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### **Conclusion: The futures of cultural heritage tourism in the MENA countries**

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*The chapter outlines the main themes that emerge in discussing the futures of cultural heritage tourism in the MENA region. Six main themes are identified. The tensions between the social and economic dimensions of heritage are illustrated in the construction of heritage, especially for international and domestic tourists. These tensions are also to be found in the way in which heritage is deliberately used by some regimes to promote certain identities. The politics of identity also strongly influences the desire by some governments to seek World Heritage status for some sites although the extent to which the heritage significance of such sites is shared by local communities appears problematic in a number of locations. Indeed, heritage tourism, conservation and management need to look beyond World Heritage to broader issues of attachment and meaning in generating support for heritage conservation measures. The chapter finishes on two main threats to heritage in the region. The deliberate destruction of heritage, whether as part of war and political marketing or for economic gain, and from climate change.*

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#### *Constructing heritage*

Heritage is usually defined in terms of the things we want to keep. Common to many definitions of heritage is the reference to a ‘form of collective memory, a social construct shaped by the political, economic and social concerns of the present’ (Graham & Howard 2008, p. 2). However, the process of keeping memories and its relationship to identity and the “we” raises difficult questions about which identities, memories and heritages are celebrated and those that are ignored or, at worst, suppressed. Issues that are very much at the forefront of the politics of heritage tourism in MENA countries (Isaac, Hall, & Higgins-Desbiolles, 2016; Seyfi

& Hall, 2019a, 2019b). Indeed, in many ways tourism is integral to the political economy of heritage whereby economic value becomes a justification to conserve and promote heritage even though the memories behind heritage may be flattened or even erased in official accounts of cultural heritage so as to serve particular national interests. For example, the Armenian heritage in parts of Turkey is promoted in the absence of accounts of the Armenian genocide (Watenpaugh, 2014; Törne, 2015); biblical and Jewish heritage in Israel is used to press claims to place in the absence of acknowledgement of the Palestinian exodus (the Nakba) and heritage (Butler, 2009; Gori, 2013; Zayad, 2018); while, simultaneously, the forced and voluntary movement of Jews to Israel around the MENA region as a result of colonial independence, and the creation of and opposition to the state of Israel has resulted in the loss of cultural memories of Jewish space in many cities of the region (Lafi, 2015). Such a situation reflects understandings of the different uses of heritage (Smith, 2006). Accordingly, heritage provides 'a point of validation or legitimization for the present in which actions and policies are justified by continuing references to representations and narratives of the past that are encapsulated through manifestations of tangible and intangible' (Graham & Howard 2008, p. 6). Shifting the perception of the past can also become 'a resource for identity-building, in the politics of remembering and, more recently, in the value attributed to the past as economic factor' (Reidel, 2015, p.225).

Importantly, heritage is socially and politically constructed. While all of us engage in heritage making and we all have our own personal notion of the things we would like to keep for reasons of memory and identity, the heritage that this book focuses on institutionalised heritage. That is

heritage is heritage because it is subjected to the management and preservation/conservation process, not because it simply "is". This process does not just 'find' sites and places to manage and protect. It is itself a constitutive cultural process that identifies those things and places that can be given meaning and value as "heritage", reflecting contemporary cultural and social values, debates and aspirations (Smith, 2006, p. 3).

Such "official" heritage construction is undertaken for a range of reasons including the perceived economic benefits of heritage tourism, the promotion of national and regional

discourses on identity; national-building and place promotion as well as conservation and management purposes. For example, given the Jordan is not a country with rich natural resources or other industries, the country depends highly on the earnings from tourism and the earnings from tourism are a major contributor to the state's finances (Riedel, 2015). However, the promoting of Jordanian heritage sites for the economic value of tourism and their perceived value to the state's economy and the way they have been developed has been subject to substantial debate (Addison, 2004; Daher, 2005; Abu-Khafajah, Al Rabady, & Rababeh, 2015; Abu-Khafajah & Miqdadi, 2019), with questions raised about the ranking of Jordanian sites in terms of their value and the subsequent implications this has for management (Riedel, 2015).

In the Iranian context the use of heritage as an international representation of national identity brings another perspective on heritage identity and highlights the selective . Although the glorification of Persian history and civilization as a means of celebrating the country's cultural heritage was on the agenda of the Shah's administration, the Islamic republic mainly promotes the Islamic heritage of the country (Seyfi, Hall, & Fagnoni, 2019; Seyfi & Hall, 2018a). As Saleh and Worrall (2015, p. 73) argued, despite some external perceptions in the West, 'Iran is a multi-ethnic state which has long had difficulty in incorporating different identities into mainstream, Persian dominated, discourses of Iranian identity'. Seyfi et al., (2019) also commented that in its revolutionary zeal, Islamic identity has become the paramount identity and Persian identity has been given a less attention particularly by the conservative elements in the ruling elite. Defining the national identity in Iran has been subjected to debate and the contestation between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity has been a constant theme in modern Iranian politics (Saleh & Worrall, 2015). When it comes to heritage promotion, the hardliners and conservative elements in the ruling elite perceive the great number of ancient sites in Iran belong to the pre-Islamic era as "inconsistent" with Islamic values and identities. For Saleh and Worrall (2015) these contradictions and the ensuing identity problematique stem from the fact that 'nationalist discourses in Iran are built upon the glorification of pre-Islamic heritage which is consistently portrayed as the authentic source of Iranian identity, this ties the notion of Iran to a specific territory, a specific sense of self and a knowledge of former greatness' (2015, p. 74). As a consequence, the contradictions between heritage recognition and tourism development have also aroused significant concerns in the general public. Hence as Seyfi et al. (2019) conclude, 'given domestic politics and the ruling

elite's ideological priorities, public sector support for heritage tourism, particularly in internationally recognized sites does not always match the willingness of NGOs and the private sector to foster cultural heritage development' (2019, p. 4). Nevertheless, given the current domestic politics in the country, it is also argued that nationalism (in the form of glorification of Persian identity) and Islamism (highlighting Islamic/Shia identity) will remain as the two main component in the definition of Iran's national identity with many implications for the shaping and orientation of the country's tourism industry.

### *Heritage, heritage tourism and the ongoing politics of identity*

Several chapters in this volume have demonstrated there appears to be increasing use of cultural heritage tourism to attract international visitors and the foreign exchange and employment they generate as well as contributing to improvements in destination branding and positioning at an international level while also serving to fulfill domestic and diasporic political agendas. For example, Thani and Hennan (Chapter 10, this volume) noted the way in which the United Arab Emirates cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubai are using heritage, including the development of museums, institutions and events, to present a particular interpretation of Arabism to Western tourists. Adie (Chapter 6, this volume) similarly suggests that the selection of World Heritage sites in Morocco is undertaken with both tourism in mind and the conveyance internationally of selected representations of national identity. Interestingly, a similar use of World Heritage is also undertaken in Turkey with respect to the Safranbolu World Heritage Site (Tataroglu, Chapter 4, this volume). However, here a Romantic discourse shared by many Turkish cultural conservatives has been developed surrounding the values of the city in relation to the impacts of modernity on Turkish cultural life. Such an ideology is very much in keeping with those of the Erdogan government (Büyüksaraç, 2004; Whitehead & Bozoğlu, 2016) and reflects that cultural heritage management has been constantly and systematically influenced by political concerns in Turkey. As a result, 'the discrepancy between the state's cultural identity, on the one hand, and the "foreign" nature of cultural heritage, on the other' (Edelman, 2015, p. 67), has been a major issue in the domestic discourse of both the Ottoman Empire and its successor state the Republic of Turkey with both having been confronted in various ways by 'the notion of heritage and to the pressure of a growing western interest for the material traces of the past lying on their territories' (Edelman, 2015, p. 67).

Various elements of Ottoman and Turkish heritage have therefore suffered from the powerful and often abusive grasp of politics. Eldem (2015) observes that, 'This mismatch has led to a containment of mainstream archaeology and museology within the logic of a civilizational mission, while new avenues were explored that might allow for a greater overlap between heritage and political identity' (Eldem, 2015, p. 67). As a result, the cultural heritage of Turkey has become dominated by different tendencies (development of Islamic and Ottoman archaeology, the valorisation of Anatolian and Near Eastern civilizations, and the secular Kemalism),

which, depending on time, context, or agency, may compete or simply overlap in opportunistic fashion in the definition of cultural policies and of cultural heritage as a whole. To this, one should add the very influential impact exerted by western perceptions of the same process, either at scholarly level or, more widely, at the demotic level of mass tourism (Eldem, 2015, p. 68).

More recently, this can be seen in the pursued ideology of the Erdogan government and its neo-Ottomanism approach and help illustrate the ties between political power and the maintenance and portrayal of heritage and the official discourses that surround it (Ekber Doğan, 2020; Whitehead & Bozoğlu, 2016; Zencirci, 2014). However, such uses of heritage are not new, Atakuman (2010, 2017) observes that

Turkish heritage has been used for chauvinistic displays of national identity throughout the course of Turkey's relationship with Europe. In the context of this reactionary response that was mainly directed at Europe, heritage in Turkey has been constructed and continues to be perceived as 'things' to be protected for their value in terms of international prestige and touristic consumption, while the problems at the core of Turkey's cultural policy remain unresolved (Atakuman, 2010, p. 108).

Över (2016) also explores the ways in which states manage their national identity through cultural tourism policy. Drawing on archival and ethnographic data Över (2016) focused on the opening of the Armenian Cathedral of the Holy Cross, a medieval Armenian Apostolic cathedral, in Akhtamar, Turkey to cultural tourism and religious services for the first time since the Armenian genocide. However, the reopening and restoration in 2007 was fraught with

controversy as the building was reopened as a museum rather than as a place of worship and Armenian groups lobbied very strongly to have religious symbols put in place and also to be able to hold services.

Beginning in 2010, it was also opened for an annual religious ceremony in the context of the “Faith Tourism” program. While the Faith Tourism program placed emphasis on the multi-religious composition of Anatolia and aimed to present Turkey as the homeland of a tolerant nation-state, the restriction of religious ceremony at Akhtamar and the state’s resistance to place across atop the church during its restoration were recognized as signs of intolerance. One party interpreted the opening of the Akhtamar as a move for political benefit in the genocide recognition debate and as a superficial effort to remove the stigmas associated with the nation-state’s identity. Others viewed it as a symptom of a deeper change in the state-definition of national identity and condemned it as a sign of a decline in ethnic Turkish nationalism (Över, 2016, p. 174).

Based on narrative evidence from the disputes among various actors with conflictual constructions of history, Över (2016) found that cultural tourism was being used by the state to produce multiple articulations of national identity and that these articulations were being governed in accordance with state interests.

The presence of multiple stages of tourism policy and the time and space bounded nature of interaction at each stage allow for the production of multiple images in different interaction situations. At the same time, the discourse of economic development associated with cultural tourism allows state actors to insulate themselves from criticism in disputes over national identity (Över, 2016, p. 173).

States clearly use cultural heritage tourism to create national identity even in the case of complex histories. ‘Turkey’s history with heritage policy demonstrates that when speaking of diversity and tolerance in the country, it has always been best to display ‘fossilized’ sites in the hope of obscuring fundamental problems at the living sites of contestation, which is where heritage as well as human rights policies begin to disintegrate’ (Atakuman, 2010, p. 125). Nevertheless, it would be vastly unfair to suggest that this action is undertaken by Turkey alone, although the country serves as a good example of the ways in which the state actively

use heritage and heritage tourism as a means of achieving broader political goals. As noted throughout this volume the use of heritage sites and heritage tourism to promote particular discourses and ideas of identity, including religious identity (See Timothy, Chapter 2, this volume; Olsen & Emmett, Chapter 3, this volume), appears inseparable from the use of institutionalised heritage in the MENA region.

### *World Heritage*

One of the most notable forms of institutionalised heritage is the nomination and promotion by countries of World Heritage sites. As Atakuman (2010, p. 10) notes, the World Heritage List 'has long been and continues to be one of the most important venues for the display of national prowess'. There has been increasing interest in the WHS nomination as it is commonly promoted view that WHS status increases visitor numbers and that acts as a 'brand' for marketing sites, promoting tourism, and attracting visitors (Frey & Steiner, 2011; Adie, Hall, & Prayag, 2018). For example, Adie (Chapter 6, this volume) notes their importance for tourism in Morocco as well as their use as international representations of national identity. For Palestine the World Heritage nomination process is regarded as a means to reinforce its state status in the international arena while simultaneously also using heritage to promote a national identity and tourism (Isaac, Chapter 8, this volume). However, the nomination of World Heritage sites may not always be in keeping with local understandings of heritage. For example, Adie (Chapter 6, this volume) highlights how Moroccan World Heritage sites are an emblematic example of the reiteration of the French colonial narrative of heritage, and who also remain one of the most important tourist markets. She notes that Moulay Idriss Zerhoun has been on the Moroccan World Heritage Tentative List since 1995 and would appear to, given its spiritual importance to Moroccans, be of greater cultural significance than the Roman city of Volubilis which receives only limited local visitation (Adie & Hall, 2017). While Volubilis was, briefly, Moulay Idriss's capital, it seems that, potentially due to the official discourse about the site which stresses its Roman connections, Volubilis is of greater interest for European, and particularly French, tourists. However, by putting Volubilis forward as a World Heritage site, Morocco has in essence nationally promoted a site which, until the French colonial period, was used as a source of cut stones with which to build Moulay Idriss Zerhoun, an arguably much more significant location both spiritually and from the perspective of national identity. From such a perspective, the interpretation of World Heritage sites such as Gobekli Tepe (Riza Manci,

Chapter 9, this volume) and Safranbolu (Tataroglu, Chapter 4, this volume), both in Turkey, take on new meaning. Indeed, the issue of MENA heritage being framed by European heritage concerns as well as heritage discourses, particularly including those surrounding World Heritage which will undoubtedly remain a focal point for institutionalised cultural heritage in the region, is well contextualised by Atakuman (2010, p. 10):

Ultimately, in a country where there are more mosques (over 85,000) than schools (under 70,000), the majority of the public is interested neither in Anatolian heritage nor in nominations to the World Heritage List. Those who do attach a value to this international display often place their evaluation in the context of chauvinistic displays of symbolic conquest, like that of Turkey's victories in the Eurovision song contest or the European soccer cup. Within this context, the fact that most sites on the inscribed list consist of 'pre-Islamic' places is easily subsumed within a vantage point that speaks of the conquest of Europe through the possession of things perceived to be important to Europe.

Furthermore, in Iran, as noted above, given the dual Persian and Islamic/Shia identities, World Heritage listing has also followed the ideological views of the ruling elite. Although, the Shad administration focused on World Heritage as a means for the country's national image and Persian glorification, the theocratic governance that replaced the monarchy ignored any listing and the process of the inscription of properties on the WHL was interrupted in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution. It was only in 2003 during the administration of President Khatami (1997–2005) when there was again a focus on Persian identity and cultural heritage in the tentative listing inventory process and the tourism organization recommenced nominating Iranian heritage sites to the UNESCO list (Seyfi, Hall and Fagnoni, 2019).

### *Beyond World Heritage*

A major area of future research in the MENA region is comparing the relative importance attached to heritage sites by tourists from outside the region and the perspectives of local people as to what constitutes heritage to them as opposed to an economic resource. Nevertheless, substantial differences as to what constitutes heritage also occurs at other scales. For example, with respect to Tel Ashkelon in Israel, Ram (Chapter 7, this volume) found that locals and the park authorities hold different perspectives as to what is important, locals are



less satisfied with places that do not represent their personal heritage and desire simply for somewhere to barbeque and plans are managed in a top-down manner. Similarly, in Tunisia there has historically been a focus on some coastal areas and particular types of heritage, while other regions and more intangible heritage traditions have often been ignored by official bodies (Dhafer et al., Chapter 5, this volume). While in Iran stresses arise between the promotion of Islamic and Persian identities in heritage tourism management (Seyfi & Hall, 2019a, 2019b; Seyfi et al., 2019). Thus, these differences in values and interests among stakeholders and the dissonance, may create a conflict in heritage preservation and management. Such tensions between different framing of what constitutes official heritage are unlikely to go away, especially as the understanding of heritage in the MENA gradually develops a more indigenous focus as opposed to what is considered as appropriate by either ruling elites or Western heritage and tourism development experts. Nevertheless, even as such changes occur there will be a continued need to try to manage and accommodate the range of different heritage interests and values that exist.

### *Destruction of heritage*

An extreme version of heritage management is dealing with the deliberate destruction of heritage sites. Since the beginning of the armed conflicts and public uprisings that accompanied and followed the 'Arab Spring', cultural heritage sites have been exposed to the destruction and damage by different perpetrators (Munawar, 2019) which has had 'a direct impact on the collective memory and cultural identity of the nations concerned' in the MENA region (Munawar, 2019, p.157).

Violent conflicts have limited access to as well as damaged heritage sites as diverse as Sana'a, a mountain city in the Yemen; the Roman city of Leptis Magna in Libya; and Palmyra in Syria, all sites inscribed on the World Heritage list. Sana'a and Leptis Magna are caught in violent civil wars, while Palmyra, including the main Temple of Bel (also known as Baal or Ba'al) which was blown up, was deliberately targeted by ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; also known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant); and *Daesh* or *Daish*). Palmyra was being visited by 150,000 tourists each year until war broke out in Syria in 2011 (Jeffries, 2015). Significantly, Palmyra was being destroyed by ISIS not only for religious reasons, but also to raise funds by supplying the archaeological black market as well as for reasons of publicity (Jeffries, 2015).

Under the Umayyad caliphate that existed in Palmyra in the 7th century AD, part of the temple of Bel was used as a mosque meaning by its actions Isis was erasing, not just pre-Islamic culture, but Islamic heritage as well (Jeffries, 2015). Munawar (2019) observe that:

The destruction of monuments, including those considered to be material representations of a nation's identity, does not inevitably mean the end of the lifecycle of those monuments. Rebuilding cultural heritage in the aftermath of war should not be taken for granted, and the focus should first be on the semantics and motives of the destruction—*i.e.* how and why these heritage sites and monuments were built and later damaged, and what reasons lay behind the targeting of historic cities by state or non-state actors (Munawar, 2019, p. 158)

Since heritage in the post-war period is usually a reconstruction of some image of the past rather than preservation of the original, many countries in the region that have been exposed to heritage destruction have difficulties in any reconstruction given the lack of a unified nation or tradition of historical preservation. The situation only being further complicated by limited financial support (Borneman, 2015). Soufan (2018) also argued that authenticity is associated with ideological understandings of heritage in the Syrian context and therefore hard to attain in future post-war reconstruction and commented that

The reconstruction and development of cultural heritage is closely linked to how different Syrian groups perceive their pasts and their futures. Although specific items of the past might be recovered, Syrian society is politically deeply divided along religious, ethnic, and other lines. Each of these divided groups is characterized by both distinct political aspirations for the future and distinct understanding of the authentic past (Soufan, 2018, p. 1).

Nevertheless, 'cultural heritage has been subject to appropriation, looting, and destruction throughout history and continues to be an ongoing problem' (Zayad, 2018, p. 81). Cheikhmous Ali, of the Association for the Protection of Syrian Archaeology, regarded Isis's actions in Palmyra as 'a way to pressure and torture the local population – to suppress their history and their collective memory' (quoted in Jeffries, 2015). Iconoclasm, the politically and/or religiously related deliberate destruction of religious icons and monuments, is an issue throughout the

MENA region given the centrality of religion to many heritage sites and monuments and presents an ongoing management problem, especially when state and religious interests are intermixed (Hall & Prayag, 2019; Seyfi & Hall, 2019b). Acceptance of religious and political differences and the willingness to acknowledge the heritage values of others is made more difficult when people are subject to stress and insecurity.

The contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Mali, and the displacement of people as well as extensive damage to, and destruction of, cultural heritage in these countries, have also highlighted the need to translate into practice the rules of national and international legal framework for protecting cultural property in armed conflict (Cunliffe, Muhesen, & Lostal, 2016). Nevertheless, many criticisms have been raised about the effectiveness of the existing frameworks such as the *1954 Hague Convention* and the *World Heritage Convention* and the role of the international heritage community in protecting the cultural properties in conflicts. Cunliffe et al. (2016) argue that

Given the lack of (or perhaps the impossibility of) the national or international enforcement of these frameworks during conflict, it must be concluded that they are inadequate for cultural property protection. Even after the conflict, enforcement will undoubtedly remain problematic, and it is doubtful to what extent, if any, prosecutions would act as a deterrent, particularly given that those involved in such war crimes are often involved in worse atrocities against the people whose heritage it belongs to, for which there does exist a body of prosecutions as precedent (Cunliffe et al., 2016, p. 22)

National laws have also been criticised for their ineffectiveness in providing a legal framework for protection of cultural properties in conflicted areas. For instance, Bowker, Goodall, and Haciski (2016) argued that despite having domestic laws to prohibit the looting and destruction of antiquities, both Iraq and Syria are overextended by the armed conflict with ISIS and simply unable to effectively enforce their own laws and they further recommend external assistance, robust international collaboration and intervention to combat with the devastation of cultural property in these countries. This can be seen in the attitude of the international community to cultural heritage and the UNESCO effort in 2015 when 50 countries adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2199 under the binding Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which prohibited trade in cultural property coming from Iraq and Syria (UNESCO, 2015). Furthermore,

a gendered approach may be critical to the successful development of a cultural rights framing of heritage where women should be involved in protecting and promoting heritage assets, through professional or volunteer roles (Matthews et al., 2020). By taking the example of practices that implemented UNESCO Conventions in Nigeria and Vietnam, Matthews et al. (2020) emphasised that the participation and engagement of women in the post-conflict negotiation process is 'essential to enhance the protection of cultural diversity through the voices of women survivors such as in the case of the Yazidi minority in northern Iraq'. (Matthews et al., 2020, p.136).

### *Climate change*

In the MENA countries a major source of stress, and arguably a driver behind the civil war in Syria (Gleick, 2014), is climate change (Hall, 2019). Although the precise role of climate change in increasing conflict risk remains debated (Adams et al., 2018; Selby et al., 2017), it is clear that water is becoming securitised in the region (King, 2015; Weinthal, Zawahri, & Sowers, 2015). From a tourism perspective conflict and political instability obviously have a major impact on visitor numbers, with terrorism and the Arab Spring being a significant backdrop to many of the chapters in this volume. The combination of already stressed fresh water resources and rapid population growth, substantially increases the vulnerability of the region to future climate change (Chenoweth et al., 2011). Potential reductions in water availability as a result of climate change, industry and population pressures, mean that there could be 30% to 70% less water per person by 2025 (Sowers et al., 2011). Such a situation is expected to create increased tensions between tourism and other sectors for available water resources, given that tourism is a major direct and indirect water user (Hall, 2019).

Sea level rise is also a potentially significant issue for MENA states that not only affects coastal resort areas but can also have a significant impact on tourism resources, especially cultural heritage, while other aspects of climate change such as extreme weather events and changes in humidity are also significant for heritage conservation (Hall, 2016; Hall et al., 2016).

Nevertheless, coastal cultural landscapes and built environments are particularly at risk (Hall, 2018; Hall & Ram, 2018). Although there is growing awareness of the potential implications of climate change for tourism in the MENA region (Fitchett & Roshan, Chapter 14, this volume), there are many unknowns with respect to the capacity of tourists and attractions to adapt,

especially with respect to heat waves and photochemical air pollution in urban centres. The potential of such pressures on flagship heritage projects, such as new museums and attractions, in the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt may be substantial. As Lelieveld et al. (2014, p. 1947) observe, 'Considering the multiple environmental stresses in metropolitan areas, including confounding factors such as the urban heat island effect and growing air pollution, the cities in this region will become true hot spots of climate change'. Yet, in 'a future that is full of technological, political, social, and economic uncertainty, climate change is a relative certainty that can be considered and planned for by policy makers' (Chenoweth et al., 2011, p. 17). However, despite the clear interests of government to promote tourism in the region as an economic development mechanism there is no matching attention to encourage tourism related adaptation and mitigation (Hall, 2019).

### *Conclusion*

Despite the development of international Westernised mass tourism and the growth of halal tourism, cultural heritage tourism will likely be a mainstay of the industry in the MENA region in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, as the various chapters in this volume have indicated, heritage and heritage tourism are subjects surrounded by substantial political and economic issues that are only likely to become more contested over the coming decades. Critical to resolving some of the issues will be the development of a stronger sense of indigenous heritage in institutional heritage management that reflects the concerns of local people and the wider community rather than elites and European heritage concerns. Significant in this will be encouraging the growth of domestic cultural heritage tourism. Although such a development may not meet some of the economic motivations of state tourism and heritage policies it would help contribute to more sustainable local tourism developments and stronger relationships between communities and heritage sites that acknowledge and reflect the wide range of interests and values associated with sites at multiple levels. Perhaps most importantly of all, such a shift in cultural heritage tourism thinking may help counter the ongoing use of heritage and cultural heritage tourism by governments and political and religious elites to satisfy their own narrow and, often selfish, interests rather than expansive idea of the "we" in the things we want to keep.

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