?” and “What is the relationship between truth and meaning?”

Pupils need to be encouraged to think about and reflect on things even when our ideas of them are ambiguous, obscure or mysterious. Children need to be encouraged to formulate their own evaluations and to be proud of and appreciate their own views and opinions and at the same time to respect others’ thoughts. When phenomena or concepts that are significant for pupils are studied, Lipman thinks that we always need to remember that even the principles within which something is studied are problematic as such and intertwined in many ways with the issues being studied.

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121 Lipman 1994.
3.6 Doing philosophy as cultivating reasonableness and democracy

3.6.1 Democracy and children's right to think

According to Lipman, the ideal democratic society is a reflective, participatory community that is committed to self-corrective inquiry in its problems and choices. In such a society people are encouraged to study and conclude together, to take part in work in society for each and everyone’s own part, to participate in its decision-making and administration and to share the services offered by it. A democratic society is dynamic, with its members constantly trying to question, criticize and reform its institutions, values and criteria. Therefore a necessary condition for a democratic society is that its citizens are capable of independent and critical judgment. As a corollary, a democratic society is, through the institutions that constitute it, accountable to all of those to whom their institutional authority power applies. Thus it is the responsibility of the school as one of the most important institutions in society to offer reflective and self-sacrificing education to the members of society.122

According to Lipman, the quality of democracy is dependent on the education offered by society, while education acquires its meaning through democracy. If democracy is understood as described above, it needs to formulate its educational mandate in terms of thinking, maintains Lipman. Children shall be treated as active and creative subjects, not as passive listeners; children’s tendency to inquire and make questions shall be respected. Lipman demands that children be granted thinking rights, that is

…rights not just to acceptable reading and writing skills, but rights to standards that go beyond mere acceptability: to reasonableness, judiciousness, imaginativeness, and appreciativeness. … children do have a right to perform up these higher standards so that they can bring their potentials into closer connection with the requirements of modern communal life.123

The school should become a positive political paradigm for children, conveying to them a trust in positive communication that involves mutual respect, compro-

123 TE2, 203.
mises, cooperation, justice and freedom. Additionally, a function of the school in the democratic context is, according to Lipman, to teach children about important characteristics and structures of their society, and to help them to reflect on them together through philosophical dialogue in a community of inquiry.

As we will observe later, Lipman strongly relies here, in one of his main theses of education, on the educational philosophical thinking of his early inspirer John Dewey. Philosophy in education thus has, in addition to the individual, consummator meaning – and intertwined with it – also an important instrumental function, as it, through its form and contents, constitutes the conditions of democracy as well as characteristics typical of the democratic process. By this Lipman refers to the richness of philosophy in relation to certain ideas essential to democracy, such as truth, justice and freedom, and the dialogicality of philosophy as a contribution to democratic consideration and decision-making.

3.6.2 The transacting dimensions of thinking

Lipman thinks that the major problem in education following the traditional standard paradigm is its failure in the cultivation of human reasonableness. For Lipman, democracy entangled with reasonableness is one of the essential components of the educational process. They form the regulative ideas of inquiry-driven society; democracy as a regulative idea for the development of social structure, and reasonableness as a regulative idea for the development of the character structure. Reasonableness (or reasonable judgments) is not, however, realized solely as a result of the rational use of reason, as has sometimes been thought. Referring to Descartes, Lipman states:

The exclusion of the mind from the body and its attributes – its perceiving, its ways of feeling, its valuing, its creating, its imagining, its acting, and so on – was total and absolute. In contrast, significantly improved thinking – multidimensional thinking – as I understand it – aims at a balance between the cognitive and the affective, between the perceptual and the conceptual, be-

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124 PGS, 48-49.
125 See for example Lipman 1998.
126 TE2, 203-204.
tween the physical and the mental, the rule-governed and the non-rule-governed.\textsuperscript{127}

For Lipman, the different aspects of multidimensional thinking are critical, creative and caring thinking. They are equal attributes in relation to each other, and should be encouraged on all levels of education.\textsuperscript{128} They also enable Lipman to identify the ‘primary aspect’ of the educational process of inquiry-driven society, “the network of policies, principles, and procedures to which we appeal when we organize the structure of that process.”\textsuperscript{129} Because they are in continual transaction with each others, it is difficult to distinguish between them in practice. However, if we want to foster and strengthen, say, critical thinking, says Lipman, we need to have a clear conception of what it can be, of its defining features, characteristic outcomes and underlying conditions that make it possible.\textsuperscript{130} In Figure 2, I have gathered and connected the accurate content of Lipman’s notion of the transacting dimensions of thinking.

In brief, by ‘critical thinking’ Lipman means thinking that (1) facilitates judgment because it (2) relies on criteria, (3) is self-corrective, and (4) is sensitive to context. However, Lipman says, those are the features actually belonging to the critical thinker.\textsuperscript{131} ‘Creative thinking’, on the other hand, is the thinking that it is imaginative, holistic, inventive and generative.\textsuperscript{132} By ‘caring thinking’ Lipman means thinking that is appreciative, active, normative, affective and empathic. Caring is for Lipman as certain category of emotion which can be learned, much as reasonable modes of inference.\textsuperscript{133}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 199-200 (italics as in original). It is to be noted in this connection that in the second edition of Thinking in Education Lipman would appear to replace the concept of higher-order-thinking with multidimensional thinking.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 201.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 204.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 209.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 62, 212. See also pp. 56-63 where Lipman discusses the characterizations of the critical thinking movement (e.g. by Ennis, Sternberg, McPeck, Resnick, Adler, Garver, Siegel, Paul, Nickerson).
\item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 243-260.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 261-271; see also Lipman 1994b, About the education of emotions, see Lipman 1995.
\end{itemize}
Fig. 2. The transacting dimensions of thinking. 134

134 Figure 2 is my summary based on TE 204, 242, 259, 271.
Actually, for Lipman, the multidimensionality of thinking is through each of its dimensions connected to different modes of judgment equating to the classic Greek ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, to Aristotle’s divisions of inquiry as well as to different branches of philosophy as indicated in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulative idea</th>
<th>Dimension of thinking</th>
<th>Mode of judgment</th>
<th>Division of inquiry</th>
<th>Branch of philosophy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>truth</td>
<td>critical</td>
<td>saying</td>
<td>theoretical</td>
<td>epistemology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>creative</td>
<td>making</td>
<td>productive</td>
<td>aesthetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goodness</td>
<td>caring</td>
<td>doing</td>
<td>practical</td>
<td>ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theoria, episteme</td>
<td>poiesis, tekne</td>
<td>praxis, phronesis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3. The ‘trinities’ of thinking, judgment and inquiry.\textsuperscript{136}

Lipman maintains that a dramatic change can only occur in school if it is committed to a balanced development of all the aspects of thinking. Pedagogical approaches thus cannot be based on one-sided emphasis on critical thinking at the expense of creativity and caring, for instance.

A classroom would have to be a community of inquiry that facilitates creative and caring thinking. It could not be a factory for the production of solely intellectual operation, wholly indifferent to or actually hostile to the consideration, respect, and appreciation that the members of the class might have for each other or for the subject to be studied.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{135} According to Aristotle; see for example Met VI.1.1025b25.
\textsuperscript{136} C.f. Fisher 1998, 42.
\textsuperscript{137} TE2, 202.
For Lipman, reasonableness as multidimensional thinking thus does not mean just calculated rationality, but it’s strengthening with self-criticism and consideration, caring and creativity. Reasonableness manifests itself as critical activity, and Lipman thinks that it can only be learnt in activity in a community of inquiry. Actually, Lipman is underlining here the inevitable normative nature of education, its links to emotions, values and meanings. The community of inquiry is, in the educational context, above all an ethical community, within which children need to be helped to both understand and practice for a non-violent and peaceful way of life. This connection also becomes understandable in the thematic of the social emergence of self that I will be discussing later.

Lipman would appear to share Aristotle’s idea of learning a virtue in an activity, praxis, and of the contextualization of philosophy by referring back to ‘practical reason’, phronesis. For Aristotle, it meant a truthfully reasoning readiness for action, an ability to function well in each individual situation as required by the influencing circumstances. In Chapter 4 I will be discussing in more detail the relationship between Aristotle’s theory of virtue and P4C.

### 3.6.3 Thinking in the disciplines

The failure to strengthen the cognitive skills simultaneously with the content acquisition of different school disciplines has been, says Lipman, one of the key reasons for the ineffectiveness of much of modern education. So, it is not about the acquisition of skills as such but strengthening the skills which children have naturally acquired in language. The cognitive skills to which Lipman is referring are (i) reasoning skills (inductive, deductive, analogical); (ii) inquiry skills (observing, questioning, describing, telling); (iii) the information-organizing skills (defining, classifying), and (iv) translation skills (comprehending, interpreting, communicating).

By the help of the classic virtues of philosophy discussed earlier, Lipman wants in connection with the above-mentioned cognitive skills to teach children

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138 About the community of inquiry approach to violence reduction see TE2, 105-124.
139 See EN VI.5.1140a24-1140b30.
140 Lipman 1992c.
141 TE1, 40.
142 Ibid., 40-46; Lipman 1987.
the *dispositions* and skills that have always belonged to philosophy, providing them with a basis for good thinking and power of deduction. These issues include:

1. arguing skills (formulation of conclusions, identification of premises, deductive and non-deductive thinking, avoidance of poor reasoning, etc.),
2. sensitivity to wonder, question ‘the given’ and demand the grounds,
3. ability to identify, apply and formulate the principles and criteria that define our judgment and on the basis of which we make decisions,
4. ability to analyze things in such a way that their complexity is opened up to us,
5. ability to identify relations connected with various phenomena (cause – consequence, tools – means, part – whole, etc.),
6. exercising ‘moral imagination’ by considering different views and ideologies, and
7. intellectual honesty and listening to others.\(^{143}\)

According to Lipman, P4C aims at a holistic experience built through language and thinking. In addition to being fun and interesting as such (i.e. consummatory) for children, Lipman thinks that it also develops the child’s learning abilities in general. Lipman means by this the ability to think about each school subject to be studied in terms of its own nature. When studying mathematics, for instance, pupils should learn to think mathematically and not only to remember calculation rules; in history to think historically, not only to remember individual historical events, etc. For this to be possible, the cognitive skills and dispositions mentioned above need to be learnt in connection with the learning of the basic skills studied at school – reading, writing, speaking and listening – irrespective of the subject. In fact, these basic skills constitute for Lipman the inquiry that combines discussion and invention with thinking and education.\(^{144}\)

In addition to the fact that the above skills and dispositions are conveyed to other subjects through the studies of philosophy, Lipman maintains that it makes possible, through its various aspects, a closer examination of each matter at hand from some specific philosophical point of view. Logic, for instance, reveals the logical dimensions contained in the various subjects, while ethics reveals the

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\(^{143}\) Lipman 1987.

\(^{144}\) Ibid.; TE2, 27, 189-191.
Lipman considers philosophy as a playful and cumulative activity, in which the ideas are built on other ideas as an increasing movement. Lipman calls the forum of philosophizing the ‘community of inquiry’. Lipman has developed this concept that was originally used by Peirce, Royce, Mead and Dewey – as shown later – into perhaps the most important and pedagogically challenging conception of his thinking. The characteristics of research and collaboration are thought to combine in it to form an environment that is simultaneously both a means to teach a reflective, multidimensional vocabulary of thinking, and a goal by itself, offering through dialogue and cooperation an authentic experience to the child about his or her personal meaning.

Lipman demands that the classroom should be converted into the community of inquiry. He means by it a ‘pedagogical space’ in which

...students listen to one another with respect, build on one another’s ideas; challenge one another to supply reasons for otherwise unsupported opinions, assist each other in drawing inferences from what has been said, and seek to identify one another’s assumptions. A community of inquiry attempts to follow the inquiry where it leads rather than being penned in by the boundary lines of existing disciplines. A dialogue that tries to confirm to logic, it moves forward indirectly like a boat tacking into the wind, but in the process its progress comes to resemble that of thinking itself. Consequently, when this process is internalized or introjected by the participants, they come to think in moves that resemble its procedures. They come to think as the process thinks.146

The formation and progress of the community of inquiry follows five different stages: i) the offering of the text, ii) the construction of the agenda, iii) solidifying the community, iv) using exercises and discussion plans, and v) encouraging further responses.147 In this key notion Lipman’s aim is no less than the renovation of

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146 TE1, 15-16 (italics as in original).
147 TE2, 101-103; Lipman 1997.
education. The modern adverse and competitive classroom should be converted into a community of friendship and co-operation, he demands. Below are some additional features of the communities of inquiry: (i) inclusiveness – no one is excluded from internal activities without adequate justification; (ii) participation – children are encouraged but not required to participate actively, and as equals, community like a cognitive schema drawing participation out of participants; (iii) shared cognition – the acts of private reflection (wondering, questioning, inferring, defining, assuming, supposing, imagining and so on) are engaged by the different persons of the group; (iv) face-to-face relationships – perceiving the importance of facial expressions in looking for meanings; (v) the quest for meaning – perceiving children’s avidity for understanding: (vi) feelings of social solidarity – the intensification of friendship is not perceived as a threat to the other; (vii) deliberation – considering the reasons and the alternatives as contrasted with debating; (viii) thinking for oneself – guiding children to respect and build on each other’s ideas as well as encouraging their unique and individual efforts of thinking; and (ix) challenging as a procedure – learning challenging as something good but not in need to be heated.

In converting the classroom into a community of inquiry the role of the teacher emerges as fundamental. It is the teacher whose duty it is to guide the formation of that social model, says Lipman. And closely connected to that, it is the teacher whose duty it is to enhance the philosophical dimension in dialogue. In addition to knowing philosophy the teacher has to learn to think like a philosopher in that he has to be able to connect the questions that the class raises with the big philosophical questions of the tradition. This idea is connected with Lipman’s more general educational thinking according to which all educational situations involve adult mediation between the culture and the child. In this process of adapting the subjective and objective, the teacher is for Lipman the absolute pedagogical authority. But he maintains that this, however, does not mean so much the demonstration of the authority of rule-enforcer as the pedagogical strength or the sagacity of the expert in pedagogy. By the concepts of scenario and script Lipman refers to this professional judgment of the teacher. They serve

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148 TE2, 95-97.
as underlying assumptions for the curriculum developer as well as the teacher to follow in guiding the inquiry. This thematic is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.

3.7 Conclusion

Taking philosophy into the classroom means to Matthew Lipman the combination of method and content in education. Furthermore, it means the study of the various subjects in an atmosphere of wondering, reasonableness and alternatives, thinking across the curriculum. Conveying the tradition to the new generation should thus take place in conditions that resemble as much as possible the creation of its achievements. For this purpose Lipman wants to dramatize philosophy so as to make it accessible for children. Yet only historical changes in ideas about philosophy and children, claims Lipman, have been able to produce such a paradigmatic change – as expressed by him – in understanding education.

The virtues of philosophy, i.e. inquiry connected with ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, logic and epistemology, have a central position in Lipman’s conception of education. In an effort to legitimize philosophizing in the classroom community of inquiry as a new paradigm of education, Lipman’s ambitious task is to challenge and detach from what he calls the standard paradigmatic setups. Actually, it seems to me that doing philosophy as looking for meaning is for Lipman the recalling of Charles Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: the meaning of an idea is to be found in the practical consequences to which it leads. If the school can provide the conditions that encourage the application of children’s thinking to the world in which they live, children also think better. “The attraction that would spur them on would be their discovery of the meanings of the ideas they were attempting to master.” School can prevent ideas from becoming meaningless abstractions, if it considers how to demonstrate their practical bearings in children’s lives. In this demand Lipman continues the long tradition which emphasizes the tight binding of philosophical knowing into the practicality as well as the immense importance of personal challenges in the growth of the child. However, with his emphasis on the importance of tradition as well as the teacher’s pedagogical authority Lipman

151 Lipman (forthcoming).
152 Peirce presented this principle in one of the most famous philosophical text How to make our ideas clear in 1878. See more in Chapter 7.
153 TE2, 208.
clearly refuses the symmetrical pattern of pedagogical action. As argued later this
does not, however, lead him to the opposite option either.

By philosophizing with children in the classroom community of inquiry, Lip-
man wants to teach multidimensional thinking. For Lipman, the critical, creative
and ethical aspects intertwined with it are mental acts that take shape historically
in the development of the human species and tradition. So far as I can see, this
basic fallibilistic standpoint forms the ontological unity which not only gives rise
to the standards of thinking (e.g. the rules of logical reasoning, the evidence to be
presented for truth statements and the relevance of judgments) demanded by
Lipman but also saves P4C from so-called ‘objectifying reflection’ – from imply-
ing some ahistorical, pure thinking methods or conceptual tools isolated from the
thinking itself.

For Lipman every member of the community is a value as such, a goal per se
and thus also an essential part of its decision-making process. The members of
democratic society should be able to question, criticize and rectify its institutions,
values and criteria. As a consequence, independent and critical judgment and
reasonable activity constitute the necessary conditions of democracy. This in turn
means the responsibility of society to offer its members a reflective and self-
sacrificing education. The school should become a positive political paradigm for
the children, conveying to them a trust in communication built on the respect of
others, compromises, cooperation and freedom.

In these central issues above as connected to education and growth, Lipman
is solidly rooted in the philosophical and pedagogical thinking of John Dewey and
George Herbert Mead, his most important inspirers – together with Lev Vygotsky
– who I will be next taking a closer look at.
4 A genealogy of classroom community of inquiry

4.1 Introduction

As an educational conception, Matthew Lipman derives the ‘classroom community of inquiry’ above all from the thinking of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. “It was Mead … who first grasped the profound educational implications of fusing together, as Peirce had, the two independently powerful notions of inquiry and community into the single transformative concept of the community of inquiry.”154 On the other hand, Lipman leans in this basic concept also on the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky. When theorizing the relationship between the individual and social, the thinking of Vygotsky and Mead goes – due to some historical ties – along the parallel lines.

My main purpose in this chapter is to explicate the theoretical assumptions of P4C in early pragmatism as well as in Vygotsky’s thought. In what follows, I will, firstly, provide my interpretation of the elements in Dewey’s philosophical and educational thinking that I think are most fundamentally underlying in P4C. Secondly, I will discuss Mead’s and Vygotsky’s analyses of self and community and their educational significance so far as they are to be recognized as further elaborations of some of these Deweyan principles in P4C. Finally, I will identify and locate the practical pedagogization of these background figures in Lipman’s classroom community of inquiry.

4.2 Philosophy and education: John Dewey

4.2.1 Philosophy of experience

Dewey, who lived in 1859-1952, was a philosopher whose thinking was closely bound up with the specific time period in which he lived. His central ideas con-

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154 TE1, 230 (italics as in original). See also Lipman 1997; Lipman 2001. The phrase ‘community of inquiry’ is derived from Charles Peirce’s philosophy, being limited to the practices of research into the natural sciences when they were thought to form a kind of community aiming at common goals with the same methods. After Peirce, the phrase has expanded to encompass all inquiry whether it is natural science or not. See Chapter 6 for more on this topic.
cerning historical consciousness, critical intelligence and creative democracy matured during the period in which America was transformed from a divided, rural capitalist country into a stable, urban, industrial capitalist world power. Cornel West points out that after Dewey,

to be a pragmatist is to be a social critic, literary critic, or a poet – in short, a participant in cultural criticism and cultural creation (...) Dewey helps us see the complex and mediated ways in which philosophical problems or solutions are linked to societal crises. More important, Dewey enables us to view clashing conceptions of philosophy as struggles over cultural ways of life, as attempts to define the role and function of intellectual authorities in culture and society.155

In his writings “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” (1917), “Reconstruction in Philosophy” (1920) and Quest for Certainty (1929), Dewey denies traditional, or ‘modern’, philosophy, accusing it of an epistemologically grounded division of reality into two realms. “The quest for certainty has determined our basic metaphysics”, he claims.156 Dewey regards modern professional philosophy as blind and conservative. Mainly due to paradigmatic notions of experience, philosophy has – in its fundamental project of bridging subject and object, mind and world, by means of epistemological mechanisms – drifted to the crisis of rationality and relegated direct preoccupation with contemporary difficulties to literature and politics.

According to Dewey, philosophy is neither a form of knowledge nor a means to obtain it. Instead, it is a mode of cultural critical action, focusing on ways in which human beings can overcome obstacles and settle problematic situations. He demands that philosophers take risks and actively engage in the events and affairs of the world.

(...) we should return to the original and etymological sense of the world, and recognize that philosophy is a form of desire, of effort in action – a love, namely, of wisdom; but with the thorough proviso, not attached to the Platonist use of the word, that wisdom, whatever it is, is not a mode of science or knowledge. A philosophy which was conscious of its own business and prov-

155 West 1989, 71.
156 Dewey 1929, 26 (hereafter referred to as QC). For more about Dewey’s critique on modern philosophy in Chapter 7. See also Biesta et. al. 2003, 18-19.
ince would then perceive that it is an intellectualized wish, an aspiration subjected to rational discriminations and tests, a social hope reduced to a working program of action, a prophecy of the future, but one disciplined by serious thought and knowledge.157

Dewey’s idea of philosophy as cultural critical action is essentially connected with his concept of experience that he elaborated on the basis of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim i.e. the theory of meaning and William James’ psychology. As early as 1896 Dewey published the essay “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”, one of his most celebrated articulations against the dominant stimulus-response model of action.158 In his later literary production like e.g. in How we think (1910), Democracy and Education (1916), Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature (1925), Art as Experience (1934), and Logic The Theory of Inquiry (1938) Dewey makes an explicit analysis of this lasting core notion in his thinking and also its integral part of education.

Meaning can only arise in practical consequences undergone through active involvement, which for Dewey meant a process of continuously and dynamically reorganising experience. In this sense philosophy cannot derive from the kind of knowledge in which the nature of experience as a conjoint trying and undergoing the consequences is broken. For Dewey, philosophy as functional, reflective experience means intelligent action through which the human being tries to achieve certain results, ends in view, and, after undergoing the consequences of that action, discerns the relationships or connections connected to the problematic situation under inquiry. Vital experience means specifically this ‘peculiar combination’ – as put by Dewey himself – of active trying and passive undergoing.159 ‘Mind’ as separated from direct occupation is fatal, because it “throws emphasis on things at the expense of relations or connections”.160 This leads to faulty reasoning that ‘knowledge’, i.e. those relations, can be captured afterwards in judging the perceptions. However, ideas cannot be perceived in isolation from their connections. Every perception and every idea, states Dewey, is a sense of the bearings, use, and cause of a thing. Later, in Quest for Certainty, Dewey charges modern philosophy,
for example Kant and Hegel, on this very ground. In chapter 7 I will examine this issue in more detail.

According to Dewey, philosophy differs from other forms of thinking, such as natural sciences, in both content and disposition, that is, in relation to its attitudes to the world. In terms of content, the problems dealt with in philosophy are ultimately derived very closely from various true conflicts and difficulties in social life. Labor and leisure, practical and intellectual activity, man and nature, individuality and association, culture and vocation – all these dualisms, as outcomes of ruptures of continuity, have their counterparts in the formulations of classic philosophic systems – such as mind (or spirit) and matter, body and mind, the mind and the world, the individual and his relationship to others, theory – or knowing, and practice – or doing etc. \(^{161}\) For Dewey, philosophy is an attempt to comprehend these complexities of world and life, it is “thinking what the known demands of us – what responsive attitudes it exacts”. \(^{162}\) As the matching of different conflicting interests can only take place through the modification of emotional and intellectual aspirations, philosophy is – when taken seriously – at the same time about the formation of various life interests and about presentation of viewpoints and methods through which a better balance between these interests could be achieved. Derivation of philosophical problems from difficulties met in the social practice is hindered, however, if the philosophers become estranged from the true problems of life, from its genuine vocabulary, into a group of people using their own technical language, maintains Dewey. \(^{163}\) Dewey wanted, as expressed by West “a worldly philosophy and a more philosophical world, i.e. a world guided by intelligence.” \(^{164}\) The transformation of what is genuinely experienced that takes place along with the dispositional aspect typical of seriously intended philosophy (general attitude), can be specifically grasped in the process of education.

…education offers a vantage ground from which to penetrate to the human, as distinct from the technical, significance of philosophic discussions… The educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophic problems

\(^{161}\) Ibid., 332-333.
\(^{162}\) Ibid., 336.
\(^{163}\) Cf. Ratner 1989. Ratner’s analogy of the architect who, locked up in his room, examines blueprints instead of taking part in the actual building of the house is quite descriptive of Dewey’s critical relationship to modern philosophy and his own idea of the nature of philosophical inquiry.
\(^{164}\) West 1989, 82.
where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice.165

For Dewey these ideas justify his well known statements like “philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education” or “philosophy is the theory of education as deliberately conducted practice”.166 This is also the reason, I think, why Dewey understood the philosophical questions as inseparable from the educational reformation.

The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of social ideals and methods … go hand in hand. If there is especial need of educational reconstruction at the present time, if this need makes urgent a reconsideration of the basic ideas of traditional philosophic systems, it is because of the thoroughgoing change in social life accompanying the advance of science, the industrial revolution, and the development of democracy. Such practical changes cannot take place without demanding an educational reformation to meet them, and without leading men to ask what ideas and ideals are implicit in these social changes, and what revisions they require of the ideas and ideals which are inherited from older and unlike cultures.167

The intimate connection between philosophy and education in Dewey’s thinking goes back to his intention to propose an educational extension of Peirce’s pragmatic test of meaning. For Dewey, education is the ‘laboratory’ in which philosophical distinctions are concretized, in which philosophy does not just remain “symbolic or verbal or a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma.”168 This means an aspiration to understand the concept of experience described above in the practice of education. And this, furthermore, leads to the notion of thinking as a core of Dewey’s educational thought.

165 DE, 338-339.
166 Ibid., 338, 342. See also Childs 1989.
167 Ibid., 341.
168 Ibid., 338. This basic idea is most likely also to have given rise to the name of the school run by Dewey in Chicago: “The Laboratory School”. The school was also called as “The Experimental School” - obviously derived from Dewey’s philosophy of experience - and as “Dewey School”. See e.g. Mead 1930; West 1989, 84-85.
4.2.2 Thinking as the process of inquiry

For Dewey, thinking is the method of intelligent learning, of “learning that employs and rewards the mind.”¹⁶⁹ Thinking as a process of inquiry that awakens as a consequence of a problematic situation means the aspiration of the human being, by the help of symbolic try outs, to control the forthcoming experience by anticipating the results of the activity in relation to the desired goals. This way thinking itself is made into an experience through the following steps of inquiry:

(i) perplexity, confusion, doubt due to the fact that one is implicated in an incomplete situation whose full character is not yet determined; (ii) a conjectural anticipation, – a tentative interpretation of the given elements, attributing to them a tendency to effect certain consequences; (iii) a careful survey (examination, inspection, exploration, analysis) of all attainable considerations which will define and clarify the problem in hand; (iv) a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to make it more precise and more consistent, because squaring with a wider range of facts; (v) taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan of action which is applied to the existing state of affairs: doing something overtly to bring about the anticipated result, and thereby testing the hypothesis.¹⁷⁰

Inquiry, i.e. reflective thinking, is this stimulated in an indeterminate situation, by which Dewey means a disturbed, problematic, confusing or in some other way unsatisfactory situation, a ‘felt difficulty’. Through inquiry it can be changed into a satisfactory, unified whole again. “Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole,” he states.¹⁷¹

As a pragmatist, it is natural that Dewey explains the unsatisfactoriness of situations in terms of the unsatisfactoriness of their consequences: If we call it confused, then it is meant that its outcome cannot be anticipated... It is called conflicting when it tends to evoke discordant responses.¹⁷² Dewey thinks that at

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 159.
¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 157, See also Dewey 1910, 72-78 (hereafter referred to as HWT ) and Dewey 1938, 105-122 (hereafter referred to as LTI). Understanding Dewey’s experience of thinking would appear to be related to his idea of the nature of scientific activity which he analyzes later in The Quest for Certainty.
¹⁷¹ LTI, 108.
¹⁷² Ibid., 106.
its best, thinking involves precisely the consideration of the grounds and consequences of beliefs. However, this continuous questioning of things inevitable leads to Aristotelian aporia, anguish and pain.

As long as our activity glides smoothly along from one thing to another, or as long as we permit our imagination to entertain fancies at pleasure, there is no call for reflection... Reflective thinking is always more or less troublesome because it involves the overcoming of inertia that inclines one to accept suggestions at their face value; it involves willingness to endure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance. Reflective thinking, in short, means judgment suspended during further inquiry; and suspense is likely to be somewhat painful.

In a situation of uncertainty we, according to Dewey, symbolically climb up a tree to find holds through which we can get additional information and a clearer picture of the issue at hand. What opens up to our eyes when we look down the three is largely determined by our own cultural lenses. This idea is crystallized in Dewey’s concepts of ‘habit’ and ‘mind’ that provide the social basis of human conduct as outcomes of intersubjectivity. Therefore “it is not we who think, ...thinking is rather something that happens in us.” Thinking is therefore involuntary, and not until “one has acquired control of the method in which the function of suggestion occurs and has accepted responsibility for its consequences, can one truthfully say ‘I think so and so.’” Efficient thinking is meanwhile dependent on the mastery of the capital of meanings that can be applied at will.

‘Felt difficulty’ implies the formulation of not only doubt but also a problem needing a solution. Dewey considers this highly meaningful for how the process of inquiry proceeds, what kind of data is gathered, etc. The form of the problem is for Dewey the criterion for the relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures. An effort is made next to present the various possible hypotheses, ideas and suggestions to solve the problematic situation. This stage that

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173 HWT, 5.  
174 Ibid., 11-13.  
175 Ibid., 11.  
176 Ibid., 34. See also Dewey 1922, 16 (hereafter referred to as HNC).  
177 Ibid., 34 (emphasis as in original).  
178 Ibid., 118 (italics as in original).  
179 LTI, 108.
is necessary for an inquiry Dewey calls reasoning. The ideas and suggestions are made meaningful by it by representing them in a symbolic form and by combining them together. This process, operating with symbols constituting propositions, is reasoning in the sense of rational discourse. Dewey thinks that meanings shall be studied exactly as meanings, meaning consideration of what the meaning in question implies in relation to other meanings in the system of which it is a member. In this way guidelines for continuing the inquiry can be found in the next discussion – as Dewey puts it “the idea of meaning when developed in discourse directs the activities which, when executed, provide needed evidential material.”180

As the last phase of inquiry, Dewey identifies experimental testing, aiming at the confirmation or abandonment of hypotheses as ends in view. It is to be noted that Dewey did not grant the so-called facts any special right of constancy, but understood them to be similar temporary things as ideas and hypotheses, which can only be something more by proving their practical relevance for the experiment. According to Dewey, the requirement of the existence of a problem and its solution, i.e. the outcome of thinking, is an important characteristic of the reflective process that guides it.

Every suggested conclusion is tested by its reference to this regulating end, by its pertinence to the problem in hand. This need of straightening out a perplexity also controls the kind of inquiry undertaken...The problem fixes the end of thought and the end controls the process of thinking.181

To summarize Dewey so far, thinking is the accurate and deliberative instituting of the connections or relations between action, active doing or trying, and its consequences, i.e. what is passively undergone. It explicates the detailed connections between action and its consequences as relationships, getting stimulated when we want to determine the significance of an activity (doing) in relation to the problematic situation that we have experienced. This takes place by anticipating the consequences, which in turn means a conditional or preliminary solution – a hypothesis. The development of a hypothesis calls for careful study of existing conditions and implications involved in them, i.e. reasoning. The solution thus formed – a theory or idea – must be tested by acting upon it. If the result consists

180 Ibid., 112.
181 HWT, 11-13.
of certain consequences that solve the problematic situation, the solution is accepted as valid. Otherwise, action is modified and a new attempt is made. Thinking involves all of these stages.  

Dewey maintains that scientific attitude could almost be defined in terms of an ability to enjoy a state of doubt. One of the aspects of the experimental method is to function as a technique that uses doubt productively, converting it into operations of inquiry. The inquirer is a person who loves thinking and is interested in problems for their own sake.  

A central trait of Dewey’s reflective thinking is concretized in him: “to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and protracted inquiry.”  

In the light of the basic ideas of his philosophy, it is only natural that Dewey does not consider the process of reflective inquiry described above as a privilege of the scientist, both natural and social, elite only, but claims that it belongs to all intellectually active people in their everyday lives. Scientific inquiry and everyday ‘common-sense inquiry’ are therefore closely connected with each other.  

In Democracy and Education Dewey calls for its inclusion specifically in education, its connection with the concrete activities of the school. At the same time Dewey points out, however, that thinking shall not be taught as something of a separate skill just like special skills shall not be taught without thinking. This kind of activity leaves the pupil at the mercy of his routine habits and others’ authoritarian control, ultimately forming the largest obstacle of all intellectual development.

Teaching shall concentrate on creating such conditions in which thinking as a reflective habit can come about, because for Dewey it is – as stated above – ‘the method of intelligent learning’.  

The actual methodological problem is thus practical, connected on the one hand with what kind of ‘learning environment’ would awaken the child’s genuine curiosity – doubt to stimulate inquiry – and on the other hand with how the connections connected with experienced things would be built so that they will, as Dewey puts it, “on later occasions promote the

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182 DE, 158.
183 QC, 182. The basis for Dewey’s idea of the scientific attitude has quite obviously been Peirce’s thinking that he presented in 1896 in his essay entitled The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism (See Peirce 1955, 42-59, hereafter referred to as PWP).
184 HWT, 13.
185 Cf. Biesta et. al. 2003, 96-97; 105-106.
186 In this requirement Dewey echoes Hegel’s inseparability of content and form – going to the water as a condition for learning to swim. See Chapter 6 of this study.
187 DE, 153. See also HWT, 57-58.
flow of suggestions, create problems and purposes that will favour consecutiveness in the succession of ideas.”

The permanence of Dewey’s thinking in this issue is shown by the fact he already states in his School and Society (1900) that both university and school are places of inquiry.

It is, however, as true in the school as in the university, that the spirit of inquiry can be got only through and with the attitude of inquiry. The pupil must learn what has meaning, what enlarges his horizon, instead of mere trivialities. He must become acquainted with truths instead of things that were regarded as such fifty years ago, or that are taken as interesting by the misunderstanding of a partially educated teacher. It is difficult to see how these ends can be reached except as the most advanced part of the educational system is in complete interaction with the most rudimentary.

Dewey continues with the same thematic a little later when he maintains that the implementation of these principles in concrete teaching can only be carried out by a teacher who has been educated in the same way himself. “Only a teacher thoroughly trained in the higher levels of intellectual method and who thus has constantly in his own mind a sense of what adequate and genuine intellectual activity means, will be likely, in deed, not in mere word, to respect the mental integrity and force of children.”

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188 HWT, 58.
189 Dewey 1900, 78-79. Dewey’s first distinctive contribution to education, Interest as Related to Will published in 1895 (rewritten in 1913 as Interest and Effort) contains, according to Kilpatrick (1989), implicitly if not explicitly most of his significant doctrines. These ideas later acquired more precise formulations in, for example, How we Think and especially in Democracy and Education. Dewey’s thinking seems to be highly permanent: the ideas related to education present in the early 20th century, crystallized in incarnations of the philosophy of experience in those books, still appear in the same form in Experience and Education, Dewey’s last statement on education in 1938. It is interesting to note how Dewey’s thinking e.g. in the quote above is close to what was presented by some contemporary Finnish philosophers of education such as Z.J. Cleve (see e.g. Cleve 1886, 67). Obviously, the natural reason for this link is their shared influence of Hegel. For more on Cleve’s point of view, see Väyrynen 1992, 213-277.
190 Dewey 1904. See also Biesta et.al. 2003, 80-81.
4.2.3 Naturalistic continuity and educative experience as the growth of intelligence

Dewey’s method of experience as the process of inquiry described above implies a naturalistic theory of existence. According to Childs, this ‘experimental naturalism’ of Dewey, as an acceptance of organic, emergent evolution connected to the principle of continuity, implies that man’s rational and moral attributes have had a natural genesis just as literally as have the structures of his body.191 This rejects the dualistic presuppositions of classical philosophy and theology assuming the experience as an inner state of the subject outside the course of natural existence. In education, Dewey’s naturalistic interpretation of human personality means the aim of development and liberation of individual intelligence.192

A central aspect of Dewey’s method of intellectual thinking (inquiry, reflective thinking) is the attempt to preserve, instead of dualistic discriminations, the continuity of knowing with the activity purposefully shaping the environment. According to Dewey, knowledge of a thing consists in a tight sense of our intellectual resources, of all the ways in which our activity is expressed intellectually. True knowledge is only what has organised as our dispositions in habits so that we are capable of adapting the environments to our needs and adapting our goals and desires to our life situations. Knowledge is not just something that we are aware of at this moment, but it consists of dispositions that we use unconsciously to understand what is happening at this moment. Knowing as transactional activity is about bringing certain dispositions to our consciousness to remove our embarrassment by establishing a connection with ourselves and with the world in which we are living.193

191 Childs 1989. Kilpatrick (1989) says that Dewey himself reported that he adopted a naturalist outlook from William James, who according to Kilpatrick was most likely to have developed his biological psychology based on Darwin. Obviously Dewey’s principle of continuity also reflects his early influences from Hegel. See chapter 6 of this study.
192 Ibid. Dewey (1939) prefers “the word intelligence to reason because of the long anti-empirical history back of the latter word.” For the same reason Dewey has major reservations for the terms ‘rationalism’ and ‘a priori’. About the necessity of habit in this process, see HNC, 121-126.
193 DE, 344. According to Biesta et. al. Dewey referred to this main principle in his thinking in different terms in different times. In 1925 he called it the ‘empirical method’ and eventually in 1949, together with Bentley, the ‘transactional approach’. Also the concept ‘interaction’ was changed to ‘transaction’ in Dewey’s later writings because for Dewey the latter still implied the existence of two independent entities. See more in Biesta et. al. 2003, 25-53.
This naturalistic principle of continuity carries important implications for, for example, Dewey’s view of mind, which also results in important consequences for education. Dewey’s view of mind is shown in the individual’s intelligent activity as he anticipates its results by trying to control events and actions. In this way the mind is connected seamlessly with the course of events without being derived from the transcendental ideas of the dualistic trains of thought. The meaningfulness of action as a quality of behaviour presupposes knowledge so that we can grasp true events. Child formulates this idea put forward by Dewey as follows:

To have mind, we must have knowledge which is grasp of the behavior of actual events. Meaning relates to behavior. We may be said to have the meaning of events when we know what can be done with them, and how to behave with reference to them. This involves understanding of the conditions on which their occurrence depends, and also of the consequences to which they lead. Meaning, therefore, signifies that knowledge of operations, or of the behavior of events, which make significant prediction and control possible.194

The naturalist principle of continuity links mind with the evolutional process of culture. The child adopts mind as ‘historical consciousness’ when he learns to control the historically formed space of meanings in language. Mind as meanings funded through language in the habits, customs, traditions, tools, methods, techniques and institutions of the society are made his own in the process of learning, by participating in the ways and life of his community. This means the other prerequisite in the formation of self to which Dewey refers as ‘intellectual growth’ or ‘individuality’.

For Dewey the power to grow depends on the need for others and plasticity.195 Plasticity, on the other hand is the power to learn from experience, to find the relations between trying and what has been undergone leading to the formation of habits. By means of habits man can purposefully control and utilize his environment. They consist of habituation, i.e. a certain kind of passive and permanent balance between activity and the environment, and, on the other hand, of active, impulsive capacities, which are able to readjust activity in new conditions. Both the dimensions of habit enable intellectual growth as the formation of self: its passive element, habituation – which can be interpreted as ‘knowledge’ or

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194 Childs 1989.
195 DE, 57.
‘tradition’ on the basis of what was said above – furnishes the background of growth, its active and creative element – which can be interpreted as intellectual thinking on the basis of the above – constitute growing in applying capacities to new aims.196

As a condition for the possibility of growth, Dewey thus assumes both tradition attached to habit and its ‘active capacities’, ‘natural impulses and desires’.197

It should be noticed, however, that “the meaning of native capacities is not native” as they are acquired in the “interaction with a matured social medium”.198

According to Dewey the impulses are “agencies for transfer of existing social power into personal ability; they are means of reconstructive growth”.199 The formation of self, or individuality, is a potentiality meaning the development of the human personality according to its capacities and energies in interaction (read ‘transaction’) with surrounding conditions.

In this process of intercourse, native capacities, which contain an element of uniqueness, are transformed and become a self. Moreover, through resistances encountered, the nature of the self is discovered. The self is both formed and brought to consciousness through interaction with environment. (…) self is created in the creation of objects, a creation that demands active adaptation to external materials, including a modification of the self so as to utilize and thereby overcome external necessities by incorporating them in an individual vision and expression.200

According to Cunningham, Dewey’s notion of ‘unique potential’ plays a major role in his conception of the self. In his analysis of its meaning, Cunningham points out the following aspects:

1. Potentiality is closely related to objects and ongoing (and hence as such unfinished, incomplete, indeterminate) events over which we can have power through the application of intelligence to our experience. This power, giving

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196 Ibid., 57; HNC, 63-75.
197 Dewey refers to the active party of habit with slightly different words in different sources, such as ‘active capacities’ (in DE), ‘native capacities’ (in Art as Experience) and ‘natural impulses and desire’ (in Experience and Education – hereafter EE). See also HNC, 65-118.
198 HNC, 65.
199 Ibid., 68.
200 Dewey 1934, 286-287. Also here one cannot help noticing Hegel’s influence on Dewey’s thinking (Bildung, estrangement from natural work, etc.).
the possibility of human choice and therefore of individuality and growth, is a
direct result of becoming aware of potentialities.

2. The self is both ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’. This is because the self can be
treated as an event-with-meaning or object; one can experience one’s own
self (a unique object of one’s experience) and other selves (grouped together
as a class of objects).

3. The essence of the concept of self lies in its potentialities (possibilities, tend-
cencies, directions); a sense of one’s ‘potential’ is at the very core of one’s
sense of the self.

4. Because native capacities and constitutions are all unique (they have an ele-
ment of uniqueness although they erect boundaries against the potentials and
generic qualities, a situation common to all normal individuals and one of
which it would be useful to be aware), each person’s self, or set of potentials
is unique.

5. We can apply our unique potentials toward the development of our unique
‘end in view’ only by being conscious of the specific, uniquely individual
facts and of the continuous dialectical interaction between our selves and our
experiences.201

The condition of the continuity of mind lies in its open, transforming potential, in
the possibility of growth. The critical development of a habit or belief in the form
of problematic situations leads to reflection, the process of inquiry described
above that includes the potential to modify new, not yet known things on the basis
of previous things. Dewey calls the actualization of this idea essential for the
principle of continuity in practical educational activities the method of an educa-
tive experience, considering it as a notion identical to reflection.202

Natural impulses and desires (or native capacities) constitute only the starting
point in Dewey’s conception of intellectual growth.203 They are “agencies of de-

eviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality.”204 In
educative experience these impulses and desires are reconstructed and remade by
intelligence in forming purposes and organizing means to execute them. This is
the ideal aim of education meaning the creation of the power of self-control

201 Cunningham 1994.
202 DE, 170.
203 EE, 64; see also HNC, 209-215.
204 HNC, 67.
which eventually is identical with freedom, that is, “power to frame purposes and to execute or carry into effect purposes so framed.”

A genuine purpose always starts with an impulse. Obstruction of the immediate execution of an impulse converts it into a desire. Nevertheless neither impulse nor desire is itself a purpose. A purpose is an end-in-view. That is, it involves foresight of the consequences which will result from acting upon impulse.

The setting of goals by anticipating the consequences of action is for Dewey a complicated intellectual operation that involves not only observation of the objective, surrounding conditions, but also knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past and judgment connecting the observed and recalled to see what they signify. The crucial question of education is, then, how the immediate, non-intelligent and impulsive action based on volition can be postponed until the above-mentioned observation, information and judgment have intervened.

The intellectual anticipation, the idea of consequences, must blend with desire and impulse to acquire moving force. It then gives direction to what otherwise is blind, while desire gives ideas impetus and momentum. An idea then becomes a plan and for an activity to be carried out... In an educational scheme, the occurrence of a desire and impulse is not the final end. It is an occasion and a demand for the formation of a plan and method of activity. Such a plan... can be formed only by study of conditions and by securing all relevant information.

In this postponement of immediate desire, Dewey sees as a condition for intellectual action the core of the teacher’s work. The teacher’s ‘guidance’ means leading the pupils to the above intelligent way of action to generate growth and freedom by communicating as ‘making suggestions’ in such a way that the pupil can see on his own behalf and in his own way the relations between the means and

205 EE, 67; HNC, 70.
206 EE, 67.
207 Ibid., 68-69.
208 Ibid., 69-71 (italics as in original); see also HNC, 69-70.
209 In this fundamental idea of his, Dewey would, at the first glance, appear to think like Kant who emphasizes that to be able to function, man shall solve the conflict between his motivationalist impulses, consideration, reflection. However, this potential overlapping turns out to be quite questionable when considering the ambivalent totality of their thinking.
methods employed and results achieved, i.e. think intelligently for himself. Thus, by the teacher’s suggestions, it essentially involves the transmission of tradition in such a way that the pupil can initiate himself into it, as only in integration with it his own powers are released and directed. What is also a necessary prerequisite for tradition to be a factor in the individual’s personal growth is his urge and need to join in an undertaking. According to Dewey, there is not any opposition between the wisdom and skill of the past and the individual capacities of learners. Where tradition is a restrictive and enslaving convention, the trouble lies in the habits, standards and ideas of the ‘master teacher’. Where tradition is enhancing and liberating, the teacher is an advanced fellow worker with his students, states Dewey.210 From this perspective Dewey, in *Human Nature and Conduct*, strongly criticizes the education of his times calling it training rather than education, where “plasticity is warped and docility is taken to mean advantage of … to learn just those special things which those having power and authority wish to teach.” 211 Impulsivity has potential to work either towards accommodation and reproduction or toward exploration, discovery and creation depending on its use, claims Dewey. This is why education has such a crucial role in a democratic society.

It is important to notice that for Dewey, the teacher as a fellow worker does not mean leaving the students by themselves with their own desires surrounded with materials, tools, appliances etc.

If the teacher is really a teacher, and not just a master or “authority”, he should know enough about his pupils, their needs, experiences, degrees of skill and knowledge etc., to be able (not to dictate aims and plans) to share in a discussion regarding what is to be done and be as free to make suggestions as any one else.212

According to Dewey, the teacher’s suggestions are important starting-points to solve the problem at hand, which still need to be developed into an actual action plan as a contribution of the experiences of all those participating in the learning process. The purpose has to take shape through the process of social intelligence.213 True intellectual shaping of the ‘end’ or purpose only occurs, however, in the course and on account of the operation following the action plan. The value

210 Dewey 1925a.
211 HNC, 70.
212 Ibid.
213 EE, 72.
of the teacher’s suggestions – as naturally presenting past experience, tradition or curriculum – is in their higher probability – compared to random ideas presented by the pupils, for instance – to lead to the intended shaping of the goal in the direction of the activity. According to Gert Biesta, in Democracy and Education Dewey for the first time solves this problem of education – how to adjust the individual (child) and social (curriculum) – in this very process of co-operative communication, which ensures participation in a common understanding. Each step forward, or each ‘means’ used in the process of this execution makes clearer the character of that end suggesting the next step to be taken. In this way originality and independence in thinking is for Dewey connected with the communicative nature of the process of inquiry, not so much with the source of the initial suggestion. Independent thinking, or freedom, is achieved in the process of education when the knowledge of facts enables one to employ them in connection with desires and aims. For Dewey this is the key notion of freedom, never referring to any metaphysical freedom of will.

Freedom or individuality … is not an original possession or gift. It is something to be achieved, to be wrought out. Suggestions as to things which may advantageously be taken, as to skill, as to methods of operation, are indispensable conditions of its achievement. These by the nature of the case must come from a sympathetic and discriminating knowledge of what has been done in the past and how it has been done.

To conclude, the intertwining of thinking and educative experience means for Dewey an important observation as to the meaning of tradition and knowledge in growth. At the same time communication as reflective, intelligent inquiry leads to new knowledge, it (knowledge) is still essentially valuable – ‘as the funded capital of civilization’ – only in the overall context of this experience, when subjected to its use in inquiry and above all in its process of growth leading to necessity. It is obvious that this is the very reason why Dewey later in his Logic prefers the term ‘warranted assertion’ to the terms ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’, as it is “free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves reference to inquiry as

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214 Biesta 1995; Biesta 2006. See also the fifth chapter of Dewey’s Experience and Nature (1925b, 132-161).

215 HNC, 209.

216 Dewey 1925a. See also HNC, 209-215.

217 DE, 158, 336.
that which warrants assertion." In choosing his words Dewey refers to his criticism of the concept of truth in modern dualistic 'philosophy of consciousness'. For Dewey’s naturalistic person, the world can basically never become ultimately ‘known’, but is subject to constant and open reshaping and growth taking place in a continuum of experience. One cannot help noticing Hegel’s influence on Dewey in this thought or in the emphasis on the value of tradition. It is – to put it in Hegelian terms – about a process of Bildung, yet with the important proviso that the thinking or intellectual inquiry entwined in experience is not motivated by the metaphysical already assumed to be ready before it. Dewey’s growing person is prospective (future oriented) which determines the value of retrospection, i.e. knowledge and tradition. So they are meaningful and useful particularly as part of the thinking process that leads to future knowledge, that which is not yet known, growth, to solve a special, individual problematic situation. This forward-looking nature of Dewey’s philosophy is often seen as the most valuable perspective in Dewey’s thinking. Richard Rorty, among others, takes up this Dewey’s idea of human ability to change and to change oneself – “change from a sense of their dependence upon something antecedently present to a sense of utopian possibili-

218 LTI, 16.
219 Right after publishing Logic (1938), Dewey was involved in a heated debate with Bertrand Russell on how ‘truth’ was to be understood. Russell still continued this discussion in his History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day published in 1946. In the light of his philosophy of experience, for Dewey the basic concept of logic and epistemology cannot be ‘truth’, but ‘inquiry’ that is open so far as its results are concerned. Russell thinks, however, that the idea of the ‘original situation changing into a unified whole’ contained in Dewey’s conception of inquiry is derived from – without Dewey noticing it himself – Hegelian metaphysics. As the naturalist, temporal development process of reality, and not the development of the Absolute – as Hegel thought – is perhaps the most essential idea in Dewey’s philosophy, Russell thinks that he ends up in a conceptual conflict in his definition of inquiry. For more details, see Russell 1989 or Russell 1996, 408-419. Dewey responds to Russell’s criticism in a ‘defense article’ entitled Experience, Knowledge and Value in a compiled work on his own philosophy (ed. by Schilpp & Hahn, first published in 1939) by maintaining, for instance, that Russell does not understand his thinking because of “his imperviousness to what I have said about the problematic quality of situations as giving both occasion for and the control of inquiry.” For Dewey, the idea of ‘converting the elements of the original situation into a unified whole’ – as put in his determination of actual inquiry – means “always a unification of the subject-matter which constitutes an individual problematic situation. It is not unification at large.” And if, however, Dewey continues in his Logic “the feature of unification is generalized beyond the limits in which it takes place, namely resolution of specific problematic situation, knowledge is then supposed to consist of attainment of a final all-comprehensive Unity, equivalent to the Universe as an unconditioned whole.” (Both quotations above are by Dewey himself from his Logic, italics added by Dewey for this special purpose.) See more in Dewey 1939; see also Borg 1992.
ties of the future, the growth of their ability to mitigate their finitude by a talent for self-creation.”

4.2.4 Community, education, and democracy

As discussed earlier, Dewey’s self is both ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’. This is because the self can be treated as an object; one can experience one’s own self and other selves. According to Rosenthal, Dewey identifies analogically also the dynamics of the community as interplay of the adjustment of attitudes, aspirations, and factual perceptions between common perspectives as the conditions for the novel emergent perspective as it conditions the community perspective. In internalizing the other’s perspective, the developing self also adopts the perspectives of the community including all its standards and authorities. This is about the passive dimension of self that Mead developed into ‘me’, the critical and objective side of self. Similarly to Mead, Dewey’s idea of self also includes a creative and subjective side. Self thus includes both the conventional perspectives of the group and the creative and unique individual perspective. In this way Dewey sees the origin of the tension of conservative and liberal factors in the fundamental construction of self – or in habit as discussed above. Both sides of the self, the conservative group perspectives and the creative individual perspective are not conflicting as such; rather, they are two mutually dependent, interrelated poles in the dynamic temporal process that manifests itself as two poles within the very nature of the self. Dewey formulates this act of adjustment as follows:

No amount of aggregated collective action of itself constitutes a community (...) To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires, and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values. But this transition is never finished.

Dewey’s community is built of similar parties of dynamic interaction as self. Every individual is thinking in relation to the common perspective in his own special way. The new perspective chosen by the individual is adapted to the

220 Rorty 1991b, 17.
221 Rosenthal 1993.
222 Dewey 1927, 353.
common perspective that joins into itself this novelty. The condition of the novelty of this new perspective is determined by its relation to the institutions, traditions and forms of life that it derives from. The dynamics of the community thus mean a continuous process of adaptation between the common perspective conditioning the new perspective and the new perspective conditioning the common perspective. In this way the creativity of the individual comes up against the conventionality of the common perspective, but not against the community itself. The community is built and develops in this continuous communicative process of adaptation. The individual is not a detached and isolatable part of the community or an atomistic part of it, as it represents the creative adaptations of its community that further change both the parties to the process of adaptation. The community and the individual as such are abstractions for Dewey, as they can only exist in relation to one another. The basis of the community lies in the common interest, a condition of which is observation of the results of common action and, on the other hand, the opportunity for every member of the community to contribute to common action.223

Based on the above we can realize that, for Dewey, individual and social intelligence are in an intimate, functional and reciprocal relation based on a continuous communicative process of adjustment. The very intelligence that is capable of transforming societies and institutions is itself influenced by these institutions. Social innovations are initiated by individuals, but innovation can occur only because individuals are continuous with each other and with the social institutions they constitute. And so Dewey’s road is open to state that because “growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself”, and further, just because of that thesis, the value of school education can be evaluated based on “the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact.”224

Mind, thinking, self and growth are manifested in the whole of human action. For Dewey, the human being is an individual only in a relationship with others. Meaning arises in human interaction and in the agreements required by common action in social contexts. Mental processes are part of the process formed by man and the environment, and language is only possible thanks to the communicative interaction on which the existence of meaning is based. Individuals need each

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223 Ibid., 353-354; Rosenthal 1993.
224 DE, 58.
other’s perspectives in their own action, producing at the same time the common meaning content of the community of meaning. According to Dewey, consciousness of self thus inevitably requires consciousness of others. Self is, however, more than just a relationship to another self. It cannot be absolutely distinguished from the other, as we can experience our selves only as long as that other exists in our experience. “Failure to recognize that this world of inner experience is dependent upon an extension of language, which is a social product and operation, led to a subjectivist, solipsistic and egoistic strain in modern thought.” Dewey’s self is not any isolated subjectivity as a metaphysical or transcendental knower but as a dynamic structure of habits.

By means of language, by communication, individuals can learn to see the perspective of the other. With the development of one’s own unique conduct, a common community of meaning also develops. It is through this community of meaning that not only the self, but also a sense of self-consciousness emerges. Thus, for Dewey, the origin of the self is intersubjective; it is through social interaction that self is both formed and brought to consciousness.

Dewey’s experimental naturalism in education correlates to this social emphasis. Childs puts it together in five grounds. Education is thus an inevitable social process, (i) because human signification can only be based on a collaborative society enabling communication based on language, which is also why meanings related to education, such as its contents and goals, are irrevocably social; (ii) because only by taking part in the actions and meanings of society, a child can be personified or learn the ways of action determining personification; (iii) because setting the goals of education presupposes understanding of the child in the context of social institutions and conditions; (iv) because every society tries to safeguard its own continuity by raising a new generation, and (v) because the child will eventually be working in the society which he was raised to be a member of.

However, Dewey points out that the conception of education as a social process and function has no definite meaning unless one defines what kind of society one has in mind. What is, once again, the end in view? The two points by which Dewey measures social life are the extent in which the interests of a group

225 Dewey 1925b, 137.
226 Childs 1989.
227 DE, 103, 105.
are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups. For Dewey, the idea of democracy is actualized in a society “which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life”. Democracy forces observation of the existence of the common interest, leading to the need to discuss and publish. Language is the most important tool in this process of the creation of meanings, by means of which people both think and communicate. Thus dialogue, face-to-face interaction, lies in the core of Dewey’s idea of democracy. This kind of social intelligence and its generation is not, however, innate for humans, as it is dependent on education.

In short, Dewey’s creative democratic ideal as the importance of mutual interests in social life and open-mindedness for continuous reconstruction is implied in the following principles:

1. Each individual has an intrinsic worth and dignity.
2. Each individual enjoys the status of ends, and the institutions the status of means.
3. Each individual, treated as an end, must be so educated as being competent to judge values.
4. Each individual is prized as different and unique.
5. Education offers a method for the resolution of conflict.
6. Free expression of thought and the experimental use of intelligence is secured.

To conclude, for Dewey, thinking, education and democracy form a unified whole. Democracy as a creative notion means thinking in education in order to encourage the students’ ability to find novelty, to learn to think for themselves in the process of inquiry. Thus, for Dewey, the school is a social microcosm in which education as a process of living – not as technological preparation for it – is the fundamental method of social progress and reform. Scientific inquiry ‘brought down to the ground’ is both a tool and a goal of democratic education. Dewey was convinced that education had failed in his times because it dealt with the final results of

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228 DE, 105.
231 DE, 93.
inquiry, trying to make the pupils learn them, rather than trying to teach how to inquire into things as such and by the pupils themselves. For Dewey, democracy meant conscious and free communication which, leading to intellectual ability through the encounter of the new and different, is a condition for the evolution of a democratic society that is open for change, diversity and dissimilarity. Conscious and free communication cannot, however, become possible resting on the natural inclinations (natural causalities) of man, as democratic education is needed. And thus, in Dewey’s opinion, the ideal aim of education is, in the process of inquiry, the development of power and self-control that enable individuals to continue their growth.232 Here the naturalistic idea of human self-realization as a continuous transaction between self and environment forms the very core of Dewey’s educational thinking.

4.3 The social origin of self and education: George Herbert Mead

4.3.1 The social self

George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), the close friend of Dewey from the times in Chicago, elaborated his idea of the social origin of self on the basis of – in addition to Dewey – his other contemporary pragmatists, Josiah Royce (1855-1916) and William James (1842-1910).233 Mead’s ‘sociogenetic perspective’ is one of the central themes in his posthumously published works in the 1930’s, The Philosophy of the Present (1932), Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936), The Philosophy of the Act (1938), and especially Mind, Self and Society (1934). In his writings Mead himself, surprisingly, almost totally ignores the thinking of Charles Peirce and, according to Hans Joas, actually mentions him only briefly in one of his last articles.234 However, Peirce’s ‘phaneroscopy’ and

232 LTI, 14; DE, 100.
233 Mead worked as Dewey’s colleague from 1891 at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbour and later, from 1894, at the University of Chicago. It should be noted that before meeting Dewey, Mead had studied in Berlin with Wilhelm Dilthey. Underlying both Mead’s and Dewey’s thinking is the Darwinian, naturalistic model of organism, which as stated by Joas (1991), “actively safeguarding its life in a given environment made it possible easily to go beyond the view advanced by transcendental philosophy, which requires the antecedent reflective certainty of the thinking ego”. For more on Mead’s life and works, see e.g. Reck 1964. Fore more on Mead’s intellectual history, see e.g. Joas 1991; Valsiner et al. 1988. See also Mead 1930.
the theory of signs obviously influenced Mead’s conceptions at least via Dewey.\footnote{Cf. Sutinen 2003, 161-167.} I will return to these Peircian roots of Mead in Chapter 6. Actually Mead already elaborated on this theme much earlier in his writings in the early 20th century.\footnote{See Cook 1991. See also Sutinen 2003; Biesta 1999. By the early writings of Mead I refer to his works in 1894 - 1913. According to Valsiner et al. (1988) the roots of Mead’s thinking can be traced just in these less known articles.} In his thinking Mead was also much in debt to psychologist James Baldwin (1861-1934) as well as to early contributors to social psychology, Charles Cooley (1864-1929), Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and William McDougall (1871-1938).\footnote{Valsiner & van der Veer 1988.} Mead utilized the different aspects of those of his contemporaries: Baldwin’s ideas on attention and imitation, Royce’s emphasis on the social nature of consciousness, Dewey’s philosophical and educational views, Cooley’s and McDougall’s social psychology and Wundt’s treatment of myth and language. Even if Mead accepted many of those previous theories, he did it not, however, uncritically.\footnote{Ibid.}

In what follows I will briefly present the main principles of Mead’s theory of the social development of self by concentrating on its intellectual phase. It is exactly in this reflective stage where, I think, Mead’s theory is the most applicable to examine the emergency of self when discussing the roots of P4C. It is important to note here, however, that Mead’s ideas are based on a developmental continuum in which its various phases presuppose one another.\footnote{See e.g. Sutinen 2003.} As conditions of the intellectual, analytical phase we need to assume the preceding the evolutional stages of the development of the relation between the individual and his environment. The ability of the growing person to solve the problems that he meets in his action in an intelligent and creative way can thus not arise unconditionally as it, according to Mead, is built on the social basis produced by the individual’s previous development.

Mead maintains that we can only speak of ‘mind’ through the existence of significant symbols. The mind appears (or emerges) when an organism is able to point out meanings to others and to himself.\footnote{Mead 1934, 132; Mead 1913.} “It is absurd to look at the mind simply from the standpoint of the individual organism; for, although it has its focus there, it is essentially a social phenomenon; even its biological functions are

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\item \footnote{Cf. Sutinen 2003, 161-167.}
\item \footnote{See Cook 1991. See also Sutinen 2003; Biesta 1999. By the early writings of Mead I refer to his works in 1894 - 1913. According to Valsiner et al. (1988) the roots of Mead’s thinking can be traced just in these less known articles.}
\item \footnote{Valsiner & van der Veer 1988.}
\item \footnote{Ibid.}
\item \footnote{See e.g. Sutinen 2003.}
\item \footnote{Mead 1934, 132; Mead 1913.}
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If I do not act implicitly like the other one does in response to my gesture, I never develop my mind. But as I respond implicitly to my expression like the other also responds to it, I can place myself in the other’s position in relation to myself by becoming conscious of my gesture and the response it caused in the other. According to Mead, in so doing I develop my reflective consciousness. The condition of this arising is that things become symbolic having meanings that I can use in that ongoing, functional interaction. Then collaboration, for instance, is successful with others thanks to the fact that I am able to take my attitudes as the objects of my own attention. Thus my own attitudes are responsible for others’ conduct, as I can through them exert an influence on others’ action, with them becoming stimuli of others’ action. As argued by Biesta the problem of how we can become aware of the (inter)subjective meaning of our own gestures to other, can be traced back to Mead’s idea of the functional nature of social cooperation where our (vocal) gesture “offers us an image of the possible responses of the other to our gestures and therefore helps to anticipate that gesture.” This same process covers, of course, the action of the other towards myself. For Mead, this intersubjective and creative ongoing meaning-making is a continual process on human subjectivity.

It is by means of reflexiveness – the turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself – that the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it; it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other toward himself, that the individual is able consciously to adjust himself to that process … Reflexiveness, then is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of mind.

Initially, my ability to see my gesture from the other’s perspective is just the perspective of the other’s individual response, but later it develops into a complicated collection of responses, or a role. The self is organized (internalized) from individual attitudes of others into social or group attitudes ”and by thus becoming an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of social or group behavior in which it and the others are all involved – a pattern which enters as a whole

241 Mead 1934, 133.
242 Mead 1910a.
243 Biesta 1999 (italics as in original).
244 Mead 1934, 134.
into the individual’s experience in terms of these organized group attitudes which, through the mechanism of his central nervous system, he takes toward himself, just as he takes the individual attitudes of others.” 245 According to Mead, ‘thinking’ is exactly this mental process of conversation, i.e. the use of inner vocal gestures, words, within one’s self when the individual takes the attitude of the other. 246 An especially significant role in this evolution of thinking self is occupied by the so-called ‘generalized other’, by which Mead – similarly to Dewey – means the community or group through which the individual creates his self in taking part in its activities and communication. According to Mead

…it is this inner thought, this inner flow of speech and what it means – that is, words with their meanings – that call out intelligent response; it is this that constitutes the mind, in so far as that lies in the experience of the form. But this is only a part of the whole social process; it has its being there. … This mental process … is one which has evolved in the social process of which it is a part. And it belongs to the different organisms that lie inside of this larger social process. 247

Mead’s intersubjective theory of the social origin of self gives rise to the question how the freedom, i.e. self-determination and autonomy of man should be understood. According to Mead, as discussed above, the privacy of mind is not something opposite to the others, or community, but the others are the necessary condition for its arising. Thus, it is essential to realize that Mead’s theory implies more than just the interaction between different individuals. Its main notion is that mind, self and reflective self-consciousness arise in symbolic interaction still originated in non-reflective experience. 248 According to Biesta, this idea of Mead means that “intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity and is constitutive of it.” 249

This problem has been studied from the viewpoint of Mead’s thinking also by Mitchell Aboulafia combining the ideas of Mead, Sartre, Freud and Hegel. According to him, Mead studies the development of self without being attached to the idea of protecting ‘self’ from an assumed control by the other. This fixation is,

245 Ibid., 158. See also Mead 1932, 176-195.
246 Mead 1936, 384-385.
247 Ibid., 381. For the evolution of mind and institutions, see ibid., 383.
248 Ibid., 384.
249 Biesta 1999.
claims Aboulafia, clearly present in Sartre, Freud and Hegel. If consciousness, for Sartre, contains in some form the internalized other, it is decayed. For Hegel, two developing ‘selves’ end up in a conflict, both wanting to be independent, i.e. the one who is free from otherness, as both see the other as a threat to this independence. Freud thinks that we have in the self the other’s vanguard, the superego, preventing us from taking a violent attitude to what the other, civilization, considers to be correct. It seems obvious that Hegel’s as well as Freud’s and Sartre’s thinking is fundamentally based on their consciousness-centred idea of subjectivity.

Following Mead, Aboulafia states that consciousness enabling self-determination has constituted itself in and through the social. For this kind of a social ‘self’ it is not essential, however, to be protected from the other, but to determine how individuals and groups are in interaction with the social heritage that both constitutes and restricts them. The condition of the autonomous individual is not so much the ‘generalized other’ as the internalization of restrictions and their potential exceeding. The ‘self’ capable of transforming and directing oneself is possible for Aboulafia with the ‘self’ overcoming the present problems through reconstruction of the directed self, and this possible integration of the me and the not-me is the me to come. Self-determined individuals arise most auspiciously in a social process that allows freedom of choice, that lays stress on how important it is to familiarise children with the reality of these choices in their lives and that treats the growing person as a human being who can make judgments of his own future. It can be questioned, however, if Aboulafia in his argumentation is really reaching Mead’s theory of pedagogical action.

250 Aboulafia 1986, 45-69, 76-78, 89, 120-123.
251 Ibid., 101.
252 Ibid., 117. The question of ‘subjectivity’, ‘freedom’ and ‘self-determination’ has been one of the most central topics of modern philosophy. The modern, consciousness-centred thought was challenged in the twentieth century in the so-called linguistic turn that largely originated with the pragmatism of Charles Peirce. This paradigm shift, as argued by Jurgen Habermas (1991), can also be clearly noticed in Mead’s work, although he took no explicit notice of it. One can get an idea of the complexity of this issue thus opened e.g. in the thinking of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). His main work Sein und Zeit (1927) is a massive attempt to understand the complicated constitution of man’s existence, Dasein, which seems to have common traits with Mead’s ideas still articulated by his distinctive vocabulary. For Heidegger ‘self’ is about being as the ‘they’ (das Man) when the subject ‘who’ of everyday Dasein is asked. “The Self of everyday Dasein is the ‘they-self’ (das Man selbst) which we distinguish from the ‘authentic Self’ – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As ‘they-self’, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the ‘they’, and must first find itself.” (Heidegger 1962, 167). If Dasein feels like ‘they-self’, it also means that the ‘they’ itself determines the interpretation of the world,
4.3.2 Education as an interchange of experience

What would be the educational significance of Mead’s theory? In this respect, as is commonly known, Mead did not make any systematic contribution to his conception of education except in some of his early essays, especially in *The psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruction*, and in the course titled as *Philosophy of Education* which he gave in 1910-1911 at the University of Chicago.

In *The psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruction*, Mead – starting with the educational practices of primitive tribal communities, i.e. play, imitation and various initiation rites – discusses learning as interaction between the social and individual. The basis for Mead’s thinking lies in the inevitable basic assumption of the social impulsiveness of the child, which the child expresses in play and in his efforts to place himself in the position of adults in his community. The child imitates adults in feelings that are awakened by their consciousness of other members of the community. The imitation determines an unconscious social control that the community is exerting through the impulsiveness of the child. In this way the child is linked to his community through the myths and cults of his tribe as he becomes aware of himself in relation to others. The child is objectified to himself, as he is able (through language) to examine his own action through the action of the community of which he is a member, as if looking at himself from another person’s point of view.

Mead thinks that skipping the fundamental process described above of the natural generation of self-consciousness in the child and of the development taking place in its language and thinking has led to the problems in school education.

the way of being in the world and being with (Mitsein) closest to it. Thus Dasein is because of the ‘they’ an unnoticeable and undefined ‘dictator’ as an everyday thing. It articulates the significant context, marking the factual Dasein as being in the with-world proximally. For Heidegger, it is not ‘I’, in the sense of my own ‘Self’, that ‘am’ but rather the Others, whose way is that of the ‘they’. “In terms of the ‘they’ and as the ‘they’, I am ‘given’ proximally to ‘myself’ (mir ‘selbst’).” (Ibid., 167). Dasein is thus roughly the ‘they’, mostly also remaining as such. If Dasein reveals its world, approaching, and opens up the actual, authentic being to itself, this exposure of the ‘world’ and opening up of Dasein is realized by dissolving coverings and obscurities, pulling down the masks limiting Dasein, with which Dasein shuts itself out from itself. (Ibid., 167). For more on Mead’s relation to Heidegger from the perspective of temporality, see Joas 1985, 197.

253 Mead 1910b.
in his own times.\textsuperscript{254} In terms of teaching, the replication of the above theory on the natural generation and development of the child’s self-consciousness takes place in the relations that the child develops to his teacher and, on the other hand – through the teacher – to his classmates. This means for Mead – as it does for Dewey – the encountering of the experiences of the child and teacher.

To use Professor Dewey’s phrase, instruction should be an interchange of experience in which the child brings his experience to be interpreted by the experience of the parent or teacher. This recognizes that education is interchange of ideas, is conversation – belongs to the universe of discourse.\textsuperscript{255}

In this interchange of experience, the teacher becomes a natural part of the solution to the problem experienced by the child himself, and in fact “that what the child has to learn is what he wants to acquire, to become the man.”\textsuperscript{256} For Mead, this would appear to be about the basic relationship in education: the pedagogical relationship. The teacher’s relation to his student is a condition of thought and meaning just because their ultimate social origin. Thus, the social relationship, which comes before meaning and thought, is actually ‘the material’ of education, and further the problem of education is that “of introducing a method of thought” which comes back to “producing a social situation” in which the child itself is included.\textsuperscript{257}

For it to be practically possible for a child’s experience to be transformed in interpretation taking place through the teacher’s experience, it presupposes a problem genuinely experienced by the child as a subject-matter of instruction. This viewpoint also determines Mead’s teacherhood:

Just insofar as the subject-matter of instruction can be brought into the form of problems arising in the experience of the child – just as far will the relation of the child to the instructor become a part of the natural solution of the problem – actual success of a teacher depends in large measure upon his capacity

\textsuperscript{254} Here Mead refers to, for instance, Herbart’s conception of the child as an \textit{Apperceptionsmasse} detached from his social self arising and developing among others, leading further to, among other things, the way in which the learning materials used in schools are presented.

\textsuperscript{255} Mead 1910b.

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{257} Mead 1910-1911.
to state the subject-matter of instruction in terms of the experience of the children.  

Based on these starting-points, teaching should, according to Mead, take place as a mutual conversation between the child, his teacher and the other children – by the agency of the teacher. The conversation of concrete individuals, demands Mead, must be substituted for the pale abstractions of thought. In the conversation ‘I’ internalize the world of meanings realized by the other members of the community in that communication by being able to place myself in their position in my own verbal expressions, i.e. to hear myself the way I assume them to hear me. Conversation must therefore be construed as the method of pedagogical practice recommended by Mead to concretize the development of self-consciousness taking place in thinking attached to language. According to Mead, the overwhelming problems of the school derive mostly from an inability to understand the radical meaning of this personal interaction and the related ‘lack of a need’ to transform the subject-matter into concrete experience of the children. So the material of the lesson is not identified with the impulses of the child but the attention of the child is that of a school self “expressing subordination to school authority and identity of conduct with that of all the other children in the room.”  

So, the essential thing is what the child’s attention is targeted at in the classroom on the basis of his impulsiveness, because that is the way the process of the organization of consciousness, or the development of self-consciousness, takes place. In the intellectual phase of human action (following the emotional and aesthetical phase) “we train our children to choose the stimuli for their acts”. By this Mead means that in the phase of intelligent action, children should learn to control their immediate and blind tendency to respond that arises from the conflict caused by the variety of possibilities for response. In the phase of intelligent action, children should be trained to anticipate the consequences of their action and replace their primitive impulsiveness with the “full process of thought”. Similarly to Dewey, Mead states that this is one of the main tasks of education, i.e. to introduce “the method of thought” by which he refers to the process of thinking.

258 Mead 1910b.
259 Ibid.
260 Mead 1910-1911. See also Biesta 1999.
261 Ibid.
through the stages of problem, hypothesis and experimentation in a social situation. The child needs to be made at home in the new situation, which according to Mead, is above all dependent on social relations where the child’s own experience is crucial thus also changing the things to be acquired.262

This inevitable social formation of self should furthermore give rise to not only the methods and learning materials of the school, but also the means to arouse and direct the pupils’ attention. According to Mead’s Philosophy of Education lectures the essential task of education is to formulate consciously the traditions, ideas, and methods that have been developed in the past, and to embody them in such a form “that they can be readily communicated”.263 So, in The psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruction Mead thinks that textbooks, for instance, should be written in such a way that in addition to respecting the child’s intelligence; drawing on their own experience as a subject matter (or curriculum) of instruction, it implements the development of subject-matter as action and reaction of one mind upon another mind. “The dictum of the Platonic Socrates, that one must follow the argument where it leads in the dialogue, should be the motto of the writer of textbooks.”264

When reflecting on Mead’s conception of education, Biesta highlights among other things Mead’s conviction about education’s existence in communication between the educator and the child and the anticipatory nature of action where it is, in the first place, guided by a ‘behavioral’ interpretation of the possible meaning of emerging actions.265 Mead’s subject is thoroughly decentered, Biesta states, because in a social situation one’s primary experience is not the one of his own but the experience of the other and because, for Mead, the meaning of one’s gestures is intersubjective. According to Biesta this implies that

For Mead the ‘social’ is not a ‘stable’ field that can simply be used to explain the emergency of subjectivity. The social is rather a reality that only exists intersubjectively, or ‘in communication,’ and in that sense it might be best characterized as an emergent reality. Precisely in this respect Mead moves

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262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Mead 1910b.
265 Biesta 1999.
beyond the common understanding of a ‘sociogenetic’ or ‘social constructivist’ position.\(^\text{266}\)

The problem is, however, if this Mead’s intersubjective theory of the emergency of subjectivity can be transmitted in pedagogical action as such. Maybe the most well known theory – largely based on Mead’s social self – has presented Jurgen Habermas, who in his well known theory of communicative action solves the pedagogical paradox by questioning its constitutive element, the idea of autonomous subject, thus avoiding the subject-centred scheme.\(^\text{267}\) This means that human consciousness is seen as produced intersubjectively in language. In the field of pedagogical action this interpretation is, however, quite problematic. According to Ari Kivelä, the Habermasian paradigm shift from the philosophy of subject to the philosophy of intersubjectivity by abandoning the idea of autonomous subject has encountered serious critique presented e.g. by Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank.\(^\text{268}\) According Kivelä, their basic argument is that intersubjectivity – and thus also the pedagogical action seen as a communicative action (Habermas) – cannot take priority against subjectivity or vice versa because they have the same origin in human existence. From the base of the studies by Peter Dews, Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, also Ari Sutinen questions the Habermasian solution. “Mead’s theory related to subjectivity,” Sutinen argues, “is based on the idea that cultural meanings in a verbal form that enable thinking and self arise in intersubjective action, yet in such a way that the individual must have simultaneously the ability to grasp, create and devise the meaning and the verbal expressions connected with meanings about intersubjective action such that can help to build the individual’s self.”\(^\text{269}\) Self is, thus, a product of dialectical tension between subjectivity and intersubjectivity and cannot be reduced solely to the other dimension of it.\(^\text{270}\) In the situation where the child is not able to solve a problem in his action, in Mead’s theory the task of the educator is – as argued by Sutinen – “to interpret the problem in the growing person’s action and to transform the things in the growing person’s action environment in such a way that a functional solution together with a verbal expression is generated in the growing person’s action for

\(^{266}\) Ibid., (italics as in original).
\(^{267}\) Habermas 1991. See also Biesta 2006, 36.
\(^{268}\) Kivelä 2004.
\(^{269}\) Sutinen (forthcoming).
\(^{270}\) Ibid.
the problem in the action.”

In this way Mead’s as well as Dewey’s education cannot, states Sutinen, be reduced either to asymmetrical or to symmetrical action but is interpretative and transforming. The child needs the educator’s active influence, because he as an impulsive and spontaneous being does not yet have the cultural competence needed in the life of community. On the other hand that influence cannot be based on causal teleology because of the nature of the interpretation being always hypothetical and re-evaluated in the course of the child’s own action thus finally also exerting an effect on the educator.

According to Sirpa Törmä, Mead’s educator is not only the organizer of the child’s environment but above all a communicating person whose experience represents the reflected ‘generalized other’. The authority of the educator is dependent not only on his longer life experience but also on the continual reflection of his own action as an educator. However, Mead also emphasizes the emotional, aesthetical and imaginary nature of the relationship between the educator and the child: “The emotional side is the medium of communication.”

Mead highlights here, Törmä argues, an educator as not only an intellectual and rational agent but an authentic human being able to express his feelings of insecurity and conflicts. By the help of his imaginary sympathy, Mead’s educator is intuitively able to put himself in other people’s places.

To conclude, Mead’s theory of the origin of self has crucial educational implications. Following Dewey, Mead convincingly questions the ‘traditional’, dualistic discourse of education where, along the lines of modern philosophy, the human subjectivity is implicitly rejected to individual consciousness isolated from its surroundings thus leading not only to the separation of the subject and the community, but also to the separation of the child and the curriculum, and finally, to the separation of the child and the educator. It is exactly this line of thinking which reach the loose end in the debate between asymmetrical vs. symmetrical nature of the pedagogical relationship. It seems to me that specifically the communicative situation with the notions concerning the educator’s interpretations and their emotional-aesthetical nature, if connected to some phenomenological ideas like ‘tact’, ‘experienced corporeality’ and ‘atmosphere’, might offer some

271 Sutinen 2003, 6.
fruitful perspectives to understand more deeply the pedagogical situation. In Chapter 8 of this study this thematic will be discussed in more detail.

4.4 The development of psychological processes and education: Lev Vygotsky

4.4.1 The process of internalization

Dewey’s and especially Mead’s thinking discussed above bears a close resemblance to the theory of Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934), the Russian psychologist who has become well-known as the pioneer of so-called materialist psychology and as the founder of the socio-cultural school. Vygotsky has not any direct indebtedness to Mead but his intellectual roots derive from the very same roots: the work of Josiah Royce, James Baldwin and the French psychologist Pierre Janet (1859-1947), and, on the other hand, the philosophy of Hegel. One of Vygotsky’s major intellectual resources was Janet, who in his turn was directly influenced by Royce and Baldwin, the important figures behind Mead as well. In his experimental psychology Vygotsky studied the relationship between human activity and consciousness. In this central theme his basic idea is very Meadian: the mental activities of a human being are adapted through social interaction into his cultural historical environment. Vygotsky reported the findings of his research in his famous book *Thought and Language* (1931). Vygotsky’s essays on children’s development and its educational implications have been collected in *Mind in Society. The Development of Higher Psychological Processes* published posthumously in 1978.

In *Thought and Language* Vygotsky discusses, among other things, the development of scientific concepts in childhood. He criticizes their direct teaching – just like Dewey and Mead did – maintaining that it is actually impossible and pedagogically useless. A concept is not just a set of associative connections that can be adopted through memory, but a complex, delicate act of thinking, the mastery of which presupposes a rise in the child’s thinking to a higher level in its

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275 For more on Vygotsky’s relation to pragmatism, see e.g. Popkewitz 1998. A more detailed analysis of the nature of that issue falls outside the scope of this study.


development. This is one of the basic observations made by Vygotsky’s research group. In its connection Vygotsky dismisses Piaget’s view of the similarity of learning spontaneous everyday concepts and non-spontaneous concepts such as scientific concepts, because they have among themselves a different relationship to the child’s experience and, on the other hand, because their relationship to their objects is different from each other. Everyday concepts arise in the child’s immediate individual experience which is usually missing in the case of scientific concepts conveyed by the school and teachers.

Vygotsky also does not accept Piaget’s idea of the child’s gradual socialization in such a way that consciousness arises through conflicts and failures, with the mature thinking of an adult superseding as if something coming from the outside the child’s verbal egocentricity of speech targeted at self. On the contrary, Vygotsky thinks – much in the same way as Mead did a lot earlier – that the child is from the very beginning a social being whose action is directed to interaction with adults and on the basis of which the gradual individualization takes place.

‘Egocentric’ speech is according to Vygotsky connected with the child’s effort to overcome the difficulties that he has met in his practical activity.

…the most significant moment in the course of intellectual development, which gives birth to the purely human forms of practical and abstract intelligence, occurs when speech and practical activity, two previously completely independent lines of development, converge.278

Speech helps the child to solve problems that he has met in his activities. In this way speech and activity are parts of one and a single complicated psychological function that is aimed at solving a problem. As Vygotsky puts it “children solve practical tasks with the help of their speech, as well as their eyes and hands.”279

Vygotsky thinks that it is crucially important to note that, while being linked to the solution of problems met in the activity, speech at the same time also starts to control the child’s own behavior. This makes possible for the child the ability to be both subjects and objects of their own activity.280 It is not hard to recognize that Vygotsky holds the same basic idea as Mead.

Egocentric speech is connected with children’s social speech when the children find that they cannot solve their problems without help from adults. Vygot-

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279 Ibid., 26.
280 Ibid., 26.
sky maintains that the major change in the child’s ability to use language as a tool of problem-solving takes place at the very time when the socialized speech directed to adults becomes internal. In terms of Mead’s theory, the child accomplishes the ‘meaning’. As a consequence, when the child encounters difficulties, he does not turn to adults any more, but to himself.

Instead of appealing to the adult, children appeal to themselves; language thus takes on an *intrapersonal function* in addition to its *interpersonal use*. When children develop a method of behavior for guiding themselves that had previously been used in relation to another person, when they organize their own activities according to a social form of behavior, they succeed in applying a social attitude to themselves. The history of the process of the internalization of social speech is also the theory of the socialization of children’s practical intellect.²⁸¹

In brief, Vygotsky’s notion of internalization consists of three elements: (1) an operation that originally manifested as an external activity is reconstructed as an internal activity, (2) processes between people are transformed to be internal to the individual, i.e. every function of a child’s cultural development is manifested twice: first on the social level, and later on the individual level; first between people (interpsychological), and then internally to the child (intrapsychological), (3) the transformation of interpersonal processes into the internal processes of an individual is the result of a long series of developments.²⁸²

### 4.4.2 The development of spontaneous and scientific concepts

But how can speech modified from interpersonal activity into an activity within the child develop? How can thinking in its own internal development rise to a higher level, as Vygotsky puts it? The answer is connected with Vygotsky’s idea of the unity of thinking and language in the sense of the basic unit of speech or the *word*. In addition to its function of referring to an object, the word has according to Vygotsky also a complicated meaning function. According to Aleksandr Lurija (1902-1977), Vygotsky’s well known disciple, this means to Vygotsky that in addition to referring to a certain object, a word also unites the object in ques-

²⁸¹ Ibid., 27 (italics as in original).
²⁸² Ibid., 56-57.
tion into the system of unities and relations, specifies and generalizes the object. A word not only refers to an object but also performs analysis of the object which has developed into the codes of language in the course of the history of society. For example the word “Tsermihninta” (ink pot), which does not only refer to the object on the table, but also unites it through its syntactic parts (tsern-, -il, n-its) to a semantic system of unities and relations that involves color, instrument and the form of a container.²⁸³

When egocentric social speech becomes internal, it becomes an important tool of thinking that relies on semantics. According to Lurija, Vygotsky makes an essential observation connected with this in his research: even if the object reference of a word can remain the same in the various phases of mental development, the meaning of the world, i.e. its internal semantic structure, can develop. The system of unities and relations linked to the object by the word can change.²⁸⁴ This would appear to be an essential starting-point for Vygotsky’s assertion on the possibility of thinking to rise to a higher level in its internal development. As the meaning of a word develops, Vygotsky thinks that at some stage it draws away from practical activity, becomes autonomous and leads the human being into a new system of unities and relations.

Vygotsky thinks that a concept can only become conscious as a part of some system, i.e. through the meaning function linked to an object by a word. Such a system and related consciousness do not, however, appear in a child’s set of concepts from the outside, replacing the child’s own way of forming and using concepts. On the contrary, they presuppose that the child already has quite a plentiful and mature set of concepts that then becomes an object of consciousness and systematization. Consciousness thus is an act of consciousness in which the object is the action of consciousness.

According to Vygotsky, an important position in the child’s psychological development is acquired at school age by the psychological functions in which the essential features are intellectualization and control, i.e. consciousness and voluntariness.²⁸⁵ This is why Vygotsky gives teaching a crucial importance. By means of it, a generalized observation of the child’s own mental processes can take place, leading to control over them.²⁸⁶ In other words, the meaning linked to an object

²⁸³ Lurija 1982.
²⁸⁴ Ibid.
²⁸⁵ Vygotsky 1982, 164.
²⁸⁶ Ibid., 168.
by a word can be developed in teaching. From P4C’s point of view it is particularly interesting what Vygotsky says in this context about formal education.

…there are two kinds of teaching. One is about the formation of and practising with narrow and specialized habits, which is often encountered in vocational adult education. Meanwhile a second type of teaching is typical of childhood and involves various mental functions in a comprehensive manner, putting many areas of thinking in motion. In the former kind of teaching formal education is an exception, while in the latter it can turn out to be the fundamental principle.287

In this connection Vygotsky refers to Herbart’s idea concerning the fact that there are subjects that, in addition to the knowledge and skills contained in the subject itself, also develop the child’s general intellectual ability. When studying the dynamics of the development of scientific and everyday concepts, Vygotsky ends up in saying that this “can turn out to be the fundamental principle”. The familiar (spontaneous) everyday concepts (such as ‘house’, ‘dog’ and ‘brother’) that arise in the child’s immediate experiences and life situations do not come at once within his ‘sphere of conscious practice’ unlike scientific concepts (such as ‘straight line’, ‘the principle of Archimedes’, ‘class struggle’) that are conveyed verbally in teaching irrespective of whether the child has experience with them and take shape as objects and results of conscious activity (definition, comparison, etc.).288 The essential thing is that an everyday concept does not link its object into any conscious system of logical categories and comparisons like scientific concepts do. As an everyday concept, the meaning function of a word thus remains outside conscious control.

According to Vygotsky, the development of scientific and everyday concepts is not, however, linear so that, for instance, a child should first achieve a certain level of maturity in spontaneous development for the adoption of scientific concepts to be possible such that teaching should subsequently follow. The core of Vygotsky’s formal education lies in the fact that the teaching of scientific concepts also has an important influence on the consciousness of the meaning functions of everyday concepts. As Lurija puts it “he showed that the formal adoption of scientific concepts has an impact on the child’s existing everyday conceptions,

287 Ibid., 175.
through reorganisation of the reflection of reality, and on the emergence of new psychological constructs that the child’s spontaneous development would never achieve.”

So it is possible that the possibilities for formal education are quite different in the case of highest processes arising in the child’s cultural development than in primitive processes. This idea put forward by Vygotsky provided the basis for a scientifically motivated reform of teaching and for a new idea that school education should be started with general and abstract things in opposition to what had been thought earlier.

To summarize, Vygotsky’s ideas connected with teaching consist of the following basic theses: (i) the development of the psychological basis for the teaching of school subjects does not precede teaching, as its development takes place in constant connection with the gradual advancement of teaching, (ii) temporally, teaching always precedes development, (iii) the child’s abstract thinking develops in all school subjects and it cannot be divided into separate areas related to specific subjects, and (iv) the so-called zone of proximal development has greater importance than the actual developmental level for the dynamics of intellectual development and school achievement.

4.5 Conclusion

In this conclusion I come to the second problem of this study: which are the explicit mutual sources in the practice of P4C that have originated in the philosophical as well as pedagogical thinking of John Dewey, George H. Mead and Lev Vygotsky? Obviously, as discussed above, in this respect there is not any relevance to separate Dewey and Mead as they share the sources of their thinking originated in Charles Peirce. Although after Peirce, Dewey legitimately has to be seen as the leading figure of early pragmatism, Mead’s special contribution is his theory of the self and its educational implications. Vygotsky’s ideas about the development of psychological processes, on the other hand, have indisputably a lot in common with Mead due to their common intellectual roots in Royce and

\[ \text{289 Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{290 Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{291 Vygotsky 1982, 181-184. The zone of proximal development means the difference between the actual developmental level (i.e. problems solved independently) and the level reached in co-operation with the teacher, for instance (“scaffolding”). “What the child can do today with the help of the teacher, he can do on his own tomorrow,” said Vygotsky.” (Lurija 1982).} \]
Baldwin via Janet. In what follows I will locate in detail the thinking of Dewey and Mead situated in the practice of P4C. In this occasion I will also discuss these Vygotskian bearings – closely related to Dewey and Mead – of P4C. In the end I will raise up some problematic questions related to this thematic for further discussion.

The pragmatist conception of philosophy rising from the critique of Dewey towards the modern philosophy of consciousness, together with its educational implications, and the connected approaches to the basic nature of human knowledge and intellectual growth, and further to the democratic community, forms the essential intellectual focal point of P4C. Dewey’s philosophy as a general theory of education means a solid connection of the concept of experience to the practice of education. Its basis lies in Dewey’s naturalistic assumption of the nature of human being recognizing man as constructed in a dynamic transaction with his environment in which he experiences the (real) meanings of his ideas in those consequences, or practical bearings, of his action. This paradigmatic notion is articulated also in Mead’s theory of the self where human subjectivity is understood as originated in social interaction. When reflecting P4C in the light of this thought, I argue that the philosophical and educational corollaries of this basic maxim are – as being overlapping and tightly intertwined with each others – mutually underlying in P4C. In brief, they are as follows: firstly, thinking, i.e. reflective consciousness, is based on the process of inquiry that is an inter-subjective, symbolic (verbal) means developed through human cultural evolution – and constantly reshaped based on habits – to imagine alternative methods of action to solve a problematic situation, and to anticipate and control their possible consequences; secondly, the solution of problematic situations requires joint action, which again presupposes communication, thus constituting the basis of the democratic society; and thirdly, philosophy is about critical action in practical everyday life, the solution of problematic situations genuinely experienced in life by thinking, by adapting it to the process of inquiry.

Implemented in education, these main principles mean radical conclusions for Dewey and Mead: (i) Inquiry as the method of thinking provides the basis for an education based on intellectual growth. (ii) A condition of intellectual growth is a context that is meaningful for the child in which the paradigm of inquiry can be implemented authentically. It is thus important in education to establish a set of circumstances that stimulates the child’s curiosity and attention, thus initiating a process of inquiry which again makes the continuous development of a democratic community possible through the formation of reflective habits. (iii) The
purpose of the communication that takes place in the process of inquiry between the educator and the child on the one hand, and mutually between the children on the other, is to produce educative experiences for the child, at the same time dispelling the pedagogical relationship. The idea is that in pedagogical action, the child’s subjectivity, his desires and impulses, adjusts to objective tradition thus generating prospective, reflective habit, thus freeing the child to think intelligently on his own, so that he does not need any more help from the educator to solve the problems he experiences in his environment. (iv) The condition of the above is that teachers themselves should be educated according the same ‘intellectual method’ as their students.

In P4C these philosophical and pedagogical ideals are basically articulated in the conception of philosophical classroom community of inquiry. By it Lipman is searching for thinking from the very early stages of education and it is more than obvious that in the heart of this urge lies Dewey’s paradigm of education towards the creation of reflective habit in communicative inquiry. Lipman’s modes of multidimensional thinking can be located in the phase of Dewey’s educative experience where the child is directed to be able to anticipate and control the potential consequences of his action. Lipman’s modes of thinking refer directly to Dewey’s funded capital of human development understood on the basis of the naturalistic principle of continuity. Lipman’s thinking is the tradition forming the condition for the process of transformation. Thus Lipman also finds that Dewey’s ‘inquiry’ is not interest- or value-free and that it does not only aim at achieving knowledge and understanding as such but that it is specifically a way to make the world better.²⁹² From the viewpoint of intellectual growth, one important area of philosophy in particular, namely logic, is important for Lipman; it gives criteria by which we can distinguish between good thinking and bad thinking. Related to this issue, Lipman’s notion of ‘education to inquiry driven society’ with its conditions as exhaustive differentiation of critical, creative and caring thinking has to be seen as a further elaboration based on Dewey’s democratic ideal. Thus Lipman’s school as an institution of society not only transforms the cultural tradition but also on this basis autonomically and critically controls the ongoing recreation of society.

In respect to the second conclusion concerning the creation of meaningful context for inquiry from the child’s perspective, Lipman’s contribution is, how-

²⁹² Lipman 1993.
ever, quite different from Dewey’s one. For Dewey the practical pedagogical context of inquiry is science, while for Lipman it is philosophy yet dramatized for education along the lines of Dewey’s pedagogical criteria. Lipman creates a new genre of children’s literature by constructing his fictional stories into ‘philosophical minefields’, i.e. by spreading deliberately in them philosophically problematic and allusive statements, which he believes appeal to children and which he believes children can grasp perhaps better than many adults would. Lipman thinks that the essential question in philosophy of a good life interests children as much as it does people of any age. P4C stories differ radically from ordinary children’s books in their narrations of children who discuss truth, goodness and beauty and who try to find rational grounds to justify their thoughts.

Through the stories and imaginary characters in them, Lipman makes an attempt to return to the fundamental roots of philosophy and, in general, all human thinking. This is not based, however, on the sophisticated conceptual systems of various philosophical systems and schools, as it takes place within the sphere of everyday use of language. According to Lipman, children are specifically interested in philosophical concepts and methods, and they are also within their reach. Philosophical concepts are contradictory and sensitive to various confusions, just like the various methods for their thorough definition are known to be deficient. This makes them apt for dialogue in which the pupils quickly drift into a conflict between various interpretations. Lipman thinks that this capacity of philosophical concepts to generate mutually competing lines of argumentation and joint intellectual inquiry make them meaningful and dynamic for children. Perhaps on these very grounds, Lipman seems to keep his own contribution even more Deweyan than Dewey’s own is. Lipman feels that philosophy more than any other school discipline can offer the intriguing context of inquiry and thinking especially from the child’s own point of view, the thing having essential importance in Dewey’s as well as Mead’s educational theory. On the other hand, by introducing philosophical inquiry into education Lipman wants to implement Dewey’s demand for thinking not only in one special discipline but across the curriculum. Philosophy as a critical subject, utilizing the conceptual and analytical skills of the philosophical tradition, is connected with all fields of sciences, and is thus also conveyed naturally into the school subjects representing them. On the other hand, philosophy is about such general, contradictory and complex conceptions (such as truth,
justice, beauty and virtue) that not a single individual special branch of science can do it on its own, states Lipman.\textsuperscript{294}

Although for Dewey, philosophy is the theory of education, according to Lipman “the idea of children doing philosophy never even occurred to him.”\textsuperscript{295} And yet, says Lipman, these Deweyan guidelines are applicable to any curriculum such as educational philosophy (read P4C). For Lipman, it is just the practice of philosophy that is ‘the methodology of education’.\textsuperscript{296}

Dewey’s and especially Mead’s direct influence on P4C is thus seen specifically in how Lipman constructs the context enabling authentic inquiry that is meaningful for the child by dramatizing philosophy. In fact, even the curricular infrastructure of P4C is largely based on the paradigm of inquiry adopted from Dewey. For Lipman this seems to mean P4C novels so written as not only to emulate the process of inquiry but also implicitly representing Dewey’s naturalistic assumption of the nature of human being as constructed through his experiences (read ‘true meanings’) in the world. Maybe the best example of this is the novel of \textit{Kio and Gus} where – through the experiences of two children, one of whom is blind – this deep philosophical, or phenomenological, Deweyan distinction as a leading theme flows in the bottom line of the story.\textsuperscript{297} On the other hand, most of Lipman’s philosophical stories have been written in first person, which I think underlines Dewey’s idea of the authentic truth of an experience to the person experiencing it.

The community of inquiry is to be seen also as a practical endeavour of Mead’s theory of self and its educational significance. In a community of inquiry, Lipman is looking for meaning as socially constructed through language thus attaching Mead’s thesis about thinking as an ultimately social phenomenon, so that other selves are the condition for my reflective consciousness as being immediately present in my meaning horizon, as without others my self would not exist. In Lipman’s conception of the ‘classroom community of inquiry’ this ‘sociogenetic theory’ by Mead as well as Mead’s practical pedagogical thoughts based on it, connected with issues such as the primary nature of discussion in

\begin{itemize}
\item Lipman et al. 1988, v; Lipman 1984b, 6, Juuso 1995a.
\item Lipman 2004.
\item Ibid.
\item Cf. Lipman & Sharp 1984b, 1-8. \textit{Kio and Gus} from the phenomenological point of view, see Hamrick 1993.
\end{itemize}
pedagogical situation and the nature of optimum learning materials, are important sources of P4C. Lipman also points out Mead’s importance explicitly:

… if internalized communication among children translates into thought, what reason is there not to conclude that a classroom community of inquiry, when internalized, will result in children who adopt the methods and procedures of inquiry?… When a community of inquiry has been established in the classroom, the social impulses of the child become the ground of the learning process.\(^{298}\)

Mead’s strong influence on Lipman becomes repeatedly evident in Lipman’s literary works such as the second edition of *Thinking in Education* as well as *Natasha*.\(^{299}\) It is to be noted that even though Lipman says that he had acquainted especially with Mead’s writings from the early 20th century, he does not – to my knowledge – anywhere explicitly refer to e.g. the abovementioned lecture notes from 1910-11 that deal systematically with Mead’s educational thinking.

As described above, Vygotsky’s thought also made a deep impression on Lipman in the late 1940’s. So far as I can see, this is due to the fact that Lipman felt an intellectual connection with him through Mead’s thinking described above, although it was not yet articulated any further. Vygotsky seemed interesting, as Lipman quite obviously realized that he was talking about the same issues anchored in the social basis of thinking as Mead and Dewey. These connections would, however, appear not to have entered Lipman’s horizon more clearly until much later, and so far as I can see, they only became an object of true reflection for him only after Lipman’s visit to Moscow in 1989.\(^{300}\) This is evidenced by *Natasha* published in 1993 – a book in whose dialogical non-expository text he implicitly seems to be working with the relationship between Mead and Vygotsky.

In his pedagogical thinking Lipman contributed explicitly to the consciousness-raising function emerging in Vygotsky’s *Thought and Language*, especially in its sixth chapter, that is important for teaching. It is natural that Vygotsky’s research results are connected with P4C from this very point of view. In a classroom community of inquiry, the object of inquiry may namely be formed by concepts that are general and abstract for adults, but are fully spontaneous everyday concepts (such as ‘good’, ‘beautiful’, ‘true’ etc.) for the child due to their attach-

\(^{298}\) Lipman 1993, 318.

\(^{299}\) See TE2, 84-85; Lipman 1996, xiv; see also Lipman 1993, 319.

\(^{300}\) See Lipman 1996.
ment to the child’s immediate experience and life situations. In his effort to teach multidimensional thinking by philosophical inquiry, Lipman would appear, from the viewpoint of the above Vygotskyan analysis, to aim at observation and voluntary mastery of everyday concepts that are spontaneously used by children in their language but are abstract for the adults, that is, at their recognition by aiming to expand and enrich the meaning functions connected with them through the process of inquiry. “Children need to be able to detect the philosophical ideas and reasoning that lie concealed within ordinary discourse”, Lipman demands.\(^{301}\) Furthermore, Lipman’s statement on philosophy as the ‘right hand’ of the other school subjects or as ‘plaster between bricks’ would, when interpreted through Vygotsky, appear to refer to the formally educational effect of philosophizing. For Lipman, this is linked with the Deweyan methodology of education that is realized in all school subjects exactly through philosophy. On the other hand, Vygotsky’s analysis of the process of realizing spontaneous everyday concepts and scientific concepts would appear to have an obvious connection with Dewey’s notions of routine and reflective thinking that are significant for P4C, with the latter essentially related to realization taking place through control of the system of relations in one’s own thinking. Here Vygotsky’s thinking emphasizing activity in the creation of symbolic meaning seems highly compatible with the basic ideas of pragmatism.

In finding that the child’s abstract thinking develops in all school subjects, Vygotsky shares Dewey’s demand not to teach thinking as separate skills in detachment of the school subjects. In his concept of ‘complex thinking’ Lipman directly refers to Vygotsky’s idea of that activity of the mind, the consciousness of being conscious. For Lipman, it refers to thinking that involves both substantive thinking (thinking about the issues under examination) and procedural thinking (thinking about how we think about the issues under examination).\(^{302}\)

Philosophy for Children persistently encourages complex thinking rather than merely substantive thinking...Perhaps if this were done more systematically throughout all the disciplines, children would have more intellectual weapons with which to fight their own dispositions towards bias and prejudice.\(^{303}\)

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\(^{301}\) Lipman 2004.

\(^{302}\) Lipman & Pizzurro 2001.

\(^{303}\) Ibid.
Vygotsky’s thinking on the development of children’s concepts is also seen directly in the P4C curriculum. For example in Suki, Lipman can point to at least one very clear connection although suspecting that there are a good many others. In this episode children are discussing the structuring of experiences and find that, in fact, how the written sentence “It is shining”, for instance, is experienced in reality only as far as the action expressed, i.e. the predicate of the sentence – shining – is concerned. Lipman thinks that this contributes directly to a similar distinction between Vygotsky’s ‘inner speech’ and ‘written speech’. According to Lipman, Vygotsky’s inner speech only consists of predicates, while written speech also includes subjects. It is quite obvious that Lipman’s thinking in this interpretation is derived from Mead. Strictly speaking, Lipman is above not only referring to the last chapter of Thought and Language, the article published in Psychiatry that he read in the late 1940’s, as Vygotsky discusses this distinction between inner and written speech in the sixth chapter of his book that was not published in English until 1962. Meanwhile in the seventh chapter Vygotsky – using a similar example (“The clock fell”) as Lipman in Suki – discusses the semantic and phonetic incongruity of speech in terms of changes of grammatical and psychological subjects and predicates. Later in the late 70’s when Lipman had read Mind in Society and Thought and Language in full the influence of Vygotsky on the P4C curriculum became more explicit. Lipman also mentions certain episodes in Pixie, Lisa and Harry related for example to the role of relationships in thinking as well as part-whole and whole-part reasoning. So in this respect the P4C curriculum consists of dramatizing of not only the tradition of philosophy but also of psychology.

According to Dewey, Mead and Vygotsky, the individual is able to build his identity in the process of interaction with other members of the community. This central idea finds a clear expression in Lipman’s definition of the classroom community of inquiry, especially when Lipman describes the function of the community of inquiry as a process where the progress of common thinking is internalized by the individual participants, when they come to think as the process thinks. What is internalized is an activity: what first happens between (inter) the members of the group then becomes the thinking of its individual members (intra). As Lipman puts it

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305 Lipman & Pizzurro 2001. See also TE1, 23-25.
Internalized, the asking of a question in a group becomes the thinking of a question in a mind. The offering of an example to another becomes the thinking of an example as part of one’s private mental activity. Social behaviour is the model which thinking behaviour replicates – not identically, necessarily, but similarly.306

In Lipman’s Dewey-Mead reception, quite an essential issue from the viewpoint of theoretical understanding of education has received the least attention in Dewey’s educational implications above, namely to consider what eventually takes place in the pedagogical interaction (item iii above). What does ‘converting’ actually consist of in Lipman’s effort to convert the classroom into a community of inquiry? Based on Dewey and Mead, Lipman does not theoretically elaborate this thematic any further. Here, I think, the essential question concerns the conditions and manifestations of the educator’s interpretative acts of transformation. I believe that neither Dewey nor Mead analyzes in detail what ultimately takes place in the solution of this fundamental problem of education specifically from the viewpoint of the educator’s practical action. This may be the reason why Lipman himself also cannot really explicate it to almost any degree, and in other literature related to P4C it has only been discussed sporadically.

5 Ancient paideia and Philosophy for Children

5.1 Introduction

Both Plato (427-437 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) considered wondering to be the original impulse and the basis of philosophy. The historical circumstances that made possible this ‘free deliberation’ about matters – and thereby the birth of Western philosophy in ancient Greece some 2600 years ago – were, according to Aristotle himself, due to the increased leisure (skhole) that people had. Since they no longer needed to spend all their effort satisfying the necessary practical needs of everyday life, they had time for philosophizing – for seeking knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself, as distinct from its direct practical utility. Plato's excursive dialogues also demonstrate this atmosphere of leisure that was typical of ancient philosophical practice.

The philosophical thinking of Plato and Aristotle concerned itself with the problems of education – or paideia – from the perspectives both of educational philosophy and practical pedagogy. These two perspectives, which are closely interwoven, are evident in their broader reflections on the goodness of human beings and society on the one hand, and on the other, in the conclusions they derived from these reflections about the social significance and role of philosophy itself in concrete pedagogical arrangements. Plato in the Republic and Aristotle in his Politics, constructed a system based on class division, which they justified with arguments about how to realize the ‘good life’. Aristotle, whose philosophy was built largely on the foundation provided by Plato, considered virtue (arete) and happiness (eudaimonia) to be the greatest goals of man. The realization of the good life presupposes social structures that support it, and thus it was the goal of the state to be the structure which guarantees “the highest and most

308 Met. I. 1. 982b 23; see also Theaet. 155a; 172c-d.
309 Politics by Aristotle was based to a large extent on an examination of real Greek city states, as Aristotle thought that it was necessary not just to examine the ideal state but also the realistically and easily accessible state that was suitable for everyone (see Pol. IV-VI; see also EN 1181b 13-23, in which Aristotle summarizes the contents of his forthcoming work called Politics). Although Plato’s point of view was different from that of Aristotle when he constructed his utopian view of the state, it is likely that even his idea reflects some kind of a realistic basis. It is essential to notice that education, in addition to the laws, has an important meaning in the political thinking of both of them. Plato discusses education in e.g. the Laws and Book VII of the Republic. Aristotle’s educational thinking is described especially in Nicomachean Ethics and in the VII and VIII Books of Politics.
complete good.”\(^{310}\) The goal of the state is realized when children are brought up to be adults capable of virtuous lives.\(^{311}\) As an educational arm of the state, philosophy in its original Greek context became a political project, in which “the one who has been freed from the shadows of the cave” as a result of philosophical education is under an obligation “to descend to the dusk again and unchain the others as well.”\(^{312}\)

We are all aware that the ancient metaphysics with its ‘first principles’ has met with serious difficulties during the last few centuries. Yet in spite of the conflicting elements it contains, classic philosophical thinking has not been obliterated. Although each era and each culture introduce, due to its unique historical conditions, their own special questions, many themes introduced by Plato and Aristotle have been repeated in the history of Western philosophy. Questions surrounding human action, being and knowledge are the legacies of antiquity, and have challenged Western thought over and over again. In the last few centuries, these various ethical, metaphysical and epistemological patterns of thought have sought their contemporary shape, and undergone the crises of modern and post-modern science and philosophy. In fact the whole crisis of modernity could be said to be an instantiation of the internal tensions present in the ancient philosophers. I think that certain lines of thinking deriving from Socrates and from Aristotle’s criticism of Plato still have importance from the viewpoint of education as well.

This chapter is about the appearance of these classical aspects in some of the basic ideas of P4C. For this purpose I will explore the program from two interpenetrating and complementary perspectives. The first is related to the question of whether Plato considered that philosophy should – or could – be taught to or practiced with children. According to Matthew Lipman, philosophy has long been denied to children due to misinterpretations of Plato’s ideas in the seventh book of the *Republic*.\(^{313}\) Although Lipman’s argument is highly relevant, it still leaves room for further elaboration. I will show the problems connected with this question of Plato’s influence. One of them has to do with the concept of philosophy adopted by Plato, and the second with the concepts of childhood and of education characteristic of his historical period. It can be argued that Plato’s general

\(^{310}\) *Pol.* I.1252a 1-7.
\(^{311}\) *Pol.* VIII. 1337a 12-33.
\(^{312}\) *Resp.* VII. 519d - 520e; 540a-b; see also Kohan 1994.
\(^{313}\) PGS, 11-15.
metaphilosophical positions, and certain ambiguous themes in the dialogues, should encourage us to re-examine his position. In order to do so, I will make use of the distinction – introduced by Alven Neiman – between the ‘pragmatic’ and the ‘Platonic’ Socrates, although neither interpretation is unproblematic from the point of view of P4C.

Although the alliance between philosophy and the child in the contemporary educational context is constructed upon very different meanings than those of the ancient paideia, it seems to me that certain, immensely interesting classical idea is still present today. In particular, I see a strong connection between P4C and Aristotle’s idea of phronesis. I will provide a brief sketch of Aristotle’s theory of virtue, and then show its significance for Lipman’s deliberations on the terms ‘judgement’ and ‘reasonableness.’

5.2 The shifting meanings of ‘philosophy’ and ‘child’

5.2.1 Sophists’ elenchus, Plato’s dialegesthai and Socrates’ negative wisdom

Who were those people who spent their free time in discussion in the shady parks of the Greek polis? According to Plato’s early dialogues, it is quite clear that they were men – only one woman is recorded – and quite often young boys.314 Calicles’ and Socrates’ debate over the practical versus the contemplative life in Gorgias implies that philosophy was thought to be a natural and respectable pastime for young men.315 For grown men, as Calicles bluntly argues, it is destructive and ridiculous. It will make them losers in practical life, in which the only thing that matters is power.316 Socrates opposes this point of view, and after a scrupulous inquiry into the nature of virtue, they finally come to the question: what is good for the soul? Here Socrates rejects Calicles’ hedonistic ideas, and identifies the soul’s good as the ability to separate good from bad, justice from injustice and the strength to act on those distinctions. Socrates then characterizes two forms of rhetoric and their pedagogical implications, one represented by Calicles, which is

314 For example the boys of Lysis (Lysis and Menexenos) has been estimated to be 11-12 years old. See also Lakhes 181a.
315 Gorg. 481b - 527c, specifically Gorg. 484c - 486d; see also Dodds 1979, 273-281.
316 Gorg. 185a-d; see also Theait. 172c-177c.
random and seeks only to please public opinion, and the other which is always understood as an instrument for attaining goodness and justice in the community. It is not hard to see which one of the two positions Socrates favours as the task of philosophy. Moreover, during the entire dialogue he never returns to the question of the age at which one might start philosophizing. When arguing on behalf of the philosophical life in general, Socrates seems to take for granted that it also belongs to the young. This inference is supported by the fact that Socrates was tried for corrupting and misleading just that age group.

Then suddenly, in the seventh book of the Republic, Plato appears to make a dramatic shift. When discussing with Glaukon about the education of philosophers, Socrates clearly rejects the use of the dialectic for those who are ‘too young’. This is because

...when they get their first taste of it, they treat argument as a form of sport solely for purposes of contradiction. When someone has proved them wrong, they copy his methods to confute others, delighting like puppies in tugging and tearing at anyone who comes near them. And so, after a long course of proving others wrong and being proved wrong themselves, they rush to the conclusion that all they once believed is false; and the result is that in the eyes of the world they discredit, not only themselves, but the whole business of philosophy.

Here Plato appears to be proposing that philosophy (dialectic) and young people should be protected from each other. If the ‘too young’ are allowed to philosophize, their deliberations will appear unworthy of adult discourse. In addition it will subvert them, corrupt them and infect them with lawlessness. Lipman argues that it is just this notion in the Republic which has, backed by Plato’s authority, denied children philosophy for over a millennium. Lipman qualifies this judgment by pointing out that Plato’s statement should be considered in light of the turbulence of the times in Athens, and above all the way in which dialectic was taught by the sophists as eristic procedures and techniques, in the spirit of an intellectual battle. The eristic method of teaching was based on the idea of win-

317 Gorg. 502e-503a; see also Dodds 1979, 325-326.
318 Resp. VII.539b-539c.
319 PGS. 11-15. See also Dunne 1998.
320 Here Lipman is referring to Gilbert Ryle’s attempt to paint the picture of intellectual Athens (Ryle 1967). Eristic was elenctic disputation based on creating conceptual confusions in the opponent. Eristi-
ning a debate through attack and defense, and by fostering conceptual confusions (elenchus) without any consideration of the students’ own ideas and interests. According to Lipman this is what Plato, echoing Socrates, is refusing the young, not the practice of philosophy as a form of life. In the Philosophy Goes to School, he concludes that

... what Plato was condemning in the seventh book of the Republic was not the practice of philosophy by children as such but the reduction of philosophy to sophistical exercises in dialectic or rhetoric; the effects of which on children would be particularly devastating and demoralizing. How better to guarantee the amoralism of the adult than by teaching the child that any belief is as defensible as any other and that what right there is must be the product of argumentative might? If this is how philosophy is to be made available to children, Plato may be supposed to have been saying, then it is better that they have none at all.321

According to Lipman, Socrates considered philosophy, when reduced to mere sophistic rhetoric, to be inappropriate for the young, because it separated technique from conviction. It was good enough for the preparation of lawyers, but not for those who were seeking guidance from philosophy in order to lead a good life. Here Plato’s distinction between two kinds of rhetoric, mentioned earlier in Gorgias, becomes more pronounced. But there is room here for further elaboration. In interpreting Plato’s position on the question “Should or could philosophy be taught to or practiced with children?” one have to realize that in Plato’s time, there was a different understanding of the basic concepts philosophy and child. When Lipman suggests that Plato never drew the line anywhere when it came to Socrates doing philosophy with people of different ages, he seems to be interpreting him pragmatically and not Platonically. Following Rorty, Neiman suggests that the distinction between two quite different visions of Socrates leads to two different views of philosophy and education.

321 PGS, 15.
One of these views sees Socrates as his student Plato tended to see him, as a thinker whose life and work was essentially incomplete and unsatisfying until it was perfected through metaphysics. The second, pragmatic view of Socrates finds its earliest expression in the writings of the Greek skeptics. On this view, Socrates becomes the paradigmatic experimentalist, willing to call all dogmas into question and wary of any easy attainment of certainty.\(^{322}\)

It seems to me that in the seventh Book of the *Republic* Socrates’ denial of dialectics for the young is consistent with Plato’s metaphysical quest. After all, for this late Plato philosophical dialectic seems to mean the highest form of inquiry, providing as it did an exclusive access to absolute certainty. In order to be able to understand the True Reality, people have to understand the *eidos* which, once grasped, offers an a priori starting point for understanding all of life. It is the task of philosophy to understand the general nature of human beings and society, and that, finally, is why the ideal ruler is a philosopher. In order to gain this philosophical wisdom (*sophia*), any contingent good or bad action is not enough, but only the ability to identify criteria for judgment, and to subject them to the test of critical discussion. The method peculiar to this was what Plato called *dialegesthai*.\(^{323}\) Compared to the art of elenctic disputation taught by sophists like Protagoras, Hippias or Gorgias, the participants in Plato’s dialectic searched for the Truth.\(^{324}\) However, this common effort was undergirded by the metaphysical assumption that there is such a Truth, which contradicts the pragmatic interpretation of Socrates. Later in the *Republic*, we find this Platonic Socrates giving exact advice on how to pick the best of the youth to be tested in dialectic at the age of twenty and thirty, and after that, chosen to reach the ultimate reality with the help of dialectic.\(^{325}\) Understood in the context of his own metaphysical quest, it was quite natural for Plato to abandon the subjectivistic ideas of the sophists as immoral.\(^{326}\)

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323 See Passmore 1967; Ryle 1967.
324 *Theaet.* 167e; *Gorg.* 505e; 526d.
325 *Resp.* 537b-537d. Plato’s conception of dialectic and dialectical method is linked to his cave metaphor, see *Resp.* 532a-534d.
326 It seems to me that, the options we currently have regarding this issue as a result of the ‘linguistic turn’ were available neither to Plato nor the sophists, both of whom unconsciously assumed the idea of language as a ‘transparent medium’. According to this notion language is understood as capable – if gradually – to represent reality precisely. See Rorty 1989, 77.
Although ‘philosophy’ is often translated literally as ‘love of wisdom’, its etymological meaning is broader, referring to the exercise of curiosity and intellect without any specific limitations as to its object. According to Martens, classical antiquity anticipated the project of the Enlightenment and its rationalistic ‘method’, which led to the collapse of the earlier, mythical way of thinking and living. The transition to a philosophical approach to reality meant a radical break with earlier forms of life. Philosophy called for individual reflection as the director of our thoughts and actions. Certainty and necessity were now valued above myth, tradition, and the conventional customs and everyday habits of the past.

Dewey maintains, that this ‘escape from peril’ was basically emotional based on a personal and a cultural search for a psychological certainty that could not be offered by practical life. Ancient philosophy is thus credited for creating the Western dualistic world picture, which proposes a higher kingdom of eternally unchanging reality that can only be striven for by true science, set in contrast to the trivial, changeable world of experience and practical matters. According to Dewey, these two different worlds imply two different kinds of knowledge. One of them – *episteme* – is knowledge in the true sense of the word, i.e. rational, necessary and unchanging. It is certain. The other type of knowledge – *doxa* – is related to the changeable world of appearances. It is experiential, particular and random, and knows only probabilities, not certainties. The division between these two kinds of knowledge corresponds to the division of action into pure, rational action on the one hand, and action based on the needs of the inferior kingdom of physical change on the other. In this way, claims Dewey, the Greeks bequeathed to Western philosophy the notion that the task of knowledge is to reveal what is originally real, and not to apply itself to problems of practical judgment. And it is in the sphere of education that the Greek idea of philosophy as a paradigmatic notion of knowing constitutes itself as a super science capable of revealing Absolute Reality.

The aporetic dialogues of Plato reveal the dilemma in his thinking: universal ideas conflict with the impossibility of gaining Euclidean certainty in practical issues. According to Neiman, this very ambiguity in the relation between the two realms offers the pragmatic Socrates an alternative. The disjunction between the

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327 Passmore 1967.
328 Martens 1995b.
329 Dewey 1929, 16.
two allows him to react to everyday problems with a common sense view of the world, not through the use of metaphysics, but through the attainment of irony, for an ironist is, in Rorty’s formulation, a person who deliberately undergoes the contingency of his or her beliefs and hopes. On the other hand Kennedy seems to suggest the same kind of interpretation of Socrates faced with the aporia as is apparent in Plato’s dialogues. The height of ‘negative wisdom’ — a conception introduced by Kennedy as the opposite of the Platonic ‘positive wisdom’ — is epitomized in Socrates’ famous statement that he is only wise because he knows that he knows nothing. For this Socrates, no one can be wise in the Platonic sense. For this Socrates, “philosophy is his lover,” and cannot be reduced to knowing or applying, but only practiced as passionate inquiry; not in order to achieve the ‘god’s eye view’, but in order to examine life and be able to cope with the world. This seems also to be Lipman’s Socrates acknowledging philosophy as a deed, as a form of life which is dedicated to looking for reasons and for meaning, a practice which any one of us can emulate.

It is just this interpretation of the pragmatic Socrates which confronts P4C with one of its most challenging questions, a question which also confronts philosophy per se. What are Lipman’s assumptions concerning the prerequisites for the possibility of doing philosophy? Can we, through philosophizing in a community of inquiry, navigate the Scylla and Charibdis of metaphysical reason and post metaphysical relativism? Or should we question this sort of question itself as a product of our conventional, modern epistemology, as did Wittgenstein and the early pragmatists? In the P4C community these dilemmas also present in the contemporary modern versus postmodern debate are currently being more explicitly formulated. I think that when he emphasizes the role of philosophy as dialogical inquiry, and thus necessarily assumes the possibility of a search for criteria, Lipman is at least partly in conflict with Neiman’s pragmatic Socrates. This is so particularly in the latter’s concept of ‘irony’ as a source of edification, and in the denial of all systematicity. If, as Rorty claims, all vocabularies are incommensurable, then all options are equal, and as a consequence, that form of philosophy

331 Kennedy 1993.
332 E.g. in Apology 21d.
333 See Gorg. 482a.
334 PGS, 12.
335 See Turgeon 1999.
practiced in P4C’s community of inquiry has come to an end. One way to overcome this dilemma might be to legitimate philosophical argumentation from the standpoint of certain transformational perspectives.\(^{336}\) Charles Taylor’s ideas concerning unavoidable fields of vision for instance or Steven Toulmin’s ‘cult of systematics’ or ‘absolutistic presuppositions’ might be profitable possibilities.\(^{337}\) Understood in these frameworks, the practice of philosophical inquiry could avoid both the assumption of an ahistorical reason and truth and the fruitless adoption of a postmodern jargon. Above all, from the perspective of pragmatism, as discussed in other parts of this study, this problem due to its dualistic presuppositions seems to fade away.

### 5.2.2 Discovering the child

Another implicit assumption of Lipman’s argumentation in the passage quoted above from *Philosophy goes to School* is connected with the idea of childhood. Our modern understanding of childhood is based to a large extent on Philippe Aries’ (1914-1984) cultural-historical analysis in his *L’enfant et la vie familiale sous lʼAncien Régime*.\(^{338}\) Aries’ central argument in this highly influential book acts to reduce childhood to a socially and historically determined phenomenon. He claims that the germ of the modern idea of childhood originated in the ancient *paideia*, was lost when the Roman Empire was destroyed, re-emerged in the Renaissance, then gradually acquired its present shape among the European middle classes after the Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries.\(^{339}\)

The invention of this modern notion of childhood was inextricably intertwined with a corresponding idea of education. According to Aries, medieval civilization had forgotten the ancient *paideia*, and had no notion of the classical aims of education. As it made no distinction between the worlds of children and adults, neither could it have any idea of their mutual reconciliation.\(^{340}\) It was a consciousness of the child’s special nature different from that of adults which inspired in religiously oriented parents the felt need to protect the souls and bod-

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\(^{336}\) From the current discussion about this topic see for example Baynes et. al. 1993.


\(^{339}\) Aries 1986, 31-47, 125-130. For historical change in the notion of ‘childhood’ see for example deMause 1974; Elias 1978; Postman, 1984.

\(^{340}\) Aries 1986, 395-396.
ies of their innocent and weak children with a form discipline that was considered morally and spiritually necessary and valuable. This form of discipline, in turn, lies at the origins of institutional education in the modern form of the school. Formal education was now seen as an essential condition for the process of civilization, and children were no longer considered capable of moving into the world of adults without it. Correspondingly, the institution of the family gradually assumed as its central task the moral and spiritual training of children. The new importance of caring for children gave rise to a new emotional attitude toward them and everything connected with them, resulting in the modern concept of the family and of the role and function of pedagogical institutions. The commitment to discipline, shared by the family and the school, increasingly distinguished the child from the adult, thereby altering and delineating the concept of childhood.

Very little is known about attitudes towards children in antiquity, for childhood was not distinguished as a clearly separate age class. What references there are to children are ambiguous nor did the Greeks have a word distinguishing child and adolescent. The word pais referred either to boys who were not of age yet (those under 17 or 18 years old) or girls who were not yet married. We do know, however, that there were no moral or legal restrictions on infanticide in Greece in Plato’s and Aristotle’s time, and that physical punishment of children was considered normal. It has been suggested that the high level of infant mortality of the period was related to an absence of the psychic mechanisms that make unreserved empathy, tenderness and a sense of responsibility toward children possible. Referring to research done by deMause, Postman argues that these attitudes developed much later, between 1850 and 1950, as a result of the emergence of the modern family. Golden criticizes this position, based on recent studies. Indications of a different sort of emotional orientation to children can also be found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. In a discussion of the father-child relation, for example, Aristotle presents the germ of an idea which later became central to the pedagogical relationship: the father’s power over his children, he asserts, is ‘royal’, based as it is on love and greater age. Love as a special form of friendship (filiat) is in the case of this relation a desire to serve the child, to nurture and edify her

341 Ibid., 231-257; 320; 353-391; 397.
342 For the vocabulary connected with childhood in classical Athens see Golden 1990, 12-16. Obviously the word pais was also used as referring to grownup slaves (doulos) and servants.
343 Postman 1985, 14-16.
Aristotle’s *filia*, understood in its educational context, implies a complex relationship between teacher and student, and anticipates notions of ‘pedagogical tact’ which developed in the German pedagogical literature of the early 19th century.

However, the idea of the child’s ‘nature’ in both Plato and Aristotle, as well as among other contemporaries, appears to be quite negative. According to Golden, it is either neutral, which would imply little distinction between children and adults; positive, which seems to be related to some kind of special freedom or spiritual openness among children; or negative, i.e. seeing children only in terms of the talents and characteristics they lack compared to adults. Golden’s sources, which are mostly literary, usually portray the negative idea. Physical weakness and moral and spiritual ineptitude are mentioned most often. Plato’s dialogues tend to portray children as unthinking, gullible beings who talk nonsense and whose judgment is deficient. According to Aristotle, children cannot be happy or moral, because they lack the ability to choose and therefore lack determination (*prohairesis*). Children, he claims, are too unstable to absorb knowledge, and they are not capable of sound deliberation. For both Plato and Aristotle, they are grouped with women – although this concept has some difference between them – slaves and animals. Aristotle even groups children with the sick, drunkards, and the mentally disturbed.

In Plato and Aristotle, the negative difference of children in relation to adults would appear to identify them as a group of their own. From the point of view of their political thinking, this meant protection of children from bad influences. For Plato, it is hardly a matter of indifference what kind of stories are told to children, what plays they watch, what kind of music they listen to, or with whom they are involved. Yet, apart from the writings of Plato and Aristotle, there is good reason to ask how children and adults were distinguished in everyday life. To what extent was antiquity really different from the Middle Ages, for instance, in relation to how soon children moved into the adults’ world, and participated in the common work and the collective life of all age groups?

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346 Golden 1990, 5-9, 16, 51, 105. See also notes on p.184 in Golden 1990.

347 *Pol. VII.17.1336a 3 - 1337a 6.*

Although the Platonic-Aristotelian idea of the child certainly appears questionable by recent standards of judgment, it is directly related to the modern idea of the child to the extent that both construe children as fundamentally in need of education.\textsuperscript{349} The similarities do not, however, extend to the invention of similar forms of schooling. The aim of classic education was not so much to overcome existing forms of life in the interest of a more civilized world as it is today, but to represent, maintain and restore cultural traditions. In spite of this, the kind of schooling implicit in Plato’s and Aristotle’s proposals represents a historical moment in which a symbolic system that had previously been held in common was breaking apart. The worlds of children and adults were indeed being separated, and for the ancients schooling represented an attempt at their reconciliation. Plato’s and Aristotle’s notions of the need for censorship are one of the manifestations of this dialectical movement of separation and reconciliation. Issues centered on the conjunction or disjunction of the worlds of adults and children have played a major role in the historical development of the idea of childhood in the West.\textsuperscript{350}

Those who invoke Plato’s authority to deny philosophy to children in our day seem to be identifying children with the \textit{pais} of classical antiquity. As I have already pointed out, this interpretation is problematic, because it does not take into account the extent to which the core concepts in question are historically conditioned. It seems justifiable to assume that it was hardly within the realm of possibility that Plato would call for doing philosophy with children in educational settings in the same sense of the word as now, two thousand years later. But P4C is also challenging modern education’s notion of the child in demanding the dialectical reconstruction of the child–adult relation. In fact I would argue that it has not been possible for the great majority of adults even to become conscious of children’s capacity and right to do philosophy as a dialogical, educational practice before the more recent crisis of the Platonic philosophical agenda. Only since then has it become possible to start to imagine the reconstruction of modern children from marginalized others to knowing subjects.\textsuperscript{351}

\textsuperscript{351} On the marginalization of children and elements of an emergent child-adult reconstruction see Kennedy 1998.
The main difference between the Greek paideia and the educational ideas of P4C revolves around the assumptions that adults carry about children, and therefore about the nature and task of education in general. In the ancient discourse, *pais* could not be personified, i.e. child could not be person in the full sense of the word. This made it impossible to even inquire into children's ability to reflect on their own actions, or to think independently about issues of importance to them, and thereby to themselves be involved in a process of social reconstruction through reflective education. The paradigmatic changes in how adults construct childhood together with changes in the adult construction of philosophy offered Lipman the possibility of demanding nothing less than a redefinition of education.\(^{352}\) However, in light of his ‘pedagogy of judgment’, his demand for reconstruction seems in some of its most essential features to lead back to the ideas discussed by Aristotle in his theory of virtue.

5.3 Education and phronesis: Aristotle

Aristotle began his studies at Plato's Academy when he was 17 years old, and remained there for twenty years, until Plato's death in 347 B.C., so it is understandable that he adopted much of his teacher’s metaphysical thinking. One of its major elements was the idea of philosophy as something separate from practical needs "as the only free science, for it alone exists for itself."\(^{353}\) Aristotle did, however, differ from Plato in one very important issue, namely the doctrine of the forms, or ideas.\(^{354}\) Plato sought invariance in ideal models existing outside the variable, sensible world, which for him promised the conceptual mastery of phenomena. Without questioning the existence of such invariance as such, Aristotle reduced it to nature itself, expressed in the forms by which the individuals of each species are similar to each other. Aristotle thus assumed, with Plato, the essence of each species, but unlike Plato, did not distinguish that essence from the sensible world. This led him to search for the essential nature of each species teleologically by examining phenomena in the context of their goals or end states. All creatures aim at the best possible realization of the essential nature of their species. This movement from potentiality to actuality, from the imperfect to the

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\(^{352}\) See Lipman & Sharp 1994, ix-x, 3-8; Lipman 1993c.

\(^{353}\) *Met.* I, 2, 982b 28.

\(^{354}\) See Knuuttila 1981, 6.
perfect, is ultimately caused by the unmoved mover, or God. The perfection of
God makes everything else in the world strive for its own perfection.355

Reasoning within this ontological framework, Aristotle also claimed that the
manifest essence of the invariable and objectively knowable human being is a
‘good life’. ‘Good life’ means the best possible realization of the essential charac-
teristics of the human. This realization is the duty of humans, and in seeking it
humans demonstrate their particular virtue, the activity which is in accordance
with their essential nature. Human good means the action of the soul in accor-
dance with virtue.356 Realization of the human essence in the good life leads, in
turn, to the realization of the ideal state.

Aristotle does not, however, extend the requirement for certainty and neces-
sity to virtue itself, nor to those areas of knowledge such as politics, rhetoric, and
ethics which belong to the realm of the probable. In Nicomachean Ethics and
Metaphysics he problematizes Plato’s idea of the universal good, and of an insen-
sible, eternal substance.357 In his own metaphysics, he does not reduce goodness
to a single common idea, but analyzes its meaning from the viewpoint of the vari-
ous uses of the concept.358 Aristotle’s assumption that the human essence is good-
ness is therefore case-specific. Even if goodness has something in common across
contexts, its applications still cannot be derived from a single, basic meaning –
and even if that were so, Aristotle does not think it humanly attainable. Human
existence thus essentially involves the aspiration for a good and useful outcome,
the greatest and most important of which is eudaimonia. Happiness is not, how-
ever, connected with the contingencies of life like power and property but with
virtues emerging from practical action. One can only become just and reasonable
by doing just and reasonable deeds. According to Aristotle, nobody can become
good without doing good.359

Aristotle divides the virtues into the intellectual virtues of the rational part of
the soul, and the virtues of character of the irrational part of the soul. The devel-
opment of the former are based mainly on teaching, and require time and experi-
ence. The virtues of character are neither natural nor unnatural, but are based on

355 Ibid., 11.
356 EN 1098a 16-18.
357 EN 1096a 11 - 1097a 12; Met. I, 9; XIII, XIV. See also Knuuttila 1981, 3; Ryle 1967.
358 When William James says in Pragmatism that “Aristotle used it methodically,” he seems to be refer-
ing just to this pragmatic way to look for meaning, which in this case means inquiring into the good-
ness of some particular action by exploring its practical consequences (see James 1948; James 1978).
359 EN 1094a 1-1103a 10; 1105b 5-11.
habit; although we are by nature capable of accepting them, habituation makes them perfect.\textsuperscript{360} The virtues of character are behavioural dispositions (heksis), which can only arrive at human good through action. As a starting point for human ethics, the virtues of character do not alone provide a sufficient condition for practical knowledge. Only when they are connected to \textit{phronesis} can persons achieve a good life. \textit{Phronesis} is an intellectual virtue, for it implies a broad evaluative ability. It tells us what and what not to do.\textsuperscript{361} Other intellectual virtues are understanding (synesis), which is based on the ability to consider one’s own actions in each particular situation that calls for our consideration; and deliberation (bouleusis), which means for Aristotle “a certain kind of research” that requires plenty of time, and involves reasoning.\textsuperscript{362} Aristotle’s reasonable person knows how to consider well, which means a certain impeccable clarity of deliberation, which leads in turn to a form of goodness which shows itself in terms of its usefulness, its goals, and its methods.\textsuperscript{363} In matters of action, practical reason thus combines both general and particular aspects. As a result, persons evolve in their capacity for judgment (gnome), which in turn leads to the ability to identify the equitable (epieikeia). A human being who can identify the equitable is sympathetic (syngnome).\textsuperscript{364} According to Alasdair MacIntyre Aristotle’s theory of virtues insists to practice virtues in order to achieve good from the general point of human being, not because of some individual interests. Choosing means to this end demands judgment, “an ability to deliberate and to do right thing in right place in right time in right way”.\textsuperscript{365}

For Aristotle, human goodness is impossible without \textit{phronesis} which, in turn, is impossible without the virtues of character, for phronesis arises from action.\textsuperscript{366}

The virtues of character and \textit{phronesis} combine in practical reason, and provide the basis for the ethical action of human beings. But this is not enough, for the Platonic Aristotle, for persons to achieve the highest goal, or happiness. Only

\textsuperscript{360} \textit{EN} 1103a 25-26.

\textsuperscript{361} According to Knuuttila (1981,140, 158), the term \textit{phronesis} has a technical meaning if it is translated as ‘practical rationality’, where it means the intellectual virtue that is manifested by finding the right way to behave in each situation. Aristotle, however, also uses the same term or its relative forms in a broad sense, meaning reasonableness or wisdom in general (e.g. 1096b 17, 24; 1095b 28).

\textsuperscript{362} \textit{EN} 1140a 24-1140b 30; 1141b 8-23; 1143a 1-18; 1144a 7-11; 1144b 31-33.

\textsuperscript{363} \textit{EN} 1142a 31-1142b35.

\textsuperscript{364} \textit{EN} 1143a 19-24. On the equitable, see also \textit{EN} 1137a 32-1138a 3.

\textsuperscript{365} MacIntyre 2004, 179-180.

\textsuperscript{366} Cf. MacIntyre 2004, 184.
wisdom (sophia), the highest form of intellectual virtue, can guarantee the full happiness of a human being. The object of wisdom or metaphysical knowledge is nothing less than the independent foundation of all that exists, upon which the practical world is also based. This ultimate, divine perspective on all that exists exceeds practical knowledge, and makes perfect happiness possible in the form of theoretical meditation upon it. The life of the Gods is, according to Aristotle, pure meditation, and the happiest human action is that which is most closely related to it. Those who cannot meditate theoretically, such as animals, cannot be happy.367

The ideals of the Greek Enlightenment are realized in Aristotle when he affords humans the possibility of directing their own development toward perfection through the power and capacity of their own reason. But this requires involvement in politics, in that the goal of the state is to provide a form of social justice that affords individuals the opportunity to be virtuous. General education based on law has a great deal of importance in the formation of Aristotle’s good life, as the irrational part of the soul is accustomed through it to act under the direction of reason and to learn to desire the good.368

But what did Aristotle think about education as it relates to the virtues of the rational part of the soul? Can children be educated in the intellectual virtues? He has been generally interpreted to consider the discussion of ethical problems, for instance, to be possible only in middle age, after one has mastered the processes of reasoning.369 This is congruent with his thinking about the development of practical reason, which he also considers to be the result of long human experience. But it would appear that his final stand on this issue remains obscure, due at least partly to the differing meanings of the concept of childhood between the ancient world and ours. In the Nicomachean Ethics he says that the young cannot control the expression of emotions, and therefore cannot acquire the intellectual virtues.370 Phronesis requires the ability to choose, which in turn can only be based on deliberation. A choice concerns an action, not a proposition, and it is about adhering to one thing above others.371 According to Aristotle, this is some-

367 EN 1141a 9-1141b 8; 1176a 30 - 1179a 31; 1178b 29-31.
368 EN 1102a 5-1103b 25; 1179b 20-1180a 20.
369 See e.g. PGS, 94.
370 EN 1095a 1-9; 1142a 11-22.
371 EN 1111b 4 - 1112a 17; 1112a 18 - 1113a 14. According to Knuuttila (1981, 148) ‘choice’ is a sort of a black box in Aristotle’s theory of doing, inside of which thought is changed into action. It should also be noted that ‘choice’ for Aristotle does not mean selection between alternatives as it does for moderns--but rather we choose what is unambiguously favored by calculating reason.
thing that children cannot do. The development of the virtues that allow us to choose come about mainly through teaching, and therefore require time and experience unlike the virtues of character, to which children can be accustomed at quite a young age, since they are based on habituation.372

In the Politics, written after the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle returns to this question. The special status of the child – and of the slave and woman as well – clearly occupied his mind more here, where he does not appear to be as categorical as before. 373 In the first book of the Politics he discusses how children actually differ in this respect from free adult males. Do they have virtues? Is a child sometimes intemperate and sometimes temperate, or not?374 He concludes by claiming that, even though there are differences in virtue between the rulers and the ones ruled, yet they must still ‘share in virtue’, for otherwise both good ruling and being ruled would be impossible. Furthermore, Aristotle proposes that children, women and slaves have both a rational and an irrational part to their souls, but in different ways. The difference is connected with their capacity for deliberation. Slaves have it none (to bouleutikon), women have it but lack the authority to control their irrational desires (akyron), and, finally, children have it, but it is still undeveloped (ateles).375

It would thus appear that Aristotle considered children to have intellectual virtues as potentialities which are actualized only through the education of the virtues of character. This potentiality, and the ‘share in virtue’ between adults and children, are key prerequisites for instruction leading to phronesis. So the question about Aristotle’s position concerning the relationship between education and the intellectual virtues has to be examined in the context of his thinking in its entirety. The objective of philosophy for Aristotle – the search for sophia – is a gradual process, unfolding in stages each of which is valuable in itself, and in

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372 EN 1103a 14-18; 1142a 10-20; 1181a 13 - 1181b 12. On the discussion of the difference between Aristotle and Kant on the question of whether judgment can be taught, see TEI, 81-82 and note 15. See also p. 261 where Lipman continues the discussion about the same theme.

373 According to Knuuttila (1981, 5) the origin and timing of Aristotle’s works are highly problematic. It is obvious, though, that both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics belong to the late production of Aristotle and were written when he was leading the Lyceum in Athens in 335-323. It can also be concluded on the basis of the last chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics that the Politics was written after it.


each of which presupposes the others, and is included in the others.\textsuperscript{376} It is the responsibility of the educator to make it possible for this potentiality to begin unfolding and move toward actualization.

\section*{5.4 Conclusion}

Despite radical metaphilosophical differences, and differences in the concepts of childhood and education, P4C has much in common with the Aristotelian ingredients described above. The notion of reasonable judgment which informs Aristotle’s concept of phronesis provides the essential background and goal of Matthew Lipman’s pedagogical thinking. He states that “the greatest disappointment of traditional education has been its failure to produce people approximating the ideal of reasonableness.”\textsuperscript{377} Lipman has not specifically acknowledged in the influence of Aristotle on his own thinking for instance in terms of the theory of virtues but he does give quite clear indications of it in many places in *Philosophy goes to School*,\textsuperscript{378} *Thinking in Education*\textsuperscript{379} and *Natasha – Vygotskyan Dialogues*\textsuperscript{380} as well as in many of his articles.\textsuperscript{381} In the IAPC materials Aristotle’s logical ideas can most clearly be identified in *Elfie and Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery*. On the other hand, it would appear that Aristotle has influenced Lipman through Dewey’s thought. As is well known Dewey at one point keeps Aristotle’s invention of syllogistic as the greatest single-handed intellectual invention in human history.\textsuperscript{382}

For Lipman, the cultivation of reasonableness is the goal of education for democracy. This entails an effort to develop multidimensional thinking, which

\footnote{376 In this interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the virtues I draw from Uurtimo (1997), who attempts to overcome the problem often connected with Aristotle’s thinking about the separation between practical action and contemplation.\textsuperscript{377} PGS, 18; TE1, 16.\textsuperscript{378} See e.g. PGS, 51.\textsuperscript{379} See e.g. TE1, 62-63, 75, 78, 81, 112, 129, 136, 199.\textsuperscript{380} See e.g. Lipman 1996, 16, 37-38.\textsuperscript{381} See e.g. Lipman 1995, Lipman 1998.\textsuperscript{382} See e.g. TE1, 106. For Dewey’s relation to Aristotle see e.g. Chambliss 1993. According to my personal correspondence with Lipman, he – after reading this interpretation of mine published in 1999 in *Thinking* – wrote to me: “I agree with you, but it hasn’t always been so… it was only in the last 15 years or so that I began to appreciate the relevance of phronesis and all that it entails for education generally, and for Philosophy for Children in particular.” (6.7.1999).}
includes harmonic combination of critical, creative and caring thinking. Reasonableness, says Lipman, cannot be reduced to pure rationality, but “reasonableness is rationality tempered by self-criticism, deliberation and judgment”. It is not purely and simply the product of one’s logical activities, but is built up, layer upon layer, out of one’s effort to be thoughtful, to be considerate, to seek integrity-preserving compromises, to be open to other points of view and other arguments, to seek appropriate means for the ends one has in view as well as appropriate ends for the means one finds at one’s disposal, and to seek solutions that take all interests into account.

Furthermore, reasonableness, Lipman claims, can be internalized only by experiencing it through reasoning together in a community of inquiry. As such, philosophy as an educational discipline has individual, consummator value, and instrumental value for the pursuit of a normative form of democratic citizenship. Philosophy itself contains characteristics through which the process of democracy is equipped and enhanced: philosophy deals directly with highly general but controversial notions (e.g. truth, justice, freedom) which are essential to democratic practice; it directly fosters multidimensional thinking; and its dialogical character contributes to the skills and processes of democratic deliberation. By identifying these characteristics, Lipman is identifying democracy itself as a form of philosophical-phronetic inquiry.

Like Aristotle, Lipman emphasizes the educational dimension of philosophy, but in a different way. For Aristotle, the goal of education was the good life, which led to eudaimonia in the form of philosophical contemplation, in a just and stable society secured by law. For Lipman, the follower of Dewey, education means the fostering of ongoing, dynamic democratic reconstruction through praxis. I argue, however, that Lipman’s concept of ‘pedagogy of judgment’ as

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383 See Lipman 1998, where he suggests how the triad of critical, creative and caring thinking breaks down into their component values. It is evident that Lipman has inherited the idea of thinking as a core of democratic education mainly from Dewey and elaborated it further. By caring thinking Lipman means the ability to value what has value. One way of responding to values is to have feelings or to express emotions. When discussing about the emotions in relation to judgments Lipman seems to approach Aristotle’s argumentation in the second book of *Rhetoric* (see Lipman 1995).

384 Lipman 1998. For the difference between rationality and reasonableness discussed in Aristotelian terms see Toulmin 1998.

385 Lipman 1993d.

386 See Lipman 1998. As discussed later in Chapter 8, by the idea of *phronesis* also the pedagogical relationship can be reflected.
education towards multidimensional thinking includes Aristotle’s *bouleusis* (de-liberation), *synesis* (understanding), *gnome* (judgment), *epieikeia* (equitability) and *syngnome* (sympathy), all combined in *phronesis*, or practical reasonableness. Lipman adds *critical thinking*, which he considers to be learned only by reflective practice. His definition of critical thinking as reliant on criteria, self-correcting and sensitive to context seems to be consonant with Aristotle’s ideas of learning virtue by habituation, and of contextualizing philosophy by identifying it with the ability to judge wisely kata ton orton logon – ‘according to right understanding of reason’.387

Finally, what is P4C’s position *vis a vis* contemporary moral and philosophical discourse? In his concept of reasonableness, Lipman is clearly contradicting the Platonic idea of a rationality grounded *only* in logical systematicity. According to Stephen Toulmin, the ideal of *phronesis*, or reasonableness, was lost to Western philosophy with the advent of modernity, an era which was ushered in a religion-political context of strife and intolerance, thus robbing the notion of practical wisdom of its usefulness or legitimacy. Europe’s religious wars led to a social order based on universalistic and foundationalist pretensions, leaving no room for a culture of philosophical fallibilism. It was in this atmosphere that the core ideas of Plato’s philosophy were reborn in the rationality of modern cosmopolitanism, in its abstract, totalizing, universal and context-free forms of thinking, which abandoned the humanistic, Aristotelian ambitions of the Renaissance.388

Now, hundreds of years later, modernity has reached a phase in which the consequences of its ways of thinking are increasingly threatening. Modern science, with its quest for certainty and efficiency, has been unable to stop the massive development of weapons of mass destruction, or to care effectively for earth’s ecosystem. It seems that it is not until we meet these consequences face to face that we will be able to challenge our conventional patterns of thinking – which includes our ways of thinking about education. Toulmin adds that to humanize modernity in the face of these threats requires both expanding our notion of philosophy, and returning it to Aristotle’s emphasis on practical wisdom. MacIntyre, on the other hand, argues against modern liberalistic individualism by modifying the Aristotelian tradition so that we still could preserve the rationality of our moral and social attitudes and commitments. Lipman’s conclusion out of

387 EN VI,1,1138b25. Translation following MacIntyre 2004, 182.
this situation is that we should extend practical philosophy into the particulars of our time and place, while conserving its historically mediated tradition of rational and ethical discussion. P4C, in its redefinition of philosophy as critical practice oriented to reasonableness, embraces this neo-Aristotelian spirit.
6 Hegel on teaching philosophy

6.1 Introduction

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is one of the most important thinkers of modern philosophy. Reactions to the basic thesis of his absolute idealism can be seen both in the various forms of philosophy in continental Europe, for example in marxism, existentialism and phenomenology as well as in thoughts of the early American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce and John Dewey. Although the basis of Hegel’s philosophy began to break soon after his death, mainly due to the influence of Ludvig Feuerbach and Karl Marx, his method of examination had an influence on many later elaborations and it still offers topical and fruitful sources for inspiration. For Hegel, all phenomena are only the contradictory and fragmentary moments of a dialectically developing Spirit (Geist), which in its final state forms the Idea, “the Being-in-and-for-itself”. In pedagogy, this dialectic thinking means the aspiration to study pedagogic action within the scope of the prerequisites of that complex, dynamic, and historical totality.

In addition to his academic career, it is well-known that Hegel also served for a long time, 1808-1816, at Nuremberg as a Rector and Professor of Philosophy at the Aegidien-Gymnasium, a classical school for boys between fourteen to twenty years of age. Prior to that time period, he had spent several years as a home and schoolteacher instructing children and young adults. Although pedagogy did not occupy an independent position in his system of the philosophy of Spirit, it so happened that during his years at Nuremberg, he contemplated issues of teaching philosophy in particular. It would appear prima facie, though, that Hegel was quite a conflicting personality as a teacher of philosophy. In the supreme of his own philosophical system along with the connected didactic views tinged with Pythagorean discipline, and demanding the ‘breaking’ of the pupil’s subjective

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389 After Hegel hardly any ‘master’ of thought has been able to express his ideas without taking into account what Hegel had to say on their. As Richard Rorty (1991a, 96) states, philosophers are deemed to encounter Hegel; he patiently waits at the end of the road no matter which route they choose to take.
390 See e.g. Hegel 1986, 76-77. The German word ‘Geist’, as the most central term in Hegel’s thought can be translated as Mind or Spirit. The so-called Right Hegelians employ Spirit in order to emphasize its supposed compatibility with Christianity. The Left Hegelians, on the other hand, are inclined to see Geist in terms of Mind and thus as quintessentially anthropomorphic and pantheistic in its implications (Georg & Vincent 1986).
will, he looks like a conservative and strict soldierly authority. He also condemns sharply the so-called playful pedagogy, emphasising the pupils’ own natural growth and spontaneity as a dangerous fad of his times. On the other hand, Hegel was an all-round genius adored by his pupils, and he tried to support them also on a personal level. Hegel did not accept under any circumstances traditional rote learning based on endless repetition, humiliation, pressure, and ‘spoon feeding’ of information, as he thought that it did not take into account the fact that learning is always based on independence. Hegel thinks that teachers shall not subdue or enslave children, nor shall they demand they obey just for the sake of obedience. On the contrary, the teachers shall endeavour persistently to earn the love and respect of the children. Hegel demands that the pupils shall be guided at an early age to trust in themselves and in their own reason, quite as the teaching of philosophy shall aim at true philosophizing.

What is this pedagogical thinking of Hegel’s that seems so confusingly divided into two parts all about? How can his views on philosophy and education be seen in his thoughts about teaching philosophy? What does Hegel actually mean by true philosophizing, and what is its contribution to his educational thought as a whole? Finally, can Hegel’s thought on these issues have any contribution to P4C?

In what follows I will explore Hegel’s insight about teaching philosophy. First I will analyse the intellectual underpinnings of Hegel’s perplexed ideas concerning the notions of ‘philosophizing’ and ‘thinking for oneself’ in the light of his philosophical as well as dialectical pedagogical thinking. In this, however, I want to point out that I do not pretend to grasp Hegel’s philosophical system in all its tremendous complexity. In Chapter 7 I will concentrate on discussing P4C from the Hegelian perspective thus opened.

Hegel’s deliberations concerning the teaching of philosophy were recorded in his talks, and especially in his correspondence with the high state officials during the years 1808-1822. My main sources in this discussion are the letters addressed to Niethammer, Sinclair, Raumer, and Altenstein. Friedrich Immanuel Nietham-

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391 See e.g. Hegel 1984, 279, 293, 340.
392 The description of Hegel’s style of lecturing written by Heinrich Gustav Hotho (in Manninen & Wahlberg 1994), the close pupil of Hegel, convincingly tells about this deep respect and admiration. Also Tubbs (1996), referring to Mackenzie’s study (1909), notes that Hegel could teach most subjects with ease and was much liked by his pupils with his genuine enthusiasm for knowledge. Hegel also took, according to Tubbs, a personal interest in the students’ reading material and interviewed them all before they left the gymnasium.
393 Hegel 1984, 199; see also Tubbs 1997.
mer appointed Hegel to be a headmaster at Nuremberg while he was managing the Bavarian Protestant Department of Education. They became long-time friends, and their correspondence reflects many of Hegel’s educational ideas. Letters to Niethammer that bear significance to my topic were registered at Nuremberg on October 10, 1811, February 5, 1812, March 24, 1812, October 23, 1812 and December 20, 1812. The lawyer Isaak von Sinclair was an old ‘Fichte’ friend of Hegel from the Frankfurt years in 1797-1800. Hegel moved from Nuremberg to a professorship in Heidelberg in 1816 and from there, to succeed Fichte as the professor of philosophy in Berlin in 1818. From this period the letters of relevance to my topic are the ones sent to Raumer from Heidelberg on August 2, 1816 and to Altenstein from Berlin on April 16, 1822. Friedrich Ludwig von Raumer, the historian, was a colleague of the Prussian reform minister Karl August von Hardenberg, while Karl Sigmund von Altenstein was the minister in charge of religious, educational and medical affairs.394

The keynotes of that correspondence are interpreted in relation to Hegel’s Philosophische Propaedeutic – the basis of his instruction – and to Kant’s and Hegel’s theory of Bildung.395 I will also argue that in striving to follow Hegel’s main thoughts on this specific topic, it is essential to show their connections to Kant’s epistemology. In this, I will bring Hegel’s demand for the unity of the form and content as well as his dialectical modes of teaching philosophy back to his criticism towards Kant’s ‘Copernican synthesis’. On this basis, I will end up by discussing the challenges and ambiguous problems that Hegel had in his curriculum and teaching of philosophy in practice.

6.2 Philosophizing, thinking for oneself and the process of Bildung

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) can be thought of as one of the best-known advocates of philosophizing. In the preface of his lectures in the winter of 1765-66, he discusses the theme entitled Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in

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394 The source that I have been using is Hegel: The Letters (1984) edited by Butler and Seiler (hereafter referred to as Let.).
395 Philosophische Propaedeutic (hereafter referred to as Prop.) includes Hegel’s papers concerning the content of his own philosophy teaching in Nuremberg Gymnasium. Hegel’s patchy text filled with emendations and rewritings was written between 1808 and 1811. It was, however, found much later by Karl Rosenkranz. He ordered and published it posthumously not until in 1840. For more on the birth history of the work, see the Introduction chapter by George and Vincent in Miller’s translation (1986, xi-xxx).
dem Winterhalbjahr von 1765-1766. Kant classifies all sciences, with the exception of philosophy, as either historical or mathematical, with both of them containing texts, for example, “as sources of absolute truths”. Both of them can be learned at schools, as Kant thinks that "it is possible to impress either on the memory or on the understanding that which can be presented to us as an already completed discipline." For the same to be possible in the case of teaching philosophy, the same idea would be required from philosophy itself. As no one has, however, shown Kant such a book of wisdom and knowledge so far, he ends up recommending philosophy as a special method of teaching of its own.

The method of instruction, peculiar to philosophy, is zetetic, as some of the philosophers of antiquity expressed it. In other words, the method of philosophy is the method of inquiry.

Kant sees the above-mentioned difference between the essence of philosophy itself and the mathematical and historical sciences as a problem for the philosophy teacher. The latter two are based on a general standard, while in the former every human being has a standard of his own. Kant thinks that it would amount to a betrayal of public trust to teach philosophy as a scientific illusion specifically as a collection of readily available things digested for the public by others, when the purpose should be to expand their comprehension and to equip them with the future possibility of adding to their views on their own.

It would appear at first that Hegel is questioning the validity of Kant’s view. In his letters to Niethammer, Raumer and Altenstein, Hegel criticises repeatedly the intuitionist thoughts of the contemporary pedagogues (e.g. Graeves, but also Rousseau and Pestalozzi) about learning being based on the subjective experiences rising from immediate life situations. Hegel maintains that thinking like
this involves the assumption that “a young mind can practise itself in relation to any topic within reach.” Hegel thinks, however, that any more or less coincidental content arising from the life situation of the educatee does not provide any grounds for using it as the basis, as it is quite as one-sided as rote learning based only on reception and remembering.

Hegel addresses quite the same criticism to the teachers of philosophy who start philosophizing by detaching the content from it. This unfortunate effort to teach thinking for oneself and self-productivity without any contents “casts a shadow on the truth”. It involves the idea of endless travel without ever learning to know the towns, rivers, countries et cetera that you meet. Hegel thinks, however, that someone who learns to know a town comes from there to a river, then to another town, and so forth, learns in this process also how to travel. In fact, he does not even learn it, as he actually travels with the purpose of getting to know those places.

Thus, in learning the content of philosophy, one not only learns to philosophize, but indeed really philosophizes. Moreover, the aim of learning to travel is only to get to know those cities etc., i.e., to know the content.

According to Hegel, philosophy is “the science of the absolute ground of things, that is, their ground not in their Individuality or Particularity, but in their Universality.” Philosophy thus cannot be defined only as something that the philosophers do, specifically a method or activity independent of a given content. Therefore, Hegel demands that philosophizing taking place in teaching shall also be directed at its actual content because that is exactly where philosophy equals “highest rational thinking”. Hegel maintains that formal and unsystematic philosophy is incidental and fragmentary, with a cold attitude towards the real content as a direct consequence. In the teaching of philosophy, the content cannot therefore be distinguished in any way from the form, as thinking is learnt in the form. The true philosophizing as thinking for oneself entails the development of strong conceptual understanding, and thus, Hegel insists philosophy shall be taught and learnt similarly to any other science. He thinks, however, that a prejudice has gained a foothold in philosophy and especially pedagogy, according to

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400 Let., 259.
401 Hegel’s metaphor derives from Descartes’ work Discourse on Method.
402 Let., 279.
403 Prop., 65.
which independent thinking shall be developed and practised as if the content did not have any significance, and, on the other hand, as if learning were the opposite of independent thinking. As a matter of fact, thinking can only practise itself in a content that is not based on imagination or senso-intellectual intuition, but is thinking by itself. It is quite a common mistake, says Hegel, to consider a thought to have been thought independently if it differs somehow from other people’s thoughts. By dispelling substance and thoughts the pure formalism leads only to perennial empty searching and wandering, to unsystematic speculation capable of nothing, Hegel states. On the other hand, it is due to the special nature of its contents that philosophy shall be both taught and learnt from the very start quite in the same way as other sciences. 404

Meanwhile, in his zetetic method, Kant assumes that philosophy is about open questions and endless study. From the viewpoint of education, its most important function is the pupil’s ability to achieve an independent capacity to reflect and reason, as Kant thinks it is the only thing useful for the pupil. As a by-product of philosophizing, the pupil can perhaps adopt some individual pieces of knowledge at the same time. Similarly to the Roman poet Horace, Kant advises for courage to be wise. Independent thinking means to Kant “the search for the ultimate touchstones of truth in one’s own self (i.e. in each person’s own reason).” 405 Whenever an idea should be accepted, Kant thinks that we should ask ourselves if it is acceptable. Independent thinking means especially the use of cognitive ability, not ‘cognitive wealth’. According to Kant, this foundation of the Enlightenment is laid in the individual subjects by means of education. He insists that ‘young minds’ need to be accustomed early to this reflection. 406 However, Kant meets with and sets the fundamental problem of modern pedagogy and education in this requirement for the maturity and self-determination:

One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the child’s capability of exercising his free will - for restraint is necessary. How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint? I am to accustom my pupil to endure a restraint of his freedom, and at the same time I am to guide him to use his freedom aright. 407

404 Let, 279, 338.
405 Kant 1995b.
406 Kant 1995a.
Kant also refers to the very same paradox indirectly at the beginning of his statement on teaching philosophy. The subject-biased Enlightenment ideal of a person’s own reason meets inevitably the teacher as an influential educative person. He cannot stay and wait for the natural maturation of his students, but is “despite all the problems involved” also forced to teach such “necessities of life” that can only be understood later. In this requirement Kant would thus appear to reject one-sided activity only based on the student’s own interests in the teaching of philosophy as well. Although teaching should, according to Kant, follow the process of the human being’s natural cognitive development, starting from understanding and continuing through reasoning to learning, this harmony can thus never be fully achieved.408

The shared pedagogical thought of Kant and Hegel inherent in their idea of teaching philosophy was the principle of Bildung.409 According to Siljander, from the times of Enlightenment that concept became as the cornerstone of both individual and social development consisting of the ideas of reason (Vernunft), higher humanity (Höherbildung der Menscheit), maturity (Mudigkeit) and self-determination (Selbstbestimmung).410 In the theoretical tradition of continental modern pedagogy the process of Bildung is understood as man’s fundamental existence in the world where he matures from the creature of nature to the creature of culture but only in relation to this very same culture with its natural and social elements. This process is, however, possible only by the indispensable impact of education (Erziehung).411 It is just this process of producing homo humanus from homo barbarus and surpassing the prevailing form of living where the above-mentioned pedagogical paradox is also originated. In Propaedeutic Hegel states that Bildung

…entails that man, in the gratification of his natural wants and impulses, shall exhibit that prudence and temperance which lie in the limits of his necessity, namely, self-preservation. He must (a) stand away from and be free

408 Kant 1996; see also Martens 1995.
409 It should be noted here that the German word ‘die Bildung’ has the meanings, which cannot fully be rendered by some equivalent English term. According to George and Vincent (1986) “the idea of Bildung originated with the poet C.M Wieland and gained considerable popularity with the Bildungsroman tradition in eighteenth-century German literature, reaching its zenith in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre and Schiller’s Wilhelm Tell.”
410 Siljander 2000.
411 Ibid.; see also Kivelä 1994.
from the natural (b) on the other hand, be absorbed in his avocation, in what is essential and therefore, (c) be able to confine his gratification of the natural wants not only within the limits of necessity but also to sacrifice the same for higher duties.  

As discussed later in this chapter, for Hegel, the process of Bildung is closely connected to his philosophical thought as a whole, explicitly for the development of Spirit in the individual, in cultures and in history. The school with its curriculum and methods of instruction is the form of the realisation of this movement in the level of individual aspiring to the liberation of man, to the freedom, by detaching the child from his immediate desires towards intellectual. So for Hegel, the goal of education is

... the elevation of man to an independent state of existence: i.e. to that existence wherein he is a Free Will. On this view many restraints are imposed upon the desires and likings of children. They must learn to obey and consequently to annul their mere individual or particular wills and, moreover, (to annul also) to this end their sensuous inclinations and appetites that, by this means, their Will may become free.

Both Kant and Hegel put an emphasis on the human being’s measureless value, which means in education that the human being is seen as a goal as such that is free from external and instrumental interests. In this connection they are united by the requirement for human self-determination and independent thinking. This does not, however, mean unqualified egoism for either one of them, as it involves the idea of adapting personal interests with the general ones. In Hegel’s theory of modern state, education means the development of the human being into a member of society and culture taking place in the process of Bildung. This, in turn, presupposes the “mediation of the personal interest in the general one”, its determination as “a link in the chain of unity”. In a way, independent thinking encompasses the non-self (or “others”) as an ethical moment. Kant would also appear to be pointing at the same collective ethicalness of life when he says that the goals of individual human being can only be realised when they do not prevent

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412 Prop., 43.
413 Prop., 18; cf. Prop., 164.
414 Hegel 1994, 175; see also Väyrynen 2001.
the realisation of others’ goals.\textsuperscript{415} However, these ideals cannot be realised in education solely as natural, subjective acts of the educatee. According to Kant, pupils shall be led – not carried - from the very beginning to think so that they are able to “walk by their own efforts without stumbling” in the future.\textsuperscript{416} This ‘leading’ means to Kant, not only the accustomation of the pupil at an early age to tolerate compulsion and restrictions on his freedom, but also the demand of developing the conceptual understanding of the pupil learning to think by the help of pedagogical action – not only by some intrinsic and haphazard intuition – from the very beginning, as this is the only path to true self-determination. This is also one main idea in Hegel’s pedagogical thought directly connected to his \textit{Propaedeutic} and Hegel’s practice of teaching pupils to take their first steps in learning philosophy. In this central issue of Bildung Hegel meets with the above mentioned pedagogical paradox formulated by Kant.

Kant’s emphasis on the primary significance of formal philosophizing is often seen as something contrary to Hegel.\textsuperscript{417} As argued above this statement is, however, quite questionable. Also Väyrynen thinks that this is only apparent, as it is obvious that Hegel was not familiar with the preface of Kant’s lectures and the main emphases in it, which may be why he does not notice the fundamental similarity of his thoughts.\textsuperscript{418} On the other hand, Hegel’s open criticism of Kant in this very issue cannot totally be neglected. Despite the similar main thoughts on the theory of Bildung, my understanding is that the requirement for the unity of form and content related to Hegel’s teaching of philosophy implies Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s epistemology of critical philosophy and the principle of dialectic that is based on it.

6.3 Teaching philosophy and the dialectical movement of Spirit

So what does Hegel mean by the actual content of philosophy, preventing one-sided philosophizing and entwined in its form? We must first observe that Hegel is not referring here to isolated and individual facts in the history of philosophy,

\textsuperscript{415} Kant 1991, 29. It is not possible here to analyse in more detail the differences that Kant and Hegel may have had in their conceptualisation of the realisation of the value of personality.

\textsuperscript{416} Kant 1996.

\textsuperscript{417} See e.g. Cosentino 1996.

\textsuperscript{418} Väyrynen 1986, 110-111.
which is what sometimes seems to be the erroneous assumption.\footnote{See e.g. Cosentino 1996. I think Cosentino is confusing the concepts of \textit{historic fact} and \textit{historicalness} in his interpretation of Hegel. He is also not considering the fact that Hegel’s thought on educational theory is associated with Kant.} In fact, Hegel wanted at some stage to remove fully this kind of study of the history of philosophy from the gymnasium. According to him, as non-speculative narration of random opinions and thoughts it only leads to contempt of philosophy.\footnote{\textit{Let.}, 392.} For Hegel, the content of philosophy means the logical structure conveyed through his entire literary production revealed in a dialectical process, in which knowledge is understood not only in terms of the results of this process but also in terms of the research that led to them.\footnote{\textit{Let.}, 288. On the other hand, Hegel also took quite practical point of view to this issue. “I am a schoolmaster who has to teach philosophy, and perhaps this is why I also hold that philosophy must assume a regular structure as teachable as geometry. But knowledge of mathematic and of philosophy is one thing, while inventive and creative talent in mathematic as in philosophy is quite another.” (\textit{Let.}, 288.)} For Hegel, such historicalness and historical awareness combining content and form mean the understanding of philosophical questions in their genetic and functional contexts, forming a necessary condition for human emancipation at the same time.

As I said above, this emphasis on the unity of the form and content of philosophy in teaching derives ultimately from Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s epistemological synthesis. As is well-known, in his \textit{Kritik der reinen Vernunft} (1781 and 1787) Kant’s ambition to join the thoughts of rationalists (e.g. Spinoza and Leibniz) and empiricists (e.g. Locke and Hume) had resulted in the non-consciousness of \textit{noumena} or ‘things-in-themselves’ (die Dinge an Sich). Thus, there is something outside and independent of our knowledge that only can, according to Kant, appear to us through our own reason giving a form to this external thing. In fact, the condition for the thoughts to exist to us is the aprioric form given to them by our reason. The responsibility for this constitution does not, however, rest with us as individual empirical subjects, as its true agent is the anonymous subjectivity, or in Kant’s terms, ‘transcendental I’ (das tranzendentale Bewusstsein) by which he refers just to those fundamental aprioristic prerequisites of thinking – the categories of pure reason which form the consciousness as such not in reach to any individual experience, which just is and can only be felt through its outcomes, the structures created by it.\footnote{See Kant 1990, 397-480; see also Kant 1997, 146-150. In his basic thesis Kant is confirming the subject philosophical paradigm deriving from Descartes. This is, according to Oittinen (1997), the} This is why Kant has to abandon the illusion of grasp-
ing the transcendent, the Absolute.\textsuperscript{423} This main thought in Kant’s epistemology focusing on the form of thought seems also to be reflected in his views on teaching philosophy, leading directly to the cross-path where Hegel on the first few pages of \textit{Die Phänomenologie des Geistes} (1807) goes his own way leading to dialectics.

Hegel does not accept Kant’s idea of knowability as a kind of instrument or apparatus placed between us and ‘things-in-themselves’. This assumption leads to the placement of the attention in the apparatus itself, on the concern for its dependability and for the fear of error. Meanwhile, this leads to the requirement that the apparatus shall be known before it is actually used so that its possible effects on the object itself can be eliminated. According to Hegel, this analogy with an apparatus cannot be applied to knowing, because knowing can only be studied knowably. It would mean that knowability is known before knowing, ‘learning to swim without going into water’. This is why the formal aspects of the object of knowing and knowability itself shall develop together, never independently or separately from each other.\textsuperscript{424}

The criticism of Kant’s epistemology offers Hegel, in principle, an optimistic opportunity to achieve the truth – the Absolute – that exists as such as the result of a long dialectical process. According to Manninen, “this kind of process was eventually based in Hegel on the fact that the subject and object, knowing and its object, the concept and reality were ontologically the same, even so that the ‘Concept’ (Begriff) in the sense meant by Hegel was manifested as the innermost core and constructional principle of reality”\textsuperscript{425} So far as I can see, this epistemological insight also gives rise to the idea of the unity of form and content that Hegel associated with the teaching of philosophy.

In Hegel’s thought everything wraps around the dialectical development of Spirit (Geist). The Spirit actualizes itself both in the developmental phases of individual consciousness and will (Subjective Spirit), in human society and culture (Objective Spirit) and in world history. The climax of this complex movement is Reason as Absolute Spirit, the ultimate unity of the world as fully con-

\textsuperscript{423} See Oittinen 1997.


\textsuperscript{425} Manninen 1987, 219. See also \textit{Prop.}, 6, 76, 105-117, 134.
scious of its freedom where all forms of human life are completely understood in light of their historical development and mutual relations. Actually, this is the goal towards which Spirit develops through its lower modes as restricted pictures of the Reason itself. This gradual dialectical process is realized by the different forms of life (e.g. political, religious, artistic, and social) in their development where the earlier form transfer as to a part of the richer and deeper one. For Hegel, it is just philosophy, especially logic, which is capable of revealing this dynamic progress.

So the word ‘dialectic’ had quite a different meaning for Hegel than for example for the Greeks. For Plato dialectesthai refers to the art of philosophical discussion searching for the Truth, as a concept of making a distinction to sophists’ elenchus, the intellectual battle. For Hegel, dialectic is the core of his philosophical system referring to the logic of the development of Spirit attained by contradictions (thesis and antithesis) towards its perfection, the Absolute (synthesis). The religious orientation of Hegel’s thought seems quite apparent when he states that “God is the Absolute Spirit, that is to say, he is the pure Being that makes himself his own object and in this contemplates only himself, or who is, in his other-being, absolutely returned into himself and self identical”.426

This metaphysical Aristotelian (i.e. teleological) movement of Spirit from immediate sensuality towards the Absolute is ultimately about a process similar to growth in education.

The task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge had to be seen in its universal sense, just as it was the universal individual, self-conscious Spirit, whose formative education had to be studied. As regards the relation between them, every moment, as it gains concrete form and a shape of its own, displays itself in the universal individual. The single individual is incomplete Spirit, a concrete shape in whose whole existence one determinateness predominates, the others being present only in blurred

426 Prop., 53. See also Prop., 88, where Hegel calls God as “… the Absolute Idea of Reason, not a posited or imagined Being, not something merely possible, He is necessary Idea not posited by an alien thinking.” It seems that Hegel’s philosophy has a strong religious and theological tuning. This is supported by the fact that Hegel, after the study in the gymnasium of Stuttgart, went to school for priests in Tubingen in 1788. Here, together with his roommates, Hölderlin and Schelling, he declared the deep concern of the dispersion of modern culture, the segregation of man from nature, society and God. The early writings of Hegel were essentially theological. See e.g. Plant 2000. However, it should be noticed here that in addition to this conservative Hegel interpretation there are also others emphasizing the importance of Hegel’s dialectical method.
outline... The individual whose substance is the more advanced Spirit runs through this past just as one who takes up a higher science goes through the preparatory studies he has long since absorbed, in order to bring their content to mind: he recalls them to the inward eye, but has no lasting interest in them.427

Similarly, the individual must also go through the developmental stages of the universal Spirit. In this way, what the ‘mature men’ were interested in previously is restored to ‘facts’, ‘exercises’ and ‘children’s play’. In fact, it is just in the child’s development at school that Hegel thinks we can identify as a silhouette the history of the cultural development of the world.

In this respect formative education, regarded from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what thus lies at hand, devouring his inorganic nature, and taking possession of it for himself. But, regarded from the side of universal Spirit as substance, this is nothing but its own acquisition of self-consciousness, the bringing-about of its own becoming and reflection into itself.428

The school institution is, as an especially important developmental form of Spirit, that ‘concrete reason’ in which Spirit presents itself, but which supports at the same time the dialectical development of Subjective Spirit to freedom through conflicts. The purpose of education is to get an individual to be ‘at home in the world’, to catch the world conceptually and realize his identity with Spirit. In this systematic whole of Hegel’s philosophical thought, pedagogical action also inevitably leads through various opposite forces and their reversals to alienation from the educatee’s natural existence to self-determination. His true nature can only be achieved in this contradictory process of Bildung – as discussed earlier – where the content of education of the school is to be derived from the formative stages of Spirit for an individual to pass through. The systematic nature of Hegel’s philosophy lies in the all-pervasive Reason. Thus, the actual content of teaching philosophy itself is to Hegel his own system of the development of Spirit, which also determines how it needs to be taught.429

427 Hegel 1977, 16 (italics as in original).
428 Ibid., 16-17.
429 Cf. Tubbs 1997; see also George & Vincent 1986, xv.
Hegel analyses the special conceptual nature of his philosophy in terms of a variety of endlessly repeated methodological forms.

Philosophical content has in its method and soul three forms: it is 1. abstract, 2. dialectical, and 3. speculative. It is abstract insofar as it takes place generally in the element of thought. Yet as merely abstract it becomes – in contrast to the dialectical and speculative forms – the so-called understanding which holds determinations fast and comes to know them in their fixed distinction. The dialectical is the movement and confusion of such fixed determinateness; it is negative reason. The speculative is positive reason, the spiritual, and it alone is really philosophical.430

For Hegel, the content of philosophy is abstract as well as thinking is abstraction "in so far as intelligence, starting from concrete intuitions, neglects one of the manifold determinations, selects another, and gives to it the simple form of Thought."431 Hegel’s own example of abstract thinking is the fictional situation of execution where the murderer is seen only as a murderer, where this simple determination is allowed to smother all other sides of his humanity.432 Abstract understanding (verständige) as the fixed determinateness is one stage of the development of individual, Subjective Spirit. This non-dialectical empirical certainty is broken by the dialectic or by the ‘Negative Reason’. In this way, the reversed abstract lead in the positive dialectics of speculative thought to concrete in which the original abstractions are revealed as non-absolute moments. “The Understanding stops short at concepts in their fixed determinateness and difference from one another; dialectic exhibits them in their transition and dissolution; speculation or Reason grasps their unity in their opposition or the positive in their dissolution and transition.”433 According to Hegel, only the last form is genuinely philosophical. Going back to that dramatic example of Hegel himself, the murderer is seen not only as the criminal but in the light of his entire life, inside the sphere of God’s mercy.434

430 Let., 280; actually these three forms of philosophical content are Hegel’s aspects of logic, see Prop., 126.
431 Prop., 75; cf. Prop., 4.
432 Hegel 1981.
433 Prop., 126.
434 Hegel 1981.
These formative stages of Spirit shall not be bypassed in pedagogical mediation, as they are exactly where philosophy is finally constituted. According to Hegel, this content of philosophy can also be learnt, as “what is true of the teaching of other sciences must also be true of philosophy”.435 Differently from Kant’s thought (i.e. everyone has his own standard for philosophy), Hegel compares philosophy to a ‘universally true’ treasury of ingenious thoughts, achieved through hard laborious work and struggle which can only be achieved by working, precisely by learning.

The philosophical sciences contain universal true thoughts of their objects. They constitute the end product of the labour of genial thought in all ages. These true thoughts surpass what an uneducated young man comes up with thinking by himself to the same degree that such a mass of inspired labour exceeds his effort. The original, peculiar views of the young on essential objects are in part still totally deficient and empty, but in part – in infinitely greater part – they are opinion, illusion, half-truth, distortion, and indeterminateness. Through learning, truth takes the place of such imagining.436

This criticism of the abstract shows the basic principle of transcendental idealism regarding the invalidity of sensualism (the natural) as the basis for scientific consciousness. For Kant, sensualism still is a necessary condition for consciousness of the understanding that synthesises the world, while for Hegel, the world seems to be constructed in thought per se, as something detached from the empirical. This is still problematic interpretation because Hegel also seems to appreciate the empirical research. However, Hegel thinks that thinking can rise in dialectical work above the sensual i.e. to the transcendental, which only as thought itself can finally reach absolute knowledge.437 Hegel’s repeated criticism of contemporary intuitionist aspirations and efforts to bypass different areas of philosophy must be seen as a consequence of this basic thesis. According to Hegel, thinking can thus only practice itself in a content that is not based on imagination or the sensual but

435 Let., 338.
436 Let., 280.
437See Manninen 1987, where Manninen also examines criticism of Kant in the works Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft and Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. As discussed before, Kant maintains the modern subject-object paradigm, while Hegel tries to overcome it in speculative. It could be questioned, however, if Hegel in his criticism of the sensual accepts the cogito basis derived from Descartes and its dualistic consequence, i.e. the distinction between the life-world and thinking, the distinction between life and philosophy (see e.g. Laine 1993, 42-48).
is thought in itself. This is the reason why logic became the core of Hegel’s philosophy. Philosophy as about the absolute ground of things in their universality, says Hegel, comes true just in Thinking and “Logic is the Science of such Thinking.”\footnote{Prop., 65.} It “has for its object the Thinking Activity and the entire compass of its determinations.”\footnote{Ibid., 74.} Besides logic is for Hegel “the Knowing of Thinking in its truth” through it “we also learn to think more correctly; for, since we think the thinking of Thinking, the mind thereby creates for itself its power.”\footnote{Ibid., 74.}

Hegel’s view of the special questions related to teaching philosophy cannot be examined in separation from the above whole characterised by his criticism of Kant. The fact that Hegel had published his Phänomenology in 1807 just before his years as a headmaster and that he soon thereafter gradually wrote and published another work with a solid basis in his phenomenology, Wissenschaft der Logik, had a direct influence on what Hegel thought about education and teaching philosophy – and possibly also vice versa. In his letter to Sinclair in August 1810, Hegel says that he is holding a position (i.e. philosophy teacher at a gymnasium) that is personally important to him due to its links to his research.\footnote{Letter., 288.} In October 1811 Hegel tells Niethammer that he is just working passionately to put his own logic into a form that can be understood more easily by the gymnasiasts.\footnote{Ibid., 261.} Hegel felt that his teaching at the gymnasium in particular – as opposed to the university – had also been useful for his philosophy.\footnote{Ibid., 331-332.} The first part of Wissenschaft der Logik was published in 1811 and 1812, while the second part was not published until 1816. Philosophische Propaedeutic is also related to the same process, although one can have reservations about his efforts to formulate philosophy as a concrete and chronological content for teaching at gymnasia. Namely the fact that Hegel himself never published this ‘textbook of philosophy’ seems descriptive of the problems in principle connected with teaching philosophy that he often refers to in his letters.
6.4 The problem of the beginning

Hegel’s Gymnasium had three class levels: the lower class (Unterkasse) with an age range of 14-15 years, the middle class (Mittelklasse) with an age range of 15-18 years and the higher class (Oberklasse) with an age range of 17-20 years. Philosophy was taught four hours per week in each. Usually Hegel started his lesson by reading aloud some short paragraphs of his patchy writings (later as *Propaedeutic* by Rosenkranz), and then explained them at length. According to George and Vincent, the structure of each of Hegel’s lessons was standard and required pupils to recapitulate the previous week’s lesson. He also encouraged questions and discussion of the topic spending sometimes the whole hour covering difficulties. Hegel also dictated notes expecting them to be supplemented later by the written homework. However, the approaches of principle described above led Hegel to major curricular problems bothering him constantly. Where and how to start the instruction?

The approaches followed by him in relation to the abstract and speculative contents are described in a letter to Niethammer on December 20, 1812 as “the thorn in my side”. Hegel observed the interest that his students had in ‘Ciceronean philosophizing’ and would also appear to be attracted by the way in which Plato like Socrates philosophized with young people, as they “would no doubt be ideal for the gymnasium level”, but which would, however, be “against my nature.” Quite evidently Hegel here refers to the necessity of *Erziehung* in the process of *Bildung* discussed above. For Hegel, the precondition of coming to be ‘at home in the world’ or to make Spirit known to itself by passing through its stages in education entails self-activity of comprehension which, however, needs something to work with. This is why in Hegel’s instruction learning by rote had a definite place before the discussion. This is also why Hegel abandons philosophy as an edification, to be exact, as fully explained by the teacher without any pupil’s own work, even when it is taught to the young. Mind cannot think in a void, says Hegel, but on the other hand mere receiving would be like writing sentences on water.

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444 George & Vincent 1986, xiv.
445 *Let.*, 285. Hegel does not exactly explain what he means by ‘Ciceronean philosophizing’. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) was a roman statesman, orator, essayist, and letter writer well known of his attempt to unify philosophy and rhetoric. Obviously Hegel was impressed of Cicero’s as well as Socrates’ way of philosophising with young but in the context of his own educational thought that unavoidably remained one-sided.
446 Ibid., 339, 341. See also George & Vincent 1986, xiv-xv.
For this reason, Hegel ends up with the teaching of philosophy for the young needing to be “essentially preparatory”.\footnote{\textit{Let.}, 282.} It should be restricted to the practical yet systematic teaching of mechanically and grammatically learnable content. This kind of teaching does not reach the above-mentioned negative and positive dialectics, an area that can only be approached occasionally at the gymnasium. According to Hegel, philosophy as a propaedeutic science shall dedicate itself particularly to the formal cultivation and exercise of thought. This is only possible, if it breaks fully away from the imaginary world and the sensual, adhering to the certainty of its concepts and consistent methodological procedure. Meanwhile it is the function of philosophy to entitle, to insight the substantially valuable, to express it with undisputed thoughts, guarding it against obscure bypaths. Confusion in this matter is, according to Hegel, due to the fact that the content of philosophy manifests various separate sciences. This diversity has led to confusion, as a consequence of which efforts are made to deny undisputable concepts and established analyses.

The way in which Hegel ended up limiting the contents of philosophy teaching in the gymnasium and especially the starting of the teaching, is also connected with the dialectical nature of Hegel’s philosophical thought on one hand, and on his frustrating teaching experiences on the other hand. Although logic provided the absolute starting-point for Hegel’s philosophy, he felt that starting from it was particularly problematic, and he returned to the theme in many of his letters.\footnote{See e.g. \textit{Let.}, 264, 283-284.} Niethammer’s directive in 1810 prescribed that he should already lead the pupils directly to speculative thinking through “practical exercises” in the first of the three grades of the gymnasium. Hegel considered, however, that it was extremely difficult to think of logic in this way.

Transposing a concrete object or actual circumstance into the speculative (key), drawing it forth and preparing it to be grasped speculatively – all this comes last just as much does judging a composition by the bass line in music instruction.\footnote{\textit{Let.}, 263.}

By logical ‘practical exercises’ in speculative thought Hegel could only understand the discussion of true pure concepts in their speculative form, which in turn

\footnote{\textit{Let.}, 282.}
\footnote{See e.g. \textit{Let.}, 264, 283-284.}
\footnote{\textit{Let.}, 263.}
is the deepest content of logic itself. For Hegel, abstract thinking, in the determinateness of the understandable abstract concept, must precede speculative thought, and teaching at the gymnasio should be limited to this only. In fact, Hegel thought that there is probably too much teaching of (speculative) philosophy at the gymnasio, and that it could be given up completely in the lowest grade. Hegel deliberated repeatedly about whether formal teaching of philosophy based on logic should be removed totally from the gymnasio. Perhaps the ancient philosophers would provide the most suitable and truest introduction to philosophy for the gymnasiasts also from the viewpoint of content. In this thought Hegel felt, however, a conflict in relation to his own duty and the livelihood that it gave to him. On the other hand, he thought that it was also his responsibility as the headmaster. In addition to financial issues, this problem was likely to contribute to the fact that he was considering moving away from Nuremberg. So he considered it better in the following years to start with the law, the simplest and most abstract consequence of freedom, moving on to morality, and then religion. According to Hegel, this approach corresponds to the nature of the content itself, although its discussion on a broader basis is not yet appropriate. Hegel justifies the suitability of content like this for an introduction to philosophy as follows:

The concepts of these doctrines are simple, and yet they at once possess a determinateness, which makes them entirely accessible to the age group of this class. Their content finds support in the natural feelings of the pupils, and has actuality in their inner life, for it constitutes the side of inner actuality itself. I thus by far prefer for this class the present subject matter to logic, for the lat-
Hegel considers freedom, law, property, etc. to be ‘practical qualifiers’ with which we are involved daily and which have a sanctioned existence and validity because of this immediate existence unlike the universal ‘logical qualifiers’. Hegel thinks that the concepts of freedom are directly present in the pupil’s life-world and thus also thought without any preceding analysis. Starting with the themes in question actually realises quite what was aimed at. Abstract understanding (verständige) is in a key position from the very start, and philosophizing shall not be taught separately from the content of philosophy. Hegel defends in this connection as well, the meaning of substance, the true content instead of hollow formalism. The abstract form of philosophical content is to Hegel about philosophy of understanding, which is important at the gymnasium to lead to the dialectical form, which is more difficult and less interesting to the pupils and further to the actual philosophical, speculative truth. According to Hegel, the dialectical and speculative methodological forms of the content of philosophy are not yet suitable for the gymnasium with a few exceptions. Hegel maintains that only few people can understand speculative thinking, if anyone can know anything about understanding it in the first place. Leaving from the abstract does not, however, exclude the practical i.e. the content of more relevance to pupils, quite the opposite. In elementary teaching the first methodological form of philosophical content, abstract understanding as the fixed determinateness, contains the practical as a pedagogically valuable moment. Hegel says that he has become increasingly assured of the justification of this approach after the poor experiences that were caused when he tried, as advised in the above-mentioned directive, to start directly from the basic concepts of logic. “I have not repeated that experience”, Hegel says meaningfully. So Hegel did not lecture on psychology and logic until the two-year Middle Class, continuing to encyclopaedia based on logic in the Higher Class. It appears that he had to make a concession to what the pupils experienced most relevant and to the intuitionist principles that he had been criticising before.

453 Let., 276. In Rosenkranz edition, however, there is also a short portion of logic even for the Lower Class (see Prop., 65-73).
454 Let., 280-282.
456 Also see Butler’s interpretation in Let., 262-263.
Later, when he was already working in Berlin, Hegel came back to philosophy teaching at the gymnasium once more. In his letter to Altenstein on April 16, 1822, Hegel divides the pre-philosophical teaching at the gymnasium, preparing for speculative philosophy and philosophical studies at a university, into the more ‘material’ and ‘formal’ teaching. Hegel means by the former the very initial contents of the above-mentioned law, morality and religion, considering them to form the true foundation of speculative thinking. Differently from previously, Hegel suggests the ancients as one of the contents of ‘material’ teaching. The great historical and artistic observations of individuals and people, their duties, fates and virtues would act as an introduction to morality and religion. Hegel thinks that such materials as such include the truth and are at the same time directly in connection with the formal content of speculative thought. In the Middle Class of the gymnasium, a move needs to be made to forms of thought that are closer to speculative thought, both purely argumentative ones and common to philosophical thought. Hegel thinks that the introduction to such formal thinking shall be seen as a direct preparation for university studies in philosophy.

Hegel also suggests empirical psychology as an introduction to logic, the basic principles of which form the main content of teaching in the Middle Class. Hegel thinks that the students come from the gymnasium to the university without the necessary basic skills in logic needed in philosophical studies. He mentions the students’ deficiencies in different reasoning methods, definition, classification, argumentation and the scientific method in particular. It is these very skills that should, according to Hegel, be already studied before the university studies, although young people often do not understand its significance and usefulness. If studying these issues is left for them to decide on their own, logic is not attractive enough. Hegel maintains that this is the reason why the study of logic has been on shaky ground and almost disappeared at gymnasiums.

Hegel thinks, however, that logic as thinking about thinking itself is a highly significant experience for the young. On the other hand, Hegel considers – on the basis of his own experiences in Nuremberg – that logic is not beyond the gymnasists’ comprehension. He claims that he himself learnt the Wolffian definitions of the ‘pure ideas’ at the age of twelve, and knew all the principles of syllogistic at

\[457\] Let., 390-395.
\[458\] Ibid., 391-392.
\[459\] Ibid., 393.
the age of fourteen. Referring to the contemporary efforts (such as Rousseau and Pestalozzi) to develop independent thinking, Hegel ironically maintains that having learnt one logic, the pupils have more freedom and cause to think about it themselves.460

Then how should logic be studied? By bearing it in mind. Hegel says briefly that pupils should know the rules of logic as certainly, accurately, and without hesitation as they must know the rules of grammar and mathematical theorems if they wish to understand philology or mathematic. If a sufficient amount of time were reserved for this purpose, it would be worthwhile, according to Hegel, to start the teaching of logic with the simple and easy to understand things. He thinks that logic could also be taught to younger pupils following the same principle.461

On the basis of the views on teaching logic in the above-mentioned letter, Ekkehard Martens criticises Hegel’s thinking related to the negligence of the subjective viewpoint to philosophical studies in particular.462 Martens fails to observe, however, the problem linked to the starting of philosophy that was described above and the practical approaches taken on its basis. Martens also notes Hegel’s idea of teaching simple, easy-to-understand logic even to younger pupils.

Such instruction would then fall in an earlier age, in which youth is still relatively obedient and educable relative to authority, and is less infected by the pretension that, in order for its attention to be won, a matter must be adapted to its representation and the interest of its feeling.463

Concluding from what Hegel says about the educability of this age group and its relation to the teacher’s authority, we may truly think like Martens does that Hegel is talking about non-gymnasiasts, children less than 14 years of age.464 The tone of Marten’s interpretation concerning Hegel’s ambition to “compel” children into logic does not, however, do justice to Hegel’s educational thought as a whole. Situational, specific forced denial of the subjective will within reasonable proportions is a condition of the Bildung-process in it. In his Grundlinien der Philoso-

460 Ibid., 394.
461 Ibid., 395.
462 Martens 1993.
463 Let., 395.
464 The Nuremberg gymnasium headed by Hegel also had a lower grade for children aged 10-12, and a grade for those aged 12-14 preparing them for the gymnasium.

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phie des Rechts (1821), Hegel defines compulsion as just when it is used as a second compulsion to reverse the first compulsion (93 §). Hegel means by the latter in the case of education, the natural will that is as such violence in relation to freedom. Freedom shall thus be defended with a second compulsion that resists the compulsion of the uneducated will. As showed previously that principle of justified compulsion is also connected essentially with Hegel’s ideas about teaching philosophy. As Hegel says in the section on teaching logic to children younger than the gymnasists, children are inclined towards any authority also in relation to content such as logic unlike the gymnasists who imagine the basis for the importance of content to be its external attractiveness. He actually also echoes his idea about the educatee’s will to be compelled being ultimately the condition for the compulsion to exist.

6.5 Thinking for oneself as a consequence of educational contradiction

Philosophizing at school means to Hegel education for thinking for oneself. Its true realisation is only possible in content, specifically in the whole of dialectical thought to which the pupils cannot, however, be led directly and immediately. For Hegel, philosophizing as something natural and spontaneous is undialectical and one-sided, leading to ‘arbitrary rule by the subject’. In the Hegelian sense, philosophizing as the development of the Subjective Spirit thus starts with the alienation of the indirect, abstract understanding, i.e. negation. Not only the teaching is important for the alienation, but also what is taught and the fact that the content of the teaching becomes the pupil’s own experience, something done by the pupil himself. As shown by Nigel Tubbs, this leads to a problematic situation from the teacher’s point of view. It is, after all, conflicting as such to teach the contradiction of dialectical thought as the pupil’s own experience. Independent thinking is watered down when derived from abstract knowledge, solving the conflict before the conflict even presents itself. This is the paradoxical core derived from Kant in Hegel’s teaching of philosophy, which is why it cannot be flattened in any way into a mere description of the philosophical content and into its mechanical transmission. This problem is connected with the issue that puzzled Hegel repeat-

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465 Hegel 1994, 117-118; see also Prop., 18.
466 Tubbs 1997.
edly of whether he should compose some kind of introductory versions for the
gymnasium and university of Logic, for instance. In his letter to Niethammer on
March 24, 1812, he mentions the difficulty of understanding what it could
mean.\footnote{Let., 264. According to Tubbs (1997), the erroneous interpretation of Hegel’s
dialectical thought in the preface (George & Vincent) to Propaedeutic is connected with the same problem.}

Hegel wants to teach to understand on the basis of one’s own philosophical
activity, but in such a way that the pupil does not end up being dependent on his
own subjective views. Thus, the emergent problem is how the pupils’ philosophiz-
ing can be regarded as independent activity if its outcome has been determined
beforehand. How can the pupils experience a dialectical conflict genuinely, if
教学 right at the start solves it? As Hegel’s system is based on independent
thinking, it is inevitably conflicting with the teacher telling what to think in the
end. As a solution to this problem, Tubbs’ interpretation is that Hegel as the
teacher of his own philosophy is forced to set himself as the starting-point to be
reversed, which in turn means conscious and one-sided exercise of power justified
by this pedagogical objective.\footnote{Tubbs 1997. As shown clearly by Tubbs, this viewpoint also questions the so-called. critical pedago-
gy, in which one of the main aspirations is emancipation, i.e. to overcome domination in the relation
between the teacher and pupil. One could think, though, in the Hegelian manner that in principle- or
theoretically - this kind of thought would mean the end of education.}

Hegel, thus, cannot start by teaching his system
as a whole, but as abstract parts of it, by giving his pupils, through himself, an
opportunity to experience genuinely the incomplete, deficiency, and desperation
of their natural ideas, thoughts, and opinions. From the viewpoint of the educa-
tional thought described above, there is nothing new in this. As we have noted
above, educationality and the goal of self-determination simply cannot be based
on the obliteration of the power relation between the teacher and pupil. The con-
tradictory tension between compulsion and freedom formulated by Kant remains,
providing the driving force for Hegel’s pedagogical thought.

According to Tubbs’ interpretation, this conflict and the rejection of the
teacher’s abstract authority taking place in its negation is to Hegel the necessary
condition for philosophizing and growth based on independent thinking.\footnote{Views can differ on the final realisation of this ideal in Hegel’s practical teaching. At first glance, it
seems here that Hegel is echoing the classic problem of anamnesis and its Socratic solution. For Socrates,
independent thought comes into being by itself, however requiring the help of a midwife in the
process. The pupils have in their own souls the capacity for thought that cannot be put there by the
teacher through his teaching. Education means the skill to turn it in the right direction. In practice, this
midwifery means to Socrates the leading of the pupil into confusion and conflict. Something new can

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does not, however, present the fundamental question of the condition for historical determination and surpassing the free self-determination of the educatee. What can the creative negation in the pupil to teacher relationship that was described above be based on without turning into socialisation, which is another important function of education? According to Väyrynen, the Hegelian solution to overcome this problem of principle in pedagogical transmission is reached by seeing society and tradition as a heterogeneous, contradictory, and historically changing whole. The heterogeneous historical social tradition involves the possibility of true selection, which is why the individual’s socialisation and historical determination are not in an exclusive relation to freedom. On the other hand, the abstract subjectivity and subsequent philosophizing connected with arbitrary construction can also be overcome and free through knowledge of tradition in Hegelian teaching of philosophy as well.\textsuperscript{470}

\subsection*{6.6 Conclusion}

The contradictory impressions in Hegel’s pedagogy derive from the larger whole of his thought on cultural theory and dialectic. Hegel rejected sharply the contemporary ‘child-centred’ organic educational ideas based on spontaneous growth as well as the resulting emphases on teaching philosophy. This did not, however, mean that Hegel did not consider childhood to be an important and valuable stage of life. The concept of child shaped by romanticism can be seen in Hegel’s theory of the family in particular. According to Hegel, the education into a fully competent member of society and culture cannot, however, be based on one-sided requirements such as natural growth in ‘playful pedagogy’, as active educational influence is needed in which the growing person shall learn also to tolerate the restrictions on his freedom at an early age. For Hegel, the education of a child means the educator’s responsibility to provide education on the one hand, and the child’s opportunity and will to grow and his right to be educated on the other.

Hegel’s ideas about teaching philosophy derive from this larger pedagogic thematic. Because of the above-mentioned principle of Bildung, Hegel could not accept ‘natural philosophizing’ based only on the pupils’ interests. In this question, only arise from a genuine experience of this state of aporia. However, it is not possible here to analyze in more detail if Hegel really is repeating this very principle in his own teaching of philosophy.\textsuperscript{470}\ Väyrynen 2000; Väyrynen 1986.
Hegel would appear to have constant problems in his practical work as a teacher. It seems that Hegel had to re-evaluate his curriculum for philosophy at the gymnasium by modifying it with the ‘pedagogically valuable practical’, the content with which the pupils are involved in their daily life. However, Hegel as a teacher of his own philosophy could not neglect the possibility of experiencing true contradiction set by its dialectical nature and its pedagogical value as the starting-point for independent thinking. Here Hegel’s thought derives from the fundamental problem of modern pedagogy expressed by Kant, as “How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?”

Another cause of rejecting ‘natural philosophizing’ derives from Hegel’s critical attitude towards Kant’s epistemology. This is implied especially by the requirement for the unity of form and content connected with Hegel’s teaching of philosophy and in the dialectic rising from it, intertwined tightly with the process of Bildung. Hegel cannot accept Kant’s doctrine of knowability as a kind of instrument or apparatus between us and ‘things-in-themselves’. This assumption would lead to fatal consequences from the viewpoint of Hegel’s absolute philosophy, with the ‘things-in-themselves’ left outside our knowledge. Hegel thinks that the object of knowing cannot be separated from knowing itself, and they shall be allowed to develop together as an ontological unity. Thus, the true content of philosophy means to Hegel the historical logical structure revealed in a dialectical process and conveyed by his entire literary production, in which knowledge is understood not only as the end product of this process, but also as the research that led to it. For Hegel, this historicalness and historical awareness combining content and form means the understanding of philosophical questions in their genetic and functional contexts, providing at the same time, a necessary condition for human emancipation.
7 Philosophy for Children in the light of Hegel’s thought

7.1 Introduction

Charles Sanders Peirce and especially John Dewey – the most pivotal figure in the theoretical background of P4C – developed their own thinking in response to the ideas of Hegel as well as Kant. In the beginning of his academic career, Dewey was intensely impressed by Hegel’s anti-dualistic writings. And later, he – more or less explicitly – continued the discussion of Hegel’s ideas in his own basic writings. “The acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking”, Dewey acknowledges himself.471 For this reason, Dewey’s thinking is often placed closer to continental than, say, British analytic philosophy.

Given this strong Hegelian connection there is a good reason to assume that also P4C would have been seriously examined from that perspective as well. However, in the literature of P4C, the Hegelian perspective is quite neglected. The Hegelian ideas of Bildung seen in the light of teaching philosophy are rarely referred to and, to my knowledge, never discussed systematically. True, the founder of P4C, Matthew Lipman, mentions him, for example, in the context of Josiah Royce’s ‘community of interpretation’, thus affecting Peirce’s ‘community of inquiry’ – the core concept of P4C – and occasionally refers to him when reflecting on Vasily Davydov’s and Lev Vygotsky’s thought.472 But there is no further elaboration or more detailed analysis to be found on this topic. It seems that the quite obvious theory-historical connection between P4C and Hegel via Peirce and Dewey has been sadly neglected.

471 Yet in 1930 Dewey wrote: “Supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy. ...The sense of divisions and separations, that were I suppose, borne in upon me as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression - or rather, they were an inward laceration ... Hegel’s synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation. Hegel’s treatment of human culture, of institutions and the arts, involved the same dissolution of hard-and-fast dividing walls, and had a special attraction for me... I should never think of ignoring, much less denying, what an astute critic cationally refers to as a novel discovery – that acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking.” (Dewey 1930 in Russell 1961, 192; Dewey 1884.)

472 See TE1, 105.; Lipman 1996, 21, 47-51.
What follows in this chapter is directly connected with those ideas discussed in the previous one. I will continue the same theme by reflecting more closely on P4C in the light of the Hegelian viewpoints that I examined earlier. I will argue that the key elements of Lipman’s definition of critical thinking expressed in the notion of ‘community of inquiry’ as well as the concept of philosophy it contains, can theoretically be better understood in terms of those early pragmatic philosophers’, especially Peirce’s and Dewey’s intense discussion with Hegel’s thought. Peirce’s ‘fallibilism’ and ‘scientific method’ as well as Dewey’s ‘experience’ and ‘reflective thinking’ are discussed in the framework of Hegel’s philosophy. I want to point out that the more profound analysis of the justifiability of that Hegel interpretation and critique presented by Peirce and Dewey – finding Hegel as an orthodox rationalist – does not belong to the scope of this study. This remark is important to keep in mind when later Hegel’s theoretical influence on P4C is argued as indirect and primarily antithetical in nature. In the end Matthew Lipman’s educational ideas are reflected in the light of Hegel’s and Dewey’s pedagogical ideas.

7.2 Hegel and the epistemology of community of inquiry

The ‘community of inquiry’ forms the heart of P4C. It offers the context in which P4C seeks to cultivate ‘multidimensional thinking’, the prerequisite of reasonableness, which is seen as the ultimate goal of education in a democratic society. Multidimensional thinking, in turn, consists of a combination of critical, creative and caring thinking. To start I will argue that through these basic concepts P4C is inclined to tie itself to the philosophical notions originating from Peirce’s and Dewey’s critique of the epistemological thinking of Hegel as well as Descartes and Kant.

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473 E.g. TE1, 64-65.
474 Important writings by Pierce from the viewpoint of my topic include at least the following: The Fixation of Belief, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism, The Principles of Phenomenology, Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs, Some Consequences of Four Incapacities and The Essentials of Pragmatism. Hereafter I will refer to these writings of Peirce collected and edited by Justus Buchler in Philosophical Writings of Peirce (1955) as PWP. Dewey’s works How We Think (1910) → HWT, The Quest for Certainty (1929) → QC and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) → LTI, are essential in this respect.
7.2.1 Against mere thinking: Peirce's criticism of Hegel

Peirce rejects Descartes’ idea of the beginnings of philosophy in universal doubt. It is an impossible starting-point for philosophical inquiry which in effect means the acceptance of our preconceptions. According to Peirce, individual consciousness, detached from experience – something in which Hegel’s dialectical process also finally culminates – is a futile tool for uncovering certainty and truth, leading to full subjectivism which bypasses tradition and especially certain collective forms of human experience. Thus, consciousness and reality, the subject and object cannot meet. Peirce points out that, as individuals, we cannot sensibly hope to achieve the ultimate understanding that we are searching for; it can only be striven for by the community of philosophers.\footnote{PWP, 229. See also West 1989, 44.} According to Peirce, philosophy should only take as its starting-points premises that can be subjected to careful inquiry and rely more on the number and variety of its arguments rather than on the decisiveness of any one of them. “Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.”\footnote{Ibid., 229.} This idea put forward by Peirce provides the fundamental idea for Lipman’s classroom community of inquiry. But what is it ultimately based on and what is its relationship to Hegel’s dialectic? 

One of the most important epistemological idea in the pragmatist philosophy elaborated by Peirce can be seen in understanding knowledge as a dynamic, evolutionary process, rejecting the Hegelian search for certain knowledge via an individual consciousness purified from experience.\footnote{477 Notice the problematic nature of this Hegel-interpretation by Peirce referred to earlier. It can also be questioned what Hegel’s ‘subject’ was in relation to other ‘subjects’.} For Peirce pragmatism meant, above all, a means to find out the meaning of things. However, it is neither ultimately enough here to identify a thing on account of its familiarity, nor to be able to formulate its definition. According to Peirce, we can best tell the meaning of a thing by inquiring into the effects that the object in question might have.
Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.478

For Peirce, the actual meaning of a concept, from among its countless possible meanings, is manifested in human action.479 When we try to establish the meaning of an object, we must therefore study the practical effects that the object in question might have, because only they find an expression through action. Connected with this axiom and his inability to give any satisfactory account of the elements represented in Hegel’s categories of dialectic, Peirce developed, in his ‘science of phaneroscopy’.480 According to Peirce ‘Phaneroscopy (or Phenomenology) is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real things or not.’481 Peirce called ‘the modes of being’ through which we as individuals are connected to the world as the ‘universal categories of human experience’. They include ‘firstness’, ‘secondness’, and ‘thirdness’. By firstness Peirce refers to monadic relation where some quality is immediately felt and comprehensively perceptible to us (e.g. sweetness, redness etc.) without any reflection. Secondness is produced in the process where the physical object

478 Ibid., 31. Peirce adopted the term ‘pragmatism’ from Kant who used it in his *Metaphysics of Morality* in distinction from the ‘practical’. Kant used the latter term in connection with a priori moral laws, while the former term was connected with rules based on artistic and technical experience and open to experience. As an empiricist and logician, Peirce was interested in the art and technique of thinking, especially in the clear presentation of concepts, whereupon he started to use the term pragmatism (Dewey 1925). See also James 1907a.

479 The prevalent conception about pragmatism is that it considers the truth to be ‘that which works’ without really asking what ‘working’ originally meant in this connection in Peirce’s philosophy. Dewey thinks that the general erroneous interpretations of pragmatism are connected with this very fact. It has been claimed so far as pragmatism is concerned that “it makes action the end of life” and that it “subordinates thought and rational activity to particular ends of interest and profits” (Dewey 1925). Although Peirce’s theory includes as an essential part a certain relationship to action, human behavior, it means according to Dewey, however, understanding action as something that conveys, not the ‘praise’ of action as an end in itself. Because concepts can be manifested in many different ways, they can also have several different meanings. A concept cannot thus be restricted to a certain special case, as it is possible for us to understand its more general meaning. According to Dewey, Peirce’s theory thus means opposition to thinking in which the meaning of a concept is linked to the achievement of an individual result and even more linking it to a personal goal. About the distorted picture of pragmatism, see also G.H. Mead’s contribution in Joas 1991.

480 See The Principles of Phenomenology in *PWP*, 74-97. The essay in question actually consists of scattered notes written by Peirce which Buchler collected and headlined as mentioned. See footnote on page 74 in the book in question.

481 *PWP*, 74 (italics as in original).
Thirdness as a triadic relation “which consists in the fact that future facts of Secondness will take on a determinate general character”. Thus, the elements of thirdness are laws which, when contemplated, are the thoughts. They are neither qualities nor facts because “they can be produced and grow” and “must have some reasons”. Thoughts are general as they can be imparted and are “referring to all possible things and not merely to those which happen to exist”. For Peirce, thirdness is the most important category providing the basis for Peirce’s well-known semiotics or theory of signs. According to Peirce,

A sign ... is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representment.

The use of signs thus requires an interpreter to whom the sign referring to an object can only mean something without revealing all of its aspects. This will lead to the idea of fallibilism, according to which knowledge is always more or less uncertain due to the possibility of interpreting the object in endlessly different ways. According to Peirce, “we never can be absolutely sure of anything, nor can we with any probability ascertain the exact value of any measure or general ratio.”

As the meaning of a proposition lies in its consequences which can be verified, and as there is an endless number of possible consequences, the best thing that we can do is to verify the proposition on the basis of probability. Probability does not, however, mean the same as certainty, whereby it is justifiable according to Peirce to maintain that any statement with regard to reality is potentially untrue and therefore fallible.

Peirce’s idea of knowing as a continuous process of belief, habit, action, doubt and inquiry is connected with fallibilism. Dewey later repeats the main

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482 Ibid., 76.
483 Ibid., 76.
484 Ibid., 99.
485 Ibid., 58.
486 The meanings of the concepts in question and the relations between them are examined by Pierce in his essays entitled The fixation of belief (1877) in PWP, 5-22; How to make our ideas clear (1878) in PWP, 23-41 and The essentials of pragmatism (1905) in PWP, 251-268.
characteristics of Peirce’s thought, though in somewhat different terms, and regards inquiry in particular as an experimental method. Both of them argue that man’s beliefs are firmly connected with action. When an action in accordance with a habit based on a belief does not proceed as expected (so that we experience a felt difficulty) but leads to an unexpected result, a genuine and living doubt (or problematic situation) arises. We do our best to get rid of it, by means of inquiry, to reach a new belief, a peaceful and satisfied condition which we do not avoid and which we would not like to trade away.\footnote{PWP, 10-11.} From the viewpoint of Hegel’s speculations on reaching the Absolute, it is therefore important to note that the result of knowing for Peirce and Dewey is always a temporary belief that can be revised to provide “a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will influence further thinking.”\footnote{Ibid., 10-11, 28-29.} Inquiry rises from the doubt caused by the conflict between beliefs (Peirce); from an indeterminate situation that is disturbed or unsatisfactory in one way or another, a ‘felt difficulty’ (Dewey). According to Peirce, the formation of views, and either permanent or momentary balancing of our thoughts and beliefs, takes place in various ways that he appears to think of as certain kinds of developmental stages of inquiry. Dewey talks only about the empirical and scientific experimental method, putting the focus on reflective thinking. Their critique of Hegel’s thought gives rise to Peirce’s criticism of the so-called a priori method and to Dewey’s experimental method.\footnote{For Peirce’s lower stages of the development of inquiry, the ‘method of tenacity’ and the ‘method of authority’ see PWP, 12-14.}

Peirce thinks that the various metaphysical systems provide a good example of the a priori method of inquiry. Here Peirce refers explicitly to Hegel’s dialectic. He maintains that it is based on our innate inclination to adopt views that ‘make sense’ but which thinks little of experience and observable facts.\footnote{William James’s (1907b, 159-176) criticism of the traditional, ‘intellectual’ way of thinking can be seen in his comparisons of the thinking of intellectualists and pragmatists in terms of the theory of truth. According to him, both the pragmatists and the intellectualists agree that truth is about a relation between ‘agreement’ and ‘reality’. A disagreement arises, however, as soon as one starts discussing what those concepts exactly mean “when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with.” James} Although

\footnote{PWP, 256-258.} In reducing the truth to a belief that we cannot doubt, Peirce would seem to anticipate the analysis of the categories of knowing and certainty put forward by Wittgenstein in his late philosophy.
Peirce clearly admires Hegel’s intellect and perhaps adopts from him ideas related to the constant change and continuity of the world, he criticizes the a priori method because of its subjectivity and its “mixing of inquiry with the development of taste”. Later, Peirce’s criticism is targeted especially at the one-sidedness of Hegel’s thinking. Mere thinking, alone and individually, is not sufficient for understanding reality as it cannot become concrete without action, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act. It is in this very issue that both Peirce, and later Dewey, disclaims the primacy of specula-
tion contained in Hegel’s dialectics:

The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute ideal-
ism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third
category (which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make
the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient. Had Hegel, instead of regard-

thinks that the intellectualists assume the truth to mean an essentially inert static relation that leads to
understanding the truth as a final state. Whereby “you’re in possession; you know; you have fulfilled
your thinking destiny. You are where you ought to be mentally; you have obeyed your categorical
imperative; and nothing more need follow on that climax of your rational destiny. Epistemologically
you are in stable equilibrium.” (Ibid., 169. Note James’ polemic reference to Kant in this quotation). The
term ‘intellectualists’ used by James is most likely due to James’ opinion about it as a one-sided focus
on rational thinking as a tool of acquiring knowledge. The intellectualists among whom James undoubt-
edly also counts Hegel clearly represent to him a Cartesian way of thinking known as the correspond-
tence theory of truth. However, in this respect there has also been many interpretations about the differ-
ences between Peirce, James and Dewey themselves (see e.g. Buchler 1939; Davis 1972; Niiniluoto
1989). From the base of that discussion it seems to be justified to claim, that there really were differ-
ences between their conceptions. Peirce speaks about the truth in general as an ultimate end of scientific
inquiry, if it could be continued infinitely. James emphasizes its individualistic and psychological as-
pects. Dewey seems to ignore it as an unnecessary concept preferring in his philosophy of experience
the notion of ‘warranted assertability’ as a phase of inquiry. Also, in the pragmatic theory of truth, we

find both the correspondence and coherence elements in spite of the fact, that it was originally a
critic against Cartesian methodology and thus also against correspondence theory. They have, however,
a different meaning and relation to each others than is usually understood. When speaking about truth,
those concepts are traditionally used as excluding each others but in pragmatic theory, it is also possible
to use them as complementary. According to pragmatic theory a belief is ‘true’ if it coheres with other
relevant beliefs. There is also room for correspondence, but only in ideal and potential meaning i.e. in
the case of infinite inquiry. It is obvious that the early pragmatic philosophers when dealing with the
problem of truth, especially Peirce in his semiotic, were pioneers in preoccupation of the importance of
language to our thinking. All ‘true’ beliefs must be justified by other linguistic beliefs which lead to
discussion and social practice. Peirce made the ‘linguistic turn’ already in 1868 when he wrote “Man
makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to
some other man. ...the word or sign which man uses is the man himself... Thus my language is the sum
total of myself; for the man is the thought. (PWP, 249.; emphasis as in original).

491 I am referring here to Peirce’s ideas influenced by Hegel of ‘tychism’, ‘synecchism’, ‘agapism’ and
‘evolutionary love’ (see PWP, 354-374).
ing the first two stages with his smile of content, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might have looked up on him as the great vindicator of their truth.\footnote{PWP, 267.}

The ‘method of science’ has arisen from the insufficiency of the above. Peirce thinks that only it can offer an external and stable basis for our beliefs, thus enabling a correct distinction between right and wrong views. “To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.”\footnote{Ibid., 18.} External permanence means to Peirce a factor that influences everybody, or potentially everybody such that it is not restricted to single individuals. If such scientific inquiry were continued long enough, it would lead all inquirers to the same result that is not dependent on short-term consequences or personal feelings or purposes, but on the method itself. The fundamental hypothesis of the scientific method thus described by him is that

There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience he reason enough about it, will be led to the True conclusion.\footnote{Ibid., 18.}

Combined with what Peirce says in his theory of signs, it seems, however, that Peirce’s ‘external permanency’ or ‘Reals’ cannot be based on any absolute starting-point. Here Peirce’s ‘realism’ also frees itself from the viewpoint, according to which, reality has an effect on our thinking without being created by it.\footnote{Peirce adopted the realistic way of thinking from Duns Scotus (1270-1308). See e.g. West 1989, 50-53; Yrjönsuuri 1996.} A reality which is independent of individual human beings’ ideas and inquiry means to Peirce an approach to reality as a result of inquiry, not a starting point that has been set in advance. This fundamental idea of Peirce’s epistemology is later reiterated by Dewey, according to whom previous epistemologies have drifted into either empiricism or rationalism (or a combination of them) by making the mistake of assuming that knowledge shall get a grasp of a reality that exists before
the operations of inquiry, regardless of them or their consequences. Thereby, the logical characteristics of the operations of inquiry are either transferred into the reality given in advance, the conscious world being reduced to atomistic elements, or “into a Kantian manifold, or some kind of ‘idealistic’ or ‘realistic’ machinery is constructed to bring the two together”\(^{496}\). For Peirce, the ‘Real things’ must therefore be assumed only as postulates of inquiry, as “Reals cannot be doubted by anyone …for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction.” As a necessary condition for doubt everyone thus in fact accepts the above-mentioned basic hypothesis. And even though the existence of ‘Real things’ cannot be proved through inquiry, Peirce maintains that it does not lead to an opposite conclusion either. In addition, everyone uses the scientific method to explore highly varied questions and the experience that we have gathered on it has not led us to doubt its suitability for the formation of views\(^ {497}\).

### 7.2.2 Against the quest for certainty: Dewey’s criticism of Hegel

Dewey’s criticism of Hegel is directly connected with the above-mentioned inadequacy of the rational thinking of the a priori method that was already put forward by Peirce. Although Hegel questions in his *Phenomenology* the subject-object arrangement contained in Kant’s epistemology, proposing their adaptation through the dialectical process, this does not satisfy Dewey. In *The Quest for Certainty* Dewey thinks that despite everything, Hegel’s main ambition remains to continue the Cartesian search for certainty in the individual consciousness itself. Dewey considers this to be simply a new formulation of the persistent attempt, reaching all the way to antiquity, to make a distinction between the practical and less valuable changing world and our knowledge about it on the one hand, and the rational reality that is not dependent on man’s practical life, seen as a final, unchanging and self-sufficient form of voluntary and self-directed ‘pure action’, on the other hand. As being or reality is ultimately eternal, divine, perfect and unchanging, it is imagined that it can be reached through rational intuition and described with rational evidence. At its most extreme and best, the changing world thus includes the possibility of achieving the unchanging and final. According to classical thinking, these two different worlds also mean two different knowledge.

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\(^{496}\) QC, 160, 229-250.  
\(^{497}\) PHP, 18-19.
One of them, science, is knowledge in the true meaning of the word – rational, necessary and unchanging. The other knowledge, connected with the changing world, corresponds to beliefs and views, it is based on experience, is particular and random and is connected with probability, not certainty. This division of being and knowledge, says Dewey, corresponds to the division of action into the pure and rational, on the one hand, and into the practical, based on the needs of a lower realm of physical change, on the other. 498

Dewey argues that the goal of post-Kantian idealistic systems was to overcome the above-mentioned problem of cognitive and practical dualism inherited from antiquity by combining them, while Kant had in his own ‘critical philosophy’ kept them in force by dividing them. Fichte’s approach, says Dewey, was to derive the structure and characteristics of the actual world from the necessities set by moral ideals. Hegel did not consider it to be man’s moral function to create the world such that it would be in accordance with the ideal, but to take into his possession intellectually and personally the meanings and values already materialized in the real world. In this way, claims Dewey, Hegel excludes the possibility for man of exerting an active influence on the formation of the world. Hegel tries to prove the absolute nature of the meanings and values in question as manifestations of the Absolute spirit in accordance with the necessary logical development. Hereby, says Dewey, both Hegel and Fichte preserve, however, the integrity of the old tradition. The ideal authority of truth, goodness and beauty is preserved in the ‘ultimate being’, in the individual consciousness independent of human experience and practical action in which the ‘mind’ constructs the object of knowledge “by some occult internal operation”. 499

From Dewey’s point of view, the pursuit of the absolute a priori is ultimately reduced to theology and superstition in the cloak of rationality. Experience with the conventions in question leads to the fact that we do not even think of questioning the premises connected with them. According to Dewey, we assume that only something fully fixed and unchanging can be real, which is why we further do not notice how this kind of a pattern of thought controls our ideas about the mind, consciousness and reflective inquiry. 500 "They all flow – such is my basic thesis – from the separation (set up in the interest of the quest for absolute cer-

498 QC, 17-20, 136-155, 229-250. See also Dewey 1917.
499 QC, 19, 49-52. It should be noticed that these Dewey’s interpretations of Hegel and Fichte are quite problematic.
500 Ibid., 21-22.
tainty) between theory and practice, knowledge and action." The attempts to overcome dualism – Dewey is most likely referring here to Kant and Hegel – have led to a transcendent empire, in which case the pattern of thought in question is, however, preserved, ending "in a division between things of this world as mere appearances and an inaccessible essence of reality."302

Peirce’s theory of the scientific method and inquiry also inspired Dewey. In fact, it is in the experimental method of inquiry and in his concept of experience connected with it that Dewey tries to solve the problem of dualism by referring repeated, as does Peirce, to the unsatisfactory nature of Hegel’s own dialectic approach. From the viewpoint of P4C, the solution emerging from this criticism of Hegel has an important bearing. Peirce’s identification of several different types of inquiry corresponds in Dewey, however, to the division between the ‘empirical’ and ‘scientific’ thinking only. Thinking is not a characteristic of something separate from nature named intelligence or reason, but a way to control external action. It is an intentional effort “to discover specific conditions between something which we do and the consequences which result, so that the two become continuous.”303 The process of thinking consists of different aspects of thinking (reflection, reasoning, remembering, being suspicious, feeling, understanding, observing, imagining and considering), ranging in its widest sense from everything that takes place in our minds to the more complex ideas of reflective thinking which follow and precede each other (the ‘train of thoughts’).304

‘Empirical thinking’ is restricted by things that we fail to observe, which is why Dewey thinks that it is finally inadequate. It leads easily to false beliefs, preventing us from coping in new situations, resulting in laziness, prejudice and finally dogmatism.305 ‘Reflective thinking’ as an “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends” is inquiry in accordance with the scientific method, by means of which the indeterminate can be changed to be a satisfactory, linked whole again.306 As the goal of inquiry in

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301 Ibid., 24.
302 Ibid., 25.
303DE, 152.
304HWT, 3.
305 Ibid., 145-149.
306 Ibid., 6; see also LT, 104-105.
fact is to change situations from worse to better, he is clearly including moral and aesthetic implications in his concept of inquiry.

For Dewey, knowing is linked to his idea of how knowledge can be achieved in the dynamics of self and the community, being connected at the same time with the existence of the whole person. Its main characteristic is, instead of dualistic distinctions, an effort to maintain the continuity of knowing together with action that shapes the environment in a purposeful manner. According to Dewey, knowledge of something consists of all the ways in which our action is expressed intellectually, implying the idea of a merger of theory and practical action. Knowledge is not contemplative or ‘from another world’ in contrast to the less important realm of practice. Meanings, beliefs and knowledge are connected with consciousness of human activity and its consequences, abandoning the Hegelian cognitive pursuit of absolute certainty by purely mental means – as interpreted by Dewey. The mind is not any passive observer external to the world, but inside the world as part of it, constructing purposefully and creatively its events and future.507 Action aims at a goal directed by a theory. Thus theory requires certain actions for it to be seen if the expected results do appear. The test of the truth is based on the consequences and cannot be understood in terms of something passively aimed at or deliberation of the absolute, but as something actively achieved with the help of a guiding theory. True knowledge, claims Dewey, only consists of what has organized our disposition to adapt nature to our needs and to adapt our goals and desires to our life situations. Knowing as an action is about introducing certain dispositions to our consciousness to remove our confusion by forming a connection between ourselves and the world in which we are living.508

The world was not, according to Dewey, given as something readily meaningful, and it can become such only through intelligent experimental inquiry. This kind of inquiry cannot lead to a rigid and fixed whole, as the experience of reality always contains unforeseen, new and spontaneous dimensions. Self-correcting inquiry is a continuous process, proceeding through problematic situations and their solutions and through the new solutions thereby arising, and through the new problematic situations arising from them, requiring new solutions. According to Dewey, the scientific attitude could almost be defined as an ability to enjoy a state

507 QC, 232; see also Dewey 1917, 27.
of doubt that is productively translated into operations of inquiry. The inquirer is a person who ‘loves thinking’ and is interested in problems for their own sake. A vital feature of Dewey’s reflective thinking is concretized in him: “to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and protracted inquiry”. A true Copernican revolution means to Dewey that we do not need to reach knowledge to get a grasp of reality. The world such as we experience it is the real world.

According to both Peirce and Dewey, knowing is always based on questions posed and on the kind of information that is being sought as well as on the seeker’s viewpoint and context. Due to this limitation of human thinking it aims at constant self-correcting and at finding the restrictions on one’s own thoughts and theories. Although knowledge is always theoretically conveyed, based on the opinions rising from the conventions of a fallible community of inquiry in a given historical situation, it does not mean that science cannot make progress. According to Peirce, understanding one’s own limitations opens up an opportunity for openness and critical thinking together, manifested in a desire to inquire into the new points of view presented on reality. Knowing thus means a social process within the framework of the rules, norms and standards created by man himself in contrast to the Cartesian doctrine of individual experience. For Peirce “the very origin of the concepts of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge”.

The relationship between P4C and Hegel’s philosophy can be perceived on the basis of the epistemological analysis of the community of inquiry described above. Fallibilism, self-correcting and ‘knowing in the world’, derive largely from the dissatisfaction of Peirce and Dewey with the ontological basis of Hegel’s idealistic thinking which preserved, as Peirce and Dewey think, dualism and its consequences. Hegel’s philosophy interpreted as individual knowing, reaching the inevitable process of reality purified from particular experience in the dialectic process is, as a consequence of this early pragmatic interpretation, restored to the face of the earth in community of inquiry, into man’s experience and his search

509 QC, 182. An obvious model for Dewey’s view on the scientific attitude has been Peirce’s thinking introduced in 1896 in the essay entitled The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism. PWP, 42-59.
510 QC, 235.
511 Peirce thinks that there is actually nothing new in this thought, as many of the greatest thinkers of all times have considered it to be true. The same has been discussed also by James (see James 1907b, 142-144) and Dewey (see Dewey 1925).
512 PWP, 247 (capitals as in original).
for meaning with the potential to create new things. From this base Hegel’s phi-
losophy looks like starting its flight as the Owl of Minerva in the dusk of the night,
trying to grasp the reality which is already in place where as Dewey hands over
philosophy to the people to remake themselves and the world. Thus the ‘critical
thinking’ typical of P4C, demanding the criteria, sensitivity to the context and
self-correcting, as well as the aspects of creative thinking and caring, can be more
deeply understood from this historical perspective even if Dewey’s as well as
Peirce’s Hegel interpretations might be questionable.

7.3 From speculation to communication

Although Peirce can be considered to be the father of the concept of the community
of inquiry, he did not elaborate it in connection with education. Meanwhile
Hegel, and especially Dewey, derives pedagogical implications from their basic
philosophical approaches. As discussed above Dewey was much in dept to Hegel
which can also be recognized in his educational thinking. To my belief, its most
important common element is to be find in the idea of Bildung, the continual and
tensional process between the individual human being and the world. Although
they had quite different assumptions of the final nature of this human develop-
ment, both of them still regard it as necessarily needing educator’s active influ-
ence to happen. In this respect Hegel and Dewey share the basic problem involv-
ing pedagogical action namely of how to adjust the past experience, the objective
tradition to child’s own experience, his desires and potentialities, the subjective in
such a way that genuine growth would happen. Their solutions are, however,
quite different naturally leaning on their overall philosophical thinking.

As argued before, Hegel derives his ideas on the special question of teaching
philosophy directly from the basic thoughts of his philosophy of the spirit. The
truth, the absolute, can only be reached as the end result of a long and laborious
dialectical process supported by the school institution as a particularly important
form of the development of the spirit. Hegel’s main thought, also defining phi-
losophy teaching, is therefore that the condition for the achievement of the genu-
inely philosophical, i.e. real from the individual’s point of view, is to go through
repeatedly the conflicting developmental stages of the spirit while realizing the
unity of knowing and its object – learning to swim by going into the water. In
other words, the actual content of Hegel’s teaching of philosophy lies in his own
system of the development of the spirit. Within its framework, abstract under-
standing, its breakage in the dialectical movement, and the speculation revealing
the original abstractions as non-absolute moments, shall be reproducible in pedagogical mediation. In the process of Bildung the educative influence (erziehung) is inevitable. As we recall, it was difficult for Hegel to actualize these fundamental ideas in his practical teaching. Particularly starting with the ‘practical exercises’ and going straight into the speculative as demanded by Niethammer, was erroneous in Hegel’s opinion. He ended up instead starting with the abstract that was immediately present in the pupil’s life-world, such as freedom and law, which, says Hegel, in the gymnasium still only form the pre-philosophical basis for later speculative thinking or proper studies in philosophy at a university.

In his letters Hegel considers only once the possibility of teaching philosophy (simple, easy to understand logic) to children younger than gymnasium students, i.e. children younger than fourteen. The reasons that he gives for this are their obedience and confidence in authority and the fact that people of this age are less interested in the external characteristics of things or emotions connected with them than older gymnasium students are.513 On the other hand, Hegel lived in a time in which the ideas of romanticism also influenced the conception of childhood. At the turn of the 19th century, childhood was discovered as an important, qualitatively unique experience with a value per se, and not just as preparation for adulthood. In ‘playful pedagogy’ this was seen in the requirement for so-called natural growth, as a consequence of which an effort was made to link school education to the child’s changing needs and capabilities. The spontaneous, pure, innocent and happy childhood was to be protected and continued as long as possible. As we have noted above, Hegel took a highly reserved attitude to this, considering that it meant pedagogically inadequate one-sidedness that lost its content. This does not, however, mean that Hegel did not understand the psychological dimension of education. This can be seen, among other things, in the themes with which he thought that the teaching of philosophy should be started. Thus the ideas of romanticism also had an effect on Hegel and could be seen in his theory of the family in particular.514 Although romanticism did find a totally new, polymorphous level of life in childhood, it still took up a prejudicial attitude towards the child’s capacity to think. It was considered primitive compared to the adults, yet it was thought to be capable of gradual growth. As philosophy had been by defini-

513 Let., 395
514 See Väyrynen 2000. According to Väyrynen, emphases obviously differing from Kant and connected with romanticism can be seen specifically in Hegel’s theory of the family and the idea of love connected with it.
tion for centuries a complicated and enormously difficult branch of science, it is obvious that it could not touch upon the child of the 19th century.\(^{515}\) Hegel did not make an exception in this respect; teaching philosophy to children younger than gymnasium pupils was not a topical issue for him.

Dewey contributes from the base of his philosophical thinking especially on education. In fact, Dewey maintains that his philosophy is no less than the general theory of education.\(^{516}\) Even in his last contribution on education, *Experience and Education* (1938) he ends with the statement

> The basic question concerns the nature of education with no qualifying adjectives prefixed. What we want and need is education pure and simple, and we shall make surer and faster progress when we devote ourselves to finding out just what education is and what conditions have to be satisfied in order that education may be a reality and not a name or a slogan. It is for this reason alone that I have emphasized the need for a sound philosophy of experience.\(^{517}\)

Along the lines of this ‘sound philosophy of experience’ Dewey resolves the pedagogical problem of the adjustment of subjective and objective in the process of non teleological communication based on the process of inquiry between the educator and the child (see Chapter 4). Educator as representing both the tradition and the child controls and directs the objective circumstances and experiments of pedagogical situation, over and over again depending on the consequences of undergone action, from the base of his more mature judgment still preserving the continuity of child’s experience. For Dewey the experience, which is always the actual life-experience of some individual, does not occur in a vacuum but interacts with objective conditions, the total set-up of situations in which a person is engaged including what is done by the educator and the way in which it is done (e.g. words and the tone of voice, equipment, books, apparatus, toys, and games played). In this idea of education adapting the subjective and objective Dewey wants to reject the one-sided either/or extremes that have, he claims, been connected with it. According to Dewey, experience does not go on simply inside a person, nor is any subject of instruction as such, educative or conducive to growth.

\(^{515}\) See also Lipman & Sharp 1994, 3-4.

\(^{516}\) DE, 338.

\(^{517}\) EE, 90-91.
There is no such thing as educational value in the abstract, states Dewey.\textsuperscript{518} Education as intellectual growth or maturity, as a desire to go on learning is for Dewey an ever-present social process that does, however, require the adaptation of the subjective and objective as the educator’s active deeds.\textsuperscript{519}

If following Dewey’s argumentation, in Hegel’s teleological system the Absolute is ultimately to be found behind everything and the institution of education is manifested only as a support for this inevitable process. The pedagogical action derives its meaning from this end. Dewey’s criticism of Hegel’s epistemology leads him to an open future also in the sense of education, yet necessarily preserving the continuity of tradition through educator’s active influence in pedagogical situation as typical in modern educational thought in general. Thus Dewey’s education emerges not only as the generator of individual growth but also as an essentially important ally for social and political reform. For Dewey, education not only aims at the achievement of knowledge and understanding but is explicitly a means of changing the world for the better.

7.4 Conclusion

Dewey thinks that the scientific method, i.e. reflective thinking, is not the sole right of elite of scientists but belongs to all intellectually active people in their everyday lives. It is of particular importance in teaching in which it shall be linked to action on the one hand and to ourselves and the world in which we are living on the other hand.\textsuperscript{520} For Dewey, “Thinking is the method of intelligent learning, of learning that employs and rewards mind … the method of intelligent experience in the course which it takes.”\textsuperscript{521} Dewey is, however, strongly opposed to teaching thinking as a separate skill, and also to teaching special skills without thinking. This Hegelian idea has subsequently been conveyed into one of the basic theses of P4C, providing the theoretical content for Lipman’s ‘teaching for

\textsuperscript{518} Ibid., 46.
\textsuperscript{519} About this Bildung-theoretical way of reading Dewey, see Pikkarainen 2000.
\textsuperscript{520} “It is, however, as true in the school as in the university, that the spirit of inquiry can be got only through and with the attitude of inquiry. The pupil must learn what has meaning, what enlarges his horizon, instead of mere trivialities. He must become acquainted with truths instead of things that were regarded as such fifty years ago or that are taken as interesting by the misunderstanding of a partially educated teacher. It is difficult to see how these ends can be reached except as the most advanced part of the educational system is in complete interaction with the most rudimentary.” (Dewey 1900, 78-79.)
\textsuperscript{521} \textit{DE}, 153.
thinking’ as well as the concepts ‘higher-order-thinking’, ‘multidimensional thinking’, ‘complex thinking’ and ‘thinking in the disciplines’.522

It would appear at first glance that Dewey – and thereby also Lipman – only repeat Hegel’s requirements for the importance of the abstract and also for the unity of content and form. It must be noted, however, that according to Dewey, for Hegel these ideas are linked to the reproduction of the developmental process of the spirit which is necessary for freedom, in which they constitute the condition for the feasibility of achieving the actual Absolute that has already been assumed to exist. Quite as we have observed above, Dewey aimed at refuting this epistemology which he proposed as Hegel’s way of thinking. This is why the focus on the pupil’s life-world as well as the requirement for the unity of content and form seems to be relevant to Dewey on different grounds. Whereas individual experience is – perhaps – only a necessary intermediate stage of the dialectical process for Hegel, it is the dynamic basis of all knowledge for Dewey. Dewey thinks that thinking that is not meaningful to the pupil in separate skills leaves him at the mercy of his own routine habits and other people’s authoritative control, finally resulting in the largest obstacle of all for educative experience and thereby for growth, which for Dewey is not only physically but intellectually and morally one exemplification of the principle of continuity.523 Awareness of the causes and consequences of thinking means signification of things, resulting in increased intellectual freedom and thereby more plentiful options and alternatives. On the other hand, the results of any inquiry cannot be understood if they are detached from the process of inquiry that produced them.

For Lipman these Deweyan ideas mean education enriched by the philosophical experience. This involves engaging children in ‘reflective reading’, ‘reflective questioning’ and ‘reflective discussion’ i.e. in inquiry or self-corrective practice as the quest for meaning through the problem-solving heuristic.524 On this basis, Lipman criticizes the traditional school education that has drifted aimlessly along under the dominance of Piagetian principles as well as the programs of the so-called critical thinking movement due to their lack of conceptual significance.525 Dewey’s philosophy, arising from the criticism of Hegel as a practice

522 See TE1, 17-18, 23-25, 185, 263-264.
523 EE, 36.
524 See e.g. TE1, 105-108; Lipman 2001.
525 See e.g. Lipman 1994. Lipman speaks about the lack of the abstract suffered by children. It must be noted here that Hegel used the concept of the abstract in a different sense.
that genuinely touches on all people’s lives and problems as well as the changed ideas of childhood, also acquires its pedagogical value for Lipman from the viewpoint of democratic citizenship. In his pedagogical reconstruction of philosophy, Lipman aims at a situation where children philosophize under the guidance of their teacher on issues which they experience as meaningful to themselves in particular. With Lipman emphasizing that this is explicitly about starting to study philosophy, his thought would appear to coincide with Hegel. If we take a closer look, this is not really the case. Although it is necessary for Hegel to start from that which is natural and spontaneous to the pupil – it is only an intermediate stage, disengagement from which postulates true philosophy as pure thinking freed from individual experience. Via Dewey, Lipman maintains the ontological status of individual experience which in education, however, is not determined and developed in whatever random or merely indirect way, but expanded, under the guidance of the teacher, by the help of philosophical fiction actually based on the very history of philosophy. In his novels Lipman dramatizes it for the reach of children (Philosophy for Children). It would be great later, says Lipman, if pupils became interested in philosophy also as an academic field of study. On the basis of the above Lipman does not, however, mean that this should take place at the expense of what is significant to the pupil.

Is there any room for dialectic in Lipman’s thought? In his book entitled Vygotskyan Dialogues (1996), he discusses in passing the dialectic of moving from the abstract to the concrete. Referring to Davydov and obviously also agreeing with him, Lipman insists on encouraging the conveyance of the child’s immediate and concrete experience to the abstract if we are to encourage them to understand the general forms of action. This leads Lipman to further consider the conflicting relations between knowledge and experience in terms of thesis, antithesis and synthesis still without any explicit referring to Hegel. Through analyses of Davydov, Lipman instead ponders on whether moving dialectically from the abstract to the concrete is typical of all higher-order thought. “To teach children to move intellectually in this fashion is simply to have them to learn the way scientists learn, using abstractions, generalizations and theoretical concepts.”

526 Lipman 1996, 45-50, 56-57, 63. The book in question consists of fact and fiction written in the form of a dialogue, which is why its interpretation involves more problems than usual. The dialectic of the abstract and concrete is, of course, conveyed to the so-called Soviet psychologists (e.g. Vygotsky, Leontyev, Lurija, Davydov etc.) from Hegel via Marx.

527 Ibid., 49.
thinks, however, that moving from the abstract to the concrete cannot be a universally valid ‘pedagogical formula’, as he supposes that the architecture of thinking in the case of both children and adults consists of constant oscillation between the general and particular. It can be considered that this idea is derived directly from Dewey’s concept of experience, which is not, however, elaborated further by Lipman. He does not pose the theoretical questions of the possibility of an individual process of Bildung and of what happens in that pedagogical situation where the child becomes a subject.

For Lipman, dialectic is connected above all with philosophical materials designed for children. The characters in the stories manifest different ways of knowing and experiencing that conflict with each other (the optic versus the haptic; men’s versus women’s; the logical versus the developmental; the experimental versus the intuitive; the analytical versus the empirical and so on). “They fall into oppositions that have to be transcended.” So, this is not about reproduction of the dialectical process typical of Hegel in education, but rather about enriching experience through an inquiry of different styles of experiencing. Lipman’s reluctance to write a traditional textbook of philosophy is connected with this. The idea is to transfer the pupil’s attention through conflicting and vague philosophical fiction from the teacher to the text to questioning. Yet the teacher is also for Lipman the bearer of the content of philosophy through Socratic questioning, though he doubts that teacher as a model of good thinking alone is sufficient to bring improvement in the way students think. I think that this approach is largely based on problems similar to those experienced by Hegel in his own philosophy teaching and presentation of his Propedeutics.

Although Lipman thinks that children are philosophically sensitive, it does not follow that they can find on its basis only and alone, the meanings for which they search. Children’s social impulsiveness must, however, be assumed as the starting-point for influencing the child. Translated into Dewey’s manner of speaking, it is a question of the process of adapting the subjective and objective in which educative experiences are produced for the children. In Lipman’s case this can be formulated as an attempt to show, with the help of philosophy, issues that attract and satisfy their curiosity in a constructive manner. For Lipman “all educa-
tional situations involve adult mediation between the culture and the child”, and so the teacher is the absolute pedagogical authority in the educational community of inquiry.\textsuperscript{532} This means, however, “an opportunity for the teacher to demonstrate not so much the authority of rule-enforcer as the sagacity of the expert in pedagogy”.\textsuperscript{533} With the help of philosophy, the teacher can add to the children’s endless capacity to wonder, to have a consciousness of the fundamental enigmas of existence that most children without guidance only have a faint idea of, maintains Lipman. Children shall be helped to think better, so that they can, for instance, estimate their own reasoning and its grounds and avoid fragmentation of their thinking. Although philosophy cannot provide the ultimate meanings, it can convey to the children the idea of the possibility and profitability of searching for meanings connected with their own lives. According to Lipman, children shall be guided to think in ways which add to the experience of meaning in their lives. Thus, for Lipman philosophy in education aims to actively generate the educative process.

\textsuperscript{532} Ibid., 177; Jussi 1994.
\textsuperscript{533} Lipman 2001.
8 Tact and atmosphere in the pedagogical relationship

8.1 Introduction

Converting the classroom into a community of inquiry is in the core of P4C. It is assumed that doing philosophy as dialogical and communal inquiry has significant pedagogical value, because it encourages multidimensional thinking and this way produces comprehensive educative experiences built through language and thought in children. Matthew Lipman refers to this idea as an attempt to show, with the help of philosophy, issues that attract and satisfy children’s curiosity in a constructive manner. These overlapping functions – instrumental and consummative – of doing philosophy with children can be regarded as the main characteristics of this ‘reflective model of educational practice’ where the classroom community of inquiry, claims Lipman, should be proposed as ‘a master educational paradigm’.534

Lipman’s classroom community of inquiry pursues the dictum of Socrates by following the argument where it leads. Here the role of the teacher emerges as fundamental. It is the teacher who can guide and enhance the philosophical dimension in a dialogical inquiry, says Lipman.535 In addition to knowing philosophy, he continues, the teacher has to learn to think like a philosopher in that he has to be able to connect the questions that the class raises with the big philosophical questions of the tradition.536 On the other hand, the teacher should be capable of inspiring an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation. The ideal classroom community of inquiry is essentially a space for certain atmosphere or feelings, says Lipman.537

From the viewpoint of pedagogy, it would seem to be essential what happens when the teacher and child encounter each other. That is, what kind of experience and which conditions are ‘educative’ in it? In this core question Lipman draws heavily on the educational thinking of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. For them both, “instruction should be an interchange of experience in which the

534 TE2, 83.
536 Ibid.
537 Lipman 1994.
child brings his experience to be interpreted by the parent or the teacher.\textsuperscript{538} Following this idea, Lipman thinks that all educative situations involve this adult mediation between culture and the child where, as Mead further states, “the subject-matter of instruction (is) brought into the form of problems arising from the experience of the child” and where “the relation of the child to the instructor becomes a part of the natural solution.”\textsuperscript{539} However, in that process the teacher is, for Lipman, the absolute pedagogical authority meaning not so much the demonstration of the authority of rule-enforcer as the pedagogical strength or the sagacity of the expert in pedagogy.\textsuperscript{540} He guides the inquiry by following the ‘tertiary qualities’ (or ‘primary aspects’) of the unique, indivisible and immediately experienced inquiry situation – as Lipman describes the \textit{Prägnanz} that lends a sense of direction to the community of inquiry.\textsuperscript{541}

Inquiry takes place in situations – in contextual wholes or fields. A situation is a whole by virtue of its “immediately pervasive quality”… These qualities … are akin to what we designate by such terms as “perplexing”, “cheerful”, and “disconsolate”… All inquiries are guided by such qualities, including Socratic inquiry.\textsuperscript{542}

In what follows this indivisible and immediately experienced educational situation proposed by Lipman will be analyzed from the viewpoint of phenomenological hermeneutic philosophy. How could the teacher’s pedagogical strength and sagacity, the relationship between teacher and pupil, and the unique nature of an inquiry situation in the classroom community be better understood within its framework? After discussing the meaning of dialogue in general, the meanings of tact and atmosphere as complicated phenomena aiming at dialogue in a pedagogical relationship are outlined. This analysis contributes to the recent discussion on the nature of the classroom community of inquiry and especially on the relationship between teacher and pupil in it within the P4C movement.\textsuperscript{543} Its aim is to

\textsuperscript{538} Mead 1910b; see also \textit{TE2}, 84-85.
\textsuperscript{539} Mead 1910b.
\textsuperscript{540} Lipman 2001.
\textsuperscript{541} \textit{TE2}, 85-86. Here, Lipman is referring to Dewey’s \textit{Logic} and George Yoos’s article “A Work of Art as a Standard of Itself” (1967). See also pp. 204, 243-244 in \textit{TE2}.
\textsuperscript{542} Ibid., 85-86 (quotation “immediately pervasive quality” from Dewey’s \textit{Logic}).
\textsuperscript{543} For example Kohan 2002; Lushyn 2002, Lushyn 2003; Lushyn & Kennedy 2003. Much of the work of David Kennedy (for example Kennedy 1990, 1992, 1997, 1998 and 2006a,b) is also closely connected with this thematic.
offer some tentative elements for deeper understanding of the classroom community of inquiry as an educative space by discussing it from these ‘new’ points of view.

### 8.2 Dialogue, encounter and the pedagogical relationship

Meeting other people is likely to be one of the most meaningful things in one’s life. This special character of human relationships has been discussed in philosophy in terms of encountering and dialogue/monologue, among others. They are connected with the tradition of German idealism and above all with its critique which has given rise to phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics. The starting-point for this thinking is always the relationship of anyone's ‘I’ to other people. This ‘I-perspective’ gives rise to the concepts of the ‘other’ and ‘otherness’. The phenomenon of encountering cannot be found if human relationships are viewed as if from the outside objectively and from the viewpoint of a third party. An encounter with another person always takes place in the lived perspective of an individual.

In modern discussion on educational philosophy, Martin Buber (1878-1965) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) would appear to have the role of classics in discussing these phenomena. The concepts of encounter and dialogue have been, however, used in this discussion in different senses. Their more limited use focusing on the special character of interpersonal relationships is referred to as existential by Otto Friedrich Bollnow. This conception is represented above all by Buber. For him ‘genuine encounters’ and dialogue are more like exceptional events in a man's life, and their value is added to through this exceptionality. According to the existentialist view, a dialogic encounter with another person means immediate experience of unity. The other person unpredictably makes a deep impression on me, touches me with his difference, and this experience changes me. Such an encounter with an experience of unity is not limited to verbal communication or, for instance, learning only. It is not a matter of ‘factual’ consciousness of another person's speech as a goal-oriented expansion of one's own previous knowledge, but of the special experience of a ‘touch’ that has a broad and deep influence on the development of our entire personality. Such existentially

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544 See e.g. Burbules 1993, 110-130.
545 Bollnow 1959.
understood dialogical encounters with others – who can be our fathers and mothers, friends, dear ones or perhaps also children, among others – create our identity, our understanding of ourselves.\footnote{Cf. Taylor 1989.} We become ourselves while others ‘tell’ it to us in situations in which our persons are fully present. This very totality in situations of encounter is the core of this existential conception: reciprocity (You to Me and I to You), personal presence, kindness, a desire to understand the other person, and confidentiality are required for it to be realized.

A broader and less demanding way to understand dialogue is to define it as a relation to another person which also aims at unity with the other person, but which is satisfied with internal dialogization of mutual discourse (Bakhtin) or ‘genuine understanding’ (Gadamer). Mutual speech and understanding are also one of the most important levels of the dialogical relationship to Buber. The most fundamental question is: how can I attain an understanding of what is strange to me from my own starting-points? For Gadamer, genuine understanding does not mean the adaptation of the other into one's own horizon, i.e. into what in the other person's expression is interpreted to me as something already known and obvious, or what pleases me because it goes well together with my previous thoughts and feelings. This kind of listening or reading that excludes otherness, the difference of the other meaning horizon, is not about understanding at all, as nothing new is understood in it. Genuine understanding is for Gadamer a dialogic process of encountering the other person, in which my own meaning horizon is merged with the other different horizon, in which an effort is made to find a new understanding of what was spoken or written as text in unity with the ‘other’. It is not about an attempt to understand the other person's mental life, but the issue at hand as seen from the other person's perspective. Then what would dialogue mean in the pedagogical relationship between educator and the child? Does it allow for a dialogical encounter with the other person, and if it does, in what form?

Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) are often cited among the first to present the concept of the pedagogical relationship. As the fundamental relationship in education it has been dealt with by German hermeneutic pedagogy in particular.\footnote{Actually hermeneutic pedagogy as a European pedagogical tradition has many different variations. According to Siljander (1988) it consists of such developmental phases as the so called ‘geistewissenschaftliche Pädagogik’, hermeneutic-critical pedagogy and objective – hermeneutic. As known, pedagogy as an independent field of science can according to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), the discipline of}
cal relationship refers to the whole of relationships constituting pedagogical activity in which the essential basic element, in addition to the educator and the child, is culture. Hermeneutic pedagogy aims at understanding and conceptualizing how the individual’s process of Bildung, reproduction and on the other hand reforming of culture are ultimately possible within the framework of these basic elements. In this way the emphasis is on the educator’s responsible action as a condition for the (subjective) individual process of Bildung on the one hand and for the reproduction of (objective) culture on the other. The not-yet-grownup educatee is not assumed to be capable of this alone. This might also be formulated in such a way that in a concrete educational situation something is paradoxically realized in the field of the encounter between educator and the child that is not only based on the educator’s intention but on the other hand also cannot be realized without it. The educator is empowered both by the child and by the culture. Efforts have often been made to perceive this dialectical tension between subjective and objective and its outrun as a kind of synthesis (Aufhebung) from the viewpoint of dialogue.

Buber presents the pedagogical relationship as a special form of the dialogical relationship.548 The ‘I-You’ relationship between educator and educatee cannot be fully reciprocal in the same way as the ‘I-You’ relationship based on equality between adults which also can be such only in principle. The ‘Umfassung’ of ideal dialogue means to Buber the ability of both the parties to the dialogue to live through the situation of encounter in all of its aspects, i.e. not only from his or her own viewpoint but also from the partner’s point of view. Buber thinks that this is also the fundamental element in the relationship between educator and pupil al-

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548 Buber 1984, 130.
though it is bipolar by nature. The educator must inspire a dialogical ‘I-You’ relationship in the pupil, who in turn “should refer to and acknowledge his or educator as this certain person”. The educational connection is, however, broken when the pupil as well is capable of reciprocally living through the common situation from the educator’s point of view.

[The teacher] experiences the pupil’s being educated, but the pupil cannot experience the educating of the educator. The educator stands at both ends of the common situation, the pupil at only one end. In the moment when the pupil is able to throw himself across and experience from over there, the educative relationship would burst asunder, or change into friendship.

According to Buber, an educative connection as such cannot represent full reciprocity in accordance with ideal dialogue. Education, similarly to the way in which a psychotherapist's patient is healed, requires that a person lives in the encounter but is also withdrawn at the same time. The educator experiences a child's growth from the child's point of view, but the child cannot experience the educator's activity from the educator's point of view. However, this very capability means the breaking of the educational connection with the emergence of the ‘I-You’ relationship and finally in the evaporation of the pedagogical relationship, which also for Buber would appear to be the raison d’etre of education.

Ben Spiecker discusses the same thematic in early interaction between mother and child. The infant's world mostly consists of her mother’s behavior, her voice, face, body and hands. It is interesting that the mother behaves quite differently towards her small baby from older children. The mother acts unusually with her baby, using baby talk and exaggerated mimics. It would appear that adults are also attracted by physical features typical of children such as a large head, relatively large eyes, round cheeks, etc. According to Spiecker, the child also would appear to have from her birth an endogenic potential for observational and motor skills on which social interaction can be built. By being allowed to take part in various activities, tasks and games, the child learns rules and conventions through which she can participate in a human form of life. It is about social pre-adaptation. Although this so-called joined activity, says Spiecker, is largely based

549 Ibid., 131.
550 Ibid., 132.
on biological and hormonal factors for the mother and on social pre-adaptation for the child, they alone cannot explain it.

On the basis of these observations Spiecker concludes by finding that the newborn baby and parents literally need each other, which in turn is a vital condition for a pedagogical relationship. The most important step in an infant's development is that he gets through interaction into a relationship with his parents, as a result of which he gradually achieves (learns, finds) the concept of dialogue. Early interaction is a one-way thing, a kind of pseudo-dialogue that is based on the mother's initiative as she echoes and responds time and again to the infant's actions. The mother thus acts as if the child's responses had a communicative meaning, thereby repeatedly drawing the child into situations similar to a dialogue. Spiecker characterizes the parents' action and its conceptual frame of reference as *one-sided contrafactuality*, in which the parents presuppose in relation to the child the principles that should be realized at the same time. Spiecker maintains that for the very reason that a child is addressed as if s/he already were an autonomous person, he also becomes an autonomous person in relation to significant others. Spiecker's one-sided contrafactuality as a unique characteristic of the pedagogical relationship is actually a reformulation of the idea of bipolarity associated by Buber to the relation between educator and the child.

The analyses of the special character of the pedagogical relationship mentioned above are united by the idea of the child developing in a human way for the very reason that the educator initiates him into the form of common action within the framework of his own meaning space. However, putting an emphasis on the fact that it is not a result of natural development but a human achievement aiming at the growing person's autonomy, the wish is to underline the well-known idea of hermeneutic pedagogy about education as a necessary condition of the process of Bildung. As Bildung is basically an open process as such, for which a condition is that the educatee necessarily remains for the educator as not transparent 'other', the question arises of what is the ultimate content of the educator's mind guiding the concrete educational situations. What is it exactly that takes place in them? Next this complicated field of phenomena will be discussed in the light of the concepts of tact and atmosphere. It is assumed that they are important phenomena searching the dialogue in the pedagogical relationship.
8.3  The notion of tact

8.3.1  Tact, Bildung and hermeneutical rationality: Hans-Georg Gadamer

According to Max van Manen, “the educator cannot get oriented on the basis of the sciences.”\(^{552}\) Not a single scientific theory of education can tell us how to act in a given unique educational situation. The sciences aim at finding general explanations for events in nature and human action, while van Manen thinks that educational research should create “a pedagogical theory of uniqueness”. Every educational situation is always special and individual in terms of the educator, the child and the setting. Van Manen does not mean that everything connected with education is always fully individual and occasional, but that this aspect of uniqueness is always essentially connected with any educational situation. Educational research should enhance the educators’ “awareness of educational situations.”\(^{553}\)

This kind of idea, though in more general level, is presented by Hans-Georg Gadamer when emphasizing the value of the Aristotle’s *phronesis* for the understanding of interpersonal situations. In *Truth and Method* (1960) he presents his interpretation of this idea.\(^{554}\) Moral situations require an understanding that is neither theoretical scientific knowledge nor technical knowledge that is needed to realize projected goals or to produce something. Purely scientific or technical knowledge as the guiding principle of the educator, for instance, ‘a theoretically based grip on work’, would lead to a mechanical attempt at solution in which the educational plan and its methodical realization would be predetermined things. Here theory precedes practice in a unidirectional way, even if theory was applied specifically to the situation. According to Gadamer, practical consideration and accordant action only emerges in connection with each unique situation. The educational situation contains essential aspects that do not derive from anything generalizable or modellable. For Gadamer, *tact* is one such an aspect.

Gadamer associates tact with the core of Bildung. Becoming cultured is to Gadamer a historical process of the development of the spirit, and it functions as

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\(^{552}\) van Manen 1990, 150.

\(^{553}\) Ibid., 150.

\(^{554}\) Gadamer 1982, 278-289.
an endlessly shaping element within the sphere of which the cultured (Gebildete) person always moves. Bildung together with the concepts of common sense (sensus communis), judgment (Urteilskraft) and taste (Geschmack) forms the basis on which the (non-methodical) hermeneutic, interpretative understanding in humanistic sciences is based. They represent a practical, non-reflective way of knowing based on the intuitive nature of the humanistic tradition derived from the phronesis of Aristotle’s theory of virtues, the immediately opening readiness for action in a hermeneutic situation. Tact is for Gadamer a kind of idea that puts together these basic humanistic concepts and generates and gives shape to Bildung.555

Furthermore, tact means to Gadamer a certain kind of elasticity of the mind, an ability to revive by forgetting and keeping oneself open to others, that is, an ability to remove oneself further from one’s own immediate interests. Tact manifests itself in reactive sensitivity in situations for action in which we cannot get any information from any general principles. Tact tells what we must say or do in a particular situation. In its inexplicitness and inexpressibility, Gadamer’s tact helps to keep a distance, avoid aggressiveness and intrusion into a person’s intimate sphere. Gadamer points out above all that tact is at the same time a form of both knowing and being. Thereby its truth is practical by nature, a hermeneutic rationality in distinction from the methodical knowledge of the natural sciences.556

Gadamer thinks that a condition for trust in tact is cultivated esthetic (in the broad sense of the word) and historical awareness. Tact does not work reflectively, but as a sensation-like immediacy, in individual cases capable of confident analyses and evaluations without demanding for criteria or grounds for itself. Tact as a function of esthetic and historical Bildung, says Gadamer, as a kind of ‘universal sense’, goes behind the empirical senses differentiated for their own functions and is active in all directions.557

For Gadamer, tact connected with hermeneutic experience or genuine and new understanding through the merger of horizons constitutes the condition for the possibility of the radical openness of the process of Bildung. In other words, tact is anchored with the dialogical encountering of the ‘other’ in the construction of Bildung. Thus, tact is essentially a dialogical phenomenon. We can then also

555 Ibid., 5-39, 278-289.
556 Ibid., 16-18.
557 Ibid., 16-18.
ask what tact means especially from the viewpoint of the construction of pedagogical interaction. What is tact in the pedagogical relationship?

### 8.3.2 Pedagogical tact

In his book entitled *Pädagogischer Takt* (1962), Jacob Muth provides a survey of the history of the concept of *pedagogical tact*.\(^{558}\) He locates its first articulation particularly in the educational discourse in the first pedagogical lectures of the young Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) in 1802. It appears that tact as a social conception was crystallized to Herbart from various sources. It was influenced by his experiences as a private tutor in Switzerland on the one hand, and then his musical experiences in particular, and by various written analyses of interpersonal relations that Herbart had quite obviously familiarized himself with.\(^{559}\) Tact is, after all, originally connected with the rhythm and pulse of music. The development of understanding their meaning from the mechanic beating of time into varied soft nuances took place in the compositions of the classic masters of the 18th century – something that Herbart also obviously observed when he took part in the social life of the family of von Steigers. ‘Tone’ (Ton) proposed by Schleiermacher in 1799 as a concept to describe the sensitivity and flexibility of human intercourse (Elastizität im Umgang) clearly heralded Herbart’s tact.\(^{560}\)

Herbart thinks that the critical question of an educator’s skill is how he manifests tact in his action. “Die grosse Frage … ob jemand ein guter oder schlecter Erzieher seyn werde, ist einzig diese: wie sich jener Tact bei ihm ausbilde?”\(^{561}\) Tact finds a place between theory and practice when a human being makes quick decisions and presents immediate judgments in his action, says Herbart. It is, above all, a situational specific form of action based on sensitive feeling (Gefuhl), and only remotely connected with ideas consciously derived from theory or beliefs. Herbart’s tact senses the unique nature of situations, and is “der unmittelbare Regent der Praxis.”\(^{562}\)

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558 When here discussing the history of tact it is mostly leaned on Muth’s (1962, 63-72) analysis later also referred to by van Manen (1993, 128-133) and also on some original sources.

559 Here Muth mentions the works of Cambe (1783) and Knicke (1787).

560 Also Kant seems to refer to this very same idea in his *Thoughts on Education* (1803) when discussing about discretion (Klugheit) and refinement (Civilisierung). See Kant 1992, 19.

561 Herbart in *Sämtliche Werke* (1887) according to Muth 1962, 68, 125.

After Herbart, references to pedagogical tact have been mostly made in the German discussion. 563 Meanwhile tact has remained almost fully unknown to Anglo-American research. William James, however, does refer to it quite emphatically at the beginning of his *Talks to Teachers* (1899), but only van Manen in the 1990’s has introduced it more systematically for English discussion. James thinks that psychological knowledge alone is not enough for a good teacher, as he needs a very special additional talent, the fine instinct and understanding to do the very thing that needs to be said and done at a particular moment. 564 For James, teaching is an art in which a resourceful teacher applies the results of science to practice in his or her own way. Instinctive perception of the situation is the most important thing in this art of teaching, says James. It is a kind of pedagogical ingenuity by means of which the teacher transforms the situation in which the teacher and pupil meet into a process of growth. 565 James uses these arguments to justify the autonomy of education in relation to psychology. The influence of continental European educational thought on James seems quiet obvious. At the beginning of his discussion, James also explicitly mentions Herbart and a little later the concepts of ‘tone’, ‘school tone’ and ‘tact’. 566

However, the concept of pedagogical tact was not developed systematically until Muth in *Pädagogischer Takt*. He emphasizes the binding and unplanned nature (Nichtplanbarkeit) of pedagogical tact as it is essentially connected with the educator’s unpredictable *feeling* (Gefuhl) that he only experiences in each individual situation.

Takt ist nicht dem planenden Willen des Lehrers unterworfen, und darum kann taktvolles Handeln nicht in einem planvollen erzieherischer Vorgehen aktualisiert werden, sondern immer nur in der unvorhersehbaren Situation, die den Erzieher in Anspruch nimmt. 567

Muth goes on by elaborating this notion especially from the didactic point of view. This means to him an attempt to perceive the meaning of tact by examining it in

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563 Muth mentions in this connection the works of e.g. Martin Buber, Theodor Ballauff, Tuiskon Ziller, Peter Petersen and Otto Friedrich Bollnow.
564 James 1913, 11.
565 It should be noted that James does not analyze this transformation of the encounter from the viewpoint of dialogicality, for instance. James’s idea of transformation in the encounter between teacher and pupil is later seen as an idea elaborated further by Mead and Dewey (see Chapter 3).
566 Ibid., 11, 41-42.
567 Muth 1962, 12, 71-72.
its functional contexts or in the concrete situations that manifest the above-mentioned characteristics associated with tact. According to Muth, tact manifests itself in education in general in many different ways. It is manifested in the engagement of speech, naturalness of action, avoidance of hurting the child, and keeping the distance necessary for a pedagogical relationship. In individual teaching situations, Muth says that tact is seen in situational confidence, dramatic skill and talent of improvisation. Muth specifically tries to show the opening of the realization of tact when the school ventures to follow free forms of action that were not planned beforehand.

Es ist eben die Regel, dass die Nichtplanbarkeit einer Form schulischen Handelns und damit die Möglichkeit der Aktualisierung pädagogischen Taktes in dem Masse stärker wird, in dem die betreffende Form von der absichtlichen Führung durch den Lehrer und allgemeinen Verbindlichkeiten didaktischer und metodischer Art freier wird, dafür aber auch in ihrem Wagnischarakter wächst.

Lack of advance planning means openness to what happens in a unique pedagogical situation. It is about risk taking in a way, allowing room for tact for this very reason. For Muth, this most profound essence of teachership obviously derived from Herbart, i.e. unselfish surrender to the child, the ability to love (Liebesfähigkeit) all people and especially learning to make quick assessments and decisions and acquiring situational confidence, does not follow any routine rules that can be learnt beforehand, although one can get prepared for them within certain limits. It is easy to note that Muth's thinking manifests not only Herbart's but also Gadamer's ideas. It is worth noting that he still does not examine the tact of the pedagogical relationship from the viewpoint of dialogue, for instance.

In The Tact of Teaching van Manen recapitulates and modifies the themes of Muth's Pädagogische Takt from a phenomenological viewpoint through a variety of practical examples. In this sense his working method in conceptualizing tact is similar to Muth's. Van Manen makes a distinction between general tactful ac-

568 Ibid., 26-62.
569 Ibid., 74-94.
570 Ibid., 74, 95-104.
571 Ibid., 103.
572 In this context Muth discusses in depth the debate on the topic between Tuiskon Ziller and the Herbartians (ibid., 107-119).
573 van Manen 1993.
tion as symmetric interaction of adults and pedagogical tact which he considers asymmetric, although he attributes the same characteristics to both of them. Van Manen characterizes the former as a considerate way to act rather than as reflective knowing. Although general tact often involves withdrawal and waiting, it is still about a human being exerting an influence on another one. A tactful person needs to be sensitive but at the same time strong, as tact may require straightforwardness, determination and an open heart. Tact is about sincerity and truthfulness; it is never deceitful or misleading. Van Manen describes that a tactful person is able to ‘read’ another person’s internal state, that is, other people’s thoughts and feelings from a variety of indirect signs (gestures, behavior, expression, body). Furthermore, tact is connected with an ability to interpret the psychological and social meanings of this internal state. A tactful person understands the requirements, limitations and balance of a situation, which is why he knows almost automatically how far to go in them and how distant to stay. According to van Manen, tact would eventually also seem to be associated with a certain moral intuitiveness, as a tactful person is capable of realizing how to act well in a given situation. Tact in this general sense is for van Manen about deeply dialogical respect of human subjectivity and dignity, openness and sensitivity to another person’s thoughts and feelings irrespective of the other person’s age, for instance.574

Van Manen considers the tact of the pedagogical relationship to be asymmetric in that the adult has no right to expect it from the child. Similarly to Muth, van Manen also emphasizes the responsibility connected with pedagogical tact, which means above all protecting the child and helping the child to grow. Pedagogical tact is a complicated phenomenon that is not based to any major extent on habits or problem solving. It is not only intellectual or bodily, not purely reflective consideration, nor spontaneous or arbitrary. Tactful pedagogical action means a kind of thoughtful alertness, says van Manen, in which the teacher is present, i.e. he does not try to reflectively draw away from a situation by, for instance, thinking about or experimenting with various alternatives or consequences to action. Van Manen interprets Herbart’s – and why not also James’s – idea of pedagogical tact between theory and practice to mean a conception through which the problematic separation of theory from practice can be surpassed. He does not conceive of tact so much as an ability to make quick decisions as a certain kind of mindfulness

574 Ibid., 125-128.
that enables considerate action.\textsuperscript{575} So when we, says van Manen, come to tactful action rather than say that it is ‘reflective’ we should say that tactful action is thoughtful in the sense of ‘mindful’. \textsuperscript{576} Ultimately, tact is also for van Manen at the core of the pedagogical relationship.

…the real life of teaching and of parenting happens in the thick life itself when one must know with a certain confidence just what to say or what to do (or what not to say or do) in situations with children. Therefore, pedagogical thoughtfulness and tact may be seen to constitute the essence and excellence of pedagogy.…. Pedagogy is structured like tact. ….The tact that adults are able to show with children is a function of the nature of pedagogy itself.\textsuperscript{577}

Similarly to Spiecker and Muth, van Manen would also appear to think that educatorship is at least partly based on the ethical responsibility to offer oneself constantly to be available to the child as a kind of instrument or mechanism. Thereby the educator is assumed to act in such way that he produces the results that he immediately feels (believes) the child to intend in his own action. It is not about conscious calculation, but a task that opens up to the educator as an immediate requirement and responsibility. This relation between child and parent/teacher is symbolized by ‘living with the child in loco parentis’.\textsuperscript{578} Van Manen means by this the normatively loaded interaction between adult and child which is permeated by the adult’s responsibility to take care of the child’s life and growth into a responsible person, “the human charge of protecting and teaching the young to live in this world and to take the responsibility for themselves, for others, and for the continuance and welfare of the world”.\textsuperscript{579} In this educational task ‘oriented towards the good’ van Manen demands priority of experience as it is entwined into the adult's pedagogical tact in the pedagogical moments of educational situations as a multifaced and complex mindfulness toward children.

As new aspects of tact, van Manen points out the orientation towards the ‘other’ connected with it and the \textit{touchingness} of tact.\textsuperscript{580} Tact is the practice of

\textsuperscript{575} Ibid., 128.
\textsuperscript{576} Ibid., 109.
\textsuperscript{577} Ibid., 130, 133.
\textsuperscript{578} Ibid., 5-7.
\textsuperscript{579} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{580} In fact, the word ‘tact’ is etymologically associated with touching. The Latin word \textit{tactus} from which tact is derived means a touch, while the verb \textit{tangere} means touching. Latin-based con-tact refers to intimate human relationship, intimacy and connectedness (see e.g. van Manen 1993, 126-127).
‘otherness’, states van Manen. This means overcoming egocentrism by realizing what and how other people are to ‘myself’. This double viewpoint of ‘myself’ means, above all, the experience of the other’s vulnerability. According to van Manen, “it is when I see that the other is a person who can be hurt, distressed, pained, suffering, anguished, weak, in grief or despair that I may be opened to the essential being of the other”. 581 Van Manen would appear to think here that even the requirement issued to the educator ‘to be for the child’ or to ‘orient oneself to the child’ is ultimately based on the ‘other’ realized in that double perspectiveness of ‘myself’. Due to these double perspectives, I also experience myself as ‘seen’ by the child, which in turn places the immediate ethical requirement that concerns me. Based on this basic starting-point, pedagogical tact is manifested in many ways, plenty of which are itemized by van Manen, largely recapitulating the characterizations that were previously presented by Muth. It means, for instance, an ability of holding back, openness to the child’s experience, preparation for subjectivity, delicate influence, situational confidence, and improvisatory ability. Pedagogical tact is further conveyed in speech, silence, eyes, gestures and the atmosphere.

The responsibility included in the tact of the pedagogical relationship referred to above as a kind of immediate ethical primate can be further analyzed through the concept of responsibility proposed by Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995). Levinas understands responsibility

…as responsibility for the Other, thus as responsibility for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me; or which precisely does matter to me, is met by me as face…The face orders and ordains me. Its signification is an order signified … this order is the very signifyingness of the face.582

For Levinas, the ‘face’ means everything that is expressive in the ‘other’, thus actually the whole meaningful body. Adapted to the educational situation, Levinas’ thinking means the experience of responsibility as ‘being for the child’. It falls on me immediately without me in any way consciously taking responsibility for him. Therefore I feel affinity with the child. It does not, however, derive from intentionality or knowledge of the other, but is based on the above unselfish sense of responsibility. In this way the pedagogical relationship can turn into a Buberian

581 Ibid., 140.
582 Levinas 1996, 95-98.
‘genuine dialogical encounter’, an exceptional experience of existential unity with the child. This encounter, however, is not pedagogical by nature.

The phenomenon of pedagogical tact reveals the many levels of the encounter between an adult and a child. An educative situation cannot be based on monologic unidirectionality, as it is shaped in tact, a dynamic manifestation brought forward by Bildung itself. The various concrete forms of pedagogical tact described above lead to the necessity of perceiving the educational situation as a comprehensive field of bodily phenomena. The educational situation gives rise to ‘space’ and ‘atmosphere’ that search for dialogue and are not derived from either party of the interaction before that situation.

### 8.4 Bodily space and pedagogical atmosphere

The relationship between ‘I’ and the other is one of the basic aspects in the ‘overall structure of being a human being’ as expressed by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).583 This interpersonal relationship is connected with another aspect that fundamentally shapes human life, namely experienced corporeality and the space and atmosphere associated with it. They are also always present in the constitution of pedagogical interaction. The word ‘body’ usually only awakens anatomical or physiological thoughts and mental images in us, because our culture has defined it purely from the viewpoint of the natural sciences in the most typical conceptions of man (dualism, naturalism). If we ask within this framework the question of the pedagogical meaning of the body, of the relation between learning and body, for instance, it is only meaningful from the viewpoint of the natural sciences, mostly brain physiology. The issue can be, however, approached phenomenologically from the experiential point of view, how this thing we call body is manifested to us in the experienced, non-reflective flow of life, how it is part of the life we experience. The meaning of such research lies in the fact that corporeality in an educational situation is present to each individual particularly as ex-

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583 In *Being and Time* (1926), Martin Heidegger has made a huge effort to analyze the whole of an individual’s perspective, the ‘overall structure of being a human being’. According to him, some highly general basic issues can be found in phenomenological analysis that are connected with all life situations and determine the way they are experienced. They are ways characteristic to all of us to get oriented towards the world, other people, cultural things, nature and always at the same time toward ourselves as well.
experienced corporeality and not so much as an anatomic physiological human body of the natural sciences.

**8.4.1 I am in double perspectives**

According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), the dualistic way of distinguishing between human awareness and body has led us away from the original experience of the body. He thinks that this experience is comprehensive and uniform: I am here doing something. This ‘I’ is then not consciousness, mind or thinking, but the bodily ‘I’ or ‘I-Body’. The functional life of a human being is essentially determined by the viewpoint of bodily experience. According to Merleau-Ponty, corporeality is the latent horizon of all our experiences. It forms the background, often quite unnoticeable, of all our experiences, on the basis of which we act in the world. Corporeality is also involved in all perception of the world, in the construction of pre-understanding, and thereby also in the formation of all higher understanding and knowledge. Human activity is intentional, i.e. we approach reality on the basis of our meanings, objectives and values. This way the acting body is also intentional. Understanding the action of an individual requires the understanding of the underlying meanings. This very point of view gives rise to the phenomenological question of the meaning of corporeality in an educational situation.

Merleau-Ponty discusses about the ability of the body to ‘understand’. It emerges through experience and habit and is manifested in our immediate bodily action. For instance, dance as ‘erotic understanding’ would not even succeed under conscious control. Similarly to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty aims to emphasize that human life and action is not only controlled by some isolated, higher consciousness and thinking.

The interpersonal world involves two perspectives. The first one is ‘I’ with my functional orientation toward the world, while the other one is the same in reverse, that is, another person, another ‘I’ in front of me as a bodily actor oriented toward the world. I am ‘seeing and seen’ at the same time as expressed by Merleau-Ponty. This simultaneous existence of two viewpoints is present in all our relations to others, thus also in an educational situation. From the teacher’s
perspective, a pupil is something other than the pupil feels he is, and vice versa. Awareness of this difference of perspectives can only be lost in extreme monologue. In what way do other people exist to me, and in what way do I exist to them? Through this question, corporeality enters the field of expressions and meanings between human beings and of their understanding.

Max Scheler (1874-1928) emphasizes this hermeneutic aspect of corporeality. He thinks that I do not see the pupil sitting in front of me as a physical body, but immediately as a whole of bodily expressions, meaningful movements, positions, expressions, gestures, speech. These expressions with different varieties and nuances carry social meanings which can only be understood in the field of meanings of a cultural community. The expressive body of ‘I’ and the ‘other’ thus forms the basis for all ‘I – the other’ relationships. If the relationship between ‘I’ and the other is only understood as some kind of a ‘mental’ relationship – such as mutual speech, verbal meanings and their understanding – we drift easily to the domain of ‘what takes place in the head’. We thus lose the opportunity to examine the connections between pedagogical tact, atmosphere and corporeality, for instance.

The various descriptions presented earlier of the ways in which pedagogical tact is conveyed focus on the significance of corporeality in an educational situation. For instance, a look as a carrier of tact cannot be interpreted technically as establishment of eye contact, but it must be considered as a relationship between looks between two corporeal human beings. It is about a meaning relationship experienced between a teacher and pupil, which meanings the look acquires in that very situation between those two people.

8.4.2 Space and atmosphere

In the ‘structure of human existence’ described by Heidegger in Being and Time, a special place is occupied by the experienced space and the state (Befindlichkeit) or mood (Stimmung) connected with it. The experiential space is not the same thing as the physical, objectively understood space as a place where we are located as physical bodies. The experiential space in each and everyone’s personal

\[\text{Scheler 1973, 237-238.}\]
\[\text{van Manen 1990, 146.}\]
meaning horizon only arises when we enter it in a bodily form. Thus the basis of experiencing space is in each person's corporeality, in the bodily mood. The body is a point where the spatial perspective as well as its atmosphere opens up. Herman Schmitz expresses this in an exciting way by saying that space flows along with us. Space always means something to us, we experience it as human meanings. According to Heidegger and phenomenologists in general, it is not a field of mental phenomena as some kind of internal feelings of an individual. We do not create a space and its atmosphere in our own minds, as it emerges inevitably in our bodily connection with the world, above all with other people, as a phenomenon between people. The atmosphere thus arises in connection with a situation; it is spirited above all by the bodily human beings in it.

The people in a space have a crucial significance for the emergence and change of the atmosphere. An educational space is always a human space. So it is not just a matter of the furnishings, size or lighting of the classroom, but above all a matter of the social mood in that space. Corporeality and experience of space entwined with other people, the atmosphere, mood, are non-intellectual aspects of the pedagogical relationship. That is why their description and conceptual grasp is highly difficult. And it is similarly difficult to try to guide or manipulate them consciously in a practical educational situation. And yet their significance from the viewpoint of growing can be inestimable.

In his book entitled *Die Pädagogische Atmosphäre* (1964), Otto Friedrich Bollnow discusses the space within which a concrete and active pedagogical relationship, for instance, can develop. Bollnow thinks that the education of a child presupposes certain affective states in both the adult and child. Honesty, impartiality, an ability to distinguish one’s own life from the child’s life, self-control and industry are examples of virtues whose realization in the educator himself before the actual pedagogical relationship helps him to get oriented toward the child. On the other hand, necessary preconditions of a child’s growth include his confidence with the teacher, sense of responsibility, love and respect. According to Bollnow, they enable not only taking care of the child but also the child’s readiness to be taken care of. Bollnow puts a special emphasis, however, on the double-sidedness that is essential for a pedagogical relationship. In an educational situation this is

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589 Schmitz 1967,111.
590 For the significance of the non-intellectual aspects of education, see Dahlin 2001.
591 Bollnow 1964, see also Bollnow 1989.
constituted by the intertwinement and inseparability of the adult’s affective attitude and, correspondingly, the child’s emotional disposition. Bollnow thus thinks that they are not separate and separable from each other, but different aspects of the same affective medium, comprising both the caring adult and the child, which is why they can only be separated in a relative sense. So, by the concept of pedagogical atmosphere Bollnow means the total *joint* harmony or disharmony between the child and the pedagogue that is formed *between* them in an educational situation. The atmosphere of the educational situation – experienced to be, for instance, confident, safe, cheerful, loving, respectful, heavy, troubled or oppressive – is not derived from either party to the interaction as a mental feeling, but is constituted in the encounter by both ‘here and now’. These moods that arise between people help to provide for the total experience of the space.

According to Bollnow, the generally supportive mood experienced by a child gives rise to *unique sentient feelings* in him in relation to the people which whom he is involved in a pedagogical relationship. Both the child and the adult are supported by this general mood, and its fundamental nature has a strong influence on both of them. They both in turn actively create more of this encompassing atmosphere. A positive and healthy growth presupposes that the child shall master cer-

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592 According to Bollnow, Pestalozzi already understood in his book entitled “How Gertrud teaches her children” this relationship in its full sense. Pestalozzi thinks that the basis of a child’s development is created in his/her relationship to his/her mother. A mental state or natural bond based on love and confidence, thankfulness and obedience prevails between child and mother. According to Bollnow, Pestalozzi gives precedence to the child’s viewpoint, describing it in terms of love, confidence, thankfulness and obedience. Bollnow wants, however, to expand on this, as from the child’s point of view it is more than an affective attitude toward an adult, most often the mother. Bollnow thinks that the child takes an approving attitude not only to the other person but to the whole world. This includes the feeling of safety and security in an orderly and trusted world, a certain joyfulness and carelessness toward the burdens of life, a mood of morning-freshness in the full day-to-day expectancy and willingness to meet the future. On the other hand, Bollnow thinks that other things than just these nice feelings and attitudes also belong to a child’s life. They include fear and doubt, and an endless experience of sorrow. These feelings have a stronger influence on a child than on an adult. Referring to existential philosophy, Bollnow maintains that they have a great deal of significance in that they tear us away from the everyday matters of course thus leading to a more authentic existence. This applies to adults and children alike. This leads, however, to questions that have not been explored before, as Bollnow thinks that we cannot assume that the developmental forms of an adult’s and child’s existential experiences are similar to each other. The educator needs to be aware of this dark side of the child’s world.Facing these threats, it is the adult’s task to give consolation and be available to the child. Bollnow does not, however, consider these experiences to be an actual part of the educational process, which is why he does not discuss them in any more detail. Kennedy (1998), for instance, would appear to think in quite an opposite way by introducing this world of the child as an essential argument in his requirements for a new kind of dialogue between adult and child.
tain sentient feelings in relation to corresponding feelings in the adult. According to Bollo
now, these feelings include the love and confidence shown by the adult to children. They lead to a merger of the relationship, which is why it is difficult to make a distinction between the adult's and the child's viewpoints. Yet from the adult's point of view, these feelings have a different meaning. From the adult's viewpoint, the nature of the pedagogical relationship involves 'reflective realization of what is good', sensing the meaning of humanness, hope for the child's growth and finally, an endless sense of patience to know how to keep down the adult's expectations and other requirements.  

Bollnow is astonished at why these problems that are essential from the viewpoint of children's education have not really been studied and developed after Herman Nohl. The cause is likely to be connected with the difficulty of getting a sufficiently intelligible account of the educator's pedagogical acts in educational situations. To understand the educational process, one therefore tends to drift easily into analogies with production methodology and techniques or with the organic idea of 'allowing growth'. Bollnow thinks we thereby lose what is essential in education, as we fail to achieve a pedagogical atmosphere. We can add to this that those various comparisons – James, for instance, refers to education as art – do not reach the principles of responsibility and search of reciprocity that are essentially connected with the educational situation.

There is no such thing as monological tact, only tactlessness, yet there is a monological pedagogical atmosphere. It is produced by the educator's unidirectional goal-oriented intervention to change the other one, expressions of power, withdrawal into an official role, and haste, among other things. Meanwhile in a pedagogical relationship that aspires for dialogue the atmosphere is essentially based on openness, the desire to understand the other person, kindness, respect for the other person's dissimilarity, confidence and making room for the other and personal presence. The educator has a primary responsibility to construct the atmosphere, not only between the pupils and him but also between the pupils themselves.

The atmosphere is largely constituted in a bodily manner, through expressions of corporeal meanings. In a pedagogical relationship, the looks between two people, for instance, can involve the assumption of power, they can close or make silent, or inquire, challenge discussion, laugh, respect, appreciate. In the same

593 Bollnow 1989.
way bodily locations in a space provide for a meaningful atmosphere. The most easily noticed of them is probably the teacher’s position in front of the others, or his way to move in the classroom.

An essential question in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is related to the pre-intellectual conditions of perceiving the world (Erschlossenheit). He places the mood arising in a space as the foremost of them. The affects generated in a space function as forms of the world opening up with understanding and speech. So they do not just constitute an obscure (or obscuring) background space for understanding, but are by themselves an essential part of the opening of the new. The world and self open up in accordance with their state of mind (Befindlichkeit), says Heidegger.594 In a state of fear, something in the world opens up as threatening, in haste as disturbing, in love as lovable. For us to be able in the first place to meet something certain in the world, it must according to Heidegger already have taken shape, it must have opened up somehow in advance. So, for a thing that is encountered to get a meaning, to be understood and interpreted as something, it must be preceded by some kind of a pre-opening. According to Heidegger, this kind of opening is effected by affective relations with the world.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) talks in a somewhat similar sense about the interests of life, value goals and feelings.595 Affects are part of functional orientation in the world. Action is always somehow tuned to observe the environment, it already has interests, a kind of orientation, and directed by those interests new things can open up to ‘I’. The preconditions for the possibility of the opening up of the world are constituted in being in the world itself, in the relations between ‘I’ and the world. Only the mood of love can open up the world and self in a certain way. Love presupposes both hubs of the relationship, the loving person and the lovability of the world. The “ability” for love can only emerge in a world where lovability can be encountered.

Heidegger’s conception of ‘the opening up of the world’ (Erschlossenheit) means learning in its full scope. The atmosphere shall not be only thought of as an ‘obscure background’ for learning, but as something that essentially guides and constitutes understanding. Heidegger thinks that understanding and the atmosphere are solidly intertwined. What and how it is understood has been intertwined into the atmosphere of learning. This holistic pattern of thought typical of phe-

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594 Heidegger 1964, 172-182.
595 Husserl 1985, 43-44.
nomenologists and hermeneutists does not approve of the examination of cognitive structures in separation from non-cognitive structures (which are often turned down referring to them as ‘feelings’ or a ‘physical state’).

8.5 Conclusion

Above the pedagogical relationship is discussed as a field of phenomena searching for dialogue. Tact and atmosphere were raised here as essential phenomena intertwined with each other. They are related to phenomenological hermeneutic understanding of the educational situation. This is about unpredictable and unique complicated phenomena of the pedagogical relationship beyond the reach of science, through which we think the educational situation in its “immediately pervasive quality” – as Dewey suggests – can be better understood. They are realized in the educator’s ability to ‘read’ the educational situation, in the ability based on the educator’s experience to act educatively depending on the meaning perspectives arising in each unique situation and the children involved in it. This in turn presupposes a dialogical attitude towards the child, a desire to encounter him as the ‘other’, and it does not work only on the basis of goals and plans constructed in advance. In tact and atmosphere, subjective encounters objective transformed by the teacher.

The classroom community of philosophical inquiry offers an especially good opportunity for tactful action and the emergence of a dialogue searching atmosphere. This is firstly due to philosophical study and teaching as such meaning also from the teacher’s viewpoint a genuine wondering orientation to whatever is at hand. A philosophical teacher is not conveying certain, in advance known facts, but is literally ‘looking for wisdom’, questioning together with his pupils. This readiness for uncertainty and aporia essentially connected with philosophizing encourages him to encounter the child educatively, although it alone is not enough.

In the community of inquiry, a genuinely philosophical and above all genuinely educative teacher is capable of living through the unique educational situations that he faces in contact with the child. Along with double perspectives, intuitive realization of the child’s viewpoint means an immediately experienced responsibility. The vulnerable, small child touches the teacher as the ‘other’, i.e. the child within the teacher as demanding, obliging and ordering him to see and hear the child. At its deepest the touchingness of this state can mean an existential experience of non pedagogical unity with the child, in the pedagogical sense a quest for dialogue as tactful action as an ability to live in it in the forms of a vari-
ety of concrete activities implying restrictions on one’s own 'selfish' perspective as representing only the reproduction of the Same. The essential content of the pedagogical sagacity of the teacher in the community of inquiry means this pedagogical sensitivity of action enabling the genuine growth still in connection with the tradition.
9 Discussion

This study discusses the intellectual sources of P4C. For this purpose the study identifies and analyzes the basic philosophical and pedagogical ideas of P4C linked to classic American pragmatism. Mainly from this perspective, the study pursues to open up new perspectives, thematic and areas of discussion based on some of the traditions of continental philosophy and pedagogical thought. In what follows I will briefly discuss the main contributions of this study and at the end make some critical remarks largely based on these observations for further reflection.

Matthew Lipman has constructed P4C based on the thinking of the best-known advocates of early American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. Especially the last two of them are the direct pivotal figures behind P4C. This is largely due to Lipman’s own academic history which started at the University of Columbia, New York, in the early 1950’s just a few years after Dewey’s death. Thus, his thinking was, naturally, from the very beginning strongly influenced by the intellectual atmosphere and terrain of classic pragmatism. It is also to be noted that Lipman acquainted himself with the thinking of both Dewey and Mead at an early phase and already before his actual academic career in the 1940’s. Yet his interest in education did not mature until two decades later mostly as a result of various problems in American universities and school education. It was natural that Lipman went out to find a solution to problems that he felt so strongly about in the tradition of pragmatism that he was familiar with, although it also included topical psychological elements.

P4C is a pedagogical practice searching for the growth of intelligence by implementing philosophical inquiry in education. This means the strengthening of children’s multidimensional thinking by providing educational circumstances that will make it possible. The foundations of this goal are solidly tied to the philosophical basis of pragmatism, especially to the philosophy of reflective experience derived from Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics and to social thinking in the ideal of creative democracy that is essentially connected to it. In practice, this means conception of the educative situation in terms of inquiry heuristics of problem solving arising from the human being’s naturalistic existence in the world. Thus human growth is determined in the continuum of the experience of the educatee in terms of an enrichment and expansion of possibilities for intellectual activity through his own active involvement – yet brought about through the educator’s influence. This main principle of pragmatist pedagogical thought is logically
based on the maxim of meaning, originally elaborated by Peirce. In their labora-
tory school in Chicago, Dewey and Mead tried to pedagogize this fundamental
idea of education as early as the late 19th century, although their real influence on
American school conditions remained quite marginal. Many ideas of so-called
progressive education also date back to those times, although they have had major
problems in generating the original ideas of Dewey, for instance.

In the late 20th century Lipman pursues to reconstruct a pedagogical practice
based on pragmatism through a critique similar to that by Dewey earlier aimed
against the working methods of the public school institution. In the light of its
own tradition, P4C could be characterized as a hypothesis of how the problems
involving learning, active participation by the pupils, and social exclusion could
be solved in today’s school. Lipman tries to offer a philosophically as well as
pedagogically valid practice to make an experiment and to study the conse-
quences caused by its implementation. The essential idea is to reconstruct phi-
losophy in such a form that it could be done by children by the help of their
teachers. This pedagogical enterprise is guided by the idea of transforming the
classroom into a classroom community of inquiry that cultivates reasonableness
and judgment and in which the child is encouraged to think for himself. By the
notion of the classroom community of inquiry, Lipman refers collectively to the
central philosophical ideas of pragmatism and to their pedagogical corollaries.
The sociogenetical perspective of Mead and Lev Vygotsky is parallel to this line
of thinking. This study has explicated this theoretical basis of P4C and its intellec-
tual and historical ties to continental thought, especially to the philosophy of Kant
and Hegel. On the other hand, I have argued that in its core objectives of judg-
ment and reasonableness, P4C can be interpreted as searching for Aristotle’s lead-
ing intellectual virtue, phronesis.

In its demand for independent thinking, P4C would appear, at the first glance,
to be directly linked to the continental thought of the Enlightenment, its basic
principle of rationality aiming at the self-determined and autonomous individual.
Considering this issue from the viewpoint of pragmatism and especially of Aris-
totle’s phronesis, I think that P4C cannot be defined in such a straightforward way.
Rationality in the sense of pure formal and logical systematics is based on the
geometry of ancient Greece and the status given to it by Plato as a perfect and
universal form in all areas of human knowledge (nature, society, man). According
to it, an ideal theory in them is more essential than real practice that reflects the
theory in an imperfect manner. I believe that the determination of philosophy in
modernity was largely based on this kind of an ideal. Although Aristotle’s phi-
losophy was largely based on Plato, he does not call for certainty and necessity in such areas of knowledge where they do not exist in reality (politics, rhetoric and ethics in particular), and which are not universal and abstract sciences. Stephen Toulmin thinks that it is exactly in modernity that these ideas of rationality differ from each other. Toulmin argues that the essential aspirations in Plato’s philosophy, ‘purified from aporia’, experienced a new rise in the ideal of the modern cosmopolis, in its abstract, timeless, universal and context-free way of thinking that abandoned the Aristotelian setup of Renaissance humanism. Aristotle’s frônesis lost its intellectual legitimacy in a situation where it was not thought to have any meaning in the solution of political religious disputes. Thus, there was a social need for a universal basis that was independent of political, financial and religious dogmas. Everyone can be certain of a basis that remains beyond all doubt, and there is no need to dispute over it. For Toulmin, the rationality of modernity is determined as something formal, universal, necessary and ideal, meanwhile reasonableness refers to something individual, and relative in relation to circumstances, and to something particular, practical, and to Aristotelian practical wisdom, frônesis. When no initial definition of rationality in terms of logical or formal systematics is made, it is possible, according to Toulmin, to accept its relativity without drifting to nihilism and anarchy. Then, rational discourse presupposes commonly shared absolute presumptions arising from concrete life practices, which Charles Taylor, on the other hand, refers to as ‘inevitable fields of vision’. Thus, rationality in terms of reasonableness is about analysis of the real use of reason within these presumptions in different historical contexts, and not just about analysis of ideal ‘correct’ reasoning.

In terms of logical systematics, modern rationality is also conveyed to education in the ideal of self-determined and autonomous subjectivity. In this whole, it is understandable that the philosophy of modern rationality has excluded children’s education. As has been said before, P4C leans in this sense on Aristotle’s phrônêsis, whereby philosophy is contextualized and reduced to ‘moderation’, to an ability to solve problems kata ton orthon logon. I think this ‘humanization of modernity’ taking place within the Aristotelian idea of the inevitable fields of vision arising in the practices of life, combined to the evolution of the adult-child concept, forms an essential condition of P4C.

This Aristotelian root as well as commitment to the philosophical and pedagogical thought of early pragmatism place P4C in a challenging position in the light of modern theory of pedagogy. From the viewpoint of Dewey and Mead, the encouragement of the child for independent thinking is to be understood in this
context as the growing person’s potential ability to solve the problems that he experiences in his activity, intelligently without the help of the educator any more. In this way P4C is fundamentally connected with the core question in modern education of what actually takes place in pedagogical interaction so that the self-determining, reasonable subjectivity can be produced by it. What is education that altruistically aims at vanishing the pedagogical relationship, yet at the same time keeping subjectivity as somewhat undetermined? In my study I have discussed this problematics by reflecting the conditions of ‘new’ conditioned by the tradition. Because the child is not transparent, his growth is always within certain limits open and uncertain in nature just due to the educator’s action in each unique educational situation. Modern education is criticized for placing the idea of rational subjectivity before education. I think, however, that growth cannot based on the idea of radically open subjectivity, as education necessarily realizes and presupposes some kind of a pre-understanding of humanity. The personal nature of new understanding means that in principle, no one else can have a similar interpretation related to an object of knowing. Personal understanding is, however, always bound to an objective within which it can only come into being. Anything new can only be new in relation to tradition. Based on its historical roots, I am inclined to claim that by dramatizing philosophy as a reflective practice P4C aspires to create pedagogical circumstances that generate ‘novelty in tradition’. This Bildung-theoretical interpretation of Dewey’s and Mead’s educational thought is essentially about the realization of this Socratic midwifery as to educative experiences in children. The condition for the possibility of the ‘new’ thus formed is that the educator encounters the child as an ‘other’, as a unique subject constructing his own self, still maintaining his ‘traditional authority’ and responsibility. In my study I have outlined this ‘educative space’ with the help of the concepts of pedagogical tact and atmosphere.

To my knowledge, Lipman does not question this theoretical discussion referred above despite its immense importance for his project. He does not explicitly develop the pedagogical theory in the sense of reflecting the nature of pedagogical interaction. This leads to the fact that while continuously referring to P4C as ‘a new paradigm of education’, Lipman’s theoretical basis for this statement remains quite unclear. Generally, the reference in these cases is to the discourse started in the late 20th century, arguing on the basic structure and nature of peda-
gological interaction either as Habermasian communicative/intersubjective activity, or as asymmetric influence – or a new category of pedagogical activity is searched, surpassing both of these. In his own claims on the shift of paradigm from teaching to thinking, Lipman would appear rather to refer to various changes in the practice of education without considering the underlying theoretical historical thematic linked as such to the phenomenon of education. So, Lipman is not really asking how education should be conceptually understood in, for instance, a situation where it from the very beginning cannot be reduced to teleological reproduction. What does “following the argument where it leads” ultimately mean in a pedagogical situation? Instead, this thematic has recently been discussed e.g. by David Kennedy, Walter Kohan and Pavel Lushyn.

As starting from the critique levelled at Garreth Matthews – a well-known American representative of children’s philosophy – Kennedy tries to shake the ‘colonization of childhood’ by structuring the relationship between adult and child as real mutuality in empathy and dialogicality. In his books *Philosophy and the Young Child* (1980) and *The Philosophy of Childhood* (1994) Matthews defends children’s ability for rational thought and philosophizing and tries to question ‘standard development theory’ which he sees as his main opponent. According to Matthews, philosophizing is natural for man similarly to, for instance, playing music. Children can also do it, even better than adults who have internalized the “requirement for knowing”. In fact, the child is for Matthews the archetype of a philosopher, as philosophizing means the ability specifically typical of the child to ‘detach’ and ask, the ability to enjoy the confusion that seems naive to the adult who has lost his philosophical sensitivity. Philosophy can even be defined in terms of the adult’s attempt to process confusing questions dating back to childhood. The concealment of the fact that a child is philosophical is due, according to Matthews, to philosophy having disappeared from the world of the adults, resulting at least partly from the priorization of ‘useful’ questions at the expense of difficult and unpleasant questions as planted by the educational system. Matthews is especially critical of the cognitivist conception of the child based on the child’s gradual development and maturation. This biological-psychological ‘standard development theory’, of which Piaget’s theory of cognitive development and Kohlberg’s theory of moral development are two good examples, underestimates systematically children’s capacity for thought and reduces development to a

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597 Kennedy 1995; Kennedy 2006a,b.
phase-by-phase overcoming of intellectual deficiencies. According to Matthews, this way of thinking has caused children and childhood to take a distance from adults and among adults themselves. Matthews sees a problem in these development theories in their inability to problematize and study their own assumptions. They should ask: What is it like to be a child? What exactly is the difference between children and adults as human beings? To what extent is ‘childhood’ a cultural and historical construction? Which hidden assumptions are contained in scientific theories of children? Matthews thinks that by answering these questions we can dispel false assumptions and distorting paradigms. We then also realize that children do know how to philosophize, that they are often ever more alert morally than we adults are, that they do know how to make real art, that they understand mysteries, such as death, within the framework of their experience quite as well as adults do, and that they are often capable of acting as ‘rational agents’ much earlier than we have assumed.598

In his criticism of the ‘phase theories’, Matthews himself, maintains Kennedy, also accepts the true origin of the entire problem, namely a certain narrowly defined notion of rationality. Kennedy agrees with Matthews on, for instance, the stranglehold of the Piagetian theory of development in education, but he approaches the problem from a different perspective. The implicit consequence of Matthew’s thinking is that children appear as small adults in it instead of them being understood as representing a different, positive form of knowing. The developmental psychologists make a mistake in comparing the manner of children’s knowing to that of adults, thereupon defining them as not-yet-adults instead of seeing something in the children themselves. According to Kennedy, standard development theory represents this privileged western, adultlike and even masculine epistemic orientation based on a certain kind of subject-object relationship. Kennedy thinks, however, that the unique orientation of every human being, together with all the factors that influence it (such as historical, cultural, genetic determinants – sex, wealth, age, membership of a cultural or racial majority or minority, etc.), places him in a different epistemic space. It involves both a common, shared space and knowledge that is not attainable by other spaces. Women, children, the poor and the coloured are examples of ‘voices’ that the ‘narrow reason’ of the dominating modern epistemology has marginalized and silenced.599

598Mathews 1994a,13, 30-80; Mathews 1980,37-55; see also Matthews 1994b.
According to Kennedy, the child should be seen “as subject – as active, competent protagonist in her own learning and developmental process.”600 By rehabilitating the child as a unique form of being and knowing, Kennedy offers philosophy a crucial role due to its basic dialogical nature.

Philosophy is the discipline which emerges most directly from the fundamental human sense of wonder, and which turns on questioning both reality and our knowledge of that reality. As the practice of questioning knowledge – both one’s own and others – it promises to be the epistemic and curricular wedge which opens the experience of childhood to reflection, both on the part of children and of adults.601

Kennedy thinks that philosophy as a collaborative dialogue offers the adult an ideal opportunity “to make good on the child’s epistemic privilege, to recognize a speech other than their own, to face a culture which represents “our other selves”, to live the other side.”602 Understanding the historical nature of the child-adult relationship makes, however, Kennedy perceive the slowness, instability and unpredictability connected with its transformation. However, the realm of education might offer, he says, the only real control over it.603

Kennedy’s views are shared by Kohan, who writes:

…as the children develop their own philosophies of childhood, the adult hegemony of the field of philosophy is eroded. Children themselves will build their own philosophies, in their own manner. We will not correct the exclusion of children’s philosophical voices by showing that they can think like adults; on the contrary that would be yet another way of silencing them. It would be more appropriate to prepare ourselves to listen to a different voice – to a different form of reason, a different theory of knowledge, a different ethics and a different politics – to a voice which has been historically silenced, due to the simple fact that it emanates from a people stigmatized through being forced into a “non-adult” social space.604

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600 Ibid.
601 Ibid.
602 Ibid.
603 Ibid.
604 Kohan 1999. See also Kohan 2002.
Lushyn on the other hand elaborates the ‘ecological system’ of the pedagogical space and philosophy as a ‘buffer discipline’ at school. As Lushyn thinks that the educational system, under the pressure of constant social reconstruction, is not capable of producing its essential ideal of a new and active generation, it presupposes two kinds of school subjects: the traditional ones, and the so-called buffer disciplines. The function of the latter ones is to structure the transitional state of school and non-school, to analyze the problems met by teachers, pupils and parents at school, and to construct new possibilities to secure personal, professional and social development. The buffer disciplines do not belong to anyone, not the pupils or their parents nor psychologists or teachers. They provide a ‘transitional zone’ towards the “socially useful results of collaborative self-organization”. According to Lushyn, in this zone both the teacher (‘teaching facilitator’) and the pupil can develop their own potentials, the teacher the educational one and the pupil the personal one. In this zone they meet, with both of them trying to move to their individual zones of proximal development. But as it does not fully belong only to the child himself, the teacher also has access to it and the other way round. Development (growth) takes place in the contact surfaces of these zones, in no man’s land where they both feel drawn to each other, offering an opportunity for the development of authentic, mutually useful cooperation. The buffer disciplines are free from determination and manipulation as well as from teaching in the classic sense of the word. Lushyn thinks that learning thus turns into joint construction of a collaborative meaning in a situation of personal and social transition and conflict.

According to Lushyn, philosophy could act as such a buffer discipline. In a community of inquiry, the teacher is a ‘role model’, an ‘ecofacilitator’ who combines integrative problem solving skills, critical skills and caring skills. The important thing is not so much problem solving or the connected reinforcement of team spirit, but promotion of the integrity of the self-organization in a constant reconstruction of personal and social meaning. Lushyn thinks that “this constructive functioning of education places the teacher and the child in one and the same learning dimension and makes of them co-workers – not because of their space-time unity but because of their mutually constructive disposition.” According to Lushyn, there are no authorities in the buffer zone, as it is based on the possibility  

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606 Lushyn 2002.
to construct a richer and fuller life in cooperation as well as to develop new forms of facilitation and helping. “As a result of the autopoesis of the community of inquiry”, Lushyn states, “both parties help one another – not just preserving the whole pedagogical matrix, but in so doing triggering the possibility both of growing and of staying human.” 607 The teacher of a community of inquiry is not to Lushyn, however, a similar member as the pupil is, as “she must assume a meta-position mediated by her teaching or scholarly status as a person with a certain professional experience.” This paradigm of facilitation is ecological in nature, and as such its primary rhetorical form, says Lushyn, is not a proposition, diagnosis or task, but a question.

In their reflection David Kennedy and Walter Kohan as well as Pavel Lushyn clearly touch on the core thematic of continental pedagogical thought, yet without asking the Bildung theoretical questions connected with it. The main problem in their thinking lies in the fact that they do not, similarly to Lipman, conceptualize the structure of pedagogical interaction as a unique complex category of action with its own laws. Instead, they merge it either into the idea of causal, asymmetric construction of the self or as communicative action between mutually competent actors. Both Kennedy and Kohan argue for the necessary understanding of the child-adult concept in relation to one another, but then they seems to demand in case of education that the adult should leap out from this relationship and leave childhood as its own inviolate and dedicated form of life. Thus they apparently exchange the causal model for the equally simplifying, symmetric communicative model of action.

When a claim is made for a philosophy made by children themselves that the adult should only listen to, an artificial antinomy is created between the adult and child; the child is isolated from the adult into a category of its own, assuming that the child and adult are to one another separate forms of being similarly to, for instance, the different sexes or human races. At this point one cannot help drifting away from the idea of the relationship that Kennedy himself in particular has pointed out. It is expressly about something that is realized in between the child and adult. The ontology of man and woman or black and white human being does not involve a similar conditional relationship as the ontology of adult and child does. Every adult has sometimes been – and in the existential sense is all the time – a child (child within) which, of course, does not apply to the relationship be-

607 Ibid.
tween man and woman or a white and black person. From the educational viewpoint, the relationship between child and adult is a pedagogical, i.e. unique moral relationship *sui generis* that cannot be traced back to the relationships between the sexes or people of different races, for instance. It is unique because it is constituted through tradition and by a continuous effort to suspend itself. So, without this relationship there cannot be education.

As philosophy is, for Kohan, about divulsion from the familiar and safe, about critical questioning and creative reconstruction, it cannot submit to the leading strings of traditional institutional education. Philosophy at school, says Kohan, can easily become the passive hobbyhorse of the prevailing status quo and the existing political system. In this argumentation Kohan regards, however, identical the fundamental starting-points of ancient *paideia* and the core goals of modern education. This is especially evident when demanding for a non-teleological, non-socializing encounter between philosophy and the child, for an opportunity for something ‘genuinely new and different’ by ignoring the tradition. If children, however, are left by themselves as Kohan seems to be suggesting, without educator’s active influence – which is necessarily conditioned by tradition – I think we end up just in prevailing status quo, the Same warned by Kohan. The fundamental condition of the self is constituted by an objective (‘me’) or commonly shared world of meanings, as only through it the subject can become conscious of himself, being able to master and control things intelligently. Reducing childhood into an autonomous life form of its own remains a void and artificial attempt to break the child-adult relationship. One of the main contributions of my study can be seen in pointing out the problematic nature of this very relationship in education and the various lines of interpreting it, and also in considering its constitution not only as conscious pedagogical acts by the educator but also as an intuitive non-reflective space filled by a pedagogical atmosphere and tact.

Lushyn and Kennedy on the other hand, confusingly suggest that the basic problem of education could be reduced into the level of different disciplines. The autonomous subjectivity in education can be achieved, they argue, in the ‘transitional zone’ opened up in ‘buffer disciplines’ – such as philosophy. This is linked to the idea of the transformative character of a dialectics of power in the community of inquiry. The power relations of the teacher and pupil are equal; “both parties in the relationship – the teacher and the student – must sincerely accept the alternative models which each one carries, and consider it as equal to his or her
own.”608 It remains, however, quite unclear what this ultimately means in finding that “if both the teacher and the pupil participate in creative manipulation in a context of equality, the external manipulation turns into a profound discourse on the level of the dispositions and values of fundamental meanings”. This argumentation seems to maintain the initial subject-philosophical assumption where the interaction in ‘buffer zone’ between the teacher and pupil is not something taking place in the space between the educator and educatee, as it is about intentional giving of meanings by subjects separate from each other based on variations in the use and control of power and its equal use. In this argumentation pedagogical action is perceived in simple terms: the teacher’s power is manifested either in teleological manipulation conscious of goals and tools, or in diverse or ambiguous control derived from systems theory. Even more significantly, in this idea of the ecological system aspiring for a balance, responsibility, one of the most essential idea for pedagogical action is lost and thereby the pedagogical core of the classroom community of inquiry is broken.

At the end, going back to Matthew Lipman, I want to point out one more observation connected with the genre of philosophical story and with its interpretation. One of its explicit starting points is the idea of the problems involving the so-called traditional school texts. Narrated in the third person, Lipman thinks that they imply and convey a questionable idea of, for instance, knowing and the relation between self and the world in general. Lipman thinks that the third person that acts as the voice in the text of traditional textbooks is the “all-seeing, all-knowing and perfectly rational Other.”609 This objective and impersonal Apollonian voice represents the absolute lookout point, God’s eye view, where everything is in place; where everything is as it should be, always and undisputably. Lipman thinks that texts like these involve a faulty epistemological assumption of text being able to represent the world as such. Furthermore, as it is assumed that children need to learn truths of the world at school, these assumptions together lead to a situation in which the most reliable way to act is to convey things in expository texts such as those mentioned. From the viewpoint of this legitimized mode of speech, the stories manifest themselves as a less valuable form of entertainment.610

608 Lushyn & Kennedy 2003.
609 Ibid., 212.
610 Ibid., 212-215.
Although I agree with much of Lipman’s criticism of textbooks, I think that his idea of their relation to understanding is quite problematic. Namely, Lipman claims that specifically the non-expository texts provide a gateway to true understanding. In this context he also refers briefly to Gadamer and the hermeneutic circle, but does not explicate his own children stories from the perspectives opened up by them. So far as I can see, a text as such can be understood in the hermeneutic sense as an ‘other’ posed against me, and also remaining such after the dialogical encounter. In this sense it seems to me that the one who is speaking in the text does not have such an importance. Lipman does not pose the question about the relationship between a text and the interpreter hermeneutically even though most of his philosophical stories are built from the “I” perspective.

He associates rationality with the third person and creativity with the first person. Here Lipman touches upon one of the essential conditions for the possibility of the process of Bildung in hermeneutic philosophy, namely the potencia in language for a different interpretation that surpasses tradition. Lipman could thus directly refer to a hermeneutic situation of understanding where I and the ‘other’ are creating ‘new understanding’. For Gadamer the ‘new’ means the expansion of my perspective through the other, between me and the other, and not a leap out from the I-the ‘other’ relationship. This idea would help to understand the philosophical story as such as an ‘other’ in relation to me and thus as a starting-point for a philosophical dialogue.

The problems involving this requirement for understanding are added to by Lipman’s statement that the community of inquiry needs to be modelled in texts for children. “If we want children – or students of any age – to form a community of inquiry, surely it would help to show them a community of inquiry and let them examine how it works.” The text should thus reconstruct the description of the process of inquiry for the child to be able to internalize it as her own way of action. From the viewpoint of the situation of hermeneutic understanding, however, this idea seems problematic. How could a text as an ‘other’ that meets me function as a model to be imitated, if my perspective to it is unavoidably only ‘mine’. Understanding is thus ‘my’ own unique experience that basically excludes the idea of the text conveying a model. I think that understanding something new is

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611 Ibid., 214.
613 Ibid. 216.
not about adopting the horizon of an ‘other’ – as assumed in the concept of the model – nor about full abandonment of one’s own horizon. In other words, Lipman’s idea of the fictional community of inquiry of a text and its significance for the real inquiry of community is highly problematic from the hermeneutic point of view. The situation is not changed by the fact that we are dealing with the modelling of a dialogical process of inquiry instead of the objects of inquiry.

‘I’ as explicated in Lipman’s text functions in a much deeper sense as the starting-point for dialogue than he is referring to in his idea of a ‘model’. The ‘I’ of a story, interpreting and understanding the world in its own way, could be interpreted as referring to the fundamental ontological basis of the way in which the human being exists in the world. Gadamer conceives of understanding exactly in terms of such an existential categorical basic attribute of human existence (Dasein). Instead of Dilthey’s methodological hermeneutics, Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle refers to the ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ based on Heidegger, to the structure of man’s true existence in the world, within the framework of which breaking the hermeneutic circle is not only impossible, but also a mindless requirement. The situation of understanding is not based on an attempt to reconstruct the meaning intended by the writer for his text – like in conservative/methodological hermeneutics criticized by Gadamer – because it is not possible. When Lipman speaks about fictional modelling of the community of inquiry in a text, assuming that it could in this way be reconstructed in the real classroom, he drifts into problems of methodological hermeneutics derived from the neglect of the radical historicalness, facticity and temporality of Dasein. The fundamental idea of ‘being inside events’ is represented to Gadamer by, for instance, Plato’s undogmatic dialogues. It would also be fruitful to read Lipman’s P4C stories from this perspective. Then in a pedagogical situation inquiry based on a text can be understood in such a way that in the interpretation, the text is another horizon that due to being restrained by my own prejudices talks to ‘me’ asking questions, not that ‘I’ ask the text something as an object. This way the philosophical story elaborated by Lipman could be justified from the viewpoint of philosophical hermeneutics.

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Hannu Juuso

CHILD, PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

DISCUSSING THE INTELLECTUAL SOURCES OF PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN