Oberngruber, Bernhard

The migration-security nexus in domains of insecurity: a qualitative content analysis of two recent EU-policies

Master's Thesis in Education

FACULTY OF EDUCATION

Master's Degree Programme in Education and Globalisation

2015
Faculty of Education

Thesis abstract

Department of Educational Sciences and Teacher Education
Master’s Degree Programme in Education and Globalisation

Author
Oberngruber, Bernhard

Title
The migration-security nexus in domains of insecurity: a qualitative content analysis of two recent EU-policies

Major subject
Education

Type of thesis
Master’s thesis

Year
2015

Number of pages
59 + 1 appendix

Abstract

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, issues in migration gradually gained importance and are now firmly on top of European policy makers’ agenda. Against the backdrop of an increasing public and political awareness of the matters related to migration, new problem-solving approaches emerged. The proposal of securitizing issues in migration is among the most prominent approaches. This would allow to break free from procedures and rules by placing the matter beyond the rule of the established political game. The impacts for migrants of the securitization of migration would however be substantial, as securitization also places the issue in a much more hostile environment.

This thesis is thus concerned with the analysis of two recent EU-policies in terms of identifying possible political speech acts, which are a basic requirement of securitization. In most cases, speech acts are highly expedient towards labelling the issue as a threat to security. Theoretically grounded in the work of Jef Huysmans’ The politics of insecurity, this thesis is guided by two research questions:

1. What are the threat definitions of migration in European post-9/11 policies and how do they correspond with the politics of insecurity?
2. Which kind of political reframing is taking place in the shift from migration as a non-politicized issue to the securitization of migration?

This thesis uses Qualitative Content Analysis as a research method. It is concerned with identifying themes and patterns in two recent EU-policies and sets them in relation to three main categories, which emerged from the theory of this research. These categories are the following:

1. Migration as a threat to internal security and domestic labour markets
2. Migration as a threat to European cultural values
3. Migration as a threat to European welfare

The data can be identified as belonging to two different policy areas, the security area and the migration area. The first policy, the European Security Strategy, is taken from the security area and was published as a reaction to the violent attacks of 9/11 in the United States. The document deals with threats all along the spectrum as related to European security. The second document, the Global Approach for Migration and Mobility, is the overarching framework of the European Union external migration and asylum policy since 2005. The document defines the premises under which the EU is conducting policy dialogues and development cooperation with non-EU countries.

The findings of this research revealed that migration poses almost exclusively a threat to the first category, European internal security and domestic labour markets. Further, empirical evidence revealed correlations between migration, organized crime and terrorism. However, no convincing evidence has been found that cultural values or European welfare is threatened by migration.

The last chapter discusses the findings and analyses them against the backdrop of the administration of fear and trust, which has a distorting effect on the relationship between refugees and frightened societies in Europe. This is because, in domains of insecurity, previously trusted or indifferent relationships between established and outsiders are relocated in a climate of fear and prejudice. This chapter also reveals potential solutions to disrupt the widespread intermingling between migration and the feeling of insecurity.

Keywords
Migration, security, society, EU, fear, securitization, domains of insecurity, Qualitative content analysis
# Table of Contents

1. **Introduction** ...................................................................................................................... 1

2. **Historical developments of the migration-security nexus** ............................................ 3

   2.1. Security studies after World War II ............................................................................ 3

   2.2. Ideological disputes in security studies ...................................................................... 5

   2.3. EU migration policy and the European Integration Process ....................................... 6

3. **Essential concepts and actors** ....................................................................................... 11

   3.1. A model of the politicization of issues ..................................................................... 11

   3.2. The securitization of an issue .................................................................................... 12

   3.3. Internal and external security and the rise of intermediary agencies ....................... 14

4. **Huysmans’ framework of the politics of insecurity** .................................................... 16

   4.1. The politicization of migration ................................................................................. 16

   4.2. The securitization of migration ................................................................................. 17

   4.3. Referent objects and threat definitions ..................................................................... 22

      4.3.1. Internal security and internal markets ............................................................. 23

      4.3.2. Cultural values ................................................................................................... 24

      4.3.3. Welfare ............................................................................................................... 27

5. **Qualitative content analysis** .......................................................................................... 29

   5.1. Issues of trustworthiness in QCA ............................................................................. 31

   5.2. Characterization of the data ...................................................................................... 32

   5.3. Description of the context of the data ..................................................................... 33

   5.4. Categories of analysis in detail ................................................................................. 35

   5.5. The coding agenda .................................................................................................... 38

   5.6. Units of analysis ....................................................................................................... 40

6. **Findings** .......................................................................................................................... 42

   6.1. Insights on migration as a threat to European reference objects .............................. 42

   6.2. Insights on the political reframing of migration ....................................................... 48

7. **Discussion – societies in domains of insecurity** ........................................................... 51

8. **The researcher’s position** .............................................................................................. 54

References............................................................................................................................... 55

Appendix
1. Introduction

Since the end of World War II, issues in migration gradually gained in importance and are now firmly on top of the European policy making agenda. In that context, the field of security studies plays a crucial role insofar as the analyses of security experts significantly steered European migration policy making, particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Within twenty-five years, the political, societal and medial perception of issues in migration, predominantly matters in immigration and asylum, increased substantially and has now arrived at a point, where it is uncertain that the conventional political system is capable of solving these complex issues. Against this backdrop arises the question whether the securitization of migration would not increase the probability of solving these issues since it breaks free of procedures and rules by placing the issue beyond the rule of the established political game (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 23 & p. 25). A basic requirement of such a securitization act is the “speech act”, which labels the issue as an existential threat to specific reference objects. As for this thesis, the reference objects are the following: internal security, domestic labour markets, public welfare and European values. The impacts of a securitized migration-security nexus on migrants would be substantial as securitization places the issue in an “existentially hostile environment” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 50). In such domains of insecurity, the insiders and outsiders are clearly separated through various instruments and techniques (i.e.: readmission agreements with third countries, issuing of vouchers for refugees or segregated housing).

Consequently, the pivotal point of this thesis is the identification of “threat definitions,” based on the depiction of migration as reflected in two recent EU-policies (one security policy and one migration policy.) Grounded in the work of Jef Huysmans (2006) on the politics of insecurity, this thesis is guided by two research questions, although the second one serves as a supplement to the first one:

1. What are the threat definitions of migration in European post-9/11 policies and how do they correspond with the politics of insecurity?
2. Which kind of political reframing is taking place in the shift from migration as a non-politicized issue to the securitization of migration?

Using Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) as a methodology, this study examines emerging “themes and patterns” in the documents as related to three main categories (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). These are:
1. Migration as a threat to European internal security and internal markets
2. Migration as a threat to European welfare systems
3. Migration as a threat to European cultural values

The categories are solely grounded in theory and serve as the main reference point for the content analysis of the policy texts. Additional themes, which emerged from the analysis of the policies, will be dealt with in the discussion part of the thesis.

As for the research design, the second chapter sheds light on the historical connections of migration and security in Europe. The third chapter deals with the general concepts of politicization and securitization and their distinctive features whereas the fourth chapter sets these concepts in relation to migration and elaborates the three main categories. This section also addresses the internal and external aspects of security in European migration policy. Chapter five discusses the methodological decision making process and elaborates the features of Qualitative Content Analysis as connected with issues of trustworthiness and reliability. Further chapter five is concerned with the characterization of the data and discloses the procedure of creating the units of analysis. Chapter six presents the findings of this thesis before I discuss the main issues of the contemporary migration-security nexus. The last section discloses the position of the researcher in this work.
2. Historical developments of the migration - security nexus

This chapter examines the migration-security nexus from two different angles. The first one deals with the developments in security studies as connected with migration. The second part takes a closer look into the progression of European migration policy making against the backdrop of the European Integration process.

As security is a central concept of this thesis, I first discuss its linguistic origins and interpretations. “The terms security derives from Latin since cura, meaning without care” (Hough, 2004, p. 20). In that sense the term is fairly elastic since the interpretation of without care stretches from “minor disturbance” to “existential threat” (ibid, 2004). However, in the context of international relations, the term is applied quite specifically: “In international relations security refers in the first instance to an existential situation in which the survival of the state as a political unit is the defining stake” (Buzan et al. 1998 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 47). The international relation’s perspective of security is examined in a more detailed manner in chapter three before security is put in relation to migration in chapter four.

2.1. Security Studies after World War II

Security studies is an academic sub-field of the discipline of international relations and focuses on the prevention of organized violence. Between the years of 1945 and 1990, the foci of security studies have been clearly defined by the premises of the Cold War. Consequently, the twin stimuli of Nuclear Weaponry and Cold War demanded highly qualified security experts around the world. Within this period of time, European Security Studies only played a subordinate role whereas the European integration process and a general “civilian by nature” attitude characterized the aftermath of World War II. One of the leading actors within the European integration process was Germany (Hough, 2004, p. 6). After WWII, it took more than fifty years before the European Union established a collective security and defence strategy (Haine, 2004, p. 131). Security studies in the United States, on the other hand, experienced a meteoric rise right after World War II. The following forty years of security studies were, with short interruptions, dominated by the cold war, “nuclear weaponry and related concerns, such as arms control and limited war” (Baldwin, 1995, p. 123). Especially the decade from 1955-65 was labelled as the golden
age of security studies. Security specialist Edward A. Kolodziej (1992 as cited in Baldwin, 1995, p.123-124) noted that at that time “threat manipulations and force projections became the central, almost exclusive concern of security studies.” However, with the relaxation of the geopolitical tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union came a fundamental shift in security studies. Ergo, economic interdependence, third world poverty and environmental issues increased in salience and emerged on the agenda of security experts (Baldwin, 1995, p. 124). These shifts were largely triggered by the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973, which was perceived as a serious threat to the American way of life, and boosted the significance of economic independence in security studies. The oil embargo also put non-military concerns to the foreground for the first time. These sudden shifts in security-priorities were also triggered by findings in Peace Research of progressively securing a better social order (Galtung, 1969). This movement gained increasing momentum in the late 1960s in Europe. Other scholars even proposed to split security studies into two fields, one which would be solely concerned with military and technological aspects while the other would be moving beyond military concerns in order to cover a wider range of security issues (Buzan, 1991 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 18). It was, all up front, an ideological dispute between (neo)-realists, pluralists and marxists in security studies (see chapter 2.2.).

The world order changed dramatically when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The downfall of the Soviet Union also shook the very foundations of security studies and ultimately led to a huge identity crisis within the field (Huysmans, 2006, p. 15). Central to this crisis were conflicting epistemological views among scholars in international relations theory (Keohane, 1988; Smith et al, 1996 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 15) and the questions of how to establish new threat relations and how the field of security issues could possibly cover them. More precisely, the debate focused on the controversy of whether security studies should now move beyond inter-state relations and abandon military security questions as a primary focus (Krause & Williams, 1997 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 15). What further complicated the situation was the fact that carefully accumulated Cold War - intelligence became de-facto worthless as soon as the Berlin wall was brought down. What followed was an extensive widening of the security debate, which finally led to migration movements and environmental degradation entering the agenda of security experts. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, migration movements
had been mainly labelled as humanitarian issues but they won increasing attention of security experts in the early 1990s:

The enormous changes and instability generated by the end of the Cold War are triggering new mass movements of people across the globe. These refugee exoduses are commanding the attention of high-level policy makers not only for humanitarian reasons and because of the increasing numbers involved, but also because of the serious consequences that mass displacements have for national stability, international security and the emerging new world order” (Loescher, 1992 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p.15).

Even the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which for decades had been almost exclusively concerned with military threat definitions in the international state system, identified a massive break-up with the hierarchy of threats in security and strategic studies. In a statement from 1991, the think tank identified international refugee flows, which were largely triggered by economic and political changes, as a “national security problem”. Slowly a new nature of threats (what is threatening?) and new referent objects (what is threatened?) emerged (Huysmans, 2006, p. 22).

2.2. Ideological disputes in security studies

Realism was the predominant and almost unchallenged paradigm in international relations from the 1940s until the 1960s. The main premise of realism was that the main actors (states) conduct their politics according to self-interest. Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) served merely as alliances, whereas Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) were labelled as utterly irrelevant. According to realists, the study of security was seen as high politics, since it covered the most prominent issue, state security, whereas other fields such as domestic politics or health politics were described as low politics. These strict distinctions were built upon the firm belief that once a war is lost or that the state failed to deter a war, it would coercively undermine the satisfaction of low politics aspirations. Naturally, the premises of realists in international relations, which was used synonymously for security studies at that time, led to a security dilemma, which was characterized by the enhancement of security at the expense of another state. However, this dilemma was
thwarted by the notion of the balance of power, which kept a sense of order to the “anarchical society” (Bull, 1977 as cited in Hough, 2004, p. 3).

For the first time in thirty years, these assumptions were seriously challenged by the growing significance of economic issues in international relations in the 1960s and 1970s. Associated with the decline of the importance of military issues in security studies, the influence of traditional realists waned and neo-realism grew in significance. Neo-realists still saw the pursuit of power as a primary concern of the state, but acknowledged that the fulfilment of this pursuit is not necessarily bound to military means. Consequently, security studies served as the military arm of international relations and International Political Economy (IPE) as its economic equivalent. Still, this distinction did not go far enough for pluralists. They challenged particularly the role of the state as a primary actor on the world stage. Instead, they advocated for strengthening the impact of non-state actors, such as IGOs and NGOs, in international relations. At that time, multi-national corporations already followed their own rights beyond state control. As a consequence, the approach of cooperating rather than self-interest pursuing states gained increasing attention among scholars.

The third stream, which grew in significance in security studies in the 1960s, was the marxist school. The main premise of marxist thought was that military strategy did not primarily serve national security but economic interests whereby inter-state competition was seen as just a side-show of economic pursuit. Thus, the marxist paradigm very much equated international relations with IPE. Along this line, marxists in international relations argued that globalisation is nothing new. Rather, it is just the latest phase of the powerful exploiting the powerless. Imperialism was not perceived as a relict of a long-gone era but still very much alive and in practice. (Hough, 2004, p. 3-5).

2.3. EU migration policy and the European Integration Process

This section examines post-World War II migration in terms of migration policy and takes a closer look in the realization of the European Integration process and analyses its implications for migrants. As for the context of this thesis, I will mainly focus on features, which have a significant impact on the migration-security nexus.
In order to fully comprehend the developments of the security-migration nexus, it is important to bear in mind that the political, economic and societal conditions of post-World War II Europe were very much different from what they are now. In the aftermath of World War II, migration was highly permissive. Countries, such as France, the Netherlands and Germany all adopted policies, which were expedient towards the promotion of migration (Huysmans, 2006, p. 65). These policy-developments stemmed from the simple fact that war-torn Europe needed additional workforce to re-build what the war had destroyed. The main target of migration policy initiatives at that time was to attract flexible labour, which most European countries could not provide at that time. Consequently, the legal status of migrants was only of secondary importance. In fact, an illegal status made them even more flexible to fit the demands of European domestic labour markets. However, this does not mean that European countries did not invest in the regulation of migration at all; but migration certainly did not have the same prominence and connotations as it had after 1980 (Marrie, 1988 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 65).

Migration was increasingly perceived as a public concern in the 1960s and 1970s. More restrictive migration policies replaced the former permissive ones, as European countries generally headed towards a more control-oriented approach. These developments were justified with the argument that the domestic workforce needed more protection (Blotevogel et al, 1993 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 65). It was also the first time that political rhetoric asserted immigration as a destabilizing potential to domestic markets and public order. However, against this backdrop, the population with a migration background continued to grow as a result of family reunions. As a reaction, the European Community (EC) adopted the Council Regulation 1612/68, which was interpreted by many experts as the first cornerstone of European attempts to properly regulate migration movements. The policy “established the principle of freedom of movement for workers within all the member states of the Community” and was implemented as an act of non-discrimination and equal treatment of all EC-member states in 1968 (Fuster, 1988, p. 127). For member states, this regulation was a blessing because it provided the domestic labour markets with a more flexible workforce from other member states. On the other hand, the implications for temporary workers and other migrants were less rosy. One point of criticism was that the regulation clearly favoured the freedom of movement of citizens of EC-member states over citizens of third countries because family reunion within the EC was exacerbated (Verschueren, 1991 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 66). According to Ugur (1995), this regulation “laid the foundation for the development of “fortress Europe” in the area of

While migration was considered mostly in economic and social terms during the 1960s and 1970s, the focus considerably shifted in favour of a politicization of migration in the 1980s (see chapter four). The pivotal idea of the politicization of migration was to confuse illegal immigration with asylum. Asylum, in that sense, was presented as yet another option for immigrants to enter Europe. Consequently, the political construct of merging illegal immigration and asylum served as an ideological groundwork for future debates on migration.

“In recent years the steep rise in the number of illegal immigrants (and therefore potential asylum-seekers) caught has revealed the increasing need to include their fingerprints in the system […]” (Austrian presidency work programme, 1998 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 66).

These “political games” in the 1980’s took place in the context of increasing Europeanization and Institutionalization. Policy coordination was primarily conducted through inter-state cooperation of member states while functional organizations, such as the police, were integrated as executive forces. Moreover, the establishment of intergovernmental fora, such as Trevi and the Schengen group, aimed to structure the “development of migration policy within the European Union through the development of transnational and intergovernmental policy networks that were interested in a cooperative regulation of immigration, asylum and/or refuge” (Bigo, 1996 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 66). These fora played a substantial role in the incorporation of migration and asylum policy into the constitutional structure of the European Community. The treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced a third pillar (Justice and Home affairs) with migration being “an explicit subject of intergovernmental regulation within the European Union” (Sayad, 1994 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 67).
However, the intergovernmental approach of regulating migration was soon contested. This lead to a communitarization of migration, as we can see in the treaty of Amsterdam from 1997. The main point of criticism was that domestic policy making could not properly respond or predict shifts in migration beyond its national borders. The French sociologist and migration expert Virginie Guiraudon analysed this shift from horizontal policy making on a national level to vertical policy making on a federal level, and concluded that the “national solution” bears more advantages for migrants than its international ambivalent. For example, on the national level migrants benefit from judicial review, from the balance of points of view within the executive and from the fact that migrant aid groups are active on that level. On an international level, again, these actors disappear to some extent (Guiraudon, 2000, p. 268).

In 2002, the European Council in Seville arranged migration policy priorities according to four headings. The first one was concerned with the combat of illegal immigration, which included readmission agreements, visa regulations and human trafficking. The second area is related to the reinforcement of the external border. Under this heading, a steady
European police, a development of a common risk model and the construction of networks of immigration liaison officers are discussed. The third part deals with the integration of immigration policy into the wider framework of European external policies with third countries. One main features of this area is the collective fight against illegal immigration while readmission agreements with third countries play a crucial role. The fourth heading focuses on a coherent policy on asylum and immigration. Under this heading universal European standards for dealing with asylum applications were negotiated (Huysmans, 2006, p. 67).

This section takes a closer look at migration after WWII from a policy-perspective and illustrates the transition of permissive migration right after the war towards a more restrictive approach. Central to this transition is the occurrence of control mechanisms, which, over the course of the past decades, were steadily elaborated and intensified. Further, it became apparent that one main trigger of this development is the specific demand of labour. The labour market, however, will loom large later in this thesis when I examine the relationship of migration as a threat to various referent objects in two recent EU-policies.
3. Essential concepts and actors

This chapter examines the dimensions of security according to Huysmans’ framework of the politics of insecurity. This exercise serves as important groundwork for the analysis of the policies in terms of how issues are politicized and securitized. Furthermore, it sets the basis for the analysis of its implications for migration issues. Consequently, this chapter illustrates the concepts of politicization and securitization and pays attention to all the actors who are driving the intensity of these phenomena. Thus, it is essential to take a closer look at specific concepts and agents of the wider security domain in order to fully comprehend the specific aspects of Huysmans’ framework of the politics of insecurity.

3.1. A model of the politicization of issues

The process of politicization is a decisive component of Huysmans’ politics of insecurity. It is therefore essential to disclose the wide range of actors who are involved in the politicization of issues.

The concept of politicization in general terms means “the demand for or the act of transporting an issue into the field of politics – making previously apolitical matters political” (Zuern & De Wilde, 2012, p. 139). This shift is further divided into politicization I and politicization II. The former describes a transfer from the realm of necessity, or from the private, to the public sphere whereas the latter speaks of a shift from the public to the governmental decision-making sphere (Hay, 2007 as cited in Zuern & De Wilde, 2012, p. 140). Consequently, the process of deciding (politics) and the content of a decision (policy) are both subject to politicization. Zuern and De Wilde argue that basically all actors who are participating in political processes on any level are influencing the transformation of ‘an issue’ (ibid, 2012, p. 140). This includes politicians, mass media, various stakeholders and political protesters. Politicization is thus increasing the controversy of an issue, which is indicated through three determining factors: rising awareness, mobilization and polarization.
In politicization, awareness is expressed through the engagement and interest of actors in political affairs. Mobilization refers to an increasing amount of resources spent on controversial issues. Polarization indicates the “co-occurrence of conflicting demands for collective goods, the extremity of such demands and the depletion of nuanced or underdeveloped positions” (Zuern and de Wilde, 2012, p. 140). However, both scholars argue that this process of politicization is just a reaction to the increasing level of political authority of superior governing bodies, such as the European Union: “The more influential the EU and its institutions become, the more they attract public attention and provoke both utilization and support, on the one hand, and counter reactions to the EU policies and the polity, on the other” (ibid, 2000, p. 140). The politicization of an issue is not a constant phenomenon. Rather, its intensity varies according to intermediating factors such as media coverage, national narratives and public debates. Therefore, a positive setting to politicize an issue is created if a strong authority claims the sovereignty of interpretation on that issue. The level of politicization again varies in intensity according to the involvement of intermediary actors.

3.2. The securitization of an issue

The term securitization was introduced by the Copenhagen School of security studies headed by Buzan, Wæver and Wilde. The thought school gained increasing attention in the late 1990s. Securitization is an extreme concept of politicization and it frames an issue either as a special kind of politics or even outside the realm of politics. Securitization thus relocates an issue beyond “the established rules of the game” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 23). In the context of International Relations “securitization constitutes political unity by means of
placing it in an existentially hostile environment and asserting an obligation to free it from threat” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 50). In theory, the political and public perception of a specific issue is not politicized, politicized or securitized.

The location of an issue on that scale varies significantly across states. Some states politicize cultural issues, others securitize religion. In some cases, an issue experienced a massive shift on the spectrum. For example, within two decades, environmental degradation has dramatically moved out of a non-politicized category and is now almost a securitized issue (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 24). But how do we know whether an issue is already securitized or still politicized? According to the Copenhagen School, the securitization of an issue requires a “speech act”. According to the standpoint of this School of thought, it does not matter whether the issue is of military nature. The important thing is how it is presented in the political discourse (Hough, 2004, p. 18).

If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat, the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules, by which s/he would otherwise be bound, we are witnessing an act of securitization. (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 25)

The question of whether an issue is pressing enough to be securitized is in most cases a governmental decision. This implies that some life-threatening issues are simply not
having enough political backup to be securitized while less-urgent matters do have the political lobby to be labelled ‘securitized’. Consequently, the securitization process is a subjective matter in the sense that it does not necessarily tally with reality. This is evident in the appearance of systemic failings, the persistence of hunger and treatable diseases in a world with enough food and medicine to counter them (Hough, 2004, p. 18). Acts of securitization are primarily conducted by governments but not exclusively. As argued in the section 3.3., the growing significance of intermediary agencies had and still has a huge impact on the securitization of specific issues.

3.3. Internal and external security and the rise of intermediary agencies

In the framework, as well as in the policy analysis chapter of this thesis, the distinction between internal and external dimensions of security plays a vital role. This is because a threat, occurring in one realm, is dealt with differently by political units than if it occurred in another. These differentiations are well marked since the cold war. Generally, the internal realm is concerned with law and order inside the state, the main executive force of internal security being the police. The external realm is characterized by war and deterrence between states. External threats are mostly met by military means (Bigo, 2006, p. 387). Moreover, internal and external security differ in terms of their perceptions of threats with the first being rather a concern and the latter a question of survival. It is important to mention that this bipolarity of security aspects did not come to an abrupt ending when the Soviet Union was formally dissolved in 1991. Rather, this old matrix was re-interpreted as the West against the others:

The emergence of failed states, criminalisation of politics in many places, war lords, transnational organised crime supported by some remote governments or guerrillas trafficking cocaine, heroin and diamonds created the image of an ‘unsafe’ third world producing ‘new wars’ and a massive flux of people fleeing these countries with the associated risk of importing their political disputes into the first world (Bigo, 2006, p. 387).

The strict dichotomy of state security was challenged by the rise of intermediary agencies such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) or the European Defence Agency (EDA), which acted in the grey area between police and army. These semi-autonomous agencies
were highly competitive among each other and divergent in their definitions of threats. Bigo (2006, p. 398) argues that these “institutional games” led to the politicization, securitization, as well as the partial privatization of matters of public security. These “games” also had a huge impact on our general understanding of security, which was shaped by “the vision of these new actors (intermediary agencies, comment by the author of this thesis) which have interests in promoting a catastrophic vision of the future and in developing a narrative of a world on the edge of Armageddon, a world in collision, or a global chaos” (Bigo, 2006, p. 402). One common by-product of adopting these narratives is the use of a disproportionate level of coercion to neutralize identified threats, regardless of whether it is global terrorism, organized crime or the massive influx of people. Against this backdrop, the boundaries of internal and external security became increasingly blurry and, at least since the attacks of 9/11, internal and external security were merged and started to share their intelligence.

To sum up, this chapter discusses the shift of an issue from the standard political system to the domain of securitization. This is a controversial act since numerous actors with different agenda are involved. However, one basic requirement for an issue to be securitized is the application of a speech act. This move is often executed from within the political sphere and identifies the issue as being an existential threat to various reference objects.
4. Huysmans’ framework of the politics of insecurity

Huysmans’ work on the politics of insecurity is the pivotal point of this thesis, as it connects theory and data. This chapter first examines in-depth the linkage between migration and the concepts of politicization and securitization, before it scrutinizes its implications for migrants. It further attempts to look for answers to the questions of what is threatened by migration and how migration threats and reference objects are associated in domains of insecurity. Three categories emerged from this analysis: migration as a threat to internal security and internal markets, European cultural values and welfare. These serve as main points of reference for the analysis of two policies in chapter seven.

4.1. The politicization of migration

As already discussed extensively in chapter two, the collapse of the Soviet Union forced the field of security studies into a reform process, which finally saw migration emerging on the agenda of security experts. However, this transition was not solely a concern of security studies. As argued in chapter three, multiple actors shape politicization whereas the political dimension is the most significant and influential in the context of migration. The interest of politicians in migration as a security issue stems from three main aspects. First, the politicization of security issues proved to have a significant impact on the choice of policy instruments. This means that the application of security rhetoric can be used to dramatize a policy question in order to move it up the list of political priorities. For example, security framing of migration can lead to the closure of borders or to a temporary reintroduction of identity controls at strategic checkpoints in order to deal with the arrival of illegal immigrants. It is essential to mention here that the reinforcement of such actions might also be at the expense of other policies concerned with regulating migration, such as economic or demographic policies. Second, citizens generally elect politicians, directly or indirectly. Consequently, the composition of an election campaign is immensely important in order to get (re)-elected and migration issues proved to be an appealing subject (Huysmans, 2006, p. 26-28).

Knowledge which speaks of a dramatic rise in migration and asylum seeking and knowledge which raises the question if a rise in migration moves a country beyond
the threshold of what it can sustain can be used by political actors to make asylum and migration a key political stake during elections (Huysmans, 2006, p. 32).

Third, the framing of migration as a danger to society or even to national security is important for the competition between different parties in order to mobilize political support. Within these political games, the notion of migrants diluting the cultural identity of the established was used to enforce nationalist opinion. For example, this argument has been “successfully employed by the far right in Flanders to mobilize political support in the name of the Flemish nation” (Martinello, 1997 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 50). Western countries have explicitly and extensively applied this practice, which ultimately led to a redefinition of migration. Over decades, the main premise of the politics of migration was the management of the influx of people whereas actions in that area were mostly applied against the backdrop of a humanitarian thought. However, the process of politicization did not just redefine the ideological foundation of dealing with migration; it also had a large impact on the perception of the very nature of migration issues and consequently on its solutions.

4.2. The Securitization of migration

The application of specific security language plays a crucial role in securitizing migration. Securitization, in that sense, strives to identify what is hostile to a community or unit rather than restructuring the substance of the community or unit itself. This implies that “securitization governs migration as an inhibiting factor in the pursuit of freedom from threat” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 61). One scheme, which proved to be a suitable tool for transforming migration into a security issue, is through labelling it a threat to the way of life of the host-community. Although the specific features of a community’s way of life are difficult to comprehend, it became apparent that its disturbance is a very sensitive issue to the community and leads to a strong unity with political units.

Framing political unity and freedom in this way (by labelling migration as a threat to the host-community, comment by the author of this thesis) is a powerful method for sustaining an image of a completed, harmonious unit that only seems to be experiencing conflict, disintegration or violence if external factors, such as migration, start disrupting it (Huysmans, 2006, p. 49).
Yet, the notion of disturbance only scratches the surface of the perception of migration. Rather, the politics of insecurity developed an independent language of security, which clearly distinguishes the “insider” from the “outsider”. In that context, the outsider is threatening what Habermas (1972 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 47) calls the good life of the insiders. However, the specific features of the good life are only of secondary importance against the backdrop of securitization of migration. Rather, it serves as a useful equivalent to the notion of a dangerous life: “In the pursuit of freedom from threat it is the rendition of dangerous life that makes the judgement of the good life possible” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 47).

For the context of this thesis, the process of securitization bears two important questions:
1) Which specific aspects of migration and security are linked on a policy-level?
2) Which kind of reframing of migration issues is taking place in a shift from minor disturbance to existential threat?

In order to fully comprehend the nexus of migration and security, I first take a closer look at the application of security language based on the theory of Huysmans. This language is characterized by the explicit expression of unease towards outsiders through placing migration in an inherently hostile environment. To clarify this point, I will give two examples of how security language can be used by stakeholders. First, the arrival of people in a country can be characterized as a flood or invasion rather than as a limited number of people who are fleeing from devastating circumstances in their home countries. Second, migration can be recognized as a destabilizing factor to the domestic labour market rather than a chance to restructure the labour market according to an increasingly globalized and interconnected world. The speech act matters. Within the securitization process, the speech act is applied in a highly expedient way towards the creation of unease (Huysmans, 2006, p. 47). Associated with that, one reason why migration is often casted in a negative light is because migration poses significant challenges to the survival of political units. For political units in power, therefore, the mere thought that an uncontrolled intake of migrants would lead to a sudden rise in unemployment, which again would result in popular unrests and ultimately lead to serious legitimacy problem of the government, is often enough to take every precaution possible. One popular measure hereby is the use of fear-arousing metaphors when talking about migration.
Apart from legitimacy problems of national and regional governments, migration also challenges the “functional integrity” of nation states. The term “functional integrity” is associated with the government’s desire to control population dynamics, whether it is repressive or permissive migration. Its main purpose is to “optimize the society’s well-being by keeping the unwanted out and integrate the needed into the labour market” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 49). In that context, illegal migration poses a significant challenges to the government’s desire to control the movement of people. Consequently, illegal migration is not simply a threat to the survival political units but an assert to the sovereignty of the host-community (ibid, 2006, p. 47-49).

The optimization process of a society is significantly steered by the administration of trust and fear. The distinction between who can be trusted and who is to be feared is very much visible in the current Western perception of Islamic nations. The cultural similar, from a European perspective the Western nation’s citizen, is awarded with advanced confidence whereas the cultural dissimilar, the Islamic nation’s citizen, has to prove first being worth of trust of the established. A common way of proving one’s worthiness of trust is through “assimilation and cultural integration” (ibid, 2006, p. 51) whereby migrants who are unwilling or less capable of integration are less welcome. However, beyond this trivial game of awarding trust to people, who are willing to integrate, lies the systematic attempt of reproducing values, which are never fully disclosed.

Instead of searching for an original Western cultural identity, systematically articulating an Islamic threat, for example, facilitates nurturing an idea of unity without having to make its content explicit (ibid, 2006, p.52).

The fear of Islam as a political currency is consequently rendering unnecessary the reflection process of why these Western values are shared in the first place. It is then the politics of fear, which steers the public perception of migration whereas securitization as a “political and administrative rendering of policy domains” serves as its framework (ibid, 2006, p. 52). This strive to securitize migration is very much visible in Bauman’s metaphor of security studies’ scholars (1991) as being the gardeners, whose aim is to protect a harmonious garden against threats and contamination which destroy it. In that context, the gardener is only a servant of a sovereign authority, which intends to regulate the relationship between the established and the outsider. The legitimacy of this higher entity stems from the fact that individuals have a limited capacity to identify threats.
The problem is rather that one does not know who does intend to kill and who does not. In the insecure state of nature, the fear of other human beings rests thus on an epistemological fear (Huysmans, 2006, p. 53).

But how do we know whether threat definitions of the sovereign authority are applicable or not? Dillon (1996 as cited in Huysmans, p. 54) argues that an important element in this ontological debate is to “secure knowledge about inherently ambivalent social relations as truth.” This truth is supported by the notion of the world as an inherently dangerous place. As for the migration-security nexus, this strategy relocates the question whether immigrants are a positive contribution to the host society, in a much more hostile environment. Within the politics of insecurity, the formulation of “truthful knowledge” is a substantial component of “helping” citizens to deal with a world full of epistemological uncertainties (Huysmans, 2006, p. 51-54). The perception of migration as a continuous threat to the established is an essential part of such “truthful knowledge”. Against the backdrop of establishing an ontological truth, generally two strategies are applied. First, the potential threat is kept at a distance. This includes the reinforcement of border control or the arrangements of readmission agreements with third countries. Second, migrants are received but controlled by means of various measures, such as special identity cards or registration. The spatial segregation between the migrants and the established also plays a crucial role within the administration of inclusion and exclusion, whereby locking up refugees who seek asylum is just one example of sustaining distance. However, in both cases, the main purpose of national security policy is to ensure the survival of political and societal units. This happens either by identifying and fighting sources of threat beyond national territory or by diminishing the internal vulnerability towards migration through various tracking techniques, spatial segregation and other continuous stigmatization techniques. Yet, the administration of inclusion and exclusion does not always work in highly politicized or spectacular ways but it created highly expedient measures of generating exclusion. One of such measures is the issue of vouchers instead of cash for refugees. Here, the use of vouchers reveals a complex dynamic of inclusion and exclusion.

The vouchers include refugees in the political community by providing them with means to buy provisions but it also marks them as outsiders. In addition, using vouchers reinforces the self-identification of refugees as unwanted outsiders,
differentiating them clearly from others, defined as members of an established community (Huysmans, 2006, p. 56).

Moreover, the application of securitization processes annihilates the complex and unique life stories of immigrants and refugees by bringing them into line. In domains of insecurity immigrants and refugees do not simply exist as individual beings escaping from political, ethinical or religious persecution in their home countries. Rather, they are perceived as a collective force, which is endangering welfare and the moral basis of the established (ibid, 2006, p. 54-57). Securitization distances the included and excluded not only in physical but also mental terms. In domains of insecurity, the previously trusted or indifferent relationship between the established and the outsider is relocated in a climate of fear and prejudice. As a result, social and political engagement between the established and the outsider is increasingly alienated and exacerbated. Huysmans (2006, p. 58) argues that the “discursive and administrative relocation” of this relationship is essential in order to politically reinforce the need to tighten immigration policies. The mobilization of political support for these reforms, once again, happens against the backdrop of protecting the functional integrity and the independent identity of the host-community (ibid, 2006, p. 58). However, history showed that even though facing restrictive border control, immigration does not simply disappear. Rather, migrants are forced to circumvent security measures, and thus take more risks, which lead to an increasing number of human traffickers. The appearance of human traffickers, as important actors in migration processes, “reinforces the image that refugees are not genuine refugees but economic immigrants illegally entering the country and claiming asylum when caught” (ibid, 2006, p. 58).

In summary it can be said, therefore, that the politics of insecurity do not always work in patently obvious ways. Rather, it is composed of many inconspicuous features, such as the issue of vouchers, special identity cards or compulsory registration upon arrival. Yet, all these measures contribute to a perception of immigration as a “dubious business” among the host-community and, consequently, to a widening of the social gap between the established and the outsiders. In terms of the political unit’s desire to control, it is important to displace this relationship in a climate of suspicion and fear in order to conveniently steer the public perception of migration. Hence, stating one-sided arguments about social relations between migrants and established as a fact, such as reducing
migrants to the image of stealers, is a potentially useful strategy in order to govern the inclusion and exclusion of migrants.

4.3. Referent objects and threat definitions

As already argued in this chapter, the securitization of migration is a procedure, which is excessively reinforced by political and social actors. However, beyond the perception of migration as a socially constructed phenomenon, underlies the simple question of “what is threatened by migration”? In order to find a plausible answer to this question, it is important to analyse the relationship between the threat and the referent object in domains of insecurity.

In security studies, a threat, whether real or perceived, is always categorized. For example, organized crime is threatening the function of the internal markets whereas military aggression is threatening state sovereignty (Buzan 1983, 1991; Buzan et al 1998 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 2). The threatening character of migration, however, has not been evident until 9/11. “The act of violence of 9/11 transformed the global security agenda, not only catapulting terrorism to the top of the agenda but also making the control of the free movement of people a security priority.” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 1) Generally, the occurrence of specific events or developments proved to have a significant impact on security framing and the merging of threats. The association of migration and terrorism is of crucial importance for the course of this thesis. “Migration and asylum in the European Union have become part of a security continuum that facilitates transferring security concerns from terrorism, the fight against organized crime and border controls to the free movement of immigrants and asylum seekers.” (Bigo, 1994, 1996b as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 4) Against the backdrop of “the war on terrorism,” which was announced soon after 9/11 by the United States, immigration policies in the US and the EU saw an unprecedented tightening. However, it would be inaccurate to argue that the attacks of 9/11 fundamentally restructured the migration-security nexus. Nonetheless, the events of 2001 certainly worsened the relationship between the state as a referent object and migration as a threat. These threats do not necessarily have to be explicitly labelled as an existential threat or as a source of existential fear. Rather these issues are interconnected by means of security language with concerns in the wider area of policy development in order to implement
security procedures and instruments. The anti-terrorist measures after 9/11 serve as a prominent example here:

Asylum and refuge have not always been the main or only object of the policy initiatives. However, since one of the assumptions has been that terrorists may abuse asylum procedures to move into a country, asylum and refuge become an issue within more broadly defined anti-terrorism policy (Huysmans, 2006, p. 64).

Since the beginning of the European Integration process, migration has been governed as a threat to various referent objects. Yet, three referent objects keep reappearing in the political discourse about the potential threats of migration. These are: internal security and markets, cultural identity and welfare (ibid, 2006, p. 64). The last part of chapter four concentrates on these three themes and sets them in relation to migration threats. This elaboration serves as an important groundwork for the analysis of policy documents in chapter six in which I examine the magnitude of implementation of these themes of political discourse in two actual European policies. Further, I explore the relationship between referent objects and the threats of migration within these documents.

4.3.1. Internal security and internal markets

In 1992, the Single European Act (SEA) was adopted. The policy aimed at harmonizing the flow of goods, capital, services and people within the European Union through the abolition of internal border controls. This act in turn led to the articulation of the necessity to strengthen external border controls.

If we diminish internal border controls then we must harmonize and strengthen the control at the external borders of the European Community to guarantee a sufficient level of control of who and what can legitimately enter the space of free movement (Anderson, 1996; De Lobkowicz, 1994 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 69).

Concerns about the negative impacts of internal market’s harmonization were already expressed in the Schengen agreement from 1985. The agreement reads that all member states are encouraged to strengthen their visa policies in order to avoid “adverse consequences that may result from the easing of controls at the common frontiers in the field of immigration and security.” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 70) A common by-product of the
decline of internal border controls was the escalation of number of random identity controls. In the wake of the internal market’s harmonization, the European Union developed and elaborated instruments to control the free movement of its people. The restricted issue of working or residence permits and the limited access to social assistance had an even higher controlling function than border controls. However, while the market harmonization was supposed to be only a protective measure for the internal labour market from issues related to migration of outsiders, it also became an internal security matter. “One expected that the market would not only improve free movement of law-abiding agents, but would also facilitate illegal and criminal activities by terrorists, international criminal organizations, asylum-seekers and immigrants” (ibid, 2006, p. 71). This security continuum was articulated even more explicitly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, both in legislation and in public discourse. The extension of this continuum, once again, was significantly promoted through the contributions of intermediary agencies and intergovernmental fora in the field of security studies (see section 3.3.).

In summary it can be said, therefore, that the category of internal security is comprised of three main themes. The first theme is the strengthening of external borders as new mechanisms replaced the controlling functions of border controls in the wake of the downgrading of internal borders. The most prominent controlling functions are the issue of working and residence permits and a well-articulated need to update national visa policies. The second theme is the security continuum of migration and terrorism and the third one is the protection of the internal markets, with the labour market being the most prominent, even though not always explicitly mentioned, element to protect.

4.3.2. Cultural values

The promotion of European values in migration policy is one of the most controversially discussed migration issues within the political discourse. Apart from the administrative and professional concerns, the forwarding of cultural values is “part of a political spectacle” whereas “politics emerges in the spectacle as a drama in which meaning is conferred through evoking crisis situations, emergencies, rituals such as consultations or elections, and political myths” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 72-73). One prominent myth is that immigration challenges the cohesion of society and the national cultural homogeneity. The political rendering of this issue happens against the backdrop of various ideological stances, which
stretch from the promotion of multiculturalism to the need to protect national traditions and Western civilization as a whole. As for multiculturalism, the main political problem is that it threatens the unity of “cultural and political frontiers” (Martinello, 1997 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 73). Within this discourse, the developments of the European Integration process are playing a decisive role. Generally, it is active along three lines. The first is the cultural significance of border controls and the free mobility of persons. European external borders are more real for people with a specific cultural background than they are for others. This problem is evident in the fact that non-OECD citizens are more often subject to random security checks at borders than citizens of OECD countries (Balibar, 1994 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 74). Another common mechanism of the cultural differentiation of “the similar” and “the other” is to have visa requirements for specific third-country nationals. This rather ambiguous execution of border controls is largely triggered by peculiar demands in national labour markets.

The cultural consequences of border closure result partly from class interests and shifts in the labour market. When Western markets seem to demand skilled labour, the restrictive policies target primarily unskilled and semi-skilled migrants, who tend to belong to non-OECD countries (Miles, 1993 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 74).

However, one has to be cautious using this argument since some regions and cities specifically attract illegal and therefore cheaper and more flexible workforce. Still, the fact remains that the permeability into domestic labour markets is largely defined by cultural factors (Huysmans, 2006, p. 74).

The second theme is the integration of migrants into the society of the established whereas the integration process often results in cultural clashes. On the one hand, the European Union recently launched initiatives to simplify family reunions and is openly discussing integration requirements of migrants (Commission of the European Communities, 1998, 2000). On the other hand, the need to integrate “late arrivers” into domestic societies has been used to strengthen migration policy (Bigo, 1996b; Ugur, 1995 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 74).
A policy of integration may be part of progressive multiculturalism, which supports the integration of immigrants by granting them political rights as a means to create a genuinely multicultural society. But emphasizing the need to integrate immigrants can also directly or indirectly confirm a nationalist desire for a culturally homogeneous society, identifying immigrants as the obstacle to a successful realization of this desire (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1992 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 74).

The argument of upholding culturally homogenous societies regardless of the multiple contributions of foreigners to the host society is then not only backing up nationalist ideology; it also feeds more radical ideologies like xenophobia and Euro-racism and with it the analysis of migration issues through the politics of cultural belonging. The concept of belonging also has important implications on welfare as a referent object (see section 4.3.3.). In integration policies, it is often implied, at least indirectly, that migration challenges culturally homogenous societies, which have existed long before migration actually started, even though migrants contributed largely to the formation of contemporary European society. The integration process of migrants into artificial, culturally homogenous spaces is then confirming the notion that the cultural mindset of the migrant is indeed a danger to the established (Huysmans, 2006, p. 75).

The third theme is the continuous struggle of the European Union to establish multicultural and non-racist societies. Consequently, the EU developed common migration and asylum practices for all member states, which are justified on grounds of countering xenophobia and racism. These build-ups are based on the fear of a return to a Europe of the late 19th-early 20th century, which was the breeding ground of nationalist and racist ideology and finally culminated in the first and second World War (Wæver, 1996 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 76). However, this approach of the EU is ambivalent in its effects. On the one hand, the European Integration process created a space of open political discourse about the multicultural project. Especially the open process of the politicization of migration had a huge impact on its current level of discourse. On the other hand, this discourse is packed with fear-arousing presentations of migration, stretching from migration as a challenge to societal and political stability to migration as a threat to culturally homogenous spaces. Thus, a multicultural project has its own dangers as “it always risks slipping into a reductionism that politicizes migrants predominantly via their cultural identity. In other
words, it feeds the cultural reification of immigrants and asylum-seekers.” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 77) Especially the extreme nationalist camps could take advantage of the politicization of migration through skilfully mobilizing support for their perception of migration as a “burdensome and threatening cultural other” (ibid, 2006, p. 77).

4.3.3. Welfare

The access to social and economic rights in a welfare state is restricted and is subject to growing competition between nationals of member states and migrants since the late 1970s. Within this competition, the politicization of belonging plays a crucial role. Immigrants and asylum-seekers are increasingly characterized as people who should not have access at all to socio-economic benefits, or at least they should have more restrictions than nationals of EU-member states. One central argument of welfare chauvinists is that once foreigners have the same conditions of accessing welfare provisions as the established, the number of new arrivers will explode. Therefore, asylum-seekers and immigrants should be illegitimate to apply for socio-economic benefits.

The access to labour is an important criterion for social entitlements whereas third-country nationals are widely restricted in their access to the labour market. This dynamic is central to the politics of belonging in welfare states and to the distribution of social goods. In addition, the application of welfare chauvinism has serious implications for the politics of insecurity. “The rendition of welfare chauvinism is a central development through which migration and asylum is connected to domains of insecurity via the issue of welfare.” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 78) The distribution of socio-economic benefits is then not simply a process, which favours nationals of welfare states. Rather, it reinforces the perception of third-country nationals of not being part of the Europe at all. As for the justification of such curtailing of immigrant’s rights to social benefits, the discourse draws largely on the image of migration as a threat to cultural homogeneity (see chapter 4.3.2.).

Recent political conflicts around social rights of immigrants have often been based on the claim that the willingness to share social goods distributed by the welfare state needs a basis of common feeling. It is not surprising that those political actors opposed to (further) immigration, and/or to granting certain social rights to immigrants, have tended to refer to the alleged threat immigrants pose not only as economic competitors in the labour market and for social policies but also as a
threat to the cultural homogeneity of the national state (Faist, 1995 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 78).

Welfare chauvinism emerges in two forms, a radical and a moderate one. The radical form portrays third-country nationals as freeloaders, who illegitimately try to benefit from a welfare system to which they do not belong. Migrants are then not just adding to the competition for social goods but are constantly suspected of welfare fraud. The moderate version, however, sees nationals of member-states as a priority to the distribution of socio-economic benefits. Here, against the backdrop of economic recession and welfare systems under pressure, the state is obliged to provide for their “own” people first. Consequently, the decline of welfare provision is instrumentalized by political units in order to dramatize the question whether the welfare system can be preserved for established and for foreigners (Huysmans, 2006, p. 79). Besides economic considerations, this question also poses a significant threat to the legitimacy and consequently to the survival of political units. Huysmans argues that, within this discourse, EU politicians created a continuum of welfare chauvinism and security framing of migration with the potential to slip towards a security framing, as soon as the future of the welfare system is seriously contested (ibid, 2006, p. 79).

This chapter examined the relationship between migration and potentially threatened reference objects and explored the impacts for migrants of a highly politicized discourse about the migration-security nexus. It became apparent that especially internal security and internal markets, European values and welfare are prime concerns to protect. In order to mobilize political and social support for the protection of these reference objects, political units often dramatize the impacts of migration on these objects.
5. Qualitative Content Analysis

The question of which methodology would fit my research best was ubiquitous ever since I have started to read about the migration-security nexus. Throughout the research process, I hesitated between political discourse analysis and QCA. Already at the beginning of my thesis writing process I immersed in Fairclough’s political discourse analysis. I was stunned by how well the analysis of politics and its language fit Huysmans’ framework of the politics of insecurity since the politicization and securitization process of migration is significantly connected with the political “speech act”. In combination with my theoretical framework, it seemed consistent to analyse these speech acts through deciphering their “underlying rhetoric in terms of contestation and reproduction of political power” (Fairclough, 2012, p. 18). As connected with political discourse analysis, I also started to study Van Dijk’s critical discourse analysis, which is concerned with the question of “what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 250). However, the more I immersed in the principles of discourse analysis the more it became apparent that I had to cut the scope of my data due to the fact that discourse analysis according to Fairclough (2012, p. 18) is primarily concerned with the structure and validity of political argumentation. Practically, I was facing the decision of whether to give up one policy and narrow down the second one in a meaningful way.

I decided to keep the initial scope of my data based on the belief that the analysis of two policies drawn from different universes would increase the meaningfulness and representativeness of my research. (Duncan, 1989 as cited in Elo and Kyngas, 2007, p. 109) As a consequence of this decision, I dropped political discourse analysis as a methodology and started to look for alternatives, which would fit both the scope of my data and my theoretical approach. Thus, I chose QCA as the methodology of research.

This research is concerned with the analysis of two recent EU-policies against the backdrop of migration as a threat to multiple referent objects. The study is supported by two research questions, namely:

1. What are the threat definitions of migration in recent European policies and how do they correspond with the politics of insecurity?

2. Which kind of political reframing is taking place in the shift from migration as a non-politicized issue to the securitization of migration?
Generally, quantitative and qualitative content analysis are concerned with the “analysis of data within a specific context in view of the meanings someone - a group or a culture - attributes to them” (Krippendorff, 1989, p. 403). However, QCA, unlike Quantitative Content Analysis, refrains from rash quantification. Rather, it seeks understanding through a “controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication.” (Mayring, 2000, p. 2) More specifically, QCA is concerned with the “subjective interpretation of content of text and data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns.” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1278) Zhang and Wildemuth (2009, p. 1) argue that QCA “goes beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts to examine meanings, themes and patterns that may be manifest or latent in a particular text.” They add that QCA “allows researchers to understand social reality in a subjective but scientific manner” in terms of exploring “the meanings underlying physical messages”. Patton (2002, p. 453) describes the main criteria of QCA as “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort” which aims to “identify core consistencies” of a given “qualitative material”. However, central to most attempts of defining QCA is the notion of the method’s inherently subjective nature. This is because QCA challenges the paradigm that there is only one truth. This, in turn, implies that the “analysis process and the results should be described in sufficient detail so that readers have a clear understanding of how the analysis was carried out and its strengths and limitations” (GAO, 1996 as cited in Elo and Kyngäs, 2007, p. 112). Later in this section, we will discuss thoroughly the issues of trustworthiness in QCA.

QCA knows three different process designs of categorizing and analysing data: the inductive, the deductive and the abductive approach. The former is the most commonly applied approach in QCA and uses “inductive reasoning, by which themes and categories emerge from the data through the researcher’s careful examination and comparison” (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p. 2). Deductive reasoning seeks to retest already existing data in a new context (Catanzaro, 1988 as cited in Elo and Kyngäs, 2007, p. 111). Deductive reasoning is therefore “based on earlier work such as theory, models, mind maps and literature reviews” (Sandelowski, 1995; Polit & Beck, 2004; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005 as cited in Elo and Kyngäs, 2007, p. 111). However, both approaches lack the potential to create new knowledge ”as for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis” (Peirce,
Consequently, Peirce argues, abductive reasoning is the only logic, which is capable of introducing new ideas. Unlike the inductive and deductive approach this third way of sense making is driven by the logic of “what might be” (ibid, 2001, p. 367). Abductive reasoning recognizes the fact that all information is incomplete and the outcome of a study can only be a best possible educated guess.

To better illustrate the three logics of sense making, find below one example for each approach.

| Inductive reasoning | A is B.  
|                     | All Bs are Cs.  
|                     | A is, deductively, C.  |
| Deductive reasoning | Each time I do A under the same conditions, B occurs. Inductively, the next time I do A under these conditions, B will occur.  |
| Abductive reasoning | I've done something like A before, but the circumstances weren't exactly the same.  
|                     | I've seen something like B before, but the circumstances weren't exactly the same.  
|                     | I'm able to abduct that C is the reason B is occurring.  |

Table 1: Logic of sense making (Kolko, 2010)

5.1. Issues of trustworthiness in QCA

Qualitative Content Analysis, as many other qualitative methodologies, acknowledges its subjective and interpretative approach. Thus, conventional criteria of trustworthiness such as validity, reliability or objectivity are unsuitable for judging the research results (Bradley, 1993 as cited in Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p. 6). However, there are measures, which aim at increasing the research’s trustworthiness. Probably the most commonly applied measure is the provision of a rich description of the research design as well as a thorough documentation of single research steps. This offers the reader the possibility to critically analyse the specific aspects of the work. In that sense a precise coding process is essential to produce credible research. According to Bradley (1993, p. 436), this includes the “adequate representations of the constructions of the social world under study”. In order to increase the transparency of the coding process, both policies
have been devised into units of analysis. The aim of this segmentation is to create logical units within the two documents. This measure is of particular importance for the intercoder reliability and the transferability of the research (Mayring, 2014, p. 42; Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p. 6). This ensures that the analysis of the data could be reproduced under similar circumstances with complementary findings. According to Elo and Kyngäs (2008, p. 113) it is very likely in QCA that units of analysis “may contain elements relating to several categories”. If that is the case, Glaser (1987 as cited in Elo and Kyngäs 2008, p.113) argues that a certain amount of tolerance of feeling uncertain is required. In severe cases, the researcher should be ready to go back and check the reliability of the categories.

A basic precondition for successful QCA is that these categories and subcategories are conceptually and empirically grounded. Another important indicator of trustworthiness in QCA is the achievement of internal coherence, meaning that the data, the findings, the interpretations, and the recommendations of the research are comprehensible (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p. 7). In that sense, Polit and Beck (2004 as cited in Elo and Kyngäs 2008, p. 112) argue that logical links between the data and the results are crucially important in order to increase the trustworthiness of the work.

I refrained from incorporating quantitative variables (word counting lists) in this work even though some scholars propose this measure to increase the validity and replicability of the work (Mayring, 2014; Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 1989) Initially, I had already included one quantitative subcategory, which was concerned with measuring the amount of insider- outsider depictions in the policies. However, I could not find a meaningful way of integrating the variable in the work without compromising its internal coherence. Moreover, I was facing problems finding suitable literature for this specific case. As a consequence, I decided to drop the subcategory and deal with the issue in the discussion section.

5.2. Characterization of the data

The outcome of this study is determined by the analysis of two recent European Union policies against the backdrop of Huysmans’ politics of insecurity. This study, however, does not intend to compare the implications for migration in both policies. Rather, it intends to provide a comprehensive view on how migration and security became intertwined after 9/11. Thus, the documents are drawn from both, the security and
migration policy fields. The first policy is taken from the security policy area and addresses a variety of different threats in terms of European Union security. The second one is a comprehensive migration policy and focuses on international cooperation between EU and third countries in order to tackle migration issues. From the perspective of the EU, therefore, the former policy has a more inward-looking focus and the latter one a rather outward-looking focus. The choice of picking these two EU policies is based on two main aspects. First, the prospect of gaining a better understanding of the EU’s internal and external foci regarding migration as threat to various referent objects such as internal security, welfare, cultural values or the labour market. Second, the anticipation of identifying migration apprehensions all along the spectrum of political attention (see figure 3). This is a significant decision since this study is eminently concerned with the shift of migration along the scale of political and social attention, stretching from the non-politicization to the securitization of migration. Consequently, it is essential to address both, the internal and the external aspects regarding migration in order to get a holistic understanding of European migration policy making.

5.3. Description and context of the data

The first document is called “European Security Strategy (ESS) - A Secure Europe In A Better World” and addresses “for the first time key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU” (European Union External Action (EEA), 2010). The paper was drafted by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and provides a “conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including what would later become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)” (ibid, 2010). The European Council adopted the policy in December 2003. The document is divided into three sections: The first section, security environment: global challenges and key threats, deals with the identification of threats towards the continuity of the European Union. The second section, concerned with the strategic objectives, discloses the ways of tackling the key threats and announces a closer partnership with EU-neighbour countries in order to address these threats efficiently. The third section, the policy implications for Europe, is concerned with the establishment of a coherent European foreign policy and promotes an effective and anticipatory use of already existing instruments.
Crucial for the publication of the policy in December 2003 was the “the split between EU member states over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003”, which “highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at EU level” (EEA, 2010). Based on the premise, that “no country can tackle today’s complex problems on its own” (ESS, 2003, p.1), the document demands that the European Union member states share the responsibility for global security in order to build “a better world” (ibid, 2003, p. 1). Consequently, effective multilateralism ought to replace bilateral agreements as the guiding principle when conducting policy talks with partnership countries. Following the continuous extension of the EU within the last 20 years it is more than ever important to “co-operate through common institutions” in order to face security threats and challenges together (ibid, 2003, p. 1). This strife for more policy coherence within the EU is further highlighted in terms of the EU’s economic potential. In 2003, member states of the European Union produced a quarter of the World’s Gross National Product. The document suggests that in order to make use of such economic power it is important to have a “coherent foreign policy” in place (ibid, 2003, p. 11). In December 2008, the European Commission published a report on the policy’s level of implementation. As for the scope of this thesis this report is not subject of analysis.

Links between the theory of this thesis and the European Security Strategy might not be obvious prima facie. However, of utter importance to this study is the portrayal and perception of migration within a policy with a broad security agenda. Therefore, the analysis of this policy is expected to indicate the position of migration on a political scale, in addition to the main research question of which reference objects are under threat by migration movements. Consequently, the analysis part of this thesis will also pay close attention to the connections made between migration and other fields of security as dealt with in the ESS. Essential to this endeavour is to identify possible applications of “speech acts” which intent to move migration up on the scale of political attention.

The second policy of analysis, the “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)”, is the overarching framework of the EU’s external migration and asylum policy since 2005. The document defines the premises under which the EU is conducting policy dialogues and development cooperation with non-EU countries in a “mutually beneficial” way (GAMM, 2011, p2). The document is implemented through several political and legal instruments such as bilateral or regional dialogues, visa facilitation and
readmission agreements. GAMM is based on four equally important pillars. 1) Better organisation of legal migration and the fostering of well-managed mobility. 2) Prevention of irregular migration and the eradication of trafficking in human beings. 3) Maximization of the development aspects of migration and mobility. 4) Promotion of international protection and the enhancement of the external aspects of migration. In terms of the realization of these objectives keeping the conditions of the human rights agenda is a crosscutting priority.

Both policies are expected to shed light on the level of interconnectedness between migration as a threat and the EU as its referent object. More specifically the documents are likely to give indication about the correlation between migration as portrayed in the policies and Huysmans politics of insecurity. The analysis underlies a simple question: “What is threatened by migration”? The answer to this question is guided by three main categories of reference, which emerged from Huysmans’ politics of insecurity: migration as a threat to the internal security and internal markets, migration as a threat to welfare and migration as a threat to the cultural value base of the EU and its citizens. It is the intention of this thesis to locate possible interferences between the content of the policies and these three categories. Other categories of reference, which are likely to emerge from the analysis of the policies, will be dealt with in the discussion-section of this work.

5.4. Categories of analysis in detail

According to Zhang and Wildemuth (2006, p. 3), “categories and a coding scheme can be derived from three sources: the data, previous related studies, and theories.” As for this work, the developed categories and subcategories are solely based on theory. The categories of analysis, which derived from Huysmans’ politics of insecurity, are active along three lines: migration as a threat to internal security and internal markets, welfare and cultural values of the European Union. This is by no means an exhaustive list of potential reference objects of migration in domains of insecurity. It is rather a deductive list of categories, which emerged from the analysis of the politics of insecurity and serve as main reference points and connecting element between the two policies, and migration as portrayed in Huysmans’ work. Apart from the main categories also respective generic categories and subcategories were developed during the abstraction process of the theory. These categories are open to scrutiny in the context of Huysmans’ work.
Internal security & internal markets

- Strengthening of control mechanisms and external borders
- Merging of terrorism and (irregular) migration
- Protection of internal labour markets

- Enhancement of visa policies, readmission agreements, residence and working permits
- Random identity controls
- Increased controlling function of external borders
- Attacks of 9/11 as an indicator event
- Limited market capacity
- Priority given to European citizens to fill labour-gaps
European cultural values

- The significance of the migrant's cultural background at external borders
- Integration of migrants into the society of the established

Maintenance of welfare

- Distribution of socio-economic goods according to politics of belonging
- Welfare systems under pressure as a crucial test for the survival of political units

Other points:
- Visa requirement for specific third country citizens
- Non-OECD nationals more often subject to random security checks at border
- Peculiar labour market demands as a neutralizing power of cultural factors
- Integration process as a means to strengthen migration policies
- Integration as a path to a multicultural society
- Migration as a challenge to culturally homogenous spaces
- Moderate welfare chauvinism: nationals of member states as priority for benefits
- Radical welfare chauvinism: foreigners have no claim on welfare provisions
- Labour as crucial element for eligibility for social goods
- Dramatization of the question whether the welfare system can be upheld for both, foreigners and established
- Legitimacy concerns towards national voters
5.5. The coding agenda

The coding agenda contains definitions and coding rules and serves as the main reference point for the analysis of units (Mayring, 2014, p. 29). The anchor examples in the coding agenda are fictional and serve as benchmark. This is because of the deductive category building based on the theory and the uncertainty, therefore, that every category is represented in the data.

Category 1 (C1) - Internal security and internal markets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Anchor example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1.1. Strengthening of control mechanisms and enhancement of border controls</td>
<td>1) The enhancement of means, which intent to control and regulate the influx of people into the European Union. Common mechanisms are: Visa policies, readmission agreements with third countries, working permits and residence permits 2) Statements, which focus on the expansion of border controls against the backdrop of market harmonization processes.</td>
<td>“Governments of European Union member states are encouraged to keep their visa policies with third countries up to date in order to guarantee a smooth transition.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1.2. Merging of terrorism and (irregular) migration</td>
<td>The establishment of a clear connection between terrorism and (irregular) migration. Often associated with the abuse of asylum in order to circumvent border restrictions.</td>
<td>“The devastating potential of terrorists abusing asylum procedures to find their way into the United States became manifest after 9/11.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1.3 Protection of internal labour markets</td>
<td>All measures, which intent to protect internal labour markets. Often these measures are upheld until labour gaps cannot be filled by EU-citizens anymore. Measures, which are geared towards the protection of internal labour markets, justified on grounds of its limited capacity.</td>
<td>“Considering the limited amount of jobs available at the moment, it is essential to fill these labour gaps with EU-citizens first in order to keep the unemployment rate low.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C2 - European cultural values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Anchor example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| C2.1. The significance of the migrant’s cultural background at European external borders | 1) Mechanisms, which hinder migrants to cross European external borders because of their cultural belonging and cultural practices. In some cases a peculiar labour market demand might override these cultural factors.  
2) The question of whether non-OECD nationals are more often subject of such preventive mechanisms or not. | “Recent debates in France raised the issue whether polygamous practices of migrants should be tolerated or punished in the eyes of the law.” |
| C.2.2. Integration of migrants into the society of the established    | The integration process as a means of strengthening migration policies on ground insurmountable cultural differences between migrants and established. The integration process depicted as a threat to culturally homogenous spaces within Europe. | “A successful integration process comes along with the migrant’s commitment to European values which, in turn, depends heavily on the migrant’s cultural belonging. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the EU to absorb people who are willing and capable of committing to these values.” |

### C3 - The maintenance of welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Anchor example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C3.1. The distribution of socio-economic goods according to politics of belonging</td>
<td>Mechanisms, which intent to regulate the distribution of welfare-provisions on grounds of the applicant’s origin. In that sense the distribution process is carried out according to the politics of belonging (welfare chauvinism). In many cases a basic precondition for a successful application is employment.</td>
<td>“As long as citizens of Austria continue to be homeless and without income, they must be prime targets of welfare-provision programmes.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3.2. Welfare systems under pressure as a crucial test for the survival of political units</td>
<td>All statements, which address the issue of whether welfare systems can be maintained for both, established and foreigners, or not. According to Huysmans, the main incentive for dramatizing this question is to maintain political power (survival of political units).</td>
<td>“Welfare systems are crumbling, whether it is Scandinavia or Middle Europe. And in consideration of the refugee crisis it is simply impossible to keep up the provision of welfare for everybody.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.6. Units of analysis

Initial to the coding process, messages and statement need to be unitized (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 3). The selection criteria of these units are based on the coding manual, which, in turn, emerged from the analysis of this work’s theory. The unitizing process is a fundamentally important step for the outcome of this work since “differences in the unit definition can affect coding decisions as well as the comparability of outcomes with other similar studies” (De Waever et al., 2006 as cited in Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 3). In QCA, units of analysis are often concerned with “individual themes” and “expressions of an idea” rather than with “physical linguistic units” such as sentences of paragraphs (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 3). Consequently, the unitizing process for this thesis is guided by three main themes (migration as a threat to internal security and internal markets, migration as a threat to European cultural values and migration as a threat to the maintenance of welfare in Europe). Statements and messages, which fit a certain category, will not always be dealt with separately but will be contracted to logical units, where needed, trusting that this measure will increase the comprehensibility and replicability of this thesis’ coding process. In order to draw meaningful conclusions from the coded data it will also be necessary to “identify relationships between categories” through “uncovering patterns” (Bradley, 1993 as cited in Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 5).

The units of analysis of this thesis emerged at the end of a long immersion process with the data. The first step was to read both policies as careful as possible in order to get a feel for the data. This first contact with the data happened even before categories were elaborated. The phase also involved to get acquainted with referenced policies and documents within the data. Especially the GAMM-policy was rich with cross-references to related policy instruments. However, these referenced policy instruments will not be subject to analysis but will serve as reference points in the discussion section, where appropriate. The second phase came after categories and subcategories were already developed. Significant chunks of the text were unitized and assigned to the appropriate category. In most cases these units consist of one or two coherent paragraphs of the policy document. The second phase was further characterized by the identification of certain themes and ideas, which did not match the predefined categories but which are closely related. These themes will be dealt with in the discussion part. The third step defined the belonging of units, which fulfil the requirements of more than one category (i.e.: statements that link up integration aspects of
migration with the labour market). This measure does not intent to compromise the substantial richness of such statements but to increase the analytical structure of this work. The fourth step involved the contraction of single units into logical units. This is an essential step since the findings part of this work will approach these logical units according to their belonging in subcategories. This will ensure that units are dealt with in a structured way.
6. Findings

The first section of the findings’ chapter discusses thoroughly the relationships between theory and data, based on the coding agenda. The second part deals with the complementary research question, which is concerned with the location of migration on the political spectrum based on the content of the policies. In order to approach this question, I examine the use of specific terms in the context of migration.

6.1. Insights on migration as a threat to European reference objects

This section discloses the insights gained from the analysis of the policies in a chronological order. This means that I will first approach category 1 (henceforth C1) with all its subcategories (i.e.: category 1.1, henceforth C1.1.). The same scheme applies for C2 and C3. Considering the fact that categories emerged from the theory, it is possible that some categories and subcategories show greater correlations with the policies than others. Some categories might even have no correlation with the data at all. As for the presentation of such intersections, Schilling (2006 as cited in Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p. 5) argues that it is essential to provide “typical quotations to justify conclusions.” Such quotations will be provided from both, the theory and the data.

C1: Migration as a threat to Europe’s internal security and internal markets

This category showed, by far, the richest amount of correlations between categories and units of analysis. This was expected as the first policy (European Security Strategy, henceforth ESS) is eminently concerned with identifying external and internal threats all along the security spectrum. However, also the second policy of analysis (Global Approach for Migration and Mobility, henceforth GAMM) revealed a significant volume of correlations. The further course of chapter C1 deals with these security and market threats as related to migration.
C1.1. Strengthening of control mechanisms and enhancement of border controls

In this section, I first look at representative statements from the policies, before I analyse their content against the backdrop of this thesis’ theory in order to examine overlapping features between the categories of analysis and the data.

Generally, this subcategory is active along two lines: 1) The enhancement of policy instruments which target the governance and controlling of migration and 2) the augmentation of external border controls in order to deal with irregular migration.

Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility (GAMM, 2011, p. 5).

This statement reveals that the good-governance of migration flows is a basic precondition for the maintenance of opportunities for those who are legally entering Europe. In order to realize such control, “the EU will step up its efforts to prevent and reduce trafficking in human beings” through improving “the efficiency of external borders on the basis of common responsibility, solidarity and greater practical cooperation” (GAMM, 2011, p. 5). This improvement of external borders is justified on the grounds of the EU enlargements process, which brought the EU “closer to troubled areas” (ESS, 2003, p. 8).

Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe (ESS, 2003, p. 7).

Consequently, the task is to “promote a ring of well governed countries [...] with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (ESS, 2003, p. 8). Therefore, the EU has established a vast amount of agreements and treaties with countries in the immediate neighbourhood in order to tackle security concerns at external borders. The most visible of these instruments is the establishment of Mobility Partnerships (MP), which links readmission agreements to visa facilitation agreements (GAMM, 2011, p. 10 - 11 & p. 16). “The MP will help to ensure that the conditions necessary for well-managed migration and mobility in a secure environment are in place” (GAMM, 2011, p. 11). Conversely, such partnerships reduce the “risks of irregular migration” (GAMM, 2011, p. 16). Huysmans argues that already the Schengen agreement from 1985 encouraged EU - member states “to
strengthen their visa policies in order to avoid adverse consequences, which may result from the easing of controls at the common frontiers in the field of immigration and security” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 70). Such concerns are clearly expressed in the two policies, especially in the GAMM. However, before such negotiations of visa facilitation agreements are launched, partner countries need to fulfil a number of specific benchmarks, “including in areas such as asylum, border management and irregular migration” with the aim to “ensure mobility in a secure environment” (GAMM, 2011, p. 3). Thus, the EU-external migration policy has a clear focus on the outsourcing of such security concerns via mutually beneficial agreements with third countries. In turn, cooperating countries are granted visa facilitation and a simplified access to EU’s internal labour markets. In many cases, a cornerstone of such agreements is the exchange of knowledge tools, such as “migration profiles, mapping instruments and statistical reports” (GAMM, 2011, p. 11). The EU uses such knowledge to “identify and address data gaps and needs regarding current migration patterns, labour market trends, legislation and policy frameworks [...]” (GAMM, 2011, p. 20). According to Huysmans (2006, p. 49), this desire to control and monitor is largely because an uncontrolled intake of migrants would lead to unpredictable shifts in the labour market and would seriously threaten the functional integrity of European societies and the survival of political units. John Torpey (2000 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 30) adds that “the control of legitimate free movement is a function that has been equally defining of the modern state as the search for a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.” Leaving aside the fact that the control of knowledge and the legitimacy to command are inextricably linked, control and monitoring is also a way of “optimizing a society’s ‘well being’ by keeping the unwanted out and integrate the needed into the labour market” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 49). A more detailed analysis of the role of the labour market will follow in section C1.3.

In summary it can be said, therefore, that the role of the controlling function of both policy instruments and external borders are well articulated in the policies. Especially the establishment of Mobility Partnerships with third countries is of central strategic importance. Associated with such agreements comes a strong desire, on the part of the EU, to control and monitor migration movements in general. This is why the exchange of knowledge and intelligence on migration represents an essential part of the EU’s external migration policy.
C1.2. Merging of terrorism and (irregular) migration

This section is concerned with identifying links between terrorism and migration. It also intends to closely examine the reasons of terrorism as presented in the policies.

The analysis of the documents did not show explicit links between terrorism and migration. However, the way of presenting the terrorist threats allows references to the nexus of terrorism, migration and organized crime. The key threats-section of the European Security Strategy identifies connections between migration and terrorism. It links illegal migration with organized crime through suggesting that the individual (the illegal migrant) is part of a coordinated movement (organized crime).

Europe is a prime target for organized crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism (ESS, 2003, p. 4).

This statement builds on the nexus of migration, organized crime and terrorism, even though the illegal migrant is presented as a victim of organized criminal activities. The consequences of establishing such ties are significant: “Migration and asylum in the European Union have become part of a security continuum that facilitates transferring security concerns from terrorism, the fight against organized crime and border controls to the free movement of immigrants and asylum seekers” (Bigo, 1994 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 4). Another transfer of such security concerns appears in a section of the ESS, which examines the reasons for terrorism.

It (terrorism, comment by the author of this thesis) arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also part of our own society (ESS, 2003, p. 3).

Here, the presentation of the alienation of young people living in foreign societies as being one of the main causes of terrorism implies that these acts of extreme violence are partly committed by immigrants, who failed to integrate into European societies for various reasons. Further, it reifies the cultural other as being something unable or unwilling to adapt to European culture and, at the extreme, something able to carry out terrorist attacks.
The GAMM policy refrains from linking migration with terrorism. Nevertheless, it transfers security concerns from organised crime to irregular migration.

A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding on corruption and inadequate regulation (GAMM, 2011, p. 15).

As a preventive measure, the EU-authorities intent to increase “the exchange of information on migration and organised crime” between FRONTEX and the partner countries (GAMM, 2011, p. 16). Generally, a strong will to control and regulate is evident in GAMM-policy. On the part of the EU, desirable migration is characterized as something, which happens in an “organised and orderly fashion” whereas unauthorised migration is often connected with criminal activity (GAMM, 2011, p. 15 & p. 18).

In sum, there is significant evidence to be found in the policies that irregular migration is characterized as being closely intertwined with organized crime and terrorism. This is an important speech act if one wants to transfer security concerns from terrorism and organised crime to migration. The EU, therefore, strives to increase the acquisition of information on such irregular migration with the clear aim to monitor and control migration movements and ultimately to prevent terrorist attacks.

C1.3. Protection of internal labour markets

The protection of internal labour markets is a prime concern to the European Union. Consequently, this section examines various kinds of migration as being linked with European labour markets and identifies strategic aims of dealing with the influx of people into domestic labour markets.

In the policies, the articulation of the main benefit of migration in connection with the labour market is clear: “Migration and mobility [...] aim to contribute to the vitality and competitiveness of the EU” (GAMM, 2011, p. 4). Against the backdrop of “evolving demographic and economic changes,” it is a “strategic priority for Europe” to secure “an adaptable workforce with the necessary skills” (GAMM, 2011, p. 4). However, the integration of such workforce into European labour markets is only desired if “vacancies
cannot be filled by domestic workforce [...]” (GAMM, 2011, p. 2). As for sectors in which European countries face labour market shortages, the EU elaborated “harmonised conditions” in order to fill these gaps with migrants (GAMM, 2011, p. 12). The most prominent instrument is probably the EU Blue Card directive, which allows “highly skilled workers” to work in the European Union for up to three years (GAMM, 2011, p. 12). The portability of social and pension rights should further attract high skilled workers as well as work as a “disincentive for irregular work” (GAMM, 2011, p. 4). According to Huysmans (2006, p. 47), the reasons for introducing such instruments are based on the fear that an uncontrolled intake could destabilized internal labour markets and weaken the state’s competitive position as well as question the government's’ legitimation. After all, citizens of EU-member states elect national politicians as well as EU-representatives. Associated with legitimacy concerns comes the apprehension that serious disruptions in the labour market might shake the very foundation of “mutually beneficial labour contracts” which guarantee “a high level of employment and wealth” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 52). In this regard, “the number of immigrants mediated through the labour market is the central element for linking immigration to an existentially dangerous situation” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 47). This is probably a prime reason why the European Union is so concerned about regulating the number of foreign workers.

Broadly speaking, the permeation into internal labour markets works according to a clear hierarchy: first EU-nationals and then foreigners. However, the EU has elaborated instruments, which facilitate the integration of specific high skilled specialists into domestic labour markets. The urge to control and monitor then intake of foreigners is also clearly evident in this section.

C2.1. The significance of the migrant’s cultural background at European external borders

No significant evidence was found in the policies that the cultural belonging of migrants is depicted as a threat, nor could I find any indication that non-OECD nationals are discriminated at EU external borders.
C2.2. Integration of migrants into the society of the established

There is no evidence that the integration of migrants into the society of the established is presented as a threat to culturally homogenous spaces in Europe. In the contrary, the European Union has elaborated instruments, which facilitate the integration of well-managed migration into European societies (i.e.: education and training programmes for migrants, employment guidelines, which prevent migrants from being exploited, measures against xenophobia and social exclusion of migrants). However, many of these measures particularly focus on increasing the efficiency of the integration into domestic labour markets. “Effective integration, in particular in the labour market, is the key to ensuring that both migrants and receiving societies can benefit from the potential of migration, including via stronger diaspora communities and migrant entrepreneurs” (GAMM, 2011, p. 13). The mutual benefit of migrant and host community is essential in that regard.

C.3.1. The distribution of socio-economic goods according to the politics of belonging

No convincing evidence was found that the distribution of welfare provisions according to the politics of belonging is a central concern to the EU.

C3.2. Welfare systems under pressure as a crucial test for the survival of political units

The examination of the units of analysis showed that the prosperity of the European Union plays a vital role as a reference object of various threats. “In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system” (ESS, 2003, p. 9). However, no convincing evidence has been found that migration poses a significant threat to European welfare or to the survival of political units.

6.2. Insights on the political reframing of migration

Migration is a highly politicized issue and “is now firmly at the top of the European Union’s political agenda” (GAMM, 2011, p. 2). This is also reflected in the European
Union’s numerous efforts to monitor and regulate migration (i.e.: GAMM, the European agenda for the integration of third-country nationals, the EU-policy development on immigration and asylum) as well as in its endeavours to establish a comprehensive European migration policy. As section C1 highlighted, migration is also perceived as a significant threat to internal security as well as to domestic labour markets. Furthermore, migration is clearly associated with organised crime and, in a broader sense, with terrorism. The speech act, in that sense, is an important step, if one wants “to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 25).

This section analyses further the questions of, first, how these spheres are interconnected linguistically and second, which kind of political reframing is taking place in order to securitize migration. Thus, I will pay close attention to the potential application of security language, which is geared towards putting issues in migration beyond the realm of conventional political systems (see chapter 3.2. and 4.2.).

One powerful tool of creating unease towards foreigners is through the use of insider-outsider depictions. In that regard, the key-threats section of the ESS discusses the alienation of young people living in foreign societies as related to terrorism (ESS, 2003, p. 3). The passage reveals reasons for such disaffection (pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises) and concludes that these people could be part of a terrorist movement because they cannot cope with our way of living. I notice two strategies at work here. First, this depiction relocates the potential question “whether immigrants are a positive contribution to the host society or not, in a much more hostile environment” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 49). As a result, the interaction between established and foreigners is increasingly alienated and relocated in a climate of fear and prejudice. Second, this “discursive and administrative relocation” is an essential step if one wants to politically reinforce the need to tighten immigration policies (Huysmans, 2006, p. 58). Apart from the relocation of the foreigners-established discourse, this depiction feeds another powerful dynamic, manifest in the question of why migrants go to another country in the first place if they cannot cope with its citizens’ way of living or, even worse, if they are reluctant to be integrated in this society. A tightening of immigration policies is just the corollary of accepting this dynamic.

On a broader scale, another political reframing of the migration-security nexus is at work in the strategic objectives section of the European Security Strategy. The passage discusses the urge to build “security in our neighbourhood”: 
Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population on its borders all pose problems for Europe (ESS, 2003, p.7).

In order to solve this problem, “our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (ESS, 2003, p.8). This depiction of our neighbourhood creates the image of an unsafe world, which produces new wars and as a consequence, a massive flux of people fleeing these countries with the associated risk of importing their political disputes into the first world (Bigo, 2006, p. 387). The image of the world as an “inherently dangerous place” is further enforced here by referring to population growth as exploding (Huysmans, 2006, p. 54). Concerning the solution of this problem, the document suggests the promotion of a ring of well-governed countries. From a European perspective, this strategy is located in the realm of the external aspects of migration as it is the clear intention of the European Union to support the stabilization process of countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood in order to make these countries more capable in terms of capacity building to deal with migration issues themselves. In turn, the European Union manages to keep potential threats further away from its external borders.
7. Discussion – societies in domains of insecurity

This study is eminently concerned with the migration-security nexus in domains of insecurity and the political shifts, which are associated with it. However, this research only touches on a fragment of a nexus, which looms increasingly large in everyday politics, in social gatherings, on social media platforms as well as in the news. In 2015, the discourse about how issues in migration and security should be connected has been ubiquitous.

In 2003, when the European Security Strategy was published, the perception of this nexus was still a different one. The publication came as a reaction to the act of violence of 9/11, which transformed the global security agenda, not only catapulting terrorism to the top of the agenda but also making the control of the free movement of people a security priority (Huysmans, 2006, p. 1). Against this backdrop measures were introduced which focused on how to prevent such terrorist attacks in the western world in the future. As a side effect of the tightening of immigration and asylum policies, the public perception of immigrants and asylum seekers shifted significantly towards migration as a “dubious business.” On the other hand, the controversial discourse about migration in Europe yielded countless new initiatives and organisations, which are concerned with shaping the public perception of issues in immigration and asylum as a humanitarian matter. The efforts of the European Union to moderate this polarizing debate through new policy initiatives were soon caught up by reality, as more and more EU member states preferred their national solutions, concerning the way to deal with the migration-security nexus, over the EU’s solutions. Even worse, this retreat to the nation state started to question the European integration process as a whole. In this regard, the questions emerged whether European migration policy making still reflects reality in terms of its expedience towards managing the influx of people. Zygmunt Bauman (2000) in his book *Liquid modernity* argues that the modern age, apart from its technological advances, also produced ungovernable chaotic spaces. In this regard, Thomas Assheuer talks about the hypothetical consequences of the disintegration of political spaces as connected with the arrival of refugees in the German weekly newspaper DIE ZEIT. He argues that if the political regime would collapse, the nation state would finally get rid of the fetters of justice and its ultimate goal would become manifest: the will for self-preservation. This would also mean that it had to determine friend or foe, which would imply serious consequences for migrants, since migration is threatening the state sovereignty.
We have not (yet) arrived at this point. However, a glimpse of the challenges, which lie ahead in order to prevent this scenario, has already been witnessed. Assheuer (2015) argues that probably the biggest challenge of them all is the European society itself. “Refugees encounter nervous societies, neither of which overcame the disaster of the financial crisis”. (Assheuer, 2015, as translated from German) He adds that additionally nobody knows if the old recipes (i.e.: economic self-controlling or growth capitalism) still work. He concludes that refugees, in that context, embody the forerunners of the unknown. In this regard, a recent study conducted by the Bertelsmann foundation in Germany showed that the fear of the cultural dissimilar is significantly higher in areas, in which the percentage of foreigners is lower than usual. This might be the reason why the anti-immigration movement Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident) enjoy the largest clientele in German regions with a percentage of foreigners below the national average such as Saxony and Thuringia. Consequently, it is then the fear of the unknown, which drives people in huge numbers to the streets to protest against all kind of issues, which appeal to human irrationality. As associated with that, the distribution of fear and trust as a political currency plays a crucial role and is alarmingly well working. Consequently, it does not come as a big surprise that scaremongers all over Europe are experiencing a meteoric rise against the backdrop of the “refugee crisis” simply by connecting the migration-security nexus with basic human fear. 

This is because “fear is not first of all an emotion. Rather it is a particular principle of making human relations intelligible in a certain way. The meaning of fear is then not a question of psychological processes or of identifying the particular situation that is being feared but of unpacking its method of categorizing human relations and relations between humans and their natural environment.” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 52) Thus, the construction of the world as an inherently dangerous place is one way of to conveniently steer the public perception of migration. The French cultural theorist Paul Virilio elaborated the features of fear in his book The administration of fear. He argues that “fear is now an environment, a surrounding, a world. Fear was once a phenomenon related to localized, identifiable events that were limited to a certain timeframe: wars, famines, epidemics. Today, the world is limited, saturated, reduced, restricting us to stressful claustrophobia. […] Fear is the world, panic as a ‘whole.’” (Virilio, 2012, p. 14 - 15) Globalization plays a crucial role in that regard as it “has progressively eaten away at the traditional prerogatives of states (most notably of the welfare state) and they [politicians] have to convince people that they can ensure their [citizens] physical safety.” (Virilio, 2012, p. 15) Hence, nation states are
tempted to “create policies for the orchestration of fear” (ibid, 2012, p. 15). This elaboration is important because frightened human beings long for security, which in turn facilitates the tightening of migration policies.

A team of European policy advisors at the European Commission investigated the public perception as linked with migration and security. Consequently, the last part of this chapter deals with their solutions to break this cycle of fear. A basic precondition of escaping this vicious cycle is to start disconnecting migration with fear arousing metaphors. This includes taking the media up on their promise as they link “a large variety of social and economic problems with the issue of migration.” This “can have a distorting effect on public perception” (Canoy, Beutin, Horvath, Hubert, Lerait, Smith & Sochacki, 2006, p. 9). History showed that it is possible for the European Union to handle a large intake of migrants whereas the public perceptions of migration in this context may strongly influence the effectiveness with which migration can be managed (ibid, 2006, p. 38). Important in this regard is to still the people’s fear by showing strong political will that the European Union can handle this influx of people together. This would include improving the basic conditions necessary for the arrival of migrants (elaboration of appropriate housing concepts, facilitated access to the domestic labour market, increased numbers of integration courses, raising the allocation for public education, etc.). Furthermore, globalisation increased the speed of change. It is important in this regard to still the people’s “fear of sudden and disturbing change” (ibid, 2006, p. 9). Ultimately, they suggest that, in order to break the cycle, a “sufficient quantity of legal migration” (ibid, 2006, p. 38) would be necessary.

In summary, it can be said, therefore, that the public perception of migration is an important element driving European migration policy making. This is because political units need the backup of citizens in order to remain in power. However, experiences have shown that European citizens are highly receptive to fear-arousing depictions as linked with migration. The administration of fear, therefore, proved to be a suitable tool to effectively steer the public perception of migration. In order to break this cycle, it is essential to still people’s fear by showing a political commitment, which states that the influx of people can be dealt within the conventional political system. This would also diminish the possibility for migration to be perceived as a threat rather than as a positive contribution to the host community.
8. The researcher’s position

The work at hand is the product of a yearlong process starting from December 2014. Within this time, the attention to issues in migration increased significantly until it became impossible to escape the matter. Social media platforms brimmed with individual opinions about how to solve the crisis; the front pages of the boulevards were full with, often unverified, fear-arousing information about the ‘refugee crisis’; news stations aired special broadcasts about the new arrival of refugees at the national border; European politicians met multiple times a week to discuss their further strategy in this critical situation and, almost as a side line, tried to keep the European project alive.

As the topic of my thesis became, each month of this year, more and more relevant to the European’s current situation, and overflowed the media, it was challenging to stay focused on the two policies I chose. Indeed, it was sometimes difficult to keep it narrow and to remain objective, despite the late happenings. The anchor definitely was my research question(s), which guided me all along the research process. It was important for me to keep reminding myself the aims of this thesis, in order to keep a certain level of coherence and consistency. As for my research methodology, I have chosen Qualitative Content Analysis over Critical Discourse Analysis for the following reason. My own position within this research might be described politically as moderate left. I am aware of my personal ideological bias and I did not want to risk to further take a stance, especially in a matter, which is as controversial as the temporary migration-security nexus. Critical Discourse Analysis as a method, on the other hand, was certainly tempting, but would have further increased the possibility to get off the scientific course. Another reason why I refrained from choosing a scientific method, which implies taking a critical stance, was the fact that the work in hand is concerned with a small fracture of an overwhelmingly huge and still very much unsolved group of themes. The internal consistencies of the study process as well as transparency, therefore, were prime concerns to me in order to prevent myself from getting lost in the matter. In that context, the clear structure of Qualitative Content Analysis certainly helped to keep on scientific track and corresponded well to the concerns of my research question(s).
References


Appendix

Security studies in the United States after WWII

The first decade (1945-55) after WWII saw a rapid increase of institutions concerned with national security, such as the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins, or the School of International Affairs at Columbia University. On a research level, the journals International Organization (1947) and World Politics (1948) were founded and functioned as a medium of exchange of ideas in security studies. At this point, the intellectual discourse in the field was already coined by military instruments of statecraft (Baldwin, 1995, p. 121). However, the first decade was not yet concerned with Nuclear Weaponry and deterrence, but rather set the infrastructural and institutional requirements for security studies in the later stages of the 20th century.

The second post World War II decade (1955-65) has been described as “the golden age” of American security studies. These years were “dominated by nuclear weaponry and related concerns, such as arms control and limited war” (Baldwin, 1995, p. 123). The central question to this era was how to use a specific set of weapons as a political tool. However, the shift to a military interpretation of security studies was discussed, with much controversy among scholars. Many thought that overemphasizing the military aspects of security studies would lead to a repression of historical, psychological, cultural or political threat definitions. Baldwin citing Kolodziej noted that “threat manipulations and force projections became the central, almost exclusive concern of security studies” (Baldwin, 1995, p.123-124).

These priorities waned around 1965, when the United States shifted their focus from the Cold War to the rather hot war in Vietnam, even though the US had limited intelligence about peasant nationalism and counterrevolutionary war in South-East Asia. In addition, the Vietnam War was a major break with modern strategic theory since the military intervention did not serve a clear political goal (Gray as cited in Baldwin, 1995, p. 124). Consequently, the impact of security experts declined and did not revive immediately after the Vietnam War. Rather, the post-Vietnam War era saw a relaxation of geopolitical tensions (detente) between the United States and the Soviet Union, which led to a fundamental shift in security studies. Ergo economic interdependence, third world poverty and environmental issues increased in salience and emerged on the agenda of security experts (Baldwin, 1995, p. 124). These shifts were largely triggered by the Arab Oil
Embargo in 1973, which was seen as a serious threat to the American way of life, and boosted the significance of economic independence in security studies. The oil embargo also put non-military concerns to the foreground for the first time. These sudden shifts in security-priorities were also triggered by findings in Peace Research of progressively securing a better social order (Galtung, 1969). This movement gained increasing momentum in the late 1960s in Europe. Other scholars even proposed to split security studies into two fields, one which would be solely concerned with military and technological aspects while the other would be moving beyond military concerns in order to cover a wider range of security issues (Buzan, 1991 as cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 18).

It was, all up front, an ideological dispute between (neo)-realists, pluralists and marxists in security studies (see chapter 2.2.).

However, with the breakdown of the detente in the 1980s, international security studies were fuelled with military concerns again but these thought experiments should serve as an intellectual groundwork for post-Cold War security studies. At the beginning of the 1980’s, the field was once again dominated by the “use of military to meet military threats” (Baldwin, 1995, p. 125), or as the European security specialist Haftendorn (1991, as cited in Baldwin 1995, p. 125) put it: “In the United States the field of international security studies has often been equated with strategic studies”. Within forty years, the Cold War had successfully militarized the field of security studies.