

# Ostracism, Inner Change and the Dynamics of Reintegration in Classical Athens

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## 1. Introduction

As is well known, ostracism (*ostrakismos*) was a voting system, which enabled the fifth-century Athenians once a year to exile any citizen of their choice for a period of ten years.<sup>1</sup> During the process of ostracism, no charges were pressed, nor any candidates nominated,<sup>2</sup> but the Athenians were entitled to vote for the removal of whomever they wished – no violation of any written law was involved. The institution was probably introduced by Cleisthenes in 508/7, although the first ostracism took place twenty years later, in 488/7.<sup>3</sup> Nine to fifteen ostracisms took place between that year and ca. 415 BCE, and the subjects were prominent politicians. The exact number of ostracisms is disputed, but the list of the subjects includes at least Hipparchus, son of Charmus, in 488/7; Megacles, son of Hippocrates, in 487/6 (and probably again in ca. 470); the third one whose name [Pseudo-]Aristotle leaves unmentioned, in 486/5; Xanthippus, son of Aripbron, in 485/4; Aristides, son of Lysimachus, in ca. 483/2; Themistocles, son of Neocles, in ca. 471; Cimon, son of Miltiades, in 461; Thucydides, son of Melesias, most likely in 444/3; and Hyperbolus, son of Antiphanes, either in 417 or 415.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, there are some disputable ostracisms: Alcibiades the Elder might have been ostracized in the 460s or 440s (perhaps twice), Menon, son of Meneclides in 471 or 457, Damon, son of Damonides, in the 440s or 430s, and Callias, son of Didymus in the 440s.<sup>5</sup> Ostracism was never officially abolished, but it fell out of use after Hyperbolus' ostracism.<sup>6</sup> In this article, I will explore ostracism as an instrument urging inner change in those subjected to it and discuss the reintegration of the formerly ostracized into Athenian society. With this goal in mind, I will focus on the idea of impermanent isolation as a factor encouraging subjects to experience inner change and to reintegrate in society.

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<sup>1</sup> The draft of this paper was read in Aix-en-Provence at the workshop *Political Refugees in the Ancient Greek World*. I wish to thank the participants for their comments on my paper. I am also grateful to Professor Nick Fisher for his helpful comments, as well as to the anonymous referees of *Pallas* for their perceptive insights. I also take this opportunity to thank the Kone Foundation for financial support and the workshop organizer Laura Loddo for allowing me to read her forthcoming articles.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. [Andoc.] 4.3.

<sup>3</sup> Various ancient sources name Cleisthenes as the lawgiver of ostracism: Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F 6; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.1; Ael. *Var. Hist.* 13.24; Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 30; *Vat. Gr.* 144; Diod. Sic. 11.55.2. However, while [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.2 states that ostracism was part of Cleisthenes' reforms established in 508/7, Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F 6 indicates that it may have been introduced in 488/7. For a discussion on the possible contradiction in the ancient sources, see, e.g., Kagan, 1961, p. 394-396; Stanton, 1970, p. 180. I find it likely that ostracism was part of Cleisthenes' reforms. This is the opinion of several other scholars too: e.g., Forsdyke, 2005, p. 282. However, the hiatus of around 20 years between ostracism's introduction and its first use has provoked much discussion, and scholars have presented several reasons for it: see, e.g., Hands, 1959, p. 71, 76; Kagan, 1961, p. 398; Stanton, 1970, p. 181. Some scholars have argued for the introduction of ostracism in 488/7 by either Themistocles, Aristides or Cleisthenes: see Raubitschek, 1951, p. 221; Hignett, 1952, p. 185, 189; Schreiner, 1970.

<sup>4</sup> [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.4-8 lists the five ostracisms that took place during the 480s. For the ostracism of Themistocles, see, e.g., Thuc. 1.135.3; Diod. Sic. 11.54.9; Plut. *Them.* 22.3; the ostracism of Cimon: Plut. *Cim.* 15.3, 17.3; Plut. *Per.* 9.5; Thucydides, son of Melesias: Plut. *Per.* 14.3, Plut. *Per.* 16.2; Hyperbolus: e.g., Thuc. 8.73.3; Plut. *Alc.* 13.3-5.

<sup>5</sup> Alcibiades the Elder: Lys. 14.39; [Andoc.] 4.34; Menon: Hesychius, *s. v. Menon*; Damon: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.4; Plut. *Per.* 4.3; Plut. *Arist.* 1.7; Callias: [Andoc.] 4.32.

<sup>6</sup> Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 30; Plut. *Arist.* 7.4.

What was the purpose of this institution, and why was it resorted to from time to time? One strand of research has emphasized the importance of ostracism as a deterrent for a politician to gain too much power (in an extreme case, to establish tyranny).<sup>7</sup> Indeed, various ancient sources associate ostracism with the fear of the return of tyranny and the maintenance of democracy.<sup>8</sup> For example, [Pseudo-]Aristotle explicitly associates both the introduction and the first uses of ostracism with the desire to prevent tyranny.<sup>9</sup> Ancient sources also frequently explain ostracism in terms of anti-superiority and envy.<sup>10</sup> For example, Diodorus states that “the Athenians passed such a law [ostracism], not for the purpose of punishing wrongdoing, but in order to lower (ταπεινότερα γένηται) through exile the audacity (τὰ φρονήματα) of the outstanding men (τῶν ὑπερεχόντων)”, and Didymus states that “the people most hostile to the demos were ostracized and condemned” and that ostracism “was designed to curb those who were outstanding in their arrogance”.<sup>11</sup> Thucydides also implies that ostracism was targeted against people who aroused fear because of their power (δύναμις) and authority (ἄξιωμα).<sup>12</sup>

Another strand of research approaches ostracism in terms of democracy, viewing it either as an expression of democratic ideology or as a peculiar institution alien to democratic thinking.<sup>13</sup> In this connection, it has been regarded as an institution either supporting or contradicting democratic ideals, values and principles prevalent in post-Cleisthenic Athens. For example, Sara Forsdyke argues in her influential monograph that ostracism was a mild and lawful form of exile, and that it epitomized the lenient and moderate nature of Athenian democracy. In her view, ostracism symbolized the justice and moderation of democratic power in contrast to pre-democratic elite power.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, ostracism has often been understood as a political weapon and as an instrument that helped to keep politicians in check. Some scholars emphasize the significance of ostracizing as a mechanism that enabled the people to intervene in political power struggles or to determine between two rival political opinions. For example, Forsdyke has argued that ostracism was designed for and served the purpose of deterring intra-elite competition that occasionally led to a power struggle between two politicians; she suggests that the idea of the institution was to prevent the political situation from degenerating into

<sup>7</sup> For example, Raaflaub, 2003, p. 327 has argued that ostracism was employed to exile such persons who were suspected to cherish “designs too great to be good for the community” and being “friends of tyrants or tyranny”, and according to Phillips, 1982, p. 24, ostracism was “designed to check those who had become too powerful”.

<sup>8</sup> E.g., Arist. *Pol.* 1284a17-36, 1288a25-30, 1302b15-29; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.6; Diod. Sic. 11.55.87; Androtion 324 F 6; Philochorus, 328 F 30; Plut. *Them.* 22; *Arist.* 7. I have discussed this issue in detail in my article “Athenian *Ostrakismos* and the *Hybris* of a Would-Be-Tyrant” (forthcoming in *Acta Antiqua* 1/2020).

<sup>9</sup> [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.6: “For three years they went on ostracizing the friends of the tyrants (τῶν τυράννων φίλους), at whom the legislation had been aimed, but afterwards in the fourth year it was also used to remove any other person who seemed to be too great (εἴ τις δοκοίη μείζων εἶναι μεθίσταντο); the first person unconnected with the tyranny to be ostracized was Xanthippus son of Ariphron.” Trans. H. Rackham. As Herbert Heftner (2002, p. 497) has noted, it is noteworthy that by using the verbal form δοκοίη (“would seem”), the author appears to emphasize the subjective element of ostracizing.

<sup>10</sup> Anti-superiority: e.g., Arist. *Pol.* 1284a17-37; Diod. Sic. 11.55.3; Thuc. 8.73.3. Usually, the envy explanations of ostracism occur in late sources such as Poll. 8.20; Plut. *Arist.* 7.2; Plut. *Them.* 22–24; Plut. *Cim.* 16; Plut. *Per.* 13; Plut. *Alc.* 13.6; however, Pind. *Pyth.* 7.18–20 implies that Megacles was ostracized because of envy. Of modern scholars, Raubitschek, 1958, p. 109 has argued that the original purpose of ostracism was to *kolouein tous hyperekhontas* (“punish those who rose above others”), but that one of the original causes of ostracism was *phthonos doxês/aretês* (“the envy of reputation/virtue”). Raubitschek, 1958, p. 90 has also argued that ostracism was designed to keep in check those “who were outstanding in their arrogance”.

<sup>11</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.55.3; Didymus, *Commentary on Demosthenes* 23.205. Trans. Phillips, 1982, p. 30.

<sup>12</sup> Thuc. 8.73.3. Heftner, 2002, p. 495 notes that the fear felt by the people was irrational and was thus not based on the factual qualities of the “candidate” for ostracism.

<sup>13</sup> Various scholars have considered that ostracism was an odd institution. See, e.g., Brenne, 1994, p. 13; cf. Hall, 1989, p. 93: “in a direct democracy it [ostracism] is bizarre.”

<sup>14</sup> Forsdyke, 2005, p. 143-145.

*stasis*.<sup>15</sup> In her view, Cleisthenes' motives for introducing ostracism and the ways in which the Athenians actually used the institution were alike, and she argues that the Athenians employed ostracism when the stability of the *polis* was in danger because of intra-elite rivalry. In sum, she argues that ostracism helped to keep the *dêmos* united and that the institution served to maintain socio-political balance. While they have their advantages, I regard such politically inclined explanations as rather one-sided and insufficient. There is no need to deny, of course, that the instability of the *polis* was a real danger in democratic Athens, and that there was constant negotiation between individual ambition and common good. However, as L. G. H. Hall has pointed out, ostracism would have been an odd way of resolving acutely emerging conflicts, because it could be resorted to only once a year (the decision whether to hold an *ostrakophoria* was made yearly in the *ekklesia kyria* organized in the sixth prytany).<sup>16</sup> In any case, to assume that Cleisthenes did not design ostracism to be used to resolve intra-elite power struggles is not to rule out the possibility that some Athenians may have cast their votes with factional interests in mind.

I am not rejecting the ideas accepted by various scholars that the purposes of employing ostracism from time to time included the desire to reduce political tension and the dangers of *stasis*. However, the purpose of the present article is to locate the idea of the institution in the collective mindset of the fifth-century Athenians. With this goal in mind, I will approach the subject from the perspective of the ostracizing citizens. I will therefore discuss the evidence offered by some potsherds used as voting ballots (*ostraka*) and interpret them in the broad cultural context. While only a small percentage of the *ostraka* we possess bears a message, these inscriptions indicate that the choice of the target was made on a moral/religious basis at least by some ostracizing Athenians.<sup>17</sup> I consider that the *ostraka* that bear a comment or a drawing serve as evidence on the shared idea(s) and imagery of the ostracizing Athenians; contrariwise, I do not consider that the *ostraka* have much worth as evidence on the historicity of any *ostrakophoria*, nor do I think they have any direct correlation with the purposes of the original lawgiver.<sup>18</sup> Instead, it is my conviction that rather than testifying to actual dates, targets

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<sup>15</sup> Forsdyke, 2005, *passim*. See also Carcopino, 1935, p. 28 for an argument that ostracism was a “humane” mechanism and that by introducing ostracism, Cleisthenes intended to regulate violent political competition. In a similar vein, de Ste Croix, 2005, p. 206 has considered that ostracism was intended to be used whenever there was a “deep division within the State on a matter of great importance” and thus to prevent *stasis*. Likewise, Missiou, 2011, p. 36, 95 has stated that ostracism reflected public good and functioned as a solution to factional struggles which threatened the stability of the *polis*. Cf. Forsdyke, 2005, p. 170, who stresses, however, that ostracism was, in her view, not intended to solve political issues but to intervene in the struggle between two leaders.

<sup>16</sup> Hall, 1989, p. 94, 95.

<sup>17</sup> Approximately 10,500 *ostraka* have been unearthed in the excavations at the Agora and Ceramicus in Athens. The first *ostrakon* was identified in 1853, and the excavations at Ceramicus and Agora had revealed 1,658 *ostraka* before 1966, when the “great discovery” at Ceramicus revealed 8,500 *ostraka*. The majority of the surviving *ostraka* contain only the name of the target, inscribed or painted on it. The *ostraka* bearing anything but the name of the target (such as a comment or a picture) form only a small minority of the preserved *ostraka*. For “portraits” on *ostraka*, see Brenne, 1992, *passim*.

<sup>18</sup> I agree with Raaflaub, 2003, p. 321, 322 that the *ostraka* testify that a certain person has been voted for but not that he has been ostracized. Raaflaub further observes that since the Athenians were entitled to cast their votes for whomever they wished, there must have been an enormous number of stray votes against a considerable number of persons. Indeed, a large number of scattered votes has been revealed by the excavations at the Agora and Ceramicus: various *ostraka* exist which bear the name of an individual unmentioned by the ancient Greek sources, and who are thus unidentifiable. For the names on the *ostraka* and their numbers and distribution: Lang, 1990; Willemsen-Brenne, 1991; Brenne, 2002, p. 43-73; Thomsen, 1972, p. 71-80. Sickinger, 2017 includes a catalogue of *ostraka* excavated from the Agora in the late 1990s. The only familiar names inscribed on these *ostraka* are those of Themistocles, Aristides and Xanthippus; other names belong to unknown persons.

and so on, the *ostraka* should be considered as evidence of the shared political ideals.<sup>19</sup> As Paul J. Kosmin has recently observed, the *ostraka* are indispensable first-hand material on the citizens' mental associations. Unlike literary sources, which mainly represent the ideas of the elite, the *ostraka* sometimes give us a glimpse of the thoughts and feelings of an ordinary Athenian and reveal opinions, attitudes and mental associations of an individual voter and an ordinary citizen. I consider that when studied with ostracism's institutional features on the one hand and with literary testimonies of analogous institutions and punishments entailing a temporary exclusion from one's group of peers on the other, the *ostraka* reveal the ways contemporary Athenians imagined the purpose of ostracism. I believe that we can assess the question of inner change and reintegration by investigating the *ostraka* with the institutional features and analogous institutions, rather than studying the end results of the ostracisms. In what follows, I aim to shed light on how the Athenians managed to reconcile their sense of justice and legal due process with an institution that scholars have recurrently regarded as arbitrary mistreatment of high-profile citizens or as a strictly political measure.

## 2. Isolating a Norm Breaker

Ostracism entailed a communally determined physical removal from the city. The required seclusion of the subject might have echoed the attitudes of the ancient Athenians towards exiles and fugitives.<sup>20</sup> It is well recognized that in classical Athens, a person was strongly attached not only to one's social groups such as one's social class and ethnic group, but also to one's *polis*. By the fifth century, deme and civic identification had become a significant part of an individual's self-image with the result that a cityless (*apolis*) person had started to be understood as handicapped. According to the famous Aristotelian definition, man is φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον ("by nature a social and political being"). In the same connection, Aristotle, quoting Homer, uses the metaphor of a pawn isolated on a chessboard to describe the sense of isolation of the *apolis*.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, according to Aristotle, a man who by nature and not by chance could not live in the community "forms no part of the state and so is either a brutish beast or a god".<sup>22</sup> From the perspective of Aristotle's political philosophy, a cityless (*apolis*) person was considered as a non-human or a beast – or, on the other hand, a god. From this viewpoint, a man subjected to ostracism might have appeared to his fellow Athenians as an inhuman creature. In general, Greek literature from Homer onwards provides numerous examples of disapproving attitudes towards cityless wanderers. Except for the Cynic philosophers, ancient Athenians seem to have regarded homeless wandering as a negative phenomenon.<sup>23</sup> As has been noted by Silvia Montiglio, the Greeks did not perceive exile as a mere change of place but they equated wandering with suffering. According to Montiglio, the Greeks perceived the exile as a wanderer moving away from the centre, i.e., out of the city. They identified the exile with a wanderer because the exile had lost his centre of belonging, that is, his *polis*. In effect, to be a homeless wanderer entailed a kind of nonexistence.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> And perhaps as manifestations of the prevailing "political culture", to use Benjamin Gray's term: see Gray, 2015, esp. p. 6-19. The notion of political culture refers to the political assumptions and ideas underlying political actions and interacting with them. Political actions, in turn, reinforce these ideas and assumptions.

<sup>20</sup> For a different view, see Garland, 2014, p. 138-140, who separates ostracism from other forms of exile.

<sup>21</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 1.2.1253a1-7; Hom. *Il.* 9.63-64. The same quotation is repeated in Ar. *Pax* 1096-1098. For a discussion, see Loddo, forthcoming.

<sup>22</sup> [...] ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος: Arist. *Pol.* 1253a2-7. The brutish beast and the hero/god are opposed by Aristotle also in his *Nicomachean Ethics* 1145a15. See also Vernant-Vidal-Naquet, 1990, p. 135, 437 n. 122.

<sup>23</sup> On the positive attitude of the Cynics on wandering, see Montiglio, 2005, p. 180-203. Stoic philosophers considered that exile was an indifferent rather than a negative experience: see Stephens' essay in this volume.

<sup>24</sup> Montiglio, 2005, p. 30, 33, 35. For a discussion on the stereotypes associated with the exile, see also Gray, 2015.

Against this background, it seems significant that the subject of ostracism was to leave the city alone, without his family and belongings. The state did not confiscate his property and he was allowed to benefit from his possessions during his absence.<sup>25</sup> While this characteristic of ostracism has sometimes been viewed as evidence of its lenience, David C. Mirhady has paid due attention to the fact that the removal of only one man offered the *polis* the advantage of exercising control over him through his property and family.<sup>26</sup> In this regard, ostracism seems to have had similarities with Athenian laws on involuntary homicide. Mirko Canevaro has recently pointed out that a “soft *atimia*” ensued in cases of involuntary homicide.<sup>27</sup> “Soft *atimia*” did not involve confiscation of one’s property (unlike in cases of, for example, premeditated murder), but the goods of the *atimos* remained *epitima* and were thus not to be pillaged by others during the exile of the property-owner.<sup>28</sup> In this connection, it is worth noting that ostracism had similarities also with the *atimia* penalty (i.e., loss of public status and exclusion from the citizen body without physical exile from the country). In the classical period, *atimia* entailed “denial of public status”, to use the translation of Philip Brook Manville.<sup>29</sup> While the penalty led to civic death, the term *atimia* not only had legal but also moral connotations.<sup>30</sup> Legally speaking, an *atimos* under total *atimia* was not entitled to participate in the assembly, move any decrees or hold magistracy, bring suits, give evidence in court, serve as a juror, or enter the Agora or the sanctuaries.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, a subject of ostracism lost his public status (although only for a fixed period): he was deprived of his right to participate in, for example, political decision-making and litigation during his absence. An additional similarity between ostracism and *atimia* was that one consequence of partial *atimia* was the loss of the right to sail to the Hellespont, or cross to Ionia.<sup>32</sup> The physical location of the ostracized, too, was restricted: after 481/0, the subjects of ostracism were prohibited to overstep certain borderlines at risk of permanent *atimia*.<sup>33</sup>

In addition to these similarities between ostracism and *atimia*, the violations entailing *atimia* within the city seem to be reminiscent of some accusations that the voters inscribed upon their *ostraka*. *Atimia* ensued, for example, for changing Draco’s homicide law, for attempting to establish tyranny or helping in its establishment, and for refusing to take sides in times of civic disorder.<sup>34</sup> Another example of a transgression ensuing *atimia* was prostitution, which

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<sup>25</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 7.5.

<sup>26</sup> Mirhady, 1997, p. 18.

<sup>27</sup> Canevaro, 2017, p. 57.

<sup>28</sup> Dem. 23.45. For a discussion, see also Canevaro, 2017.

<sup>29</sup> Manville, 1980, p. 221.

<sup>30</sup> Youni, 2018; Youni, 2019; cf. Maffi, 1983. Emphasizing the connection between *atimia* and *timê*, Maffi argues that the verb *atimazein* meant “dishonour” and expressed the community’s negative judgment about a person. Hansen, 1976, p. 55 has argued that *atimia* was not identical with disenfranchisement, and van ’t Wout, 2011, p. 126 has argued for a continuity between the legal (disfranchisement) and the non-technical and non-legal (dishonour) usages of the word. Dmitriev, 2015 argues that there was no evolution from a moral to legal concept or from a severe to a mild punishment, and that the ways of using *atimia* in classical Athens were the result of the extra-legal nature of the punishment.

<sup>31</sup> Manville, 1980, p. 216; Hansen, 1976, p. 61-62.

<sup>32</sup> Andoc. 1.73-76. Other forms of partial *atimia* listed by Andocides included, for example, the loss of the right to speak in the Assembly, to become a member of the Council, or to enter the Agora. See also Manville, 1980, p. 216; Youni, 2019, p. 371-372.

<sup>33</sup> It is disputed whether the ostracized had to stay within or outside the residential boundaries. For example, Raubitschek, 1958, p. 103-105 and Heftner, 2018, p. 96-98 argue that the ostracized were to stay within the geographical boundaries while Figueira concludes that the ostracized were to stay outside these limits. For a philological discussion, see Figueira, 1987, p. 281-288.

<sup>34</sup> Changing Draco’s homicide law: Dem. 23.62; establishing tyranny: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 16.10; remaining neutral in civil strife: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 8.5. For a discussion on remaining neutral in times of civic disorder, see Manville, 1980, p. 217-218. This measure was based on the Solonian law on *stasis*. The law has survived in [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 8.5, and its authenticity is under dispute: see Hansen, 1976, p. 75 n. 6 and p. 78-79, rejecting the authenticity of

could be prosecuted under *graphê hetairēsis*. The law did not forbid prostitution, but if man was prosecuted for and convicted of *hetairēsis* in court, he was declared an *atimos* and hence deprived of his public status as an Athenian citizen.<sup>35</sup> Numerous *ostraka* indicate that the voter had felt that the target of his vote had broken these kinds of norms and rules. Upon one *ostrakon* excavated from the Agora a voter has inscribed ---]ς ἄτιμ[ος.<sup>36</sup> On another *ostrakon*, Themistocles, ostracized in ca. 471, is called *katapygôn*.<sup>37</sup> This *ostrakon* seems to insult Themistocles as an unmanly *kinaidos*: *katapygôn* was a vulgar expression that referred to a passive role in sexual intercourse;<sup>38</sup> on the other hand, the term *katapygôn* was also one of the opposite concepts of *sôphrosynê*.<sup>39</sup>

Why was Themistocles ostracized? Forsdyke has considered this ostracism, with others, in terms of intra-elite competition. Yet, Plutarch tells us that the Athenians ostracized Themistocles because of his “asymmetry”, “[...] curtailing his dignity and pre-eminence (κολούοντες τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν), as they were wont to do in the case of all whom they thought to have oppressive power, and to be incommensurate with true democratic equality (πρὸς ἰσότητα δημοκρατικὴν ἀσυμμέτρους εἶναι)”.<sup>40</sup> In general, Plutarch explains Themistocles’ ostracism in terms of envy. Plutarch also mentions that Themistocles had offended the people by building the temple of Artemis and surnaming it Aristoboule (“the Best Counsellor”) – the obvious hint was that it was Themistocles himself who was the best counsellor of the Hellenes.<sup>41</sup> According to another late source, Diodorus of Sicily, Themistocles was ostracized because of his superiority (ὑπεροχὴν) on the one hand and envy on the other.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, Demosthenes presents Themistocles’ placing of himself above the multitude (μειζὸν ἑαυτῶν ἀξιοῦντα φρονεῖν) as the cause of his ostracism.<sup>43</sup> In this respect, it is noteworthy that one *ostrakon* states that “this ostrakon is to Themistokles from the deme Phrearrhos, on account of honour” (*timês heneka*),<sup>44</sup> thus appearing to refer to Themistocles’ excessive love of *timê*. Taken together, these accounts may indicate that Themistocles was perhaps perceived by the Athenians as being over-ambitious, and that his ostracism was related

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the law. For a contrasting view, see Forsdyke, 2005, p. 98, 99, accepting the law as authentic. For recent discussions on the Solonian law on *stasis*, see van t’ Wout 2010 for a claim that the law was not intended to encourage side taking but, in fact, quite the opposite; see also Schmitz 2011 for an argument that the *stasis* law may have been an archaic predecessor of ostracism. For a full list of transgressions that led to *atimia*, see Hansen, 1976, p. 72-74.

<sup>35</sup> E.g., Lanni, 2016.

<sup>36</sup> Agora P 17615 (in Lang, 1990). For a recent study on this *ostrakon*, a curse tablet and *atimia*, see van t’ Wout, 2011.

<sup>37</sup> Brenne, 2002, T 1/150. Sickinger, 2017, p. 457, 475, 501 has observed that two *ostraka* (P 32941 and P 32587) excavated from Agora in the late 1990s may be interpreted as bearing the epithet *katapygôn*: a third line on one *ostrakon* addressed against Themistocles starts with the letters ΚΑΔΑΠ, which may be the beginning of the word *katapygôn*, assuming that the voter has, erroneously, written a delta for tau. A similar insult may also occur on an *ostrakon* against an unknown candidate that preserves the traces [- - -] ΠΙΓΟ[- - -]. However, these graffiti are very unclear and they remain open to interpretation.

<sup>38</sup> For a discussion on the cultural image of a *kinaidos*, see Winkler, 1990, p. 45, 46, 50, 52, 54.

<sup>39</sup> Rademaker, 2005, p. 257; Winkler, 1990, p. 51. In the fifth century, an absence of self-control was perceived as a violation against the prevailing civic ideals, and a lack of self-discipline was thought to make man incapable of leading the state. In other words, if man was regarded as incapable of controlling his personal lusts, he was viewed as incapable of controlling himself; and a man who was not in control of himself was seen as incapable of being in control of a state.

<sup>40</sup> Plut. *Them.* 22.3. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin.

<sup>41</sup> Plut. *Them.* 22.1.

<sup>42</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.54.5-55.1.

<sup>43</sup> Dem. 23.204-205.

<sup>44</sup> Brenne, 2002, T 1/147.

to his excessive love of honour. While *philotimia* was considered a civic virtue in fifth-century Athens, a person with excessive ambition risked being regarded by others as a *hybristês*.<sup>45</sup>

Forsdyke views the ostracism of Aristides, too, in terms of intra-elite power struggle, arguing that Aristides and Themistocles were the primary “candidates” in the *ostrakophoriâ* of 482/1.<sup>46</sup> Indeed, Aristides and Themistocles were political (and perhaps personal) rivals.<sup>47</sup> However, Plutarch states that Aristides was ostracized because of envy. According to him, Aristides was first loved and then “envied” (φθονεῖσθαι) by the people. Furthermore, Plutarch relates that the Athenians were “in high spirits owing to their victory” (ἐπὶ τῇ νίκῃ μέγα φρονῶν) over the Persians and were “irritated with those whose name and repute set them above the mass. So they [...] ostracized Aristides, calling their envy of his repute fear of tyranny (ὄνομα τῷ φθόνῳ τῆς δόξης φόβον τυραννίδος θέμενοι).”<sup>48</sup> In the Plutarchian view, then, the people used fear of tyranny was only as a pretext for ostracizing Aristides; in fact, according to Plutarch, they ostracized Aristides because of envy. Nonetheless, Aristides was known for his modesty and justice. Herodotus, for one, depicts Aristides as “the best and most just man in Athens”,<sup>49</sup> and the anecdote on Aristides’ behaviour in the *ostrakophoria* of 482/1 is often repeated.<sup>50</sup>

Megacles was ostracized in 487/6 (and probably again around 470).<sup>51</sup> There are various indications of breaking civic norms on the *ostraka* addressed against him. One *ostrakon*, referring perhaps to his corruption, states that Megacles is “silver-loving” (*philargyros*).<sup>52</sup> In addition, several *ostraka* accuse Megacles of his habit of horse breeding. Since horse breeding was associated with wealth and social status, these *ostraka* can be interpreted as comments on Megacles’ aristocratic and luxurious life-style. Also Megacles’ new hair-style drew the attention of the voters: two *ostraka* refer to Megacles’ “new hair” (*nea komê*).<sup>53</sup> Long hair might have been perceived as a sign of aspiration to tyranny: for example, Herodotus reports that Cylon, who attempted to become tyrant in the seventh century, “groomed himself” or literally “grew his hair long” (*ekomêse*).<sup>54</sup> Provided that long hair was perceived as a sign of desire for

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<sup>45</sup> For the connection between *mega phronein* (“thinking big”) and *hybris*, see Cairns, 1996.

<sup>46</sup> Forsdyke, 2005, p. 166, 170.

<sup>47</sup> Plut. *Them.* 3.1-4 relates that Aristides and Themistocles were political opponents and personal enemies; they were different in their life and character. According to Plutarch, Aristides was gentle, conservative and righteous whereas his opponent Themistocles represented a more innovative type. Themistocles was famous for his ambition and for his competitive spirit: e.g., Plut. *Them.* 3.1-4; 8.110.1-3, 8.112.1-3, Hdt. 8.123.1-125.2. Furthermore, according to Plut. *Arist.* 2.1-2, Aristides represented a politician who was in favour of an aristocratic form of government while Themistocles was known as the “champion of the people”. According to [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.3, Themistocles was renowned for his military skills while Aristides was famous for his political skills and his justice. On Aristides’ and Themistocles’ enmity, see also Hdt. 7.144, 8.79.2; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.7.

<sup>48</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 7.1-2. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin, modified.

<sup>49</sup> Hdt. 8.79.1.

<sup>50</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 7.5-6: “[...] as the voters were inscribing their ostraka, it is said that an unlettered and utterly boorish fellow handed his ostrakon to Aristides, whom he took to be one of the ordinary crowd, and asked him to write Aristides on it. He, astonished, asked the man what possible wrong Aristides had done him. ‘None whatever,’ was the answer, ‘I don’t even know the fellow, but I am tired of hearing him everywhere called ‘The Just.’ On hearing this, Aristides made no answer, but wrote his name on the ostrakon and handed it back.” Trans. Bernadette Perrin.

<sup>51</sup> There is significantly more archaeological than literary evidence concerning the ostracism of Megacles against whom, according to Brenne, 2002, p. 62, 4142 *ostraka* have been unearthed. According to Brenne, 2002, p. 42, all the Ceramicus *ostraka* belong to the *ostrakophoria* of 471 as a result of which either Megacles or Themistocles was ostracized. For a recent discussion on the dating of the Ceramicus *ostraka*, see Sickinger, 2017, p. 449-451 (he prefers dating the *ostraka* to the 470s). However, Missiou, 2011, p. 157-158 believes that the Ceramicus *ostraka* are not from a single *ostrakophoria* but from several *ostrakophoriai* organized between the 480s and the 460s.

<sup>52</sup> Brenne, 2002, T 1/111.

<sup>53</sup> Brenne, 2002, T 1/107-108.

<sup>54</sup> Hdt. 5.71.1; cf. Thuc. 1.126; Plut. *Sol.* 12. For another reference to cutting long hair, although in a completely different context, see Anac. fr. 347. See also Harrison, 2003, p. 147. Fisher, 2009, p. 535 notes, without a reference

tyranny, these *ostraka* may imply that Megacles wished to become tyrant. On the other hand, long hair was associated with *habrosynê*, and therefore the “new hair” *ostraka* may indicate that these ostracizers perhaps based their voting decisions on Megacles’ luxurious and aristocratic life-style.

Megacles is also called ΤΡΟΦΟΝΟΣ (literally: “nurtured”) on one *ostrakon*.<sup>55</sup> Among others, Stefan Brenne has interpreted that ΤΡΟΦΟΝΟΣ is related to *tryphê* (τροφή, “luxury”).<sup>56</sup> This *ostrakon*, then, would refer to Megacles’ arrogance, overindulgence, and luxurious lifestyle. Another possibility is that ΤΡΟΦΟΝΟΣ referred to the builder of the first temple of Apollo in Delphi – the mythical builder was called Τροφώνιος.<sup>57</sup> However, the literal meaning of ΤΡΟΦΟΝΟΣ is “nurtured” (τροφέω = “to nurture”). To the best of my knowledge, no-one has interpreted the *ostrakon* by translating it in this way. However, I would also consider the “nurtured” meaning of the word plausible. Indeed, *trophê* was a constant concern of the fifth-century Athenians, as all citizens obviously shared an aspiration to be well fed. In this regard, the idea of the *ostrakon* might have been associated with the gap between the rich (the well-fed) and the poor(ly fed). Yet it is noteworthy that the state of being well-fed was described as a precondition of *hybris* in Greek literature. According to the general cultural pattern in archaic Greece, prosperity (*olbos*) was seen as a cause of *koros* (“satiety”, or, as M. W. Dickie has aptly translated it, “feeling well-filled and pleased with oneself”<sup>58</sup>). *Koros*, in turn, was considered as a cause of *hybris*. In this view, material well-being was thought to engender great human villains. According to this traditional view held by, for example, the sixth-century poet and politician Solon, satiety and excess of wealth caused *hybris*.<sup>59</sup> *Koros* referred to the state of being overfed or drunk, and *hybris* was, then, associated with satiety.

Aristotle and Theophrastus use the word *exhybrizein* (“to break out in *hybris*”) in their botanical texts to refer to vines that “goat”, that is, to a condition of not producing ripe fruit but instead creating a profusion of flowers and leaf.<sup>60</sup> The vines break out in *hybris* because of their excessive nurture (*trophê*). Over nurtured plants, which failed to produce fruit or crops, were depicted in Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ botanical texts as hybristic.<sup>61</sup> Accepting Ann Michelini’s argument that in classical Athenians’ view, similarities existed between hybristic plants and hybristic men,<sup>62</sup> I would propose that the ΤΡΟΦΟΝΟΣ *ostrakon* could be seen in association with Megacles’ wealth. His material well-being, together with his greed, corruption, and luxurious life-style, is repeatedly referred to on the *ostraka* that refer to his habit of horse-breeding and his love of silver. In my view, the term ΤΡΟΦΟΝΟΣ might here be related to Megacles’ hybristic condition that had resulted (or was about to result) in, to speak metaphorically, producing only leaves instead of fruit. I would suggest that Megacles’ wealth and material well-being (*koros*) was perhaps perceived as an incentive for a lack of willingness

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to the *ostraka* addressed against Megacles, that the Herodotean wording suggests that there was a close relation between a bid for tyrannical power, an Olympic victory, and an aristocratic hairstyle.

<sup>55</sup> Brenne, 2002, T 1/113.

<sup>56</sup> Brenne, 2002; Mattingly, 1971.

<sup>57</sup> Brenne, 2002, p. 118.

<sup>58</sup> Dickie, 1984, p. 108.

<sup>59</sup> Several of Solon’s poems deal with the destructive effects of *hybris*. Specifically, his elegy on *eunomia* (fr. 4 West) discusses the effects of hybristic leaders on the *polis*, while his *Hymn to the Muses* (fr. 13 West) focuses on the retribution of *hybris* by the gods on a more individual level. Fr. 6 West states straightforwardly that *koros* breeds *hybris* in such men whose minds are not ready (or firm/solid enough) to receive it. For a recent commentary on Solon’s poems, see Noussia, 2010.

<sup>60</sup> Arist., *Gen. an.* 725b35: ὁμοιον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς τραγώσας ἀμπέλους πάθος, αἱ διὰ τὴν τροφήν ἐξυβρίζουσιν [...] For a discussion, see Fisher, 1992, p. 19.

<sup>61</sup> See also Fisher, 1992, p. 19: “In plants the undesirable element in the *hybris* consists in the plants’ ‘disobedient’ failure to produce crops or fruit.” On hybristic plants, see especially Michelini, 1978, *passim*.

<sup>62</sup> Michelini, 1978.



to submit to the same rules as others, and the voter expressed that this was the reason why he wished to ostracize Megacles.

### 3. Impermanence and Inner Change

The subject of ostracism was not exiled for life, but he was expected to return and entitled to regain his public status after a decade had passed. Interestingly, ten years is a period which is found often in Greek literature. For example, Odysseus' journey home after the Trojan War took ten years; the tyrant Pisistratus was banished from Athens for ten years after his second attempt to seize power; and the statesman Solon's voluntary absence from public life after making his democratic reforms in the 590s lasted ten years.<sup>63</sup> Why was the period of ostracism determined to last ten years? Some may argue that a lifelong exile for no specific offence was thought unfair, and that this unfairness was the reason the period of ostracism was fixed. One may also assume that ostracism was practised to reduce political tension and the dangers of *stasis*, and that after ten years, the conditions of political conflict would have been eased and the ostracized person could return home safely. In this view, a lifelong exile would have been unnecessary. While I am not rejecting this view, I find it worth asking if the impermanence of ostracism indicates that the subject was supposed to experience an inner improvement during his period of absence.<sup>64</sup>

Various parallels exist regarding the significance and the reforming effect of the impermanent exclusion from one's group of peers in archaic and classical Greek literature. For example, Hesiod represents in his *Theogony* a punishment equivalent to ostracism. According to Hesiod, if a god swore an oath in the name of Styx and committed perjury, he would spend one year without breathing, in a deep sleep (*kôma*) without having any dreams and neither food nor drink. After one year's "coma", the treacherous god would lose his right to participate in the issues concerning gods for a period of nine years; in the tenth year, nevertheless, his right to take part in the business was restored:

"For whoever of the deathless gods that hold the peaks of snowy Olympus pours a libation of her water and is forsworn, lies breathless until a full year is completed, and never comes near to taste ambrosia and nectar, but lies spiritless and voiceless on a strewn bed: and a heavy trance overshadows him. But when he has spent a long year in his sickness, another penance and an harder follows after the first. For nine years he is cut off from the eternal gods and never joins their councils or their feasts, nine full years. But in the tenth year he comes again to join the assemblies of the deathless gods who live in the house of Olympus [...]"<sup>65</sup>

Hence, Hesiod seems to be describing a punishment among the gods that has distinguishing similarities with ostracism, which was invented more than two hundred years later. Firstly, after being banished by ostracism, the exiled man was to keep away from his group of peers for a period of ten years at the risk of permanent *atimia*. After ten years had passed, his public status was restored. In an analogous way, the treacherous god of this Hesiodic passage was allowed to return after a ten-year period of absence (a one-year coma with an additional nine-year absence from public life). Secondly, like the treacherous god, the ostracized man was not allowed to take part in the public life in Athens. Ostracism was like a "coma" because the subject was forbidden to be in contact with other Athenians and was isolated from his group of peers. Furthermore, Hesiod names perjury as the transgression leading to an impermanent banishment and, interestingly, *atimia* seems to have been a penalty

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. Mirhady, 1997.

<sup>64</sup> Kosmin, 2015, p. 124, too, has remarked the significance of return and the possible implications of ostracism as a "transformer" of a "dangerous or treacherous politician into a safe member of the Athenian community".

<sup>65</sup> Hes. *Theog.* 793–806. Trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White.

for perjury in the fifth century.<sup>66</sup> While it is obvious that the story did not serve as a model of behaviour for the Athenians, Hesiod's story shows that the idea of an impermanent exclusion from one's group of peers was familiar to Athenians living in the pre-Cleisthenic age.

More significantly, a parallel is worth drawing between ostracism and what the fourth-century philosopher Plato later called *sôphronistêrion* in his *Laws*. In Plato's philosophy, the *sôphronistêrion* was a place intended for the redeemable.<sup>67</sup> Whereas remorseless wrongdoers were to be executed, those wrongdoers who had committed impiety (*asebeia*) out of folly or impulse (and not out of conviction) were given a chance to recover by spending a five-year term in a *sôphronistêrion*. If the offender committed impiety a second time after a period in a *sôphronistêrion*, he was to be executed. Plato considers that punishment makes the offender *sôphrôn* and keeps people from further injustice – this is why he names his “reform centre” *sôphronistêrion*. The name is derived from the Greek word *sôphrôn*. Herodotus uses the verb *sôphronein* to mean “soundness of mind” when he describes Cambyses' recovery from his madness.<sup>68</sup> As Adriaan Rademaker has noted, the terms can be used in this context to contrast sanity with madness or other abnormal states of mind. These states of mind could therefore be cured (as was Herodotus' Cambyses). Indeed, Rademaker notes that soundness of mind or “sanity” provided the basis that enabled the person to behave in a morally desirable way.<sup>69</sup> As it was related to the avoidance of injustice and violence, *sôphrôn* was also close to *dikaïos* as a *sôphrôn* man is both able and willing to comply with standards of decency.<sup>70</sup> Rademaker also notes that the counterpart of the *sôphrôn* man is described in ancient Greek sources as “lacking in *aidôs*” (a sense of shame and respect for others) (*anaidês*), as *miaros* (“filthy”), *panourgos* (“up to everything”), *thrasys* (“bold”), *katapygôn* (“depraved”), or *hybristês* (“given to physical infringement on the integrity of others”).<sup>71</sup>

In Plato's *Laws*, the men who committed *asebeia* out of conviction were to be isolated for the rest of their lives, and after their death, their bodies were to be cast outside the city because of the infectious nature of the pollution. Men convicted of outrageous assault upon parents were to be banished from the city for life, and they were to keep away from the sacred places at the risk of death. Free men were forbidden to pay any attention to them at risk of incurring a share of contagious guilt.<sup>72</sup> In ancient Athens, exiles were treated as if they did not exist: for example, it was illegal for a free citizen to give hospitality to a convicted exile.<sup>73</sup> Murderers and incurable persons were viewed as bringers of pollution and as public plague. In one passage of a probably unauthentic speech by Demosthenes, a reference is made to the criminal Aristogiton as an incurable beast who is to be cast out and destroyed.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, according to the creation myth told us by Protagoras in Plato's dialogue (*Protagoras* 322d), Zeus had given *aidôs* and *dikê* to mankind, and these were to be equally distributed among all the people. Humans, without political skill, were incapable of living together, and *aidôs* and *dikê* were required to keep human society together. However, not all the people were capable

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<sup>66</sup> Antiph. 2.4.7; Andoc. 1.74. For a discussion, see Youni, 2019, p. 371.

<sup>67</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 854d5, 907d-909a; Pl. *Gorg.* 478d6; cf. Pl. *Crit.* 121c2. For a discussion, see Rademaker, 2005, p. 290–291.

<sup>68</sup> Hdt. 3.64.5. Cf. Hom. *Od.* 23.13. See also Rademaker, 2005, p. 252.

<sup>69</sup> Rademaker, 2005, p. 253. Given that the man was sane he could, in the words of Rademaker, 2005, p. 254, “with the soundness of mind [...] refrain from irresponsible behaviour”.

<sup>70</sup> In this sense, *hybrizein* is one of the antonyms of *sôphronein*. Rademaker, 2005, p. 266.

<sup>71</sup> Rademaker, 2005, p. 257-258.

<sup>72</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 881d3-e7.

<sup>73</sup> For a discussion, see Garland, 2014, p. 137.

<sup>74</sup> According to [Dem.] 25.58, 63, 95, “He is an unclean beast; his touch is pollution. Is he not impious, bloodthirsty, unclean, and a sycophant? [...] His case is incurable, men of Athens, quite incurable. Just as doctors, when they detect a cancer or an ulcer or some other incurable growth, cauterize it or cut it away, so you ought all to unite in exterminating this monster. Cast him out of your city; destroy him.” See also Allen, 2000.

of taking part in *aidôs* and *dikê*, and Zeus ordained that he who could not “take part in *aidôs* and *dikê*, shall die the death as a public plague” (‘καὶ νόμον γε θεὸς παρ’ ἑμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.’). This passage shows that classical Greek philosophers were familiar with the idea of casting out a man who was neither capable of living with others nor equipped with *aidôs*. Douglas L. Cairns has defined *aidôs* as an internal restricting force, a “prospective, inhibitory emotion” that makes a person respect the honour of others.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, according to Cairns, *aidôs* comes close to “conscience” but is not identical with it.<sup>76</sup> The notion of *aidôs* was closely related to the concept of *sôphrosynê*, too. While *sôphrosynê* had multiple meanings in classical Greek discourse, the most common definition and the one that was most easily activated in the minds of the classical Athenians when thinking about men was that of “control of desires”.<sup>77</sup>

Plato believed in the reformatory effect of punishment and held that punishment should be curative or educative. For example, in his *Gorgias*, Socrates states that a prudent man should denounce himself and thus ensure a penalty. Comparing a judge with a doctor and the healing with the cutting and burning of the surgeon, Socrates states that a penalty makes the subject healthy.<sup>78</sup> In the *Laws*, Plato’s Athenian speaker refers to temporary exile as the penalty for homicide through anger. The idea is that temporary exile will have a transformative effect on the subject, and that the offender’s propensity for anger will be checked by temporary exile. The Athenian speaker states that if the deed has been done in rage without deliberate intent, the exile will last two years; if he has slain in passion with deliberate intent, the period of exile will be three years.<sup>79</sup> It is therefore the act of deliberation that prolongs the punishment. Benjamin Gray has suggested that the offender’s propensity for anger was checked during the punishment because of the harsh conditions of exile; during exile, mere survival required more prudent and restrained habits.<sup>80</sup> Certainly, some passages imply that at least some Greeks wished to see that the exiles were embracing hardship during their punishment; they referred with scorn to exiles who lived in comfort in exile.<sup>81</sup> Later, the Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus believed exile accustomed men who were suffering from illnesses caused by soft living and a luxurious life-style to live more austere. According to this Stoic view, exile improved soft men and restored their health.<sup>82</sup>

The current scholarly consensus seems to be that the rehabilitative effect of punishment was only a philosophical conception, and that it was in fact an inversion of the prevailing contemporary attitudes.<sup>83</sup> However, David Cohen has argued that the legislation in Plato’s *Laws* and the laws of classical Athens did not differ from each other as one might expect.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the fact that Platonic ideas probably had no direct influence on Athenian political discourse does not rule out the possibility that ideas of individual reform, improvement and reintegration might have prevailed in fifth-century Athens. In addition to Plato’s philosophy, the topic of the reformatory effects of punishment on its subject emerges in a variety of ancient Greek sources.

<sup>75</sup> Cairns, 1993, p. 432.

<sup>76</sup> Cairns, 1993, p. 139-146. For the debate over the question of early Greece as a “shame culture” or a “guilt culture”, see Cairns, 1993, p. 27-47.

<sup>77</sup> Adriaan Rademaker has challenged the alleged contrast between the “intellectual” sense, which translates *sôphrosynê* as “discreet”, “prudent” and “of sound mind”, and the “moral” sense, which prompts translations such as “self-controlled”, “temperate” and “chaste”: see Rademaker, 2005, p. 7-8. For women, the notion was associated with fidelity, and for boys and girls, it meant quietness or obedience: Rademaker, 2005, p. 251.

<sup>78</sup> Pl. *Gorg.* 480a5-d7.

<sup>79</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 867c4-d5; cf. *Leg.* 866d-e and 867b.

<sup>80</sup> Gray, 2015, p. 127.

<sup>81</sup> See Gray, 2015, p. 330 and n. 220 on the same page for references.

<sup>82</sup> For the Stoic views on exile, see Stephens’ article in this volume.

<sup>83</sup> Gray, 2015, p. 123, 127.

<sup>84</sup> Cohen, 1991, p. 216 asks: “[...] how different is Plato’s legislation from Athenian law? Hasn’t Plato just systematized the traditional notion of *asebeia* and fitted it into his larger political theoretical framework?”

For example, Demosthenes expects a remedial effect from punishment in his speech against Aristogeiton,<sup>85</sup> and Andocides, presenting himself as one who has “learnt the meaning of self-control and good sense (ἐπιστάμενον δὲ οἶον τὸ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ὀρθῶς βουλευέσθαι)” and one who has suffered after making an error, clearly implies that exile can have a significant educational effect on the offender, and that these were formative adversities of punitive exile.<sup>86</sup>

#### 4. Expelling and Reintegrating a Deviant

In Athenian tragedies, exile was represented as the standard remedy for pollution.<sup>87</sup> The fear of divine retribution meant archaic and classical Athenian society eschewed men who caused pollution. In particular, prominent men such as kings and generals were regarded as potentially dangerous. Various scholars such as the French sociologist and historian Louis Gernet a century ago have viewed ostracism as a reverse of the scapegoat (*pharmakos*) ritual through which the city was annually purified.<sup>88</sup> During the scapegoat ritual, two ugly persons were chosen from the lowest segment of society, chased across the city’s borders, and either driven away or stoned to death.<sup>89</sup> In contrast, the subjects of ostracism were highly prominent men belonging to the upper class. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet have argued that the role of ostracism was symmetrical to and the reverse of the scapegoat ritual: while in the *pharmakos* ritual “whatever is most vile and threatens it from below” was expelled, through ostracism the city expelled “whatever it is in it that is too high and that embodies the evil that can fall on it from above”. By doing this, the *polis* set its limits concerning what was below it and what above, thus opposing man to the divine and heroic on the one hand and to the monstrous and bestial on the other.<sup>90</sup>

Andrej Petrovic has argued recently, against the traditional scholarly view, that Greek religious thinking was concerned not only with one’s outer purity but also with one’s inner purity. He maintains that social norms and divine ordinances significantly overlapped in Greek societies (for example, in norms such as respecting one’s parents and treating guests properly), and he emphasizes the connection between purity and morality.<sup>91</sup> Robin Osborne, too, has recognized the moral aspect of purity. According to him, “Declaring that a form of behaviour was impious, impure and demanded purification served to bring the offender into the public gaze and justify treating him or her as needing to be separated from and then reintegrated into society.”<sup>92</sup> Moreover, Petrovic distinguishes two types of “metaphysical” pollution: the first resulting from minor offences, and the second from major transgressions. According to him, pollution resulting from minor offences did not contaminate other humans, whereas a major transgression that had violated divinely sanctioned social norms led to “major metaphysical pollution” (termed *agos* by the Greeks). *Agos* was caused by fundamental transgressions against divine or ritual authorities. These included violation of the sanctuary, violent removal of suppliants or oath-breaking. Thus, breach of divinely sanctioned social norms could lead to

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<sup>85</sup> Dem. 25.94: “Now here is Aristogeiton, who has so far outstripped all men in wickedness that his punishments have not disciplined him (οὐδὲ παθὼν ἐνουθετήθη), and he is once more detected in the same illegal and rapacious acts.” Trans. A. T. Murray.

<sup>86</sup> Andoc. 1.144-145. For a discussion on this passage, see Gray, 2015, p. 127, 128.

<sup>87</sup> For example, Allen, 2000, p. 79-80 has suggested that the Athenians treated wrongdoers as diseased persons who could spread disease within the city. On pollution in general, see Parker, 1983. On the connections between homicide and pollution, see also Harris, 2015, for an argument that the ideas of pollution had continuing influence on laws as late as in the fourth century.

<sup>88</sup> Gernet, 1917.

<sup>89</sup> On the scapegoat ritual in more detail, see Bremmer, 1983.

<sup>90</sup> Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, 1990, p. 133-135.

<sup>91</sup> Petrovic, 2016, p. 12.

<sup>92</sup> Osborne, 2011, p. 176.

major pollution.<sup>93</sup> Interestingly, one *ostrakon*<sup>94</sup> describes Themistocles as *hypegaios agos* (“pollution in the land”), and another<sup>95</sup> accuses Aristides of offences against suppliants. There are several further examples, too, of magical or irrational uses of the *ostraka*. On three *ostraka* the subject of the vote is called “cursed” (*aleitêros*), and one *ostrakon* against Xanthippus accuses him of having done “the most wrong of the accursed leaders”.<sup>96</sup>

Some scholars have paralleled Hyperbolus, ostracized in ca. 415, with a scapegoat.<sup>97</sup> Indeed, various ancient Greek sources describe Hyperbolus as an exception among the subjects of ostracism, and he was regularly mocked by contemporary comedians.<sup>98</sup> Furthermore, Plutarch considers that “no worthless or disreputable fellow had ever before fallen under this condemnation of ostracism.”<sup>99</sup> Philochorus’ account agrees with that of Plutarch: “Hyperbolus was the only one ostracized since he was disreputable because of his wicked lifestyle, and not because of suspicion for aiming at tyranny; after him, they made an end of the custom of ostracizing.”<sup>100</sup> In a similar vein, Thucydides states that Hyperbolus was not ostracized because of the fear of his influence and worth (οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον) but because he was a “shame to the city” (διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως).<sup>101</sup> The athidographer Androtion, too, states that Hyperbolus “was ostracized because of his baseness” (διὰ φαυλότητα).<sup>102</sup> Along similar lines, the comic poet Plato labels Hyperbolus as unworthy of ostracism:

“Although he got what he deserved,  
his fate was too good for him and his slave brands.  
For ostracism was not invented for men such as he.”<sup>103</sup>

However, at least one passage seems to imply that Hyperbolus was in fact a suitable target for ostracism: he was shameless and immune to public opinion. Plutarch represents Hyperbolus’ insensibility to criticism as a negative thing, stating that Hyperbolus was unmoved by abuse, and insensible to it, owing to his contempt of public opinion (ἄτρεπτος δὲ πρὸς τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ ἀπαθὴς ὢν ὀλιγοῖα δόξης). This feeling some call courage and valor, but it is really mere shamelessness (ἀναίσχυντίαν) and folly (ἀπόνοϊαν). No one liked him, but the people often made use of him when they were eager to besmirch and calumniate men of rank and station.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>93</sup> Petrovic, 2016, p. 31 (Table 0.1).

<sup>94</sup> Brenne, 2002, T 1 / 149.

<sup>95</sup> Brenne, 2002, T 1/38 = Lang 44. See also Forsdyke, 2005, p. 157.

<sup>96</sup> Χσάνθ[ιππον τόδε] φῆσιν ἀλειτέρων πρ[υτ]ανειῶν / τῶστρακ[ον Ἀρρί]φρονος παῖδα μά[λ]ιστ’ ἀδικῆν. Brenne, 2002, T 1/153; Lang, 1990, p. 134. The text is open to interpretation. An alternative way of reading the text (with changed accents on ἀλειτέρων and πρ[υτ]ανειῶν) is: “This ostrakon says that the accursed Xanthippus, son of Ariphron, wrongs the prytaneion.” Forsdyke, 2005, p. 156 accepts the latter interpretation, thus dissenting from the scholarly consensus. See Lang, 1990, p. 134 and Brenne, 2002, p. 134 with further references.

<sup>97</sup> See, e.g., Ogden, 1997, p. 143. According to Ogden, in Hyperbolus’ case, the banishment, harm to the city, and personal obnoxiousness were associated with each other. For a discussion of Hyperbolus and Cleon as scapegoats, see also Ogden, 1997, p. 144.

<sup>98</sup> *E.g.*, Ar. *Eq.* 1304, 1363, 1402-1405; *Nub.* 623, 876; *Pax* 681, 921, 1316; *Ach.* 846; *Vesp.* 1007; *Ran.* 570-571; *Thesm.* 839-841. Other sources include Eupolis, Leucon and Polyzelus. See also Rhodes, 1994, 95 n. 58.

<sup>99</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 13.4-5. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin.

<sup>100</sup> Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 30: μόνος δὲ Ὑπερβόλος ἐκ τῶν ἀδόξων ἐξωστρακίσθη διὰ μοχθηρίαν τρόπων, οὐ δὲ ὑποψίαν τυραννίδος· μετὰ τοῦτον δὲ κατελύθη τὸ ἔθος [...].

<sup>101</sup> Thuc. 8.73.3.

<sup>102</sup> Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F 42: Ὑπερβόλος οὗτος, ὡς Ἀνδροτίων φησίν, Ἀντιφάνους ἦν Περιθοίδης, ὃν καὶ ὠστρακίσθη διὰ φαυλότητα.

<sup>103</sup> Plato *Com.* F 203 K.-A.: καίτοι ἐπέπραχε τῶν τρόπων μὲν ἄξια, | αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν στιγμάτων ἀνάξια: | οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων εἶνεκ’ ὄστραχ’ εὐρέθη. Trans. Forsdyke, 2005, p. 153. The poem is cited by Plut. *Nic.* 11.6. and *Alc.* 13.5.

<sup>104</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 13.3. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin.

Plutarch nevertheless considered Hyperbolus' ostracism as mistargeted. According to Plutarch, Hyperbolus was ostracized only because Alcibiades and Nicias joined forces and manipulated the vote: he considers that as soon as Nicias and Alcibiades became aware of Hyperbolus' wickedness, they united their factions and made Hyperbolus ostracized.<sup>105</sup> While this explanation has been somewhat celebrated by modern scholars, Forsdyke has pointed out that Plutarch is the only source who mentions any manipulation of the vote, and that Plutarch's version is likely to be storytelling from the fourth century sources.<sup>106</sup> David Rosenbloom has proposed a more compelling explanation for Hyperbolus' ostracism. He has suggested that *stasis* existed between the social classes *chrēstoi* ("good" or "noble"), with Nicias and Alcibiades as its representatives, and *ponēroi* ("bad" or "vile"), represented by Hyperbolus. From this perspective, the *ostrakophoria* of 415 is a manifestation of an ideological class struggle.<sup>107</sup> However, another possibility is that it was Alcibiades' undemocratic style and his profligate way of life that had prompted the decision to organize an *ostrakophoria* that year.<sup>108</sup> These explanations can be combined by studying the subject in light of the black sheep effect of which social psychologists have been long aware. According to social psychologists, the black sheep effect stems from the social groups' need to restore the positivity of the in-group. Individuals that deviate from the group's norms or dissent from its norms and actions threaten the positive self-image of the group. As a result, the group rejects such individuals. In addition to threatening the positivity of the group, the deviant also threatens group cohesion, group distinctiveness and group locomotion. The rejection of the deviant also serves to restore a threatened self-image. The devaluation of the deviant (understood as an individual violating the norms of the group rather than as an individual disagreeing with the group's actions) serves to maintain and protect group identity. The group's treatment of the deviant depends on the severity of the deviant's actions, on the one hand, and on the seriousness of the harm caused to the group, on the other.<sup>109</sup> Is it perhaps possible that Alcibiades' undemocratic style may have divided the people into two camps, and that the Athenians felt that their democratic identity was in danger? As I see it, the decision to organize the *ostrakophoria* and the consequent voting

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<sup>105</sup> Plut. *Nic.* 11.1-4; *Alc.* 13.4. Although he emphasizes Hyperbolus' obnoxious character, Plutarch sees the division of the people into two camps as the primary reason behind the organizing of the *ostrakophoria* of 415. Indeed, according to Plutarch, the feud between Alcibiades and Nicias had become intense, and the *ostrakophoria* was an attempt to resolve the situation. Forsdyke, 2005, p. 174-175 agrees with this view, arguing that while the ostracism of Hyperbolus is usually treated as an exception it may have been an example of the *dēmos*' intervention in intra-elite strife for political power.

<sup>106</sup> Forsdyke, 2005, p. 171-172.

<sup>107</sup> Rosenbloom, 2004, p. 55, 56, 58, 65, 97. Rosenbloom concludes that Hyperbolus' ostracism did not resolve the *stasis* between the *chrēstoi* and the *ponēroi*, but that the *stasis* continued to exist through the scandalous affairs of the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries, as well as through the oligarchic revolutions in 411 and 404, and the restoration of democracy in 403.

<sup>108</sup> Rosivach, 1987, p. 164 has suggested that Hyperbolus utilized the initial vote in the *ekklēsia kyria* to provoke the Athenians into reviving the institution of ostracism. According to Rosivach, Hyperbolus had manipulated the emotions of the people to intensify the hatred aroused by Alcibiades through his undemocratic style, behaviour and way of life. Alcibiades' profligate way of life and his disregard for public opinion brought to the Athenians' minds the life-style and attitude of a tyrant, and Hyperbolus, by exploiting this and presenting Alcibiades as a potential tyrant, manipulated the people to organize an *ostrakophoria*. Rosenbloom, 2004, p. 55, 72 considers that Hyperbolus had invoked the *ostrakophoria* and played the role of the advocate of the people by representing Alcibiades as a symbolic tyrant. As he notes, the tradition which considers the target of ostracism in terms of ill-will against the *dēmos* or his capacity to subvert democracy is here connected with the symbolic function of ostracism. Rosenbloom has drawn attention to the symbolic function implied in [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.3 statement that ostracism was first an attempt to prevent another Pisistratus, but that after expelling the remnants of the tyrannical regime, a "symbolic transformation" took place as the people also started to ostracize those who seemed "too great". For the symbolic functions of ostracism, see also, e.g., Rosivach, 1987, p. 164-165; Forsdyke, 2005.

<sup>109</sup> See Jetten-Hornsey, 2014, p. 467-470, with further references and literature.

may well have served to unite the people and restore a self-image threatened by Alcibiades' tyrant-like behaviour.

While ostracism has been paralleled with the *pharmakos* ritual, a major difference existed between the two institutions. Scapegoats were excluded permanently; the subjects of ostracism were expected to return and regain their status as Athenian citizens. Not many did. For example, Hyperbolus died on Samos in 411, and Themistocles went to Argos after his ostracism, visiting other parts of Peloponnese from there as well. After various phases, he ultimately stayed at the Persian court, where he attained high consideration. Having been ostracized, he was convicted of treason.<sup>110</sup> He eventually died in Magnesia.<sup>111</sup> However, some subjects of ostracism were officially recalled. One of these was possibly Cimon, son of Miltiades. Forsdyke has explained Cimon's ostracism in terms of intra-elite rivalry. She suggests that a violent conflict between Cimon and Pericles or Ephialtes might have been a tangible threat on the eve of Cimon's ostracism.<sup>112</sup> Cimon had opposed the democratic reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles, and had gained a reputation as he had recovered the legendary king Theuseus' bones from Scyrus.<sup>113</sup> In 463, Cimon had stood trial charged with treason, and Pericles had been one of the accusers.<sup>114</sup> According to Plutarch, Cimon was ostracized for political reasons. He reports that Cimon's pro-Spartan policy had provoked envy and hostility among the Athenians and that the rage against the supporters of Sparta was the crucial factor that ultimately led to Cimon's ostracism. The story goes that the Lacedaemonians had summoned the Athenians for assistance against the Messenians and the Helots in Ithome but the Lacedaemonians had sent the Athenians home. The Athenians were furious because they felt they had been treated inappropriately. Subsequently, they ostracized Cimon as "a Sparta-lover and a *dêmos*-hater" (ὡς φιλολάκωνα καὶ μισόδημον).<sup>115</sup> Plutarch further relates that when he was suffering his ostracism, Cimon came to Tanagra in 457 to fight the Spartans and thus to prove that he was no lover of them. After the battle, Pericles perceived that the people longed for Cimon and wrote the decree that recalled him.<sup>116</sup> The story goes that Cimon returned and made peace between Athens and Sparta in 450.<sup>117</sup>

In addition to the political reasons, there may also have been moral reasons for ostracizing Cimon. According to some ancient sources, Cimon was ostracized because of his incestuous relationship with his half-sister Elpinice.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, one *ostrakon*, stating that Cimon should leave and take Elpinice with him, seems to refer to the incestuous relationship.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> According to Thuc. 1.135, the trial of treason was brought about as a result of information laid by the Spartans after his ostracism. Plutarch, however, does not represent Themistocles as treacherous in his *Life of Themistocles*.

<sup>111</sup> For the phases of Themistocles' journey after his ostracism, see Thuc. 1.135.3-1.138.2. On Themistocles' life and death: Thuc. 1.138.4-6; Nep. *Them.* 10.4; Plut. *Them.* 31.4-7.

<sup>112</sup> Forsdyke, 2005, p. 167-168. Ephialtes had deprived the Areopagus of their prerogatives at the end of the 460s and was later assassinated. On Ephialtes, Pericles and the Areopagus: Plut. *Cim.* 15.1-2. For the chronology of Cimon's dismissal and the deprivation of the prerogatives of the Areopagus, see, e.g., Cole, 1974.

<sup>113</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 8.5-6.

<sup>114</sup> Cimon had been accused of having been bribed by King Alexander of Macedonia because he was not willing to invade Macedonia in 463: see Plut. *Cim.* 14.2.

<sup>115</sup> Plut. *Per.* 9.4. On Cimon's alleged philolaconism: Plut. *Cim.* 16.1-4. Zaccarini, 2012 has claimed that the allegation of philolaconism is a product of late sources such as Plutarch, and that their allegations rely on the concept of philolaconism, which was not developed until the late fifth century.

<sup>116</sup> Cimon's recall: Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115 F 88; Plut. *Per.* 10.3-4; *Cim.* 17.6; Nep. *Cim.* 3.3.

<sup>117</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 18.1; *Per.* 10.1, 10.3; Diod. Sic. 11.86.1; Andoc. 3.3. According to Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115 F 88, too, Cimon was recalled after five years and he afterwards made a truce with the Lacedaemonians.

<sup>118</sup> [Andoc.] 4.33; Plut. *Cim.* 15.3; *Suda*, s. v. Kímon: Ἰθνηναῖος. οὗτος τῆ ἀδελφῆ Ἰθνηνικῆ συγκοιμηθεὶς διεβλήθη πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὠστρακίσθη πρὸς τῶν Ἰθνηναίων. *Suda*, s. v. *ostrakismos*: ὅτι Κίμων τῆ ἀδελφῆ Ἰθνηνικῆ συγκοιμηθεὶς καὶ διαβληθεὶς πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ἐξωστρακίσθη. *Suda* s. v. *aposttrakisthênai*: [...] ὅτι ἀποστρακίσθηται φασι τὸν Κίμωνα τῆ ἀδελφῆ Ἰθνηνικῆ συγκοιμηθέντα ὑπὸ Ἰθνηναίων. Gernet, 1917, p. 410 has emphasized the perspective of moral judgment. See also Zaccarini, 2012.

<sup>119</sup> Brenne, 2002, T 1/67.

It therefore seems plausible that at least a rumour was spread concerning the inappropriate relationship between Cimon and Elpinice (whether it was true or not), and that at least one citizen was so aggrieved that he wrote it down on his *ostrakon*. Rosivach has argued that Cimon was ostracized because his inappropriate affair revealed his contempt for the laws.<sup>120</sup> On the other hand, one might add that incest was a religious and social crime and, as such, entailed pollution.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, Cimon's alleged "laconizing" or "philolaconism" can be interpreted as a moral transgression.<sup>122</sup>

In addition to Cimon's recall in the early 450s, all men ostracized during the 480s (Hipparchus, Megacles, Xanthippus, a nameless man and Aristides) were recalled in 480 by the "Themistocles Decree". After the recall, the Athenians set residential restrictions to control the physical location of the ostracized. The decree stated that "in order also that all Athenians be of one mind in warding off the barbarian, those who have been exiled for ten years shall depart to Salamis and wait there until the people come to decision about them. Those who have been deprived of citizen rights are to have their rights restored."<sup>123</sup> Stanley M. Burstein has observed that the choice of the word "depart" (*apienai*), as well as the fact that Aristides and Xanthippus were appointed generals in 480/79, indicates that the ostracized were already staying in Athens when the decree was published.<sup>124</sup> Hence, at least some of the ostracized persons seem to have stayed either in Athens or near it at the time of the publishing of the decree. Would it be possible that all the men subjected to ostracism at that time were staying near Athens during their ostracisms? Were they, in fact, required to leave Athens at all? Did any residential restrictions exist before 480?

After the recall of the five men under ostracism, the Athenians determined residential restrictions for the ostracized. According to [Pseudo-]Aristotelian *Athênaiôn Politeia* (22.8):

"Three years later in the archonship of Hypsechides [probably in 481/0] they allowed all the persons ostracized to return, because of the expedition of Xerxes; and they fixed a boundary thenceforward for persons ostracized, prohibiting them from living within a line drawn from Geraestus to Scyllaeum (ἐντὸς Γεραιστοῦ καὶ Σκυλλαίου κατοικεῖν) under penalty of absolute loss of citizenship (ἢ ἀτίμους εἶναι καθάπαξ.)"<sup>125</sup>

The boundaries were drawn in Geraestus (in Euboea) and Scyllaeum (in Argolis). Why fix boundaries at all and why specifically these boundaries? It has been suggested that the geographical limits were introduced in order to prohibit the ostracized from being in contact with the Persians.<sup>126</sup> However, it is perhaps worth asking whether the five men ostracized during the 480s had been staying in an undesirable residence or behaving in a manner conceived as inappropriate for a man under ostracism. Thomas J. Figueira has suggested that the ostracized stayed on Aegina and that their close vicinity to Athens, as well as their continued influence on

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<sup>120</sup> Rosivach, 1987, p. 165.

<sup>121</sup> See, e.g., Zaccarini, 2012, p. 296 n. 30.

<sup>122</sup> According to Zaccarini, 2012, p. 297, "laconizing" was associated with "weird sexuality before political crimes".

<sup>123</sup> Themistocles Decree: ML 23. There is massive amount of research on the Themistocles Decree and its authenticity has been duly questioned. See, for example, Burstein, 1971.

<sup>124</sup> This leads him to believe that the recall decree and the Themistocles decree were two different motions: Burstein, 1971, p. 97, 103, 110.

<sup>125</sup> Trans. H. Rackham. Philochorus, *FGrHist* 328 F 30 is another ancient Greek source on the geographical limits.

<sup>126</sup> E.g., Rhodes, 1981, p. 282. According to this view, the geographical limits were meant to prohibit the ostracized from stepping outside the geographical boundaries. See Figueira, 1987, p. 299 with n. 62. For a philological discussion, see also Phillips, 1982, p. 40-41 n. 68. For a recent discussion, see Heftner, 2018, p. 97-98, for an argument that the residential restrictions were declared in 481/0 to prevent the ostracized from being in contact with the Persians. According to Heftner's reconstruction, the ostracized "was not allowed to enter the area beyond the promontory of Euboa": see Heftner, 2018, p. 105.



the Athenians, irritated the Athenians and prompted the recall.<sup>127</sup> Indeed, it seems likely that in general, exiles often chose to remain in the near vicinity of their homeland.<sup>128</sup> According to Gray, “liminal” exiles (i.e. exiles who saw their exile as an interlude) often chose to live in a piece of disputed or marginal territory, consisting of “rugged and inhospitable borderlands” in rural areas, including isolated parts of the territory of a *polis*, or the mainland territories of island *poleis*.<sup>129</sup> Gray also argues that similarities existed between the stereotype of the exile and the stereotypes of the ephebe and the young man. He maintains that a stereotype existed of the ephebe or *neos* as a “liminal young man confined to rugged border regions and focused on hunting and trickery, part citizen-in-waiting and part the antithesis of the socialised adult citizen”. Moreover, he argues that the figure of a liminal citizen-in-waiting without civic self-restraint was essential to Greek civic consciousness.<sup>130</sup> Furthermore, “liminal” exiles adopted a quasi-citizen identity and behaviour; one type of quasi-citizen behaviour was, according to Gray, participation in Panhellenic Games.<sup>131</sup> In this respect, it is worth noting that Megacles had attended and won the Pythian Games during his ostracism.<sup>132</sup> Remarkably, Draco’s homicide law banned unintentional homicides from Amphictyonic sacrifices and athletic Games (possibly Amphictyonic Games).<sup>133</sup>

Of the five Athenians ostracized in the 480s, Xanthippus and Aristides were appointed generals after their homecoming, in 479. Contrariwise, Megacles was not welcomed that warmly and he may have been ostracized again in the late 470s.<sup>134</sup> The (dubious) story goes that Alcibiades the Elder, too, was ostracized twice.<sup>135</sup> Indeed, it was not to be taken for granted that the homecoming exile was welcomed back warmly. Silvia Montiglio has noticed that while there are many known examples of exiles in Greek history who did regain their socio-political position after their exile, there are numerous opposite examples, also. Several ancient Greek sources support the view that the exile could not be wholly reintegrated into his community. For example, Montiglio has pointed out that Odysseus, disguised as a homeless wanderer, voiced the shared fear of not being fully recognized and reintegrated into the community after a long absence.<sup>136</sup> In this respect, it is interesting that social psychologists have demonstrated that a rejected deviant stays rejected even if he is vindicated (unless the group officially reintegrates him).<sup>137</sup> Recent studies in social psychology have also shown that the group tends to treat those who violate the norms of the society repeatedly and those whose guilt is certain more harshly. On the other hand, social psychologists have shown that independent thinking is more likely to be regarded as suspicious in early stage groups and in collectivist (rather than in individualist) cultures.<sup>138</sup> Viewed from this perspective, it would seem that the Athenians were especially harsh toward those who violated norms repeatedly, such as Megacles whom they may have ostracized twice.

<sup>127</sup> Figueira, 1987, p. 290-294, 305. According to Hdt. 8.79.1 and Dem. 26.6, Aristides had stayed on Aegina during his ostracism. Unfortunately, we do not have any evidence on the place of residence of the other men ostracized during the 480s.

<sup>128</sup> Loddo, 2019a, p. 9; cf. Loddo, 2019b. See also Gray, 2015, p. 309-310.

<sup>129</sup> Gray, 2015, p. 308-309; on the tendency of the exiles to settle *peraiiai*, see Loddo, 2019b.

<sup>130</sup> Gray, 2015, p. 308, 330, 333 with further references and literature.

<sup>131</sup> Gray, 2015, p. 323 (Table 6.1).

<sup>132</sup> Pind. *Pyth.* 7.18-20.

<sup>133</sup> Dem. 23.37. For a discussion of Draco’s homicide law and Demosthenes 23.37 and 23.39, see Canevaro, 2017, esp. p. 54-58.

<sup>134</sup> Megacles’ double ostracism: Lys. 14.39.

<sup>135</sup> Lys. 14.39; [Andoc.] 4.34.

<sup>136</sup> Montiglio, 2005, p. 35-36. In the words of Montiglio, 2005, p. 35: “Within a society in which one’s identity is so closely determined by the native community, being away from it for whatever reason jeopardizes one’s identification and acceptance within that community.”

<sup>137</sup> Jetten-Hornsey, 2014, p. 476.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 2014, p. 474-476.

In the light of the evidence discussed above, it seems that the Athenians conceived ostracism as a punishment for norm breaking and that they reacted by ostracizing to moral and social transgressions. As a punishment, ostracism had notable similarities with *atimia*. However, ostracism differed from *atimia* because, unlike *atimia* within the city, it entailed a period of exile with definite geographical boundaries, at least from 480 on. Moreover, the ideas of purifying the community and punishing a transgressor seem to have been combined in the institution of ostracism. The fixed period of ten years was not met in various cases of ostracism which seems to support the view that the duration of the exile was not as important for the Athenians as was the fact that the ostracized man was banished from the city in the first place. On the other hand, the non-permanence of ostracism allows us to assume that the subject was supposed to experience inner change and moral improvement during his period of absence. While the parallels derived from Plato and Hesiod are fictitious, they seem to indicate that the Athenians regarded a temporary exile as an intervention encouraging the transgressor to change and to reintegrate into the community. Therefore, I would suggest, first, that at least some Athenians casted their votes against norm-breaking deviants and, second, that they expected ostracism to have effect on the attitudes and states of mind of those subjected to it.

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