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EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON RECOGNITION THEORY
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Abstract
The starting point for the research is to examine the educational perspectives of Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to find useful contents for educational institutions. The method of the thesis is conceptual analysis which gets a dual role: chapters two and three of the treatise define and analyse Honneth’s concept of recognition and its historic-philosophical context and with help of critical analyses, the articles (I, II and III) and chapter four of the dissertation connects the concept of recognition to the field of educational science. The starting points in the articles and the summary aim to respect Honneth’s own methodological starting points to discover new perspectives through criticism of criticism. Honneth’s methodological starting points, differing from the first and the second generations of critical theory, lie in a critique of critical theory resulting in the idea of normative reconstruction.

The articles and chapter four elaborate on the central argument of the dissertation, demonstrating how social freedom as an ideal of democratic education leads to insurmountable problems. The argument is that from the perspective of education, Honneth’s idea of social freedom appears a rough initiation and socialisation to the prevailing culture. In these formulations, intentional pedagogical action vanishes in the background, and the process of Bildung gets a controversial character as an adaptation process. Education and Bildung are defined as homing processes on which the educator is unable to have an influence. This study concludes that this problem, peculiar to pragmatism, compels Honneth’s critical theory at a cross-roads; whether to follow the commitments to German idealism in the old critical theory or to abandon them by following pragmatism and Dewey. The danger is that by choosing the road of pragmatism, all the critical potential inherent in German idealism and old critical theory might be lost.

Keywords: achievement principle, Bildung, conceptual analyses, critical educational science, critical theory, democracy, democratic education, education, Hegel, Honneth, misrecognition, pragmatism, recognition, recognition theory, schools, social freedom
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**Tiivistelmä**


_Asiassanat:_ demokratia, demokratiakasvatus, Hegel, Honneth, kasvatus, koulu, kriittinen kasvatustiede, kriittinen teoria, käsiteanalyysi, ohitunnustaminen, pragmatismi, sivistys, sosiaalinen vapaus, suoritusperiaate, tunnustamisen käsite, tunnustamisen teoria
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Oulu, November 2014  Teemu Hanhela
List of original publications

This thesis is based on the following publications, which are referred to in the text by their Roman numerals.


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1 Introduction


These intensifying discussions around recognition and education also inspire Honneth (2012a, 2012b, 2012d, 2013b, 2014, In Press) to take part in them. However, Honneth’s explicit educational thoughts and writings seem preliminary and related only to Honneth’s recent research results (Honneth 2013c). In his educational ideas, Honneth does not, for example, systematically develop his earlier recognition theory (Honneth 1995a), the thematic of reification (Honneth et al. 2008), the concept of misrecognition (Honneth 1997) and the criticism of capitalism (Honneth 2013c: 176–253, 2012c: 56–76, 169–191). Readers who would like to understand Honneth’s educational perspectives or how the theory of recognition should be applied in the context of education might even be confused with Honneth’s educational writings. The reason for the confusion is that Honneth does not elaborate on how the forms of recognition, love, rights and solidarity should be applied to education, or how Honneth’s remarkable criticism of capitalism should be taken in the context of education and schools and how we should take account of the problems of reification in education.

This study aims partly to ease the confusion caused by the lack of Honneth’s educational perspectives. Educational debates over recognition theory have already been developed in many quarters. Rauno Huttunen (2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012, Huttunen & Murphy 2012), for example, has developed Honneth’s theory in the context of indoctrination, moral development, critical adult
education, in teachers’ recognition narratives and considering recognition theory as the normative grounds for radical pedagogy. This study differs from Huttunen’s research by not assuming any of these special emphases on recognition theory, but rather aiming to be faithful to Honneth’s original intentions. The theoretical starting points for Honneth are in Hegel’s philosophy and in Hegel’s entire works1 except for his educational writings and sources. Hegel’s immanent idea in *Philosophy of Right* to develop the normative reconstruction is central. This idea as Honneth has interpreted it is introduced in Chapter 2 of this study as a methodological framework from which educational perspectives should be developed. Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* guides also Honneth (2013c) in his book *Freedom’s Right* to develop an updated version of Hegel’s conceptions of social freedom. Chapter four of this study examines how the idea of social freedom could be understood in the context of education. Altogether, Chapters 2 and 4 and Article II aim to clarify how the forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem and the corresponding modern institutions, personal relationships, market economy and democratic will formation should be understood in the context of education and Bildung. These parts of the study aim to outline answers to the exact wonderment left open by Honneth’s recent educational writings.

The second issue debated initially around education and recognition is the concept of misrecognition. The focus of this study follows Honneth’s starting points (see Article III) and avoids falling under the post-modern definitions of misrecognition, where the concept of recognition as a significant action category, and as a precondition of Bildung is lost (cf. Bingham 2001, 2006). The life stories or teachers’ narratives of their recognition histories and histories of misrecognition interestingly describe and illuminate how misrecognition might appear in a teacher’s life (see Heikkinen & Huttunen 2002, 2004). However, these narratives seem insufficient to report how contemporary schools should acknowledge and respond to problems of misrecognition. There appears to be a mistaken idea in these narratives that recognition is something to be earned through struggles and

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1 Rauno Huttunen (2012) argues that Honneth does not consider Hegel’s mature social philosophy like *the Philosophy of Right, The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Hegel’s Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* (Hegel 1971) as sufficient sources for the concept of recognition and developing further his recognition theory. This argument becomes somewhat inadequate if we take a look on Honneth’s recent books *I in We* and *Freedom’s right* where Honneth (2012c vii–xi: 1–33; 2013c) argues that Hegel sought throughout his life to interpret objective spirit, i.e. social reality as a set of layered relations of recognition and Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* analyzing possibilities of recognition as the highest form of freedom, *social freedom*. For Honneth Hegel’s mature social philosophy works exactly more fruitful source for developing theory of recognition than Hegel’s early writings.
that recognition is never received for free (see Heikkinen & Huttunen 2004, Huttunen 2003). This logic being strange for Honneth, the core idea in recognition relations is the process of development where persons learn to find a healthy balance between egoistic and symbiotic tendencies (see Article II). This balance allows individuals to take part freely and happily in recognition relations and the obligations involved. Groups and group formation are also matters of a positive process of recognition for Honneth, with developmental processes of regression and progression enabling a healthy balance of symbiotic and egoistic impulses (Honneth 1995a, 2013c: 42–63, 2012c: 201–217). Honneth’s educational writings (2012b, In Press) similarly support the idea that recognition is not something we need to earn, but has more in common with equal participation in shared projects. According to Honneth, education in the family should be organized to allow equal partaking of all the family members in the shared cooperative life form. The family represents for Honneth a field for practicing and exercising democratic will formation supported by sufficient voluntary emotional care. It is not a question of earning recognition from others, but something Honneth calls ‘habituation’ in the democratic culture of recognition.

For a clearer picture of the concept of misrecognition in the context of education and schools, this study follows Albert Ilien’s (2008) and Krassimir Stojanov’s (2006, 2009) guidelines, where misrecognition is characterized as the first and foremost hindrance to the Bildung process, but at the same time as a hindrance to the development of a professional teacher. Misrecognition hinders Bildung by violating three principles central to recognition theory, the affection principle, equality principle and the achievement principle. This thematics is studied further in Article III where misrecognition is seen as a problematic challenge for pedagogic action. Article III also elicits certain problems involved in Honneth’s way to define misrecognition. These problems are discussed and partly answered in Chapter 3.3 of this study where Honneth’s reinterpretations of the concept of reification are introduced. The thematics of reification can be understood as explaining reifying ideologies and reifying social actions behind the acts of misrecognition. Honneth’s (2008) ‘new look at an old idea’ of reification partly explains the unconscious motives behind the struggles for recognition that misrecognition causes.

The third educational perspective on recognition theory culminates on the proposed question: what educative elements could Honneth’s criticism of capitalism contain for schools and education? Honneth’s criticism of capitalism has inspired interesting elaborations on market economy and work (e.g. Hoevel 2013,
Smith 2009, Deranty 2012) and is slowly beginning to be debated also in the field of education (Fleming et al. 2013, Huttunen 2012, Jørgensen In Press, Schumann 2012). However, these perspectives lack clear educational elaborations on Honneth’s (2013c: 178–253) criticism of labor markets and the sphere of consumption. In this study Honneth’s criticism of capitalism is examined in the first (I) and the second (II) articles. The first (I) article of this study examines Honneth’s theory in the context of the problem related to the achievement principle which was vividly debated in critical pedagogy in the 60’s and 70’s. These aspects are studied further in the second article (II) of this study where Hegel’s original ideas on schools as an independent and critical institution are introduced and compared with Honneth’s educative ideas.

Chapter 4.5 of this study unites the perspectives from the articles (I, II) outlining the critical contents for schools and education. Chapter 4.5 provides a more extensive view to the problem of the achievement principle than that introduced in the first (I) article of this study by elaborating on the paradoxes of network capitalism causing ‘desolidarisation’ in the private sphere, in the sphere of social rights and in the forms of the paradoxical achievement principle.

The fourth point, and perhaps the main argument of this dissertation, is that Honneth’s (2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 2014) explicit writings and speeches on education are confusing. On the one hand Honneth’s criticism towards the decay of the public education and the defence of the public schools, as introduced in Chapter 4.7.1 are significant, but on the other hand the analogue between pedagogic action and democratic action is problematic. Chapter 4.7 of this study examines the problems involved in Honneth’s way to parallel the democratic action and pedagogic action concluding how democracy seems to be incompatible as well with the concept of education and as it is with the concept of Bildung.

Interestingly, Honneth’s (2012a) explicit educational perspectives emphasize the importance of the morals of democracy. The moral basis for democracy and democratic education described by Honneth (cf. Huttunen 2012) begins with the philosophical tradition started by Kant, Rousseau and Schleiermacher and furthered by Durkheim and Dewey. Chapter 4.7.4 of this study argues that the leap from the philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as Kant, Rousseau and Schleiermacher, towards pragmatism is a giant leap, and perhaps an unnecessary one. Laying the basis of his ideas on democratic education, Honneth refers to Dewey and Durkheim and this theoretical basis gets tangled with the problems of pragmatism (see also Kivelä, et al. 2012: 302–311). Honneth’s pragmatist emphasis on education ignores the necessary asymmetry involved in education as well as the creative and critical elements inherent in the concept of Bildung. Thus in Honneth’s democratic education, something like growth eventually appears as an organic, natural event where education is left only with the role of a remover of barriers to growth. Education is reduced to the action of adaptation to the prevailing conditions rather than creative and critically renewing action. A similar problem is inherent in Honneth’s (2013c: 154–176) recent writings examined in Chapter 4.4 of this study by criticizing Honneth’s way to capture education as the creative process of role switching between parent and child; the parent needs to regress him- or herself to the developmental level of a child, while the child needs to act or animate the developmental level of an adult. This is for Honneth the core content of education in the sphere of the family where the developmental processes of mutual regressions and progressions alternate. Honneth (2013c: note 116) even argues that in some cases ‘the children of the modern family can become parents of their parents’. These aspects alien to the concepts of education and Bildung characterize the problematic turn towards pragmatism in the field of education which Honneth’s conceptions lead to.
However, to gain a better understanding of Honneth’s educational perspectives, and not being satisfied with simplified cynical criticism, this study aims to analyse Honneth’s educational perspectives against Honneth’s methodological idea of ‘normative reconstruction’ which develops through his works and is embodied in his recent book *Freedom’s Right* (2013c). Chapters two, three, and four of this study examine Honneth’s ‘learning process’ which eventually generated the idea of normative reconstruction. As a result of his reconstruction, Honneth is convinced that increasing democratic tendencies in the sphere of personal relationships, market economy and democratic will formation are positive historical developmental processes in which education is also involved. Upbringing and education belong initially to the sphere of the family, and Honneth (2012a) describes them as a seed bed for the development of democratic ideals for a child’s later life, in the market economy and in democratic will formation. Education and upbringing are the most significant premotors for maintaining a democratic society. The deficits introduced in Honneth’s idea of democratic education depend strongly on how we understand democracy, and the deficits introduced might result from an incomplete understanding of Honneth’s idea of democracy. Chapters 4.6 and 4.7.5 of this study aim to describe this theoretical cap, but the thematics of democracy and education needs to be investigated further.

Altogether, the starting points for the study in the articles and the summary aim to respect Honneth’s own methodological starting points to discover new points of view through criticism of criticism. This criticism is inherent in every article (I, II and III) of this study and culminates in Chapter 4.7. In short, the criticism in this dissertation implies that for Honneth’s educational perspectives to be vital, they should be discussed together with Hegel’s own writings on education and school (see Article II), the old critical pedagogy theorists' views on the achievement principle (see Article I) and clarifications on the kinds of roles that the concepts of education and Bildung play in the theory of recognition (see all Articles III, II, I and the chapter 4). The conclusion of this dissertation crystallizes the relationship of Honneth’s theory with the first and the second generations of critical theory, Honneth’s educational aspects and the critics discussed herein.

The research questions of this study are as follows:

1. How is Honneth’s account on critical theory theoretically located in the context of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory? (Chapter 3, Article I and the conclusion answer this question).
2. How should the theory of recognition and the forms of recognition, *love, rights* and *solidarity* be understood in the context of education? (Chapter 4 and Article II answer this question).

3. What educative elements does Honneth’s criticism of capitalism contain? (Article I and Chapters 4.5, 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.7.1 answer this question).

4. How should the problems of misrecognition and reification be understood in the context of education? (Article III and Chapter 3.3 answer this question).
2 Methodological framework of the research

It would be fair but unrealistic to study Axel Honneth’s writings using his own methods, and this task would even empirically collapse. In this chapter, I describe my own method, which is similar to conceptual analysis, and then outline the methods and aims that Honneth developed in his main works. Honneth’s theoretical method seemed to richen from his early writings to the present texts and eventually cumulated in the method of ‘normative reconstruction’, which reached its fullest expression in his Freedom’s right (2013c). The analysis of Honneth’s research method is important first for the conceptual analysis of the concept of recognition, and additionally, it can guide me in how to revise my own methodological starting points or in how this kind of dissertation research should be oriented in the first place.

The guiding ideal for constructing the methodological starting points for my research follows the method of conceptual analysis. For example, Krassimir Stojanov (2006) has elicited two elements in this method, historical-hermeneutic analysis, which attempts to clarify the historical process of the formation and development of semantic characteristics and components of the studied concept, and using this historical knowledge to reconcile the studied concept with the contemporary and the ordinary conceptions of language and the relevant theoretical discourses. Stojanov emphasised that the methodology of concept analysis has a double role; it identifies the concept it examines in the context of everyday language and in the context of science. However, this twofold role leads not to epistemological deficiency but rather to deeper forms of understanding; the aim of this methodology is not to develop new meanings and concepts but the meanings that are already embedded in the linguistic social practices. By using consistent analysis, concept analysis aims to transform the differentiated statements of the linguistic social practices, explicating and criticising the validity and fallibility of the embedded claims (Stojanov 2006: 21–22).

Stojanov’s elements of conceptual analysis are actually similar to Honneth’s idea of ‘normative reconstruction’. These ideals are high standards for the methodology that my dissertation can only limitedly fulfil. The methodology of this dissertation aims to clarify the formation and theoretical development of the semantic characteristics and components of the concept of recognition elaborated by Honneth. The second demand, that conceptual analysis should use historical knowledge and reconcile the concept of recognition to contemporary and ordinary language and to the relevant theoretical discourses, is much harder to accomplish.
My dissertation research can only partly touch this demand; its aim is to reconcile Honneth’s conceptions of recognition to the general critical discussions about the concept of recognition and to connect this discussion to the relevant educational scientific discourses. The articles (I, II and III) and the chapter four of this study certainly attempt to fulfill the latter task. In my research, the double role of the conceptual analysis takes a somewhat different shape than that described by Stojanov: to identify the concept of recognition and then reconcile it with the help of philosophical critical scientific discourses to the educational scientific debates. As a result of the method of this study, we can find ingredients to evaluate validity and fallibility of Honneth’s concept of recognition and its validity in the context of education.

2.1 The normative reconstruction

Honneth’s method was embodied in his recent book *Freedoms Right*, in which he described his method as stemming from urge to follow Hegel's intentions in his *Philosophy of Right* to develop the principles of social justice directly in the form of social analysis. Such an approach, contended Honneth, requires, however, that one first gain clarity about the values that should be embodied in the various areas of social life. Honneth called his analysis ‘normative reconstruction’, which examines how and to what degree the institutionalised forms of freedoms are understood and realised in our social practices. Honneth analysed in his normative reconstruction the institutional forms of freedoms through their developmental history to gain insights into the threats and pathologies of freedom and into the developmental aspects of the forms of freedoms. Honneth’s approach differed from the strict historical approaches representing more sociological types of research (Honneth 2013c: 7–9).

When outlining his normative reconstruction based on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Honneth argued that a mere revival of intent and thinking behind the philosophy of right is not enough because, 200 years after the publication of these ideas, both the social relations and the philosophical argumentative conditions have changed considerably. Honneth set four methodological aims for his reconstruction. First, every modern society to some degree involves the embodiment of the objective spirit: the institutions, the social practices and routines that have emerged in modern societies represent the normative conceptions about recognition relations. The reproduction of societies today depends on these ideals in two senses: as values representing ‘the ultimate values’ in Talcott Parson’s sense, and
as values emerging from below giving guidelines on how individuals’ life paths should be formed in everyday practices. In short, the first premise is that the particular form of social reproduction of society is determined and regulated by norms that have an ethical character, insofar as they contain ideas of a shared common good. The existing social order is always accepted by its members with the legitimization of these values (Honneth 2013c: 3–4).

Second, when reconstructing a theory of justice, only those values and ideals work as moral reference points that are already institutionalised and form the normative claims concerning the reproductive conditions of each given society. This premise claims that the concept of justice cannot be understood independently of these overarching social values. The idea of what is just can only be accomplished within existing institutions and practices and generally accepted values. To identify those values that are essential to reproduction, we need to accomplish a normative reconstruction of all social routines and arrangements to see which ones are essential to social reproduction. Honneth characterizes this procedure as a reconstruction where from the entirety of social routines and institutions those are picked out as material for analyses which are indispensable for social reproduction. Honneth compares Durkheim’s and Parsons’ methodical starting points with Hegel’s intentions in Philosophy of right. Both of these sources examine the logic of social reproduction in terms of how it preserves certain socially accepted values and ideals. However, Hegel differs from Durkheim and Parson in the sense that where the latter elaborate the hindrances in normative integration, Hegel finds within these processes the social conditions that constitute the principle of justice in modern society (Claasen 2014: 9, Honneth 2013c: 4–7). In his second methodological premise, Honneth aims to stay faithful to both of these theoretical innovations.

Third, applying Hegel’s insights as a theory of justice in the form of a social analysis requires the methodical process of normative reconstruction; the social reality itself cannot be assumed to be an already sufficiently analysed object; rather, the analysis should indicate the essential features and properties in already socially institutionalised values that are worth preserving. Honneth contended that this sort of analysis addresses very different phenomena than the general social sciences of our 'ultra-modern’ societies. The fashionable and debated institutions and practices enjoy little attention in this analysis, while at the same time it elicits occurrences that are pushed completely into the background. The aim of this third thesis is that normative reconstruction should reconstruct social reality by identifying the practices and institutions that can contribute valuable values. These
values should be realised in the level of principles and norms, as well as in habits and routines (Honneth 2011: 11–25).

Following Hegel’s idea, Honneth formulated his normative reconstruction such that the concept of ‘Sittlichkeit’ represents the moral norms of modernity that are worth preserving and worth applying in terms of the criticism of existing practices. Hegel’s concept of ethical life is not a mere description of the existing forms of life, but as a normative reconstruction it uncovers universal values. In this process it has to uncover already existing practices, but also criticise existing practices or finding the other developmental paths which have not yet been exhausted. (Honneth 2013c: 7–8).

Fourth, to construct a theory of justice in the form of a social analysis, it is necessary to set the thesis that the process of normative reconstruction always has the chance of a critical application: it cannot just be a matter of a reconstructive way to expose instances of existing morality, but it must also be possible to criticise those conceptions in light of the values embodied in each. Honneth referred to his method as reconstructive criticism. The fourth premise tries to ensure that the application of such a methodological procedure can not only affirm the existing instances of morality but also indicate how ideas about universal norms and values are incomplete. Honneth’s method must be capable of criticising existing reality where it fails to actualise its potential to realise the values that reconstruction has elaborated. In this sense Honneth states that the normative judgments that his normative reconstruction produces are gradual rather than categorical. Honneth uses as an example Hegel’s account of ‘corporations’ in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right producing this kind of gradual normative judgements which are not external standards but ones that rise from the critique of existing institutions. In short, Honneth’s normative reconstruction is about analyses and criticism of existing forms of life producing values worth preserving (Honneth 2011: 27–31, 2013c: 9–10).

Honneth (2013c) concluded in his new book Freedom’s Right that the four premises described above only constitute the outlines of the theoretical framework for designing a theory of justice as an aspect of social analysis. Honneth emphasised that such a project, from the first to the last step, depends on how the common values of our contemporary societies are determined and stated that only after this task can the normative reconstruction of the concept of ethical life in our post-traditional societies begin (Honneth 2011: 30–31). Rutger Claasen (2014) interpreted this as indicating that modern people are continuously testing and challenging their personal relations, market interactions and political develop-
ments, so Honneth’s normative reconstruction must start afresh in each age (Claasen 2014: 10).

Honneth’s method, ‘normative reconstruction’, is a polemic expression of his criticism of Kantian ‘constructivism’; it should be a method free from the constraints of moral constructivism. For Honneth, Kantian approaches attempt to devise the principle of justice by relying only on thought experiments of proceduralist methods. These approaches separate the historically formed claims of participants and the application of resulting norms. Honneth’s normative reconstruction aims to find the norms that are tacitly accepted by participants of our social practices; he aimed to capture ‘normative mis-developments’ and moral progress. This retracing should reveal the social conflicts and struggles that have been raised to defend the appropriate interpretations and applications of the norms. Honneth contended that his reconstruction captures moral progress that not only reveals the social freedom in each sphere but guides us in how to remedy and formulate social freedom more fully and in a more advanced way in the social reality. For Honneth, the history of Western societies is series of historical improvements that are perceived as beneficial for everyone. These ‘signs of history’ in a Kantian sense play an indispensable role in providing a sense of historical direction (Honneth 2013a: 38).

Honneth hoped to find through his normative reconstruction the post-metaphysical equivalent of what Hegel called the ‘logic of the concept’ as applied to the sphere of ‘objective spirit’. Honneth referred to Hegel’s idea that spirit is structured like an organism that has the power to shape reality by actualising itself according to its own distinctive procedure. In this process, philosophy has the task of representing this process of self-actualisation. Hegel’s spirit has an ‘autopoetic’ nature; it can reshape reality according to its own essential structure of pure self-referential ability, freed from all external constraints, and it does so all by itself through its own immanent power. Honneth contended that, if we abandon the spirit’s metaphysical power of self-actualisation, then the methodology of reconstruction must give another explanation for why and how something spiritual should be able to self-actualise. For Honneth, the normative ideas are these kinds of entities that have power similar to that of objective spirit; they reshape social reality and are embedded in the social habits, eventually generating social struggles. The post-metaphysical reading emphasises that a method relying on Hegel’s idea of spirit should start from the efforts made by a social actor who insists on the yet unredeemed promises contained in the norms that history has handed
down to them and impugns these historically given norms by actions in revolt against the status quo (Honneth 2013a: 38).

Honneth argued that, for every specific sphere of social freedom, there exists one specific principle of recognition underlying it. Honneth followed Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* and argued that family, civil society and state represent institutionalised varieties of freedom containing these specific principles of recognition. At the centre of normative reconstruction are the social conflicts and struggles over how the ideas of freedom institutionalised in each sphere are to be appropriately interpreted as legitimate sources of demands for justice (Honneth 2013a: 40).

How did Honneth avoid the problem of constructivism; how could he justify the notion that the principles of recognition are the only legitimate normative principles in every sphere of social freedom? Honneth stated that his method is similar to Jürgen Habermas’ interpretive method in his *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Habermas’ method is a hermeneutical retrieval of the founding documents of particular spheres, though it does not sufficiently show that the principles uncovered retain their justificatory force. Honneth amended this method by analysing historical documents, autobiographical reports and empirical studies and attempted to show that participants in each sphere still find recognition to be their legitimate coordinating moral principle. For example, the discourses of social movements such as workers’ cooperatives and labour unions are used in the sphere of the market economy and recent empirical studies in the sphere of personal relations. Honneth’s method is a hermeneutic approach taking both historical and empirical evidence to justify his claims (Honneth 2013a: 39).

### 2.2 Axel Honneth’s main works and methodology

Honneth’s early work *Social Action and Human Nature* through its anthropological strand aims to reshape the old Marxist tradition as workable social anthropology. In this task, Honneth argued that a subdiscipline of neither biology nor philosophy can fulfil this task; biology with its subdisciplines is unable to describe the central categories of the social and cultural sciences and the fundamental characteristics of human being, and philosophy cannot immediately grasp cognitively the ‘essence’ of the human being by means of abstract definitions. Anthropology, which Honneth aimed at, must overcome the disciplinary boundaries; however, this cannot be done by means of an unstructured collation of what the various individual sciences can contribute. Honneth emphasised that the theme of
the unitary theory that must enter into a dialogue with natural scientific knowledge cannot be derived from that knowledge but must have its origins in the problems of the social sciences. Honneth understood the scope of anthropology not taking constants of human cultures as persisting through history but taking them as an enquiry into the unchanging precondition of human changeableness. Honneth’s idea is that false anthropologies can be discerned from correct ones; the correct ones recognise the changeableness of the human being and his capabilities to attain self-understanding as a part of the very heart of anthropology (Honneth & Joas 1988: 1–8.)

For Honneth, anthropology is a reflective step in the scrutiny of the suitability of social-scientific theoretical frameworks that has become autonomous. It represents a radical self-examination that makes explicit the natural bases and the normative implications that are always assumed in the substantive work of the social sciences in light of the findings of biology, palaeontology and other natural sciences. This self-reflection asserts its questions from the problems of the social and cultural sciences and returns to them with its theories clarified and internally differentiated by anthropology. This anthropological method contains self-reflexivity on the one hand as an essential component of anthropology’s field of investigation and, on the other hand, as a determination of the relationship between anthropology and the other sciences (Honneth & Joas 1988: 1–8.)

Honneth concluded that his approach to anthropology understands it as self-reflection of the social and cultural sciences on their biological foundations and on the normative content of their constructions of knowledge in light of determinate historical and political problems and its viewpoints of the humanisation of nature. Honneth introduced three anthropological theses: 1) human beings humanise nature by transforming it into what is life-serving for himself and thereby combine the transformation of nature and the development of the human personality and the cultural shapings of his nature; 2) human beings humanise nature within themselves in the course of the long civilising process that has been engaged in by the human species; and 3) human beings themselves are a humanisation of nature, or only in the human being does nature become humane (Honneth & Joas 1988: 9–10). The theses for Honnethian social anthropology are compatible with the traditional concepts of Bildung and Bildsamkeit; the basis for anthropology has to be the premise that human beings have capacities for Bildung where nature develops toward the second nature, culture, and that this process is a continuous, never-ending process. Without this kind of methodological presuppo-
Honneth (1991) described his method in *Critique of Power* as critical research that is a historical investigation providing the reconstruction of a learning process. He attempted to portray argumentatively the historical succession of the individual theoretical stages in a way that at least outlined solutions to the initial problems of a critical social theory could be recognised. He by his own words used the Hegelian method for the history of philosophy, aiming to reach not an ultimate conclusion but at least the direction in which the solutions to the problems seem to be attainable (Honneth 1991: xiv–xv).

Honneth considered that the development of critical theory must be understood as a learning process and the history of theoretical progress. Honneth interpreted Habermas’ early writings and theory about communication as an answer to Horkheimer’s central problem, providing a theoretical way out of the philosophical-historical dead end into which critical theory was led with Adorno’s negativism. With this guiding motif, Honneth reconstructed the history of critical theory as a specific learning process. To avoid circular argumentation, Honneth leaned on the method on which every Hegelian history of theory leans: by showing at the end of his critical reconstruction that he has justified the theoretical premises he had presupposed from the outset (Honneth 1991: xiv–xv).

Honneth also described that, in this process, he interpreted Habermas’ works re-constructing the development of his theory in a way that would gradually eliminate the arbitrary character of the communication-theoretic premises of his own (Honneth’s) argumentation by further grounding Habermas’ arguments. This means that the historical development of social orders can be fully explained only by extending the sphere of communicative action to include the negative dimension of struggle. Honneth concentrated on an internal connection of interaction and struggle. Honneth furthered this methodological task in his book *The Fragmented World of the Social* by arguing that Habermas’ universal pragmatics led to a split between the level of moral-theoretic statements and that of our everyday moral experiences, which could only prove detrimental for the empirical intentions of a critical theory. Honneth sought the possibility of an alternative formulation of Habermas’ original idea by asserting four thematic domains: 1) everyday moral experiences must be defined through the concept of a struggle for recognition; 2) the organisation of social labour and the experience of recognition need to be clarified; 3) a diagnosis of the crisis of modern society must be sought from a different approach than Habermas’ and critical theory; and 4) there is a need for a
psychoanalytic concept of the subject that must explicate the moral creativity of individual person (Honneth 1995b: xi–xiv). Obviously, the learning process that Honneth described is both the theoretical progress that the history of critical theory can offer and his own learning process, which Honneth called an ‘unintended learning process’, which his critique of critical theory has generated as a side effect.

Honneth’s methodological premises deepened in his book *Struggle for Recognition, the Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. He aimed to develop on the basis of Hegel’s model of struggle for recognition the foundation for a social theory with normative content. In his *Critique of Power*, Honneth tried to connect Foucault’s historical work to Habermas’ communicative action theory, concluding that this kind of combination of social-theoretical insights must rely on the concept of a morally motivated struggle. For Honneth, Hegel’s early Jena writings worked as a great theoretical source for this task. Systematic reconstruction of the Hegelian line of argumentation led to the distinction of three forms of recognition, each containing a potential motivation for social conflict. Honneth argued that Hegel’s idealist assumptions about reason are no longer valid under the conditions of postmetaphysical thinking and must be revised through an empirical version of the Hegelian idea that is inherent in the social psychology of G. H. Mead. With this social psychological emphasis, Honneth aimed to justify his claim that the possibility of an undistorted relation to oneself proves to depend on three forms of recognition *love*, *rights* and *esteem*. Honneth’s approach was an empirically supported reconstruction of Hegel’s writings, resulting in three forms of recognition and three corresponding forms of experiences of disrespect that generate motives that contribute to the emergence of social conflicts (Honneth 1995a: 1–3).

Honneth reformulated a critical social theory based on three forms of recognition that can explain processes of societal changes and the historical significance of experiences of disrespect, from which the moral logic of social conflicts becomes evident. For Honneth, the normative point of reference for a critical social theory can be found in Hegel’s concept of *ethical life* (‘*Sittlichkeit*’). The book *Struggle for Recognition* represented methodologically the first attempt of Honneth to clarify how Hegel’s concept of ethical life fulfils the task of a critical social theory, and it indicates only the theoretical directions that are useful to work on (*ibid.*).

With his interpretations of Hegel’s theory of recognition, Honneth argued that he gained insights that not only allowed a rethinking of the concept of justice but
also led to a better account of the relationship between socialisation and individuation, i.e., social reproduction and individual identity formation. In his book *The I in We*, Honneth (2012c) clarified that he wrongly assumed in his earlier book *Struggle for Recognition* that only Hegel’s early Jena writings can offer ingredients for developing a critical social theory. In *The I in We*, he claims that Hegel sought throughout his life to interpret the *objective spirit*, i.e. social reality as a set of layered relations of recognition. According to Honneth, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and its chapter on self-consciousness for example contain the central idea that social justice cannot be found through alienation from the surrounding world, but it is to be found in historically developed and already institutionalised relations of recognition (Honneth 2012c: vii). However, Honneth (2013c) in his recent book *Freedom’s Right* takes Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* to be the most fruitful for furthering a theory of recognition; it contains much more strongly than Hegel’s early writings the idea of social justice based on the requirements of mutual recognition.
3  Axel Honneth’s critical theory

This chapter examines and aims to find answers to the first research question of this study: How is Honneth’s account on critical theory theoretically located in the context of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory? This chapter and conclusion of this study results answering this question by starting from the critics of Karl Marx’s theory and ending up in Honneth’s re-examinations of György Lukács’ the concept of reification. The idea of this chapter is to elaborate the critical core which Honneth considers worth for retrieving from the tradition of critical theory.

3.1 Critique of Karl Marx and historical materialism

Honneth criticised Marx for reducing the nexus of social action to a great extent to instrumental action or to instrumentalised social relation. This narrow scope must be amended with an internally nuanced concept of communication (Honneth & Joas 1988: 1–7). To do this, in his book Struggle for Recognition, Honneth examined how Marx missed or misinterpreted Hegel’s idea of the struggle for recognition. According to Honneth, Marx narrowed Hegel’s model of the struggle for recognition in the direction of an aesthetics of production. In this narrowing, all aspects of intersubjective recognition that do not originate directly from the process of cooperative and self-managed labour are excluded. Marx conceptualised for the first time social labour as a medium of recognition and a medium of possible disrespect. This prevented him for seeing the alienation of labour in the fabric of relationships of intersubjective recognition that would reveal its moral importance for the social struggles of his time. In his later writings, Marx left out Feurbach’s influences, and this led, according to Honneth, to the application of the utilitarian model of social conflict; in his book Capital, Marx defined the class struggles following the traditional model of a struggle for economic self-assertion, not following the logic of a struggle for recognition. Honneth criticised Marx for considering the bourgeois ideas of freedom and equality serving only the capitalist economy’s needs and thus also understanding the logic of mutual recognition as such a servant (Honneth 1995a: 146–150).

Honneth cited Marx’s writings ‘Eighteenth Brumaire’ and ‘Civil War in France’ as representing the promising expressivist approaches toward social conflicts. In these political-historical studies, Marx interpreted social conflicts as an ethical dispute where subjects’ identities are at stake in a kind of eternal struggle between inherently incompatible values. In these writings, Marx moved closer to
Hegel’s original intention of a struggle for recognition. Honneth concluded that Marx was never able to comprehend in systematic terms the struggle between social classes because he was unable to connect his economic writings and the expressivist approach of the historical studies, and these two contradicting conflict-models remained separate in his mature works (Honneth 1995a: 150–151).

Honneth (1995b) also evaluated post-Marxian criticisms and tried to find in his book *The Fragmented World of the Social* valid and topical elements from these criticisms. Honneth introduced three different critical aspects of Marx’s theory. Honneth named the first critical line of thought ‘game theoretic Marxism’, arguing that Marx’s theory lacked an adequate theory of collective action. To overcome this shortcoming, this criticism leans on the methods of game theory. Second, criticisms that Honneth called ‘culture-theoretic Marxism’ asserted a similar critique, but as solutions, it introduced re-evaluation of the specific logic of cultural traditions and interpretive models. The third critique, which Honneth conceived as the most promising one, he called ‘power-theoretic Marxism’. It criticised Marx for insufficiently understanding social power. This deficiency should be avoided when analysing the mechanisms of social power formation from their functional linking and the logic independent of the processes of economical reproduction (Honneth 1995b: 1–5).

Honneth’s interpretation of game theoretical Marxism began its criticism with disappointment in Marx’s class theory. Class theory was accused of being heuristically too weak to describe the real life of social classes. Collective actions of agents were described as always carrying out objectively given tasks and not as creative achievement. Thus, ‘game theoretical’ approaches concentrate on the analysis of the creative achievements of individuals’ actions. Honneth referred to Jon Elster’s and G. A. Cohen’s works representing this kind of game theoretical approach to Marxism (Lash & Urry 1984) Honneth criticised ‘game theoretical Marxism’ for understanding creative achievements as a result of strategic action; the game of agents reciprocally calculating their interests was then used to explain the construction of those collective plans for action by means of which social movements act to modify historical conditions. Honneth (1995b: 6) described this tradition applying the methodological individualism to the action-theoretic objectivism, which the model of strategic action offers.

The second critical approach that Honneth introduced, cultural-theoretic Marxism, has roots in Matthew Arnold’s, Raymond Williams’ and E.P. Thompson’s writings. This tradition arises also from the critique of Marx’s class theory but suggests a different solution than game-theoretical approaches; Marx’s theory
lacks all the normative convictions and moral sentiments that social groups rely on in their practical action. In this tradition, the collective norms of action are placed at the centre of class theory. Honneth contends that this tradition has successfully described the history of the labour movement but lacks a consistent analysis of the norms integrated in our daily practices (Honneth 1995b: 7).

The third strand of criticism, which Honneth called the ‘power-theoretic approach’, criticised Marxist tradition as unable to analyse the bureaucratically supported state control. Marxist power critique is argued to be limited when assuming that all political power accumulates from economically grounded class domination articulated in the form of the state. Honneth argued that only under Foucault’s influence was the idea of social power removed from the functional context of economic reproduction and in this respect was held to be an independent element of historical development. (ibid.)

Honneth stated that the first two of these critical strands concentrate on the practical orientations of subject, representing action-theoretic alternatives, while the third ‘power-theoretic’ critique refers to the subject-independent processes of systematic mechanisms. The first two give the internal view, while the third gives the external view of society. Power-theoretic approaches emphasise the techniques of power embedded in the institutes as a basic concept in social theory (Honneth 1995b: 7).

All three redemptive critiques have a common problem, the lack of diagnostic and normative potential. When these new understandings of Marxist theory define Marx’s concept of labour as the pivotal concept of Marxist social theory, they are unable to provide a concept of action that would be sufficient for both a theory of emancipation and an analysis of society. All three critiques lack substitutes for what Marx called alienation or reification, so they do not have elements to describe a theory of emancipation. Honneth argued that these redemptive critiques also lack criteria for defining failed and successful socialisation processes. These three approaches lose Marx’s normative potential of the concept of labour because, for Marx, labour was the critical sphere of human self-realisation, and society’s degree of justice could be measured by the opportunities it afforded for self-realisation in labour. These three approaches replace Marx’s concept of labour with some other concepts with no normative components, and then the possibility for a normative critique is lost. These three approaches are thus forced to adopt moral relativism because they are unable by themselves to ground the criteria by which contemporary capitalism can be criticised (Honneth 1995b: 11–12).
Honneth recruited Marx’s idea of class struggle by assuming that class struggle is not a strategic conflict over the acquisition of goods or powers of command but a kind of moral conflict where an oppressed class struggles to obtain the social conditions to achieve self-respect. Honneth contended that, for Marx, the unequal distribution of goods results in class struggle only because it restricts the conditions for social identity. The still valid core of Marx’s class theory arises not from the logic of labour but the logic of recognition. Honneth criticised Marx for combining individual development too strongly with the concept of labour and thus being unable to reshape it as the intersubjective logic of recognition. According to Honneth, the concrete conditions of respect and recognition among individuals are subject to historical and cultural change, but the unchanging feature through history is that individuals always have to struggle for the social conditions to gain respect and recognition of their identities. Honneth argued that, if Marx’s class theory is considered a scientifically revised theory for explaining social reality according to the logic of recognition, then there is a need for two preconditions; first, it is necessary to demonstrate the historically effective morality in individuals’ efforts to achieve self-respect. Then, if it is possible to show that the struggle for recognition opens the way for moral development, then the analysis of the feelings of injured and misrecognised self-respect gives tools for criticising societal settings in societies that leads to the damages of self-respect. Honneth concluded that the aforementioned paradigm of recognition could be the successor to Marx’s paradigm of labour. Honneth (see also 1988) attempted to reformulate the Marxist idea of a class struggle in a realistic manner. He diverged from an earlier critical tradition that, according to him, stated that a social conflict should be conceived as a process that refers to individuals’ moral claims that can be, in principle, socially realised. Honneth emphasised that the idea of a class struggle should be transformed by making Hegel’s idea of a struggle for recognition systematically fruitful for a social theory (Honneth 1991: xviii, Honneth 1995b: 13–14).

Honneth’s Marx interpretations have been criticised for not understanding the historical context of modern society that contains pre-determined unequal forms of recognition; it has been argued that Marx was right in contending that these relations are always already predetermined by the asymmetrical, polarised social structures in which they are instantiated. Honneth has been accused of failure to see capitalistic society as a social formation premised on the domination of labour and thus unable to uncover the real causes of crises and pathologies by misidentifying their most serious effects and overlooking realistic political solutions. In
addition, Honneth’s view that modernity enlarges moral principles or has contributed moral progress through struggles for recognition has been seen as overly optimistic; Honneth’s model overlooks the tensions and contradictions of the capitalistic system. Honneth argued that Marxian normative reconstruction of capitalist societies must begin by analysing the existing normative potentials, but as Deranty (2013: 747–748) argued that, in many cases, new rights and liberties are insufficient to make a full normative assessment that is consistently tied to asymmetrical distributed property relations.

3.2 Axel Honneth’s criticism of the Frankfurt school’s critical theory

There are, as Walter Benjamin has shown, three kinds of critiques: constructive, reconstructive and genealogy critiques. Kant, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse pursued reconstructive social criticism. The model of Marxist critique argued that there must be in social reality in itself normative ideas by means of which the reality of capitalism could be justifiably criticised. Critical theory, apart from traditional theory, must be conscious of its context of social development and political application. For Honneth, this awareness represents self-reflection of the historical process. The norms that criticism uses must be in some way anchored in historical reality itself. Even the later critical theory has been faithful to this premise, unlike Rawls, who relocated procedural rationality as a discursive practice of justification into the social reproduction of society (Honneth 2009: 49).

Honneth argued that every reconstructive criticism faces the problem that it cannot justify what causes the ideals from its own culture to be chosen as a tool for the criticism. Critical theory uses the concept of reason that can justify the normative validity of the immanently raised ideals. As soon as it can be shown that an available ideal incorporates progress in the realisation of reason or in the process of social rationalisation, it can yield a justified standard to criticise the given social order (Honneth 2009: 49).

To clarify these arguments concerning reconstructive criticism, we need to take a systematic look at Honneth’s line of argument. Honneth (1991), in his book Critique of Power, attempted to clarify the central problems of a critical social theory. He adopted Michael Foucault’s and Jürgen Habermas’ as two most influential and competing approaches to a critical social theory. Honneth understood Foucault’s theory of power and Habermas’ theory of society or the theory of communicative action as a new way to interpret the process of the dialectic of
enlightenment analysed by Horkheimer and Adorno. Foucault’s theory represents a system-theoretic and Habermas’ a communication-theoretic solution to the aporias that Adorno and Horkheimer encountered in their philosophical-historical analysis of the process of civilisation. Honneth argued that, from the viewpoint of the history of theory, Foucault’s work represents an alternative to Habermas’ works by implicitly realising a negative radicalisation of the dialectic of enlightenment rather than its positive transformation in a theory of communication (Honneth 1991: xv).

Honneth set for his research the following aim: a central problem for a critical social theory today is the question of how the conceptual framework of an analysis must be laid out so that it can comprehend both the structures of social domination and the social resources for its practical overcoming. Honneth provided a systematic answer to this research question by reconstructing the theoretical development of critical social theory from its starting point in Horkheimer’s original approach, through Adorno’s philosophy of history and Foucault’s analysis of power, to Habermas’ theory of communication (ibid.).

Honneth’s critique of the tradition of critical theory can be summarised as follows: Horkheimer was unable to solve the problems that he set for himself. His philosophy of history was tailored solely to the dimensions of societal labour and was toothless for analysing everyday cultural life and social conflicts. Adorno’s conceptual re-evaluation of societal labour resulted in a negative philosophy of history in which prescientific critiques can no longer be discerned because it saw in all social action only an extension of the human domination of nature. Foucault innovatively examined Adorno’s misunderstood ideas of social interaction and conflict, tracing the origin of social domination back to a process of strategic exchange between subjects. However, Foucault’s model is a purely system-theoretic explanation leaving all normative agreements and moral incentives outside of its scope. Habermas’ communicative action theory created a theoretical approach that can recognise the beginning of an answer to Honneth’s research question. Honneth argued that, through Habermas’ theory, it is possible to explain the structures of social domination as the result of processes of communicative agreement that underlie the intersubjective freedom that serves as the standard for a reflexive ‘critique of power’. According to Honneth, Habermas developed his theory in the direction of two different theories of society, the theory concerning technical rationalisation in the form of a system and the theory of communicative action only concerning life-world. For Honneth only other is promising one, not the logic of rationalisation (system) but a dynamic of social struggle that is locat-
ed in the moral space of social interaction, i.e., life-world (Honneth 1991: xiv–xvii).

According to Honneth’s interpretation, the tradition of the Frankfurt school intended to define the decisive disorder of modernity based on the fact that instrumental reason has gained hegemony over other forms of action and knowledge. All manifestations of the social pathologies are explained through the assumption that action with the goal of dominating nature has gained autonomy over all other forms of actions. This same tendency in a more ennobled form continued in Habermas’ communicative action theory where the technical rational thinking colonised the life-world causing social pathologies. Honneth stated that, typical of the critical diagnoses of the present era carried out under this tradition, it was based on the supposition that all pathologies or anomalies of social life can inevitably be measured against the stage of development of human rationality that has been reached at a given time. This presupposition about social pathologies, inherited from left-Hegelianism, led to one-sided definitions in which all social pathologies that had nothing to do with the developmental level of rationality cannot be examined at all, according to Honneth. He claimed that all disorders in social life and the processes of individualisation do not result directly in changes in human reason (Honneth 1995b: xix–xx). Next, I will outline the main criticisms that Honneth directed toward Max Horkheimer’s, Theodor Adorno’s, György Lukács’ and Jürgen Habermas’ theories.

### 3.2.1 Critique of Max Horkheimer

Horkheimer criticised the Cartesian-rooted empirical ‘traditional theory’, believing that it could ground its methods in criteria immanent to knowledge alone and thus be blind to its own constitutive context. The first task for critical theory is to amend the traditional theory with self-understanding and the understanding of its own historical relatedness. Traditional thought represents an intellectually objectified form of knowledge, collected in the historical process of the domination of nature. Honneth stated that Horkheimer argued that traditional theory can produce only technical knowledge that helps the productive forces in the future but is unable to criticise the present organisations and social institutions. The scientific perfection of the domination of nature that traditional sciences represents does not lead to rational human decisions that can guarantee emancipatory potential in the productive forces (Honneth 1991: 5–14).
The starting premise in Horkheimer’s critical theory was that subject and object are not opposed to one another in the same way as in traditional theories because the whole society itself is the object of research and thus the critical theory is itself also part of this same process. The task of theory was to make conscious its constitutive historical conditions and to anticipate its political context of application. According to Honneth, Horkheimer’s analysis proceeded to address the aspects of social production and social struggle. Social struggles arise from the economic development of productive forces and the protests it causes. Critical theory finds its practical-critical activity from the subjective experiences of a prevailing injustice that is connected to a given distribution of social labour among social classes. Honneth described Horkheimer’s critical theory as representing a dialogically mediated interpretation of social reality in light of injustice experienced by the oppressed class (Honneth 1991: 14–17).

Horkheimer developed an interdisciplinary research program in the 1930s that combined investigations on political economy, mainly Friedrich Pollock’s research, the social psychology of Erich Fromm and the cultural-theoretical analysis of mass culture. The guiding motif for these disciplines was the question of what psychic mechanisms have come about that enable the tension between the social classes to remain latent, although this tension nearly causes social conflicts by enforcing the unequal economic distribution of goods. In Horkheimer’s model, a materialist reinterpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history was the interpretive background for integrating these three disciplines. (Honneth 1995a: 62–68.)

Horkheimer suggested three disciplines to study. First was an examination of the system of the newly organised capitalist economy by indicating the mechanisms of its domination. Friedrich Pollock’s research was assigned to this task and represented a structural analysis of the capitalist economy. Second were the psychological reasons that people voluntarily subject themselves to the mechanisms of the domination of capitalism. This was the task of Erich Fromm’s social psychology, which combined Freud’s psychoanalysis and a Marxist sociology. The third topic was the morality, lifestyles and interactions of capitalist society, which enabled a different cultural-praxis of dominations. According to Honneth, Horkheimer reduced the idea of culture as a functionalist theory to institutions where the action-theoretic view vanished. It did not concentrate on the familiar cultural communication within social groups or the everyday conflicts between the cultural actions of different social groups (Honneth 1995b: 62–70, Horkheimer 1982).

The purpose of these three disciplines was to make science (critical theory) transparent to all political and societal interests. The task of such critical theory
was to utilise interdisciplinary science, which could change the conditions of societal development. However, according to Honneth, Horkheimer’s model leads to the dualism of economics and psychoanalysis; the task of economics is to investigate the economic development producing a knowledge of reality, while psychoanalysis examines the motives, instincts and human needs. However, the concept of culture is left out of this dualism, causing one-sided critical theory (Honneth 1991: 30–31, Honneth 1995b: 67).

Honneth proposed that if Horkheimer had developed further the third research program, the cultural studies of capitalist society, he would have been forced to see the inclusive functionalism of critical theory. Critical theory would then have been open to study the social practices of dominations that have function not only in the reproduction or expansion of social relations of labour. These social practices would be everyday interactions, communicative situations that take place in people’s daily lives (Honneth 1995b: 69). This would reveal that the societal reproduction of a capitalist or any other system happens not only through blind compliance with functional demands or rules; rather, it appears through creative and spontaneous daily communicative socialisation processes. These communicative practices, which Jürgen Habermas concentrated on in his communicative action theory, were the crucial point that early critical theory ignored.

3.2.2 Critique of Theodor Adorno

Honneth addressed Adorno’s conceptualisations of critical theory that differed from Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary program. Adorno oriented his philosophy toward a theory of mass culture through the critique of regressive phenomena of capitalism where aesthetic enjoyment is fused with the mere consumption of commodities. Adorno was influenced by the analysis of fetishism, which Marx introduced in his critique of the political economy. Another strand that Adorno developed was the idea of a critique of instrumental reason. In his writings, Adorno sketched out the methodology of a philosophy that could reveal the socially determining configurations of action in an alienated world. This method is similar to Walter Benjamin’s hermeneutic method where the concepts of historical image and configurative language are the means for an interpretive technique for removing the instrumentalising spirit. Adorno influenced the development of critical theory in the 1940s by his theory of mass culture and the idea of a hermeneutic that were assigned to clarify an unconscious process of human natural history (Honneth 1991: 32–36).
Honneth argued that Adorno took the different systems of totalitarian domination so seriously as his starting points that they became the thematic horizon of his entire model of history. Honneth contended that Adorno read the relations of domination that became visible in his own time as a structural paradigm from which the hidden logic of the whole process of civilisation can be explained. For Honneth, Adorno’s critical theory was ‘the theory of the fascist present in which the hidden side of the things comes to light’. According to his theory, the progress of civilisation is revealed to be the process of human regression (ibid.).

The process of human regression is examined in *The Dialectics of Enlightenment*, which Adorno and Horkheimer wrote together. The basic idea of this book was to generalise Marx’s critique of capitalism as a theoretical model for explaining increasing reification in the liberal capitalist society extending it to whole civilisation process. Honneth emphasised that only in a few passages did Adorno and Horkheimer address the intersubjective relations remaining secondary to their central arguments. *The Dialectics of Enlightenment* manifested a Marxist idea that enlightenment has become a counterproductive process. In this process, humans have learnt to use nature as an object or by instruments to produce natural objects. This equipped humans with a new kind of instrumental thinking, where a person learns to assert himself or herself over nature. The developmental process was supposed to emerge through systematic disciplining of the instincts, impoverishing the sensual capabilities and the formation of social relations of domination. The logic of this process was the simple idea that, when humans have learnt as a historical process to relate themselves to nature with dominance, then this objectivizing attitude inevitably also penetrated the area of social relations. Human enlightenment began its counterproductive process because humans started to see each other as thing-like objects, and eventually, their self-relations transformed into thing-like objects. György Lukács’ concept of reification was the theoretical way for critical theory to demonstrate this process. Following the dialectics of enlightenment, the whole human civilisation process was viewed through logic of a gradual reification that started with the first act of the mastery of nature and found its endpoint in fascism (Adorno et al. 1986, Honneth 1991: 37–43, 1995b: 73–76).

Honneth introduced Adorno’s idea of ‘retrogressive anthropogenesis’ as a central concept of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s dialectics of enlightenment. In this concept, Adorno and Horkheimer attempted to understand individuals’ inner-psychic parallel to the process of the control of nature as a sketchy theory of the ego in the anthropological reflection. Honneth argued that, following this theory,
the development of ego is a process that plays out solely between an individual subject and his natural environment and wrongly assumes that human autonomy of results from the acts of isolated individuals. According to Honneth, Adorno and Horkheimer concluded that, when human subjects systematically increase their instrumental control over nature, they at the same time gradually forfeit their inner nature because they have to treat it in the same way as external nature. (Honneth 1991: 37–39).

The main theoretical obstacle in the old critical theory is its deep commitment to Marxism, especially the Marxist philosophy of history. Marx’s historical materialism was the coordinating background philosophy for Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary program. Honneth pointed out that the influences of Marx caused functionalist reductionism for critical theory. Functionalist reductionism means that all the methods and research of critical theory were designed such that only social phenomena that had functions in the reproduction and expansion of social labour signified. All the other forms of social phenomena were outside of the focus. In addition, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno did not eliminate the tradition of conscious philosophy (subject-philosophy) that defines human rationality as a subject’s cognitive relation with the object. They (Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) remained associated with this tradition through Marxist pathos by assuming that human rationality or reason is embedded in the capability (with the help of intellectual faculty/capitalism) for the instrumental disposal of natural objects. This line of thought leads to a limited theoretical worldview in which the history of humanity is characterised as the developmental history of human rationalisation or instrumentalisation of nature, the history of the societal processing of nature (Honneth 1995b: 70–71).

3.2.3 Jürgen Habermas and the communicative turn

The first generation of the Frankfurt school’s social-philosophical instruments were not sufficient to define cogent emancipatory interest in social reality. Honneth considered Habermas a recent and cogent theorist who successfully re-elaborated the directions of critical theory. Honneth regarded Habermas’ social theoretical alternative as a fresh but not a trouble-free attempt to reformulate the old critical theory. According to Honneth, Habermas’ theory of communicative action is functionalistic in categorising the social world on the basis of concepts such as the communicative and strategic action systems and life-world. The existence of these categories is impossible to justify, so communicative free rationality
emerges as a normative requirement through the structure of language. Honneth emphasised that social interaction cannot be fully grasped if it is defined solely in terms of the linguistic conditions of reaching understanding free of domination. Honneth argued that Habermas’ normative perspective prevented him (Habermas) from explicating the existing experiences of social injustice. Honneth intended to demonstrate that social injustice that evokes resistance and struggles is not motivated by positively formulated moral principles. Honneth went on to state that these struggles are motivated by the fact that people are denied the recognition they feel they deserve (Honneth 2007a: 65).

Honneth presupposed that we have cognitive expectations concerning others before we enter into the communicative situations. If these expectations are not fulfilled in our interaction with others, we intuitively feel that our rights have been violated and feel disrespected. Honneth concluded that the normative presupposition of all communicative action should be seen in the acquisition of social recognition. Honneth in his book *Disrespect* admitted that he was not yet able fully to justify the claim that the expectation of social recognition belongs to the structure of communicative action. This would require solving the difficult problem of replacing Habermas’ universal pragmatics with an anthropological concept that can explain the normative presuppositions of social interaction. Although Honneth delineated that the focus of critical theory has to move forward from the tension between the instrumental rationality or systems of instrumentality and life-word which is the ground for communicative action to the social causes of systematic violations of the conditions of recognition (Honneth 2007a: 72).

Honneth stated that Habermas’ universal pragmatics harmfully distinguished moral philosophy from that of everyday social experiences. According to Honneth, when subjects experience injury in the moral point of view it is not perceived in terms of a deviation of intuitively mastered rules of speech, but rather as violence to identity claims acquired through process of socialisation. Honneth (1995b.)

Honneth intended to overcome Habermas’ problem where the moral philosophy diverges from the daily experiences of moral injustices. According to Honneth, Hegel’s idea of a struggle for recognition in his Jena lectures is the initial starting point from which we can find arguments that demands for morality rises from the demands for the development of intact identity formation. Hegel’s early model gave a moral guarantee to individuals’ struggles for the recognition of their developing claims to identity. According to Honneth, Hegel’s theory on the struggle for recognition contained a prescientific reference point upon which critical
theory had to rely. Honneth described Hegel’s innovation as a conception of morality that can be connected in a satisfactory manner to the intuitive moral sentiments of subjects and contain an indication of the mechanism through which those feelings could become a motivational wellspring for social conflicts (Honneth 1995b: xiv–xvi).

Honneth’s theoretical exploration of critical theory could be summarised as a critical conceptual analysis that seeks to identify the pathologies of contemporary social structures and offering ways toward emancipation from these pathologies. According to Honneth, various authors of the Frankfurt school were united in the idea that the living conditions of modern capitalist societies produce social practices, attitudes or personality structures that result in a pathological deformation of our capacity for reason. Critical theory in its plurality always aims at exploring the social causes of the pathology of human rationality. Honneth was concerned with the contemporary development that, in the pressures of aimless professionalisation, there is a danger that philosophy and social analysis will be conclusively broken. Honneth emphasised that the heritage of German idealism, the understanding of rationality depending on social-historical processes, had begun to disappear. In this context, the renewal of critical theory approaches was a salutary task for Honneth (Honneth 2009: viii).

3.3 Retrieving the critical core of the critical theory

Despite his criticism, Honneth argued that the Frankfurt school’s critical theorists discovered important critical potential that can be revised and maintained. The unifying intention in research on critical theory has been the idea of the maintenance of mediation of theory and history in a concept of socially effective reason. According to Honneth, the historical past should be understood from a practical point of view. History should be taken as a developmental process in which, through enlightenment, subjects have overcome the pathological deformations of capitalism. Honneth contended that, if we want to retrieve the critical core of the old critical theory and make it topical, first, we need to examine the ethical core that is inherent in the definitions of a socially deficient rationality. Second, it is necessary to outline how capitalism can be understood as a cause of such a deformation of social rationality. Third, these analyses should produce practices for overcoming the social suffering caused by deficient rationality (Honneth 2009: 20–21).
In the first step, examining the ethical core that is contained in the critical theory’s idea of a socially deficient rationality, Honneth highlighted the idea that social pathologies are to be understood as a result of deficient rationality. This Hegelian thread leads to the idea that rational potential is inherent in societal institutions, practices and everyday routines, but capitalist society is unable to express these potentials properly. Honneth’s first thesis was that each successful form of society is possible only through the maintenance of its most highly developed standards of rationality. The standards of rationality are highly developed when they provide the members of society with possibilities for orientations through which they can meaningfully direct their lives. According to these rational principles, every member of society should feel that these principles lead to a successful and shared undistorted life where all can understand these principles as rational ends for their self-actualisation. Honneth contended that any deviation or lack of such social rationality, such as communal ends or universal norms, leads to social pathology (Honneth 2009: 21–28).

Honneth contended that all the members of the Frankfurt school share the fundamental idea that emancipation from distorted social relations has to start from the cooperative self-actualisation which should be also universally rational process. This cooperative self-actualisation is more than just the result of the coordination of individual interests; it requires a higher degree of intersubjective agreement than liberalism allows. This cooperative self-actualisation fulfils the task of increasing social rationality by assuming that, when the possibilities for individual self-actuality increase, the actualisation of reason also increases. Strangely Honneth argues that it was clear for all the critical theorists that a liberating practice of cooperation cannot be based on mere feelings of membership or social bonds, as it requires rational insights. Liberating practices should start from the rational insights based on a well-grounded analysis of human development producing reciprocally shared self-actualisation processes (Honneth 2009: 28). This argument contradicts Honneth’s (2012a, 2013c: 154–176) views on education where education represents an affect-mediated process of habituation or initiation to some emotionally loaded culture. For Honneth education is learning through voluntary involvement with affect-mediated cultures, like within the sphere of a family where a child learns to follow the habits of the parents based on love and mutual trust. Thus it seems odd that critical awareness of social pathologies starts from different viewpoints than affect-mediated processes do, i.e., rational analyses.
In the second step, outlining capitalism’s deformation of social rationality, Honneth stated that all the critical theorists have emphasised the relationship of cause and effect between social injustice and the absence of any public negative reactions to it. The absence of negative reactions was explained by the fact that capitalism produces a system of convictions that has the paradoxical quality of diverting one’s attention from the very social conditions that structurally produced them. Honneth contended that this kind of analysis of the causal relation between social injustice and the absence of negative reactions requires an element of historical explanation. For Honneth, a historical process of the deformation of reason causally explains the failure that constitutes the social pathology of the present, and causally explains the failure of individuals to formulate the universally valid social rationality. (Honneth 2009: 30.)

Honneth examined György Lukács’ writings and argue that these writings for the first time offered a promising way to analyse capitalism’s limited state of rationality. For Lukács, the subjects are forced in capitalism to types of practices that make them metaphorically speaking spectators of their own life without any ability to influence the occurring events. Honneth’s interpretation is that for Lukács, the capitalist society separates individuals’ genuine needs and intentions from the occurring events, i.e., the demands of social reality, or hinders individuals from recognising genuine needs and interests in the first place. The mechanised division of labour and the exchange of goods generates a reified attitude where all other human beings appear to be unfeeling, thing-like objects. In today’s capitalism, Lukács’ analysis could be understood as revealing a logic in which a certain form of practice achieves dominance in capitalism, compelling indifference to those aspects of other human beings that are valuable. Then, instead of relating to one another with mutual recognition, subjects view themselves as objects of others’ interests, according to Honneth (2009: 34).

Lukács’ writings represented for Honneth a categorical framework that made it possible for critical theory to define distortions in the actualisation of reason in a new way. These distortions could be defined following Lukács’ concept of reification. Honneth contended that Lukács’ writings provided a critical diagnosis of his era that was radical and penetrating in a manner similar to that of the young Hegel. Both of these theoreticians, Hegel and Lukács, according to Honneth, offered in their early writings definitions of social pathologies that are free from critical theory’s limiting scheme of the theory of rationality (Honneth 1995b: xx–xxi, Honneth et al. 2008).
Third, Honneth, in his revision of the critical core, aimed to examine and update the possibilities for overcoming the social suffering caused by the deficient rationality of capitalism. The overcoming of social pathologies cannot be achieved only by philosophical reflection but requires a psychoanalytical orientation. Critical theory took Freudian psychoanalysis as its methodological model for establishing a connection between defective rationality and individual suffering. With the help of Freud, critical theory posited that human subjects cannot be indifferent about the restriction of their rational capacities. Individuals’ self-actualisation is tied to the presupposition of cooperative rational activity, and thus they cannot avoid suffering psychologically under its deformation. Honneth elaborated that Freud pointed out that there must be an internal connection between psychological intactness and undistorted rationality (Honneth 2009: 38–39).

According to Honneth, Freud gave important insight for critical theory: the logic of psychoanalytical treatment was adapted as a model for analyses of the social pathologies in capitalism. Social pathologies of capitalism produce stress for individuals, which pushes them toward a cure. Thus, the same power that restricts access to the cure makes them act toward the cure. In other words, an individual who suffers from a neurotic illness also wants to be free from that suffering. Honneth argued that critical theory can maintain its Freudian potential if it can construct a realistic concept of emancipatory interest. This interest should be able to give answers to the following question: what experiences, practices or needs allow the process of realisation of rational action despite the deformation or skewing of social rationality, or what would the remaining rational incentives be for healing individuals of the social suffering? As in the treatment of neurotic illnesses, it is necessary to presuppose the existence of an indestructible core of rational responsiveness; it is this same indestructible responsiveness that realistic emancipatory interest should uncover at the societal level (Honneth 2009: 42).

3.3.1 The concept of reification

Honneth (2008, 2009), in his books Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea and Pathologies of Reason emphasised that Lukács’ critical theory or critical analysis of capitalism is worthy when considering reviving the critical potential of critical theory. I elaborate on Honneth’s critical studies of Lukács that reveal how the concept of reification could be rehabilitated for the contemporary critique.

Lukács’ concept of reification was one of the theoretical cornerstones of critical theory when explaining social pathologies. However, Honneth considered the
definitions of reification a one-dimensional because the only social cause of reification for Lukács was the expansion of commodity exchange in a capitalist society. Lukács’ concept of reification concerned three relations, our relation to nature, social relations and self-relations. For Lukács, capitalist society causes reification simultaneously in all these world relations by narrowing individuals’ only to orient themselves with the demands of profit-oriented perspectives. In other words, the capitalist form of life inevitably requires every person to perceive himself, nature and other persons as mere things and objects to gain profit. The economic profitability thinking turned into second nature for humans in capitalism (Butler 2008: 98, Honneth et al. 2008: 22–25).

Lukács’ outlines of the ‘second nature’ of capitalism are, however, limited. Honneth argued that the capitalist commodity exchange enforces the depersonalisation of social relations, which is not the same thing as reification; when persons take reifying attitudes toward each other, they deny their whole existence as humans. In capitalist exchange, if successful, interaction partners need to regard each other at least as bearers of certain rights. Thus, they cannot wholly deny each other’s existence as humans (Honneth et al. 2008: 25–32, 77–78).

The connection among the different forms of reification cannot be taken so directly that reification in one relation would give rise to reification in other relations; reification in our relation with nature does not necessarily produce reification in our self-relations. For Lukács, reification in capitalist society is a social fact such that everyone is socialised in the same manner. It is the system of the capitalist economy that colonises family life, general public opinion, the educational system and our leisure time and emerges through the depersonalisation of human relationships. According to Honneth, this definition of reification is too deterministic and leaves out of its scope the sphere of social life, which today causes much stronger reifying behaviour, such as human trafficking or racism. In addition, Lukács’ concept of reification and critical analyses based on it have an idealistic presupposition of the existence of an intact or genuine praxis, a non-reified world from which social reality has departed. However, it remains unclear whether this kind of intact, genuine praxis exists and how it would be revivable for general knowledge (Butler 2008: 98, Honneth et al. 2008: 25–32, 77–78).

Raymond Guess (2008: 124) conceived Honneth’s reformulation of reification as based on the supposition that Lukács was right in assuming that modern society is reified but that Lukács’ foundation for his theory of reification was wrong. The problem with Lukács’ concept of reification is the logic that reification is identical to objectification of our thoughts and that every action that re-
quires objective thinking or objectification leads to the process of reification. Honneth saw no reason to connect, like Lukács, the objectification of nature and the harm of the primacy of care or qualitative experiences. Reification in a direct sense can happen only in our relations with other persons, not in our relation with nature. Honneth stated that, if we can take up a reifying stance toward the objective world, we still have the cognitive possibility to disclose it. Instead, if we take up a reifying stance toward other persons, we lose the possibility to understand the other as a person (Honneth et al. 2008: 64). In this sense, we can say that reification occurs only in interpersonal relations.

According to Honneth, the idea of reification would be more plausible if it were understood as an action where two kinds of knowledge are mixed: knowledge that is sensitive to acts of recognition and knowledge in which every trace of its antecedent act of recognition has been lost. These two types of knowledge are transparent and accessible or obscure and inaccessible to each other. Honneth asserted that we need superordinate criteria for judging this kind of mixture of these two types of knowledge. Honneth stated, “Reification happens when the act of cognition or detached observation frees itself of the knowledge of its dependency and deludes itself that it has become autonomous of all non-epistemic prerequisites.” According to Honneth, this process can be described as a forgetfulness of recognition. Honneth was convinced that Adorno, Stanley Cavell and Dewey also had in mind this element of forgetting or amnesia of recognition when they referred to the concepts as pathology, scepticism and identity thought. Forgetfulness of recognition appears, for example, when someone is expressing his or her feelings for us; we perceive these feelings in a cognitive sense, but we are unable to feel the connection or to be affected by these expressions. In that case, we are observing the world like an autistic child; everything is merely an observable object, without any emotions or impulses. This kind of oblivion of the antecedent recognition was for Honneth (Honneth et al. 2008: 56–58) the cause of all forms of reification.

Honneth clarified that, in reification, it is not a matter of an unlearning process; rather, it is our reduced attentiveness that slips recognition out of our sight. Honneth provided two very practical examples of this action. The first was an institutionalised form of reification, a tennis player who is so focused on winning the game that he forgets that his opponent is his best friend and he started the hobby for the sake of his friend. War was another example of this action. In both cases, the purpose of observing and cognising the surroundings becomes so independent that it obscures everything else in the background. Second are the reify-
ing ideologies: a selective interpretation of social facts means that we allow some ossified and untruthful though schemata like prejudices and stereotypes to affect our interpretation of social facts (Honneth *et al.* 2008: 58–60).

From these classifications, the second type of reification, *reifying ideologies*, seems to be more obvious in our societies. Honneth elaborated on two reifying ideologies, *cognitivist* and *constructivist* approaches, which have been widely accepted and spread without much concern for the deficient elements of these ideologies. Both of these thinking patterns can cause reification in self-relations. Honneth referred to the cognitivist approach as a detectivist model. According to this model, a person can become aware of his own desires and feelings in the same way that he perceives objective reality. From the cognitivist view, our intentions, feelings and desires are prior to or endogenous in our consciousness. We just have to be the detectives who discover and make them accessible to our consciousness as they appear. Honneth criticised this view as problematic because, according to it, we would need to have instincts similar to those we have for perceiving objective reality and our inner world, feelings, intentions and desires. However, cognitivist science has not been able to discover this kind of instinct, like a ‘human inner eye’. Second, intentions, feelings and desires should be categorised like the definitions and descriptions of natural objects. This means that we should be able to define and describe precisely our mental occurrences even before we start to discover these occurrences (*ibid.*: 67–69).

The constructivist approach is reifying because it assumes that humans’ inner intentions, feelings and desires are so simple that it is possible to name these intentions directly in the interaction with other persons. When a person articulates his inner intentions to another person, he at the same time allows these intentions to exist for himself. According to Honneth, constructivism wrongly assumes that we can conceptualise our feelings, or that by constructing explicitly our feelings and desires we can manipulate them. Constructivism seems to be the empty process of naming our intentions without really understanding them. Contrary to constructivism, feelings, desires and intentions are for Honneth passively exposed long before we can attain the necessary distance for interpreting them (Honneth *et al.* 2008: 69–70).

Cognitive and constructivist approaches take the self as a thing-like object: in cognitivism, the self is seen as something fixed and given, and in constructivism, the self is something to be instrumentally produced for a certain situation. Honneth provided two different social types of these. A person who has a cognitivist self-relation would regard his or her own desires as fixed and permanent charac-
teristics that just have to be discovered, like given talents. A person who has a constructivist self-relation lives in the illusion that the feelings and desires he calculatingly presents to others could in fact be his genuine feelings and intentions. Honneth underlined that these reified self-relations occur when persons forget the antecedent recognition. According to Honneth, it is the fact that we have known what it means to have desires, feelings and intentions that is worthy of affirmation and articulation, but somehow, we later lose or replace these mental states with false ones. If we forget our antecedent affirmation of our feelings, then we allow the space for reified self-relations such as the constructivist and cognitivist types (Honneth et al. 2008: 72–73).

Both cognitivism and constructivism seem to characterise deficiently spontaneous and unconscious feelings and intentions. Honneth sketched a middle path between cognitivism and constructivism. He asserted that it is possible for us to disclose and articulate the foreignness of these feelings by comparing unfamiliar feelings with the horizon of feelings that are already familiar to us. Important in this process is the attitude of self-care, where a person regards his own psychic experiences as worthy of being actively disclosed and articulated (ibid.: 70–72).

Honneth took his new look at an old idea of reification by defining it as the interplay of reifying ideologies and worldviews with a particular reifying praxis. The example of this kind of interplay could be the praxis where a child’s potentials and talents are regarded solely as an issue of genetic measurement and manipulation, which finds reinforcement in reifying stereotypes that those of a certain race are more talented than those of some other race. In this interplay, the reifying praxis is reinforced by reifying ideology, and ideology reinforces its typifying descriptions with the help of a reifying praxis (Honneth et al. 2008: 79–82).

Honneth provided hints about how our self-relation can practically become reified in modern societies; self-reification can emerge through institutionalised social practices that are connected with the artificial self-presentation of subjects. These kinds of situations include job interviews, jobs in the service industry and organised dating services. Honneth considered that, the more a person is involved with these kinds of self-portrayal practices, the more his or her tendencies for self-reification increases. In these self-portrayal practices, the person must self-evidently pretend and perform feelings and intentions that are not his or her genuine feelings. Honneth saw these practices as compelling a person to react to his or her feelings and attitudes as objects that can be brought forth at any time and can be formed according to future demands. This causes a person to experience his or
her feelings and intentions as arbitrarily manipulatable things (Honneth et al. 2008: 82–84).

Honneth conceived reification as a form of praxis that is structurally false, not as a categorical mistake or moral failure. Judith Butler argued that this definition was the only way for Honneth to demonstrate the importance of recognition in human exchange and communication. Honneth did not consider recognition an action that is guided by external moral principles but by principles of recognition that constitute the ideal state and not the reified social praxis (Butler 2008: 106). The central problem here is how three forms of recognition as a norm of ethical life can be assumed not to represent the external norms. How should Hegel’s love, rights and social esteem be understood without reverting to these as limiting external norms, and how can these ethical concepts represent learning processes?

Butler saw that, following Honneth’s argumentation, another person remains reified for us if we cannot take the perspective of another. Butler asserted that it is possible for us to fail to take another’s perspective but still be in a participatory relationship with the other. According to Butler, it is possible that we have, for example, aggressive and negative feelings and aims toward the other that are highly affective. Butler argued that Honneth could not claim that affective involvement is a sign of recognition and detachment a sign of a reifying attitude. Butler saw our relations with others as wholly affective involvement, which consists of our inner struggle between love (a recognitive stance) and hate (aggressive affections). Butler criticised Honneth by stating that positive affirmations are not the only forms of action that emerge through affective involvement (Butler 2008: 98–106).

Honneth held recognition to be persistent in our social interactions because, in all forms of reification, some traces of recognition remain; it cannot fully vanish. Jonathan Lear conceived Honneth’s starting point being that there must be something good in every human being. There cannot exist a wholly evil person. Honneth delineated reification as forgetting something that we previously remembered. The prior condition gives us the hope in reification that we will remember the positive attitudes of that condition. Lear suggested that Honneth unwittingly built too much goodness into that prior condition. Lear argued that there is no empirical or any other kind of evidence for Honneth’s assertion about the prior condition of recognition. Thus, there is no evidence that reification would appear as some kind of forgetfulness of a previous prior condition of recognition (Lear 2008: 123, 136). However, it is possible to criticise Lear with the same argument, that there is no evidence to support his conceptual choice to distinguish

Judith Butler criticised Honneth’s selective reading of the psychological attachment theories and ignoring the theories of the differentiation. According to Butler, the attachment theories that Honneth used give a one-sided view; there exists also a different view where the differentiation process precedes attachment. According to these theories, when a person is capable of attaching to something, he or she must already have crossed the dividing line between that thing, that person and herself or himself. Butler considered that, when a person is able to take another person’s perspective, he/she must be able to distinguish the other’s perspective from his/her own perspective, and only after this cognitive process can he or she understand the other person’s perspective. Thus, the differentiation process is as much a condition of the attachment as it is a consequence. In response to Honneth’s underlining that attachment precedes the ability to take the other person’s perspective, Butler argued that this ability requires a similar differentiation process. Butler contended that, when a person is capable of taking another’s perspective, he or she must be able to see himself or herself as a separate being from another person. Butler defined differently from Honneth’s account the formation of attachment as an ambivalent struggle where a person fights with the feelings of breaking and separating and at the same time with the feelings of unity, dependency, helplessness and need. According to Butler, Honneth’s account emphasised too strongly only the positive side of the attachment process (Butler 2008: 106, 108).

Judith Butler’s criticism interestingly revealed the peculiarity of Honneth’s argumentation. Honneth understood detached observation as a reifying attitude, relying on the observational methods of psychology to gain empirical reinforcement for his arguments. Butler (2008) asked how we can get reliable knowledge about recognition relying on theories that do not concentrate on the concept of recognition as prerecognitive affection but as objectively observable phenomenon (*ibid.*: 110–111).

Raymond Guess elaborates that, for Honneth, recognition seemed to be a precondition for any form of human cognition, and at the same time, it should provide the basis for a non-moralising analysis of social pathologies, i.e., be the basis for radical criticism of societies. Guess noted the same problem as Butler in Honneth’s argumentation; if recognition is the precondition for everything and anything, including hatred and indifference, then it cannot be the basis of social criticism. Guess claimed that brutality, indifference and active intentional destructive-
ness are highly complex phenomena and cannot be explained by the lack of recognition or forgetfulness of recognition or referring to social pathology. Geuss (2008: 120–128) argued that awareness of the priority of recognition over cognition does not help us to explain the violence and brutal action of people in contemporary societies.

The above outlined critique reflects a wider philosophical turn, the intersubjective turn in the tradition of critical theory. This so-called intersubjective turn has received acrimonious critique in philosophical debates. I examine in a preliminary manner how Honneth’s account and especially how his writings on reification are situated in this debate.

### 3.3.2 Problematic intersubjectivity

The most fruitful elements that we can distil from Honneth’s reformulations of the concept of reification concerns the problems of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Honneth, like many other intersubjectivist philosophers, took intersubjectivity as prior to subjectivity. In Honneth’s case, prerecognitive attitudes precede the cognitive development of humans; recognition is prior to cognition. Honneth’s arguments can be put schematically as follows: a) recognition is a precondition of cognition; b) reification is a failure of recognition; c) the importance of cognition has increased in societies, and for that reason, we have good reasons to criticise any dimension of society that undermines the precondition of cognition, i.e., recognition, and d) following from points a, b and c, we have grounds to criticise a society that is reified (Geuss 2008: 124).

Honneth formulated two justifications, a genetic and a conceptual one, for his thesis that a recognitional stance enjoys priority over all other attitudes toward the self and the world. Honneth’s argument was that recognition comes before cognition or that emotional receptivity comes before the transition to cognition of intersubjectively given objects. The human self or subjectivity develops intersubjectively, and intersubjective action, recognition and its affirmative attitude enable the cognitive development of the child. According to Honneth, the same idea is constituted by Heidegger’s concept of care, Dewey’s concept of practical involvement and Lúkaecs engaged praxis. All these theorists assumed that empathetic engagement with the world is prior to our detached cognitive action (Honneth et al. 2008: 36–46).

Honneth began his genetic justification with the assumption that characteristic of human behaviour is the communicative stance achieved through taking a
second person’s perspective. The ability to take another person’s perspective precedes interaction, which can be viewed as existential care or a recognitive stance. Honneth contended that developmental psychology and socialization research has for a long time agreed that thinking and abilities for interaction develop through the process of taking another person’s perspective. Honneth considers Jean Piaget, G.H. Mead, Donald Davidson and Freud as having a similar idea that the cognitive development of a child is keenly related to the formation of the primary relations of communication. However, Honneth criticises these theorists for largely considering the relation of a child with its figure of attachment without giving attention to the emotional sides of this process. At the time of Mead, Davidson and Piaget, there was a strong cognitivist tendency to describe early childhood communication and the process of learning to take place from the perspective of a concrete second person as a process where the child’s affective connection to this second person did not play any significant role. Honneth contends that comparative autism research has recently tried to revise these limited cognitivist perspectives. These investigations have demonstrated that a small child must first have identified emotionally with an attachment figure before he can accept this person’s stance toward the world as a corrective authority. (Honneth et al. 2008: 40–47). Jonathan Lear (2008: 133) criticises Honneth’s view ignoring a huge body of literature on child development considering the emotional aspects of recognition in the relation between an infant and her emerging world. This literature includes, for example, the work of John Bowlby, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, D.W. Winnicott and Peter Fonagy

Honneth took these recent comparative investigations of children with autism as a serious demonstration of the fact that a small child must first have identified emotionally with a psychological parent before he can accept this person’s stance toward the world. According to Honneth, we can find these results in Hobson’s (1993, 2004) and Tomasello’s (1999, 2008) research studies. According to these approaches, the decisive cause of autism is that an autistic child is structurally prevented from emotional identification with a concrete second person or a caregiver, i.e., from the perspective of the second person. This isolation from emotional identification with the caregiver leaves a child entrapped in his own worldview, and the child cannot become familiar with any other perspectives. Tomasello’s and Hobson’s research studies agreed that a child’s ability to take another person’s perspective leads to the development of the capacity for symbolic thinking. Honneth argued that at the centre of these studies is the process of mutual recognition and that recognition of this kind is the precondition for the
It seems that Honneth mixes cognition and symbolic thinking here, these both are considered the same and conditions for the development of both cognition and symbolic thinking in recognition of an affective relationship between the infant and his or her caregiver.

Second, Honneth furthered his conceptual justification armed with Stanley Cavell’s philosophy. According to Honneth, Cavell’s philosophy can give theoretical ingredients for the categorical justification. According to Honneth, Cavell started with the assumption that we cannot achieve purely cognitive knowledge concerning another person’s mind. Our knowledge of another person’s mental state is categorically something different from our knowledge of ourselves, and it cannot be compared with our pure perceptions of physical objects. According to Honneth, Cavell asserted that we can have knowledge of another person’s mental state only through acknowledgement of the other, which constitutes a non-epistemic prerequisite for linguistic understanding (Honneth et al. 2008: 48–50).

Honneth understood this as meaning the acts of acknowledgement are antecedents of linguistic understanding. Thus, it seems that any cognitive action must precede acts of acknowledgement. Honneth reformulated Cavell’s acts of acknowledge as a recognitional stance. The recognitional stance is something more or different from just taking another person’s perspective; it is something more than a mere communicative stance. In this antecedent recognitional stance, we take an empathetic attitude toward the other person’s emotional statements and perceive the specific value of the other person. This is affectedness and involvement in the interaction. Honneth emphasised that only through empathy can we say that we really know what another person’s expressions of emotions are (Honneth et al. 2008: 50–52).

Honneth’s conclusion was somewhat problematic: an empathetic attitude, affectness and involvement with other person in an interaction are the preconditions for learning linguistic propositions, while the learning process of the empathetic attitude is a non-linguistic process. Mutual recognition, a non-linguistic process is learnt pre-linguistically in intersubjective action by taking another person’s perspective as well as empathetic engagement in the interaction. These arguments are difficult to demonstrate, first because the ability to feel empathy would be very hard to perceive if it were a non-linguistic action. For Honneth, a child’s ability to recognise the emotional bond with his or her caregiver develops before the ability to perceive physical objects, and these two developmental processes should not be confused with each other. However, this argument might
need more clarification because it is not so clear that are these kinds of abilities that first require cognitive development for a child or at least that the ability to feel empathy might be learnt side by side with the development of linguistic skills or cognitive skills.

Honneth’s genetic justification with reference to research studies on autistic children might not assert this justification because it compels a somewhat one-sided view where a child with autism is understood as solely disabled with respect to symbolic thinking and cognitive actions. I argue that a child with autism can have good cognitive abilities, although his or her social abilities can be very limited. Honneth assumed that, when a person’s early childhood emotional bond with his or her caregiver is restricted, the child’s cognitive abilities are underdeveloped. The logic of this argument is that, if a person is not capable of taking another person’s perspective and empathy, he or she is not capable of linguistic and cognitive development. This argument cannot be proved by referring only to recent autism research. Even if, this argument being commensurable with our ordinary experiences, it is questionable that how well the research results of autism research applies to a person with no autism. Altogether, it remains unclear that how this justification is in any sense a genetic one.

Jonathan Lear (2008: 134–136) similarly impugned Honneth’s thesis by taking the example of a personality type of a narcissist. Honneth’s thesis becomes implausible when we try to explain the acts of a narcissist. Lear stated that there exist narcissist personalities that are very skilful in taking another person’s perspective and giving recognition to the other along with their own motivations, desires and projects. This kind of a narcissist does have remarkable social skills and skills for giving recognition. He or she uses the social skills in the service of treating other people as a means to gain his or her own egoistic goals. Others are used instrumentally as tools to gain the intended goals by means of recognition. Lear distinguished two kinds of recognition, empty recognition (recognition–as–sine–qua–non), which involves the minimum emotive-cognitive recognition of another’s point of view required for the development of a capacity for symbolic thought, language, and the ability to recognise and track the mental state of others and a paradigmatic recognition (recognition–as–paradigm), which is needed for the development of the capacities for sympathy, empathy and acknowledgement of others. According to Lear, Honneth did not see this kind of conceptual difference between these two types of recognition, which makes Honneth’s model deficient. This kind distinction, according to Lear, is helpful when explaining the recognition that a narcissist personality very skilfully uses. A narcissist is capable
of taking another person’s perspective and does not treat others as merely thing-like objects; instead, he or she is very concerned others’ feelings, intentions and aims. Lear underlined that, in the case of a narcissist, it is useless to analyse his or her actions referring to the forgetfulness of recognition; rather, a narcissist’s action is an action of empty recognition (Lear 2008: 134–136).

Judith Butler also challenged Honneth’s thesis of the priority of recognition over cognition by arguing that, when a person adopts a second person’s perspective, he first must regard the other as a second person, as not oneself, separate from oneself. This perspective requires the differentiation process, the loss of egocentrism, in two senses: first through the recognition of the second person as another and then by adopting this second person’s perspective, which opens the independent objective world for us. Adopting the perspective of the second person introduces us to a new aspect of the object but at the same time constitutes the objectivity of the object (Butler 2008: 116).

All these criticisms reflect the general philosophical criticism against the inter-subjectivistic turn in critical theory. It seems that all these criticisms share the fundamental idea that following intersubjectivistic identity development is too strongly dependent on other subjects’ contributions and that it might be that a subject must be aware of himself or of his identity before he can recognise another subject’s identity. Individuals’ identity formation is taken as problematic if it relies purely on intersubjectivity (Kivelä 2004).

However, there exist alternative philosophical insights (Ikäheimo 2003, Stojanov 2007) that consider Hegel’s philosophy one where Cartesian subjective philosophy integrates with intersubjective philosophy. According to this contrary interpretation, the subject first forms the common self or a shared self-image and then adapts this self-image to his own self or identity. Perhaps Honneth’s approach should be analysed similarly as a philosophical program where the two paradigms, Cartesian subjective philosophy and Hegel’s intersubjective philosophy, are not necessarily exclusive of each other.
4 Theory of recognition and education

When approaching the core idea of Honneth’s theory of recognition in reference to education, it is necessary to consider three forms of freedoms that Honneth addressed. Honneth contended that modernity generated three ideas about freedom, negative freedom, reflexive freedom and social freedom. Negative freedom corresponds to Hobbes’ and Machiavelli’s ideas about freedom. Reflexive freedom was posited by Rousseau and furthered by Kant, and social freedom has been argued to supersede these forms of freedoms. Honneth attempted to criticise Kant’s ‘constructive’ idea of freedom by elaborating on the social freedom inherent in Hegel’s philosophy of right. Honneth (2011: chapter C) devoted the final chapter in his book Das Recht Der Freiheit, the largest section, to a reconstruction of the norms implicit in the three spheres in which social freedom should be realised: personal relationships, the market economy, and democratic will formation. His reconstruction aimed to show the move from reflexive freedom to social freedom as an important learning process where personal relations, the market and democracy offer a social and empirical context for the realisation of freedom.

This chapter is constructed following Honneth’s leading idea that the spheres of social freedom as educative elements enable the transition from reflexive freedom toward social freedom. In the first section, 4.1 a conceptual clarification is made to specify what we mean when we use the term ‘recognition’. The section 4.2 examines the theoretical origins from which the concept of social freedom emerges. In the section 4.3 examines how social freedom is argued to be distinctively better from the negative and the reflexive freedoms. Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 examine the embodiments of social freedom, i.e., personal relations, the market economy and democratic will formation, from the educational perspective. The last part, 4.7, aims to show critically how social freedom and education are interrelated using Honneth’s own words.

4.1 The conceptual clarification of recognition

The concept of recognition with all its dimensions is the substrate of social freedom. It is worthwhile to step back, before addressing the specific spheres of social freedom, to consider what we mean exactly when we use the term ‘recognition’. I rely here on Heikki Ikäheimo’s and Arto Laitinen’s cogent definitions. They described three different everyday uses of the term. First, ‘recognition’ is used synonymously with identification, which in this case means that, by identify-
ing, we can recognise anything numerically as the entity it is, qualitatively as an entity with certain qualities and generically as belonging to a certain species. Second, recognition is used synonymously with acknowledgement when it refers to an action where we acknowledge something as valuable. The third usage of the term according to Ikäheimo and Laitinen is interpersonal recognition or the paradigmatic sense of recognition, which is most commonly used in Hegel-influenced debates where only persons, groups or collectives of persons can be recognised (Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2011: 7–8, Brink & Owen 2007: 34–36).

Among the definitions of recognition as identification, acceptance and interpersonal recognition, the third mode is certainly the most relevant and is the action category that Honneth described in his theory of recognition. This third mode of recognition, i.e., interpersonal recognition, can be described as one-dimensional or multi-dimensional. Honneth’s model is a multi-dimensional approach to recognition involving three forms, love, rights and esteem. Love refers to the recognitive attitude where a person is recognised as a singular needy being capable of happiness and misery. Rights refers to the recognition where a person is recognised as capable of rational self-determination and moral deliberation, as a bearer of rights and duties. Esteem is described as recognition where persons are recognised as having particular qualities, capacities and achievements that merit evaluative affirmation by others (Honneth 1995a, Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2011: 8).

Moreover, Honneth’s account of recognition can be defined as an ontological account. Ikäheimo emphasised that it is decisive to distinguish ethical and ontological accounts. Ethical accounts of recognition conceive recognition as something that makes our lives as persons better in various ways, while ontological approaches view recognition as something that makes us persons in the first place. According to Ikäheimo (Schmidt am Busch & Zurn 2010: 344–346), ontological accounts that are based on Hegel’s philosophy are more prominent than ethical accounts.

Ikäheimo and Laitinen (Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2011: 10) stated that, while Honneth’s theory is a multi-dimensional model of interpersonal recognition, institutional recognition concerns not persons per se but persons as bearers of institutional deontic powers. Honneth did not explicitly address persons’ institutionally created deontic powers. According to Ikäheimo and Laitinen, there exist two senses of institutional recognition; one is the granting of deontic powers to persons by the appropriate authorities, and another is responding appropriately to persons as bearers of particular deontic powers that they have been granted previously. These two models, response and attribute models of institutional recogni-
tion are in a distinct sense ‘impersonal’ even though they have persons as their objects; any set of deontic powers or the institutional roles or positions they comprise are fundamentally transferable to any persons. Honneth’s model of recognition lacks this kind of analyses of deontic powers of recognition.

Ikäheimo and Laitinen emphasised that it is decisive to make a distinction between interpersonal recognition and institutional recognition for clarity in social ontology. They stated that we can, for example, respect the policeman as a bearer of institutional powers without having much respect for him as an individual person, while it would be completely different to claim that there would be respect for institutional powers in society even if no one had absolutely any interpersonal respect for any others as having authority over his or her behaviour (Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2011: 10–11). Honneth has been criticised for intermingling in his theory these two dimensions, institutional and interpersonal levels of recognition.

If we follow Ikäheimo’s and Laitinen’s suggestions, then Honneth’s interpersonal recognition model should be regarded keeping in mind the following questions: is recognition in it something responsive to persons or something about them, or is it creative or constitutive action? Are the different forms of recognition something responsive that should already exist in our social world and in all persons or do the forms of recognition represent something creative to which we can elaborate our existing social institutions further?

Honneth’s elaborations of the spheres of social freedom offer answers to these questions. Honneth updated Hegel’s ‘family’, ‘civil society’ and ‘state’ as ‘personal relationships’, ‘the market economy’ and ‘democratic will formation’. These spheres have two important meanings; first, only these spheres can guarantee healthy self-relations and intact identity development. Second, they are the constitutive and integrative power that forms, holds and unites individuals in societies, communities and groups; i.e., they generate the norms driving us toward I in We as Honneth’s recent book has been shown (Honneth 2012c). However Ikäheimo’s and Laitinen’s questions are significant in a sense that we should keep in mind how well Honneth can conceptualize the distinction between the factual and the counterfactual which has always been the trade mark for the critical theory.

4.2 The origins of social freedom

The starting point for the Hegelian idea of social freedom lies in Hegel’s ‘scientific’ treatment of natural law, and it was a step toward an intersubjective under-
standing of public life. Hegel was influenced by Friedrich Hölderlin’s philosophy of unification, Plato, Aristotle and a critique of the English political economy. He began by developing the Aristotelian idea of an ethical community of free citizens where the process of the formation of the human spirit emerges and, on the other hand, the strategic public sphere where subjects encounter each other only as legal persons, as actors isolated from one another. Hegel’s contribution to natural law reflected the philosophical dilemma of how to increase individual freedom and the freedom of the community (Honneth et al. 1992: 203–204).

Honneth argued that Hegel criticised modern social philosophy for making a fundamental error in its atomistic premise; in both empirical and formal treatments of natural law, as in Hobbes as well as in Kant and Fichte, the individual being is posited as the primary and supreme thing. In Hobbes’ treatment, subjectivity is inevitably at the centre of the state of nature, and in the transcendental philosophy, ethical actions cannot be thought of except as the result of the rational accomplishment of an individual’s reason. Honneth referred to transcendental philosophy as limited when determining human reason as a result of the purification of all its empirical inclinations and the needs of human nature. Hegel departed from these atomistic premises by arguing that a philosophical theory of society must proceed not from the actions of isolated subjects but from the ethical connections within the framework in which subjects always already coexist. Hegel took the existence of the elementary forms of intersubjective cohabitation as a kind of natural basis for human socialisation. Therefore, in Honneth’s recapitulations, Hegel set the intersubjective obligations as a quasi-natural precondition for any process of human sociation (Honneth et al. 1992: 204–206).

Hegel criticised Fichte for his formal approach to the tradition of natural law while adapting Fichte’s idea of freedom embedded in mutual recognition. Fichte in his ‘Foundation of Natural Law’ (Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre) elicited recognition as a reciprocal effect underlying the legal relationship; when subjects mutually require one another to act freely and simultaneously limit their own sphere of action to the other’s advantage, they form a common consciousness that attains objective validity in the legal relationships. In this process, a subject knows that his capacities and characteristics need to be recognised by other subjects. Only through the other person’s recognition, an individual comes to know parts of his own identity and to know himself as a particular subject (Neuhouser 2000). Honneth argued that Hegel freed Fichte’s innovation from all implication of the philosophy of consciousness when applying it directly to empirical forms of reciprocal action, which are the communica-
tive relationships of ethical life. Hegel went one step beyond Fichte’s initial model when arguing that, once the relationships of mutual recognition are ethically established, subjects always learn something new about their particular identity; in the process of mutual recognition, individuals demand increasingly more sophisticated forms of their individuality. This demanding occurs by means of the altering stages of conflict and reconciliation where subjects reach higher forms of individuality when moving toward the state of ethical life (Honneth et al. 1992: 206–208).

Honneth contended that Hegel’s three forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem, were adapted from Friedrich von Schelling’s philosophy. Hegel elaborated further on these three forms of recognition in his System of Ethical Life (1802/03) and the First Philosophy of Spirit. Honneth introduced these forms of recognition as the cornerstones of his theory of recognition. These forms were introduced as follows: a) a quasi-natural precondition for any process of human sociation and b) the altering stages of conflict and reconciliation from which the individuals’ moral development emerges. Based on these premises, Honneth regarded three forms of recognition as the precondition for all human coexistence and development, i.e., preconditions for social freedom. Three forms of recognition contain the basic mutual affirmation that is necessary in all human development and any form of being together whatsoever (Honneth et al. 1992: 208–210).

In the first dimension of recognition, love, subjects are prying loose from the pure determination of nature, from ‘the first nature’ towards ‘the second nature’. Honneth emphasizes that when an infant develops from the state of natural helplessness towards independence, love and the emotional bond between an infant and caregiver are the most significant elements to offer her. This recognition relation belongs in family relationships between parents and children. In this initial relationship, subjects should recognise each other as loving, emotionally needy beings. Krassimir Stojanov (2007) highlighted the educational mission in this phase as the providence of the feeling of empathy. When a subject experiences empathy, he can develop his self-relation, where he becomes aware of his own needs and desires and generally becomes aware that humans have these characteristics (ibid.: 75–93). The second stage of recognition, rights, has been described as legal recognition, where formal rights enable interaction between subjects as a contractually regulated relation of property change. Rights enable an individual’s strategic action, where actors, with their purely egoistic interest, appear isolated from one another. Rights represent an insufficient form of recognition for generating shared social concerns or societal solidarity. The third form of recognition,
social esteem, as Honneth called it, surpasses all other forms of recognition. Honneth traced the theoretical bases of the concept of social esteem to Schelling’s concept of intuition. Hegel transformed this idea into the category of mutual intuition, where an individual senses himself as being similar to every other individual. For Honneth, the term intuition is used to refer to a form of reciprocal relation between subjects that is superior to merely cognitive recognition (Honneth et al. 1992: 210–212).

The aforementioned theoretical elaborations of the core elements of social freedom from post-Kantian thinkers generated three forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem. Honneth criticised Kantian reflexive freedom because it is unable to offer a social context where reflexive freedom can flourish. The spheres of law and morality, i.e., reflexive freedom, can only offer social statuses that enable individuals to distance themselves from the existing social world by criticising social reality only from one’s own isolated point of view. The social contexts that are necessary for realising social freedom are, according to Honneth, personal relationships, the market economy and democratic decision making. Each of these spheres contains normative principles in the forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem. Honneth argued that social freedom, through its elements of ethical life, enables individuals to recognise each other in the sense of giving to each other a certain social status or social role. In the sphere of social freedom, individuals depend on each other for formulating and realising their intentions in the first place. Honneth’s idea was that social freedom is realised by individuals voluntarily and happily committing the duties that come with their social roles. These duties are experienced not as conflicting with personal goals but as the social realisation of these goals. Reflexive freedom, the capacity to reflect on the justifiability of one’s social roles, was transformed by Honneth into a social role itself that one can only fulfil as long as others ascribe this role to him (Claasen 2014: 67–82, Honneth 2011: 223–227).

4.3 Negative, reflexive and social freedom

In his book Das Recht Der Freiheit, Honneth (2011) addressed the problems of the negative idea of freedom through Hobbes’ absolutism, Locke’s liberalism, Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism and Robert Nozick’s libertarianism. Honneth introduced Sartre’s existentialism and the libertarianism of Nozick as radical examples of the Hobbesian concept of negative freedom. All models of freedom based on the idea of a social contract and negative freedom do not provide a suf-
ficient social sphere where individuals could freely find and formulate their aims and interests for their life, i.e., find shared goals for their lives. Honneth stated that such theories use almost exclusively the fiction of a state of nature that leads to a ‘war of all against all’ due to the lack of a constitutionally guaranteed protection from government interference. In these models, the forms of the state’s governing order and its justice are legitimated with reference to the mutual wrongs that so-called ‘free’ individuals in a state of nature would do to each other. It is assumed in negative freedom that a state’s organised and governed order and justice would cause less cost and harm than individuals being free and unregulated in the state of nature. According to Honneth, negative freedom is based on a contract among individuals. However, a contract cannot put an end to the precarious state of a struggle for survival of all against all (Honneth 2011: 44–57).

Honneth mentioned two difficulties involved in the idea of negative freedom. First, it results in an egoistically motivated idea of justice, and this kind of justice is hard to reconcile with the claim that justice is normally motivated also by virtue or at least should originate from a non-egotistical perspective. It assumes that individuals in the state of nature consider only egoistic utility calculations; they are only interested in securing their own space for free action. Negative freedom does not allow individuals to be co-authors of the laws that govern them. Second, this concept of freedom is so primitive that it does not allow us to label, for example, overwhelming inner compulsions toward justice and rightness, according to Honneth. It does not pay much attention to people’s intentions or motives. As Rutger Claasen noted, individuals are considered free even if they are guided by whims and emotions. Negative freedom fails to reach the inner depths of a person’s will (Claasen 2014: 67–82, Honneth 2013c: 21–29).

The second form of freedom is positive freedom, which Honneth called reflexive freedom. Honneth contended that Rousseau formulated the idea of reflexive freedom by dividing it into autonomous and heteronomous actions. These lines of thought can be developed in two different directions following either Kant or Herder. The Kantian line is more important for the sake of Honneth’s main argument that Kant’s ‘constructivism’ was futile. Kant’s reflexive freedom was based on universalisation, where individuals can guide their actions following a principle that all other rational beings would also be willing to follow. The categorical imperative is of course this kind of principle, which additionally allows individuals to respect each other as an end in itself (Claasen 2014: 67–82).

Reflexive freedom is accused of lacking the social conditions to exercise this freedom. The process of realising freedom following reflexive freedom models
can never, according to Honneth, come to completion or ever be carried to a successful conclusion. For Honneth, Kantian autonomy does not tell us how we should structure our life and actions; it only gives possibilities to impugn the existing conditions (Honneth 2011: 79, Rössler 2013: 15). Honneth argued that, even if Kantian theory were able to include the social conditions necessary for autonomy, these social conditions would not be included as a constitutive part of freedom itself, as Claasen (2014: 67–82) noted. According to Honneth, an autonomous person in the reflexive sense is a person capable of directing his or her actions towards aims that he or she has set autonomously, or toward desires that he or she has uncovered authentically. However there seems to be no guarantee that reflexive aims can in fact be achieved. Although the reflexive freedom defines individual’s will as autonomously determined without the external authority it ignores the objective reality, the social institutions which enable autonomy and freedom in the first place. (Honneth 2013c: 42–43.)

For Honneth, Kant’s moral freedom appears monological, formal and empty, because it cannot take into account its own social preconditions, the rootedness of freedom in the context of the social world, according to Rössler. Rössler (2013: 15) stated that Kant’s moral freedom was limited for Honneth, for example, in that we cannot under the idea of moral freedom act at the same time as friends, lovers, mothers or compatriots.

We can summarise Honneth’s critique of Kant as an emptiness objection and a superfluity objection, according to Claasen. Honneth’s emptiness objection asserted that Kant’s constructivism applies a procedural method: the only valid norms are those that emerge from an idealised collective procedure of will formation. Claasen stated that, according to Honneth, constructivist theories are restricted to formal principles that might appear later, after a separate stage of application, completely disconnected from social reality and therefore useless. For example, Honneth criticised moral constructivism as toothless when analysing markets: moral constructivists first set up their principles and then apply them to certain problem areas. In this case, the constructive method must give up a social analysis of its own. In the area of the market economy, the constructivist method must accept as a given the contemporary picture of the markets defined by neo-classical economists (Claasen 2014: 67–82, Honneth 2011: 318–319).

Honneth’s superfluity objection contended that Kantian constructivism is parasitic on normative reconstructivism; whatever normative principles it grounds, these are in fact always taken from a historical reconstruction of the ideals of modernity. Constructivists are in fact reconstructivists. Claasen offered the exam-
ple of Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel’s critique of the social contract. The contract presupposes the existence of fully free individuals, while these individuals come into being only after the social contract has been concluded and just institutions have been implemented. The principles of contracts cannot be anything other than a reconstruction of the norms implicit in the institutions in which the contracting individuals already live (Claasen 2014: 67–82).

The transition from reflexive freedom to social freedom emerges when the elements of reflexive freedom, i.e., moral and legal freedom, are permitted as long as they do not danger the institutions of ethical life. These institutions predetermine individuals’ goals, and individual moral and legal freedom cannot endanger these institutions. The idea of social freedom is that it has to guarantee the social institutions from which the different forms of mutual recognition develop. Honneth, armed with Hegel, posited the problem of how, in a social situation marked by relations of mutual competition, individuals can arrive at an idea of intersubjective rights and duties.

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The tradition of natural law, i.e., Hobbes’, Machiavelli’s, Kant’s and Fichte’s interpretations of it, gives negative answers to this problem. The determination of right is always imported from the outside; making contracts is posited either as a demand of prudence (in Hobbes) or as a postulate of morality (in Kant and Fichte). Honneth considered that subjects can on their own reach a conflict resolution based on rights even under the conditions of hostile competition because the precontractual relationships of mutual recognition underlie even the relations of social competition. Subjects must in some way have already recognised each other before the conflict. Honneth interpreted that, for Hegel, all human coexistence presupposes a kind of basic mutual affirmation between subjects since, otherwise, no form of being together whatsoever would ever come into existence (Honneth 1992: 197–217, Honneth 1995a: 40–43).

Honneth’s intention in his early writings and in his recent book Freedom’s right was to revive Hegel’s innovation of social freedom. Honneth (1992) in his early writings elaborated on the idea of a ‘struggle for recognition’ as the medium of social action where subjects develop systematically toward morally demanding practices. Honneth suggested that Hegel reformulated Hobbes’ and Machiavelli’s idea of a war of all against all into a moral developmental social struggle; this kind of struggle occurs when subjects’ particular identity is insufficiently recognised. Hegel’s innovation was that the basis for social struggles cannot be in individuals’ struggles over self-preservation, and the social struggles in modern societies are not a natural state of war of all against all, but struggles where disrespect-
ed groups try to gain respect and equal treatment by acts of revolt. In Honneth’s recitations, Hegel transformed the Hobbesian state of nature into the struggle for recognition. From the negative idea of freedom emerged, however, the good idea of the conflict-ridden moral developmental theory. The war of all against all was transformed into the struggle for every acquisition of mutual recognition (Honneth 1995a: 10–24, 40–42).

### 4.4 Personal relationships

The first institution of social freedom is, according to Honneth, ‘we of personal relations’ (2013c: 132–176). In the context of personal relations, Honneth discerned friendships, intimate relationships and family. According to Honneth when the spheres of social freedom and the corresponding forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem are permanently established then individuals growing up in these institutions will learn in the course of their Bildung process to develop desires and goals that can only be satisfied through the complementary actions of others. These shared intentions are something more than what is legally and morally allowed; i.e., it is more than the negative and the reflexive freedom can offer. For Honneth, in this sphere, the logic of recognition reveals itself as the social freedom much more obviously and easier than in other spheres of social freedom.

Honneth started his analysis with friendships, where mutual affection is central. In friendships, subjects are voluntarily and happily concerned with the well-being of others and have no strategic interests toward others. This kind of freedom, through reciprocal affirmations, should produce the ‘inner nature of man’ (Honneth 2013c: 48–49, Brink 2013: 23).

Honneth’s analysis of family is most important from the perspective of education and reveals Honneth’s argument that education and democracy belongs together. Honneth elaborates through his normative reconstruction that the contemporary change in family education has improved abilities for democratic morality in the younger generations; thus, the ‘cooperative individualism’ of contemporary families can function as a seedbed for further democratisation of our societies.

Honneth emphasizes that democratic community must have a vital interest in creating the socioeconomic relations under which all families could truly adopt the democratic ‘educational’ practices that are already institutionally available in our social reality (Honneth 2013c: 176, Brink 2013: 24).

We can approach these ‘existing democratic educational practices’ via Honneth’s term ‘cooperative individualism’ which refers to an action where the family
members help each other to be the person they would like to be in society on the basis of their own individuality. According to Honneth in today’s families children can experience early on what it means to participate as individuals in shared cooperation. Family members experienced this by internalizing inner-family rules of recognition which teach to set aside their egocentric interests once another member of the family is in need of their help and support. If the inner-family duties are distributed fairly and just among family members and there exist tolerance enough for the different life styles of family members’ then upbringing of family should produce the intellectual schema of the generalized other for the family members. (Honneth 2013c: 175–176.)

Practically this educative process appears as a process of mirroring where all family members’ are mirroring their recognitional relationships for the others. Honneth argues that when playing with their children father and mother can see themselves called upon to regress to their children’s level of development, just as children can be encouraged in their interaction with their parents to experiment with and try out the latter’s level of development. This is for Honneth peculiar process of regression and progression where the generations’ boundaries become blurred and the uncontrollable element of our nature is briefly undone through this act of experimental role-switching. Honneth argues that children can experiment and try adult’s level of development with being their father’s or their mother’s partner in interaction while parents can free themselves from the biological circumstances of their age by acting as their children’s play buddies. Honneth contends that this de-differentiation works not only in the family members’ imaginations, but also in their practical interaction with each other. Honneth considers that in these moments we can move forwards and backwards in our organic existence as if our external and internal nature imposed no limits upon us. (Honneth 2013c: 170–171.)

What is confusing in Honneth’s analyses of the family is that upbringing and education seems not to be the solely parent’s task or solely on those responsibility who are adults in the family, but in some cases even children can be the ‘parents of their parents’. Honneth finds as a good example of this role switching from Jonathan Franzen’s novel Freedom and asserts that in the modern families wider possibilities of family members to articulate the intentions and moods freely, causes conflicts that can be healed by the caring support of the children for their parents. Then children literally become parents of their parents (Franzen 2011, Honneth 2013c: 171, 361). Also in Honneth’s text it seems that the idea of the generalized other does not develop only for a child but to the all family members.
This assumption becomes problematic in the case of adults because how many times the scheme of the generalized other can develop or do it get some new shape when adults forms a family, this must be either an mistake or oversight to fact that it is only the child in the family who is target of intentional upbringing and education for the sake that his or her abilities to understand the ideas of the ‘generalized other’ would develop.

Honneth connected the forms of personal relationships to the idea of a democratic *Sittlichkeit*. The relations of love, friendship and family create the bases for the social spheres of the market and the democratic community. Democratised and egalitarian personal relationships are the basis on which mutual respect, tolerance, socially responsible independence, flexible role-taking abilities and deliberative competences are first learnt. Thus, these abilities and skills should be required later in the social spheres of the market and the democratic community. Honneth extended the skills and abilities needed in personal relations to the other two spheres of social freedom (Honneth 2011: 313–317, Brink 2013: 24).

It is possible to categorise roughly three educational tasks for the personal relationships. The first educational implication of Honneth’s account can be summarised as the parent’s task to provide the educational setting for a child’s development of basic *self-confidence*. Synthesising the results of object relation theory and American social psychology, Honneth contended that a subject’s I-formation takes place in stages of internalising social responses characterised by intersubjective recognition. Intersubjective recognition represents approval, encouragement and affirmation, and in response to these positive elements of recognition, a child learns to cultivate an inner core personality consisting layers of positive relations to the self. Honneth referred to Erik H. Erikson’s term self-confidence in describing this kind of elementary security concerning the value of one’s own needs that the relationship between a caregiver and a child should provide (Honneth 2012c: 201–204).

According to Honneth’s theory, the second educational implication is the learning process where children should learn to go beyond self-confidence by acquiring a positive relation to self: recognition of his or her abilities for moral responsibility. Honneth referred to Jean Piaget’s and George Herbert Mead’s ideas of children’s internalisation of the experience of playing with other children. A child’s self-respect develops significantly when he or she experiences him or herself in game as an interaction partner whose judgment is regarded as valuable or reliable. Thus, a child’s move from play to the sphere of game is crucial for the development of self-respect. In addition, Honneth argued that a child had to be
increasingly respected by other members of the family as an interaction partner whose beliefs are no longer wholly irrelevant for common decision making (Honneth 2012c: 204–205).

Honneth argued that the idea of learning through participation in games also vividly captures individuals’ general development of self-respect at the societal level, where legal rights enable mutual participation. The rules of the game at the societal level are understood as representing the shared legal rights and mutually binding contracts that generate the generalised perspective, which Mead called the ‘generalised other’. This is the self-understanding where persons learn to recognise each other equally as rational beings, able to use reason, and as morally responsible beings equipped with the ‘conscience’, which is our capability to consider and justify different moral points of view and be responsible for our actions. Honneth considered Mead’s concept of the ‘generalised other’ a significant theoretical extension to Hegel’s idea of rights (Anderson 1995, Honneth 1995a: 80–89, Stojanov 2009: 164).

Third, education or parental upbringing should generate for a child the initial requirements for self-esteem. Parents need to provide circumstances in which children can arrive at awareness of the value of their own physical and mental abilities. Honneth emphasised that three different types of positive self-relations, self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, should not be understood as steps in an ontogenetic sequence but as developmental phases that occur in unison through the internalisation of parental care. The educational implications of love and personal relationships occur in the sphere of the family through cultivation of the initial requirement for all three self-relations by using all three forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem. These three forms of mutual recognition and the corresponding self-relations develop in parallel and are not strict stages of development (Honneth 2012c: 205).

Honneth contended that, in his model, individuation and socialisation are intertwined or that autonomisation is tied to the process of socialisation. The positive self-relations, self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, are forms of autonomisation and directly correspond with the number of the interaction partners; the more interaction partners there are, the more demanding forms of autonomisation are available for a child. Thus, the initial requirements for self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem are learnt in the sphere of family and later differentiated in personal relationships, friendships and intimate relationships, which all widen these three self-relations and the forms of recognition, generating the basis for social freedom. Honneth emphasised that two other spheres of social freedom,
the market economy and democratic decision making, should be based on the same elements that are learnt in the sphere of personal relations.

More generally, we can conclude that Honneth’s (2011: 277–317) historical analysis or normative reconstruction of family generated the idea that the upbringing habits of the modern family have been developed into more democratic ideals. Changes in how children are educated within the family affect the moral content of that education. According to Honneth, the more advanced egalitarian practices of today’s family life contribute to the development and stabilisation of democratic virtues. The changed intrafamilial communication style has consequences for the norms of conduct for the children. Honneth amended this idea using the work of Durkheim and Dewey by contending that moral contents are not so decisive in a child’s moral development, as more decisive are the forms of socialisation where these moral contents are transmitted.

The second article (II) of this study concerns the core elements of social freedom in the sphere of personal relationships. The aim of this article is to analyse critically how personal relationships enable a drawn-out process of education. Criticism is formulated with the following structure: first, Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel psychologised (Pippin 2008: 183–184, Tubbs 2004: 47) Hegel’s original ideas, and second, it contributed a one-sidedly positive image of the process of growth. When psychologically transforming Hegel’s philosophy, Honneth used G. H. Mead’s social psychology and Donald W. Winnicott’s object-relation theory. Both of these theories were used to explain the intersubjective motivational basis in Hegel’s early innovations that Hegel himself could not elaborate, as Honneth argued. These psychological revisions, as I claim, transformed Hegel’s original idea about growth strongly as a positive developmental process containing no elements of compulsion, work, discipline and upbringing. Honneth’s ‘personal relationships’ lacks Hegel’s idea about the positive process of alienation where the critical abilities and capacities are learnt through an upbringing that involves discipline and work in the sphere of the family. Thus, I conclude that Hegel’s own writings about education clarify Honneth’s idea of social freedom in the sphere of personal relations.

4.5 Market economy

If we consider the providence of Honneth’s elaborations of the market economy, these ideas can give insights in how to understand the educative elements of the concept of civil society. This theme is examined in the first article (I) of this study.
by contrasting Honneth’s ideas with critical pedagogy’s ideas on the problem of achievement principle. The second article of this study (II) amends these views by examining the critical tasks of schools which Hegel himself defined. This chapter furthers themes of the articles (I, II) examining Honneth’s critique of labour markets and the sphere of consumption.

How could the market economy contain educative elements? In answering this question, Honneth’s insight that the market economy cannot be analysed without regarding it as a normative praxis based solely on the logic of demand and supply is very helpful. The first mistake that hard-core analytical economic sciences make is to analyse the market economy as a purely rational sphere, without regarding the existing norms and values behind it. According to Honneth, the market economy should be parallel with the other two spheres of social freedom, personal relationships and political decision making, and as a form of social freedom, it should contain values that are worth reconstructing.

Honneth began his reconstruction by critically elaborating on the sphere of the labour markets and the sphere of consumption. Honneth’s historical analysis leaned on the traditions of moral economy, and the main emphasis was in the criticism that impersonal forces of demand and supply determine outcomes without regard for any moral considerations that exchange partners might raise. Honneth interestingly wanted to separate his analysis from Habermas’ analysis by following for example Boltansky, Hegel, Dewey, Durkheim, Parson, Polanyi, Thévenot and Weber. Following this tradition, Honneth argued that, in the market, there are always embedded social norms and values that restrict the pure forces of demand and supply. The problem for Honneth was how these values could be taken as embedded and generated inside the markets and not something brought from outside of the market itself (Claasen 2014: 67–82, Honneth 2011: 347).

Honneth referred to Hegel and Durkheim, taking the markets as a sphere in which order depends on an ethical framework of pre-contractual action norms. This is the only condition under which markets can secure the legitimacy of the agreement of all participants. The markets requires the moral consent of all participants, and this kind of consent is to be based not on negative freedom but on social freedom, where economic actors understand each other as members of a cooperative community (Claasen 2014, Honneth 2010b, 2011: 349).

Honneth stated that, through historical analysis of labour markets and the sphere of consumption, history repeats the logic where social movements raise certain moral requirements against the logic of demand and supply. After counter-actions, there is always a time of laissez-faire until, at some point, resistance rises
again. Now we live in a period of laissez-faire where a pathological market fails to realise social freedom (Claasen 2014). The laissez-faire situation caused Honneth to wonder where the public outrage of the working people is and why the unfair conditions and suffering at the work is strangely unmentioned by workers. He wondered why even those parts of the middle class that are threatened by precariousness, wage losses and dismissals are not publicly criticising and resisting the working conditions. In the last two decades, the shared efforts against the progressive deregulation of the labour markets have not increased even in these middle class groups, where the educational context and good communication networks would make it easier to share concerns and articulate public resistance. This period of laissez-faire manifests itself as a willingness to privatise the feelings of the injustices and the resistance when a worker is threatened with dismissal; in today’s world of work, workers feel solely responsible for their own fate, and it leads to the oppressive silence (Honneth 2011: 461–462).

Honneth’s (Honneth 2011, 2012c: 169–190) criticism of the contemporary laissez-faire situation and the pathological market economy produced conceptualisations of three paradoxes of capitalism. Honneth argued that, since the 1980s, a neoliberal revolution has arisen that introduced ‘network capitalism’ generating the effects of ‘desolidarisation’ in the three spheres of action. These desolidarisations are expressed in the form of the paradoxes of capitalist modernisation. The first paradox appears in the private sphere, in ‘personal relationships.’ Honneth characterises this paradox as an exchange of informal knowledge of the private sphere with economic knowledge. In this exchange informal knowledge, i.e., knowledge useful for personal relationships, is dispossessed by the economic action and private informal knowledge is economised by economic knowledge. Honneth (Honneth 2012c: 179–180) referred to the ‘informalization of the economic and economization of the informal’. Honneth stated that, when informal emotional skills are included in work processes and economic imperatives are compounded into informal relationships, it obscures the line between instrumental and non-instrumental aspects of intersubjective relationships. Friendship-like relations are also established with a view to instrumental interests, and instrumental relationships are transformed into friendship-like relations. Honneth contended that these unclear intermediate forms of friendships and instrumental relationships have become common and made us ambiguous about the true intentions of the encountered subjects (ibid.).

A manifestation of this paradox is an entirely new conception of working subjects, so-called ‘entreployees’. These workers are expected to employ communi-
cative and emotional skills and resources from their private sphere to achieve their professional goals. These employees are less and less in a position to develop longer-term connections with firms and colleagues. The changed requirements compel workers to remain open with regard to their choice of location, use of time and type of activity, so friendships, love relationships and even families are exposed to a high degree of pressure, according to Honneth. Network capitalism sets unlimited demand for the subjective capacities that blur the borders between the private and the professional-public spheres (Honneth 2012c: 178–179).

In addition, romantic love relationships are strongly affected by the new spirit of capitalism. The entrepreneurial idea of calculative action penetrates into intimate relationships by predominating these relations with utility-oriented calculations. Honneth elaborated on a new model of behaviour, the tendency to calculate the long-term changes of such love relationships according to their compatibility with the future mobility demands of a career path that can be planned in the short term. Honneth concluded that economic rationality was something that partners took into account together to make their precarious relationships last, but now, they are using economic rationality as a tool to evaluate one another as partners (Honneth 2012c: 188).

A second paradox occurs in the area of social rights. For Honneth, social rights should have an empowering and an unburdening effect. In our capitalist societies, every person should have equal opportunities for civil and political participation, which requires that every person have access to a certain standard of living even if they cannot always establish these circumstances by themselves. Social rights free subjects from being solely responsible for their life situation, and everyone’s livelihoods do not depend solely on their achievements. Rights should guarantee awareness that, in complex societies, social inequalities are connected to different starting conditions, which are characteristics that are not under the subject’s control. However, Honneth emphasised that, in network capitalism, social rights are massively cut and transformed into economised social services. In this process, remoralisation and paternalisation are emerging effects; paternalisation is based on the claim that those who want to enjoy welfare-state benefits must do something in return. Honneth emphasised that, when it is less possible to perceive welfare-state benefits as rights claims, the greater the danger will be that these benefits are handed over to the arbitrariness of unburdened bureaucracy or to the unpredictable demands of the organisations of civil society (Honneth 2012c: 182).
According to Honneth, network capitalism paradoxically enforces the ideas of self-responsibility, although, in an increasingly complex society, subjects can hardly assume responsibility in the full sense of the word for many aspects of their existence. For this reason, Honneth asserted, individuals are compelled to be responsible for a state of affairs for which they are not in fact responsible. According to Honneth, the paradox of social rights is that they do not guarantee individuals’ rights anymore but rather cause compulsion toward unrealistic responsibility, which increases rates of depression. Citing Alain Ehrenberg, Honneth stated that a depressive is a person who thinks that he or she has failed, not one who has broken the rules or been cheated out of an existing legal benefit (Honneth 2012c: 183).

A practical example of this paradox could be Honneth’s idea of the individualisation of resistance in the sphere of labour, of which Christoph Dejours’ and Florence Bègue’s (2009) studies on suicides at work are good proofs. For Honneth, these studies showed the major suffering in contemporary work life. For example, these studies showed that, in France in 2009–2010 among telecom employees, 33 committed suicide in 18 months, which is almost two per month, and in 2007, a similar rate of suicide was found for the employees of Peugeot and Renault (see also Dejours & Deranty 2010). These examples indicate the overemphasised self-responsibility that leads to an isolated, helpless and defensive battle where subjects do not have the social power to coordinate collective resistance. Workers are privatizing their feelings of injustice and resistance at work, where the trade unions and associations seem toothless for gaining any improvement.

Honneth stated that, especially in the lower service sector the tendencies to privatize the feelings of injustice are common. By the lower service sector, Honneth refers to trades like retail cashiers, domestic helpers, commercial cleaners, geriatric nurses at hospitals, those in parcel services or in low-qualification industrial work in the construction or automotive industries. In these so-called ‘new service proletariat’ we always encounter individual defensive battles and resistance rather than the collective articulation of interests, according to Honneth. The degree of association and participation in trade unions is extremely low in these fields, and Honneth expressed concern that a communicative understanding of common issues and the discussions of the wrongdoings of work life, which labour movements have traditionally maintained, has now vanished (Brinkmann et al. 2006, Honneth 2011: 448–461).

Behind the individualisation of resistance are the new definitions of workers as autonomous entrepreneurs, which make workers employers of their own work.
Thus, every change in working conditions depends only on worker’s own decisions. This ideology assumes that every member of the labour force is capable of planning his or her career path as a risk-filled enterprise and at the same time autonomously apply his or her genuine traits and abilities. The worker is then totally responsible for his own failures and successes at work. Honneth considered that the function of this ideology is to encourage workers to accept willingly a considerably modified workload, increased demand for flexibility, deregulation of labour and the ability to market oneself productively as the entrepreneur of one’s own labour power. These tendencies treat a large proportion of wage earners unfairly because most of earners’ achievements are not adequately appreciated, and a large number of workers are required to allow too high a degree of flexibility. These arguments refer to the reification process of the workers where they have to learn strategic self-marketing and self-optimising skills by adopting the external and alien personality qualities that seem most beneficial in light of the changing job opportunities (Honneth 2012c: 56–75, Brink & Owen 2007: 343).

Third paradox concerns the achievement principle. Honneth contended that modernity introduced the emancipating achievement principle; it took the form of common knowledge by asserting that individuals’ social statuses had to depend solely on how well subjects succeed by their own efforts in gaining their social positions. Social status cannot be based on a status beyond the individual’s own influence, like the statuses of nobles. In this way the achievement principle promoted equal opportunities to gain social statuses and positions. However, this assumption soon encountered criticism as an ideology for maintaining inequalities and argued that equality requires a complex series of stages in the socialisation process. Honneth argued that there are still good empirical arguments that in the realm of senior management, origin or class-specific habitus is more appreciated than achievement based characteristics. Thus, the emancipating effects of the achievement principle have not been fully realised yet, but recent research (Neckel et al. 2004) has shown that this principle continues to affect the consciousness as a normative expectation and to serve as an evaluative standard for the judgment of structures of social distribution and reward (Honneth 2012c: 184).

Network capitalism creates a problematic achievement principle. It transformed the traditional picture of wage workers into one of creative entrepreneurs or self-employed persons. This changed picture provokes the idea that work must involve more possibilities for self-fulfilment in the sphere of production and the provision of services. The idea of creative entrepreneurs in the workplace is seemingly achieved by dissolving hierarchies, by raising the autonomy of work
teams and by providing a higher degree of self-management. These new management concepts should provide more opportunities for receiving one’s own activity as an autonomous expression of acquired skills, transforming the profession into a personal vocation or calling (Hartmann & Honneth 2006; Brink & Owen 2007: 343–343).

However, this new achievement principle offers no objective criteria for judging the values of achievements and informal abilities. The ability to create stable social relationships, for example, is hard to express in the form of formal qualification criteria. Honneth argued that it is paradoxical that authenticity and genuine self-realisation are required, but not rewarded; workers should have opportunities to plan their careers following their genuine interests and vocation, but at the same time, they need to be entrepreneurs by seeking opportunities to contribute autonomously and sell the skills they have learned for social and economic security. Project-based workplaces reward ‘flat’ personalities that can respond flexibly to new challenges. Honneth contended that the original emancipatory significance of the ideal of authenticity has been transformed into an instrument for legitimising capitalist arrangements. Honneth emphasised that network capitalism’s project-based work situations decrease the recognition of individual work achievements. In flexible organisations, the memory of workers’ past services is very short, which leads, according to Honneth, a thoroughly predictable instability of hierarchies. Thus, workers become uncertain about the true value of their contributions and achievements. The achievement principle of network capitalism is problematic, because it allows contradicting values and thus makes an individual work hard for recognising the value of his or her achievements. (Honneth 2012c: 184–186.)

Honneth described the current achievement principle as paradoxical; on the other hand, this principle originally contained positive and emancipating elements that still seem to be in use, but at the same time, it has lost its validity in the economic realm. Recent critiques of the achievement principle have shown that it marketises itself; in the economic realm, market success is the sole criterion for rewarding achievement, and all achievements that cannot be converted into profits in the labour markets are uncertain. Honneth argued that this causes uncertainty about whether a working relationship is initiated on the basis of objective criteria or personal inclination and a general difficulty in objectifying the skills that are worthy in network capitalism. Honneth emphasised that the marketising of the achievement principle turns the discussion about the contents of achievements from their original emancipating elements to marketing tools, which undermines
the idea of welfare where livelihood is independent of achievements and introduces the idea that this principle offers the possibility of partaking in status where it in fact does not exist (Honneth 2012c: 186).

If we follow Honneth, then schools obviously should introduce the previously described problems of the market economy. Honneth concluded that we can perceive, like Boltansky, Chiapello and many other social scientists, that the processes of instrumentalisation, standardisation and fictionalisation have turned the individualism of self-realisation over the last half-century into emotionally barren systems of demands within which individuals today suffer more than benefit from it. Western capitalism or the market economy has turned the idea of self-realisation into an ideology and productive forces in a deregulated economic system. Honneth described that ideals are transformed as constraints and claims into external demands, causing social suffering and discontent. Honneth furthered his claims by interpreting the psychological clinical material of Alain Ehrenberg’s studies and arguing that depression-related illnesses are replacing neurosis because of is the diffuse demands that individuals must face and the permanent compulsion to find their authentic self-realisation as a constant form of fruitless introspection. With this development, self-realisation has turned into a compulsion causing the experience of emptiness in the young, who are required to remain open on all sides for authentic identity seeking, and this forces them either to learn to feign authenticity or to flee into depression (Honneth 2012c: 163–166).

Honneth’s reconstruction produces the normatively functional norms for the consumer markets. Claasen elaborated on four norms that Honneth set: first, some objects or services should not be for sale. Second, price setting should not be left to the market where essential goods such as food and housing are at stake. Third, there should be limits on luxury consumption. Fourth, sometimes, collectives and cooperatives should act in the market rather than individuals. These four principles are massively violated by our deregulated consumer markets and far from the realisation of social freedom. According to Honneth, consumers are at the mercy of powerful corporations, lacking any kind of organisation that could provide a countervailing power (Claasen 2014, Honneth 2011: 405–407).

Social freedom emerges in the market economy from two different ideas, democratic and corporatist directions. The democratic direction is emphasised through collectives of consumer and labour, which in the public sphere are a key part of the political process and raise debates on how to regulate the market. The corporatist direction refers to Hegel’s ideas of the positive value of corporations which can influence the negative and egoistic interests of the market economy.
Honneth finds this corporatist direction in Hegel’s and Durkheim’s ideas and emphasises that for both of these authors, intermediary institutions like corporations and labour unions are necessary to control the market economy’s profit-oriented interests. These institutions which can, for example, negotiate wage and price setting and how individual preferences are formed. This would be coordinated negotiation against the sole demands of the market (Claasen 2014).

Overall, Honneth’s historical analysis or ‘normative reconstruction’ of labour markets and the consumer sphere contains the idea that social freedom can be realised only by fulfilling individuals’ needs to be freely organised in groups. Honneth stated that this initial need was formulated in Hegel’s idea of corporations and Durkheim’s preference for professional groups. In the consumer sphere and the labour sphere, the eradicating tendency is that work and consuming are seen solely as an individual’s own business. Consumer associations made consuming a social issue and trade unions elaborated possibilities for social freedom, but now it seems that both of these types of unions address only individual rights, leaving the individual standing alone against corporate power. Claasen (2014) asserted that, according to Honneth, individuals should find homes in groups, as both consumers and labourers, to realise social freedom in the market.

4.6 Democratic will formation

The third form of social freedom was, for Honneth, ‘we of democratic will formation’. Honneth asserts that democratic will formation cannot be the isolated sphere of social freedom; only by realising the social freedom in the sphere of family and market economy can social freedom in the public will formation be possible. The relationship between the three spheres of freedom should be taken as learning process where the democratic will formation can only live up to its own premises if it learns in a continuous debate over the conditions of social inclusion by supporting the struggles over social freedom in family and market economy, contends Honneth. Honneth aims to show by his normative reconstruction of democratic will formation that the present conditions are not the merit of liberal freedoms and individual freedom, but quite contrary depending on mutual role obligations of recognition. First, his analyses reveals the current deficits on democratic will-formation and second, trace the development of modern constitutional state for analysing current state of social freedom and third, define the connection of the spheres of freedom asserting how a political culture of democratic ethical life would have to look like today. (Honneth 2013c: 254–255.)
Honneth considers eighteenth-century as a significant period when the public sphere and the debates over public life and ruling norms began to expand. The freedom of press and opinion were expanded concerning men from the economically independent classes. According to Honneth also those members of society whose rights of the status of full citizens was not granted, women, day labourer and the economically dependent, profited this expansion. The bourgeoisie started to form clubs and press and at the same time the bottom of the society the ‘rabble’ or the ‘plebes’ formed social clubs and unions where public interests were debated. In these lower class forums the norms of social cooperation and the legitimacy of feudal rule was questioned. These critical voices against ruling feudal system got enforcement from the bourgeoisie’s counterparts leading to the general idea that the forums of workers’ and bourgeoisies’ discursive communities have to be understood as organs in the sphere of civil will formation. (Honneth 2013c: 257–258.)

In the French Revolution the universal rights of man were declared and emanated throughout Europe improving the various publics. For Honneth nineteenth century represents the period in which the political rights to participation were achieved. When in Europe nation states were established then also entirely new liberties was formulated in the form of three rights, the right to vote, to assemble and to form associations. These political rights gave different kind of possibilities than mere liberal rights; liberal rights only provide protection for the freedom of the individual, but political rights enable subjects to do what they could not to establish alone. (Honneth 2013c: 259.)

These three rights represents for Honneth the institutional preparation for a third sphere of freedom which cannot interpreted merely individualistic way, but the realization of freedom occurs only through intersubjective examination of opinions and in discursive exchange and dispute with other citizens. Honneth contends that when the nation states were formed then the constitution had to take the roles of the public speaker and public listener. The communication technologies spread availability of these roles and made the virtual exchange of these roles possible. The emergence of the roles where subjects have to either to present arguments to the public or to consider arguments for the public is significant. The institutionalization of these roles introduced a principle of reciprocal recognition; all adult members of society should now be capable recognizing each other as equally entitled citizens within the nation-state. (Honneth 2013c: 260–261).

Honneth emphasizes that it is one-sided to consider democratic will formation only as a learning process of the roles of speaker and listener. Honneth
amends that one of the arenas for democratic will formation is the public struggles for political rights of participation. In these struggles the mere roles of speaker and listener are not enough. According to Honneth the struggles where the barricade are set in the streets, the demonstrations are held, the discussions organised, leaflets produced, etc. are significantly representing miniature democratic will formation processes. These struggling groups organize their action following democratic unforced will formation basing on the feeling of solidarity. Individuals must take care of in a cooperative manner these kinds of non-discursive tasks before they can exercise their freedom. (Honneth 1995b: 127, 2013c: 262).

Honneth elaborates that the expansion of the communication media in the context of nation states has two-folded nature; it has been significant for the development of the democratic public will formation, but at the same time it can turn into xenophobic patrols armed with a naturalistic conception of national belonging. This similar ambivalent nature of public sphere was experienced nearly in all European countries during the twentieth century. Honneth explains that these extreme nationalist attitudes are connected to a deep-seated misunderstanding about the type of political unity within which members of society, through processes of mutual recognition, began to form a many-voiced public will formation. On the one hand individuals’ membership in society based on formal and procedural defined belonging to a given nation-state and on the other the nation was defined an essentialist manner as a cultural or even biological feature of a people. Lack of these collective features led to the denial of rights. (Honneth 2013c: 266.)

In short, Honneth defines five conditions for social freedom as democratic will formation: 1) Political rights containing universal human rights. 2) The universal communicative spaces enabling different groups to enter an exchange of opinions. These kinds of communicative spaces aim to extend Durkheim’s idea of the nation state in the international contexts. 3) Media should be directed following by Dewey’s idea of ‘the art of communication’. Honneth contends that media should research and express precisely and comprehensively commonly shared social problems and find solutions to these problems. 4) Beside the roles of the public speaker and the listener citizen have to be ready to take civil disobedience if needed. The citizens need to learn the skills for the critical analyses and an action towards it. 5) The democratic constitutional state representing the reinterpretation of Durkheim’s idea of constitutional patriotism. In his definition of the constitutional state Honneth follows Durkheim, Dewey and Habermas introducing the relationship between the state and the public in a way that is neither plebi-
scite nor representative. Truly functioning the democratic state should live up to its own premises in the form of permanent research around the social problems as Durkheim and Dewey thought, and to be based on the discussion developing constantly revisable consensus as Habermas asserted. The focus of such state should be building up the conditions of non-coercive self-legislation of citizens basing on the recognition where each recognizes each other as capable for judgement. (Honneth 2013c: 296–314.)

4.6.1 The concept of social esteem

The central to Honneth’s idea of democratic will formation is the idea of ‘post-traditional’ social esteem. Honneth (2007a: 99–129) stated that social esteem has gone through a historical and structural transformation in the transition from traditional to modern societies. This development generated ‘a post-traditional esteem’. Honneth purposely used the term ‘post-traditional’ to distinguish his idea from the post-modern theories. ‘Post-traditional’ refers here to Anthony Gidden’s (1984, 1990) way of understanding our contemporary post-traditional societies. This chapter critically analyses and aims to find useful paths to develop Honneth’s concept of social esteem.

According to Honneth, historical development of social esteem split honour into two contradictory ideas, democratic and individualistic ideas. It was the public demand that all members of society should be equally respected for their dignity and autonomy as legal persons, but on other hand, social esteem was given in accordance with individuals’ achievements, achievements related to productive citizens. In short, social esteem was democratised but also meritocratised (Fraser & Honneth 2003: 141).

Social esteem is conflicting in modern societies; the value horizon and societal goals should be individual enough to provide space for the different self-realisations and at the same time universal enough for the general system of esteeming. The social esteem of modern societies generates two competing interpretative practices, primary and secondary praxis, according to Honneth. The primary interpretive praxis is the dominant interpretations of the societal goals, where societal goals are defined as a seemingly neutral idea of achievement and the secondary interpretive praxis is an ongoing cultural conflict (Honneth 1995b: 126–127).

Honneth’s idea was that modernity necessarily leads to the development of minorities and struggling groups that compete for social esteem. From the aspect
of social esteem the struggle for recognition emerges through disrespected groups of society. These groups are disrespected for the lack of social esteem in particular when they feel that their work contributions do not necessarily help or contribute at all to the shared common societal goals; i.e., they do not get rewards or salary enough for livelihood for their work. In addition, individuals may feel that their work contributions do not match their genuine needs, desires, traits and abilities. These negative feelings group people in modern society and renders them permanently different groups in the cultural conflict. Honneth stated that this is a social phenomenon in which different groups try through the symbolic use of force and with reference to general goals raise the value of their ways of life and work contributions (Honneth 1995b: 126–127).

Social freedom, in this sense, or as it should result from the democratic will formation processes, should produce societal solidarity. This solidarity refers to a mutual concern between persons, where persons not only passively accept others’ traits and abilities but also are concerned about the development of others’ traits and abilities. Persons should ask, for example, what is individual and particular in others and how much they actively care about the development of the others’ characteristics that are foreign? Honneth emphasised that only through these concerns is it possible to formulate shared societal goals. Honneth argued that he developed a model where persons’ competition over social esteem is for the first time free from pain and disrespect (Honneth 1995b: 128–130).

Exactly where, then, does solidarity come from at the societal level? Yolande Jansen argued that possibilities for democratic will formation depend on a pre-political cultural solidarity. Jansen stated that solidarity is to be found somewhere at the nation-state level in the national background culture to ensure the energies that are necessary for social struggles for equality. For Honneth, solidarity, which is necessary in democracy, does not result from deliberation and consensus-oriented political will formation but rather from social struggles originating from specific social spheres (Honneth 2011: 609, Jansen 2013: 33).

4.6.2 The critics and the responses

My intention to study the theme of ‘achievement principle’ in article I of this study arose from the critique of Honneth’s concept of social esteem. Honneth’s concept of social esteem, the third form of recognition, has been accused of reintroducing the achievement principle (e.g. Deranty 2009: 300–307, Fraser & Honneth 2003: 59, 213–228, Ikaheimo et al. 2004, 81–85: Ikaheimo & Laitinen 2010: 84.
Thus, it is necessary to explicate further the concept of social esteem. Social esteem represents the solidarity-generating mechanism behind democratic will formation. Next, I examine the criticism of social esteem and responses to it.

The core form of recognition behind democratic will formation is social esteem. It is possible to distinguish three levels in this esteeming: the negative way of defining esteem where the atmosphere of esteem provides possibilities for general esteem free from disrespect, a definition of a positive atmosphere that provides possibilities for general esteem of significant contributions to the common good and the general frames for esteem that generates the self-realisation process regardless of whether these self-realisation projects contribute to the common good or not (Laitinen 2012: 1–7). These three levels contain four problems: the problem of self-realisation, the plausibility of the concept, demarcation of social esteem in the area of work and the unresolved tension between individualism and universalism. I will next analyse these problems further.

The first criticism of social esteem is Honneth’s problematic assumption that the traits and abilities that support the individual self-realisation process will be automatically, harmoniously and mutually esteemed by others in post-traditional societies. There is not necessarily a direct causality between self-realisation and given social esteem or commonly shared goals as Christopher Zurn has shown (Zurn 2000). Honneth argued that post-traditional societies are organised such that solidarity emerges. Then, everyone’s shared goals would be the mutual concern of all individuals’ development, especially concern for the development of their genuine talents and traits. This kind of society would maximise its outcomes in light of everyone’s self-realisation possibilities. This logic of course raises the question of how this could be possible and what kind of contributions society would produce. The outcome of such an enterprise would always be unpredictable because the result of individuals’ self-realisations and Bildung processes, are by nature unpredictable.

Following the idea of post-traditional esteem, it seems paradoxical that individuals are mutually affirming each other’s unknown progress. It remains a bit

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2 Arto Laitinen similarly made four critical points concerning how esteem is related with solidarity. His critical points were the universalistic problem, the issue of duties and permission, the definition question and the solidarity issue (see more Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2010: 1–21).
unclear where the content of such mutual concern comes from and what exactly is esteemed in others. Honneth argued that, if the forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem, are taken as the coordinating moral principles of post-traditional society, then individuals are naturally motivated by the question of what is individual and particular in others and how much they actively care about enriching these foreign characteristics. Self-esteem would depend on how much a person’s traits and abilities help to enrich others’ traits and abilities; the more they help, the more a person gains esteem. However, this enriching process or shared concern appears problematic because it is unclear how we can ever learn what kinds of traits we need to enrich in the other if these qualities are unpredictable. Thus, post-traditional esteem seems to exist without content. Perhaps the problem is that, while an individual’s Bildung processes are unpredictable, it is impossible to define the exact prefixed shared value horizon for guaranteeing it, but we can at least define a commonly shared value horizon based on recognition theory, which would be reflexive enough to allow expansion, as Honneth has done.

The second criticism of social esteem concerns the clarity and plausibility of the definitions of achievements. Can a capitalist society offer a proper value horizon for evaluating achievements? The concept of social esteem is accused of being too commensurable with the values of modern capitalism and incapable of criticising it. Honneth’s concept unclearly defined valuable contributions and the process of how these contributions are transformed into common goods in the first place. Social esteem has to be earned in light of the prevailing value horizon of society, which means that the more subjects’ traits and abilities contribute to the societal goals, the more valuable these traits are considered (Fraser & Honneth 2003: 59, Ikäheimo et al. 2004). In other words, the logic is that the more a person’s traits help in the realisation of the goals of capitalism, the more advanced his or her self-esteem will become, and negatively, if persons do not possess these traits and abilities, they have reduced possibilities for self-esteem.

The third critical points are targeted at Honneth’s demarcation of social esteem in the area of paid work. For Honneth, paid work (Lohnarbeit) is the only sphere where individuals can receive and bestow social esteem independently of the social background and depending only on individual contributions to the common good of society (Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2010: 7–9). In short, the critics have claimed that, according to Honneth, people who have work are socially esteemed as possessors of specific skills, while those who lack work are not socially esteemed in this regard. Honneth should be able to give concrete criteria or values for how our work life measures social esteem and justify his claims properly. Due
to the lack of clarity in formulating such criteria, the only measure for social esteem in capitalism seems to be income. In Honneth’s model, people have recognition-based motivations to compete for the usefulness of their achievements; they compete for the highest usefulness, which is measured by their income (Schmidt am Busch 2010: 263–271, Seglow 2008: 68–69).

If work represents the only medium for gaining self-realisation, then all struggles for self-realisation possibilities in society depend on work life. Honneth then must explain all the problems, distortions and the wrongdoing at work via the forms of misrecognition as the distortion of the self-realisation process. However, many problems in our work life are the distributive injustices of the global markets, which are not commensurable with the forms of misrecognition. These critical tendencies caused Honneth to denote a highly abstractive ideal where all the media that provide the development of self-esteem and self-realisation should be regarded as work. Honneth argued that every form of action that has importance for self-realisation and social integration, including household work, child rearing, the maintaining of friendships and love relations, etc., should be counted as work (Honneth 2010b: 224–236, Zurn 2000). This kind of redefinition of work leads to the unlimited expansion of a division of labour, and the danger is that we might lose some of the critical potential of the recognition theory. There might be the social media that promote the development of self-esteem while not promoting equality at work or in the global markets.

The fourth critical aspect asserts that the concept of social esteem involves unresolved tension between individualism and universalism; we should esteem persons for their individual contributions, but at the same time, we should esteem them as human beings in general. In other words, Honneth’s concept of esteem did not specify personifying attitudes and instrumentalising attitudes adequately enough because Honneth’s notion of ‘esteem’ is more related ‘Leistungsprinzip’, where a person is esteemed merely for his contributions to the common good, to the good of others, and this definition does not indicate whether the given esteem is a form of recognition or not (Ikkäheimo & Laitinen 2010: 1–7, Stojanov 2006).

How can Honneth’s arguments on social esteem be elaborated more plausibly regarding the previously introduced criticism? The first critique concerns the problem of self-realisation. Arto Laitinen analysed the concept of social esteem and argued that, in the Honnethian style of esteem, it is not the case that all in self-realisation is connected to contributing to the common good, and even in cases where it is, we can examine esteeming qua a contribution to a shared good or qua an achievement in a self-realisation project. In the self-realisation process,
there must always be at least implicitly some audience or other persons involved. A person cannot create a self-realisation process by himself or herself, but self-realisation requires deeds that are not only one’s own created illusory deeds. However, the deeds of self-realisation do not necessarily need to be common goals but goals that some other person highly appreciates. Social esteem rewards the worthwhileness of the deeds and success in executing one’s deeds. The basis of esteem is not that the action would be good for the agent herself; rather, it is the question of whether one is doing something worthwhile well and the fact that the need for feedback is a legitimate aim of non-illusory self-realisation through worthwhile goals, according to Laitinen (2012: 15–17).

It is unclear why the above mentioned critical aspects take Honneth’s social esteem, so strictly demarcated by Honneth himself, into the area of work. Only in some writings did Honneth (Honneth 1982, Honneth 1988: 689–711, Honneth 2007a: 75) propose that social esteem could emerge through work, but he did not deny that other media could exist for social esteem (see Fraser & Honneth 2003: 142–143). Additionally, Honneth did not explicitly argue that the measure of social esteem should be earned income, and I am not convinced that Honneth’s original idea of social esteem would offer the elements of a competition for the highest usefulness of work in terms of a competition for the most highly paid vacancies. Rather, Honneth developed his idea of social esteem against this kind of competition by referring to the free and shared concern of the development of each member’s traits and abilities in society (Honneth 1995b: 128–130, Honneth 2007b: 261).

Honneth made a distinction between an ideological form of recognition and a justified form of recognition. Perhaps this distinction can partly show that, according to Honneth, a capitalist society uses an ideological form of recognition, while a just society should offer conditions for the emergence of a justified form of recognition. A justified form of recognition differs from an ideological one by being a concrete action that has institutional grounds in our social reality. In addition, a justified form of recognition contains the ingredients for changing reality in a better direction. It should enable societal development by advancing contemporary social affairs (Brink & Owen 2007: 323–348).

When considering the institutional grounds of social esteem, we could argue that social esteem is a primary good for human beings and belongs to everyone as a basic right (Fraser & Honneth 2003: 147–148, Honneth 2011). Without social esteem, our actions seem useless, nothing seems worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. It can be said, as Rawls
(1972: 440) did, that without social esteem (or respect), all desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism. If full human agency depends on the positive self-relation that social esteem generates, then a fair society or a just state must provide appropriate conditions for forming social esteem (Laitinen 2012).

What, then, are the critical elements for societal improvements in Honneth’s concept of social esteem? If we look at Honneth’s way of understanding work life as similar to Durkheim’s organic solidarity, then a person can make contributions like those of others as well as unique contributions based on their unique traits and talents. If social esteem is a primary good for human beings and everyone is allowed to realise his or her genuine self-realisation processes, then we could assume that no one is unwillingly unemployed or excluded from making useful contributions to the common good. Thus, Honneth argued that society should guarantee a minimum amount of esteem, in the form of a minimum livelihood, to secure the development of person’s traits and abilities even if these abilities do not have any connection to the common good. Honneth seemed to understand our contemporary work life as an ideological praxis where the ruling neoliberal values contradict recognition theory’s social democratic values. For Honneth, the normative emphasis of recognition theory gives grounds for critique and possibilities to redefine the concept of meaningful work (Laitinen 2012: 13, Renault 2010: 245–255, Schmidt am Busch 2010: 268).

The critical arguments concerning the problem of individualism and universalism or instrumentalism and non-instrumentalism, however, are more convincing and perhaps one of a key points for developing further the concept of social esteem. The problem of instrumentalism as a philosophical conundrum interestingly reveals the problem of the theory of recognition; people need others for the sake of their existence as human beings in the first place, so the existence of others is always to some degree a means or an instrument for our own aims. Immanuel Kant in his idea of respect stated that we should not treat each other merely as means. This wisdom contains the idea that, while we cannot escape instrumental thinking for the sake of our existence, we cannot let it entirely determine our interpersonal relationships. (Laitinen 2012: 13.)

How well can the concept of social esteem retain this Kantian tension that others do not appear as mere instruments for us, but still have instrumental value in the sense that without others we could not exist? Using the work of Honneth, we can argue that existing as a human being equally alongside others requires a form of universal social esteem that prevents a lack of esteem. Everyone should
be esteemed at a level that restrains stereotypical stigmatising, which would lead to lowered self-esteem. Social esteem should guarantee that no one’s way of life is downgraded and disrespected and that every person has possibilities to attribute social value to his or her abilities. No one should be defined as a second-class citizen and be able to appear in public without shame (Honeth 2001: 111–126, 1997: 306–324, Honneth 1995b: 131–139, 2007b: 306–324 Laitinen 2012: 10).

To avoid the confusion of personifying and instrumentalising attitudes, it is clear that social esteem should be defined as a form of recognition containing a personifying attitude. In that case, only particularities that are important for the recognised (a person who receives recognition) can be the content of esteem. However, the content of esteem cannot be all the particularities that recognisee conceives as important but capacities, actions or achievements that make one somehow a contributor to the good of others. Social esteem should involve the perspective of taking the recognisee as a person in a way that attributes to him interpersonal significance (Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2010: 6).

The concept of gratitude and a grateful attitude of being could bring the needed clarity between instrumental attitudes and personifying attitudes, as Heikki Ikäheimo proposed. Through the concept of gratitude, social esteem appears through cooperative valuing. If we combine the preconditions of gratitude with the concept of social esteem, then social esteem should fulfil three conditions: 1) the target of esteem is an intentionally and not instinctually acting agent (a person) who 2) is capable and free of choosing and being responsible for his or her actions and 3) intends the beneficial results to other persons in a way such that they are not merely instruments for some other purpose; he or she must benefit others out of at least some degree of non-instrumental concern for their good or for their own sake (Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2010: 6–12, Ikäheimo 2014: 15–17).

Ikäheimo (2010: 6–12) defended Honneth’s account by arguing that, even if we restrict social esteem to the area of paid work, it can fulfil the conditions of gratitude and represent a form of recognition. If a wage labourer’s moral expectation is appropriate, he or she has to be motivated by a minimal intrinsic wish to contribute to the common good or the good of others, not purely contributing for money. Honneth’s account emphasised that, in a society that is based on the three forms of recognition, workers must have some love for those to whose lives they contribute. This kind of society would manifest the achievement principle as the structuring power of the moral expectations within the sphere of wage labour defining an economy following the logic of gratitude. When workers wish to be valued as persons for their work as wage labourers, they imagine their relation-
ship to at least some others influenced by their work as an ethical one. Thus, Honneth’s idea of wage labour is not merely an instrumental activity (Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2010: 6–12, similarly Ricoeur 2005: 225–246).

How, then, could Honneth’s idea of social esteem be taken as pedagogically significant? First, we can argue that schools should emphasise that the field of the market economy and especially the labour markets should represent the sphere of the social esteem. In these practices, social esteem should mean an approval atmosphere where society’s social climate is encouraging enough for individuals to develop as active participants through their rationally formulated traits and abilities. An individual’s traits and abilities are rational when they can be seen as contributing to the common good, so schools should sharpen the idea of ‘societal solidarity’. This solidarity refers to a shared learning process where the mutual concerns of the development of traits and abilities are learnt. Individuals should not only passively accept others’ traits and abilities; rather, they should be actively concerned with how they can best help to develop others’ traits and abilities that appear unfamiliar to themselves. Honneth considered this to represent a process where every member of society has the possibility to recognise and develop the activities of each other and to perceive these activities as significant contributions to the common good. This is the only way to guarantee the development of self-esteem for all members of the society. Social esteem produces an individual’s inner self-relation, self-esteem (Honneth 1995b, 2010a: 60–63, 2013c: 255–329).

Second, schools should indicate how contemporary tendencies in the market economy hinder the development of individuals’ self-esteem. Honneth’s analysis can provide critical insights for schools; schools should not rely purely on the demands of the labour markets because the labour markets individualise feelings of responsibility and feelings of resistance, causing asocial phenomena such as suicides at work. When planning the curriculum, schools should understand that the commercialised market economy does not represent the sphere of common responsibility but rather the field of competition, where every subject is solely responsible for maximising his own interests. Honneth (2013c: 250–253) concluded that, in the market economy, workers cannot find themselves useful members of society anymore; they feel that they do not belong anywhere and cannot see the results of their work as a contribution to the common good. Honneth called this the erosion of the responsibility principle, where the ideas of societal solidarity and shared common goods are dispelled.

Schools and curriculum designs should consider Honneth’s critique that labour markets increasingly demand that individuals act on artificial self-portrayal
experiences that represent reified self-relations, causing depression in the young. This topic is widely ignored in the enthusiasm for entrepreneurial education in the curriculum plans. According to Honneth, self-portrayal experiences, such as the self-marketing strategies that labour markets require, confuse our genuine feelings and intentions. Honneth (Honneth et al. 2008: 67–69) emphasised that these practices are reifying and make us forget what it means to have desires, feelings and intentions that are worthy of affirmation and articulation. The contemporary labour markets can make us lose or replace genuine mental states with reified self-relations.

4.7 Social freedom and education

The purpose of this chapter is to characterise how Honneth connected his ideas on social freedom to education. The problem in this task is the scarcity of sources, as Honneth (2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 2014) has only recently started to devote speeches and writings to the topic of education. This shift in his theoretical focus is, however, very welcome and long awaited. Honneth announced that the second expanded edition of his forthcoming book Freedom's Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life will contain a chapter concerning public education. Unfortunately, this text is not available yet, so my reconstruction can only outline Honneth’s educational thoughts based mainly on his speech titled 'Education and the Public Sphere: A Neglected Chapter of Political Philosophy' and German published version of it, and his Freedom’s right concerning family upbringing (Honneth 2012a, 2013b, 2013c). This chapter is structured as follows: in section 4.7.1, Honneth’s concerns about current public education are introduced; in section 4.7.2, the theoretical reason behind the recent eradicating tendencies are elaborated on; in section 4.7.3, Honneth’s solutions to these problems are analysed, and section 4.7.4 critically revises Honneth’s views.

4.7.1 The contemporary challenges of the public schools

Honneth argued that contemporary schools are transformed solely following the demands of the changing economic reality. This reality demands that schools greatly increase the number of pupils in classrooms, flexibility and the orientation toward achievements. Honneth emphasised that because the social political efforts toward lessening the educational deficiencies of the lower classes have remained unchanged, in developed capitalist countries, schools have no choice than to focus
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on stronger selection, individual assessment and the cultivation of abilities for competitive behaviour in the classroom (Honneth 2012a: 438).

Honneth took an example of this development from the US. Recently in the US, demands have risen to reform the whole school system to make teaching entirely servant to the goal of transmitting marketable skills. These reform campaigns include, for example, President George W. Bush’s No Child Left Behind law and President Barack Obama’s Race to the Top Program. Honneth cited Diane Ravitch (2012), who argued that these campaigns are examples of a global educational reform movement promoting standardised testing as the most reliable measure of the success of students, teachers and schools. They promote the privatisation of schools, standardisation of curriculum and merits for high-scoring schools while closing low-scoring schools. The basic idea of these programs is that only by reforming the public school system can we fix the problem of poverty. The reformers of these programs consist mainly of Wall Street fund managers, foundation officials, corporate executives, entrepreneurs and policymakers, but few experienced educators. Diane Ravitch stated that the reformers like G. W. Bush, Joel Klein, Michelle Rhee and Arne Duncan have indicated that there should be ‘no excuses’ for schools with low test scores (Carter & Meyerson 2000). The reformers’ idea is that schools should be able to offer to all children academic proficiency without regard to poverty, disability or other conditions. Reformers have claimed that bad teachers the reason that contemporary schools cannot fulfil this task. The reformers have argued that the economy of the US is jeopardised not because of growing poverty, income inequality or the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs but solely because of the bad teachers and that these bad teachers must be identified and dismissed (Honneth 2012a: 438, Ravitch 2012).

The problem with these reform ideas is the notion that, since teachers are solely to blame, the only way to solve the problems of poverty is by launching expensive programs to evaluate teachers based on student test scores. According to Diane Ravitch, the main mechanism of school reform in the USA is to identify teachers who can raise their students’ test scores every year. The reformers believe that when every classroom has this kind of ‘great teacher’ and more schools are handed over to private managers, even for profit corporations, the students will enrol in college and poverty will eventually disappear. Ravitch cogently argued that these reformers do not seem to care that standardised tests are plagued by measurement errors, sampling errors and other statistical errors. Besides the errors, it seems absurd to measure the quality of a teacher according to the students’ results on a multiple-choice test given on one day of the year. In addition,
Ravitch argued that this kind of test-oriented school reform will narrow non-tested subjects in schools, such as the arts, physical education, history and civics (Honneth 2012a, Ravitch 2012).

Ravitch criticised the reformers for too idealistically assuming that schools can achieve miracles by relying on competition, deregulation and management by data. Generally, these ideals refer to US policymakers’ market-based solutions for public education, such as forcing tougher competition, obtaining more data, abolishing teacher unions, opening more charter schools and employing corporate management models. Ravitch argued that the reformers are detached from the realities of schooling and are blind to scientific research knowledge and thus ignore the important influence of families and poverty (Ravitch 2012).

Honneth considered that these economic interests are affecting not only the public education systems in the US but also those in Europe. This development has the effect of eliminating the idea that public schools should be a viable organism for reproducing democracies. Honneth (2012a: 438–439) argued similarly to Ravitch that these reform tendencies apart from all the empirical findings of which indicate successful school achievements. By this argument Honneth refers mainly to the studies like PISA where the most successful educational systems differ from the ideals of the reform campaigns. Honneth uses the Finnish school system as an example to support the argument that schools that output the best cognitive achievements and abilities for the students at the same time also give the best ingredients for a regeneration of democratic practices. (ibid.: 429–442.)

4.7.2 Theoretical reasons for recent tendencies

Honneth considered the reform campaigns in the US to reflect more general, even global interests in reforming public schools. Honneth stated that the reasons for the recent developments emerged from the theoretical separation of or a forgotten link between political philosophy and the philosophy of education and between theories of democracy and theories of education. Honneth defended the ‘forgotten link’, arguing that Rousseau, Kant, Schleiermacher, Durkheim and Dewey all devoted significant writings to public education, treating pedagogy like a twin sister of the theory of democracy. They all agree that without proper guidance and cultivation toward the abilities of cooperation and moral initiatives needed in democratic will formation, the development of ‘a good citizen’ would only be an empty ornament of political speeches. The idea of ‘a good citizen’ was, for Rousseau, Kant, Schleiermacher, Durkheim and Dewey, a practical challenge asking
for theoretical elaborations and even the experimental testing of suitable school types and teaching methods. Honneth contended, that after the defeat of Nazism in Germany, it was natural to retrieve unlearned practices of democratic decision making, and this had to done nation-wide in education. However, since then, the important link between educational concepts and democracy has been broken. For Honneth, it seemed that only some isolated ideas in educational sciences highlighted the importance of democracy, and on the other hand, democratic theories of political philosophy do not concern education and theoretical applications to school methods and curriculum. Honneth worried that contemporary political philosophy has lost the view where educational processes (‘allgemeine Bildungsprozesse’) produce cultural and moral conditions vital for democracy and its existence. Thus, the studies of educational processes should be at the centre of political philosophy (Honneth 2012a: 430–431).

Honneth asserted that democratic theory has separated from her twin sister, educational theory, and thus lost the possibility to make a proper contribution regarding the normative function of preschool, general school and adult education. At the same time, political philosophy encounters the problems of education in every conceivable place, without having, however, too many theoretical tools to solve these problems (Honneth 2012a: 431).

Honneth contended that the reason for this fatal gap between the theory of democracy and the theory of education is the association of problematic views on the cultural preconditions of democracy and a misunderstood principle of the neutrality of the state. Moreover, there exist theoretical transformations that are responsible for the fact that school- and state-organised education receives so little attention in political philosophy. These theoretical transformations have manifested disillusionment in the self-generative forces of the democratic state, and the political significance accorded to school education will be correspondingly reduced since it is not regarded as a powerful tool for change. Honneth elaborated on two theoretical sources that might explain why democratic theory over the past few decades has lost its faith in the value that state-organised education has for democracy (Honneth 2012a: 431–432).

The first theoretical source of this kind is the famous dictum laid out by Ernst Böckenförde, the so-called ‘Böckenförde dictum’. This dictum states that liberal democracy in its constitutional form, comprising the rule of law, the protection of fundamental rights, the separation of powers and so on, possess no secure foundation for its legitimacy and effectiveness. On the one hand, the liberal democratic state can function only when liberty, guaranteed for its citizens, is exercised and
regulated from within the moral substance of the individual and by shared values in society. On the other hand, the liberal state is unable to command or enforce these inner regulative forces by its authority or legal power without giving up liberalism (Böckenförde 1991).

The Böckenförde dictum impugns liberal democratic state’s ability to articulate the origins and validity of its constitutional arrangement and legal norms and the reasons that individuals should obey these norms. The liberal democratic state seems to play a minor role in its own regeneration of the moral and cultural conditions. Honneth argued that, although Böckenförde understood his thesis originally in a much more narrow sense concerning only the uncertainty of the origins of the moral grounds of modern law, it is now widely interpreted and taken as evidence of the cultural non-autonomy of all democratic states. When political systems follow this generalisation, they constantly find that they do not possess appropriate tools for cultivating moral support for cultural growth and care. It sounds reasonable, then, that these theories lead to the conclusion that state-organised educational processes do not have any reasons to teach democratic-promoting behaviours (Honneth 2012a: 432–433).

Following this general interpretation of the Böckenförde thesis, all governmental efforts to organise a democratic education are futile because they cannot be based on the moral virtues that are vital for the survival of democracies. Honneth argued that this reading of Böckenförde has led to the general misunderstanding that democratic virtues, such as the moral attitudes of collaborative decision making, tolerance, empathic skills for taking the perspective of others and the idea of the common good, seem impossible for education to cultivate but rather take place through experiencing the ethical socialisation milieus of pre-political communities. Thus, if public education and the Bildung processes of democratic societies are to cultivate democratic ideals, then they should distance themselves from the existing democracy and fall back to or retrieve the pre-political milieu of traditional communities. Honneth emphasised that this widespread thesis has negatively caused democratic theories largely to avoid questions concerning public education, and such problems even appear superfluous because democratic contents for pedagogic action must be found somewhere other than from the existing state-mediated processes, such as from tradition-oriented communities (Böckenförde 1991, Honneth 2012a: 433).

The second tendency toward the decoupling of democratic theory from educational theory arises from a more normative phenomenon, the idea of the neutrality of the state. Honneth argued that, in Western Europe, for example in France
and in Germany, the recent debates and conflicts concerning multiculturalism in education have generated completely absurd and paradoxical developments. There have been intensive debates in defence of multiculturalism in the public schools with arguments that schools should not cultivate any particular cultural values. In these debates, strict state neutrality is seen as necessary. What is really absurd in these debates, according to Honneth, is that parents who are interested in or worried about their children’s career possibilities take this ‘multiculturalism argument’ as suggesting that schools should not involve any democratic values and should provide a value-free education to guarantee better career possibilities for their children. Democratic values are taken as something that would leave not enough space for certain cognitive skills and thus should be abandoned. Honneth emphasised that it was self-evident in the tradition of Kant, Durkheim and Dewey that the state-organised public school had to cultivate the values and content equally for everyone to secure future citizens. Parents’ particular value beliefs for their children had to be broken at the entrance to the school so that every student would have equal abilities for the reflexive behaviour needed to participate in the public will formation. These traditionally mandatory democratic procedures in education are now widely questioned; the requirements of state neutrality have expanded to the point where any kind of partiality in the school curriculum is seen as problematic, and even the idea of democratic education loses its normative truism (Honneth 2012a: 433–343, 2013b).

The danger is that, with the conjunction of the idea of state neutrality and the Böckenförde dictum, the democratic elements will be eliminated from state-administered education. Honneth referred to the term ‘civic minimum’, which liberalism has introduced as a new requirement for public schools. According to this principle, the publicly mandated requirements of civic education in schools must be minimal to diminish democratic disagreement and increase parental control over schooling. The idea of civic minimalism is put into practice through school voucher systems where the state gives parents a certificate of funding that parents are able to apply toward tuition at the school of their choice, public or private, secular or religious. The idea of civic minimalism is defended by arguing that the only way to solve the problem of achieving consensus about civic education under the conditions of pluralism is to minimise the civic component of schooling and leave parents to decide what education will best suit their children. In this way, the democratic disagreement over public schooling can be minimised. Following the idea of civic minimalism, parents have constitutional rights to determine every feature of their children’s schooling except the civic minimum. It
was introduced as an alternative to democratic deliberation. These tendencies reflect a general change in the opinion atmosphere where parents have begun to think more and more that schools are their property, not the property of the state (Gutmann 1999: 292–303, Honneth 2012a: 433–435).

Honneth’s elaborations on democratic education contradict the idea of civic minimalism. For Honneth, democratic education should allow its citizens to be taught more than a civic minimum for the sake of everyone’s equal rights. According to the principles of democratic education, parents do not have general rights to override legitimate democratic decisions concerning the schooling of their children. Democratic education defends public education that offers abilities that support a democracy of free and equal citizenship. Democratic education indicates when parents and citizens exceed the limits of their legitimate authority over education. It also welcomes critiques and arguments about the contents of public education, which civic minimalism excludes (Gutmann 1999: 292–304, Honneth 2012a: 435).

Honneth contended that the Böckenförde dictum and state neutrality have decreased the interest to develop democratic education that would be applied to public schools, and it seems that the remaining task for contemporary schools is only to recognise and cultivate ‘civic minimalism’. The ideological characteristics of the school curriculum and the general orientations of education are left as the parents’ responsibility having to choose among a variety of private schools suitable for their children. Teachers must no longer see themselves as agents of the democratic state but rather as answerable solely to the parents; they should be solely the ‘agents of the parents’. Honneth also argued that the more decisively ethical neutrality is required from public schools, the greater the danger will be that it will be replaced by ideologically tied private schools, and then democratic society will lose its central instrument for reproducing its own moral foundations. Struggles over the public school system, whether concerning the structure, the curriculum or the methods, are struggles for the future viability of democracies (Durkheim 1961: 196, Honneth 2012a: 434–445).

4.7.3 Attempts to rehabilitate ‘forgotten link’ between education and political freedom

Honneth defended the ‘forgotten link’ between education and political philosophy to respond to the threats to public education. Honneth (2012a, 429) began with Kant’s lectures on education, where Kant addressed two most difficult human
inventions, the government and the art of education; a theory of education and the idea of the perfect republic, governed by principles of justice, are both conceptions of a perfection that has not yet been experienced (Kant 1899: 8–9). Honneth read Kant as asserting two-dimensional tasks for the government and pedagogy; both contain the tasks of cultivation in the level of individual development and the history of humankind. These ‘phylogenic’ (‘der phylogenese’) and ‘ontogenic’ (‘der ontogenese’) tasks are analogical to the educational process where a child, through education, grows from immaturity toward freedom, but at the same time education represents art that perfects itself through the practice of many generations. Kant asserted that each generation, provided with the knowledge of forgotten ones, is better able to add contents that will develop individuals’ natural gifts toward their end and at the same time advance the whole human race toward its destiny (Kant 1899: 11).

Honneth emphasised that, for Kant, the connection of a perfect republic and pedagogy are not a mere analogy but inherently belong together. The reciprocal conditions of a republican system of government (‘republikanischer Staatsordnung’) can guarantee education, and only via education can this government retain its functions. Education must cultivate a child from the state of nature to the state of culture toward freedom, which is necessary for one to become a member of a self-regulated state. Conversely, only autonomous citizens can institutionalise public education that enables the path to political maturity. The unity of a good education and a perfect republic (‘republikanische Staatsordnung’) brings forth cultural and moral qualities that also enable the lower classes (‘Des niederen Volkes’) to partake in political emancipation. Honneth found in both Rousseau’s Emile and Kant’s lectures a link between the idea of ‘a good citizen’ and the concept of Bildung (‘Bildungskonzeption’). According to Honneth, Kant as well as Rousseau emphasised that, without one (the concept of Bildung), the other (political philosophy) would not be possible because both explain the requirements of a democratic polity and cannot exist independently (Honneth 2012a: 429–430).

The first practical advice to rehabilitate the link between education and democracy is drawn from Kant’s idea that the primacy of the public schools over family education must be granted. Kant defended public education to avoid of the deficits of family upbringing (‘Familienfehlern’) by cultivating for all students equally the virtues and abilities needed to become citizens. The deficit in family education that Honneth referred to was, for Kant, the fact that parents usually educate their children merely to adapt to the present conditions of society regard-
less of how bad the world may be. Kant emphasised that children deserve a much better education, an education not for the present but for the possibly improved conditions of the future. Children should be educated in a manner such that the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man are adapted. The basis of a scheme of education must be cosmopolitan, and this idea of a universal good is never harmful to us as individuals (Kant 1899: 14–15, 20).

Second, Honneth took up Kant’s three elements, mechanical skills (‘mechanische Geschicklichkeiten’), pragmatic prudence (‘pragmatische Klugheiten’) and abilities for moral autonomy (‘moralische Selbstbestimmung’) as initial elements for a democratic-oriented education. Kant elaborated on these elements as parts of ‘practical’ or moral training that teaches a human to live as a free being. Honneth argued that Kant’s conceptualisations of the three skills needed by future citizens should not be understood as useful knowledge for exercising different future professions. These pedagogical elements cannot be thought of as marketable skills to gain better professions, but rather as abilities to require and recognise healthy self-relations. Mechanical skills, pragmatic prudence and moral autonomy help an individual to acquire as many dimensions of self-esteem and self-worth as are needed to become a self-confident citizen of a republic. According to Honneth, Kant’s ‘skills’, concisely expressed by John Rawls’s concept of self-respect, are educative contents that need to be cultivated before an individual can participate as an equal among equals. Thus, Kant’s vocational dexterities, orientation toward the knowledge of civil society and moral principles are not understood as something to learn to secure a future income but represent a socially generalised media of social recognition. In these media of recognition, a person should learn to respect oneself as an individual, respect oneself as a citizen through the acquisition of knowledge of civil society and respect the whole human race through moral principles. Pedagogic action should cultivate these media of respect to enable adolescents progressively to gain consciousness of the value of their own selves in the eyes of others (Honneth 2012a: 435–436, Kant 1899: 30–31, Rawls 1972: 440–446).

While criticising Kant for not explicitly defining how the contents of the school curriculum and pedagogical methods should be formulated, Honneth found in Kant the idea of cooperativeness; Kant indicated quite well that a public school is a place for learning the communal virtues, enabling everyone to work together as a recognised member sharing with all others deeds toward shared decision making rather than a place for learning specific cognitive career-oriented skills (Honneth 2012a: 435–436).
Honneth forged his path from Kant to Émile Durkheim and John Dewey arguing that these philosophers took a step further and considered the inner connection between democracy and education, the learning processes in the school and the role of a democratic citizen. Honneth found surprising similarities between Durkheim’s and Dewey’s ideas of education, despite their apparent contrast. They both exclusively emphasised the importance of the third function, preparation toward the role of a future citizen, defined by Kant as the most crucial for the public schools. They both thought, like Kant, that skills for professions will develop as a side product of the democratic values and abilities in the schools. According to Honneth, these thinkers thought that, when a democratic state organises compulsory education as a basic right for its citizens to learn equally to use their political rights, it guarantees the viability of democratic legitimation and at same time removes the deficiencies of the different social backgrounds in education (Honneth 2012a: 436–437).

Both Dewey and Durkheim considered that preparation for the role of a future citizen is less a matter of teaching the right kinds of facts and testable knowledge of political or historical contexts and more a matter of requiring certain kinds of practical formations of habits, practices enabling morally self-confident cooperation in the community. Dewey, as a pragmatist, set the ideal for school education following the interaction of the research-based communities. Honneth agrees Dewey’s emphasis that teaching should be cooperative as possible, by using the method of inquiry, like problem-based learning. Thus education following these ideas would be something like creative problem-solving process. Durkheim appears for Honneth offering more for a child the initiation to the culture of a democratic will formation process and considering the contribution that schools can make toward the skills needed for the practice of democratic will formation processes. (Honneth 2012a: 437.)

According to Honneth, Durkheim followed Kant’s principle that every child’s selfish inclinations must be broken only by moral disciplining before he or she is able to learn autonomously the social rules of the democratic community. However, Durkheim differed from Kant in characterising educational processes as more successfully achieved if teaching follows practical role models and playful activities, passions and desires emerge from the sensible nature of a child. Infantile egoism is not defeated by moral discipline but rather through learning affect-mediated habits through appropriate participation in practices where a child’s inclinations are useful (Honneth 2012a: 437). The idea is that only democratic practices can give the initial impulses or urges to learn the rules of democratic
coexistence and control of affective habits which are necessary in later life. Initiation to a democratic form of life from the very early childhood can only guarantee the development of democratic habits that represents autonomy for a child.

Durkheim expresses this similarly by arguing that a sense of identity and personal fulfilment can only be achieved by systematically exposing the cultural heritage of the students’ own country. Schools need to make students into moral beings, beings who are aware of their implications in the society to which they are bound by duties and desires. Excessive individualism in education leads to personal defeat and social chaos, against which moral education is needed. For avoiding excessive individualism, discipline, relative of the historical context, is the necessary element of moral education. Discipline teaches us to restrain and master ourselves enabling emancipation and freedom. This self-control is the condition of happiness and of moral health being necessary for democratic societies. Durkheim emphasises that discipline is needed for a child in teaching interests and subjects which have the most fortunate influence on the general welfare and preventing brutality and ignorance. (Durkheim 1961: 42–50).

According to Honneth, Durkheim’s ideas of education and schools are comparable with those of Kant, while Dewey’s views are based on Hegelian arguments. Dewey argued that teaching in schools should cultivate the learning processes that are as cooperative as possible enabling the participation of all involved in any matters related to school. Teachers should use community-based punishments and encouragements rather than individualistic ones. Dewey stated that only cultivation of the spirit of democratic interaction from an early age can guarantee confident participation in public political decision making. Neither of these thinkers, Dewey and Durkheim, considered the requirements for schools to cultivate individual autonomy, which is now widely demanded, but rather the requirements to teach students a strong sense of what it means to understand their classmates as equal partners in joint learning and inquiry processes. Honneth concluded that both Dewey and Durkheim agreed that a democratic state, for its re-creation, needs public education that does not one-sidedly cultivate moral principles, specific rules for how to act right and wrong, but introduces children to the ‘culture of associations’, as Dewey called it, the communicative practice of taking the perspective of others and the moral initiative to regenerate democracies (Boydston 1980: xi–xiii, 87–107, Honneth 2012a: 437–438).

According to Honneth, Durkheim and Dewey were more prominent than Kant because they understood the teaching of morality through habits where a child accepts moral rules that are appropriate for fulfilling the roles that individu-
als play in their various associations. Children learn to obey moral rules because they benefit from the associations to which they belong, and through belonging, they provide benefit in turn. Honneth concluded that what we can tell about morality education in schools guided by Durkheim and Dewey is something like the idea of a ‘morality of associations’ (Honneth 2012a: 437–438).

Honneth referred to Rawls briefly but mainly used Amy Gutmann’s writings on democracy and education when defining the idea of the ‘morality of associations’. However, it is clear that Gutmann’s (1999: 59–62) interpretation of the idea of the morality of associations comes straight from Rawls’ tripartite moral theory. The stage of morality of associations is the second highest moral developmental stage in Rawls’ theory. Rawls, inspired by Kohlberg, defined a three-stage moral development for a child, where morality develops through the morality of authority, the morality of association and the morality of principles. Rawls characterises the first stage of moral as happening within the family, where the parents represent for a child unquestioned authority. At this stage, a child does not have the ability to question a parent’s guidance; a child lacks the concept of justification or standards of criticism. Parents’ unconditional love for their child launches solid confidence for the child by which he or she acquires various skills and develops a sense of competence that affirms his or her self-esteem. Rawls argued that parents’ love makes a child love them back, and if a child loves his or her parents, he or she tends to accept their injunctions. The child strives to be like them, assuming that they are worth esteeming. A child experiences parental norms as constraints, against which he or she may rebel. However, according to Rawls, if a child loves his or her parents, then the child is inclined to confess his or her misbehaviour or rebellious acts against the rules and to seek reconciliation. In other words, when a child has broken a parent’s rules, a feeling of guilt arises; the absence of these feelings would indicate a lack of love and trust. The morality of authority is primitive and based on a limited understanding, consisting of a collection of rules without a larger understanding of right and the justice from which these rules are derived (Rawls 1972: 462–467).

The second stage of moral development, ‘the morality of associations’, is based on the ideal roles that are esteemed in different associations. For example, family is seen as a small association where a child adopts the ideals of a good son or a good daughter. At this stage, individuals learn different kind of ideals, such as the virtues of a good student and classmate and the ideals of a good sport and companion. Rawls argued that, when individuals develop through holding a sequence of different positions in life, these positions increasingly require greater
intellectual judgments and finer moral discrimination and enable increasing moral understanding. The morality of associations enables the ability to take other people’s perspectives by understanding the roles that others occupy throughout the system of cooperation. Rawls contended that this is the skill of regarding things from a variety of points of view and thinking of these together as an aspect of one system of cooperation. Participation in associations where the members live up to their duties and obligations generates ties of friendship, mutual trust and confidence. When these ties are established, people tend to feel guilt when they fail to do their part in the association (Honneth 2012a: 467–472).

The third stage of moral development, according to Rawls, is ‘the morality of principles’. Rawls (1972: 473–479) stated that, in this phase, an individual identifies with the ideals of equal citizens and the principles of justice, i.e., the highest-order principles. The morality of principles takes two forms, one corresponding to the sense of right and justice and the other to the love of humanity and self-command. The first form, the sense of right and justice, includes the virtues of the moralities of authority and associations. These virtues are not supererogatory, and what really distinguishes ‘the morality of principles’ from the earlier moral stages is the second form, the love of mankind and self-command, which are supererogatory. Supererogatory morality means that individuals are willing to do more than their duties require; it is antithesis for an obligatory task. Rawls explained two aspects of the morality of supererogation: first, ‘love of mankind’ advances the common good in ways that go well beyond our natural duties and obligations. This morality is not for ordinary people and includes the virtue of benevolence, heightened sensitivity to the feelings and wants of others and proper humility and unconcern with the self. Second, ‘the morality of self-command’ emerges by fulfilling with complete ease and grace the requirements of right and justice and their characteristic virtues of courage, magnanimity and self-control in actions presupposing great discipline and training (Rawls 1972: 473–479).

Gutmann (1999: 59–62) argued that neither Kohlberg nor anybody else has yet discovered a way that schools can succeed in teaching the idea of ‘the morality in principle’, the highest moral development. At best, schools can teach children developing from the morality of authority toward the morality of associations, according to Gutmann. In the context of democratic education, teaching the morality of associations is great progress over the morality of authority because children learn to alter their habits and to criticise authority out of empathy for others and a concern for fairness. Gutmann defined the elements of morality of associations as empathy, trust, benevolence and fairness. According to Gutmann,
the most successful schools seem to teach not the morality of principle but the morality of association: a willingness and ability to contribute and to claim one’s fair share in cooperative associations. Gutmann contended that, if a child learns only the morality of authority, he or she lacks the capacity to distinguish between fair and unfair and trustworthy and untrustworthy authorities. They fail to identify the purposes of the social institutions that do not continually force them to cooperate. They are unable to judge the commands of the authorities or their own actions with respect to whether they live according to the terms of fair cooperation (ibid.).

Honneth concluded that the pedagogical methods and the learning styles used in countries that have been successful in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests are surprisingly similar to the idea of ‘the morality of associations’. Following Honneth, the idea of the morality of associations combines Durkheim’s and Dewey’s cooperative and democracy-promoting teaching methods evidenced in the Finnish school system which has always achieved the best results in all international comparisons. Honneth embraced the Finnish school system for treating students from different social backgrounds as equal members of the same single school community and keeping these students together as long as possible. In Finnish schools, student testing is reduced to a minimum, and communicative responsibility and mutual trust are more important than individual accountability. Honneth even states that Finnish schools (by which I think he mainly means primary schools) are ahead in cooperativeness compared with other countries, because there are no individual accomplishments but only accomplishments of the whole group; individual accomplishment is not even assessed. In addition, Honneth argued that Finnish schools are very rich and over-financed schools (Honneth 2013b). Teachers receive much greater pedagogic freedom in their work and more respect than they do elsewhere; they are highly educated professionals who can themselves decide how and what to teach in each lesson with cooperation with their student representatives. Of course, in the vocabulary of Durkheim and Dewey, the concepts of habituation, communal morality, and cooperative methods are not directly used in Finnish schools, but it seems that, for Honneth, the reinterpretation of these elements as a language of democratic education could easily be supplied. According to Honneth, the Finnish school system supports the argument that those schools that produce the best cognitive achievements and abilities for students will at the same time give the best ingredients for regenerating democratic practices (Honneth 2012a: 429–442).
4.7.4 From Kant to democratic ideals in education – a giant leap?

In this chapter, I reflect critically on Honneth’s views on education and democracy. First, it is necessary to clarify a few points regarding Honneth’s reading of Kant’s lecture by considering that it is a too big leap to go from Kant to Durkheim and Dewey. Then, the overly optimistic perspective on the Finnish school system needs to be revised. Finally, I will try to do justice to Honneth’s claims that democracy and education belong together by examining how Honneth’s idea of democracy should be understood.

Honneth did not make explicit in his reading of Kant the author’s idea that only when individuals encounter the public can they start to use their reason. Honneth did not emphasise Kant’s two different forms of the usage of reason, private use and public use. The private use of reason involves the action of a person who is in a specific position in society and represents a passive part of the mechanisms of society. Only the public use of reason enables freedom, where individuals are no longer bound by some specific societal position or profession but can independently, using their own reason, express opinions and criticise the limitations, norms and standards of the private use of reason. For Kant, the contemporary stage of humanity represented the private use of reason, while the public use of reason should give impetus toward the process of history, which is an everlasting approach toward enlightenment, to the ideal state of human reason and freedom (Kivelä 2012: 62).

The core idea of Kant’s lectures on pedagogy is how to cultivate individuals toward the public use of reason. This use of reason is not the actions of an isolated being but merely a social discursive practice. Kant’s lectures repeated his idea of the history of humanity and the process of enlightenment. The history of humanity should be seen as a collective process of education and Bildung. Thus, we can argue that the social dimensions that Honneth sought from Dewey and Durkheim were already addressed by Kant. According to Kant, supreme abilities develop only in societies through joint efforts and practices. Kant’s public use of reason involves the idea that there should exist a mutual interdependence between the public sphere and rational individuals. The community must be enlightened enough to provide freedom to individuals to express their opinions and to criticise the existing order if needed, and there must also be enough rational and free beings to participate in the public use of reason (Brandom 2009: 12, Kivelä 2012: 63–69).
When Honneth moved from Kant to Durkheim and Dewey, he defended this theoretical move based on the argument that Kant elaborated abstract educational insights containing strict obedience to moral principles, whereas Durkheim and Dewey characterise the connection between democracy and education in a more exemplary way respecting the child’s nature and playful activities. However, in contrast to Durkheim and Dewey, Kant was the one who introduced the greatest problem in education, the so-called ‘pedagogical paradox’. Kant proposed how we can unite submission and the necessary restraint with a child’s ability to exercise his or her free will, how to accustom students to restraining their freedom and at the same time guide them to use their freedom properly. How can freedom be cultivated through restraining it? Kant emphasised that without this kind of problem, education would be merely mechanical, and a child would never be able to use his freedom properly (Kant 1899: 27).

Honneth agreed that there hardly exists as deep and radical an educational debate as Kant has elaborated in his pedagogical paradox (see Honneth 2013b). However, according to Honneth’s interpretation, it remains completely unclear how Kant developed answers to this problem and what connection, for example, mechanical, pragmatic and moral skills have to it. Honneth argued that three pedagogical elements from Kant’s lectures, mechanical skills, pragmatic prudence and abilities for moral autonomy, should be understood as layers of mutual recognition that enable individuals to act as confident and self-esteem actors in public. In other words, these skills are expressed as vocational dexterities, orientation toward the knowledge of civil society and moral principles that should teach a person to respect oneself as an individual and a citizen and to respect the whole human race (Honneth 2012a: 435–436).

For Honneth, Kant’s third element, moral training, seemed to be the most important, but we need to clarify more precisely how Kant in his lectures defined an answer to the problem of the pedagogical paradox. He started with four demands for education, discipline, culture, discretion and moral training. Discipline is needed for restraining our animal nature from taking over our personhood at the individual and societal levels. Discipline is necessary only for restraining unruliness. According to Kant, horses and dogs are broken in, and children may be broken in too, but it is of greater importance that they learn to think (Kant 1899: 58–65). Kivelä (2012: 67–68) suggested that education for Kant meant cultivation
from *sentient beings* to *sapient beings* and that discipline in education is needed only for sentient beings.

Kant described the use of discipline for a child or for a ‘sentient being’ by defining three necessary restraints to be used in education so that a child learns to use his or her freedom properly. First, it is necessary to allow a child perfect liberty in every respect. The only limit on this freedom should occur when he or she might hurt others and himself or herself. A child needs this restriction so that he will not restrict the freedom of others. Second, it is necessary to teach a child that the only way to meet his or her own deeds is to allow others to attain theirs. Third, it is necessary to make it clear to a child that restraints are to be used only until he or she grows older and is capable of using his or her freedom properly, until the child is independent of the need for the help of others. Kant argued that this is the last thing that children realise because they imagine that they can always live like they do in their parents’ house, where food and drinks are always provided for them without any trouble on their part. This third element refers exactly to the public use of reason where a person should learn to take responsibility for his or her own life and be capable of rational reasoning and moral deliberations without anyone’s custody. (Kant 1899: 28–29.)

Second, education should subject people to culture, which consists of the exercise of the mental faculties. Kant argued that culture is what distinguishes man

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3 Ari Kivelä cogently noted that the core of Kant’s educational thought was autonomy, which reflects the key concept of modernity. Kivelä proposed that, through Robert Brandom’s definitions of sentence and sapience, we can outline answers to the pedagogical paradox. Sentence refers to the sensuous awareness common to all consciously living creatures, such as feeling pain, seeing colours and hearing sounds. Sentient beings orient their actions simply based on sensuous pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Sentient creatures act merely like animal-like creatures living in their natural environment, behaving in responsive to their natural environment. This is not a sufficient condition for true human beings. Human beings are not only sensing and feeling beings, but they are also thinking, reflexive beings. A sapient being has conceptual awareness, consciousness of the self and the world. A sapient state of consciousness is something that can be articulated and made explicit with concepts. Sapient beings make judgements and perform intentional actions. They are normative beings who act and think for reasons that they are responsible and committed to and that they have authorized solely by their own reasoning. Brandom expresses this by asserting that ‘The content of sapient beings is merely the rules that grip us on our way to thinking and acting. They determine what we deliberately choose to do and think’ (Brandom 2009: 142, Kivelä 2012: 66–67).

Kivelä connected Kantian positive autonomy to Brandom’s sapient being; sapient beings are free to do something from reasons developed by themselves, and the freedom to do something is maintained only by sapient beings. As they are able to self-legislate, the freedom of a sapient being appears not to be freedom from external constraints but internal endorsed commitments that are drawn from his own reasoning. Such beings are free because they can be constrained by norms and reasons based on their own intellectual activities. Kivelä (2012: 66–68) emphasised that, for Kant, the task of education is nothing but to transform us from sentient beings to sapient ones.
from animals and that it contains information and guidance that enable ability. Ability represented for Kant an open-ended goal having various ends. The task of adults is to let a child see his weakness but at the same time not overpower him with a sense of their own superiority and power. In this kind of guidance, we should let the child develop his own individuality within the limits of a world large enough not only for himself but also for others (Kant 1899: 58–65).

Third, education supplies a person with discretion (‘Klugheit’), which Honneth called ‘pragmatic prudence’. For Kant, this referred to person’s ability to behave following the social habits and tacit rules in such a way that he may be liked and may gain influence in his social group. This kind of action is necessary for refinement (‘Civilisierung’) or developing the habits of civilisation. Kant contended that discretion consists of the art of transforming our skills into something valuable for our social environment. In this process, one should learn to recognise the characteristics of others without losing one’s own. By recognizing the characteristics of others, we amend our own characters with others but not solely by replacing them. Kant emphasises that discretion should make us brave, but not violent; we need to learn to hide our weaknesses and keep up outward appearances. Such an action requires control of our passions. (Kant 1899: 18–20, 96).

Kant’s fourth educational dimension, moral training, is based on ‘maxims’, the general principles of right and wrong. The whole moral value of actions consisted for Kant of maxims concerning the good. Kant contended that we must see that a child does right because of his or her own maxims and not just as a habit. A child should be made aware that he or she is not only mechanically doing things right but because it is right to do so. Kant emphasises that moral training cannot based on discipline; rather, disciplining a child for doing wrong and rewarding doing right violates a child. In this case, a child would do right only for the sake of a reward and grow into an individual who changes his or her actions between right and wrong according to which is the most beneficial to himself. Moral education should cultivate the readiness to act according to the maxims. The first are school maxims, followed by the maxims of humanity (Kant 1899: 18–20, 71, 77–78).

Kant gave an example of how to estimate moral development: giving a child some pocket money so that he may help the needy, and then from his actions, we can evaluate whether a child is really compassionate or not. Kant emphasised that children should learn their duties toward themselves and others. Mere sympathy in response to the sorrow of others is not the right way to teach the obligation of benevolence; rather, it should be introduced as a duty to help. A child should be
made to realise that, when we are helping the poor, we are only doing our duty. Benevolence should not be taught as a meritorious action either because it only makes a child compare his own worth with the worth of others and induces only envy. A child should be made to compare himself with a concept of reason that contains ideal standards that are right and fitting. Kant wisely acknowledged that, when a man estimates his own worth based on the worth of others, he either tries to lift himself above others or to lower the others’ worth. Lowering others’ worth is envy, where a person seeks to fault others so that he or she looks more favourable compared to others. Kant argued that self-confidence in a child does not develop through comparing oneself with others, but requires the cultivation of frankness and humbleness, not pride in being better than others (Kant 1899: 104–106).

Kant stated that youngsters should be taught that inequality is an institution that has risen as a result of one man striving to gain an advantage over another. Consciousness of the equality of men, together with their civil inequality, may be taught to him little by little. Youngsters should get accustomed to esteem themselves absolutely and not relative to others. According to Kant, this might be achieved through love for others as well as through feelings of cosmopolitanism. Individual interests should be accompanied with an interest in the progress of the world. Committing oneself to this interest should warm one’s heart. Children should learn to rejoice at the world’s progress even though it might not be to their own advantage (Kant 1899: 119–121).

Honneth asserted that Durkheim and Dewey concentrated on Kant’s fourth element, moral training; they saw only this element as worthy of further investigations. Strangely, Honneth (Honneth 2012a: 438, 442) referred to the Rawlsian idea of the ‘morality of associations’ (Kultur der Assoziation or ‘Assoziationsmoral’), representing a concrete conception what can be said about Dewey’s and Durkheim’s educational points. However, Kant’s fourth pedagogical element, moral training, is more similar to Rawls’ ‘morality of principles’ than to the morality of associations.

Kant’s idea was that education, as moral training or ‘morality in principle’, anticipates ‘sapient beings’. Such a being chooses only the goals that are good in the sense that every other sapient being can also accept these goals for their actions. A sapient being is free to act according to the maxims that he or she has authorised and instituted by himself or herself. Eventually, the task of moral education is to create a social space that is structured by mutual agreement between individuals (Kivelä 2012: 68). The logic of reciprocal recognition was already
inherent in Kant’s lecture on education, and the leap from Kant to Durkheim and Dewey seems a giant but unnecessary one.

The second surprising thing in Honneth’s writing on education is that he embraced the Finnish school system for representing an ideal democratic system where Dewey’s and Durkheim’s vocabulary could be easily evidenced in everyday school practices. Perhaps we can agree with Honneth that Finnish schools were ahead in cooperativeness in the 1970s, when the school system was reformed from two separate school systems, elementary school (kansakoulu) and High school (oppikoulu), into one universal nine-year basic education system that was compulsory and the same for all students. Politics were brought into the schools, and democratic ideals were forcefully embedded in this reform. Early in the 1970s in Finnish upper high schools there were school councils that were formed through cross-voting. This has been considered the crest of the wave of democracy in the Finnish school system. When electing the school council using cross-voting, teachers as well as students could choose one representative from among the students and one from among the teachers. The idea was that school councils had considerable power to influence school development, and via cross-voting, students had real democratic power to influence the schools and the topics being taught. However, since 1974, cross-voting to form school councils in Finnish schools has been eliminated, mainly due to teachers’ objections. Cross-voting was objected to as an undemocratic mechanism where students always had more votes than the teachers. Thus, students could always overwhelm the teachers’ consensus, according to teachers’ and the right wing’s objections (Kärenlampi 1999: 139–195).

School councils have been abandoned and replaced by fraternities and pupils’ unions in Finnish schools. These student associations do not involve an idea similar to that of the school councils, cooperative decision making concerning all issues related to school life among teachers and students. The student unions consist merely of a minor fraction of student representatives and can, for example, influence the curriculum very limitedly, if at all. Thus, the Finnish school reform that created the comprehensive school system neutralised schools in politics and political participatory activities (Rautiainen & Räähä 2012). Although Finnish schools have attained success in international assessments such as PISA and the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), it seems that two negative elements have remained in the schools, passivity toward democratic participatory actions and a lack of school well-being amongst children.
Honneth stated that, in Finnish schools, there exists a keen relation between cooperative and democracy-promoting teaching methods and students’ achievements. Armed with the results of ICCS 1999 and 2009, we can argue that Finnish schools produce excellent civic knowledge but are unable to increase young people’s interest in participatory culture. Young Finns are not interested in politics or civic activities such as participating in the activities of the community. It even seems that willingness to engage in participatory activity among the youth has remained at the same passive level over the last ten years in Finnish schools. Finnish schools produce cognitive skills toward cooperative actions but do not change practical habits (Rautiainen & Räähä 2012, Suoninen et al. 2010). In addition, we can argue that teachers’ teaching methods are not necessarily so cooperative and democratic. Studies have shown how individualism and the traditional ethos that ‘one must cope on one’s own’ are still prevalent in Finnish teacher profession. Teachers do not cooperatively share their tasks, professional knowledge, wishes and worries in their work (Rautiainen 2008: 106–108).

Honneth referred mainly to Pasi Sahlberg’s (2011) studies when arguing that Finnish schools are the most democratic ones. In Honneth’s opinion, Finnish schools appear to be shared cooperatives where the atmosphere of the ‘morality of associations’ flourishes; shared efforts, communicative responsibility and mutual trust are more important than individual accomplishments. Honneth contended that Durkheim and Dewey emphasised the importance of shared habits rather than learning exact contents or cognitive skills and that, in Finnish schools, these ideals are a reality. What Sahlberg’s studies and Honneth seem not to have noticed are the studies that have shown that well-being in Finnish schools is largely felt unsatisfied and that the school work is overburdening (Kiuru et al. 2008). For example, Lea Pulkkinen, a professor of psychology, argued that Finnish schools have changed materialistic and result-oriented systems because they have been developed from the teachers’ perspective, not that of the students. Pulkkinen contended that, by looking only at international assessments such as PISA studies, we shut our eyes to the real problems; Finnish children do not like school. Crises such as school killings are alarming examples of this fact. It is hard for children to recognise their strengths, and too many children experience failure and are left aside. Contemporary Finnish schools, by emphasising cognitive skills, force competition in all kinds of performances, and the failures accumulate. Cooperative action and shared efforts, which Honneth also spoke about, have been effectively deployed in Finland by forming huge schools. An example of this tendency is the fact that almost all traditional small village schools have been abolished and
all the students from entire federations of municipalities are put in large schools. Pulkkinen polemically expresses these tendencies by arguing that shared responsibilities and long-term relationships between teachers and students are long gone because of the politics which enforce the forming of above mentioned compound-ed schools, employing course-based studies, and defining teachers’ work merely as lessons. (Pulkkinen 2008, 2012: 38–49).

One factor behind the school malaise is the persistent social inequality\(^4\) in the Finnish school system; descendants of university graduate parents, compared to descendants of vocational school graduate parents, have seven to eight times the chances to enrol in a university (Rinne \textit{et al.} 2008: 27–32). Competition for the most distinguished study programs is high, and the unified comprehensive school system cannot equalise the differences emanating from students’ socio-economic backgrounds, or the system contains persistent inequality in favouring students from academic families.

\subsection*{4.7.5 Honneth’s idea of democratic education}

To do justice to Honneth’s claims that the theories of education and theories of democracy belong together, it is necessary to consider exactly what Honneth meant by democracy. Rutger Claasen suggested that Honneth, in his discussion of the modern democratic state, rejected not only a Rousseauian conception of a plebiscitary democracy but also a classical liberal view of representative democracy. In contrast to these models, Honneth adopted a third alternative, inspired by Durkheim, Dewey and Habermas, in which the legitimacy of democratic decisions depends on the conditions under which these decisions have been debated by the larger public (Claasen 2014, Honneth 2011: 568–569). This ‘third route’ is a natural continuation of Honneth’s earlier analysis of social freedom. Honneth’s account of democracy has also been argued to represent ‘radical democracy’ (De- ranty 2009: 288, Lysaker 2014, Owen 2007: 305, Thompson 2006: 139).

Odin Lysaker cogently analyses Honneth’s idea of democracy containing three dimensions, \textit{psychological}, \textit{politological} and \textit{sociological dimensions} (Lysaker 2014). The psychological dimension concerns Honneth’s demand that democracy allow the development of individuals’ self-realisation and intact iden-

\footnote{There exists a dispute as how to interpret inequality based on statistical odds-ratio values. The disputing parties have agreed that, although inequality in Finnish schools has decreased over time, the difference in university enrolment between students from academic and non-academic families is still high. (Hedman \textit{et al.} 2008, 2012, Rinne \textit{et al.} 2008).}
tity formation. Understanding of this is a learning process where democratic decision making requires from its participants a large degree of voluntary engagement and a considerable willingness to accept burdens and redistributions. According to Honneth, the citizens must antecedently recognise each other as sufficiently good-willed, trustworthy and non-indifferent, i.e., solidarity beings (Honneth 2013a: 44, Honneth 2011: 615–616). The motivation to act politically or to be a political actor lies, according to Honneth, in personal relationships, which through loving care can establish the necessary basis for the development of political autonomy.

The psychological dimension of Honneth’s account on democracy emphasises that a democratic state must guarantee its citizens’ development free from misrecognition; if a person cannot trust herself or himself, i.e., he or she does not have self-confidence, it is quite obvious that he or she cannot trust others (Lysaker 2014: 98–116). Thus, only if the self-confidence of the participants of democracy is guaranteed can social freedom occur in other forms, such as free market participants, the self-conscious democratic citizens and the emancipated family members.

Lysaker (2014) contends that the second element in Honneth’s democracy is ‘the politological dimension’. The term politological refers here not only to political rights, but to Honneth’s wider understanding of the term of rights, involving rights guaranteeing negative and positive freedom and private and public autonomy for citizens. This legal recognition comprises economic, social, political and cultural rights that should offer possibilities for every individual to be recognised as a moral and conscious being. Besides private autonomy, a democratic state should also guarantee for its citizens public autonomy, positive freedom, which is a real opportunity for participation in public opinion formation. Rights enable citizens to reflect on questions such as who is granted rights and the meaning of what is considered as citizens’ rights and as right conduct in general. Honneth argued that rights should be expanded so that they ensure a minimum level of welfare for every citizen. There should be sufficient redistribution of money and knowledge to everyone to guarantee equal opportunities to take part in will formation. Only with these elements can rights enable debates on the appropriateness of laws of democracy (Honneth 2007: 234–235, Lysaker 2014).

The third dimension, the sociological dimension, is the shared or common culture that serves as the pre-political grounding for democracy. Honneth contended that the possibility of democratic will formation depends on pre-political cultural solidarity, ‘the nation’. Solidarity can be found somewhere on the nation-state level with a national background culture that enables the energies for social
struggles for equality. Honneth referred to Durkheim’s idea of ‘constitutional patriotism’: that there is always a certain amount of patriotism needed so that deliberative conflicts can arise, and the citizens are ready to participate actively in democratic decision making only when they can see their desirable values that are worth defending. This requires a certain amount of patriotism that is anchored to the emotional commitment to the welfare of their own community (Honneth 2011: 495).

On the basis of this shared common ground, individuals are able to practice rational problem solving. Honneth refers to Durkheim’s argument that every person should have possibilities to influence the issues that policy-makers are dealing with, which means that the citizens and the ruler should share the same concerns for the development of their community. Only if people can contribute to the same questions that concern the state can they affect the decisions under which they are subjugated (Honneth 2011: 500). Honneth found similar ideas in John Dewey’s philosophy where Dewey emphasised that cooperative interaction in public decision making is first and foremost a means and the purpose of individual self-realisation. The democratic sphere, according to Dewey, is a kind of experimental research community that explores the social conditions of peaceful coexistence, and this kind of a societal experimental research community should output a shared vision of what is politically desirable and worth striving for. Dewey’s view on democracy was, for Honneth, the idea of the free circulation of ideas. Dewey used art as an example that can establish free social communication conditions. Art can make explicit the limiting conventionalised and routinised consciousness and challenge it. The circulation of ideas is about critically challenging prevailing conceptions, giving room for the aspects differing from generalized and common knowledge. The binding force in democratic cooperation is the force of civic solidarity, which requires members to feel responsible for each other and, if necessary, to make sacrifices (Honneth 2011: 505–506, 545).

All three spheres, personal relationships, the market economy and public decision making are forums that can generate a struggle for recognition. Honneth contended that democratising social energies do not emerge through deliberation or consensus-oriented political will formation but through social struggles emerging from the neglect of freedom in each sphere (Honneth 2011: 609, Jansen 2013: 33). For Honneth, morality and culture were connected so that prevailing social norms that are contested and serve direct actions function as a necessary seedbed for marginalised groups and individuals to organise their counteractions.
Honneth’s model contained three types of democratic participants: private individuals, legal citizens and social citizens. The third actor, a social citizen, is an active participant who follows his own volition in different volunteer organisations and interest groups. Odin Lysaker has elaborated that Honneth’s model with these actors is a multidimensional model of radical democracy containing three frameworks: political conflict, democratic deliberation and democratic culture. Honneth’s psychological dimension should be understood as the basis for political conflict. In political conflicts, three forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem, serve as motivation toward political action. In Honneth’s account, democratic deliberation emerges in the politological dimension, i.e., through rights. Rights represent the institutionalisation of the social and discursive space where citizens come together in their joint opinion and will formation. The sociological dimension enables democratic culture or ethical life and is based on social trust and solidarity (Lysaker 2014: 98–116).
5 Conclusions

The main aim of this work is to study educational perspectives on recognition theory using conceptual analysis. For this task, I first set the research question: where is Honneth’s theory theoretically located compared to earlier traditions of critical theory? The third chapter and the first article (I) of this study aim to answer this question in an introductory way. To provide an answer to this question, it was necessary to take a look at how the first and the second generations of critical theory, such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas with his communicative turn, affected Honneth’s account. Thus, to understand Honneth’s critical theory, it was necessary to outline the central themes of the first and second generations, as was done in chapter 3 of this study.

Examination of the first generation of critical theory began in this study by elaborating on the criticism that Honneth directed toward Karl Marx. It has been argued that Marx’s historical materialism lacked a theory of communication and an explanation of the significance of human needs. Human needs and desires, i.e., feelings, play an insufficient role in historical development and do not explain the motivation for social conflicts. According to Honneth, Marx misinterpreted Hegel’s idea of a struggle for recognition as merely concerning class struggles and especially struggles in the labour force. Marx’s theory is ultimately a utilitarian model for social conflicts where the logic of recognition is also a servant of the capitalist economy. Moral development arises, according to Honneth, not from conflicts over material benefits but rather from lack of respect. Thus, Marx’s conflict theory should be revised to a moral conflict theory where the motivation to struggle for recognition arises from moral feelings caused by the denial of recognition.

Then, through criticism of the first generation of critical theory, through Horkheimer and Adorno, it becomes obvious that the first generation’s thesis that the cognitive actions by which we conceive the objective world is conditioned by material conditions is still valid. The social world lacks given characteristics of the physical world and must be taken as our construction. Traditional theory or bourgeois science denied that the social world is our construction because, while representing our construction, it could then be taken as appearing differently than it appears. Thus, the first generation took the view that, when examining the traces of reason, we need to examine the materially conditioned social world and especially examine the experienced subjective feelings of individuals in the area of labour. This was the methodological conviction of all interdisciplinary projects.
of the first generation of critical theory. The idea of the first generation was to gain emancipation through reflective social sciences by articulating the structures of consciousness underlying the experiences of the working class. In the period when critical theory was exported to the US, it started to employ a social-theoretic approach using the methods of qualitative social science to expose the ideological structures responsible for various pathologies. These research studies included, for instance, Adorno’s (1982) *The Authoritarian Personality*. According to Joel Anderson, what connects the first, the second and the third generation of critical theory is their examination of the social pathologies. Anderson mentioned two of such re-emerging pathologies: one concerning how social and political institutions, such as universities, the media, political party machines and corporations, come to serve various oppressive interests. These pathologies at the institutional level correspond more with Habermas’ elaborations. The second group of pathologies includes subjective pathologies thematic like alienation, reification and different social perversions occurring in the late-capitalism are more related with Honneth’s elaborations. (Anderson 2011: 31–35).

Honneth’s critique showed how the first generation developed the idea of reconstructive social criticism. This kind of criticism is conscious of its context of social development and political application. Following this model of critique, the norms used must be in some way anchored in historical reality itself. Cogently, Honneth elicited the criticism of the second generation of critical theory and especially Habermas’ theory that, in representing reconstructive criticism, it faces the problem that it cannot justify what causes the ideals from its own culture to be chosen as a tool for the criticism. This criticism is a criticism of cultural relativism, according to which every critical reconstruction seems to be relative to our western culture or cannot escape the conceptions of reason formulated in our western world. The first generation attempted to answer this problem by asserting that the normative validity of the immanently raised ideals must correspond with the concept of reason. The concept of reason arising from the Enlightenment and especially from Kant’s formulations was taken as a standard which could be evaluated against social reality and the prevailing ideals and used to criticise the given social order.

The second generation of critical theory, including Habermas and the communicative turn, changed the perspective to examine the conditions under which human interaction would be free from domination. Habermas saw emancipatory impulses arising from free interpersonal interaction in ordinary life and more precisely emerging from the pragmatics of understanding which refers to the
communication in which we express our intentions and interpret others’ intentions. The second generation of the critical theory criticised the first generation for asserting capitalism’s negativity as kind of self-evident claim without offering normative justifications for their premises. The first generation was criticised for offering a critique without normative foundations. Habermas argued that the first generation failed to direct the critical reflexivity toward their own theories. Habermas aimed to develop a social theory that could correspond to this demand in his theory of communicative action. It should be a theory that can be validated by its own standard. Anderson (2011) contends that Habermas developed two kinds of critiques: a left Marxist one and a Kantian one. These critiques pointed out social injustices and, in Kant’s sense, an examination of the conditions for possibilities for critique in the first sense. Anderson’s interpretation claims that Habermas had a strong intention to study the philosophical possibility of critique as studied by Immanuel Kant in his critique of pure reason, practical reason and judgement (Gregor 1997, Kant 2014, Wilkerson 1976). These examinations gave rise to Habermas’ discursive theory which is a norm-based theory explaining how claims are justified and how the process of understanding takes place in a situation of communication between subjects. Every communicative act contains claims of validity where the validity of claims can be criticised under the conditions of discourse. Habermas’ discourse theory was at the centre of his work on moral theory, democratic theory, rationality and truth (Anderson 2011: 35–40).

Habermas explained social pathologies arising from distorted communication, where strategic action generates explicit and latent distorted communication. Using these systematically distorted communications, Habermas explained or directed his social criticism toward bureaucratisation, militarism, technocracy, laissez-faire economics, privatisation, mediatisation, ideologically driven approaches to immigration and social policy. According to Habermas, these strategic communication types are used by the ruling interests to obscure the unequal situation of the status quo. Habermas’ intention is to restore, defend and radicalise the universal imperatives of procedural rationality, modernist culture and genuine democracy (Habermas, 1984, 1989, Anderson, 2011: 41).

Honneth criticised Habermas because his characterisations of communicative action and strategic action or categorisations such as system and life-world are somewhat distinctive categories failing under functionalism. The existence of these categories in real life is impossible to justify, and with a mere linguistic approach, the social world or social interaction cannot be fully explained. According to Honneth, Habermas’ discourse theory harmfully distinguishes moral phi-
losophy from that of everyday social experiences. Habermas was unable to explain the existing experiences of injustice; social injustice from which social resistance and struggles emerge are not motivated by positively formulated moral principles but by the fact that human subjects are denied the recognition they feel they deserve (Honneth 2007a: 65).

According to Joel Anderson, Honneth belongs to the tradition of the third generation of critical theory, which faced theoretically very different themes than the first and the second generations. Anderson contends that beside Honneth in this tradition belongs the Worldwide range of philosophers such as Andrew Arato, Kenneth Baynes, Seyla Benhabib, Jay Bernstein, James Bohman, Susan Buck-Morss, Jean Cohen, Peter Dews, Alessandro Ferrara, Jean-Marc Ferry, Nancy Fraser, David Held, Dick Howard, David Ingram, Martin Jay, Douglas Kellner, Thomas McCarthy, David Rasmussen, William Rehg, Gillian Rose, Steven Vogel, Georgia Warnke, Stephen K. White, Joel Whitebook and others – many of whom studied with Habermas or Marcuse – as well as by second generation persons as Richard Bernstein, Fred Dallmayr and Agnes Heller. The third generation faced themes such as the fall of the subject which generally means the transition from subject philosophy towards intersubjective philosophy, the disunity of reason and the challenges to the universal proceduralist conception of justice. Their thinking was shaped deeply by concerns on particularity, particular and singular phenomena, thematics of difference and pluralism. Honneth’s project concentrated on the ongoing investigation of the tradition of modern Western philosophy for finding the vital elements for critical theory. Honneth engaged with qualitative social science research and investigated the core of critical theory through the theory of recognition. What made Honneth’s project distinctive and central to the third generation of critical theory include, first, Honneth’s idea of society and history based on the struggle for recognition by social groups. Second, Honneth paid great attention to the ‘other of reason’ which means the creative powers of unconsciousness in which critical social theory can find useful elements. However, these elements have been silenced and marginalized as ‘other of reason’, not the real source for reason in the social philosophical debates. Third, Honneth contextualised the normative foundations in the deep structures of subjective experiences (Anderson 2011: 41–48).

The first element, the idea of the struggle for recognition between groups aims to show that freedom occurs through conflicts between groups rather than through conflicts between individuals. Honneth criticised that Adorno, Horkheimer, Foucault, and Habermas do not elaborate on how society reproduces itself
through struggles among real social groups. For Honneth, social groups represent both the driving force of historical development and a vital condition for human flourishing. With this claim, Honneth changed the direction of the first generation’s critical theory from the strong focus on the domination of nature by instrumental reason and Habermas’ second-generation analysis of the conflict between the ‘system’ and ‘life-world’ toward the conflicts between groups based on the struggle for recognition (Anderson 2011: 48–50).

The second element, which Anderson referred to as the ‘other of reason’, means that Honneth emphasised more than the first and the second generation the creative power of the unconsciousness. Citing Anderson, Honneth argued that the voices emanating from Castoriadis, Adorno’s concept of the ‘non-identical’ and themes from the ‘ethical turn’ in postmodernism have been silenced and marginalised as the ‘other’ of reason (Anderson 2011: 50–52, Honneth 1999: 224–225, Honneth 2009: 126–146). Honneth aimed to retain some of the still valuable aspects of this ‘other of reason’ which practically means Honneth’s intention to revitalise Freud’s ideas and take Mead’s theory as one of the cornerstones of his recognition theory. From a different angle, this very topic can also be seen in Honneth’s (Honneth et al. 2008) reconsiderations of Lukács’ concept of reification, where Honneth formulates arguments to defend the priority of recognition over cognition following Adorno, Cavell and Dewey. This thematic is discussed in chapter 3.3 of this study and results in the conclusion that Honneth’s insights concerning ‘the other of reason’ reflect the general problems of the theoretical turn towards intersubjectivity. Section 3.3.2 critically concludes that Honneth ended up with the problem of intersubjectivism. Honneth, in his reinterpretation of reification, offered a defence of the priority of intersubjectivity against subjectivity. However, these justifications are problematic. The thematics of the priority of recognition over cognition duplicate the problem of the priority of intersubjectivity over subjectivity which was largely discussed in terms of Habermas’ communicative action theory.

The third theme concerns the normativity of critical theory. For the second generation, the first generation’s assumptions were problematic due to having insufficient normative grounds. For this reason, the second generation, such as Habermas, focused on the universal principles of morality, justice and truth. The third generation, like Honneth, questioned the universality and abstractness of such principles, as I suggest in the second (II) article of this study. Instead of universal principles, Honneth focused on individuals’ negative experiences emerging from the violation of moral expectation. Lived experiences of denigration and
disrespect serve as a source for a moral claim in social struggles. Honneth’s account was closer to the first generation than Habermas’ account in concentrating on individuals’ experiences of being subjected to domination. These experiences are the phenomenon from which the normative core of social critique emerges, according to Honneth (as cited in Anderson 2011: 53).

Section 3.3 of this study examines the elements that Honneth claimed are retrievable from the first and the second generation. For Honneth, the intact development of personality is the core reference point from which the critical theory can begin. His idea was that *self-confidence, self-respect* and *self-esteem* are self-relations that need to be secured and that, when the development of these relations is hindered, it always generates struggles for recognition. Habermas concentrated on distorted forms of communication, while Honneth’s emphasis was more on overcoming the barriers to identity development, barriers of misrecognition, such as violation of the body, the denial of rights and disrespect. Social struggles over misrecognition aim to guarantee conditions for self-realisation and self-determination, and normative criteria for self-realisation and self-determination arise from the real feelings of those who are subjected to humiliation and denigration (Anderson 2011: 53–54). Thus, the concept of reification as a systematic mechanism for preventing self-realisation was one of the most important themes to be revised for Honneth. According to Honneth, critical theory needed to develop a theoretical apparatus for recognising reifying mechanisms of the market economy. It should be capable of defining the barriers to self-realisation that our market economy produces. This theme is elicited and practically elaborated in sections 3.3.1 and 4.5 of this study.

The second research question of this study concerns how should the theory of recognition and the forms of recognition, love, rights and solidarity be understood in the context of education. Chapter 4, amended by articles I, II and III, aims to provide answers to this question. Chapter 4 considers Honneth’s recent writings and especially his idea of social freedom giving significant educative contents. The methodological discussions of this work in chapter 2 and especially section 2.1 concerning Honneth’s own methods reveal that Honneth elaborated on normative reconstruction distinctively from Kant’s and Habermas’ ‘constructivism’. Kantian constructivism was accused by Honneth of lacking awareness of the social context where the normative principles are to be applied. Honneth found a sufficient context in Hegel’s concept of ‘ethical life’. According to Honneth, Hegel sufficiently valorised the institutions or the social context for social freedom.
Honneth followed Hegel’s critique of Kant and argued that, if we take up a moral stance, we must explain the spirit with which we accept the antecedent obligation of our everyday life-world. We need to be able to explain the normative preconditions from which our conscience starts to test these principles against reality. Honneth stated that Kant lacked the philosophical resources to separate these ‘pre-moral’ obligations from mere facts or social preconditions. Kant did not have an ethical theory that would explain the value of specific forms of social practice. Honneth elaborates that, for Hegel, mutual recognition or the idea of ‘being oneself in another’ produces pre-moral obligations. These obligations constitute opportunities to enjoy social freedom in the first place. Moral freedom or Kantian autonomy is secondary to or even parasitic toward these obligations; only after we have attached ourselves through these pre-moral obligations to social freedom must we then in a conflict situation distance ourselves from these obligations by taking up a moral stance. The structures of the social life-world generate individual crises of conscience, but only after these structures have been experienced as obligatory because of the intersubjective kind of freedom they afford. Honneth argued that social freedom is logically and genetically prior to the freedom of the moral standpoint (Honneth 2013a: 42).

The main results of this research are embodied in articles I, II and III. All these articles examine from different points of view the spheres of social freedom, personal relations, market economy and democratic will formation. Articles I, II and III contain specific critiques of recognition theory. In the first article, the spheres of social freedom are taken as resolution to the problem of the achievement principle in education. In the first article (I) the paradox of empty content, an inability to define any clear content for pedagogical action, has been elaborated based on the central ideas of critical pedagogy, by which the content for pedagogical action is deduced from problem-solving processes in the classroom. This argument of the first article is an exaggeration, because Klaus Mollenhauer (1973) and Wolfgang Lempert (1971) for example, have much more intelligent approaches to education and emancipation than just problem-based learning models or the ideals of democratic education. Only Wolfgang Klafki (1976) refers directly to the idea of commonly shared problem-solving processes and solidarity that could be launched by democratic education. It should be revised that, following Klafki’s suggestion, we might enter into the problems of the inability to define clear pedagogical contents, and the role of educator might be problematic in these conceptualisations. However, this argument needs much more research than is
done in this treatise to understand Klafki’s didactic theories and conceptualizations of Bildung.

The aim of the first article of this study was, however, to examine the possible solutions to the above mentioned ‘paradox of empty content’ by following Axel Honneth’s (2010a) notion of a drawn-out process of education, in relation to which Hegel’s concept of ethical life comprises three different cognitive world relations, and the corresponding language games offer sufficient content for pedagogical action.

The third article concerns the conceptions of misrecognition and their implications for education. It offers criticism of contemporary debate on recognition and education that seem not to take recognition as a pre-condition for the Bildung process. Additionally, it criticises Honneth’s concept of misrecognition for being a partly limited categorisation subsuming all types of denigrations under the concept of misrecognition. In addition, Honneth’s commitment to psychoanalysis or the limits of self-reflection is questioned.

The second article links the themes of articles I and III of this study by reflecting Honneth’s idea of ‘a drawn-out process of education’ against the traditional Bildung conception. Traditionally, Bildung is the goal of education, and based on Honneth’s work, we can assert that the Bildung process contains the ideals of the emancipated family member, the free market participant and the self-conscious democratic citizen. It is critically argued in article II that, in ‘the psychologisation of Hegel’s ideas’, Honneth considered that ‘a drawn-out process of education’ concerns merely the positive developmental processes, ignoring Hegel’s proposal of the so-called ‘negative’ elements of Bildung, such as compulsion, discipline and authority, which, Hegel argued, are necessary in the spheres of family and civil society. Second, Honneth contended that a drawn-out process of education has a homing, self-reconstructive nature that leaves readers uncertain as to how upbringing, education and schools should be understood in that context.

The criticisms presented in the first, second and third articles of this study can be summarised as the basic problems in Honneth’s recognition theory; it is disorganised and does not explicate the concepts of education and Bildung. It is unclear for the reader, when Honneth’s theory should be understood as Bildungs theory and when the theory of education or perhaps intention to understand his theory through these concepts is inadequate in the first place.

Honneth characterizes upbringing in the family as equal participation in the joint action where all participants’ abilities and emotions and moods are responded and fulfilled together. Honneth states that in some cases even children can
become the parents for their parents. However these definitions seem to lose vital basic asymmetric starting point where the adult must be an educator of a child and not vice versa. The analyzes of how social freedom is learnt in the sphere of family through upbringing reveals that in Honneth’s definitions parenthood and adult’s authority or adult’s care is lost.

Honneth’s concrete suggestions on education seem not to help in this problem as chapter 4 of this study aims to show. Honneth’s concrete suggestion on democratic education involves the problem of the inconsistency of democracy with education and Bildung. This problem can be expressed simply by asking: does the fundamental postulation of naturalism enable education? Do we understand growth in the end as an organic, natural event where education is left with the role of a remover of barriers to growth? (Siljander et al. 2012: 303–312.) We could express this more practically by asking why education in schools should be similar to democratic participation and what democratic education could be like in practice? When aiming to answer these questions, we confront the fact that education and pedagogic action are not directly commensurable with democratic action.

First, if we look at this problem of inconsistency from the viewpoint of education, we perceive that Honneth rightly argues teachers to be the servants of neither parents nor the market economy, but the genuine servants of a democratic state. However, the confusing thing is that Honneth commits to Dewey’s and Durkheim’s ideas where teaching should be something similar to habitual action, i.e. learning habit formation by actively participating in different processes. Honneth agrees with Dewey’s emphasis that teaching should be as cooperative as possible by using the method of inquiry, similarly to problem-based learning. In short, the ideals of democratic education seem to be based on the socialisation process on one hand, and on problem-solving skills on the other hand.

Democracy combined to education suggested by Honneth leaves the educator in a somewhat useless position, and the intentional pedagogic action vanishes in the background, because the intended learning processes cannot be guided or directed from outside. The process can only be facilitated by taking part in the collective learning process through communication and action. The process itself does not give the contents to how and in what direction the educator should intentionally direct his or her pedagogic action. The educator should be able to evaluate his or her own actions and be somehow aware of whether he or she is reaching his or her goals or not. Similar criticisms have been targeted towards pragmatism and Dewey’s ideas on education (Masschelein 2001: 16, Peters 1981, Pikkarainen 2004, Vandenbarg 1980.) For Dewey, growth has no goal, but growth itself. How-
ever, it is useless for the educator to know that he or she can influence it but not to have any criteria for judging how well he or she is succeeding in this influence. (Pikkarainen 2004: 207).

The problematic thing about forgetting the intentional attitude of pedagogic action and its asymmetric relationship is that we might end up in ‘the ideology of learning society’ or biological pragmatism which understands learning as the whole life and the whole life as learning. John Dewey and pragmatism in general, the tradition from which Honneth partly elaborates his ideas of democratic education, emphasised this turn towards ‘meta learning skills’, the skills of ‘learning to learn’. This tradition objectifies and problematises educational reality in terms of learning to learn and no longer in terms of teaching and Bildung, or Erziehung and Bildung. (Horkheimer 2008, Masschelein 2001: 5.)

The naïve emphasis on the problem-based learning duplicates the ideology of learning society and throws us in a situation of continually having to solve problems, making this method a natural continuum in the evolution: problem-solving is the only way to survive by adapting and modifying our behaviour according to the future demands. We could even say that learning is something that occurs in nature, not in the world (Masschelein 2001: 12–13). In a Kantian sense, this means that democratic education, which Honneth endorses, seems to refer mainly to the actions of a sentient being using Robert Brandom’s terms. For Kant it is obvious that this is not a sufficient condition for true human beings. Human beings are not only sensing and feeling beings, but they are also thinking, reflexive beings. It is this exact difference between sentient being and sapient being which democratic education seems to obscure; for Kant the task of education is to cultivate individuals from sentient beings to sapient beings, capable for the public use of reason, while the ideals of democratic education seem to leave individuals in the state of sentient beings. For the Kantian distinction between the sentient and sapient being, see more (Brandom 2009: 142, Kivelä 2012: 66–67).

A pedagogic action containing an asymmetric relationship loses its moral validity and even seems forbidden in the context of democratic action. A democratic educational event whatsoever should not permit any kind of exercise of power but the use of democratic power, which is an action leading to deliberative and discursive consensus. In an educational event the intentions of all participants should, in principle, be taken as equally constitutive. This leads to the paradox: ‘the pedagogic’ discourse requires equality in the communicative situation, while on the other hand those participating in the communication have different capacities of discourse and are therefore differently capable of participating in the edu-
cation. This paradox is evident in the schools where the teacher is an adult and the child is an object of teaching (Masschelein 1995, Oelkers 1994, Peukert 1993, Siljander 1989: 117).

However, education traditionally always involves certain aspects of power where the educator is the participant who regulates the pedagogic interaction, controls the situation and is also otherwise more powerful than the student. Education is asymmetric based on the disequilibrium between the different participants, where asymmetry prevails between the educator and the students throughout the process of education until the actual process of education has reached its goal. Klaus Mollenhauer’s concepts of cultural presentation and representation characterise education that is not merely about the organisation of the growth environment, but also about systematic influence on the growth process including direction, demands, advice, prohibitions and orders. According to Mollenhauer, it is the task of schools to provide a cultural presentation; the school is not a miniature society but a pedagogically reduced space through which the older generation determines for the younger generation the central determinants of the existing way of life and guidelines for the future. The existing cultural world does not appear in the child but is filtered and systematically presented to the growing generation. In this presentation the shape of modern society is a reduced one, in other words, a conscious choice is made on what things are shown and taught. The presentation of a culture as the principle for pedagogical interaction imposes a responsibility on the educator to build an intersubjective communication space, in which the growing person adheres to the elective forms of life on the one hand, and opens up a path on the other to the renewal and change of forms of life and representation and to the production of new horizons of meaning. Pedagogical interaction contains the tension between presentation and representation which seems to be unfamiliar with the ideals of democratic education. (Mollenhauer 1973, Siljander et al. 2012: 310.)

Second, from the viewpoint of Bildung, Honneth’s concluding idea of ‘the morality of associations’ (Gutmann 1999: 59–62, Honneth 2012a: 435–436, 438, 442) which should concretely represent Dewey’s and Durkheim’s educational core ideas, occurs as an initiation to a culture, an initiation that sets culture or the world on the one hand and the individual on the other. Human growth is central to an individual to attain the ability to participate in common public social life and its cultural heritage. Bildung appears only as a crude process of socialising individuals so as to sustain an existing culture and ultimately reproduce a society. However, the link between Bildung and culture might be more complicated. Initi-
ation to a culture should rather be understood in the sense that the culture initiated to represents ‘second nature’. As second nature, culture is not biological or evolutionary; rather, it is independent of natural evolution. The aim of the Bildung process is to realise what an individual has not yet become, but which he or she can be, because our being contains a dimension or element which promises that we can be other than we are here and now. The process of Bildung is not thus just random growth or adaptation to a physical and social environment. The Bildung process is rather characterised by the tension we feel between the factual and counterfactual. (Siljander et al. 2012: 302–311.)

It seems that the concept of Bildung as well as education are incompatible with the conceptions of democratic education. The critics of Dewey and pragmatism demonstrate how the ideals of democratic education are quite blind to questioning the given order of things and questioning its own rationality. This is contrary to the idea of the Bildung process. Traditionally, Bildung has been regarded as having nothing to do with the self-preservation and optimal organisation of the life process of the individual or society as a whole. The process of Bildung involves no capacity for self-regulation or reflexive problem solving, it is not such a skill, but rather the capacity to question and judge the possibility of freedom. (Masschelein 2001: 12–18.)

We could roughly categorise that the action that Honneth refers to via Dewey and Durkheim is more similar to adaptation than to constitutive or creative action. On the contrary, the concept of Bildung refers to a creative process in which a person through his or her own actions shapes and develops himself or herself and his or her cultural environment. Bildung contains the idea of a person’s improvement where the person seeks a more advanced form of life. However, democratic education through habituation and inquiry seems to be an autopoietic action whereas Bildung is not; Bildung cannot occur by itself, it requires education. A human being’s nature is not equipped with a drive for Bildung that would lead to ‘natural development’ of autonomy and reason. Autonomy, self-activity, reason and freedom are potentialities whose realisation requires continuous conscious efforts (Siljander et al. 2012: 3–4.)

In conclusion, two critical arguments were elaborated in chapter 4.7.4; that the Finnish school system is not as democratic as Honneth assumes but is burdened with the problems of depression, competition, inequality and passivity, and that democracy and education do not belong together and that Honneth’s ideas on democratic education correspond inadequately with the concepts of education and Bildung. Perhaps Honneth’s argument makes sense, if we agree that everything is
relative, if we compare Finnish schools with the schools of the U.S. and the UK which are burdened with global educational reform movements such as the ‘No Child Left Behind’ law and the ‘Race to the Top’ programme and reforms aiming at ‘no excuses’ for schools with low test scores and in the UK Every Child Matters programme. I agree with Honneth and Diana Ravitch that these tendencies are very negative and violate the ideas of education and Bildung. Although these kinds of reform campaigns have not yet been very clamorous in Finland and our public education seems to remain strongly a public one, I argue that both these reform stories and Finnish schools are lacking a critical consideration of the assumed inequality and of the existence of a social hierarchy as such. This implies that the idea of inequality in talents, intellectual capacities, interests and needs constitutes and maintains this idea by itself, but that this inequality is also constantly verified by the different qualifications or learning outcomes. (see also Masschelein & Simmons 2010: 670.)

The second concluding argument in chapter 4.7.4 and in the articles of this study was that democracy and education do not belong together, and that Honneth’s ideas on democratic education correspond inadequately with the concepts of education and Bildung. As regards this argument, everything depends on how we define Honneth’s ideas of democracy. My dissertation follows mainly Honneth’s (2012a) explicit arguments on democratic education where he contends that in all the tradition from Kant, Rousseau and Schleiermacher to Durkheim and Dewey, we can find a crucial link between education and democracy. The leap from the philosophers of the Enlightenment to Durkheim and Dewey seems courageous and can be explained by Honneth’s intention to find the most reliable elements for developing democratic education. This line of argument suggests that by Emile Durkheim’s educational ideas, we can revitalize Kant’s educational thoughts and that through John Dewey, we can find the core of Hegel’s educational insights. Thus for Honneth, the soundest model for democratic education consists of a combination of the reinterpretations of Kant’s and Hegel’s educational thoughts.

This interpretation is limited in the sense that it ignores Honneth’s (2013c: 253–335) idea of democracy as ‘radical democracy’ as was outlined in chapter 4.7.5. The examination of Honneth’s ‘third route’ to democracy requires further investigation, and following the route of Dewey, Durkheim and Habermas brings Honneth’s conception of democracy close to the second generation of critical theory. However, what seems to me the most plausible part of Honneth’s argumentation is that if we follow Kant’s and Hegel’s educational thoughts, then dem-
ocratic education might reserve the ideas of education and Bildung, but the leap towards Durkheim and Dewey, and pragmatism, seems vague and perhaps unnecessary. This seems to be the fundamental problem where Honneth’s critical theory is at a cross-roads; whether to follow the commitments of the old critical theory to German idealism or to abandon it by following pragmatism and Dewey. The danger is that by choosing the road of pragmatism we might lose all the critical potential inherent in German idealism.
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