

Ilkka Lähteenmäki


ENGAGING HISTORY IN THE MEDIA

*BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING
HISTORICAL PRESENTATIONS AS WORLDS*

UNIVERSITY OF OULU GRADUATE SCHOOL;
UNIVERSITY OF OULU,
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

B

HUMANIORA



ACTA UNIVERSITATIS OULUENSIS
B Humaniora 174

ILKKA LÄHTEENMÄKI

ENGAGING HISTORY IN THE MEDIA

Building a framework for interpreting historical
presentations as worlds

Academic dissertation to be presented with the assent of
the Doctoral Training Committee of Human Sciences of
the University of Oulu for public defence in the OP
auditorium (L10), Linnanmaa, on 7 December 2019, at 12
noon

UNIVERSITY OF OULU, OULU 2019

Copyright © 2019
Acta Univ. Oul. B 174, 2019

Supervised by
Professor Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen
Docent Kalle Pihlainen

Reviewed by
Professor Allan Megill
Assistant Professor Chiel van den Akker

Opponent
Associate Professor Berber Bevernage

ISBN 978-952-62-2449-7 (Paperback)
ISBN 978-952-62-2450-3 (PDF)

ISSN 0355-3205 (Printed)
ISSN 1796-2218 (Online)

Cover Design
Raimo Ahonen

JUVENES PRINT
TAMPERE 2019

Lähteenmäki, Ilkka, Engaging history in the media. Building a framework for interpreting historical presentations as worlds

University of Oulu Graduate School; University of Oulu, Faculty of Humanities

Acta Univ. Oul. B 174, 2019

University of Oulu, P.O. Box 8000, FI-90014 University of Oulu, Finland

Abstract

This dissertation suggests that historical presentations should be understood as literary worlds. It studies how they are engaged with in the current media environment. The concept of a world offers a novel way of analysing how presentations are identified as being specifically historical presentations. In the case of the traditional written history, the identification of historical worlds is determined by contrasting their implied world-state at the present moment against the actual world's world-state at the present moment with the help of counterfactual heuristics. This is done because the evidence of any e.g. past events can only be evaluated in the present as the past itself is inaccessible. The dissertation approaches the evaluation of history from a presentist point of view. It is argued that within the digital media environment, historical presentations are intuitively interpreted as incomplete presentations or as fragments of a larger whole. The functioning of historical presentations is examined as part of a large media network. History's availability through a variety of media is then analysed through the concepts of transmedia and remediation. It is concluded that history is necessarily mediated and that the current media environment is changing how history is being engaged with.

Keywords: counterfactuals, historiography, history, philosophy of history, transmedia, worlds

Lähteenmäki, Ilkka, Historian kohtaaminen mediassa. Viitekehysten rakentamista historiallisten esitysten tulkitsemiseksi maailmoiksi

Oulun yliopiston tutkijakoulu; Oulun yliopisto, Humanistinen tiedekunta

Acta Univ. Oul. B 174, 2019

Oulun yliopisto, PL 8000, 90014 Oulun yliopisto

Tiivistelmä

Väitöskirja ehdottaa, että historiallisia esityksiä tulisi käsitellä kirjallisina maailmoina. Samalla tarkastellaan, kuinka historiallisia esityksiä kohdataan nykyisessä digitaalisessa mediaympäristössä. Maailmojen tarjoama käsitteellinen viitekehys antaa mahdollisuuden analysoida, kuinka historialliset esitykset tunnustetaan juuri historiallisiksi (eikä joksikin muuksi). Perinteisen kirjoitetussa muodossa esiintyvän historian tunnustamisen analyysin kohdalla esitetään, että historiallisten maailmojen implikoidun nykyhetken maailmantilaa verrataan kontrafaktuaalisen heuristii-kan avulla aktuaalisen maailman nykyhetken maailmantilaan. Historiallisten väitteiden tueksi esitettävää todistusaineistoa on mahdollista arvioida vain nykyhetkessä, koska meillä ei ole pääsyä itse menneisyyteen. Näin ollen historiallisia maailmoja ei voida verrata suoraan aktuaaliseen menneisyyteen. Väitöskirja lähestyykin siis historian arviointia presentistisestä näkökulmasta. Väitöskirjassa esitetään myös näkemys, jonka mukaan nykyinen mediaympäristömme toimii siten, että se ohjaa meitä intuitiivisesti käsittelemään kaikkia historiallisia esityksiä epätäydellisinä sirpaleina, jotka näyttävät vain välähdyksen suuremmasta kokonaisuudesta. Historialliset esitykset nähdäänkin analyysissä osana laajempaa verkostoitunutta mediaa. Tämä laajennetaan transmedia-analyysiksi siitä, kuinka historiaa kohdataan ja levitetään populaarissa mediassa. Tämän pohjalta esitetään näkemys, jonka mukaan historia on välttämättä välittyntä ja nykyinen mediaympäristö on muuttamassa suhdettamme historiallisiin esityksiin.

Asiasanat: historia, historianfilosofia, historiankirjoitus, kontrafaktuaalit, maailmat, transmedia

*To Aatos, who permanently changed my conception of
time.*

Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to the University of Oulu, the Scholarship Fund of the University of Oulu, and the EUDAIMONIA institute of the University of Oulu for funding this research. Funding-wise, I would also like to personally thank Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen and Kari Väyrynen. They both have been able pull together situations where my employment with the University of Oulu has been extended beyond what was originally agreed. I have a hunch that Petteri Pietikäinen has also played a role in the creation of some of these employment-opportunities, but I cannot prove anything.

I would like to thank my supervisors Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen and Kalle Pihlainen who systematically have had differing views of my papers and have helped me to push forward in the explication of my views about history. I am sure that I have occasionally been a source of disappointment for them during these five years, but they both have stayed extremely supportive through the whole ordeal. I also offer my gratitude to Kari Väyrynen and Mikko Myllykangas, who were always available for my follow-up group meetings. Georg Gangl, Katariina Parhi, Annukka Sailo, Samu Sarviaho, Matti Mäntylä, Esa Ruuskanen, Maria Julku, Mikko Leino, Daniel Blackie and so many others (whose names elude me now at the moment of writing this) have provided crucial collegial support through random and unplanned discussion sessions in various locations. Thank you all for those fleeting moments of clarity and joy. I would also like take this opportunity to thank Tyty, without whom I would not have been able to write this thesis.

Finally, I offer my sincere gratitude to the two pre-examiners of my thesis, Allan Megill and Chiel van den Akker, and to the anonymous reviewers of my articles for helping me to improve my work.

October 28, 2019

Ilkka Lähteenmäki

Publications

This thesis is based on the following publications, which are referred throughout the text by their Roman numerals:

- I Lähteenmäki, Ilkka. (2018). Possible Worlds of History. *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 12, 164–182. doi: 10.1163/18722636-12341354
- II Lähteenmäki, Ilkka. (2016). Kontrafaktuaalinen historia – mahdollisuus, ilmiö, harhaoppi? In Väyrynen, Kari. & Pulkkinen, Jarmo (Eds.). *Historian teoria*. Vastapaino. 171–206
- III Lähteenmäki, Ilkka & Virta, Tatu. (2016). The Finnish Twitter war: The Winter War experienced through the social media project #sota39 and its implications for traditional historiography. *Rethinking History*, 20(3), 433-453. doi: 10.1080/13642529.2016.1192259
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642529.2016.1192259>
- IV Lähteenmäki, Ilkka. Transmedia History. Manuscript

Table of Contents

Abstract	
Tiivistelmä	
Acknowledgements	9
Publications	11
Table of Contents	13
1 Introduction	15
1.1 The Concept of History	18
1.2 History in Society.....	26
2 Research Questions and Results from the Articles	29
2.1 Research Questions	29
2.2 More Detailed Research Questions of the Articles	30
2.3 Summary of the Research Articles	31
3 Historical Presentations' Connection to the Actual	41
3.1 Temporal Completeness	42
3.2 Evaluation of History through Counterfactual Heuristics.....	47
4 History in the Wild	57
4.1 Varied Points of Engagement	60
4.2 Making Sense of the Fragments.....	64
5 Conclusions but no Closure	71
Bibliography	75
Original Publications	81

1 Introduction

This doctoral dissertation deals with two issues: how historical (re)presentations are related to the actual world¹ and how history is encountered in our modern media environment. The first issue is tied to the production of history—or historical (re)presentations—while the second looks at the consumption of those (re)presentations. For the most part I use “presentation” instead of “representation” when I discuss how history is made available because I wish to slightly distance my points from the usual discussion of historical representation. My engagement with history and its non-academic presentations attempts to widen the discussion of what kind of presentations can be fitted within the concept of “history.” Thus, the decision has been made to remind the reader that sometimes terminology can hinder the discussion of categories’ border cases.

For years, Frank Ankersmit has held a view that philosophically, historical writing is more interesting than historical research. His argument is that historical writing has a specific quality that is not available elsewhere.² I think that this interestingness is not limited to historical writing specifically, but covers all presentations that deal with the “realm of history.” If it turns out that historical *writing* (historiography) specifically possesses some quality that cannot be matched by any other media,³ which ranges from museum exhibitions and films to virtual reality and games, then the “variant of rationality unknown to the sciences”⁴ that historical writing is argued to possess is actually there and written history is unlike any other form of engagement with the past. However, that argument cannot be made before the non-literary media and modes of presentation are explored.

The “realm of history” is a terminological tool used by Marek Tamm and Eugen Zelenák in their introduction to Ankersmit’s philosophy of history in the *Journal of the Philosophy of History* (2018), and it reveals one of the more challenging issues of discussing history or anything historical in general terms. In their paper, they seem to refrain from using, for example, “history” or “historiography” as the

¹ The “actual world” is the world we all inhabit. Depending on one’s view of possible worlds, an actual world is either a special case of possible worlds, or just one world among all possible worlds.

² Ankersmit, Frank & Tamm, Marek. (2016). “Leibnizian Philosophy of History: A Conversation.” *Rethinking History*, 20(4), 493; Tamm, M & Zelenák, E. (2018). “In a Parallel World: An Introduction to Frank Ankersmit’s Philosophy of History.” *Journal of the philosophy of history*, 12, 325–344, p.331.

³ “Media” is often used in such a way that it can mean either a singular or a plural case. I use “media” for the plural and “medium” for the singular, following Bolter & Grusin’s terminology in their book “*Remediation*”

⁴ Tamm, M. & Zelenák, E. (2018). “In a Parallel World: An Introduction to Frank Ankersmit’s Philosophy of History.” *Journal of the philosophy of history*, 12, 325-344. p. 331

umbrella category for anything relating to history or anything historical; instead they use “realm of history,” which they consider to be “constituted of three aspects: 1) historical experience, 2) historical research, and 3) historical representation.”⁵ This is an example of how theoretical discussions about things that are in the “realm of history” but not strictly “history” or “historiography” in the sense these terms are employed in academia⁶ can get easily muddled just because the terminology is limited. Tamm and Zeleňák try to avoid confusion by emphasising the fact that “history” and “historiography” do not cover the whole field of discussion. Thus, the “realm of history” is used to make sure that what they are discussing is not limited, or done from the viewpoint of disciplines of “history” or “historiography.” They do not define the “realm of history” further than mentioning these three mentioned aspects of it, which is probably their intention all along as they wish to discuss Ankermit’s works’ effect in the larger scheme of how to relate to the past in general.

I share Ankermit’s—and Tamm’s and Zeleňák’s—interest in our quite strange relation with the past:

*What makes us aware of the past at all, what should happen, or what must have happened to a nation or a collectivity to become fascinated by the problem of its past?*⁷ [emphases in the original]

The question of why we are interested in the past and finding out information about it has no easy answer. Nevertheless, my view is that the reason for any kind of interest in history cannot be found in the past. The curiosity stems from the present, so the origins of that interest should also be in the present. However, there might be hints available in different kinds of (re)presentations of history. Thus, this dissertation also discusses how history and its presentations are encountered and consumed in our society and not just how historians produce them.

The beginning of my interest in the consumption of history stems from Jerome de Groot’s book *Consuming History: Historians and heritage in the contemporary*

⁵ Ibid. p. 325

⁶ In this dissertation, “history” is used for presentations in different forms and media that aim to tell how the past possibly was, not for the past itself. “Historiography” is in turn used to refer specifically to history presented in a written form, of which production might include, for example, some specific research practices, but not necessarily. For discussion about the challenges that the term “history” brings when non-literary forms of history are engaged, see e.g. Chapman, Adam. (2016). *Digital Games As History: How Videogames Represent the Past and Offer Access to Historical Practice*. Routledge.

⁷ Ankersmit, F. (2005). Sublime Historical Experience, XV. Tamm, M & Zeleňák, E. (2018) “In a Parallel World: An Introduction to Frank Ankersmit’s Philosophy of History. *Journal of the philosophy of history*, 12, 325–344. pp. 337–338

popular culture (2009). In it, he engages with history from a relatively unusual point of view and presents the following question: “Is it possible to understand or conceptualise ‘history’ as a social or cultural entity?”⁸ My thinking had slowly slid towards that direction, even though I had not been conscious of this shift until quite late in my doctoral studies. So, when I came across de Groot’s formulation of the question, I managed to extrapolate my take on the issue. History has become to me more a social and cultural phenomenon than a discipline or a type of knowledge. In his questioning of the role of history in society, de Groot draws from Raphael Samuel’s work, where history is described as a “social form of knowledge.”⁹ I am not sure if I am willing to go that far, but in this dissertation I do present an argument that historians (and people interested in history) form “knowledge communities.”¹⁰ Still, my theoretical background for that view does not originate from Samuel’s work.

Through analysing the different “types of the ‘historical’ that are being presented and sold,” de Groot tries “to conceive of how History as a set of entities and discourses works in the contemporary society: what it means, how it means, how it is construed, and how people use it.”¹¹ None of these questions by themselves are new. However, because de Groot begins from the position that history exists in a social and cultural setting, and he also ties its meaning to that society in question. This kind of questioning begins to reveal a picture where history is a cultural phenomenon; it is something that our society has established as important and taught us to be interested in. Thus, the answers to questions relating to history’s meaning and use must be found in the present society and not in the past.

De Groot goes on and uses “the breadth of access to history – either embodied re-enactment, interactive exhibit or actual archival materials (however digitized and virtual)” that are available in our society as an implication that that “history is a socially and culturally constructed and consumed entity.” This description of history he has again picked up from Raphael Samuel’s work.¹² Even though I

⁸ De Groot, Jerome. (2009). *Consuming History: Historians and heritage in the contemporary popular culture* (p. 2). Routledge. London and New York: Routledge.

⁹ Ibid.; citing Samuel, R. (1994). *Theatres of Memory*. London: Verso.

¹⁰ Lévy, Pierre. (1997). *Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s Emerging World in Cyberspace* (pp. 13–15). Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books; Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture* (pp. 26–27). New York University Press.

¹¹ De Groot, Jerome. (2009). *Consuming History: Historians and heritage in the contemporary popular culture* (p. 3). London and New York: Routledge.

¹² Ibid. (pp. 4–5)

generally agree with the description, I am not willing to accept that just the amount of available ways to engage with history is enough to prove that history is “socially and culturally constructed.” Nevertheless, it certainly implies that there is an interdependency between society and history, as our society has managed to make history very easily available, but that might be just because history is consumed by the society in large amounts, not because it is socially constructed.

The previous couple of paragraphs make a decent case for why the terminology needs to be thought out. If “history” is read as meaning, for example, the academic discipline of history, then the meaning of those paragraphs is radically different that if it meant “the past,” as is sometimes thought. The main challenge is the lack of a fitting umbrella term for anything in the “realm of history” as Tamm and Zeleňák put it.¹³ Thus, these kinds of non-standard terms tend to appear when the non-research related issues around proper history¹⁴ are under discussion. There are two sides to the discussion of terminology and the possible need to expand or define it more. One way to look at “history” is that it is over-determined and thus its use prohibits certain topics. Another way to look at it is that “history” is a specific discipline and the way that the discipline is determined is the way that the term should be used. Everything that does not fit the description of “history” is not history and should be labelled as something else. However, it does not matter which of these perspectives one endorses as the border cases will still provide interesting insight into our perception and requirements for “history.” Thus, this dissertation (especially in Chapter 4) turns away from the more traditional presentations that are immediately recognised as “history” and instead looks into presentations emerging from popular media for arguments about the nature of “history.”

1.1 The Concept of History

The concept of “history” is at the core of the whole dissertation. The challenge here is not just defining its meaning, but rather the extrapolation of the whole scale of meanings that it seems to have. I first came across the problematisation of the term as an undergraduate student reading E. H. Carr’s *What is History?* (1961). His

¹³ Because of the rigidness of how “history” is usually construed, it can be difficult to engage in the discussion of presentations that are not exactly “history” but are close by. These tend to get dismissed as being bad or low quality, even though it is just that their way of presentation is different than what is usually done in the case of “history.”

¹⁴ See for example White, Hayden. (1987). *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

notion of “history with a capital H”¹⁵ was an eye-opener. It turns out that “the past” and “history” are not identical—who would have thought! This realization led me down the rabbit hole of the theory and philosophy of history, and the question presented in the title of Carr’s book has not left me since. If history is not the past, then what is it?

The usual answer is something along the lines of: “History is the reconstruction of past presented in textual form.” Something along these lines might even be the go-to-answer for most historians in academia. In academia, history is an empirically governed quest to find out what has happened in the past, quite often, in the Rankean understanding of “what has actually happened.” However, if one shifts the perspective to the consumers of history and how the term is used in public discussions, then it becomes obvious that “history” is used in a myriad of ways and is continuously tied to other concepts like, for example, “cultural heritage.”

My use of “history” in this dissertation is not as strictly defined as I would like it to be, but there are some general guidelines for what I mean by “history.” History as a term does not mean “the past.” Nor is history “the historical record” in the sense that history would be some kind of listing of what remains or is important about the past. Neither is history only a professional discipline where certain epistemological and methodological stances inform its practitioners of how and what they should be doing. In the end, history is a construct (usually) created by historians, but at the same time history is a social and cultural phenomenon. History is very deeply ingrained into our culture; it is just always *there*. What I mean by this is that whatever one might engage with, there will always be some kind of historical context that can be provided, which mysteriously tells us something meaningful about the thing we are engaging with. This is of course not limited to material things, but also goes for social and cultural phenomena: they also always seem to have *a history* that somehow makes us more informed and helps us to understand them.

Therefore, this puts me in the slightly awkward position where I claim that history is both a construct and a socio-cultural phenomenon. Both of these are explored later on in the dissertation, but before that, I would like to point out that these two are not mutually exclusive viewpoints. There are other objects in the world that are also both constructs and phenomena; most social norms and ideologies, for example.

¹⁵Carr, Edward Hallett. (1961). *What is History?* (p. 128). University of Cambridge and Penguin Books.

In general, I hold that history is made to be a presentation, not found and presented. By this I mean that history is created, which does not mean that it is invented in the sense that it would equal to the fictional *The Lord of the Rings*. Just because it is man-made is enough for me to categorize history as a construct. History does not just naturally form by itself. There needs to be someone doing some historicising (the process creating history). There are different views of what kind of a construct history is. Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen has claimed that historians produce arguments of how the past was,¹⁶ and that usually empirical research can settle these arguments¹⁷ if there are enough traces and evidence left to analyse. Hayden White has claimed that history is a narrative construct akin to a fictional narrative, where the definitive aspect of history is its form as a narrative drama, often mimicking the genre of the realist novels of the 1800's¹⁸.

I have no problem with Kuukkanen's or White's depictions. I do not see them as mutually exclusive even though they probably would not agree with me. If one looks at history as a construct, then the interest intuitively focuses on how it is made. Being a construct implies that there are pieces that are joined together to form that specific construction. Then, of course, the intuition is that the answer to what history is should be found in those pieces. History is constructed of evidence, of traces of past events and people. There are theorists that claim that we can only have singular existential statements (as opposed to general existential statements) as the baseline of evidence, and when we begin to use terms like the Cold War, we have already done some historicising, and that these kinds of large-scale phenomena cannot be found in the evidence itself but are creations of historians or others, acting as quasi-historians¹⁹. Regardless of what the construction pieces of history are, the other required part of construction is the joining together of the chosen pieces. White claims that this joining is a narrative process where past events are emplotted to make sense and form history. Kuukkanen claims that the process of joining pieces is one of forming an argument. My general stance is that

¹⁶ See Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. (2016). *Postnarrativist philosophy of history*. Palgrave.

¹⁷ As Kuukkanen kindly informed me, there are cases that do not operate within empiria-driven rationality and thus it cannot be claimed that all historical debates can be solved through empirical research.

¹⁸ White, Hayden. (1973). *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; White, Hayden. (1987). *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; White, Hayden. (1966). "The Burden of History" *History and Theory*, 5(2), 111–134.

¹⁹ Ankersmit, Frank. (2007). "Reply to professor Saari" *Rethinking History*, 9(1), 23–33; Pihlainen, Kalle. (2017). *The Work of History: Constructivism and a Politics of the Past*. New York: Routledge.; Jenkins, Keith. (1999). *Why History? Ethics and History*. Routledge.

the process is more akin to world-building,²⁰ where narration plays a role as well as forming arguments, as does creating chronicles and detailed descriptions of places, events, and people. World-building happens often through multiple media, because different media are more effective in different kinds of presentations. The challenge for history is that the building of “historical worlds” is a continuous process that is not limited to research-based presentations.

I think most theorists would agree that as a discipline, history’s goal is to provide information and knowledge of the past. There might be some who argue that it fails to do so, but I would think that even they would acknowledge that that is what history aims to do. This means that history has some epistemological issues that need to be addressed. This has been done by a multitude of theorists and philosophers to provide methodologies for producing knowledge about the past (which in turn have been later challenged). What is not answered by specifically epistemologically oriented theorisations is the question, of why to do history at all: what is the point of providing information about the past?

There are two options for answering the question of “why do history?”: 1) knowledge of the past is valuable in itself or 2) knowledge of the past is useful in some way. My personal inclination is towards option 2. My background as an undergraduate student in a faculty of social sciences is visible in my preferences here. History did not only provide knowledge of the past, but also had something to say about the present. It could (and it should) be able to tell something about the current social, political and cultural issues. This meant that history was not only valuable in itself, but had an inferential value. History was presented as useful for knowing about the current world that we live in, and not just as an academic discipline producing knowledge because all knowledge is inherently valuable.

This background makes me prefer option 2 when trying to make sense of the reasons why history interests people. This is not to state that history (again as an academic discipline) does not have any inherent value, just that its inferential value is more interesting to me and for history’s ability to comment and participate in public discussion. Both of these options still suppose that history can actually provide information, and knowledge about the past. I will quickly go through some of the non-academic uses of the term “history” to contextualize the endeavour and

²⁰ See e.g. Ronen, Ruth. (1994). *Possible Worlds in Literary Theory*. Cambridge University Press; Wolf, Mark J. P. (2012). *Building Imaginary Worlds*. New York [u.a.]: Routledge.

to question whether the idea of history as a discipline might not be the best way to begin researching “history,” especially when engaging with “popular history²¹.”

In everyday discussions, “history” appears with multiple meanings. What seems to connect most of these is the connotation of significance associated with the term. History is not invoked without some seriousness in mind. 1) Statements like “They made history that day” or “History was made here” embody an intuition about history that is vastly different from the academic research orientation. The making of history is not writing or the creation of any kind of historical (re)presentation, it is the significance of an act. It is an act so significant that future historians cannot ignore it and it must be included in any respectable (re)presentation of the past.

When historic events are discussed in this way, the historians writing history are secondary to the significance of the events themselves. This goes well with what Alun Munslow calls reconstructionist history²². It is a view of history where historians reconstruct the past in the Rankean sense—as it actually happened. In this schema it makes perfect sense that there can be events so significant that historians will reconstruct them in their works in the future. The intuition about making history in the sense discussed here entails the idea that history can happen now and later on it can be reconstructed by historians and they can then show the truth. Thus, history in itself is independent of historians and is tied to events happening in the world instead of historical records, sources, or academic historiography. In E.H. Carr’s terms, these would be “History” with the capital H: Events so significant that they are not just parts of the past, but important parts of the past.

With this kind of take on “history,” the question of why would anyone research history is answered quite easily: The events are so significant that they cannot be ignored. Thus, historical knowledge gains inferential value. It is simply useful, e.g. in understanding our current society. An argument can probably be made for this kind of inherent value of knowledge, but it is not as obvious as the inferential one.

From a modern academic’s point of view, the previously presented depiction of events so significant that they cannot be ignored by history seems very old

²¹ It is worthwhile to note (as Allan Megill kindly informed me) that the term “popular history” can be understood in two different ways: It can mean history that is aimed at large audiences, or it can be understood as people producing history in response to their needs and desires to make sense of their own pasts. My discussion focuses on the first meaning of popular history. However, the second one is also relevant for the discussion about participatory culture in Chapter 4.

²² Munslow, Alun. (1997). *Deconstructing History*. Abingdon: Routledge; Munslow, Alun. (2007). *Narrative and History*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

fashioned. It reeks of the history of big powerful old men. Anyone would be hard-pressed to find a way to incorporate this view in e.g. postcolonial or feminist histories, or in any general history of the oppressed. My point here is not to argue against these types of historiographies, but to underline that they operate from a point of view where all actions done by anyone deserve a “place in history.” All people’s actions are significant enough to be historicised, not just those large tumultuous moments. Thus, this kind of take on history where “history is made” or “was made” in the sense of doing something so monumental that it cannot be ignored is hard to incorporate into the more democratised notions of history. Options are either to argue that all events are of equal importance, or to agree that some events are so monumental that they need to be acknowledged and that by acknowledging those events, the other events’ significance is not diminished. Neither of these stances is without challenges, as the option is to either claim that the dropping of a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima in 1945 and me eating breakfast last Tuesday are of equal importance, or that all things are important, it’s just that some events are a bit more important than others. Of course, there is a third option where we acknowledge that not all events are significant while some are, but then we quickly return to the history of powerful old men. Thus, to conceive history as a kind of record of significant events is not theoretically beneficial. Even with this in mind, one still cannot escape the slightly nagging voice in the back of the mind whispering: “This will be written down in history books” when witnessing world-changing events.

2) Discussions where arguments like “Our history deserves to be heard!” are voiced²³. There are two interesting claims in these kinds of discussions. The first is “Our history” and the second is that it somehow “deserves” attention. Of course, this quotation is not a direct quotation but a generalization of an argument that is usually voiced by representatives of different minorities or otherwise oppressed peoples. “Our history” builds a narrative of a shared past. Of something that unites a community be it small (family-sized) or large (e.g. a whole ethnic group). This intuition of communal history is tempting, but it is not unproblematic. It presupposes that to experience something happening ties those who experience it together because they have lived through that specific event or series of events.

²³ See Stojanović, Dubravka (2019) “What is a Nation? The Balkanization of historical memory”, *The Times Literary Supplement*, Sept 13 2019 p. 29. for an example of the more nefarious consequences of this kind of take on history-use

If history is treated as equal to the past, then “our history” would mean something along the lines of “the past where people have been in the same spatiotemporal location and share the experience of living through some events.” But this does not capture the aspect of belonging, which is built into “our history.” The “sharedness” of “our history” cannot be returned to just existing in a general spatiotemporal location. In the other option, “history” does not equal to “the past.” History is more akin to “recounting of the past” or “telling about the past”. It might even be a more formalised construct, where there are actual rules in place that tell us how the “recounting” needs to be done and presented in order to produce a history. It is necessary to discuss how “our history” is formed especially in the latter interpretation of “history”—if it indeed can be formed. With these issues in mind, the discussion of the idea that some history “deserves to be heard” brings out interesting intuitions about history.

The idea that history *deserves* to be heard has two different meanings depending on what “history” means. If history is the past and it deserves to be heard, then there is something in the past that affects the present and it should be made public knowledge. But then again, what is the point of talking about *history* here? Why just not talk about the past? It seems to be implied that in the past, there is something that deserves to *be* history and in order for the past to become history or historical at all, it needs to be told. It needs to be historicised²⁴ History thus becomes not just an exploration of past events, but a sociocultural status symbol. It is not only a scholarly matter of finding out what happened in the past, but a value-giving system in a sociocultural sphere. In Foucault’s terms, acknowledging that e.g. some minority has a history that deserves to be heard gives them power. This once again gives history inferential value, it is not just about having a history, but about making others acknowledge it.

3) Public celebratory news or documentaries about new (often archaeological) finds that “change history.” For example, I recently came across a documentary about the pyramids of Giza. I watched it with interest on how it depicts facts and history. It turns out that the documentary (*Mysterious Discoveries in the Great Pyramid* by Florence Tran, 2018—can there even be a more sensational name for a documentary?) focused on a new scanning method using muons that could reveal the secrets of Cheops’ pyramid. The documentary—even though it was labelled by

²⁴ In his keynote “History’s Root in Attachment and Difference” at the University of Oulu, Allan Megill discussed how communities have historicised buildings and locations. A recording of the presentation is available: <https://www.oulu.fi/centreforphilosophyofhistory/node/48720>

the broadcasting company as a history documentary—was more a documentary of a long multinational research project than about history. This made me question my own experience of watching the documentary and my conception of “history.” Why would I not categorize the documentary as being about history? What was missing? Why did the documentary feel more like a science documentary than a history one?

A new scanning technology (by the Scan Pyramids Mission²⁵) was the centrepiece of the documentary. This of course gives an instant “science feel” to the presentation. However, this is not a unique aspect of science documentaries. Quite a few history documentaries discuss new archaeological tech that has made new research possible, but this time the new historical research was missing (because it had not yet been done, and might never be done because it might require invasive digging into the pyramid), which played quite a large role in creating the effect of “lacking history.”

The documentary plays with the most tempting part of research: finding something new. In the documentary, physicists use cosmic muons to map the top parts of the pyramid and find a new space above the grand gallery, which is more than exciting! Egyptologists are still unsure whether there actually is such a space, but from the documentarist’s viewpoint it certainly appears so. This excitement underlines the un-historyness of the documentary. The film is filled with the same kind of excitement that appears in the documentaries that tell the stories of astronomers and cosmologists who find a new planet or a black hole. After the first excitement of finding something new dies down, the research continues and the questions change. Research is no longer about finding something but about what to do with it.

In documentaries about history that deal with new finds, the focus is usually on the research done after the initial discovery. This is easily recognisable in claims like “This changes how we understand X” or “This forces us to reconsider the timing of Y.” *Mysterious Discoveries in the Great Pyramid* lacks this and because of that, it does not historicise the findings. The (possible) new space in the pyramid is left as a fact of the world for others to deal with; this makes the documentary more a “science documentary” than a history one.

The reason I bring this up is not to claim that science does not compile old and new data together, but to highlight the presupposition we have of history. When history is discussed, it seems not to be enough just to find something new and be excited about that, but there is a constant “so what?” hanging over new finds. The

²⁵ The Scan Pyramids Mission. Retrieved July 1, 2019 from <http://www.scanpyramids.org/>

amount of historical information that is available in popular media has become so vast that it is not enough to just find out new facts, but those facts have to mean something too. If meaning is not attached to the new finds, then they are just forgotten and stored with all the other previous finds that are deemed to be important enough, because they are historical objects/facts/relics, but are in the end relatively uninteresting. Museums have faced a similar challenge with space issues that have appeared in relation to their collections. Is every museum required to keep those small wooden cups from 1800's if they are all similar to each other? This leads to the questioning of what is the inherent value of historical finds and collections; do they in the end only have inferential value as objects that make research possible.²⁶

1.2 History in Society

Sirkka Ahonen has argued that “History is produced on three levels, namely on the vernacular level of social memory, the public level of history culture and the academic level of historical research. History is thus not a spin-off from academic history but a rather broad forum for reflecting memory.”²⁷ My interests lie in the two latter levels of her three-level distinction of history production. Of these two, the concept of “history culture” (*Geschichtskultur*²⁸) has largely been missing from the English-language discussions. The concept spread to Nordic discussions of history's role in society originally from Germany. As a relatively new concept, “history culture” is still in the process of being defined. In its most limited sense, it would only consist of willingly consumed historical presentations like novels, movies, memorials and games while remembering and school history would be left out of it.²⁹ In a wider take on the concept, any kind of communication relating to

²⁶ See Häyhä, Heikki, Jantunen, Sari & Paaskoski, Leena. *Analysing Significance*. Publications of Finnish Museums Association No. 75 (available through https://icomfinland.fi/icom-finland_en), which discusses the issues relating to the removal of objects from museums' permanent collections.

²⁷ Ahonen, Sirkka. (2012). *Coming to Terms With a Dark Past: How Post-conflict Societies Deal With History* (p. 13). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

²⁸ See for example Rüsen, Jörn. (1994). “Was ist Geschichtskultur?” In: Klaus Füllmann (Ed.): *Historische Faszination. Geschichtskultur heute*. Böhlau, Köln, 3–26.

²⁹ Ahonen, Sirkka. (1998). *Historiaton sukupolvi? Historian vastaanotto ja historiallisen identiteetin rakentuminen 1990-luvun nuorison keskuudessa*. Suomen Historiallinen Seura, (pp 15–20); Ahonen, Sirkka. (2001). "Historiaa koulun ulkopuolella – Yhteisön historiakulttuuri ja historianopetus". In Aromaa, Vuokko et al. (Eds.). *Pedagogiikka*. Helsinki, Historian ja yhteiskuntaopin opettajien liitto HYOL ry, 105–116. (pp 106-107); see also Sarviaho, Samu, (2018) *Ikuinen Rauha – Vuoden 1323 pätkinäsaaren rauha suomalaisessa historian tutkimuksessa ja historiakulttuurissa 1800- ja 1900-luvuilla*. (pp. 26–31) *Acta Universitatis Ouluensis B Humaniora*, 152. Doctoral Dissertation, University

history could be included. I use a rather wide definition where all kinds of communication and phenomena is included in “history culture.” In general, I take it to cover the culture of engaging with anything historical, without any concern about the media used to convey the history, be that a book, a game, social media spectacle, film, research paper, memorial, painting, or oral story.

A historian’s position in a culture can be described as: “A historian is not only producer but a product of time and society. His research questions arise from the shared aspirations of his time, and he interprets the past in the framework of his culture.”³⁰ Historians are an integral part of the formation of history culture, but they are also affected by it. History is thus not only scholarly work, but affects the society where it is produced. It faces the same challenge that other disciplines in humanities and social sciences have: the research affects the researched. What I mean by this is that by producing history, historians (and laymen) affect our society’s perception of its history, which through prevalent history culture affects future research interests. However, with a large amount of popular history and other popular presentations that are related to history available, it is not only historical research that affects the history culture. Popular depictions (especially visual ones) have significant effect on the general perception of history and thus also on general history culture.

Robert A. Rosenstone has gone through lot of self-reflexion to unearth to “what extend, the experiences of a historian engaged in doing research reflect the world in which he lives and somehow shape the history he (in this case) writes.”³¹ The case in question for him is himself. His discussion does not make use of the concept of “history culture,” but deals with topics that are related to it. His viewpoint is that of a historian who writes history, but is continuously affected by the society around him. His take is a bit wider than what is usually thought of as history culture. To him, it is not just the history culture of the society that affects historians, but the society and events in general that guide historians’ research topics and questions. It needs to be noted that historians are not the only ones who face this challenge of personal experiences affecting how we understand history; for non-professional historians (or the so called “general public” or “laymen”) this is the baseline model

of Oulu, History of Science and Ideas., for how “history culture” has been defined and used in the Finnish context.

³⁰ Ahonen Sirkka. (2012). *Coming to Terms With a Dark Past: How Post-conflict Societies Deal With History* (p. 13). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

³¹ Rosenstone, Robert A. (2016). *Adventures of a Postmodern Historian: Living and Writing the Past* (p. 2). Bloomsbury.

of how to engage with history. Rosenstone is interested in how “the writer” is present in their own historical works when history is expected to have some level of detachment from the historian. The present world seeps into historical research and presentations, making the prevalent culture and society a player in the analysis of any aspects of “history” or “historiography.” This of course resonates with Hayden White’s historicism, where “history” as we understand it is only the current way of doing history; in time, “history” will mean some other standards of production as it has done in the past.

The power that the prevalent history culture has on people should not be underestimated.

My favorite novels (...) not only took place in the past, they seemed truer than any work of scholarship I encountered in the sense that they brought the world alive in a way that the historical writing we were given in classes never did.³²

The various (entertaining) depictions of historical events and people in popular culture are so very effective because they build historical worlds that seem to be human. Historical novels can skip large descriptions and focus on characters’ experiences because of the large amount of “history” that we come across in our everyday lives. Because of the constant exposure to historical imagery and depictions from before we are even old enough to read, we are pre-enabled to engage with almost any form of history culture. History is being transmitted to us through a variety of means and mediums so widely that it is not even questioned. History is at large in popular culture; its depictions are part of our pastime and the power that historical texts have to define what kind history is appropriate diminishes constantly.

³² Ibid. (p. 5)

2 Research Questions and Results from the Articles

In this chapter, I outline the research questions of both the dissertation and the individual articles. I also summarise the conclusions of the individual research articles.

2.1 Research Questions

This dissertation is compiled out of four research papers. The first of them is about counterfactuals, the second is about literary possible worlds, the third is about a Twitter feed and the fourth about transmedia. From these descriptions, it would appear that there are two different topics that I am engaging with: the theory of possible worlds and digital media. However, I am trying to shed light on the intuition that there is something more behind historical presentations than just the presentation itself. By “history,” I do not mean the actual past, but (re)presentations in different forms that aim to tell how the past possibly was.

My research looks into the relation between historical presentations and the actual world. The reason why I formulate the question to be about the relationship between historical presentations and the actual world instead of the past stems from two different points, which not-so-surprisingly is also the reason why the articles attached seem to form two pairs within one larger whole. History has been used as a term to discuss the actual past and as an oppositional term to fiction. This has led to the enforcement of a binary opposition between the two: history vs. fiction. This binary opposition has also been criticised and it has turned out to be quite hard to uphold. My first two articles discuss truth and counterfactuals in history while acknowledging the fact that history and fiction are not directly oppositional and that aspects of both can be found in each of them. Thus, the underlying question that emerges from these articles is: How does history relate to the actual world, and what is the role of counterfactuals in the evaluation of historical presentations?

The two latter, more media-oriented articles discuss the role of history within our actual world. How does the employed media affect historical presentation and how is history being engaged with in our actual world? These two papers turn away from academic history and explore what might be called experimental history or popular history. History is seen as a part of the media environment we live in and analysed as part of it instead of as a form of knowledge or an academic discipline. From these two viewpoints stems the question, what is history’s relation to the

actual world? It is not only a metaphysical or ontological question, but also social and cultural. History is created in the actual world and it is engaged with in the actual world, but it is also perceived to be about the actual world. So is it just a way to discuss ourselves? Or something else?

2.2 More Detailed Research Questions of the Articles

The first of the articles, *Possible Worlds of History* (*Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 2018), looks into the intersection of the possible worlds theory and the theory of fictional worlds, as these theories are applied to the analysis of history and historiography. In the article, the metastructural differentiation between “historical worlds” and “fictional worlds,” as presented by Lubomír Doležel, is questioned. The paper argues that there is no metastructural difference between historical worlds and fictional worlds, and that the only way to make any distinction between the historical and the fictional is through the relation to the actual world. Thus the “world group” in which the analysed historical or fictional world resides becomes significant in deciphering whether a literary world is historical or not. The presence of the actual world in the world group is argued to be a necessary condition for a presentation to be a “historical world.”

The second article: *Kontrafaktuaalinen historia – mahdollisuus, ilmiö, harhaoppi?* (Counterfactual history – possibility, phenomenon, heresy? [my translation of the title] published in *Historian Teoria* (eds. Väyrynen & Pulkkinen, 2016)) asks whether counterfactual history is useful for historiography. The focus is on looking at the rise of counterfactual history since the 1990’s as a phenomenon happening within the discipline of history rather than as an overt methodological stance. This is then extended to analysing counterfactuality as a form of research heuristics that is employed even in research that does not aim to produce counterfactual historical presentations.

The third article: *The Finnish twitter War: The Winter War experienced through the social media project #sota39 and its implications for traditional historiography* (*Rethinking History*, 2016) in turn explores the #sota39 project by the Finnish national broadcasting company YLE. The article raises a question of “How can historical characters be transfigured to relive 105 days of a national crisis, after 70 years of its passing, through a strict chronology and on a social media platform, in a manner that connects with contemporary media consumers and still maintains its

relevance as a historical project?”³³ The article focuses on the experimental format of the #sota39 rather than its content in an effort to understand the possibilities of our digital era for historical presentation

The Fourth article: In History as transmedia (Manuscript, submitted to Rethinking History), “I argue that history is a large-scale transmedia project that is not understood as such, and this causes friction when history is engaged with through media in which historical research is not usually presented.”³⁴ This is done by applying Henry Jenkins’ ten-step definition of transmedia to history. Article ask if transmedia is a useful concept of analysing history and is there something to be gained by conceiving history as such?

2.3 Summary of the Research Articles

In this subchapter, I summarise the arguments presented in the four research articles included in the dissertation. These are split into two different themes where articles I and II deal with possible worlds and counterfactuals, while articles III and IV look more into how history is present in the modern digital media environment.

In Article I, *Possible Worlds of History*, I argue that historical texts create sovereign historical worlds in the same way as fictional texts create sovereign fictional worlds. The main argument is that there is no metastructural difference between historical and fictional worlds to be found on the level of possible worlds. If one wishes to separate history and fiction on the level of possible worlds, then it needs to be done by analysing the world-groups where the worlds in question are, instead of the worlds themselves. History is commonly held to be true (even though this has been contested). On the level of possible worlds, each proposition can be considered to be true in its own world³⁵. Thus, trueness in a literary world cannot be considered to be the origin of the possible historicity of a literary world.

In *Narrative Logic*, (1981) Frank Ankersmit discussed the same problem from a slightly different angle when he proposed a thought experiment where a novel turns out to be completely factual down to the last detail—a completely true historical novel³⁶ The question for him is whether a claim can be considered true if

³³ Lähteenmäki, Ilkka & Virta, Tatu. (2016). p. 433. (Article III)

³⁴ Lähteenmäki, Ilkka. Unpub. *Transmedia History*. (Article IV)

³⁵ See Lewis, David. (1978). “Truth in Fiction” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 15(1), 37–46.

³⁶ Ankersmit, Frank. (1981). *Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historians’ Language* (P. 23). Groningen: Krips repro meppel.

it does not claim to be so. The Gettier problem³⁷ at least makes a case that accidental trueness of a belief does not make it knowledge. In Ankersmit's thought experiment, the point is to prove that accidental trueness of fiction is not enough to turn in into history. This, along with the Gettier problematisation of knowledge, points to the idea that history has to be knowledge, and would thus also require at least justification.

Dorrit Cohn has argued that a two-level narratological plot-narrative-analysis is not equipped to deal with historical writing. A third level of reference is required for analysing history.³⁸ In my model, textual references are used to expand the amount of true propositions in a literary world so that a historical text (that creates a historical literary world) can refer outside of itself and those references set the truth-value of specific propositions in that world. So, if a novel does not explicitly refer to anything outside of the literary world that it stipulates, its truth-values are independent of the actual world's state. It bears no connection to the actual and is a pure possibilist fiction even if the truth-values of all propositions in that world would happen to be equal to the actual world's truth-values.

In the article, it is argued that the context or the world group where the analysed literary world resides is of importance. The point of the argument is that a historical novel where every single sentence turns out to be a true statement in the actual world would still not be a history of those events. The world-group of the literary world defines the world's context and the world-group is made visible through references. In the case of a novel there would exist only worlds that stem from the novel itself. The world-group of the hypothesised historical novel would not contain only one world because if even one fact would be left undecided then two (sub)worlds would spawn. In one of them the fact would be true, and in the other false. Now if source references are added to an accidentally completely true novel, then the stipulated literary world is placed in a pre-existing world group. This changes the arguments about what is true in the historical world from a creator-god's statements to "This is true because a historian (or a source) x has stated so."³⁹ The historical world derives some of its true propositions from other works and is placed into a structure that already contains those works. This does not require that

³⁷ See Gettier, Edmund L. (1963). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", *Analysis*, 23(6), 121–123. doi:10.2307/3326922

³⁸ Cohn, Dorrit. (1999). *The Distinction of Fiction* (pp. 111–115). Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

³⁹ Lähteenmäki, 2018, p. 180. (Article I)

all the propositions of the source are accepted as true. However, even one is enough for a world to be placed into a pre-existing structure.

This can be visualized by thinking of world-structure being like a flowchart in which the world I have created resides at the bottom and to reach it I have to flow through a huge amount of true/false steps which fix the necessary truths of my world. If I write pure fiction, there are no steps before me in the flowchart (making me an omnipotent creator or god for my text), but when I start relating my text (world) to other texts (worlds) and claiming that my arguments are true or false because of something that other people have said I have to flow through the chart to find a place where my world “fits.”⁴⁰

This makes it possible to model historical interpretations and how they function. Because, if I accept a contingent interpretation of events as proposed by other historians as true in my historical world, it becomes necessarily true in the world I have stipulated. This happens because all of the worlds that can be positioned below my world in the “flowchart of worlds” would also have that interpretation as a true state of affairs in those worlds. Otherwise those worlds would be positioned in another location in the chart in the first place.

History is not the only form of literary world-creation where this kind of pre-existing world structure can be observed. Fanfiction or long lasting series where the author changes in the middle face the same challenge of having to place their text into a pre-existing context where they cannot decide every detail just by having the authorship of the text. These usually lack explicit source references, but seem to refer to other works through rigid references of proper names. “Harry Potter fanfic happens in the context of Harry Potter because it is about Harry Potter.”⁴¹

In the case of counterfactual history, Doležel has claimed that counterfactual history “tends to minimize the importance of a singular agent’s decisions and to make changes to global characteristics, which can be, but are not limited to, the social, the political, the economical, or the military. The individual tends to be interesting only in case of a leader.”⁴² This is quite contrary to the usual notion that singular decisions or “points of divergence” are often seen as the beginning points of counterfactual history-writing instead of global scale differences. The role of counterfactual heuristics and their ability to deepen historical understanding is

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Lähteenmäki, 2018, p. 181; Doležel, *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The Postmodern Stage*, pp. 121–122.

discussed more in depth in article II (Kontrafaktuaalinen historia – mahdollisuus, ilmiö, harhaoppi?).

The interesting similarity between counterfactuals and fiction on the world level is, however, worthy of discussion. Doležel's central observation is that "All worlds of counterfactual history, whether constructed by historians or by fiction makers, whether their function is cognitive or aesthetic, are semantically fictional."⁴³ However, counterfactuals seem to presuppose the existence of factual arguments because without facts there cannot be counterfactuals.⁴⁴ Doležel also attempts to combine a view from Austin's speech act theory, according to which an argument cannot be true or false during its creation, as nothing pre-exists that could set the truth-value of the argument in question, with Fregean logic that deals with all fiction (not just the creation of fiction) as truth-valueless. I argue that such a stance cannot be upheld in combination with possible worlds where truth-values are required. Instead, the process of fictional performative textual world creation should be thought of as a stipulation of the truth-values of propositions in an environment where there is no pre-existing world structure that the literary world in question needs to be positioned in.

The difference between fiction and history cannot be identified on the basis of their producing structurally different possible worlds. Both create literary possible worlds with the difference of being differently positioned in relation to other literary possible worlds. This means that while the world of Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* has no connection to world of Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, historical worlds share links to other historical worlds (and to the actual world) through which these worlds are identified as historical. These worlds are temporally complete⁴⁵, as argued by Robert M. Adams in his criterion of

⁴³ Doležel, *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The Postmodern Stage*, p. 122; de Mey, Tim & Weber, Erik. (2003). "Explanation and Thought Experiments in History," *History and Theory*, 42(1), 29.

⁴⁴ Doležel, *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The Postmodern Stage*, p. 122.

⁴⁵ I use "temporally complete" instead of e.g. "finished" for two reasons: It is the original wording of Robert M. Adams and because "finished" implies that there is an endpoint, which time does not necessarily have. The idea is to argue that worlds cover all of time instead of up to a certain point. The meaning, and implications of "temporally complete" worlds are expanded in Article I and in Chapter 3. Generally "temporal completeness" of a literary world should be thought as meaning that even though descriptions of contents of a literary world does not cover every moment in time, all possible points of time are still there in the structure of the world. This means that if a historical literary world describes the middle-ages it still has the world-structure that includes other points in time like e.g. the date 23rd of October 2019. Of which it incidentally has no descriptions of, but that point in time is still there in the structure of the literary world in question.

completely determinate possible worlds⁴⁶. This makes all history texts complete world histories (although very undefined ones). This is achieved by referencing to other texts and thus making the world more determined than any text could achieve in isolation. Referencing to other texts also determines a text's location in the world-group. This world-group can then be thought of as the construction that is usually called "history." Thus, literary possible worlds support the idea that there are a countless world histories, but that these histories are very well interconnected and thus easily interpreted as being one singular whole even though it is a vast network.

Article II, *Kontrafaktuaalinen historia – mahdollisuus ilmiö, harhaoppi?*, questions whether speculation with non-actualised events serves historiography in any meaningful way. It is apparent that historians implicitly use counterfactuals in the evaluation of causes for actual events. The evaluation of how necessary something was for causing something else requires the evaluation of other options, and thus counterfactuals enter both the heuristic process of the historian and to the produced historical presentation⁴⁷. Modern historiography has moved away from categorising "necessary causes" for historical processes or events and possible causes or influences are more preferred terms.⁴⁸

The value of counterfactual history is largely dependent on research goals and what the main purpose of creating the specific historical representation that the historian is in the process of constructing is. If the presentation aims at only describing historical events, then counterfactuals offer very little, but if the goal is to explain or understand an event or a series of events, then counterfactuals became an increasingly valuable heuristic tool. For a presentation to generate understanding of its content, it needs to offer a credible construct that appears acceptable and relatable to both the historian and to the reader/watcher/consumer of the presentation.

Because counterfactuals used in history disciplines deal with what actually did not happen, it forces both the reader/watcher/consumer and the historian to continuously evaluate the credibility of the presented scenario. This kind of continuous skepticism brings forth a new understanding of the presented events.

⁴⁶ Adams, Robert Merrihew. (1974). "Theories of Actuality," *Noûs*, 8(3), 211–212. doi:10.2307/2214751

⁴⁷ Lähtenmäki, Ilkka (2016). "Kontrafaktuaalinen historia – mahdollisuus, ilmiö, harhaoppi?" In Väyrynen, Kari. & Pulkkinen, Jarmo (Eds.). *Historian teoria*. Vastapaino. (Article II); Megill, Allan (2007). *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A contemporary guide to practice* (pp. 151-156) Chicago and London: Chicago University Press

⁴⁸ Evans, Richard. (2014). *Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History* (p. 35). London: Little, Brown.

This is possible because the object of the skepticism is a presentation that does not claim to be (f)actual. Thus, one cannot criticise it just for not being factual as this kind of criticism is redundant. This leads other parts of the presentations credibility to be scrutinised. Such presentational strategies include narrative, the text's genre⁴⁹, historical contextualisation, our general conception of how the world around us operates, what are the social forces affecting people, etc.

A significant amount of counterfactual histories deal with historical events that are perceived to still have an effect on what kind of present world we inhabit. These kinds of "points of divergence" that are intuitively found to exist in time are usually tied to the fates of rulers, military victories or defeats, large cultural or religious movements or demographic changes like massive immigrations or deadly epidemics.⁵⁰

The heuristic intuition behind counterfactual scenarios is that through the outlining of alternative scenarios and options, we can gain more understanding of how, for example, different world leaders operated and made their decisions at the start of the First World War. This also undermines the idea that certain historical events were unavoidable and instead emphasises their uncertainty. Interestingly both the defenders of counterfactual history (like Niall Ferguson) and its critics (such as Richard Evans) have pointed out that the amount of different counterfactual options or scenarios is not unlimited. Thus, it would be intuitive to think that historians should only take into consideration options that have been at the minimum credible options for the contemporaries making those decisions, and where there is some evidence that they have been under consideration. This would, however, rule out quite a lot of possible scenarios, such as things like impulsive behaviour, human error, unintended consequences and natural disasters (which at present can be forecast but could not back then). With all these uncertainties left out, the actual outcome might appear far more determined than it actually was.⁵¹

Counterfactuality alone is not enough to form a solid historical research methodology, as pure speculation of counterfactual scenarios does not produce robust historical analyses. However, when it is combined with other historical methodologies, it can be used to access ideas and presuppositions that might

⁴⁹ For example, comedic takes on past events tend not to be considered credible presentations.

⁵⁰ Rosenfeld, Gavriel. (2002). "Why Do We Ask "What If?" Reflections on the Function of Alternate History" *History and Theory*, 41, 90–103, (p. 94)

⁵¹ Evans, Richard. (2014). *Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History* (p. 67). London: Little, Brown; Lebow, Richard Ned. (2010) *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations*. (pp. 47–49) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

otherwise be left unexplicated. Thus, it is conceivable that counterfactual history actually tells us more about historians and their presuppositions and interests than about the past.⁵²

In article III, *The Finnish Twitter war: the Winter War experienced through the #sota39 project and its implications for historiography* (*Rethinking History*, 2016), Tatu Virta and I explore the #sota39 social media project that was created by the Finnish broadcasting company YLE and ran from November 2014 to late March 2015. We argue that the kind of relaying of history that happened in the project, where historical facts were enriched with fictive elements and characters, changes the perception of what should be considered as history. With history presentations like the #sota39 project, “we are entering a domain of history where experiencing the events through imitations may appear as important as the historical accuracy of the imitation.”⁵³ We emphasise positive aspects of diversifying the possible presentational forms of history and argue that through new media, new audiences are gained also for more traditional historical presentations. Social media (or in our case study, Twitter specifically) does not surpass the earlier medias as a form of historical presentation, but it can operate differently and emphasise different aspects of history than e.g. a book can.

Within the digital (post)modern media environment that is prevalent in the 2010’s, original arguments and sources are remixed, distorted and removed from their original context. This environment is a challenge for historical presentation as it “has changed the perception of what comprises proper representation or experience.”⁵⁴ Academia (especially history disciplines) has not been a forerunner for deploying new standards of information and knowledge transmission, while the users of internet—based media take them for granted. Thus, it is invigorating to see that public broadcasting companies and individual people are exploring the possibilities provided by modern information technology for historical interpretation.

⁵² Rosenfeld, Gavriel. (2002). “Why Do We Ask “What If?” Reflections on the Function of Alternate History” *History and Theory*, 41, 90–103. (p.90); Evans, Richard. (2014). *Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History* (p. 176). London: Little, Brown.; Wurgaft, Benjamin Aldes. (2010). “The Uses of Walter: Walter Benjamin and Counterfactual Imagination” *History and Theory*, 49, 361–383 (p. 361); Lähteenmäki. (2016). Kontrafaktuaalinen historia – mahdollisuus, ilmiö, harhaoppi? (pp. 202–204). In *Historian teoria* (eds. Väyrynen K & Pulkkinen J.). Vastapaino. (Article II)

⁵³ Lähteenmäki & Virta, 2016, p. 448 (Article III)

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 449

Conceptions such as presence and experiencing history can be explored and played with in social media in ways that simply are not possible in a literary form. #sota39 has mingled together historical characters, events, and narratives in a media format that allows for a highly presentified and very positively received presentation of Finnish national history.⁵⁵

This kind of content production challenges the traditional perception of authorship and authored history writing. The functionality of the social media makes it possible for anyone to participate in the project's narrative. In the case of #sota39, this could be done just by using the hashtag functionality of Twitter. While YLE's official accounts are built on previously authored material, "it is the community working with the content, appraising and endorsing it while producing their own interpretations and source materials to enrich it, that brings the project to life."⁵⁶ Even though projects like #sota39 do not directly challenge traditional history writing, it would be useful for historians to engage with these kinds of experimental histories to familiarise themselves with and to explore possibilities of digital presentation. The only way to evaluate the value of these new presentational forms is to create history presentations with academic aspirations and test the limits of these media.

Article IV, *Transmedia History*, argues that history is a large-scale transmedia project and that it is not usually understood as such. In the article history is conceived as something that is consumed in the same manner as other available media content. Thus, history is looked at as happening in the media instead of being a purely academic discipline. The concept of transmedia is used to analyse the different engagements with history presentations. "A transmedia perspective emphasizes the idea that no medium is safe on its own little island in the modern media ocean."⁵⁷ Through this perspective, it is possible to question which kind of media can be used for historical presentations and what the strengths of specific media like literary text, or a digital game, for example, are. This also makes it possible to look into the question of which aspects of history (if any) are independent of the media that is used to present it, and whether some media should be preferred over others.

The transmediality of history is not a new phenomenon, but the modern digital technology has made it much more obvious as digital technology has invaded the

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Lähteenmäki, Ilkka. Unpub. "Transmedia History" (Article IV)

traditional history presentations: “museums employ virtual and augmented reality in their exhibitions, historians comment on social media, films and games are filled with digitally made historical imagery, and so on.”⁵⁸

If “fictional and historical transmedia worlds are compared, no fictional one can match the amount of detail that has been established for the historical one – and it is the details that matter in world-building. This is most fitting for history since historians take pride in getting even the smallest details correct in their presentations.”⁵⁹ When all presentations are considered to be incomplete depictions, the small details provide possible clues for more information. Thus, the information value of even the smallest details rises as they are used to generate coherence across all available presentations. This also paints a picture of a historical (or fictional) world that has more content in it than what is available through the engaged presentations. The concept “worlds” links together my discussions of historical worlds and modern media as both employ the idea of there being more information available than what can be found in any single presentation.

The transmedia viewpoint emphasises the equality of media for engagement with any content, and that the deployment of a variety of media creates value that is more than just the sum of all the presentations of the content put together.

This means that non-literary presentations are no longer viewed only as adaptations of texts, but as genuine historical presentations that contribute to the discussion. A transmedia viewpoint thus gives emphasis to those forms of representation that are often taken as ‘not quite proper history’ by levelling the field between mediums and by giving credit to all the different ways of which different mediums contribute to the building of what we commonly depict as history.⁶⁰

History has been traditionally presented in a written form. The perception is still strong that history texts provide the ur-texts for presentations done in other media. This makes history an unbalanced transmedia, where text still holds power over other media. However, there is a tension building up between the literary form of history and other forms, as the consumption of non-written history grows. This growing transmedial world-building of history “also moves narrative out of the centre of history-making. Small details and descriptions matter as much as the

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

story.”⁶¹ In transmedia, a world-building narrative is just another building tool among others, such as images, or technical manuals, or encyclopaedias.

⁶¹ Ibid.

3 Historical Presentations' Connection to the Actual

In this chapter, I present an argument for a way of evaluating historical presentations through the concept of literary worlds. This is based on the arguments made in articles I and II. I make use of the slightly un-intuitive idea of all historical presentations being temporally complete worlds. In other words, all historical presentations are temporally complete world histories, just relatively undefined ones. These complete world histories are then evaluated with the help of counterfactual heuristics. While counterfactuals are usually discussed as scenarios in historical discussions, I employ them here as heuristic tools which can be used to make sense of a variety of claims and cases. This schema is then used as a basis for evaluation of history presentations' relation to the actual world.

Subchapter 3.1 explores the temporal completeness of historical worlds that are presented by historical works. The focus is on how referring to sources and texts functions as a basis for a presentation's historicity. ("Historicity" derives from "historical" as used in e.g. "historical novel," while "historicity" derives from "historic" which is used to describe for example major events. I use "historicity" rather than "historicity" [both have been used for translation of *Geschichtlichkeit*⁶²] in my discussion to emphasise the constructed nature of history in presentations.) This is not a new perspective, as historians have taken pride in their ability to accurately refer to source material and to other historical works. However, when all historical works are considered to be temporally complete, a sort of genealogy of interlinked historical worlds begins to emerge, where historical works seem to implicitly contain more details about historical worlds than what is explicitly stated in the presentation itself. The exploration of the functionality of referring in historical works brings forth an evaluation model for comparing historical worlds to the actual world. In the heart of this schema is the shift from the idea that historical claims are compared to the past, to idea that history is compared to the actual present instead.

Subchapter 3.2 argues for the usage of counterfactuals as heuristic tools for contrasting a historical worlds' implied present moment in time with the actual world's present moment. This is done because all historical presentations that are available for evaluation have been completed in the past, and thus cannot contain

⁶² see The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy "historicity" p.308 or The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (second edition) (1999) "Historicity" p.673

explicit descriptions of the current present moment's world-state. Thus, historical worlds' implied present state of the need to be inferred from the described portions of historical worlds much in the same as counterfactual scenarios' credibility is evaluated. This kind of evaluation of history benefits greatly from the fact that it aims for historical worlds to converge towards the actual world's present world-state instead of diverging from the actual as is the case with most possible worlds.

In more general terms, I attempt here to move past the idea that history is mainly narratively constructed. Instead, I proceed with a conception of history where it is a construction that has several elements that contribute to the creation of history side by side with narrative aesthetics. As a concept, historical worlds are a special case of literary worlds. In literary theory, the concept of literary worlds has been used to analyse works of fiction. The concept of a world has been used in these discussions as more of a metaphor, instead of arguing that fictional worlds created through literary means are real physical worlds. However, analytical philosophy discussions have explored the concept of abstract possible worlds, and the arguments made in those discussions can be applied to the concept of literary worlds to an extent. Thus, the analysis presented here relies quite heavily on the philosophical discussions, while arguing about historical worlds.

3.1 Temporal Completeness

There are two major premises on which my argument for the historicity⁶³ of historical worlds is based on. The first premise is that the only worlds that can be created through natural language are possible worlds (as opposed to natural language creating actual physical worlds). So the worlds that I am discussing here are abstract constructs, not physical realities like David Lewis originally proposed⁶⁴ In this, I follow the philosophical tradition of abstract possible worlds (or abstractionism), stemming from the works of people like Saul Kripke, Robert M. Adams, and Robert Stalnaker. This stance has also been taken up by literary

⁶³ "Historicity" is used here as a quality of presentation that gets attached to presentations, not as an e.g. epistemic term. What I mean by this is that for a literary world to be considered historical, it needs to have a quality of historicity associated with it. Thus, historical worlds are a special case of literary worlds, specifically because of the perceived historicity of the world in question.

⁶⁴ See Lewis, David. (1973). *Counterfactuals*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; (1986). *On The Plurality of Worlds*. Oxford: Blackwell; and (1978). "Truth in Fiction" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 15(1), 37–46.

theorists like Ruth Ronen, Marie-Laure Ryan, Lubomir Doležel, and Thomas Pavel⁶⁵ who have used it as a base for work on the theory of fictional worlds.

The second premise is the criterion of completely determinate possible worlds by Robert M. Adams. It states:

(1) For every possible world, *w*, and every pair of contradictory propositions, one member of the pair is true in *w* and the other member is false in *w*.

(2) Each possible world, if temporally ordered at all, is a complete world history and not a momentary stage of one. The actual world, therefore, includes what has actually existed or happened and what will actually exist or happen, as well as what now exists or happens; and they all count as actual.⁶⁶

This criterion is originally part of Adams' argument for what he calls "world-stories." In his theory, these are "maximal consistent set of propositions. That is, it is a set which has as its members one member of every pair of mutually contradictory propositions, and which is such that it is possible that all of its members be true together."⁶⁷ He then uses the concept of a world-story to defend a metaphysical position known as actualism. According to actualism, everything exists. In other words, everything is actual and there is nothing that is not actual.⁶⁸ Actualism thus rejects the idea that there could be anything that is just possible but not actual.⁶⁹

Adams' theory and the previously quoted criterion for the completeness of possible worlds originates from discussions about modal logic. So it gives statements about possible worlds in their complete form, which is not restricted by

⁶⁵ Kripke, Saul. (1963). "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic" *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, 16, 83–94; and Kripke, Saul. (1980[1972]). *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard.; Adams, R. (1974). "Theories of Actuality" *Noûs*, 8, 211–31; Adams, Robert. (1981). "Actualism and Thisness" *Synthese*, 49, 3–41; Stalnaker, Robert. (1976). "Possible Worlds" *Noûs*, 10(1), 65–75; Stalnaker, Robert. (2012). *Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ronen, Ruth. (1994). *Possible Worlds in Literary Theory*. Cambridge University Press; Pavel, Thomas. (1986). *Fictional Worlds*. Harvard University Press; Ryan, Marie-Laure. (1991). *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory*. Indiana University Press; Doležel, Lubomír. (2010). *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The Postmodern Stage*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.; Doležel, Lubomír. (2000). *Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

⁶⁶ Adams, Robert. (1974). "Theories of Actuality" *Noûs*, 8(3), 211–212. doi:10.2307/2214751

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 225.

⁶⁸ For a more detailed description of actualism, see Menzel, Christopher. Actualism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/actualism/>

⁶⁹ I have no objections to having possibly existing objects in my ontology, so I do not defend actualism.

natural language. This is why, for example, his intuitive idea of world-stories is not automatically applicable to literary worlds, as they cannot achieve the required “maximal consistent set of propositions.” This is due to the simple fact that it would take an eternity to write out every possible non-contradictory proposition in a natural language. Thus, literary worlds are not capable of this kind totality, not because of any theoretical restriction, but because of practical reasons. There seems to be nothing fundamental that would prevent literary worlds from being temporally complete worlds.⁷⁰ This means that the criterion for a temporal structure and for the temporal completeness still holds true for them. It just remains that literary worlds’ “world-stories” are incomplete.

Lubomír Doležel has used Adams’s criterion for his theory of fictional and historical worlds in *Heterocosmica: Fiction and possible worlds* (1998) and *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The postmodern stage* (2010).⁷¹ I believe his take on the theory has some challenges with historical worlds, a point that I have argued in article I⁷². However, I agree with him that Adams’ criterion is useful and applicable to literary worlds. Therefore, I hold the view that literary worlds are complete, but this completeness is not present explicitly in the text. This implies that there are quite a lot of things that are left undecided and undefined by the text itself.

The first and most direct effect that Adams’s criterion has for the concept of historical worlds is that all historical presentations are temporally complete. This does not just mean that a history of the Cold War is a temporally complete piece that covers the time period between 1945 and 1992 for example, but that the historical world it describes is temporally complete from the Big Bang to end of the Universe (if that is ever going to happen). The same is of course also true for our actual world. Our actual world is temporally complete in the same manner even though the past is beyond our reach and the future is not here yet. This way of thinking about historical worlds makes it possible to make some interesting claims

⁷⁰ See Doležel, Lubomír. (1998). *Heterocosmica: fiction and possible worlds*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; and (2010). *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The Postmodern Stage*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.; Pavel, Thomas. (1986). *Fictional Worlds*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. P;

⁷¹ Doležel, Lubomír. (1998). *Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press; and Doležel, Lubomír. (2010). *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: the Postmodern Stage*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

⁷² See Lähteemäki, Ilkka. (2018). “Possible Worlds of History” *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 12, 164–182. (Article I)

about historical (re)presentations, how they operate, and how they are—in the non-naïve way—in terms of the actual world.

Intertextuality is usually taken to mean that by referring (implicitly or explicitly) to another text, the author implies that the content of that text is related to or affects what is articulated in the text that is currently under scrutiny⁷³. From a world-building perspective, this can be considered to be additional information that also describes the world in question or in Adams' terms, would add more to the incomplete “world-story.” Intertextuality also creates a perception that the information of a text expands beyond itself and that there is something (like a world) lurking behind the actual text. This intuition of a world that is only partially described in texts becomes important in Chapter 4, where encountering history is discussed.

Historians are generally very good at employing explicit intertextuality in their works. They quote, refer, and cite other history presentations and primary source texts constantly to support their own historical claims. The cited secondary literature of course contains its own citations to further works. This creates a sort of genealogy of historical knowledge which defines and describes large portions of the historical world presented by a single text that would not have otherwise received any descriptions. From the world-building perspective, this kind of intertextuality serves two major purposes in the creation, description, and definition of historical literary worlds.

First: it expands the world to contain more historical “facts” and interpretations so that a more complete world history is implied to be present in the presented historical world. By expanding the described portion of the historical world beyond of what is available in a single text, the world in question becomes more detailed and descriptions and definitions expand also to the temporal areas that are not directly dealt within the presentation itself.

Eric Hobsbawm's *The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* is a good example of traditional historiography done by a professional. Its bibliography has some 409 sources listed and then a few pages of other related works. So with the world-building schema that I am working with, these works in the bibliography of *The Age of Extremes* expand the historical world beyond of what is explicitly stated by Hobsbawm in the chapters of the book. The listed works in the bibliography range from UN statistical reports (*UN International Trade*

⁷³ See Alfaro, María Jesús Martínez. (1996). “Intertextuality: Origins and development of the concept”, *Atlantis*, 18(½), 268–285.

Statistics Yearbook, 1983) and Encyclopaedia Britannica articles (*War*, 11th Edition, 1911) to works like J. D. Bernal's *The Social Function of Science* (London, 1939), Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (London, 1651), and Hobsbawm's own previous works (*The Age of Empire 1870-1914* [London 1987] and *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* [Cambridge 1990]).

In historiographical works, the bibliography section is usually treated as a list of locations that contain the proof of what is said in the historiographical presentation itself. It can be thought of as a sort of an address book if you like. In the historical literary worlds -schema, these operate as addresses: they give you the names (and addresses) of other literary worlds which in our example, *The Age of Extremes* is positioned in relation to. Some are agreed with and some are not. These referred works expand the temporal area that is depicted and described in the work, while also detailing the timeframe covered by the Hobsbawm's book itself. In *The Age of Extremes*, only 77 years are covered, but the referred books cover areas outside of that specific timeframe. There seems to be an Age of Empire that happened just before, and some kind of nationalistic ideology that originates already from 1780's, and even a book from 1600's that discusses some strange mythical aquatic beast.

The point here is that if one starts to work through the listed references of a history book and follows up on those listed works' bibliographies, a whole genealogy of historical worlds opens up. If all these are considered to be meaningful pieces of the historical presentation under scrutiny, then the idea that a single history presentation is a temporally complete world history does not seem so far-fetched anymore. The admission of other works' descriptions and depictions as part of a historical world is only one level of referring. By referring to Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Hobsbawm also makes the claim that in the historical world he depicts in *The Age of Extremes*, Thomas Hobbes published a book called *Leviathan* in 1651, and same goes for all other references. The world Hobsbawm depicts has to be such that these works are created. This implicitly expands the world even more than what is explicitly in the content of the referred works. This theme of implied content will be discussed more in depth in the next subchapter, where counterfactuality heuristics are discussed as a tool of evaluating historical works.

The second major theme of "quoting, referring and citing" is that they are used to give credibility to presented historical worlds. This is done by making sure that the reader perceives the presentation to be compatible with other historical worlds/texts. This compatibility and coherence with other works, which are deemed history, ensures that the presentation is interpreted as a history instead of, for

example, fiction. The “addresses” of references tie the presentation to other historical works while fictional works are seen as more “standalone” pieces of work where the creator/writer has more freedom than in historical pieces. This is of course a depiction of “classical” history. More experimental pieces tend to play within the border area between history and fiction to make the reader question his/her preconceptions.

The credibility of a historical presentation is not just the result of its internal coherence, or the quality of its arguments in a vacuum, or the strength of its narrative, but also how well it is tied to other works that are already deemed as “history.” The process of encountering presentations of history and interpreting them as “history” is discussed further in Chapter 4. What I argued here about the function of references in historical worlds was done to accommodate the view that a two-level system of plot-narrative is not properly equipped to deal with historical writing and that the level of reference needs to be added to the analysis⁷⁴. The challenge that references pose to historical writing has been explored by theorists like Kalle Pihlainen, who has argued that the presentation of sources breaks the narrative coherence of the historians’ texts⁷⁵. The use of sources limits narrative possibilities and can seriously disrupt the flow of a narrative. So from a purely narratological point of view, the use of references is a hindrance to historical writing, but from a world-building perspective it is an integral part of historical worlds. As usage of sources is central to historical writing and is something that historians pride themselves in, it is necessary that any theorisation of how historical presentations function addresses the use of sources.⁷⁶

3.2 Evaluation of History through Counterfactual Heuristics.

I take it for granted that we have access to evidence of past events and people in the general sense. This in the sense that there are documents in archives, archaeological findings, recordings of events and peoples activities, etc., and these are available for historians (and laymen) to observe. However, the past itself is inaccessible to us. By this, I mean that without time travel, there is no direct access

⁷⁴ See e.g. Cohn, Dorrit. (2000). *The Distinction of Fiction* (pp. 111–115). Johns Hopkins University Press. for extrapolation of this view

⁷⁵ Pihlainen, Kalle (2015). ”Realist histories? When form clashes with function” *Rethinking History*, 19(2), 177–192.

⁷⁶ Most of the theories of history do address source usage. Some deem it not important or interesting at all, but they do address the issue.

to the past (or the future). Thus, the only temporal location that is accessible to us is the present. This also means that all empirical evidence that is available to historians is what is available in the present. Here I attempt to bridge the gap between historical presentations and empiria by abandoning the idea that historical presentations attempt to match “the past.” Instead, I argue that with the help of counterfactual heuristics (where counterfactuals are used as heuristic tools instead of scenarios), historical presentations are evaluated against the present world-state. The temporal completeness of historical worlds, which was discussed in section 3.1, makes this kind of evaluation possible.

Because historical presentations are treated as temporally complete literary worlds, the timelines of these worlds can be contrasted against the timeline of our actual world. In the example of Hobsbawm’s *The Age of Extremes*, the book discusses the time period between 1914 and 1991. Even though it was published in 1994, *The Age of Extremes* literary world’s world-state in the year 2019⁷⁷ has to match the actual world’s state in the year 2019. In short: a historical world’s implied world-state at the present moment has to match the actual world’s world-state at the present moment for the presentation to be considered historical. This is not very intuitive, but I’ll extrapolate the claim further below. Hobsbawm’s book does not contain any descriptions of the world in the year 2019 because it had not happened at the moment of its writing, and it does not even attempt to describe the year 1994, but a time period before that. This is why counterfactual heuristics are being employed in the evaluation of a literary world’s credibility. My argument is that for a presentation to be considered historical or “history,” it does not only need to match the sources it uses,⁷⁸ but it also has to match the present. This partially brings back the ghost of teleology to history writing and the evaluation of historical works.

As history is based on empirical research, the sources it uses need to be available in our actual world. Because there is no way to directly access the past, all sources that are used for historical research and the writing of history need to exist in the present. There are cases when a source has been destroyed or become inaccessible, but is still referred to in historical works. In these cases, there is an available mediating source in between that fills the requirement of being available in the present. The requirement for empirical sources available in the present leads to two interesting requirements for historical worlds. First, the historical world

⁷⁷ The year this text was written, but this year can be replaced with the year that it happens to be when this text is being read.

⁷⁸ Incidentally, matching to sources is also done through the comparison of present world-states.

created by a historian has to match the evidence in the present. Secondly, any history presented must lead to a world-state that matches the current state of the actual world. The second requirement actually also contains the first one, but the schema is easier to present by separating these two for now. By fulfilling these two requirements, a work becomes accepted into the category of history (instead of e.g. fiction).

These two requirements are not independent of each other. Historical literary worlds need to have the same evidence in them as exists in the actual world. This means that historical worlds need to be constructed in such a way that the evidence that historians use as their sources are generated, and that that evidence also survives through time so that it matches with what is available in our actual world's present. This means that in our example, the 409 entries in *The Age of Extremes* bibliography are not only available in our actual world, but are also there within the world of *The Age of Extremes* and must survive at least to the year 1994⁷⁹ for Hobsbawm to match them with the actual world's state at that time.

This schema points towards categorisation, where the perceived historicity of a literary world is dependent on its ability to match the present actual world. If a literary world is perceived to be in conflict with the actual world's current state, then the historicity of it is questioned. This in turn implies that the use of empirical evidence for historical writing not only conflicts with the narrative properties of history and breaks up narrative coherence, but has wider implications for the building of historical worlds. The dependence to empirical evidence creates implied "content" that is not explicitly stated in the presentation, but is expected to be present in the historical world that is being presented. Because of all of this implied content, we need to rely on counterfactuals as heuristic tools for the evaluation of whether a historical world's present matches with the actual world's present.

So my point is to flip the usual setting of history that matches the past to a setting where history presentations' implied present world-states match the actual world's present world-state. This is done to avoid the challenges of verifying historical claims against the past itself. My schema faces a different challenge, as it requires implied claims to be matched to empirical data. And another challenge is that comparing worlds is hard, and there is not yet a definite consensus on how that should be done in the case of counterfactuals. In his review of David Lewis'

⁷⁹ I suspect that all of the sources used are also available in the actual world's year 2019, but if any of them have been destroyed between the years of 1994 and 2019 in the actual world, then those sources must face the same fate in the world of *The Age of Extremes*.

Counterfactuals in 1975, Kit Fine presented the central problem, which has been discussed widely ever since⁸⁰.

The challenge presented by Fine is quite intuitive: Suppose the following counterfactual, “If Nixon had pressed the button there would have been a nuclear holocaust” is true. Now let us suppose that there will never be a nuclear holocaust. Now according to Fine, the counterfactual is very likely false based on Lewis’ analysis of counterfactuals. This happens because “For given any world in which antecedent and consequent are both true it will be easy to imagine a closer world in which the antecedent is true and the consequent false. For we need only imagine a change that prevents the holocaust but that does not require such a great divergence from reality.” Fine goes even so far as to point out that even if the holocaust is prevented by a miracle (whether those are plausible to happen in the actual world or not), a world with a single miracle and no holocaust is still closer to actuality than a world with a nuclear holocaust. However, there are other non-miraculous ways to prevent nuclear war, as Fine suggests, like a simple failure in the button’s electric, which prevents the launch of the nuclear weapons. Another example that Fine uses is that the statement “if Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have” would likely be true in Lewis’s analysis because it would make less difference to the world if someone else shoots Kennedy than if he is not assassinated at all. Neither of these examples works according to our intuitions about counterfactuals, and the problem is evaluating the closeness of possible worlds to each other. In general, as Fine points out, the main problem is that if the similarity of worlds is used as a basis for the evaluation of counterfactuals, then any, major change⁸¹ may be avoided by using specific smaller changes.⁸²

However, this is not a major problem for my schema of evaluating history. This is mainly because of the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependencies. Boris Kment has extrapolated the functioning of these dependencies. In my schema, the temporal asymmetry of dependencies is part of the evaluation of historical worlds against the actual world. The issue is relatively intuitive. Changes do not move back in time, only forward. If a “particular local fact at one time had been different, then

⁸⁰ See e.g. Ippolito, Michela. (2016). “How similar is similar enough?” *Semantics & Pragmatics*, 9(6), 1–60. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.9.6>; Briggs, R.A. (2012). “Interventionist Counterfactuals”, *Philosophical Studies*, 160(1), 139–166. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9908-5; Fine, Kit. (2012). “A Difficulty for the Possible Worlds Analysis of Counterfactuals”, *Synthese*, 189(1), 29–57. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0094-y

⁸¹ The scale of “major changes” can vary hugely from single acts to astronomical events for example.

⁸² Fine, Kit. (1975). “Review of Lewis’ Counterfactuals”, *Mind*, 84, 451–458. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXXIV.1.451

things later on would have been different as well; but earlier matters would have been pretty much the way they actually were. If Nixon had pressed the button, then a day later the world would have been radically different from what it was actually like. But until shortly before the button-pressing, matters would have been pretty much the way they actually were.”⁸³

Counterfactual scenarios operate by diverging from actuality. In the case of evaluating historical worlds, we are actually looking for convergence towards actuality over time instead of divergence from the actual. Therefore, the challenge that Lewis’s similarity-based analysis faced is actually working slightly in our favour. Historical presentations cannot have major differences from actuality or they lose their status as history. To use my example of Hobsbawm’s *The Age of Extremes*, the evaluation of its convergence towards the actual begins temporally from the year 1994 because that is when it was published. Then we have a gap of some 25 years to the present moment. Now *The Age of Extremes* is evaluated as a literary possible world, which is not counterfactual but is evaluated in the same manner as counterfactuals are. We evaluate it in the same manner as any other counterfactual scenarios’ credibility. If the description in the world of *The Age of Extremes*, which ends in 1994, is such that—if we are, in Timothy Williamson’s words, just “letting things run”⁸⁴—it leads to a world-state that matches the present actual world, then we deem it as an accurate historical presentation. If it does not, then we argue against it and claim that it has some things wrong in it.

The argument here is that by considering historical presentations as worlds, there is a way to distinguish history from fictional worlds. This is done by comparing a literary world’s implied present moment’s world-state with the actual world’s world-state at the present moment. This evaluation is done generally in the same manner as historical counterfactuals are evaluated. If it is deemed that the presentation does not lead to a match with the actual world’s current world-state, then it is not deemed as being relevant to history. This can explain how some older works of historiography are not deemed relevant anymore even though they have been influential before. In these cases, the worlds presented in those works have managed to reliably lead to a past present world-state in which it matched with the

⁸³ Kment, Boris. (2006). “Counterfactuals and Explanation”, *Mind*, 115(458), 261–310. doi:10.1093/mind/fzl261

⁸⁴ Williamson, Timothy. (2005). “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105(1), 1–23. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x It should be noted that “letting things run” is very lax way of evaluation how things might proceed and should not be considered to produce highly determinate results as it is extremely dependent on the background knowledge and imagination of the person doing the evaluation.

actual world's world-state, but we can no longer perceive a way of how those literary worlds would lead to the current present world-state. This means that, in example some 19th century racist histories can easily be thought as being acceptable in the early years of 20th century, but now we fail to see how those explanations and descriptions of the world could lead to the present state of the actual world.

The use of a world-schema puts emphasis on the use of sources and the intertextuality of historical claims, which makes the construction of history seem intertwined with presentations even though we are dealing with literary worlds. The usage of sources and references to other texts gives credibility to the historical world. Even though the use of sources has some tension with the building of historical narratives, it is a central piece of the construction of historical presentations in general. Referring (as a process) expands the literary world in such a way, that it appears to hold content, which is not explicitly stated in the text itself, but is implied to exist through referring to sources and other texts. This implied existence of content outside of the historian's text itself can be perceived to expand into such a large scale that the historian's interpretations gain credibility just because it is perceived to have in itself what so many others have argued. All of this is at the end perceived to match with our current state of the actual world. Interestingly, but not so surprisingly, it seems that all histories lead to the present or more specifically to a world-state that matches the actual world's present world-state. This implies that the culmination point of all histories is at the present.⁸⁵

My point here is to claim that the analysis done between the implied world-state of a (historical) literary world's present moment and actual world's present moment's world-state is informative. By "informative," I mean that "an utterance is informative if it eliminates some (but not all) candidate worlds under consideration."⁸⁶ This is the case as the comparison between (historical) literary worlds and the actual world eliminates the non-matching worlds from the category of "history."

The way that the evaluation is done resembles the process of evaluating historical counterfactuals in general. Before discussing details of specifically historical counterfactuals, it should be acknowledged that counterfactuals are constantly used in our everyday lives. In this, I rely on Timothy Williamson's views

⁸⁵ I am not alone with these kind of views, as for example Veli Virmajoki has defended a presentist take on the history of science in his dissertation (2019) *Cementing Science: Understanding Science Through its Development* where he argues for a causal structure of history that leads to the present.

⁸⁶ Snider, Todd & Bjorndahl, Adam. (2015). "Informative Counterfactuals", *Semantics and Linguistic Theory*, 25, 1–17. doi:10.3765/salt.v25i0.3077

and some psychological studies. There is nothing “mystical” or deeply philosophical in the use of counterfactuals in the evaluation of different things or events. Williamson argued, “We often use counterfactuals in our practical dealings with the world. I observe that if that rock had fallen five seconds later it would have hit me, infer that the path I am on is dangerous, and resolve to avoid it in future.”⁸⁷ Counterfactuals are also used in the explanation of evidence. Williamson’s example is the claim “There are no kangaroos on this island,” which is supported by a counterfactual “If there were any, we’d have seen some of them by now,” his point being that counterfactuals are like heuristic tools which can be adapted from one situation to another.⁸⁸

The use of counterfactuals in everyday life is also supported by psychological studies.⁸⁹ In her studies, Ruth M. J. Byrne has challenged the link between causal thoughts and counterfactual thoughts, and points out that they often differ from each other. She has observed that

When people reflect on a past event, they spontaneously offer about twice as many causal explanations that describe the facts as they happened, for example, “I didn’t meet new people because I didn’t go to the party,” compared to counterfactual thoughts that referred to an imagined alternative, for example, “If I had gone to the party I would have met new people”⁹⁰

Despite this, she considers counterfactuals to be particularly useful for historical analysis, following the arguments of Tetlock and Belkin.⁹¹ Interestingly, she points out that “most people tend to imagine the very same sorts of counterfactuals. People zoom in on similar fault lines in their representation of reality.”⁹² This points

⁸⁷Williamson, Timothy. (2005). “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105(1), 1–23. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x

⁸⁸ Williamson, Timothy. (2005). “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105(1), 1–23. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x

⁸⁹ See Byrne, Ruth M. J. (2016). “Counterfactual Thought”, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 67(1), 135–157. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249

⁹⁰ Byrne, Ruth M. J. (2016). “Counterfactual Thought”, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 67(1), 135–157. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249(p.137) citing McEleney A., Byrne R. M. J. (2006). “Spontaneous causal and counterfactual thoughts”. *Think. Reason.*, 12, 235–55.

⁹¹ Byrne, Ruth M. J. (2016). “Counterfactual Thought”, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 67(1), 135–157. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249 (p. 137); citing Tetlock P. E. & Belkin, A. (Eds.). (1996). *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.

⁹² Byrne, Ruth M. J. (2016). “Counterfactual Thought”, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 67(1), 135–157. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249; citing Kahneman D. & Tversky, A. (1982). “The

towards a widely shared view about how the world operates. Another psychological study has come to the conclusion that “Counterfactual thinking, which juxtaposes reality against a hypothetical universe, is an essential feature of healthy cognitive and social functioning and also a ubiquitous part of life,”⁹³ and that certain mental disorders like Parkinson’s disease and schizophrenia diminish the ability to create counterfactuals. Psychological studies have also shown that counterfactual thinking helps to establish connections between different concepts and events.⁹⁴ Notably counterfactuals have been used to argue even for a theory of information where information is understood through counterfactual relations instead of probabilities.⁹⁵ So there is no need to go full Bayesian just to be able to use counterfactuals for the evaluation of events or scenarios.

The “evaluation of ‘philosophical’ counterfactuals” is not in any way radically different from more casual or “unphilosophical” counterfactuals. Timothy Williamson’s argument here is that the evaluation of counterfactuals does not usually need any specific piece of knowledge, but is based on “a more general sense of how things go, honed over a long experience.” However, Williamson points out that some counterfactual evaluations are “more sensitive than others” to a subject’s experiences.⁹⁶ This would imply that it is possible in the case of historical counterfactuals (and historical presentations in general) that historians with their professional experience of dealing with history would have an edge over laymen.

simulation heuristic”. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (Eds.), *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (pp. 201–208). New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.

⁹³ Kray, Laura J., George, Linda G., Liljenquist, Katie A., Galinsky, Adam D., Tetlock, Philip E. & Roese, Neal J. (2010). “From What Might Have Been to What Must Have Been: Counterfactual Thinking Creates Meaning”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98(1), 106–118. doi:10.1037/a0017905; citing Summerville, A. & Roese, N. J. (2008). “Dare to compare: Fact-based versus simulation-based comparison in daily life” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 44, 664–671.

⁹⁴ Kray, Laura J., George, Linda G., Liljenquist, Katie A., Galinsky, Adam D., Tetlock, Philip E. & Roese, Neal J. (2010). “From What Might Have Been to What Must Have Been: Counterfactual Thinking Creates Meaning”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98(1), 106–118. doi:10.1037/a0017905; citing McNamara, P., Durso, R., Brown, A. & Lynch, A. (2003). “Counterfactual cognitive deficit in patients with Parkinson’s disease” *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry*, 74, 1065–1070; Roese, N. J., Park, S., Smallman, R. & Gibson, C. (2008). “Schizophrenia involves impairment in the activation of intentions by counterfactual thinking” *Schizophrenia Research*, 103, 343–344.

⁹⁵ Cohen, Jonathan & Meskin, Aaron. (2006). “An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 84(3), 333–352 (p. 351). doi:10.1080/00048400600895821

⁹⁶ Williamson, Timothy (2005). “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105(1): 1–23 (p. 14). doi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x

However, the role of imagination in the evaluation of counterfactuals should not be underestimated⁹⁷. Williamson goes on to argue that:

When we work out what would have happened if such-and-such had been the case, we frequently cannot do it without imagining such-and-such to be the case and letting things run. Obviously, the use of the imagination in evaluating counterfactuals would generally be useless if it were not disciplined by background knowledge.⁹⁸

Once applied to historical worlds and counterfactuals, this means that the background knowledge possessed by historians makes it possible for them to make disciplined evaluations through their imagination. Unfortunately, this is not a credible enough system to warrant absolute trust. “Even when the imaginative exercise is disciplined by one’s background knowledge, one can easily misjudge the truth-value of the counterfactual, because one’s background knowledge is inevitably incomplete and often over-estimated.”⁹⁹ Williamson’s point is that from an epistemic point of view, the process of evaluating any kind of counterfactuals “is manifestly fallible and practically indispensable” and involves our cognitive capacities “that are widely used throughout our cognitive engagement with the spatio-temporal world” and thus is about as reliable in any setting as it is in our daily life.¹⁰⁰

Thus, the use of counterfactual heuristics for the evaluation of historical presentations is not a system that provides perfect outcomes, because the evaluation process itself is not without its challenges. However, this kind of matching of present world-states (between the implied and the actual) creates room for what Ankersmit has called “logical space,” where “historical thinking and historical discussions are possible.”¹⁰¹ Even though historians fill their historical worlds with detailed descriptions, those worlds are never complete “world stories.” Because of this incompleteness, the amount of implied content, and the temporal difference

⁹⁷ Allan Megill pointed out to me that the combination of imagination and counterfactuals can be observed already in the works of R.G. Collingwood, although not in any single text. For discussion of causes and early exploration of counterfactual thought, see Collingwood, R.G. (1940) *An Essay on Metaphysics*, Oxford (pp. 296–312); and for imagination Collingwood, R.G. (1946) *The Idea of History*, Oxford.

⁹⁸ Ibid. (p. 19)

⁹⁹ Ibid. (pp. 19-20)

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. (pp. 20-21)

¹⁰¹ Ankersmit, F. R. (2001). *Historical Representation* (p. 41). Stanford university Press. See also Tamm, M. & Zelenák, E. (2018). “In a Parallel World: An Introduction to Frank Ankersmit’s Philosophy of History” *Journal of the philosophy of history*, 12, 325–344.

between the described events and the present, there will always be room for historical discussion, and history can be considered to be about the actual world in a non-naïve way. This incompleteness of historical presentations is explored further in the next chapter. However, the analysis is done from quite a different viewpoint.

4 History in the Wild

In this chapter I move from the details of histories as worlds to how history is encountered in the actual present. Here, I rely heavily on research done in media studies and on the concept of transmedia. Neither media studies nor discussions of transmedia have focused much on history or historical presentations. Article IV makes a case for history being a large-scale transmedia presentation, and I discuss the topic a bit further here. In general, I believe that the discussion about the role that history holds in the heavily digitalised media environment we inhabit is just beginning. One indication of this is the title of the 2020 International Network for Theory of History's conference, *Media, Mediations and Mediators: (Re) Mediating History in the 21st Century*.¹⁰²

On a general level, the argument I present in this chapter is that the fragmented nature of modern media and the way these fragments are intuitively perceived as being interconnected both have an effect on how history is currently being engaged with. This argument is made to incorporate concepts and discussions from media studies to the analysis of history. Following this, I also argue that the evaluation of historical presentations in different media cannot be done on the same basis as for example academic history is evaluated. By using conceptual frameworks from Jay David Bolter's and Richard Grusin's seminal book *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (2000) and from the works of Henry Jenkins, for analysing how history is being engaged with, I move from a literary conception of history to a transmedia conception of history.¹⁰³

In the discussion below, I thus present a view where history is seen as something that is necessarily mediated. History is also seen as a commodity that is consumed by the general public as well as historians, much the same way that any other media is consumed. The conception of history as a product that is consumed by society makes it possible to do comparisons with other commodities that are valued in societies. However, it is often impossible to exactly pinpoint what the value of those commodities is. This viewpoint emphasises history as a part of the popular culture in which it has to compete with other presentations for its place.

¹⁰² CFP 4th INTH Network Conference. Retrieved June 13, 2019 from <https://www.inth.ugent.be/content/media-mediations-and-mediators-re-mediating-history-21st-century>

¹⁰³ In memory studies the interest in media and remediation has also risen during the 2010's. See for example Rigney, A. & Erll, A. (2009). *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory*; and Rigney, A. (2015). Cultural Memory Studies: Mediation, Narrative, and the Aesthetic. *Routledge International Handbook of Memory Studies* (pp. 65-76).

This levels the field in way that is not usually done with academic disciplines. When history is treated as a product, and as a part of a larger cultural phenomenon, it becomes a commodity like anything else. This makes it comparable to other consumer products like the different forms of leisure activities that are marketed to people. With the commodification of history, the value that history produces is no longer necessarily tied to the knowledge it provides but also to people's interest in consuming it. As history's source of value becomes comparable to e.g. films or novels or news about football, we can start to compare its ability to invoke the interest in people to the other possible sources and topics of interests they might have.

In 2005, Jerome de Groot argued that history has already been commodified regardless of historians' actions.¹⁰⁴ This much is in line with my argumentation that history is transmedially at large in the society, whether historians wish it or not. (Article IV makes this argument.) These two might even be fundamentally the same argument, just made from different viewpoints, as the main force behind both is that history is not just an academic discipline that aims to provide knowledge of the past. De Groot puts emphasis on the need for historians to understand how the public gains its "history sense" or "sense of history" or "general knowledge of history." This ephemeral "sense of history"¹⁰⁵ seems to be a kind generic sense about what can be right in history presentations. In other words, what can be considered to be known about history (sub-consciously) is not just "known truths," but also what is possible and what cannot be right. It is the gut feeling of "that can't be right" when coming across some information. De Groot suspects that popular culture is the source of this "general sense of history", and I think he is right. Specifically, this would be what in German and Scandinavian discussions goes by "history culture" (which was shortly discussed in Chapter 1), i.e. all the presentations (and remembering) that have at minimum something to do with the perceived past and are consumed by the public.

¹⁰⁴ de Groot, Jerome. (2009). *Consuming History: Historians and heritage in the contemporary popular culture* (p. 5). London and New York: Routledge; For a discussion about the branding of historical phenomena that offers another take on the commodification of history, see also Salvati, Andrew & Bullinger, Jonathan. (2013). "Selective Authenticity and the Playable Past." In Kapell, Matther & Elliot, Andrew (Eds.). *Playing with the Past* (pp. 153–167). New York: Bloomsbury; and Koski, Johannes. (2017). "Reflections of History: Representations of the Second World War in Valkyria Chronicles" *Rethinking History*, 21(3), 395–414. doi:10.1080/13642529.2016.1256625

¹⁰⁵ Tessa Morris-Suzuki has used "Our visions of history" to refer to this. (Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. (2005). *The Past Within Us: Media, Memory, History*. London and New York: Verso)

The discussion of “history culture” has been widely influenced by memory studies and exploration of historical and communal memories. My discussion relating to history culture comes from the point of view of consuming history presentations, rather than memory and identity studies. Thus, “history culture” here in this chapter is used as a specific term for a part of larger popular culture and popular media, and not as a venue for identity politics or a forum for communal memories, as is often done. My use of “popular culture” does not take a stance on the social status of the consumers’ of popular culture, even though popular culture is often associated with the so-called lower classes.¹⁰⁶ I follow Henry Jenkins’ argument that “[t]he skills needed to make sense of popular texts emerge through informal education practices as we spend time consuming media with friends and family.”¹⁰⁷ What follows from this is another point of Jenkins’ that if one does not have the skills to engage with popular media, they might struggle to make sense of it, much the same way that “a country bumpkin might who finds himself trying to make sense of modern dance.”¹⁰⁸ So even though one might be a professional historian, that does not mean that just because of that training (s)he is proficient in interpreting history culture. History culture is highly interconnected with the trends of larger popular culture and popular media. Thus the evaluation of presentations that are not strictly “history” but which have something to do with history, or historiography, or historiophoty,¹⁰⁹ etc., (or in other words the “realm of history”) is not just like the evaluation of the products of the academic discipline of history.

With the use of digital presentational forms like games and social media¹¹⁰ entering the discussions about the realm of history, it is becoming apparent that the

¹⁰⁶ Jenkins, Henry. (2007). *The Wow Climax: Tracing the Emotional Impact of Popular Culture* (p. 15). New York and London: New York University Press.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. (p. 16)

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ White, Hayden. (1988). “Historiography and Historiophoty” *The American Historical Review*, 93(5), 1193–1199.

¹¹⁰ For general works about games, see eg. Jenkins, Henry. (2007). *The Wow Climax: Tracing the Emotional Impact of Popular Culture* (p.22). New York and London: New York University Press; citing Wardrip-Fruin, Noah & Harrigan, Pat (Eds.). (2006). *First Person: New Media as Story, Performance, and Game*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; King, Lucian & Bain, Conrad (Eds.). (2002). *Game On*. London: Barbican; Game Studies (Online journal), <http://www.gamestudies.org/> For historical games specifically see Chapman, Adam. (2016). *Digital Games as History: How video games represent the past and offer access to historical practice*. New York: Routledge; Chapman, Adam, Foka, Anna & Westin, Jonathan. (2017). “Introduction: what is historical game studies?” *Rethinking History*, 21(3), 358–371. doi: 10.1080/13642529.2016.1256638; Salvati, Andrew & Bullinger, Jonathan. (2013). “Selective Authenticity and the Playable Past.” In Kapell, Matthew & Elliot, Andrew (Eds.). *Playing with the Past* (pp. 53–167). New York: Bloomsbury; Spring, Dawn. (2015). “Gaming history: computer

evaluation standards of these media need to be discussed. Luckily some theorisation is already taking place.¹¹¹ Here I revisit some of the topics of articles III and IV in order to expand from them towards a somewhat more detailed take on history's functioning across popular media, and how the realm of history is engaged with.

4.1 Varied Points of Engagement

In 2005, Tessa Morris-Suzuki argued in her book *The Past within Us* that:

Our visions of history are drawn from diverse sources: not just from the narratives of history books, but also from photographs and historical novels, from newsreel footage, comic books and increasingly, from electronic media like the Internet. Out of this kaleidoscopic mass of fragments we make and remake patterns of understanding which explain the origins and nature of the world in which we live. And doing this, we define and redefine the place that we occupy in this world. Often, in fact, it is the snippets of vision and sound – seconds of newsreel, stark caricatured faces – that continue to frame our picture of the past even when the details of the accompanying narratives have been forgotten.¹¹²

Morris-Suzuki is not alone in her views on history's relation to popular media. I cite her because she has managed to capture three themes I wish to engage with here, in the four quoted sentences. Those are 1) the diverse ways of engaging with the realm of history, 2) the fragmentary nature of the bits of history that are found in popular media, and 3) the influential role of these fragments. All three of these themes converge under the concept of transmedia.

The general idea of transmedia is that content is presented through multiple platforms. However, it does not end there. The concept of transmedia shifts the

and video games as historical scholarship." *Rethinking History*, 19(2), 207–221. doi:10.1080/13642529.2014.973714

¹¹¹ See e.g. Chapman, Adam. (2016). *Digital Games as History: How video games represent the past and offer access to historical practice*. New York: Routledge; Myers, Cayce & Hamilton, James F. (2015). "Open Genre, New Possibilities: Democratizing History via Social Media." *Rethinking History*, 19(2), 222–234. doi:10.1080/13642529.2014.973712; Lähteenmäki, Ilkka & Virta, Tatu. (2016). "The Finnish twitter war: The Winter War experienced through the social media project #sota39 and its implications for traditional historiography" *Rethinking History*, 20(3), 433–453. doi:10.1080/13642529.2016.1192259

¹¹² Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. (2005). *The Past Within Us: Media, Memory, History* (p. 2). London and New York: Verso.

viewpoint from analysing single presentations to the analysis of all presentations and how those presentations support each other. For Henry Jenkins, for example, this means that transmedia storytelling creates robust worlds that are capable of upholding multiple narratives across multiple media platforms.¹¹³ For the analysis of how history is engaged with, this shifts the viewpoint from different manifestations of history culture being just adaptations of academic history made to please the public, to them being equally important pieces for the engagement with the realm of history. This transmedia viewpoint stresses the idea that the presentations are interconnected across platforms, thus every presentation is seen as an “entry point” to content instead of treating each presentation as a separate complete piece. An informative metaphor of transmedia would be that of a network,¹¹⁴ where every node is a presentation linked to other presentations regardless of the platform used.

The range of information available through historical presentations and materials, which are within our reach through different media, is probably impossible for any single individual to internalise. On top of the sheer amount of different media employed, the presentations themselves vary widely from exhibitions of physical (and virtual) objects in museums, to written texts and films, to games (card, table top, digital) and social media spectacles. Even the media literacy required for the evaluation of all different kinds of presentations is not a trivial thing to achieve—mastery of all of them might require a lifetime. Analysing what kind of metanarratives are present in a historical museum’s exhibition is, as a process, pretty far from the process of evaluating how a first-person shooter game constructs and visualises Second World War combat environments through limited player movements.

If a historian goes on to seriously attempt to present history by making for example a film, it quickly becomes apparent how different the requirements of the film medium are when compared to the requirements of traditional narrative history texts.¹¹⁵ In his autobiographical take on historians’ work, Robert A. Rosenstone gave his first-hand description of dealing with the film-form’s requirements:

¹¹³ Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture*. New York University Press.

¹¹⁴ See Colin Harvey’s discussion of transmedia networks in Harvey, Colin B. (2015). *Fantastic Transmedia: Narrative, Play and Memory Across Science Fiction and Fantasy Storyworlds*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹¹⁵ See for example Davis, N. Z. (2000). *Slaves on Screen: Film and historical vision*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; and Rosenstone, R. A. (2006). *History on film/film on history: Concepts, theories and practice*. Harlow: Pearson Longman.

Okay. I take the hint and for the first time—at least knowingly—do what history filmmakers always have to do: I invent a fact by deciding that precisely eighty-seven people attended the founding convention of the CLP. Some months later, eighty-seven extras are shepherded onto a set.¹¹⁶

In the case of film, the challenge rises from the requirement for information to be visually present in scenes, while in a text, fewer details are usually required for the text to work. The differences in the requirements of varied media for the making of presentations becomes even more apparent if we compare two medias that do not resemble each other as much as film and written text¹¹⁷ do. Like for example, if we compare mixed reality games and encyclopaedias. One is built on augmented visual presentation, while the other is a list of topics; however, both of these can be used for (and are being used for) engaging with history.

The availability of history through multiple media does not bring only challenges to historical presentation, but also strengthens the presentations and creates robustness to history. The transmedia viewpoint of history emphasises the width and complexity that is available for consumers through different historical presentations in different media. In transmedia analysis, all presentations are considered to be incomplete. While some might be more central to the transmedia network of presentations, even those are not complete in a holistic sense. All nodes are seen as pointing towards more nodes where some additional information is available. The drawback is that this requires the audience to be active in its engagement with the transmedia content, it is not enough to just sit back and watch the show.¹¹⁸ For transmedia to work, each presentation needs to make sense on its own while simultaneously pointing towards more presentations.

Transmedia operates more akin to a scavenger hunt than a traditional novel or film. The interest towards the presented content is generated from finding things out rather than finding closure or completion. This is why for example Henry

¹¹⁶ Rosenstone, Robert A. (2016). *Adventures of a Postmodern Historian: Living and Writing the Past* (p. 157). Bloomsbury.

¹¹⁷ Experimental history text have questioned our intuitions of how we should write history (see e.g. Braudel, Fernand (1976) *The Mediterranean and The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*; and Kellner, Hans. (1979) “Disorderly Conduct: Braudel’s Mediterranean Satire” *History and Theory*, 18(2), (pp. 197-222), but the presentational requirements are more easily observable by doing comparison between different media than in experiments done within a single medium.

¹¹⁸ For a case study of the Matrix franchise that was very ambitious in its transmedia world-building, but ended up being too complex and alienated large parts of its audience, see Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture* (pp. 93-131). New York University Press.

Jenkins has argued that “storytelling has become the art of world building.”¹¹⁹ His argument is that the popular media and the internet have generated a change to how we engage with stories. While he uses an example from Hollywood to highlight this change, I believe it is not limited to the film industry but affects other fields (like narrative history) as well:

As an experienced screenwriter told me, ‘When I first started, you would pitch a story because without a good story, you didn’t really have a film. Later, once sequels started to take off, you pitched a character because a good character would support multiple stories. And now, you pitch a world because a world can support multiple characters and multiple stories across multiple media.’¹²⁰

Because of the fragmentary nature of our media environment, where we have become used to searching for more information—and services like Google have made this so very easy—about everything that interests us, the way we engage with stories (fictional or historical) has also changed.

We are no longer expecting a complete analysis or closure from a single presentation and we are willing to engage with multiple presentations in our search for more information.¹²¹ For example, I recently watched HBO’s miniseries “Chernobyl,” which offers a very visual and touching presentation of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and its aftermath. It was labelled as a drama, so I did not expect it to be completely factual, but I considered it to be within the “realm of history” (in other words: contributing to our history culture). Having watched the series, I read through several Wikipedia entries ranging from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster to different types of nuclear reactors and how the cooling system of a reactor can be built in several different ways. After this superficial reading of the topic, I had several discussions about people’s memories of news reports at the time of the disaster. Then I went back to the Internet and looked at forum discussions about the event, went to the university library’s web page and searched for a history book about the disaster. Consider the media I used for this engagement: I went from a television series to a book by going through an online encyclopaedia, real-life face-to-face and internet-mediated discussions, and different websites. History is transmedial and there is nothing special about that, because all other information is also spread across media.

¹¹⁹ Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture* (p. 114). New York University Press.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ For a more detailed discussion of how this works in fictional universes like Star Wars, see Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture*. New York University Press.

4.2 Making Sense of the Fragments

The intuition is usually that, historical presentations in popular media are sort of at the end of a one-way street where written pieces of historical research (which for some reason are not treated as media) get popularised. However, through the conceptual tool of remediation,¹²² this intuition can be challenged. In remediation, the idea is that new media re-uses some of the functions of older media and incorporates those into its own presentations. While doing this, it transforms the older media, which in turn discards some of its features and picks up new ones from the newer media. Bolter & Grusin's discussion of remediation depicts media as interconnected, but competitive.

A medium in our culture can never operate in isolation, because it must enter into relationships of respect and rivalry with other media. [...] [W]e cannot even recognize the representational power of a medium except with reference to other media. If someone were to invent a new device for visual representation, its inventors, users, and economic backers would inevitably try to position this device over against film, television, and other various forms of digital graphics. They would inevitably claim that it was better in some way at achieving the real or the authentic, and their claim would involve a redefinition of the real or authentic that favors the new device. Until they had done this, it would not be apparent that the device was a medium at all¹²³

De Groot's view that popular history borrows liberally from history's discursive practices and produces different kinds of hybrids¹²⁴ appears to be making a similar claim but without the conceptual framework of remediation. Historical material is widely available in popular media and actual historical research is usually only indirectly responsible for the content. However, if both historical research and popular presentations of history are seen as media and analysed within the frameworks of remediation and transmedia, the popular presentations should also affect the way historical research is done.

If conceived as media, then popular history (and the whole larger history culture) can be seen as having taken parts of traditional history presentational

¹²² Bolter, Jay David & Grusin, Richard. (2000). *Remediation: Understanding New Media*. MIT Press.

¹²³ Bolter, Jay David and Grusin, Richard. (2000). *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (p. 65). MIT Press.

¹²⁴ de Groot, Jerome. (2009). *Consuming History: Historians and heritage in the contemporary popular culture* (p. 1). London and New York: Routledge

practices and employing them in its own ways to provide what de Groot has called hybrids. However, according to Bolter & Grusin's remediation, this should also have affected traditional history. As a disciplined practice, history has been quite resistant to changes in its presentational practices, but it has not been completely immune. Slowly, photos and illustrations have crept into history books, and historians have been involved in productions of films, documentaries, and tv-series (Natalie Zemon Davies and *The Return of Martin Guerre* in 1982, Robert Rosenstone and *Reds* in 1981, and Simon Schama with several television documentary series in the 2010s, to name a few). During the last few years, the proliferation of presentational practices has been tremendous as e.g. virtual reality (and mixed reality) projects are popping up in museums.¹²⁵

This is in line with Bolter & Grusin's view that for a medium¹²⁶ to be recognised as a medium at all, it needs to make a case for its ability to perform some aspects of "the real" better than previous mediums. A relatively large theoretical discussion¹²⁷ about historical film began in the 1980s and continued at least to the late 2000s. And in the 2010s, discussions about different digital media's capabilities for historical presentation have gained traction.¹²⁸ Both of these

¹²⁵ For the usefulness of mixed reality presentations in museums and historical sites, see for example Lauri Viinikkala's Dissertation *Digitaalisia valheita vai historiallista tietoa? : aineellisen todellisuuden, kerronnan ja historiallisen tiedon suhde yhdistetyn todellisuuden teknologiaa hyödyntävissä menneisyyden esityksissä* (2019. University of Turku, Finnish History).

¹²⁶ "Medium" is used by Bolter and Grusin as singular form of "Media." However, "Media" can often be seen as used for both plural and singular cases.

¹²⁷ See White, Hayden. (1988). "Historiography and Historiophoty." *The American Historical Review*, 93(5), 1193–1199; White, Hayden. (1996). "The modernist event." In Sobchack, V (Ed.). *The persistence of history: Cinema, television and the modernist event* (pp. 17–38). London: Routledge; Burgoyne, R. (1997). *Film nation: Hollywood looks at U.S. history*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Rosenstone, Robert A. (1995). *Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to Our Idea of History*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; Davis, N. Z. (2000). *Slaves on Screen: Film and historical vision*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Rosenstone, R. A. (2006). *History on film/film on history: Concepts, theories and practice*. Harlow: Pearson Longman; Hughes-Warrington, M. (2007). *History goes to the movies: Studying history on film*. London: Routledge; Burgoyne, R. (2008). *The Hollywood Historical film*. Oxford: Blackwell.

¹²⁸ See e.g. Chapman, Adam. (2013). "Is Sid Meier's Civilization History?" *Rethinking History*, 17(3), 312–332. doi:10.1080/13642529.2013.774719; Chapman, Adam. (2016). *Digital Games as History: How video games represent the past and offer access to historical practice*. New York: Routledge; Koski, Johannes. (2017). "Reflections of History: Representations of the Second World War in Valkyria Chronicles." *Rethinking History*, 21(3), 395–414. doi:10.1080/13642529.2016.1256625; Salvati, Andrew & Bullinger, Jonathan. (2013). "Selective Authenticity and the Playable Past." In Kapell, Matthew & Elliot, Andrew (Eds.). *Playing with the Past* (pp. 53–167). New York: Bloomsbury; Spring, Dawn. (2015). "Gaming history: computer and video games as historical scholarship." *Rethinking History*, 19(2), 207–221, doi:10.1080/13642529.2014.973714; Wright, Esther. (2018). "On the

discussions seem to support Bolter & Grusin's argument that a medium needs to be contrasted with other media and make a case for itself before it is recognised.

The acceptance of different media for historical presentation seems to usually begin outside of historical research itself. Several new media¹²⁹ that have been used usually first found their place as “teaching tools.”¹³⁰ So new media have sort of been smuggled into the discussions of historical (re)presentation from the side. The adaptation of historical content to different media has not been without its challenges, and so far most of the discussions have focused on questioning which media is suited or acceptable for historical presentation. My viewpoint differs slightly because I consider history to already be presented across media. So the question is not about what the suitable media for history are, but rather how to make sense of what is already going on.

Our current history culture is past the competitive phase of trying to establish new media where old ones used to rule. This is because history is already available through a myriad of means. To make sense of history in a multimedia (or transmedia, as I have argued) environment, and how it is engaged with, I will employ another concept championed by Henry Jenkins—participatory culture. Jenkins draws a distinction between participatory culture and participatory media. So while Bolter & Grusin discuss how media functions and what is needed for it to function the way it does, discussions about participatory culture focus on how people participate in things, through media. Jenkins has argued that even though participatory culture has become more visible in the digital era, it has been on-going at least since the late 1800s amateur press associations. It is simply that different media have been taken up as they have become available from printing presses to camcorders to the multitude of digital media available today.¹³¹

promotional context of historical video games.” *Rethinking History*, 22(4), 598–608. doi:10.1080/13642529.2018.1507910

¹²⁹ Pictures in textbooks, historical films shown in classes, social media projects like the #sota39 project that I explored with Tatu Virta in “the Finnish Twitter War” (article III).

¹³⁰ Rosenstone, Robert A. (2016). *Adventures of a Postmodern Historian: Living and Writing the Past* (p. 155). Bloomsbury; For an argument for gaining better understanding of multimedia practices to produce better history textbooks, see also Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. *The Past Within Us: Media, Memory, History* (p. 21). London and New York: Verso.

¹³¹ Jenkins, Henry. TEDxNYED 06.03.2010. Retrieved June 23, 2019 from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFCLKa0XRlw>; Jenkins, Henry, Ford, Sam, & Green, Joshua. (2013). *Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture*. New York University Press; Jenkins, Henry et al. (2009). *Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media education for the 21st Century*. *The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Reports on Digital Media and Learning*. MIT press; Jenkins, Henry et al. (2016). *By Any Media Necessary: The new youth activism*. New York University Press.

To give a general take on participatory culture: some of its key features include relatively low barriers for engagement, strong support for sharing creations with others, informal mentorships, and the belief that people's contributions matter.¹³² For the creation of media, participatory culture breaks the traditional author/creator vs. consumer dichotomy. Instead, the production of media is seen as a continuous process where one person creates something, puts it out there for others, who in turn improve it and share it again. Thus the media is being consumed, improved, and remediated constantly by multiple people. There is a comparison to be made here to academia with its conferences, research papers, peer reviews, and publications, but that is not why I wish to discuss participatory culture and what it has to do with history.

My reason is that participatory culture is no longer limited to engagements with popular culture and popular media, but it has—much like Bolter & Grusin argued about remediation and old media—begun to influence the way other aspects of our society are engaged with. Jenkins has analysed how popular culture has seeped into political activism and campaigns¹³³ and changed how especially younger generations engage in political activism¹³⁴. “The realm of politics” is being engaged with in the same way that popular culture and popular media are engaged with. I believe that the same thing is starting to happen with history. People are beginning to engage with the realm of history in ways that we are used to seeing only in discussions of popular culture.

Social media is probably the most intuitive platform for participatory engagements with history. It has spawned, for example, the project #sota39, which Tatu Virta and I explored in “The Finnish Twitter War” (article III). The project's success rested heavily on audience participation and it is a very good example of how engagement with popular media (in this case the social media platform Twitter)

¹³² For an executive summary of participatory culture and required skills, see Jenkins, Henry et al. (2009). *Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media education for the 21st Century*. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Reports on Digital Media and Learning, pp. XI-XV. MIT Press.

¹³³ Like the comic book superhero depictions of the US presidential campaigns of 2008 that led to Obama playing along with the Superman analogy and people campaigning for candidates by producing their own Youtube videos.

¹³⁴ Jenkins, Henry et al. (2016). *By Any Media Necessary: The new youth activism*. New York University Press.

is used to engage with history. It of course has not been the only such project. There have been several Twitter projects that do “historical events in real time.”¹³⁵

Another example of participation-based manifestations of social media history engagements is the website [www.reddit.com](http://www.reddit.com/r/askhistorians)'s /r/askhistorians subreddit,¹³⁶ which operates with a question and answer-based system where a question is asked and those who have some answers (and can provide sources for those answers) offer them. Partially because /r/askhistorians is also a form of public engagement, it is beginning to resemble what Pierre Lévy has called “collective intelligence” where “No one knows everything, everyone knows something, all knowledge resides in humanity.”¹³⁷ The general idea for Lévy is that virtual communities can use the combined expertise of its members to do more than any single individual could.¹³⁸ Lévy's central point is that there is a distinction between shared knowledge (thought to be true by all members of a group) and collective intelligence, which is all the information possessed by the group's members, which “can be accessed in response to a specific question.”¹³⁹ So most of the community is on call for specific questions because nobody can know everything.¹⁴⁰

These kind of communities rely heavily on participation, and are held together by “the social process of acquiring knowledge—which is dynamic and participatory, continually testing and reaffirming the group's social ties.”¹⁴¹ With a low barrier for asking questions, a forum like /r/askhistorians is a great entry point for engaging with history, as it directs the questioner towards further information. This once again brings forth the fragmentary nature of the modern media environment. Even though an answer to a question about history is given, simultaneously, references

¹³⁵ See Lähtenmäki, Ilkka & Virta, Tatu. (2016). “The Finnish Twitter war: the Winter War experienced through the #sota39 project and its implications for historiography”, *Rethinking History*, 20(3), 433–453 (pp. 437–438). doi:10.1080/13642529.2016.1192259

¹³⁶ <https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/>; see also Bergen, Sadie. (February 1, 2016). “Have a Question about the Past? AskHistorians” *Perspectives on history*. Retrieved from <https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/february-2016/have-a-question-about-the-past-askhistorians> for general take on the functioning of the /r/askhistorians

¹³⁷ Lévy, Pierre. (1997). *Collective Intelligence: Mankind's Emerging World in Cyberspace* (pp. 13-14). Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books.

¹³⁸ Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture* (pp. 26–27). New York University Press; Quoting Lévy, Pierre. (1997). *Collective Intelligence: Mankind's Emerging World in Cyberspace* (p. 20). Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books.

¹³⁹ Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture* (p. 27). New York University Press.

¹⁴⁰ For a comparison to Peter Walsh's “expert paradigm,” which highlights the difference between collective intelligence and the traditional idea of experts, see Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture* (pp. 51-54). New York University.

¹⁴¹ Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture* (p. 54). New York University Press.

to more information are provided. The perception of complete information is dismissed as nobody knows everything, but everybody knows something.

In this chapter, I have painted a picture of the media environment where history is encountered today. I have done this to argue that the way we engage with different media encourages us to look for connections between historical presentations both academic and popular. This happens because of the fragmentary nature of historical presentations and how they are encountered. So even though history is available in small fragments, we (the consumers of history) intuitively connect these presentations together in our search for more information. This perceived interconnectedness of presentations creates a perception of a larger body of knowledge, of which these presentations are but glimpses; much like fictional (or historical) worlds are perceived to exist in the background of stories. Both the fragmentary nature of transmedia and the participatory culture from which collective intelligence emerges promote the viewpoint that there is no closure, but a whole world of information to explore. My point is that while most of these presentational and discursive practices relating to engagements with the realm of history are prevalent outside of academia, their influence is seeping in and even the academic view of proper history might change in the future.

5 Conclusions but no Closure

The discussion I have presented converges under the concept of worlds. In Chapter 3, there is the discussion of historical worlds and how they can be considered an informative and useful schema for analysing how historical presentations operate. Then there is the discussion of in what kind of environment history is being engaged with and how popular engagements with the realm of history are becoming more influential. On the surface these two appear to be distinct issues, but both of them point towards the same intuition: there is something lurking behind presentations themselves. Modern media attempts to build presentations where the perception of content being mediated at all is lost. I have consistently discussed historical presentation instead of representation to highlight the function “to present”, or “bringing something forth to be seen” to combat the illusion of non-mediated content. History is presented through different media and there are no bypasses to the “real.” History is not something in the place of another, but a product of an act of presentation.¹⁴² Without that act there would be no history.

The way we scavenge of information from the fragmented media environment has made us so used to “connecting the dots” that we intuitively perceive different historical presentations as interconnected. However, history is not the exception here, it is just engaged in the same way that all other information is. All presentations are considered to be fragments or glimpses of a larger whole where there is always something the presentation did not have room for. There is just always something more to find out from the other presentations. This same intuition, as in the case of in popular fiction, has made the idea of worlds behind the presentations surface once again.¹⁴³ The concept of a story-world (or a fictional world) is not a theoretical tool used in academia anymore but a concrete part of popular culture. This has led fans of popular franchises to arguments about what is true, e.g. in the Marvel Universe, and how the internal logic of that universe operates, much like how historians argue about history. My point is that because of the connection between history culture and popular culture, the “world-talk” will probably also enter into the discussions of history in the future (if it is not already there). However, because of the similarities between history and fiction, which have been quite extensively discussed ever since Hayden White’s seminal book

¹⁴² For another view on how the process of history-making operates, see also Kalela, Jorma. (2011). *Making History: The Historian and Uses of the Past*. Palgrave Macmillan Education.

¹⁴³ Think about the Marvel Universe, or Middle-Earth, or the Star Wars Universe. See also article IV.

Metahistory (1973),¹⁴⁴ it is not that difficult to apply the conception of “worlds” (be that literary, fictional, or possible) and accompanying discussions to the analyses of historical presentations.

In Chapter 3, I made a case for evaluating historical worlds with the help of counterfactual heuristics. The general idea is to compare the world-states with the actual world’s present and the historical worlds’ implied present moments to see if the evaluated historical presentation offers a glimpse of a world that can lead to a similar present moment as the actual world has. Following Timothy Williamson’s argument that philosophical counterfactuals are not different from everyday counterfactuals, a case can be made for discussions about what is true in e.g. a specific fictional world is evaluated in the same manner as historical worlds are. This institutes counterfactuality heuristics as an integral part of history discussions—a point that has been made by most historians who have discussed counterfactuals in historiography.

The conception of historical worlds I presented stressed their temporal completeness, but in Chapter 4, I discuss the fragmentary nature of the historical information that people engage with. These two views are not incompatible with each other. The connection is the intuitive use of other presentations to fill the void left by any presentation in our quest for knowing more. I have argued in Chapter 4 and in article I¹⁴⁵ that literary worlds cannot be complete in the sense that logic-based stipulations of possible worlds can be. This means that even though presentations are perceived to be temporally complete, we intuitively fill the blanks with information available from other presentations for the world to make more sense. This connects the theoretical discussion of historical worlds to the modern media. Fragmented digital media, where we scavenge for information from varied sources through a myriad of media, enforces the intuition to connect presentations to each other, and this plays into our intuition of having some kind of unified history even though all we have is a huge amount of small glimpses.

I have offered some perspectives on the challenges that interconnectedness poses for historical presentations here. With the digital tools that are available, some kind of mapping of history as a transmedia network could (and probably should), for example, be done to explore how far reaching it is. For me, thinking with worlds has always been intuitive—I might have imported that view from my

¹⁴⁴ White, Hayden. (1973). *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

¹⁴⁵ And people like Thomas Pavel have argued before me.

early-life engagements with popular culture to history by stopping by in the philosophical discussion of possible worlds on the way—but other analytical schemas like the network theory could also be applied. I have also left any analysis of specific kinds of engagements with history out of my study, largely because of the bird’s eye view of transmedia, but also for my ambitious attempt to offer a framework for thought rather than by a case by case analysis. Nevertheless, the mechanics of different kinds of engagements from reading and writing, to looking and searching, to playing and gaming should be looked at more closely. Some research of this kind has already been done. This is so especially relating to narrative aspects of history presentations, while non-written presentations have received less interest so far. However, interest is growing. With the digital revolution and the rise of virtual immersive environments, the discussion of producing historical experiences or the possibility of “experiencing the historical (not the past) world” needs to be looked at again from a variety of points of view, in which the incorporation of the findings from media studies should be useful.

This short paragraph ends the main body of the dissertation. Because of that it needs to say something relevant and memorable. However, as this work is also but a fragment it cannot offer real closure and it needs to point to further information to link itself to other fragments. So... History is media! There are whole worlds of it available elsewhere. Go look at them.

Bibliography

- Adams, Robert Merrihew. (1974). "Theories of Actuality", *Noûs*, 8, 211–231. doi:10.2307/2214751
- Adams, Robert Merrihew. (1981). "Actualism and Thisness" *Synthese*, 49, 3–41.
- Ahonen, Sirkka. (1998). *Historiaton sukupolvi? Historian vastaanotto ja historiallisen identiteetin rakentuminen 1990-luvun nuorison keskuudessa*. Suomen Historiallinen Seura.
- Ahonen, Sirkka. (2001). "Historiaa koulun ulkopuolella – Yhteisön historiakulttuuri ja historianopetus". In Aromaa, Vuokko, Kangas, Jussi-Pekka, Lehtonen, Juha-Pekka & Liuskari, Markku (Eds.). *Pedagogiikka* (pp. 105–116). Helsinki: Historian ja yhteiskuntaopin opettajien liitto HYOL ry.
- Ahonen, Sirkka. (2012). *Coming to Terms With a Dark Past: How Post-conflict Societies Deal With History*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Alfaro, María Jesús Martínez. (1996). "Intertextuality: Origins and development of the concept", *Atlantis*, 18(1/2), 268–285.
- Ankersmit, Frank. (1981). *Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historians's Language*. Groningen: Krips repro meppel.
- Ankersmit, Frank. (2001). *Historical Representation*. Stanford: Stanford University press.
- Ankersmit, Frank. (2005). *Sublime Historical Experience*. Stanford: Stanford University press.
- Ankersmit, Frank. (2007). "Reply to professor Saari" *Rethinking History*, 9(1), 23–33.
- Ankersmit, Frank & Tamn, Marek. (2016). "Leibnizian Philosophy of History: A Conversation" *Rethinking History*, 20(4), 491–511.
- Bergen, Sadie. (2016). "Have a Question about the Past? AskHistorians" *Perspectives on history*. Retrieved July 2, 2019 from <https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/february-2016/have-a-question-about-the-past-askhistorians>
- Bolter, Jay David & Grusin, Richard. (2000). *Remediation: Understanding New Media*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Braudel, Fernand. (1976). *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II: Vol. 1-2*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Briggs, Rachael. (2012). "Interventionist Counterfactuals", *Philosophical Studies*, 160(1), 139–166. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9908-5
- Burgoyne, R. (1997). *Film nation: Hollywood looks at U.S. history*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Burgoyne, Robert. (2008). *The Hollywood Historical film*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Byrne, Ruth M. J. (2016) "Counterfactual Thought", *Annual Review of Psychology*, 67(1), 135–157. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249
- Carr, Edvard Hallet. (1961). *What is History?* University of Cambridge and Penguin Books.
- Chapman, Adam. (2013). "Is Sid Meier's Civilization History?" *Rethinking History*, 17(3), 312–332. doi:10.1080/13642529.2013.774719

- Chapman, Adam. (2016). *Digital Games As History: How Videogames Represent the Past and Offer Access to Historical Practice*. Routledge.
- Chapman, Adam, Foka, Anna & Westin, Jonathan. (2017). "Introduction: what is historical game studies?" *Rethinking History*, 21(3), 358–371. doi:10.1080/13642529.2016.1256638
- Cohen, Jonathan & Meskin, Aaron. (2006). "An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 84(3), 333–352. doi:10.1080/00048400600895821
- Cohn, Dorrit. (1998). *The Distinction of Fiction*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Collingwood, Robin George. (1940). *An Essay in Metaphysics*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Collingwood, Robin George. (1946). *The idea of history*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Danto, Arthur. (1962). "Narrative Sentences" *History and Theory*, 2(2), 146–179.
- Danto, Arthur. (1985). *Narration and Knowledge*. Columbia University Press.
- Davis, Natalie Zemon. (2000). *Slaves on Screen: Film and historical vision*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- de Groot, Jerome. (2009). *Consuming History: Historians and heritage in the contemporary popular culture*. London and New York: Routledge.
- De Mey, Tim & Weber, Erik. (2003). "Explanation and Thought Experiments in History," *History and Theory*, 42(1), 28–38.
- Doležel, Lubomír. (1998). *Heterocosmica: fiction and possible worlds*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Doležel, Lubomír. (2010). *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The Postmodern Stage*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Evans, Richard. (2014). *Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History*. London: Little, Brown.
- Fine, Kit. (1975). "Review of Lewis' Counterfactuals", *Mind*, 84, 451–458. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXXIV.1.451
- Fine, Kit. (2012). "A Difficulty for the Possible Worlds Analysis of Counterfactuals", *Synthese*, 189(1), 29–57. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0094-y
- Game Studies, The international journal of computer game research*. <http://www.gamestudies.org/>
- Gettier, Edmund L. (1963). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", *Analysis*, 23(6), 121–123. doi:10.2307/3326922
- Harvey, Colin B. (2015). *Fantastic Transmedia: Narrative, Play and Memory Across Science Fiction and Fantasy Storyworlds*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Häyhä, Heikki, Jantunen, Sari & Paaskoski, Leena. (2018). Analysing Significance. *Publications of Finnish Museums Association*, 75 (available through https://icomfinland.fi/icom-finland_en).
- Hughes-Warrington, Marnie. (2007). *History goes to the movies: Studying history on film*. London: Routledge.

- International Network for Theory of History. (2019). *CFP 4th INTH Network Conference*. Retrieved June 13, 2019 from <https://www.inth.ugent.be/content/media-mediations-and-mediators-re-mediating-history-21st-century>
- Ippolito, Michela. (2016). "How similar is similar enough?" *Semantics & Pragmatics*, 9, 1–60. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.9.6>
- Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture*. New York and London: New York University Press.
- Jenkins, Henry. (2007). *The Wow Climax: Tracing the Emotional Impact of Popular Culture*. New York and London: New York University Press.
- Jenkins, Henry. (2010). TEDxNYED 06.03.2010. Retrieved June 23, 2019 from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFCLKa0XRlw>
- Jenkins, Henry, Ford, Sam, & Green Joshua. (2013). *Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture*. New York and London: New York University Press.
- Jenkins, Henry, Purushotma, Ravi, Weigel, Margaret, Clinton, Katie, & Robison, Alice J. (2009). *Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media education for the 21st Century*. *The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Reports on Digital Media and Learning*. Cambridge MA: MIT press.
- Jenkins, Henry, Shresthova, Sangita, Gamber-Thompson, Liana, Kligler-Vilenchik, Neta & Zimmerman, Arely M. (2016). *By Any Media Necessary: The new youth activism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Jenkins Keith. (1999). *Why History? Ethics and History*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1982). "The simulation heuristic". In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (Eds.). *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (pp. 201–8). New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Kalela, Jorma. (2011). *Making History: The Historian and Uses of the Past*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Education.
- Kellner, Hans. (1979) "Disorderly Conduct: Braudel's Mediterranean Satire" *History and Theory*, 18(2) 197-222
- King, Lucian & Bain, Conrad (Eds.). *Game On*. London: Barbican.
- Kment, Boris. (2006). "Counterfactuals and Explanation", *Mind*, 115(458), 261–310. doi:10.1093/mind/fzl261
- Koski, Johannes. (2017). "Reflections of History: Representations of the Second World War in Valkyria Chronicles." *Rethinking History*, 21(3), 395–414. doi:10.1080/13642529.2016.1256625
- Kray, Laura J., George, Linda G., Liljenquist, Katie A., Galinsky, Adam D., Tetlock, Philip E. & Roese, Neal J. (2010). "From What Might Have Been to What Must Have Been: Counterfactual Thinking Creates Meaning", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98(1), 106–118. doi:10.1037/a0017905
- Kripke, Saul. (1963). "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic" *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, 16, 83–94.
- Kripke, Saul. (1980[1972]). *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

- Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. (2016). *Postnarrativist philosophy of history*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Lähtenmäki, Ilkka. (2016). "Kontrafaktuaalinen historia – mahdollisuus, ilmiö, harhaoppi?" In Väyrynen, Kari. & Pulkkinen, Jarmo (Eds.). *Historian teoria*. Vastapaino. (Article II)
- Lähtenmäki, Ilkka & Virta, Tatu. (2016). "The Finnish twitter war: The Winter War experienced through the social media project #sota39 and its implications for traditional historiography" *Rethinking History*, 20(3), 433–453. doi:10.1080/13642529.2016.1192259. (Article III)
- Lähtenmäki, Ilkka. (2018). "Possible Worlds of History" *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 12, 164–182. (Article I)
- Lähtenmäki, Ilkka. (unpub) "Transmedia History", manuscript. (Article IV)
- Lebow, Richard Ned. (2010). *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lévy, Pierre. (1997). *Collective Intelligence: Mankind's Emerging World in Cyberspace*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.
- Lewis, David. (1973). *Counterfactuals*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lewis, David. (1978). "Truth in Fiction," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 15(1), 37–46.
- Lewis, David. (1986). *On The Plurality of Worlds*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- McEleney, A. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2006). "Spontaneous causal and counterfactual thoughts". *Think. Reason.*, 12, 235–255.
- McNamara, P., Durso, R., Brown, A. & Lynch, A. (2003). "Counterfactual cognitive deficit in patients with Parkinson's disease." *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry*, 74, 1065–1070.
- Megill, Allan (2007). *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A contemporary guide to practice*. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press
- Megill, Allan (2017). "History's Root in Attachment and Difference." Keynote presentation at *Role of the Philosophy of History* conference at the University of Oulu. Retrived June 16.2019 from; <https://www oulu.fi/centreforphilosophyofhistory/node/4872>.
- Megill, Allan (2019) "History's unresolving tensions: reality and implications" *Rethinking History*, 23(3) 279–303. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2019.1625544>
- Menzel, Christopher. (2018). "Actualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/actualism/>>
- Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. (2005). *The Past Within Us: Media, Memory, History*. London, New York: Verso.
- Munslow, Alun. (1997). *Deconstructing History*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Munslow, Alun. (2007). *Narrative and History*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Myers, Cayce & Hamilton, James F. (2015). "Open Genre, New Possibilities: Democratizing History via Social Media." *Rethinking History*, 19(2), 222–234. doi:10.1080/13642529.2014.973712
- Pavel, Thomas. (1986). *Fictional Worlds*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Pihlainen, Kalle. (2015). "Realist histories? When form clashes with function" *Rethinking History*, 19(2), 177–192.
- Pihlainen, Kalle. (2017). *The Work of History: Constructivism and a Politics of the Past*. New York: Routledge.
- Reddit.com/r/askhistorians/ -forum, <https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/>
- Rigney, A. (2015). Cultural Memory Studies: Mediation, Narrative, and the Aesthetic. *Routledge International Handbook of Memory Studies* (pp. 65-76). London: Routledge.
- Rigney, A. & Erll, A. (2009). *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory*. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.
- Roese, N. J., Park, S., Smallman, R. & Gibson, C. (2008). "Schizophrenia involves impairment in the activation of intentions by counterfactual thinking". *Schizophrenia Research*, 103, 343–344.
- Ronen, Ruth. (1994). *Possible Worlds in Literary Theory*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rosenfeld, Gavriel. (2002). "Why Do We Ask "What If?" Reflections on the Function of Alternate History." *History and Theory*, 41(4), 90–103.
- Rosenstone, Robert A. (1995). *Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to Our Idea of History*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rosenstone, Robert. A. (2006). *History on film/film on history: Concepts, theories and practice*. Harlow: Pearson Longman.
- Rosenstone, Robert A. (2016). *Adventures of a Postmodern Historian: Living and Writing the Past*. Bloomsbury.
- Rüsen, Jörn. (1994). "Was ist Geschichtskultur?" In Füßmann, Klaus (Ed.) *Historische Faszination. Geschichtskultur heute*. Böhlau, Köln 1994, (pp. 3–26)
- Ryan, Marie-Laure. (1991). *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory*. Indiana University Press.
- Salvati, Andrew & Bullinger, Jonathan. (2013). "Selective Authenticity and the Playable Past." In Kapell, Matthew & Elliot, Andrew (Eds.). *Playing with the Past*, 53–167. New York: Bloomsbury.
- Samuel, Raphael. (1994). *Theatres of Memory*. London: Verso.
- Sarviaho, Samu. (2018). *Ikuinen Rauha – Vuoden 1323 pähkinäsaaren rauha suomalaisessa historian tutkimuksessa ja historiakulttuurissa 1800- ja 1900-luvuilla*. *Acta Universitatis Ouluensis B Humaniora*, 152. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oulu, History of Science and Ideas.
- Spring, Dawn. (2015). "Gaming history: computer and video games as historical scholarship." *Rethinking History*, 19(2), 207–221. doi:10.1080/13642529.2014.973714
- Summerville, A. & Roese, N. J. (2008). "Dare to compare: Fact-based versus simulation-based comparison in daily life." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 44, 664–671.
- Snider, Todd & Bjorndahl, Adam. (2015). "Informative Counterfactuals", *Semantics and Linguistic Theory*, 25, 1–17. doi:10.3765/salt.v25i0.3077
- Stalnaker, Robert. (1976). "Possible Worlds", *Noûs*, 10(1), 65–75.
- Stalnaker, Robert. (2012). *Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Stojanović, Dubravka (2019) “What is a Nation? The Balkanization of historical memory”, *The Times Literary Supplement*, September 13 2019, 29.
- Tamm, M & Zeleňák, E. “In a Parallel World: An Introduction to Frank Ankersmit’s Philosophy of History.” *Journal of the philosophy of history*, 12, 325–344.
- Tetlock, P. E., & Belkin, A. (Eds.). (1996). *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy* (2009). Edited by Bunnin, N & Yu, J. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell
- The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, Second Edition (1999). Edited by Audi, R. Cambridge University Press.
- Tucker, Aviezer (Ed.). (2011). *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Viinikkala, Lauri. (2019). *Digitaalisia valheita vai historiallista tietoa? : aineellisen todellisuuden, kerronnan ja historiallisen tiedon suhde yhdistetyn todellisuuden teknologiaa hyödyntävissä menneisyyden esityksissä*. Doctoral dissertation, University of Turku, Finnish History.
- Virmajoki, Veli. (2019). “Cementing Science: Understanding Science Through its Development” 2019 Reports from the Department of Philosophy Vol. 42 University of Turku. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Turku, Philosophy. <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-29-7676-8>
- Wardrip-Fruin, Noah & Harrigan, Pat. (Eds.). (2006). *First Person: New Media as Story, Performance, and Game*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- White, Hayden. (1966). “The Burden of History” *History and Theory*, 5(2), 111–134.
- White, Hayden. (1973). *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, Hayden. (1987). *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, Hayden. (1988). “Historiography and Historiophoty”, *The American Historical Review*, 93(5), 1193–1199.
- White, Hayden. (1996). “The modernist event.” In Sobchack, V. (Ed.) *The persistence of history: Cinema, television and the modernist event*, 17–38. London: Routledge.
- White, Hayden. (2014). *The practical past*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Williamson, Timothy. (2005). “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105(1), 1–23. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x
- Wolf, Mark J. P. (2012). *Building Imaginary Worlds*. New York [u.a.]: Routledge.
- Wright, Esther. (2018). “On the promotional context of historical video games.” *Rethinking History*, 22(4), 598–608. doi:10.1080/13642529.2018.1507910
- Wurgaft, Benjamin Aldes. (2010). “The Uses of Walter: Walter Benjamin and Counterfactual Imagination.” *History and Theory*, 49, 361–383.

Original Publications

- I Lähteemäki, Ilkka. (2018). Possible Worlds of History. *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 12, 164–182. doi: 10.1163/18722636-12341354
- II Lähteenmäki, Ilkka. (2016). Kontrafaktuaalinen historia – mahdollisuus, ilmiö, harhaoppi? In Väyrynen, Kari. & Pulkkinen, Jarmo (Eds.). *Historian teoria*. Vastapaino.
- III Lähteenmäki, Ilkka & Virta, Tatu. (2016). The Finnish Twitter war: The Winter War experienced through the social media project #sota39 and its implications for traditional historiography. *Rethinking History*, 20(3), 433-453. doi: 10.1080/13642529.2016.1192259.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642529.2016.1192259>
- IV Lähteenmäki, Ilkka. Transmedia History. Manuscript.

Reprinted with permissions from Brill (I), Vastapaino (II), and Taylor & Francis (III)

Original publications are not included in the electronic version of the dissertation.

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS OULUENSIS

SERIES B HUMANIORA

158. Modarress-Sadeghi, Mirette (2018) Muinaisaineesta kauppahyödykkeeksi : arkeologia, kulttuuriperintö ja kolonialistiset tutkimuskäytänteet
159. Acosta García, Nicolás (2018) Chocó challenges : communities negotiating matters of concern and care on Colombia's margin
160. Nordqvist, Kerkko (2018) The Stone Age of north-eastern Europe 5500–1800 calBC : bridging the gap between the East and the West
161. Tranberg, Annemari (2018) Ympäristön ja ihmisen suhteen muuttuminen Perämeren rannikolla varhaismodernina aikana : makrofossiilitutkimus kasvien käytöstä muuttuvassa maailmassa
162. Lehto, Liisa-Maria (2018) Korpusavusteinen diskurssianalyysi japaninsuomalaisten kielipuheesta
163. Parhi, Katariina (2018) Born to be deviant : histories of the diagnosis of psychopathy in Finland
164. Ratz, David (2018) The Canadian image of Finland, 1919–1948 : Canadian government perceptions and foreign policy
165. Keskimaa, Sari (2018) Kalle Päätalon Iijoki-sarja kielielämäkertana
166. Magga, Sigga-Marja (2018) Saamelainen käsitys yhtenäisyyden rakentajana : duodjin normit ja brändit
167. Helisten, Marika (2018) Participants' multimodal practices for managing activity suspensions and resumptions in English and Finnish interaction
168. Hakamäki, Ville (2018) Seeing behind stray finds : understanding the Late Iron Age settlement of Northern Ostrobothnia and Kainuu, Finland
169. Rytinki, Markus (2018) Musiikkialan tekijänoikeuksien kesto, ansaintalogiikat ja digitaalisen aineiston saatavuus internetissä
170. Harju, Aki (2019) Pohjoisen kaivokset suomalaisissa sanomalehdissä
171. Holopainen, Tuure (2019) Hyvä ihminen ja kunnan kansalainen : Santeri Alkion maailmankatsomus hänen tuotantonsa ilmentämänä
172. Kingelin-Orrenmaa, Zea (2019) Tammerfors som svensk språk : en etnografisk studie av språkpolicy som praktiker, processer och val i svenska rum i det inre av Finland
173. Råman, Joonas (2019) The multimodal and collaborative aspects of demonstrations in the teaching of budo sports

Book orders:
Virtual book store
<http://verkkokauppa.juvenesprint.fi>

S E R I E S E D I T O R S

A
SCIENTIAE RERUM NATURALIUM
University Lecturer Tuomo Glumoff

B
HUMANIORA
University Lecturer Santeri Palviainen

C
TECHNICA
Senior research fellow Jari Juuti

D
MEDICA
Professor Olli Vuolteenaho

E
SCIENTIAE RERUM SOCIALIUM
University Lecturer Veli-Matti Ulvinen

E
SCRIPTA ACADEMICA
Planning Director Pertti Tikkanen

G
OECONOMICA
Professor Jari Juga

H
ARCHITECTONICA
University Lecturer Anu Soikkeli

EDITOR IN CHIEF
Professor Olli Vuolteenaho

PUBLICATIONS EDITOR
Publications Editor Kirsti Nurkkala

