Critical communications over mobile operators’ networks: 5G use cases enabled by licensed spectrum sharing, network slicing and QoS control

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ABSTRACT Commercial mobile operators’ networks will be used for public safety communications due to demand for wireless broadband services, new applications, and smart devices. Existing dedicated professional mobile radio (PMR) networks, such as terrestrial trunked radio (TETRA), Tetrapol, and project 25 (P25), are based on narrowband technologies and hence their data bandwidth is limited. This paper studies how critical communications needed e.g., by ambulance personnel, rescue squads, and law enforcement agencies can be implemented over a 5G network. The most important technology enablers are described and test network architectures used in our project given. We focus on two different use cases: First, how to enable priority communications over a commercial mobile network. Second, how to create rapidly deployable networks for emergency and tactical operations. Tests done with the implemented systems in real networks show that both approaches are very promising for future critical users. Techniques such as network slicing and licensed shared access (LSA) provide means to support mission critical applications in any environment.

INDEX TERMS Public safety, priority communications, mission-critical communications

I. INTRODUCTION Traditionally public safety communications services have been provided with narrowband professional mobile radio (PMR) systems such as terrestrial trunked radio (TETRA) and Tetrapol in Europe and project 25 (P25) in North America [1]. The trend is going towards commercial mobile broadband networks e.g. long term evolution (LTE) and fifth generation (5G) networks in the future due to demands for broadband services, new applications and smart devices. For example, multimedia transmission is useful in many critical scenarios but current PMR systems support this kind of services poorly. The maximum data rate of the TETRA system is 28.8 kbps and for the P25 system it is 9.6 kbps. Enhanced TETRA may reach a few hundred kilobits per second which is not yet enough for many multimedia services. Thus, there is a need for higher transmission rates. There are already ongoing projects for nationwide next generation public safety services based on mobile operators networks, e.g. FirstNet in the US, Emergency Services Network (ESN) in the UK and SafeNet in Republic of Korea. Mission critical users such as police officers, border guards, ambulance personnel, and fire and rescue need reliable communications, high availability, and security that cannot...
be matched without numerous technological enablers. Key enabling technologies for critical communications in fourth generation (4G) networks standardized by 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) are device-to-device (D2D) communications and proximity services (ProSe), group communications, mission-critical push-to-talk, video and data (MCPTT, MCVideo, MCDATA), quality of service (QoS) and prioritization mechanisms including preemption, and end-to-end security.

The situation will be further improved in 5G systems that will enable seamless integration of multiple radio and network technologies and even creation of logical public safety networks within the same infrastructure as is used for commercial users [2]. Development of 5G includes a diverse set of technologies such as software-defined networking (SDN), multi-access edge computing (MEC) and spectrum sharing to better support different application areas [3]–[5]. Especially licensed spectrum sharing approaches that guarantee QoS for sharing applications are promising also for rapid deployment of public safety networks.

There is a need for practical testing and trials to verify how the proposed technologies can be used e.g. in 3GPP evolution networks. 5G test network activities are going on globally. In Finland aim is to build an infrastructure where beyond state-of-the art technologies and flexible service configurations are developed and tested. Recently, we demonstrated citizen broadband radio service (CBRS) [6] technologies in live trials with commercial network devices. We have implemented and tested licensed shared access (LSA), QoS and policy control mechanisms and network slicing techniques [7]–[14] to run critical traffic such as MCPTT in our test network. Our trial environment is geographically diverse, distributed to several locations in Finland and it supports multiple domains. In addition, it enables a combination of techniques both on the core network and access network sides.

The main motivation for this paper is to show how critical communication use cases are implemented in a 5G network. Our work complements previous studies reported in [1]–[5] by 1) reviewing mission-critical services and latest enabling techniques and standards in 5G and by 2) implementing and studying use of commercial technologies for mission-critical services in two important use cases. In the priority communication use case we use the policy and charging rules function (PCRF) in the core network for dynamic QoS management to prioritize the MCPTT application. In the rapidly deployable network use case, we implement a distributed LTE network for the scenarios where the commercial network might be unavailable. We further use LSA and sensing to find the spectrum information for the available frequencies for our network.

This article is organized as follows. First we describe needed technological enablers and review the advances within 3GPP standardization. Then we present the trial environment for priority communications and discuss how we implemented MCPTT application in the network. Another trial environment focusing on a rapidly deployable network and a distributed LSA solution is given in the following part. Finally, we define promising future research ideas and conclude the paper.

II. ENABLERS FOR CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS

Mission-critical communication services in mobile operators’ networks require multiple technological enablers that are continuously advanced in standardization. Various QoS control methods can be used to guarantee required level of low latency, packet error loss, and high priority. We review the status of standardization and describe the main mechanisms under the 3GPP roadmap. Reliability and integrity of the communication are crucial for authorities and thus, security mechanisms are needed. In addition, softwarization of future networks and edge computing enables to tailor the network to specific needs of the critical users. For example, network slicing can be used to create a logical network inside the physical network to guarantee enough communication resources e.g. for ambulance communications. In some occasions spectrum sharing technologies are crucial in finding suitable radio resources for communications e.g. when the current infrastructure has been damaged or lost. Finally, multiple radio technologies are integrated in the 5G system and they can be seamlessly used to support different capacity and communication range needs of the users. More detailed description of each enabler can be found in the following subsections.

3GPP roadmap and QoS control: 3GPP is the main standardization body for 5G technologies. Figure 1 shows how supporting technologies are included in different releases of 3GPP standardization to enable critical communications over commercial networks. The QoS concept [7] has been included since Rel. 8 and the following releases have advanced the QoS mechanisms. Device-to-device communications (D2D) [8] was included already in Rel. 12 to enable different proximity services and operation of critical users even without supporting infrastructure. Group communication enablers [9] were developed in the same release and improved in the following 13th release. Support for mission-critical push-to-talk is included in Rel. 13 and for data and video in the Rel. 14.
In the first phase of 5G system, i.e., in Rel. 15 all the mission-critical services are enhanced. In addition, interworking with other systems such as TETRA will be used so that in the future services could be seamlessly provided to mission critical users with different radio interfaces. The 5G system will include tailored support for different vertical such as railway and maritime operations.

QoS control in 3GPP networks ensures that users with higher priority classification are given access to appropriate operator resources and receive sufficient service quality even in congestion situations. Policy-based management i.e., applying operator-defined rules for resource allocation and resource use, plays a fundamental role in QoS control and traffic prioritization [7], [12]. QoS in 3GPP networks is based on the concept of bearers, which is a transmission path through the infrastructure and radio interface with a defined capacity, latency, and packet loss. Bearers are assigned for different applications according to applications’ QoS class identifiers (QCI) as depicted in Table 1. For each QCI class a resource type that is either guaranteed bit rate (GBR) or non-guaranteed bit rate (NGBR) is given. Every QCI is associated with a priority level. Mission-critical services such as MCPTT have the highest priority in the defined QCI classes. Priority level 5 is the highest priority level and it is assigned for MC-PTT signaling. Numerical requirements for delay and packet loss rate are shown in the table for each QCI.

Enforcement of QoS policies is based on several mechanisms. Creation of dedicated bearers and dynamic QoS control is enabled with the policy and charging rules function (PCRF) [15]. Access Class Barring (ACB) is mainly used for congestion control of a specific area or a specific base station or cell in two ways: 1) Access class control method enables mobile terminals to determine whether they should send the connection request to base station; 2) Connection reject method enables base station to accept or reject connection requests. Mobile network operators may use both methods depending on the network congestion and traffic conditions. Every data bearer must have QCI and allocation and retention priority (ARP) defined. ARP primarily allows network to decide whether a bearer establishment request can be accepted or rejected. As priority communication needs may arise dynamically, 3GPP has defined also preemption mechanisms that provide means to remove lowest priority users so that higher priority users can start immediately their transmission when accessing the network.
Table 1. QoS class identifiers for different applications [11].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Resource Type</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Delay Budget</th>
<th>Error Loss</th>
<th>Example Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-2}$</td>
<td>Conversational voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-3}$</td>
<td>Conversational (streaming) video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-3}$</td>
<td>Real time gaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>300 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-4}$</td>
<td>Non-Conversational Video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-2}$</td>
<td>Mission Critical user plane Push To Talk voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-2}$</td>
<td>Non-Mission-Critical user plane Push To Talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-2}$</td>
<td>Vehicle to everything</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-6}$</td>
<td>IMS signaling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>300 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-6}$</td>
<td>Buffered video, TCP-based (www, email…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-3}$</td>
<td>Voice, streaming video, gaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>300 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-6}$</td>
<td>Buffered video, TCP-based (www, email…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>300 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-6}$</td>
<td>Buffered video, TCP-based (www, email…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-6}$</td>
<td>Mission Critical delay sensitive signalling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>200 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-6}$</td>
<td>Mission Critical Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-2}$</td>
<td>Vehicle to everything</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>non-GBR</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>10 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-6}$</td>
<td>Low latency eMBB, augmented reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Delay Critical GBR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-5}$</td>
<td>Remote control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Delay Critical GBR</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-6}$</td>
<td>Intelligent transport systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Delay Critical GBR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-5}$</td>
<td>Intelligent transport systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Delay Critical GBR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-4}$</td>
<td>Discrete automation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Delay Critical GBR</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10 ms</td>
<td>$10^{-4}$</td>
<td>Discrete automation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Priority services rely on 3GPP’s security architecture [16] to authenticate users and to protect network assets against external threats. To support end-to-end confidentiality and integrity protection, 3GPP has also defined identity and key management mechanisms for mission critical applications [17]. Further, mobile network operators typically apply domain and vendor specific security firewalling and monitoring solutions to preact and react against disturbances and attacks affecting the availability of critical services.

Softwarization and network slicing: Promising enablers in 5G networks, affecting a lot both to architectural choices and mechanisms, include multi-access edge computing (MEC), software-defined networks in (SDN), network function virtualization (NFV), cloud computing and cloud networking. They enable deployment and runtime of network functions as software only make networks dynamic programmable through centralized control points [2], [15]. These technologies are the main drivers for enabling customized 5G network infrastructures for specific applications and services and for seamless integration of different heterogeneous networks. NFV and SDN can make network slicing (NS) a reality, allowing operators to customize networks according to various requirements of mobile services, thus leading to a more cost-effective way to build dedicated networks.

3GPP defines a network slice as a complete logical network, which provides telecommunication services and network capabilities [13]. Distinct Radio Access Network (RAN) network slices and core network slices will interwork with each other to provide mobile connectivity. A device may access multiple network slices simultaneously through a single RAN. The realization of NS faces significant challenges in cellular systems [14], [18]. There are great difficulties in organizing mobility and authentication management in the control plane as well as session and charging management in the user plane. Network slices are isolated from each other to prevent control plane congestion on one slice to affect the control plane of other slices, and to improve security.

The simplest way to implement NS would be to create static slices for certain purposes. However, in critical communications the demands are dynamic and thus, dynamic network slicing is a preferred way of operation. The following phases describe the network slice lifecycle [13]: 1) Preparation phase, 2) Instantiation, Configuration and Activation phase, 3) Run-time phase, 4) Decommissioning

1 However, an always available dedicated slice in commercial networks for critical communication purposes could be very useful. The drawback for this approach is resource consumption since the slice might be underused majority of time.
phase. Run-time monitoring and controls enable dynamic management the functionality and resources of slice. Network slices can be dedicated or shared among multiple applications or users [18]. The slices may have dedicated or common network functions. Dedicated functions facilitate customization of slices and assure strong isolation between different applications. A fixed splitting of common functions and resources simplifies the network management and operation but may lead to inefficient network utilization.

**Spectrum sharing and multi-radio access technologies (RATs):** Spectrum sharing approaches support critical communications by enabling use of more spectrum resources [19]. Typically, critical communications are the primary user in the sharing arrangements. Allowing commercial and other spectrum users on the critical communications bands can reduce the risk of being migrated to another band, even if the use of the radio spectrum is rare. Organizations utilizing critical communications may also benefit from secondary access to commercial spectrum bands, for example for training purposes. Spectrum sharing with a primary status between different critical communications systems could also be a possible scenario in the Public Protection and Disaster Recovery (PPDR) missions. Distributed LSA is a promising approach for rapidly deployable networks. The basic principle of a spectrum database approach is that the database controls when the secondary user can access the spectrum and such helps to avoid harmful interference to protected spectrum users. Under the LSA approach, the incumbent operators are required to provide information about their spectrum use over the area of interest to the database. Based on that information, the spectrum database determines explicitly where, when, and which parts of the frequency bands are available for the secondary use. This approach enables interference free spectrum sharing for all and guaranteed QoS for the incumbent networks.

5G is a multi-radio system built upon both new high capacity and low-latency interfaces and convergence of existing radio technologies such as 5G new radio (NR), LTE and WiFi to a ubiquitous radio access network. The wireless access can be obtained with multi-operator 3G/4G/LTE router. The routers can be combined with a high gain directional narrow beam antenna high of the ground when long range communications are required. This setup provides connection in areas where the normal LTE mobile phones do not have coverage. Then, for even more remote environments, satellite broadband connections are available in integrated satellite-terrestrial 5G networks [20]. This multi-radio network requires intelligent end-to-end network management where selection of the most appropriate RAT and route to the data is based on the QoS requirements and measurements.

**III. CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS TRIALS**

Our practical work has focused on two use cases. First, how to implement critical communication services in the existing mobile operator network using described technological enablers? We focus on push-to-talk application in Trial 1, describing how we have implemented the system in our test network and what are the main components and communication interfaces between those components. Trial 2 focuses on creation of a network in an area where infrastructure is not currently available. The rapidly deployable network (RDN) requires that all the required functionalities such as core network, application servers, and the LSA server for spectrum needs are implemented and built in the area on interest. Finally, collaboration trials between the RDN and the commercial 5G are presented.

**A. PRIORITY COMMUNICATIONS OVER MOBILE OPERATORS’ NETWORKS**

This use case focuses on enabling critical communication in commercial networks by use of QoS management and prioritization mechanisms. We are using dedicated bearers and mission-critical QCI classes for those bearers to prioritize PTT users in the commercial networks. This can be seen as “4G network slicing” that we were able to implement already with existing network components. In the future 5G networks the slicing will be based on software-defined network switches and network function virtualization mechanisms. The proposed “4G network slicing” with dedicated bearers could be implemented in the existing commercial networks already now. Figure 2 describes the implemented trial environment for priority communications. The key building blocks and interfaces of the trial environment are given in the following. The trial architecture is geographically distributed in several locations in Finland. The architecture connects the application server in Helsinki area to the core network in Oulu and can be used to support PTT clients over an access network both in Helsinki and in Oulu. The architecture enables adding flexibly components and testing technologies in different locations and environments.

**PTT application:** One or more PTT clients require priority connection in the commercial network for authority communications, i.e., using pull mode from the end -users’ side to open the connection. The PTT client sends service request over the LTE-Advanced network to the PTT application server.

**PTT application server** provides the group communication and messaging service to the PTT clients. It also interfaces to the narrowband TETRA networks providing seamless interoperability between PTT clients and TETRA radios. The server uses Rx interface to communicate with the PCRF located in the core network and requests priority connection to the PTT clients based on a service request, PTT client user profile, and service profile provisioned in the server.
Core network is implemented with the OpenEPC [21].
The main components regarding the priority communication are given in the figure. A key component is the PCRF that provides QoS of different applications and subscribers. It can also apply security procedures before accepting information from the PTT application server that is under control of the public safety service provider. The PCRF is used in creating a dedicated bearer for the PTT application with a mission critical QCI 65 value. The PCRF allows dynamic creation and management of dedicated bearers, i.e. new bearers can be added on the fly to the network.

Other main component of the core network is the mobility management entity (MME) that is the main signaling node in the evolved packet core (EPC), taking care of e.g. authentication and handover signaling between different networks. MME connects to the base station, evolved node B (eNB), through the S1-MME interface and connects to the serving gateway (SGW) through the S11 interface. MME works with the home subscribing server (HSS) and the RAN to decide the appropriate radio resource management strategy that can be UE-specific. The HSS includes user identification and addressing data as well as subscriber profile repository (SPR) where user-subscribed QoS classes are stored. The PCRF is connected to the SGW, packet data network (PDN) gateway (PGW), HSS and MME using Diameter based connectors Gxx, Gx, and Sp. The PDN Gateway provides connectivity from the UE to external packet data networks and public safety applications over the SGi interface. The S5 reference point provides tunneling and management between the SGW and the PGW.

Access network: The used RAN in our test network is located in office environment. It includes 3GPP base stations that are connected to each other using X2 interface. The base stations and UEs are commercially available 3GPP compliant equipment that are constantly updated with the latest software releases.

We have tested creation of dedicated bearers and use of them in a congested network, especially the mission-critical applications. The results shown in Figure 3 were achieved with our trial network using a pico base station and three UEs with different QCI class bearers. First, there is a 30 Mbits/s QC19 default bearer data transmission to UE3 (green line) going on, this user being the only one over the air. The transmission stops after data transmission to the user UE1 (red line) with a high priority dedicated bearer QC15 starts. The result shows that the priority user reserves the whole band for its use. After another critical user UE2 (blue line) with the same priority and dedicated bearers QC15 starts transmission UE1 and UE2 divide the bandwidth equally.
while they are receiving data simultaneously. Traffic to UE3 default bearer continues after UE1 and UE2 have stopped. The way to use the bandwidth can be affected by policy management in the core network. For example, in our case the priority users may request total bandwidth for their use but there could be also a policy set to leave e.g. 20% of the bandwidth available for commercial users. This could be still limited so that video transmission is not allowed but e.g. speech and text is fine.

This trial shows how critical communication users can receive a high quality service in a commercial network when needed. The trial scenario enabled us to evaluate the maturity levels of available commercial products. For instance, we noticed that the support for mission-critical quality classes was inadequate in the base station and consequently we utilized lower quality classes with identical behavior. We were also able to advance development of the EPC to support better GBR bearers.

**B. RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE NETWORKS**

This use case focuses on building a rapidly deployable network (RDN) for public safety applications for scenarios where the commercial network is fully or partially unavailable. This could be caused by some catastrophic situation such as an earthquake or there might be a need to create a dedicated network in a remote location for search and rescue, as an example. The rapidly deployable network provides the basic services such as voice and data transfer for the users as well as multiple ways to access the network and its services including local LTE, WiFi and access via a commercial mobile network, if available. Here, drones, sensors, and cameras can be connected to the network wirelessly or wired. Figure 4 describes the rapidly deployable network concept including the LSA functionality that is used for spectrum management [4]. The RDN can utilize towable lifts or crane cars to allow the rapid deployment and sufficient radio coverage without fixed tower assemblies. The test environment is Finnish forest.

The **lite-EPCs** provide LTE access points to the tactical network and emulate the EPC functionalities of a commercial LTE network. The lite-EPC is a server program running inside a small and portable computer. Compared with the complete commercial EPCs, this is a distributed and a lighter solution to enable stand-alone LTE operation for the selected users.

The **tactical network** offers the backhaul for the public safety operator network and consists of SDR-routers [22], which support both wireless and wired connections. These routers are able to select and use the best possible connection/route available and will re-route the connection automatically, if needed. In addition to tactical connections, a connection to any public and mobile networks can be provided allowing the users connect to, for example, to the internet, or remote users connected to a mobile network to access the tactical network through a secure Mobile virtual private network (VPN) connection. Note, that while in Figure 4 we have two tactical routers, the network is scalable, i.e., the number of the access points and tactical routers can vary. As an example, Figure 5 shows a tactical network trial with four backhaul nodes. We also see a crane car that has all the necessary equipment. The trial included backbone links up to 12 km distances, which provided sufficient connectivity at each location and enabled group communication between LTE handsets.

The **LSA system** offers spectrum information for the rapidly deployed LTE network. A secondary spectrum license is sufficient, because this network is a backup

![Figure 4](image4.png) **Figure 4.** A concept for rapidly deployable public safety network using LSA for spectrum needs.

![Figure 5](image5.png) **Figure 5.** An example public safety backhaul network.
network for the commercial network. Here, the incumbent spectrum users reserve the spectrum an agreed time before their transmission. The LSA repository saves this information. The LSA server obtains the latest spectrum information from the repository, which is then valid for the agreed time after the LSA server has had a repository connection. The LSA server acts as a mediator between the LSA repository and the distributed LSA controllers.

The distributed LSA controllers are running on the same computers as the lite-EPCs. The controllers control their own LTE access point spectrum use, but decide the spectrum sharing together. They synchronize with each other and obtain spectrum information from the LSA repository and from the sensing system. This information enables to control the access point for locking/unlocking cells, changing frequency, and/or changing transmission power. The controller is a small and lightweight software that provides rapid base station control. It is easy to port to any computer and thus easy to utilize in mobile scenarios. The performed trials verified the LSA functionality for this type of rapidly deployed network operation.

The sensing offers additional spectrum information for the rapidly deployed network. It is used if the LSA information is uncertain or invalid due to commercial network breakage; the sensing is used both to verify the spectrum information validity and to select the channel with the least interference when the LSA system fails. In our trials, a spectrum analyzer was used remotely to calculate the channel energy of downlink LTE Band 7. Initial tests suggest that sensing the LTE channel free with an energy detector and by using antenna gain 6 dBi and antenna height 30 meters can guarantee sufficient separation distance to the incumbent macro base station in remote areas. We plan to use the radioheads for sensing.

To understand the dynamic spectrum use capability of our trial system, we performed measurements with the distributed LSA setup while evacuating the frequency and starting the transmission in a new band. The evacuation process aims to protect the incumbent spectrum users’ rights by evacuating LSA band when the band request from the incumbent is received. The restart frequency process on the other hand defines the necessary time for a base station to start their service in a new LSA band from the time the base station received a new frequency band information from the LSA repository. Thus, we measured time consumption in both processes in order to show the efficiency of own new LSA concept in this experiment.

The measurement begins at the moment the LTE base station received the information from the LSA repository that the current frequency is not available anymore. Following steps are then performed: 1) At the base station, LSA controller executes LOCK procedure to turn off the air interface at the current frequency. 2) After that, the LSA controller inquires new information about available spectrum from the LSA repository and synchronizes the newest update with other LSA controllers in the network. 3) Then, the controller uses new information to find available frequency and executes SET_FREQUENCY procedure to reconfigure the base station to operate in a new spectrum band. 4) Finally controller executes UNLOCK procedure to turn the air interface of the base station back on to continue transmission on the configured frequency.

The results are shown in Table 2. Our previous measurements that have used large network management systems [6] instead of our self-developed controllers have shown reconfiguration times in the order of minutes. Now we achieved much better results for a rapidly deployable network where we are only controlling the small network with dedicated controller functionality. The achieved times show that current band can be evacuated in less than 10 seconds during LOCK command. The restart frequency process combining the SET FREQUENCY and UNLOCK times takes approximately 17 seconds.

TABLE 2. Reconfiguration times in the rapidly deployable network trial.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Commands</th>
<th>Time duration</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCK - Turn off air interface at base station</td>
<td>8.78 s</td>
<td>0.39 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SET_FREQUENCY - Change LSA frequency from one to another</td>
<td>7.97 s</td>
<td>0.37 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNLOCK - Turn on air interface at base station</td>
<td>8.97 s</td>
<td>0.37 s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. COLLABORATION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE PUBLIC SAFETY NETWORKS

In addition to the conducted main trials and achieved results, we have tested the RDN concept collaboratively with commercial networks. The tests have been conducted during public safety operations so that the personnel has used more than 20 end user equipment that can access both RDN and commercial network. The solution has ensured operational safety and priority communications in commercial network. Based on the operational tests following requirements and recommendations can be given.

The collaboration between commercial and public safety networks can be enabled with a political decision. Alternatively, the commercial operators can have monetary incentives to offer tailored and complete solutions for public safety together with the rapidly deployable network equipment providers. The public safety needs interconnection and requires a similar operation of the applications and services in every network. The public safety can utilize common applications in each type of network in the following fashion.

**Common services at the internet:** The public safety offers and uses its application servers and data bases over the internet. The services can be hidden services in the tactical networks and alternatively offered in any other private or public networks. These applications are reachable from any network having an internet connection. The connection can be secured for example with a VPN. Normally, the public safety can gain wireless internet with single or multi-radio access technologies and in planned operations, public safety can use locally available commercial hardwired networks.

**Common services at the commercial network EPC:** The commercial network configures the public safety base stations at the tactical networks to its EPC. Likewise, the public safety configures its base stations to use the commercial EPC. The main benefits of this scenario are the latest commercial application services and the interoperability with older mobile systems.

The public safety can connect to the EPC via a VPN using an internet connection or via commercial network slices. Then, when there is no connection, the public safety can utilize a local EPC solution, which can support the services that the public safety has noticed to be beneficial.

Note that the public safety can also act as a mobile virtual network operator inside the commercial networks. Furthermore, the public safety can operate a full commercial EPC service itself. Here, the public safety obtains more control over the network it uses. Then, it can have roaming agreements for the communication with the commercial networks. With roaming, the public safety can allow commercial users to use their base stations. This can be critical in some operational scenarios, where the commercial network is down and the commercial users do not have an outside world connection.

**Common commercial network switches and routers:** The commercial networks can enable the backbone of the commercial networks for public safety use. Here, any of the connected networks can offer the applications, which are accessible to critical users via routing. Rapidly deployed public safety networks are connected to commercial networks using interface devices, which are secure traffic relays. The public safety can have multiple interface devices in different parts of the commercial internet protocol (IP) networks. They can be connected to each other with methods like a virtual local area network (VLAN) or a virtual private local area network service (VPLS). Then, they can communicate together with their desired method. Note that these interface setups can be dynamically set up or pre-defined permanent installations.

The interface devices can also give tactical network access to the LTE users outside of the public safety operator network. Here, the interface device has been defined a known access point name (APN) for critical data. Moreover, the critical LTE user equipment request the same APN in their critical applications. Note that the LTE has support for multiple packet data networks [23]. Thus, the non-critical applications can route their data to elsewhere.

IV. FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS

**Dynamic network slicing:** Network slicing can improve many public safety services by decreasing delays. For example, QCI is currently requested on per session basis potentially slowing down overall call control setup. Already a static network slice enables reserving the resources ahead of time in a coarse-grained manner instead of per session. Since static slicing consumes resources, dynamic slicing techniques will be needed in future networks to quickly create, adapt, and manage slices according to the needs of users and applications. Dynamic slicing provides also robustness against challenging network conditions, as application specific network slices can be more easily isolated from other applications and adapted e.g. in the case of emerging cyber security attacks or hardware failures. It is an open research challenge how to do these in practice.

Softwarization and virtualization of the network resources are key enablers for the dynamism [24]. One of the core challenges currently is to identify or develop a set of technologies suitable to implement the infrastructure over which network slicing will be built, without requiring major rework of the 3GPP specifications. In the longer term, trials of dynamic network slices for priority communications between rapidly deployed networks is a potential topic to be tested in our trial environment. Traditional QoS and prioritization mechanisms will be used in network slices to prevent congestions and emerging possibility to dynamically adjust e.g., the size of the slice will further improve the situation. Open research challenges include how to apply machine learning based control strategies in dynamic adjustments.
Remote operations: Majority of work conducted with prioritized public safety communications has been done in densely populated areas and due to congestion probabilities it will remain as the most important environment also in the future. However, prioritized PTT applications in commercial and in rapidly deployable networks in remote locations is a topic that requires more work to be done. How to create rapidly deployable networks with D2D connections and slices in those areas? How to efficiently use multi-RAT networks, combining satellite systems, long-range digital communications and broadband solutions in the remote and isolated environments to different services? QoS-aware radio and network resource management schemes will be required. Partly this work is done by developing solutions for different mobile platforms such as cars [20], ships [20], unmanned aerial vehicles [26] and trains [27].

V. CONCLUSIONS

This paper discusses how critical communications can be carried out in a mobile operators’ network and how a dedicated rapidly deployable network can be implemented to support public safety needs. The most important enabling techniques such as prioritization, QoS management, SDN, network slicing, end-to-end security, and spectrum sharing are discussed and their use in practical trials described. Architectures of trial networks used for priority communications and rapidly deployable operations are given. The results shown in each trial indicate that the developed mechanisms in prioritization and spectrum sharing are good enablers for future public safety users. The paper defines promising future research questions, especially more trials are needed to validate technologies.

VI. REFERENCES