“Fundamentally Ruthless, Shameless, and Cruel”

Henry Morgenthau's Image of Germany

University of Oulu
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Jukka Mantere
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Introduction

Contextualization and Historical Background

Henry Morgenthau Sr. was the Ambassador of the United States of America\textsuperscript{1} to the Ottoman Empire, from here on referred as Turkey in this thesis\textsuperscript{2}, from 1913 to 1916. After leaving Turkey in 1916, he wrote his memoirs of his time as the ambassador, titled \textit{Ambassador Morgenthau's Story}. According to Morgenthau himself, the main motive for him to write his memoirs was to inform world about the horrific atrocities against Armenians that took place during his stay in Turkey, as well as to warn the world about Germany's plans for a world conquest. Morgenthau's story was dedicated to the American President Woodrow Wilson, and thus influencing him and the American public can be seen as a another motive for writing his story\textsuperscript{3}. The memoirs were originally published in October of 1918, just before World War I ended in the German armistice.\textsuperscript{4}

The horrific series of events Morgenthau refers to in his story's preface is nowadays usually referred to as the Armenian genocide, which started in earnest in March 1915 in wartime Turkey.\textsuperscript{5} The Armenian genocide has been studied extensively, and Morgenthau's story has been used as an important primary source for studying it. However, referring to the massacres of Armenians in Turkey during the First World War as a genocide is still sometimes disputed even in academic circles, usually political reasons, and this will be examined more closely later on in this chapter.

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} The United States (shortened as the US) is used to refer to The United States of America in this thesis.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} In this thesis, term Turkey will be used anachronistically to refer to the Ottoman Empire. Henry Morgenthau also referred to Ottoman Empire as Turkey, and its Muslim inhabitants as Turks, in his story.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Morgenthau 1918, Preface.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} Winter 2003, 302.
  \item \textsuperscript{5} Balakian 2003, xvii.
\end{itemize}

This thesis uses the term genocide to refer to the widespread massacres of Armenians which started in 1915 and lasted until the 1920s. Usage is justified by the fact that The Association of Genocide Scholars passed formal resolution in 1997 where the association "reaffirms that the mass murder of over a million Armenians in Turkey in 1915 is a case of genocide which conforms to the statutes of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. It further condemn[s] the denial of the Armenian genocide by the Turkish government and its official and unofficial agents and supporters" IAGF. http://www.genocidescholars.org/resources/resolutions
The First World War, its geopolitical ramifications and anti-German propaganda set the broader context for the Armenian genocide, as well as to Morgenthau's story. The war itself was culmination of steady rise in rivalry and military build-up between major European powers. The First World War's roots can be traced to the rise of Germany as a Great Power in the end of the 19th century. Gradually, Germany took over France's immemorial role as the traditional continental rival and threat to the UK.\(^6\) This development eventually culminated in Germany lead the alliance of the so called Central Powers, and Allied powers were lead by the United Kingdom\(^7\). The interests of the two great powers were bound to cross, and this lead to increasing tensions. One of the places these interests clashed, was the grumbling Turkey, and it increased the distrust between them\(^8\).

The traditional anti-French attitude in the UK gradually made way to the anti-Germanism, as Germany was seen as the most potential enemy of the UK especially after 1904. Anti-German propaganda to change the image of Germany in the UK started in earnest after 1904, but it should noted, however, that the image of Germany in the UK had already begun to worsen, and anti-German propaganda had steadily increased as the end of the 19th century neared. This anti-German propaganda begun to spread to the US as well, partly because of the close cultural links between these two English-speaking countries.\(^9\)

The use of propaganda in geopolitics are as hot topics as ever, as many believe that the world has entered the so called “post-factual” era of politics\(^10\). The emotional hype which is highlighted in mass media, Internet and social media, can seem to overwhelm the more moderate, well-grounded opinions, and heated political arguments often without factual or logical content are used side by side with reasoned ones. Relativity seems to put emotional or religious opinions and scholarly reasoned opinions on the same level, and thus it seems we are in danger of drowning in this mire of factual irrelevance. By studying historical images, and how they were changed by means of propaganda, we can better understand

\(^6\) Connors 1966, chapter "Public opinion of Germany to 1914”
\(^7\) The United Kingdom, shortened as the UK, is used to refer to The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in this thesis.
\(^8\) Trumpener 1968, 5-6.
\(^9\) Connors 1966, chapters "Public Opinion of Germany to 1914” and "Entente Propaganda”
today's problems as well. And also by understanding the images that people of the past have held, we can better understand their actions and reactions in their subjective realities. After all, people act based on how they perceive the world, and not based on how the world “truly” is. Understanding this fact is of paramount importance in order to comprehend motivations behind peoples' actions, both in past and present.

Geopolitical realities can also be important as they can greatly influence what topics are brought up into general discussion in the first place. Idealism, morality and truths are often drowned in political quagmires of realpolitiks when major powers are concerned, as is evident by the US President Obama's refusal to use the word “genocide” when referring to the deaths of well over million Armenians between 1915-23 in Turkey, despite the promise he made during his presidential campaign in 2008. The truth is usually the loser in this kind of situation, and geopolitical needs supersede it. On the other hand, it seems when geopolitical needs call for it, moral condemnation and human right breeches are used in full force to further those ends. However, this kind of duplicity by making truth subjective is only helping populists and demagogues, as this in part can cause the people to lose their faith in the established political system. These kind of issues should not be put into limelight only when it is convenient, no matter the context. This thesis makes an effort to show how simplified tendentious story and untruthful claims can undermine one's whole undertaking, despite the general respectable motives behind it.

The United States' Foreign Policy

The United States was following its isolationist foreign policy towards the Old World and focusing its foreign policy towards the Americas since the early 19th century, while excluding European powers from gaining too much influence there, as expressed in the so-called Monroe doctrine. However, American economic and diplomatic influence was gradually increasing all over the world in as Americans began taking a much more active role

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11 Ratz 2007, 220.
12 Ratz 2007, 220.
in the world affairs after 1901. The US remained formally detached from European alliances, but in practice it was slowly aligning itself towards the UK and the Entente in general as the First World War progressed, partly because of the British propaganda efforts against Germany. The US was still largely following its traditional isolationist policy towards the Middle East as well, as dictated by the Monroe Doctrine. But it was President Woodrow Wilson, who changed the American foreign policy like no other person before him, partly out of necessity when the US got involved in the European conflict. As an idealist, President Wilson did not initially believe that Germany was to be blamed for starting the war, nor that it would be wise to do so. Later on Wilson begun to see Germany as more guilty for the start of the war than before and abandoned his policy of ”peace without victory”, but still preferred to seek ”impartial justice” with Germany, as his Fourteen Points address exemplified.

The American Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau

Henry Morgenthau senior was born in Germany into an affluent Jewish family, and he immigrated with his family to United states in 1870. They settled in New York, and after two years he entered to study law in New York's City College, even though he did not speak a word of English when he arrived in the United States. He had a very successful career as an attorney and a businessman, and became a supporter of the democratic party. The reason why Morgenthau left the business world, and entered politics was because he felt that he was “released from the toils of materialism” by his economic success, and that he should “pay back in the form of public service”. Morgenthau was also an active member of the Reform Jewish community in New York and was one of the community's leading figures, although he was also affected by Quakerism from an early age, and had a daily habit, like Benjamin Franklin, to make a list of virtues to practice. Morgenthau was described as being energetic, direct, open and had straightforward, no-nonsense personality with strong sense of moral

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15 Herring 2008, 376.
16 Welch 2014, Part II chapter 2 ”The Hun: Constructing image of the Enemy”
17 DeNovo 1963, 86-87.
18 Herring 2008, 379.
20 Herring 2008, 413.
21 Oren 2007, 332.
22 Balakian 2003, 221.
purpose who followed his conscience, not his pride.\textsuperscript{23} He was considered to be a religious man, but he himself said that his true religion and calling was to “serve democracy”. He was a one of the most important supporters of Woodrow Wilson from early on, and when Wilson rose to presidency in 1912, Morgenthau was hoping for a cabinet position in Wilson's government. The President, however, had different plans for him, and asked Morgenthau to become the US ambassador to Turkey.\textsuperscript{24}

Morgenthau was not very enthusiastic about the thought of becoming the American Ambassador to Turkey. He had no prior experience in the diplomatic world, and had no prior special knowledge about Turkey. But Wilson had made up his mind. President's primary reason to make Morgenthau the ambassador was Morgenthau's Jewish background. Two prior US ambassadors to Turkey had been of Jewish faith, and the traditional view was that Jews could more easily work as middlemen between Muslims and Christians. Morgenthau reluctantly accepted the position, partially out of loyalty to Woodrow Wilson.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Past Historical Research}

As already mentioned, Morgenthau's memoirs have been extensively used as a primary source about the Armenian genocide. Two examples such work is JAMES L. BARTON'S \textit{Turkish Atrocities: Statements of American Missionaries on the Destruction of Christian Communities in Ottoman Turkey, 1915–1917}, published in 1998, and PETER BALAKIAN'S awarded and best-seller \textit{The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response}, published in 2003.

There has also been many historical studies, in which Morgenthau's story has been passingly criticized, that have already debunked many of the claims presented in Ambassador Morgenthau Story. These studies include such such as \textit{Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918}(1968) by ULRICH TRUMPENER and \textit{The Origins of the World War}(1929) by

\textsuperscript{23} Balakian 2003, 222.
\textsuperscript{24} Oren 2007, 333
\textsuperscript{25} Oren 2007, 333-334.
SIDNEY FAY, as well as *Genesis of the World War*(1926) by HARRY E. BARNES.\(^{26}\) It has been already found in earlier research that the anti-German outlook of Morgenthau's book is not present in his letters, diary, and official telegraphs as with the United States Department of State\(^{27}\).

Some scholars have gone even further, and have discredited the whole book as mere non-factual piece of propaganda, for example HEATH W. LOWRY wrote in his book *The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* that Morgenthau's memoirs is just a record of “crude half-truths and outright falsehoods”\(^{28}\). Lowry was the Atatürk professor of Ottoman and modern Turkish studies in Princeton university, and is now retired\(^{29}\). He has been considered to be the leading voice among the so-called Armenian genocide denialists in the academic world, and he discredits the whole memoir as mere propaganda is his article. Respected Jewish German-born American historian GUENTER LEVY has defended Lowry's claims about inaccuracies and falsehoods presented in the Morgenthau's memoirs', as there seems to be many many factual differences between Morgenthau's story and Morgenthau's archives\(^{30}\). Levy has also questioned in this whether the Armenian massacres could properly be defined as a genocide, but as noted, this thesis uses the term genocide in a more loosely defined manner to refer to the massacres and mass deportations of Armenians in Turkey from 1915 onwards. Morgenthau himself uses phrases like “the murder of a nation” and “the destruction of the Armenian race” to describe the massacres\(^{31}\), so in this respect the use of the term genocide in this thesis also follows Morgenthau's lead. J. M. WINTER also admits that Lowry raised legitimate questions about the discrepancies between Morgenthau's contemporary diary and the letters written in the story's time period compared to his story of 1918.\(^{32}\) Opinion about the memoirs' truthfulness in describing the events in Turkey seems to have taken a political dimension, and discrediting the memoirs can been seen as a political act to help the cause of the Armenian genocide denialists. As noted earlier, the International Association of Genocide Scholars passed a resolution in 1997, in which it was confirmed that the Armenian massacres from 1915 onwards should be classified as a genocide, and thus this


\(^{27}\) Cook 1957, 129.

\(^{28}\) Winter 2003, 302.


\(^{30}\) Levy 2005a, 140-142

\(^{31}\) Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXIV: The Murder of a Nation

\(^{32}\) Winter 2003, 302-303.
thesis also uses the term.

**Methodology**

On a general level, methodological approach of this thesis is qualitative, and quantitative approach is only used sporadically to support the qualitative analysis. In more concrete terms, traditional historical source criticism will be used to analyze Morgenthau's book, and this forms the first half of the methodological tools in this thesis. Why were Morgenthau's memoirs written? How well informed he was concerning the events he describes in his book? Geopolitical necessities and broader historical contextualization of Morgenthau's story are additional tools used in order to understand Morgenthau's story and motives behind it. This will also give us valuable information concerning Morgenthau's image of Germany, and make it easier to understand the source better.

Methods of historical image research will form the rest of the methodological tools used in this thesis. Questions why Henry Morgenthau really wrote his memoirs the way he did, and why he had such image of about German people, cannot be satisfactorily answered by simple source criticism alone. By utilizing methods of historical image research, and comparing views Morgenthau expresses in his memoirs with the general image of Germans and Germany among the press and different writers in English-speaking western countries during this period, according to research literature, can give better chances in understanding these challenging questions.

But what is an image? Humans have in general a psychological need, and a habit, to categorize and simplify things in order to make it easier to understand world around them. According to The American social scientist Walter Lippmann, stereotype can be used to describe the knowledge persons think they have, which is only based on stories and myths. This type of knowledge can be more real to masses than actual reality.33 This kind of stereotypical “knowledge” about some object could also be called an image of that thing. OLA VI K. FÄLT writes in the introduction to the book *Looking at the Other: Historical*

33 David Welch, 2014. Part II, Chapter 2 ”Images of the Hun”.
study of images in theory and practice, that

images are simplification of the reality which they describe”, and that it is only “of secondary importance whether the image is a “correct” or a “wrong” one, as one cannot even aspire to “correctness” in such a matter. This means evaluating the motives and reasons behind to possess certain image of a certain object is very difficult and many times not even that important, and this study only makes some “educated” guesses and assessments about the possible motives behind images presented by Morgenthau in his memoirs. The historical image research focuses on the possessor of the image, not the object of the image. Nevertheless, the historical background around the images presented in Morgenthau's books is important because it can answer the most important question in historical study, why, and it can shed light to the motives and possibly assess the veracity of the Morgenthau's various claims presented in the book. One more important characteristics that defines an image, compared to a view or to an opinion, is that an image is more permanent in nature, and less conscious. This is also very important thing to consider when analyzing Morgenthau's image of Germany.

One more important thing to consider is that the images of Germans and Germany reviewed in this thesis, could be more easily classified as “elite images” before the 20th century, and only gradually changing to “mass images”, especially in the time period of the First World War. Morgenthau himself can easily be classified as being a member of the American elite, and thus foundations of his image of Germany can be said to be based on the American elite's image of Germany. However, as has has been already mentioned, Morgenthau was born in Germany, and his native language was presumably German, Yiddish or both. This important fact must also been taken into account when analyzing Morgenthau's image of Germany.

It should also be noted that the word propaganda is used extensively is this thesis, and so it should also be defined. Propaganda in this thesis is defined as

34 Fält 2002, 9-10.
36 Ratz 2007, 205.
37 Fält 2002, 10.
38 Fält 2002, 10.
more or less systematic effort to manipulate other people’s beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means of symbols. Deliberateness and a relatively heavy emphasis on manipulation distinguish propaganda from casual conversation or the free and easy exchange of ideas. The propagandist has a specified goal or set of goals.\(^3^9\)

So propaganda also includes writings by free press during peacetime, if those writings can be interpreted as being part of some greater scheme or current in public life. However, sometimes it can be hard to distinguish real propaganda from unsophisticated writings and publications which are based on shock value, or from writings which carry on certain style of writing about some topic which has been started by deliberate propagandistic motives. Difference between rhetorical persuasion and propagandistic communication is open to interpretation, but the general guideline that persuasion is more interactive and aims to promote mutual interests with the reader or listener\(^4^0\). In methodological terms, some aspects of rhetorical study relevant to this thesis should also be acknowledged. For purposes of this thesis, *pathos* (appealing to the emotions of the recipient) and *logos* (appealing to the reason of the recipient) are the most important aspects, when analyzing the expressions, style and choice of words in Morgenthau's story.\(^4^1\)

Propaganda as a term can be rather elusive, because, especially after the Second World War, it includes a strong moral aspect in it. This is particularly true in everyday speech. The aforementioned definition of Propaganda used in this study however, is not morally loaded, and does not take account whether the motives behind the propagandist action is factual or erroneous, or even if they could be considered to be “morally acceptable” or not. Because of that, teaching of enlightenment values to children would be considered to be propaganda as much as teaching of xenophobic values to them. It should be noted that this differs considerably from common view what propaganda means, but for purposes of this thesis, it is the only reasonable way of defining the word in precise way, if one wants to retain objective view of the matters this study examines. Propaganda assumed most of its negative, even sinister connotations during and after the Second World War, largely because of the infamously prominent usage of propaganda by Nazi Germany and other authoritarian states. Term propaganda is now associated with words including deceitfulness, lying and brainwashing. But as DAVID WELCH writes in his introduction to the book *Propaganda* 

\(^3^9\) Encyclopedia Britannica, https://global.britannica.com/topic/propaganda
\(^4^0\) Alenius 2014, 17.
\(^4^1\) Alenius 2014, 15.
Propaganda uses this inherent human need for simplifications and stereotypes by giving people prefabricated stereotypes about desired object. Inciting hatred towards a particular enemy or adversary is usually the easiest route, as it needs only address the very basic emotions in a simple way, by usually blaming one's mishaps to someone else.\textsuperscript{43} MARJA VUORINEN writes how in stereotyping, a multifaceted, changing reality is reduced into a few features blown out of proportion and presented as innate and permanent. To be convincing an enemy-image must be easily recognizable, openly threatening, rationally or at least pseudo-rationally justifiable, and emotionally touching.\textsuperscript{44}

The oldest references to propaganda in literary sources, if defined as a state lead activity against foreign or domestic political rivals, can be tracked as far as Sun Tzu's \textit{art of war} 2400 years ago. Word propaganda itself was first used in 16\textsuperscript{th} century during the protestant reformation, but the use of propaganda as a well defined, organized and semi-scientific activity really took of during the First World War. The First World War can be considered to be the first total war in this sense as well.\textsuperscript{45}

As has been already noted, Morgenthau's story contains many descriptions of events which never took place and obviously incorrect interpretation of the relationship between Turkey and German, which might have been intentional. By analyzing Morgenthau's image of Turkey and Germany, it might be possible to gain further insight into Morgenthau's claims. Also, if Morgenthau's image of Germany and Turkey closely corresponds to general Allied propagandistic image of Germany and Turkey, it will further undermine Morgenthau's story as a reliable source about the relationship between Turkey and Germany prior and during the First World War. This kind of imaginary often is international in character and spread between allied nations, especially during war time.\textsuperscript{46} Based on this observation, and on later

\textsuperscript{42} Welch 2003, xv.
\textsuperscript{43} Welch 2014. Part II, Chapter 2 "Images of the Hun"
\textsuperscript{44} Vuorinen 2012, 5.
\textsuperscript{45} Welch 2014, Part I Chapter "Opening Pandora's Box: Propaganda, Power and Persuasion"
\textsuperscript{46} Vuorinen 2012, 4.
clarification presented in this thesis how British propagandistic imaginary spread to the US, no specific difference will be made between American and British propaganda. They are, perhaps little bit arbitrarily, lumped together under term *western propaganda* in this study.

Methodological source books include *Enemy Images in War Propaganda* (2012) by Marja Vuorinen, aforementioned Fält's article in the book *Looking at the other – Historical study of images in theory and practice*, as well as the article *The Study of Historical Images* by DAVID RATZ and KARI ALENIUS' *Unselfishly for Peace and Justice – and against Evil. The Rhetoric of the Great Powers in the UN Security Council, 1946–1956*. The two previously mentioned books by David Welch also include quite a lot of methodological content as well.

**Research Assignment, Primary and Secondary Sources**

The main research assignment for this thesis is to examine what was Morgenthau's image of Germany and Germans presented in his story, and to undercover possible reasons why he had such image. Morgenthau's image of Germany will be compared to the image of Germany in the Allied propaganda during the First World War, his image of Germany will be contrasted to his image of German allies Turkey and Austria. As the secondary assignment, Morgenthau's story's possible propagandistic elements will be examined, as well. Based on these findings, can Morgenthau's story be considered to be propagandistic piece of literature, and what reasons can be found for Morgenthau's anti-German attitudes and negative image of Germany? Can examining Morgenthau's image of Germany and Germans offer new explanations for his apparently fictitious claims about German actions prior to, and during, the First World War? What this means in the context of politically motivated debate about the Morgenthau's story? Although Morgenthau's anti-German tone has been already noted in earlier research, Morgenthau's story has not been analyzed by using the methods of historical image research.

The primary source for this thesis is the aforementioned book by Henry Morgenthau Sr., *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, published in October 1918. The story was dedicated to
Woodrow Wilson. Morgenthau received help in writing his memoirs from Burton J. Hendricks, who was working as an editor in the World’s Work. While Morgenthau's ghostwriter Hendricks had been sometimes accused of being a fabulist, he won three Pulitzer prizes in the decade following the Morgenthau's story, in history and biography. Hendrick's entire career has been described as being marked with "accurate and detailed reporting" and "carefully researched works".

Apparently Morgenthau started to write down his story with Hendricks somewhere between the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. This can be deduced by reading the first paragraph of the first chapter, where he writes:

*When I began writing these reminiscences of my ambassadorship, Germany's schemes in the Turkish Empire and the Near East seemed to have achieved a temporary success. The Central Powers had apparently disintegrated Russia, transformed the Baltic and the Black seas into German lakes, and had obtained a new route to the East by way of the Caucasus.*

Russia concluded an armistice with Central Powers in 17th of December in 1917. The story is divided into twenty nine chapters with an introduction, and is written mostly in chronological order, but it is not a diary. This means that Morgenthau examines and interprets the past events with knowledge and perspective acquired later on, and even admits this himself. This is an important methodological factor to consider, as it sets the context of the story to the year of its release in 1918, in the World's Work magazine in October 1918, just before the German Armistice in November 11th, after the US had joined the war, and after the Armenian genocide had been going on for years and the scope of the massacres had become even clearer. Thus it should be seen also in context of coming the peace negotiations which ended in treaty of Versailles in June of 1919, as Morgenthau would have been most likely aware of a probable military collapse of Germany in next few months.

The secondary sources for this thesis consist of many different books and articles. Perhaps the most important pieces of source material in addition to the previously mentioned studies

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47 Winter 2003, 302.
48 Winter 2003, 302.
49 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German superman at Constantinople.
50 Zetterberg 1988, 718.
51 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German superman at Constantinople.
52 Zetterberg 1988, 721.
are Peter Balakian's *The Burning Tigris*, as well as an article by Dr. MICHAEL F. CONNOR, *Dealing in Hate, The Development of Anti-German Propaganda*(1966). Other important pieces of source literature are MICHAEL B. OREN'S *Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the present*(2007) and *Power and Persuasion: From World War I to Wikileaks* by David Welch.
1. Henry Morgenthau's Image of Germany and its Allies

1.1. The Changing Image of Germany

As was noted in the introduction, the image of Germany in the UK and the US was gradually changing prior to the First World War. As Morgenthau's story also contains references to this change, it is important to examine and analyze this change more closely. This is also crucial in order to better understand his image of Germany presented in his story.

The first chapter of Morgenthau's memoirs is titled “A German superman in Constantinople”. The German superman whom he refers to, is the German Ambassador to Turkey, Baron Von Wangenheim. Morgenthau describes Wangenheim as a very talented man, who spoke German, English and French, and who also had “complete understanding of all countries”, including the United States, and Oriental countries. Morgenthau further describes Wangenheim as an active, massive, tall and burly figure with piercing eyes, and he notes that even his physical form symbolized modern, new Germany. Morgenthau remarks how this is not the Germany of his own childhood, when Germany was usually symbolized as a powerful, beautiful woman.

Morgenthau's remark how the personification of Germany had changed from a beautiful, powerful woman to a menacing burly man is somewhat reminiscing to how the image of Germany changed in the UK and the US in the early 20th century. For example, The French writer Madame De Stael's described Germans as being “a race of kindly, impractical, other-worldly dreamers without national prejudices”, who were also “disinclined to war”. This image of Germans was, according to Michael F. Connors, also the most common view in Britain and in the United States as well. Americans also held German society and institutions in high regard, and relations between Germany's precursor Prussia and United States can be described as being cordial.

53 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German superman at Constantinople.
54 Connors 1966, Chapter “Entente Propaganda”.
In fact, the positive view of Germany could be seen as being even almost universal one in the 19th century, and the admiration of German achievements in science, administration and culture were quite widespread around the world, not just in the UK and the US. It can be said that France was still considered to be the general threat to world peace in the UK, quite the same way as Germany was later considered as the biggest threat to world peace in the first half of the 20th century. An example of this image is an open letter send by historian EDWARD A. FREEMAN to the *Pall Mall Gazette* in November 1870. Freeman wrote in his letter, that it was Germany's “high mission” to end the threat of French conspiracy against the world peace. This echoes quite closely to the image of Germany in the UK and in the US just before the start of the First World War. It seems that in a way, Germany inherited the part of France as the continental threat to the UK after Entente of 1904.

Michael F. Connors also confirms this development, as he writes in his article *Dealing in Hate: The development of anti-German propaganda* how anti-Germanism was making steady progress in the United States prior to the Great War, partly because aforementioned British propaganda, which started in earnest in 1904 after The Entente Cordiale between UK and France. Prior to the spread of the British anti-German propaganda and its cultural influence, Americans' view of Germans was markedly favorable. The British view of Germany was also traditionally favorable, until it changed radically after Germany displaced France as the Britain's most powerful potential enemy and rival. But it was really after start of the Great War that image of warmongering and bloodthirsty Germany and Germans really took hold in the Anglo-phone allied countries. Americans adopted this anti-German view, and several American scholars joined the propaganda effort against Germany. They also managed to give the anti-German propaganda a more respectable, scholarly outlook.

However, as previously noted, the growing rivalry between Britain and Germany had already started to build up in end of the 19th century. View that the rapidly expanded British Empire was defenseless and its army was too small, begun to spread, and this opinion was fueled by aforementioned “invasion literature”. Another remarkable development that increased the British sense of vulnerability was the naval race that started as Germany rapidly expanded its navy towards the end of the 19th century, and the UK saw this as an unacceptable challenge.

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55 Welch 2014, Part II, Chapter 2: "The Hun: Constructing an image of the Enemy".
56 Connors 1966, Chapter "Public opinion of Germany to 1914".
57 Connors 1966, Chapter "Public opinion of Germany to 1914".
58 Connors 1966, Chapter "Entente Propaganda".
and as a direct threat to British supremacy of the seas. These developments lead to changing image of the Germans in the UK, which was in part started by active propaganda effort from the British press. Anglo-German relations worsened even further after the Moroccan Crises in 1905-06 and 1911, which cemented the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 against Germany. This paved way to even greater effort in British press and public life to increase the propaganda effort against Germany.

This new image of aggressive, expansionist Germany began to spread to United States in the end of the 19th Century, mainly from the UK, even though France was still considered the major rival to the UK until entente of 1904 between these states. But the growing concerns of British public over imperial defense in general, as well as German naval build-up, started the development of Anti-German feeling and propaganda in the British public life as the 19th century neared its end. This development started to gradually change the image of Germans and Germany in the British general view, and as previously noted, this view image of Germans started to spread in the United States as well. However, it should be noted that this general view mainly focuses on the image of Germans in press, radio, posters and other such media outlets, and precisely how much this image of Germans spread to common people's mind at this points remains uncertain.

As previously noted, Olavi K. Fält divides images two different levels, “elite images” and “mass images”. Fält also writes how “elite image” started to be replaced by “mass images” in the 20th century. So in this light the views expressed about image of Germany in public life, not only in clearly propagandistic media, can be considered to reflect at least somewhat common people's image of Germany. As noted in the introduction, Morgenthau as an educated, successful businessman and a senior civil servant, can clearly be categorized as being a member of the American elite. This means that Morgenthau's image of Germany can be assumed to be already influenced by the older, American elite image of Germany.

The British propaganda against Germany was working, and the stories about the uniquely aggressive Germany was and had been throughout the history, and this changed the image of Germany in the UK and the US, little by little, even before the war. American press and

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60 Connors 1966, Chapter "Public opinion of Germany to 1914".
61 Fält 2002, 11.
62 Fält 2002, 10.
public was highly dependent on British information about matters and events in Europe, and this made the British propaganda very effective. At least it gradually changed the climate of opinion about Germany in the US, and perhaps many started to consider Germany as a potential enemy of the US. After the war started, the spread of anti-Germanism from the UK to the US was also made easier from the British, because they had the complete control of the cables crossing the Atlantic from the UK to the US. The British could easily censor all news coming to America, and thus further their cause. C. HARTLEY GRATTAN wrote in his book *Why We Fought* that “honest, unbiased news simply disappeared out of the American papers along about the middle of august, 1914”.63 In fact, American suspicion of Germany had been steadily rising not only because of British propaganda efforts, but also because of Germany's seemingly hostile intentions in the Western Hemisphere, especially in Mexico.64 Morgenthau himself acknowledges this in several occasions and stresses how he describing the character of the “new” Germans. He mentions in his story how his knowledge of the “modern” German character was gradually increasing as the war raged on, despite the German ingratiating behavior towards him in the beginning of the war. According to Morgenthau, Germans' behavior changed gradually as well, as American public opinion was changing against Germany, and became even hostile towards Americans.65

Nevertheless, before the war started in June of 1913, several notable Americans including Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Nicolas Murray Butler praised the German Emperor Wilhelm II on the occasion of the twenty-fight anniversary of his accession to the German throne. Taft declared that William II was the greatest single force for peace in the world and Butler claimed that Wilhelm II would have been chosen to be a monarch by popular vote if he had not already been born as one. This image painted by these notable men would radically change in a year, when Wilhelm was called “the beast of Berlin”, which have been described as “the first great triumph of the art of modern war propaganda”.66 GEORGE C. HERRING also agrees that the American image of Germany and Germans begun to worsen steadily during the early years of World War I, when the US was still formally neutral.67 This means that the change Germany's image in the US was quite fast and dramatic, and the image of Germany and Germans presented by Morgenthau in his memoirs can be

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63 Connors 1966, Chapter ”Atrocity Propaganda”.
64 Herring 2008, 403.
65 Morgenthau 1918, chapter XI: Wangenheim and the Bethlehem Steel Company. A "Holy War" that was made in Germany.
66 Connors 1966, Chapter ”Public opinion of Germany to 1914”.
also understood in this light. The new image of Germany had not been around for long, and Morgenthau's story can perhaps be seen as an attempt at reinforcing it. On the other hand, Morgenthau as a member of the elite, presumably had older, quite positive image of Germany, and the fast change in the image of Germany can have lead to “psychological discomfort” in his part.\footnote{Ratz 2007, 203.} This could also explain why the anti-German elements were missing from Morgenthau's contemporary diaries and messages, and that his image of Germany had changed considerably by 1918 when he finished his story, thus explaining his story's anti-German tone?

1.2. Stereotypical Descriptions and Imagery of Germany and Germans

Morgenthau's story contains many different elements, which contain information about Morgenthau's image of Germany. The most self-evident of these elements are Morgenthau's direct, straightforward descriptions and claims about Germans and Germany, and these elements will be examined next. Morgenthau's descriptions and claims will also be examined in comparison to Morgenthau's descriptions about Germany's allies, Turks and to lesser extent, Austrians.

1.2.1. Germans as Ruthless Conquerors

The basic image of Germany and Germans Morgenthau presents in his story is quite vivid. As Von Wangenheim was supposed to, at least partially, personify the new Germany, it is in order to examine Morgenthau's image of him even further. In addition to the earlier description, Morgenthau writes that Wangenheim's “only religious instinct was deification of his emperor”, and that he venerated and worshiped the aristocratic and autocratic organization of the German society. Also according to Morgenthau, Von Wangenheim thought that The land-owning Junkers were the perfection of mankind, and with the Prussian military system Germany was destined to rule the world. But Morgenthau's stresses that Wangenheim was not a brute, and that his character was a mixture of Wangenheim's native
South German softer characteristics and Prussian ambition and coercive strength. This mixture was in Morgenthau's opinion perfect for dealing with the Turkish character, and gave Wangenheim an edge with the Turks. But Morgenthau adds

As I write of Wangenheim, I still feel myself affected by the force of his personality, yet I know all the time that, like the government which he served so loyally, he was fundamentally ruthless, shameless, and cruel. But he was content to accept all the consequences of his policy, however hideous these might be. He saw only a single goal, and, with the realism and logic that are so characteristically German, Wangenheim would brush aside all feelings of humanity and decency that might interfere with success.\(^{69}\)

So Wangenheim was, according to Morgenthau', also very vain. Supposedly his personal vanity led him to reveal very important facts about Germany's political intrigues and ambition to start a world war. According to Morgenthau, this form of personal vanity was also shared by other important German characters in Constantinople, for example General Liman Von Sanders. Von Sanders was officially the head of the German mission to reform the Turkish army. According Morgenthau, Von Sanders' demands about seating arrangements in an diplomatic meeting revealed a diplomatic secret; Von Sanders was not in Turkey only to train and reform the Turkish army, which was nothing unusual, as there was a British admiral reforming the Turkish navy as well\(^{70}\), but that he was really personal representative of the Kaiser in Turkey, and should be given more prestigious seating than the foreign ambassadors. Von Sanders also boasted privately to Morgenthau how he was selected by the German Emperor and had been personally instructed by him for this important mission in Turkey.\(^{71}\)

So in Morgenthau's view, important Germans in Constantinople were also characterized by their vanity and how they boasted their closeness to the Kaiser, even to Morgenthau. The This is also how Morgenthau acquired much of the supposedly secret information about German plans in Turkey and elsewhere, even about a secret conspiracy to start a great war. Personal vanity seems not be, at least not an important, part of the image of Germany in the Entente Propaganda, as it has been impossible to find references to it in the source literature and art. It is also possible that it is merely coincidence that two important Germans are

\(^{69}\) Morgenthau 1918, chapter I: A German superman at Constantinople
\(^{70}\) Trumpener 1968, 13-14.
\(^{71}\) Morgenthau 1918, Chapter III: "The personal representative of the Kaiser." Wangenheim opposes the sale of American warships to Greece.
described a being vain, or it could be that Morgenthau simply thinks it helps his story's argumentation to describe them as vain. Von Wangenheim's other qualities, as told by Morgenthau, match the prevalent propaganda image more closely. The brutal Prussian militarism and strive for world domination by conquest were central themes in British propaganda, and later on in the US as well.

The Germans' supposed veneration of the emperor and the autocratic and aristocratic system in general, were also present in the allied war propaganda. Germany was many times personified as the autocratic, even demonic, emperor, as this highlighted the difference of political systems between the warring nations. Morgenthau was in quite closely following these propagandistic guidelines when describing Von Wangenheim and Von Sanders. Religion also played a part in western propaganda, and in addition to portraying Wilhelm II as a demonic creature exemplified in a propaganda poster where German soldiers are shown crucifying allied soldiers. This also correlates with Morgenthau's remarks how deification of the German emperor Wilhelm II was Von Wangenheim's "only religion". This in effect contributes to the Morgenthau's claim about special German amorality and wickedness, as religion and being religious was still perceived to be a major part of the moral standard, at least in the US.

Therefore it seems that Morgenthau's image of German character, according to his memoirs, was a dualistic combination of Prussian militaristic, brutal tradition and Southern German tact, geniality and amiability. It should be noted that Morgenthau himself was a German of Jewish faith born in Southern Germany and German was his native language. His experiences in his native land may be a reason why he seems to be compelled to stress the difference between Prussian and Southern German character. But in the end, the supposedly Prussian tradition of ruthlessness and cruelty were the core qualities of new modern Germany and Germans, and not the Southern German qualities, which more closely resemble the older image of Germany in the UK and the US. It should also be noted that Morgenthau's negative way of depicting various persons of different backgrounds in his story could very well be

72 Welch 2014, chapters "Prussian bully" and "world domination".
73 Welch 2014, chapter "world domination"
http://www.ww1propaganda.com/ww1-poster/times-are-hard-your-majesty-you-leave-us-nothing-do, Fig. 4.
http://www.ww1propaganda.com/ww1-poster/chums-when-i-really-began-admire-you-my-friend-was-when-you-pulled-lusitania-job-when-you, Fig. 5.
74 http://www.ww1propaganda.com/ww1-poster/your-liberty-bond-will-help-stop-sus-bonos-de-la-libertad-ayudarán-a-dar-fin-con-esto, Fig. 7.
accurate portrayal of their each respective personality. There can also be some personal reasons for Morgenthau to show them in bad light. However, it isn't that important whether Morgenthau was right or wrong with his descriptions. The interesting and most important thing here for this study is how Morgenthau makes generalizations from those characters' personalities to describe the common stereotypical characteristics of entire nations. At the same time Morgenthau empathizes the positive characteristics of the American people to German diplomats:

But there is one thing that we will fight for," I replied, "and that is moral principle. It is quite apparent that you do not understand the American spirit. You do not realize that. We are holding off, not because we have no desire to fight, but because we wish to be absolutely fair. We first wish to have all the evidence in. I admit that we are reluctant to mix in foreign disputes, but we shall insist upon our right to use the ocean as we see fit and we don't propose to have Germany constantly interfering with that right and murdering our citizens. The American is still perhaps a great powerful youth, but once he gets his mind made up that he is going to defend his rights, he will do so irrespective of consequences. You seem to think that Americans will not fight for a principle; you apparently have forgotten that all our wars have been over matters of principle. Take the greatest of them all ---the Civil War, from 1861 to '65. We in the North fought to emancipate the slaves; that was purely a matter of principle; our material interests were not involved. And we fought that to the end, although we had to fight our own brothers.75

This rather long quotation from Morgenthau's book illustrates very clearly how he highlights the positive attributes of the American people, and contrasts these aspects with the negative attributes he associates with German people. Americans are supposedly driven by moral principle, and that is way more important than serving American interests, as Morgenthau argues. Morgenthau even claims that the American Civil War was fought over principle, to emancipate the slaves, and that no other interests were involved. Kari Alenius writes in his book, Unselfishly for Peace and Justice – and against Evil. The Rhetoric of the Great Powers in the UN Security Council, 1946–1956, how empathizing positive aspects of one's own nature, and highlighting the negative aspects of the opposing side, is "a fundamental aspect of all forms of persuasion"76. Thus Morgenthau's boasting about righteousness and

75 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXIC: Von Jagow, Zimmermann, and German-Americans.
76 Alenius 2014, 30.
superior morality of the American people supports the notion that Morgenthau's story has a strong persuasive and propagandistic tone. Interestingly, Morgenthau's rhetorics in his story match quite closely President Wilson's words in 1919 on his way to Paris, after the release of Morgenthau's story. Wilson proclaimed that the Americans would be “the only disinterested people at the Peace Conference” and that The US had entered the Great War for completely unselfish reasons. Wilson also repeated his older remark, that the US was only an associate and co-belligerent to the Allied powers, and not truly a part of the Allied powers. The President also claimed that the US in general acted in unselfish manner in world politics, and for example, had gone to war with Spain and occupied Cuba in 1898 “not for annexation but to provide the helpless colony with the opportunity for freedom”.77

1.2.2. Germans and Atrocity Propaganda

Image of Germans and ruthless conquerors was also reinforced by so called atrocity propaganda. Atrocity propaganda relies on making the enemy seem barbarous, savage and even inhumane, thus inducing hate against the enemy and diverting the public attention away from the real political and social problems at home. This kind of atrocity propaganda was of course used by all states partaking in World War I.78 Part of Morgenthau's image of Germans as particularly ruthless and cruel rests on the claims presented in western propaganda, and it can be assumed that Morgenthau was extensively exposed to and aware about the Entente propaganda against Germany. He was quite probably had read the Bryce Report, or at least he had heard about the report's assessment of the German war crimes in Belgium. This becomes clear when he infers to the German atrocities in Belgium and Northern France in his memoirs when urging Turks to treat their alien enemies residing in Turkey decently, after Turkey had joined the war. In Morgenthau's view, Germans were forcing the Turks to mistreat the citizens of enemy states, despite that Turkey would have treated them well79. This echoes with the image of Germans in western propaganda, especially after the release of The disputed Bryce Report of 1915, which was published a week after the Lusitania incident. The Bryce Report could be considered to be a watershed in the spread of anti-German thinking from UK to US.

77 Macmillan 2003, 9.
78 Welch, Depicting the Enemy.
79 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XII: The Turks attempt to treat alien enemies decently, but the Germans insist on persecuting them.
The veracity of the *Bryce report* has been disputed for long, for example Michael F. Connors dismissed it as untruthful propaganda in his 1968 article about anti-Germanism. However, JOHN LIPKES' extensive analysis of the Bryce Report in his 2007 book *Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914* seems to demonstrate that the many of the atrocities described in the Bryce Report, like massacres of unarmed civilians, are true. Some of the alleged atrocities are based on unreliable witness accounts. There were also some plainly outrageous fabrications and rumors concerning the German war crimes in Belgium, like the widely circulated claim that there were a German factory which melted down killed German and allied soldiers in order to produce fat and other such products to further German war economy.

However, the truthfulness of the *Bryce Report* or the more outrageous rumors are only of secondary interest for this thesis. The more important thing is the image of Germans presented in these rumors and publications to the British and American public. The *Bryce Report* presents the German atrocities in Belgium as “unprecedentedly cruel” among the so called civilized nations in modern times, and that these massacres of civilian population and other crimes were “systematically organized.” By some twisted logic, it seems that the authors of the *Bryce Report* apparently though that Belgian atrocities in Congo were somehow less reprehensible than German crimes in Belgium. Or perhaps Belgium wasn't considered to be a “civilized nation” by the writers of the *Bryce Report*? Humorous remarks aside, the real reason for this was quite certainly the fact that the UK was also a major colonial nation which had conquered almost half of the world, and Belgian atrocities in Congo would naturally be downplayed in the UK. Morgenthau also doesn't say a word about the Belgian atrocities in Congo in his story, but makes very strong moral accusations, although somewhat justified, against Germany on similar matters. This silence on the Congo issue can be understood to contribute to the propagandistic tone of the book, as the Belgian atrocities in Congo had been subject of public debate comparable to the Armenian Question, and it should have naturally came up in his story when writing about the alleged German...
atrocities.

However, there's an another interesting observation to be made, if one is to examine how Morgenthau is describing Germans who he sees as doing good things and as being of morally sound persons. These descriptions lack the stereotypical simplification Morgenthau utilizes when he is depicting, for example, Ambassador Wangenheim or General Liman Von Sanders, where persons character is also representing the character of his native state. Example of this is when Morgenthau writes about a German missionary Dr. Lepsius, who was investigating the alleged Turkish atrocities against its Christian population in behalf of German missionary interests. Morgenthau describes Dr. Lepsius as a devout, high-minded Christian gentleman. According to Morgenthau, Dr. Lepsius felt humiliated as being German, because Germany was making no effort to prevent the massacre of the Christian population in Turkey. Morgenthau highlights how Dr. Lepsius' aggravated feelings were directed primary against his own government. Morgenthau also tells us about other Germans who were appalled by the massacres of Armenians, and how they were felt humiliated by Germany's inaction:

*These men and women confirmed all the worst things which I had heard, and they were unsparing in denouncing their own fatherland. They did not conceal the humiliation which they felt, as Germans, in the fact that their own nation was allied with a people that could perpetrate such infamies, but they understood German policy well enough to know that Germany would not intercede.*

This totally reasonable reaction to these atrocities, but the view expressed Morgenthau's story seems a bit misleading, especially considering how he saw Germans even more morally culpable than the Turks for merely “doing nothing”. Apparently for Morgenthau, only morally reprehensible Germans represent Germany as a state, and morally good Germans represent only themselves, and are against the actions, or inactions, conducted by their own government and its representatives. This lack of objectivity and logical integrity is one of the attributes of propaganda, as has been noted earlier in this thesis, regardless if the moral motivations behind the propaganda could be considered morally acceptable or not. As rhetorical terms, Morgenthau seems to focus on the emotions of the readers, in order to evoke feelings of condemnation for Germany as a state. It also seems that Morgenthau doesn't want

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84 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVI: Enver Pasha discusses the Armenians.  
85 Morgenthau 1918, chapter XXV: Talaat tells why he deports the Armenians.
to make image of Germany to seem multi-faceted or containing various, perhaps even opposing elements, but wants to support the simplified, stereotypical representation of the German character and German people also presented in the western propaganda during the war. So making the few Germans who were depicted in positive light to be standing against their own government would work well for needs of propaganda against the Germany and promoting the view how Germans were barbarous, violent and inhumane as a people. This stereotyping, simplifying and vilifying is a common theme in depicting enemies in war propaganda, to motivate and justify the aggression of the defining side.86

As will become clear in the next two main chapters, Morgenthau blamed Germany and Germans for many crimes in his memoirs. Germany conspired and started World War I, and it was also partially responsible for the Armenian genocide as well. The possible reasons to Morgenthau to write, or to think, the way he did about German actions presented in his story will also examined. If Morgenthau's view of Germany's role and plans expressed in his story were sincere, there are some important things to consider. Was Morgenthau's negative image of Germans distorting his view of the events taking place in Turkey, or was his view of Germany's role in events taking place in Turkey and elsewhere during the war shaping his image of the Germans? Most probably there was a two-way effect of influence taking place, and Morgenthau's view about the Germans and Germany's actions took shape after both of them. If Morgenthau's view about Germans and Germany's responsibility were fundamentally insincere, then Morgenthau's story is best to be understood in propagandistic terms, as he was trying to influence the future peace negotiations between Germany and the US by telling about the unprecedented German wickedness to the American public and administration. On the other hand, in light of Morgenthau's negative image of Germany he had by 1918 when he completed his story, it is possible that he just ignored the conflicting evidence about the German actions in Turkey and for Germany's plans for a world conquest, which did not correspond to his image of Germany and Germans. However, as will be found out in the next main chapter, Morgenthau consciously included the fictitious claim about the secret Potsdam conference, which never even took place at all. The “true” image of Germany Morgenthau had, remains unsolved and outside the scope on this thesis, as the assignment is to examine Morgenthau's image of Germany presented in his story. However, it could be fruitful opportunity to examine Morgenthau's image of Germany presented in other sources written by him, especially of those published after his story of his stay in Turkey.

86 Vuorinen 2012, 5.
On a side note, it's true that a person can be could be sometimes be more readily understood as being “victims” of propaganda themselves, as well as being producers of it. However, it could be said that it is matter of semantics if a victim of propaganda, who after being influenced by propaganda starts similar conscious actions to influence other people and not merely repeating old phrases without clear motivation, becomes an active propagator of propaganda himself. There can also be a considerable difference between image used in propaganda to influence others, and the actual image that some individual or larger collective holds. It is also difficult to examine how closely images of ordinary people corresponded to the images presented to them. This distinction is impossible to make in practice, but nevertheless it is good philosophical point to keep in mind when analyzing what images certain historical characters or larger bodies of people have. Nevertheless, an individual can and will be genuinely influenced by propaganda, and his or her image can change because of that influence. So, this should also be one of the major methodological considerations when studying Morgenthau's image of Germans in this study. The main focus in this study however, is to review the image of Germans presented in western propaganda and compare those to the images presented in Morgenthau's story, as "All we can do is examine the ideas contained in the books which such people read".87 This means that the image of Germans Morgenthau had in his story, can be vastly different than his image of Germans in other sources, especially considering that Morgenthau's story's has clearly propagandistic tone, as which will be examined more closely in later chapters.

After all, it can be very problematic to get “inside the mind” of individual, especially into someone's who has been dead for long time. The truthfulness of claims based on such forays will be limited, but according to David Ratz, at least “approximations of the truth” or “tentative understanding” of the past can be reached through “a critical reading of the fragmented evidence”.88 This is the justification for the answers presented in this thesis, buy at the same time it is acknowledged that the findings should not be seen as “absolute truths”. Each answers' “probability of truth” is intended to be roughly assessed when possible, based on the evidence and it's critical, methodological assessment.

So the Morgenthau's image of Germany presented in his story included all three main points

87 Fält 2002, 10.
88 Ratz 2007, 198.
of the image of Germany in western propaganda, except the usage of the term Hun and the association to eastern barbarity accompanied to it.\textsuperscript{89} The German strive for world domination and autocratic tendencies, ruthlessness expressed in the atrocity propaganda, and finally, the supposed efficiency and high level of organization are all present in Morgenthau's image of Germany. It seems that Morgenthau doesn't use the term Hun, common in western propaganda during the First World War,\textsuperscript{90} to describe Germans, because he apparently wants to empathize Germany's modernity, high level of organization and efficiency.

Use of the word Hun to associate Germans with an older established image of invasive “eastern barbarians” made the British propaganda effort very effective.\textsuperscript{91} This is interesting fact, considering that image of Turks was traditionally too connected to this image of “eastern barbarians”, as various Turkic peoples were the dominant ethnic element in most of the eastern invasion of Europe. Morgenthau himself reinforced this image of Turks as barbarians in his memoirs when describing them.\textsuperscript{92} The increasing atrocities by Turkey and Turks against the Armenians from the 1890s onwards must have reinforced the old image of “eastern barbarians” in Britain as well, especially because the Armenian Question was not only well known and very public topic in the US, but in European countries as well, especially following the Hamidian massacres of 1890s.\textsuperscript{93} By drawing a connection with Germans and the Huns in propagandistic imaginary must have been even more efficient because of that.

It can be assumed that the German crimes against Belgians in 1914 would have been partially connected, and also reinforced by efficient propaganda effort, in the subconscious level to the Hamidian massacres against Armenians in the 1890s. It could be argued that this kind of total replacement of an older image Germans with another old image already present in the British and American consciousness, though originally referring to different people, was necessary to achieve quick and efficient change in the image of Germany among the general public.

\textsuperscript{89} http://www.ww1propaganda.com/ww1-poster/beat-back-hun-liberty-bonds Fig. 2.
http://www.ww1propaganda.com/ww1-poster/hun-his-mark-blot-it-out-liberty-bonds Fig. 3.
http://www.ww1propaganda.com/ww1-poster/remember Fig. 8.
Retrieved 19.01.2017

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\textsuperscript{91} Welch 2014, Part II, chapter 2: “The Hun: Constructing an image of the Enemy”.

\textsuperscript{92} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXII: Turks revert to the Ancestral Type.

\textsuperscript{93} Balakian 2002, 56-58.
David Ratz writes how there are usually “latent” elements present in old images, which can be manifest into the new image. This is especially true if the “latent” image has been existing for a long time in society. Perhaps there weren't that many easily usable and widespread “latent” negative characteristics in the image level to be associated with Germany among the British and American public? The possible reason why Morgenthau didn't himself use the term Hun in his story will be discussed more closely in the next chapter.

1.2.3. Organized German Huns and Inefficient Turks

The high level of organization and systematic operation of Germans was also one of the attributes assigned to Germans in western propaganda, as in the Bryce Report as well. However at the same time Germans were portrayed as being rapacious eastern barbarians by calling them “Huns”. But it also clear that Morgenthau has greater insight and knowledge about Germany as he points out the difference between so called “old” and “new” Germany on several occasions. He also states that the new Germany represents Prussian values, not his native south German ones. That is the biggest difference between Morgenthau's and images of Germany propagated in Allied propaganda press. Propaganda can be considered simplistic and relying in shock value, and it is not surprising that no special difference was made between northern and southern German character. Maybe Morgenthau himself felt compelled to address the difference between old and new image of Germany to make his statement more plausible. Other possibility is that he was just compelled to somehow defend his old native country and its culture, which in his view was being replaced with new Prussian militaristic and aggressive character. It is not surprising neither that the image of Germans being systematic and being well organized could be considered to be in contradiction to them being described as being barbarian at the same time. After all, propaganda is usually based on emotional shock value and stereotypical half-truths as best, and not on carefully detailed, analytical information.

Morgenthau's image of Turks is interesting as well for purposes of this study, as he sometimes contrasts, and sometimes equates, the German characteristics with the Turkish

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95 Welch 2014, Part II Chapter 2: "Images of the Hun".
96 The Bryce Report 1915, 48.
97 Welch 2014, Part I Chapter: "opening Pandora's box: Propaganda, Power and Persuasion".
ones. Here's how he describes Turks in general:

*Essentially the Turk is a bully and a coward; he is brave as a lion when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him*\(^\text{98}\).

When Morgenthau described Ottoman navy minister Djemal, one of the three Pashas who formed the so called "triumvirate", he used following words:

*His eyes were black and piercing; their sharpness, the rapidity and keenness which they darted from one object to another, taking everything with a few lightning-like glances, signalized cunning, remorselessness and selfishness to an extreme degree. Even his laugh, which disclosed all his white teeth, was unpleasant and animal-like*\(^\text{99}\).

This differs with his image of the German character, which contained qualities associated with effectiveness, bravery and organization as well as brutality. Turkish character described by Morgenthau lacks these qualities, and Morgenthau's image of the Turks can be more easily associated with the old image of eastern barbarians that associated with Germans in the general style of anti-German propaganda in the west during the First World War.

Morgenthau's image of Turks seems to have been more positive in the beginning of his ambassadorship, and Morgenthau found the Turkish capital "dazzling", and like a scene out of *a Thousand and One Arabian Nights*, when he first assumed his post as the new American ambassador. He wrote in his diary that "This is undoubtedly going to prove and intensely interesting experience for me". Within a year however, he grew disillusioned with Turkey and Turks, and with their propensity to "intrigue, intimidation and assassination". Morgenthau's uninformed, as he admitted himself, view about about American missionaries changed as well, who he originally though were just over-zealous agents of a foreign religion, but later he discovered that they were really "advance agents of modern civilization".\(^\text{100}\) He also writes some, at least by today's standard, racist generalizations about Turks, when comparing them to Armenians. According to Morgenthau, Armenians "are so superior to the Turks intellectually and morally"\(^\text{101}\).

\(^{98}\) Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXII: The Turk reverts to the ancestral type.

\(^{99}\) Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German superman at Constantinople.

\(^{100}\) Oren 2007, 333.

\(^{101}\) Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXI: Bulgaria on the auction block.
In fact, many of the Morgenthau's stereotypical comments about various nationalities and ethnicities would be considered blatantly racist and xenophobic today, but they were quite common among the American elites in this era, as was noted earlier. Morgenthau apparently also had other stereotypical views about different ethnicities, as is evident when he was describing President Woodrow Wilson's character to a German diplomat:

*The President has two sides to his nature. Do not forget that he has Scotch-Irish blood in him. Up to the present you have seen only the Scotch side of him. That makes him very cautious, makes him weigh every move, makes him patient and long-suffering. But he has also all the fire and combativeness of the Irish. Let him once set his jaws and it takes a crowbar to open them again. If he once decides to fight, he will fight with all his soul and to the bitter end.*

As a side note, this can be seen as an “encouragement” to the President Wilson himself. People seldom want to let down their friends' expectations of them, and Morgenthau could have tried to influence Wilson in this manner as well by bringing up Wilson's supposed combativeness. Morgenthau's description of Wilson is remarkably positive, again corresponding with the dualistic aspect of human behavior, where enemies are seen exhibiting only negative features, and your own side only positive features.

But back to the racist Morgenthau's racialist stereotyping. This racist stereotyping of different ethnicities, common to his era, could have further impaired Morgenthau's view about the various events taking place in Turkey and can provide us with one more reason for Morgenthau to write the way he did about the events described in his story. President Wilson believed that Americans and British "organically" inclined to democracy, and it seems that Morgenthau's held a similar view. This could be one of the reasons for Morgenthau's story's anti-German tone and his negative image of Germans, as he apparently though that Germans were instead especially inclined to autocracy, as has been noted earlier.

Later on in his story, when Morgenthau is writing about the treatment of alien enemies residing in Turkey, he makes some more telling remarks about his images about German and

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102 Herring 2008, 381.
103 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXIX: Von Jagow, Zimmermann, and German-Americans.
Turkish character. Morgenthau writes how Germans were

*urging their well-known ideas of repression and brutality, while on the other were the Turks, with their traditional hatred of Christians and their natural instinct to maltreat those who are helplessly placed in their power*.

Morgenthau's image of Turks in this paragraph is again characterized with traditional bigotry and propensity certain type of unchivalrous abuse and atrocities against minority subject nations, and his image of Turks can be traced back to aforementioned image of eastern barbarians associated with Turks in Christian Europe. This is evident when Morgenthau describes the Turks' "Ancestral type" in Chapter XXII of his story titled *The Turk reverts to the ancestral type*. In Morgenthau's view, "ancestral" Turks were essentially just brutal barbarians who build their empire on top of the older civilizations, and basically contributed almost nothing on their own, while at the same time greatly despising the conquered peoples in their vast empire.

This image of menacing and violent eastern barbarians, was quite common and well established in the UK in 1914. In fact, the roots of eastern barbarians', particularly Turks', image in Europe as rapacious, brutal and destructive can be traced back to the Hunnic invasions. This image of Turkic peoples was further reinforced after recurring nomadic, later on usually Muslim, invasions of Europe from Central Asia and Eastern European plain. Edward W. Said is even of the opinion that these invasions of Islamic “eastern barbarians” caused lasting trauma in Europe, and only intensified with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire especially after the fall of Constantinople. This feeling of constant threat of invasion by Islam and “eastern barbarians” into Europe lasted until the end of 17th century, and during this long time this image of Turkey, Islam and the “eastern barbarians”, as well as part of Islamic lore, events and history, became part of Europe's cultural landscape. Marja Vuorinen writes how this is an prime example of the idea of otherness, which is based on

*the social psychological concept of projection coined by Sigmund Freud. Projection begins with splitting what is considered evil, destructive, weak or otherwise faulty apart from the*

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105 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XII: The Turks attempt to treat alien enemies decently, but the Germans insist on persecuting them.
106 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXII: The Turk reverts to the ancestral type.
more acceptable psychological and cultural features, and continues by removing the unwanted features from the self by placing them into an other (usually someone who actually is slightly different) in order to mentally protect the self.\textsuperscript{109}

This again shows how Morgenthau's image of Turks is clearly different from his image of Germans as represented in his memoirs. Germans are, according to Morgenthau, are more modern and resolute in their brutality and aggression, as previously noted, even though Turks and Germans are both prone to subjugate other peoples. It should be noted that Morgenthau doesn't use the term Hun to describe Germans in his memoirs, and he apparently saw, or at least wanted to portray, Germany as particularly a modern state using modern means to achieve its nefarious ends, in contrast to the barbarous Turkey. This is a significant difference compared to how Germans were portrayed in the general propaganda in the UK and the US, even though it should be kept in mind that the propaganda posters and such were not very analytical or precise in their portrayal, and focused on shock value and use of simplification and stereotypes. This means the use of the term Hun and at the same time portraying German as modern and efficient wasn't really that contradictory as it would initially seem. Moreover, it would have been quite odd for Morgenthau to use the word Hun to describe Germans, as the Turks, almost the original stereotype of “eastern barbarians” in western imaginary, were central to his story. It should also be noted that Morgenthau's story general tone, while noted for being anti-German, is not blatantly propagandistic, and use of the term Hun might have undermined Morgenthau's book by associating it too closely with obviously propagandistic art and literature.

Morgenthau's image of Germans nevertheless has striking similarities to the idea of otherness. His description of how Germans characterized by their autocratic tendencies, irreligiosity and indifference to basic humanity when reaching for their goals. These attributes are almost direct opposites to Morgenthau's own personality and ideals, as to President Wilson's ideals as well. This will be examined more closely later on.

In context of the Armenian Question, it is easy to understand why Morgenthau had such a negative image of the Turkish State, and Turks as a people. As mentioned before, the plight of the Armenians in Turkey had been the most central topic in the discussion of human rights in the American public since 1890s, and it is clear that Morgenthau would have been closely

\textsuperscript{109} Vuorinen 2012, 1.
informed about the situation of Armenians in Turkey even before his post as the ambassador in Turkey. He had chosen Armenian Arshag K. Schmavonian, who had been a long time legal adviser to the American Embassy in Constantinople, as his interpreter and aide, and this connection would have given Morgenthau special insight about the Armenian Question and suffering of the Armenians.\(^\text{110}\)

In later chapters in his memoirs, Morgenthau makes more direct comparisons between German and Turkish disposition. Morgenthau's writing in this chapter, in fact his whole book, should be put in the context of the Armenian genocide. The chapter XXVII "I Shall do Nothing for the Armenians" says the German Ambassador" of the Morgenthau's story describes the conversations between Morgenthau, navy minister and member of the triumvirate Enver Pasha, as well as conversations between Morgenthau and the German Ambassador Wangenheim. Morgenthau begins the chapter with the question:

\textit{Had the Germans any part in it? To what extent was the Kaiser responsible for the wholesale slaughter of this nation? Did the Germans favor it, did they merely acquiesce, or did they oppose the persecutions? Germany, in the last four years, has become responsible for many of the blackest pages in history; is she responsible for this, unquestionably the blackest of all?}.\(^\text{111}\)

Morgenthau recounts how Turkish philosophy about conduct of war is similar to German conduct of war, when describing the Turkish rhetoric about the mistreatment, forcible relocations and the massacres against the Armenian people. Enver and other prominent people in the Turkish administration supposedly used phrases like:

\textit{The Armenians have brought this fate upon themselves." "They had a fair warning of what would happen to them." "We were fighting for our national existence." "We were justified, in resorting to any means that would accomplish these ends." "We have no time to separate the innocent from the guilty." "The only thing we have on our mind is to win the war."}

Morgenthau writes that any comments about atrocities against subject peoples could have been said by a German general. But there was supposedly one major difference between the

\(^{110}\) Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: "I shall do nothing for the Armenians," says the German Ambassador.
German and Turkish conduct in this area of war time policies. Morgenthau tells that while Turks had persecuted Armenians and other minorities for centuries, their methods had always been "crude, clumsy and unscientific". Turks had used torture, killings and other such methods against Armenians in unorganized and inefficient way, but it was only after German influence that Turkey adopted new "modern" methods to deal with the so-called Armenian "problem".

Morgenthau's image of Germany as a especially modern, efficient and organized state is the major difference between German image in the western propaganda, despite that the images had also much in common. As mentioned before, Morgenthau's image of Turks was that they were unorganized, old-fashioned and inefficient people, while Germans were very efficient, organized and cold-heartedly calculating in their evil designs. Morgenthau seemingly wants to stress out how Germans are unprecedentedly dangerous and destructive, because of their modernity and efficiency, while Turks are just inefficient eastern barbarians. This means that equating Germany with Turkey on an image level would not have been appropriate or reasonable for Morgenthau's alleged purposes, as convincing enemy-image must be threatening, as has been noted in the introduction. Presenting Germany as, for propagandistic purposes, a dangerous, modern state able to threaten the US, would have been possible motives for Morgenthau to vilify Germany. It is not important if Morgenthau truly believed that Germany really was a danger to the US or not.

This modernity also seems to make Germany as a state, in Morgenthau's opinion, a more morally culpable actor, and thus responsible for the Armenian genocide. On the other hand, the Turks are not fully morally responsible for their actions, as they are just acting on their "natural instincts". This double standard of morality and moral responsibility might be there because Morgenthau seems to think, or at least wants to express this view to influence others, that Germany as a Christian, civilized nation should be more moral and ethnic actor in the world stage than backwards, barbarous Turkey. This means that the anti-Germanism and untruths about German actions found in Morgenthau's memoirs might be partly fueled by his personal, moral outrage against supposedly civilized Germany, who should not have acted the way it did in Turkey during World War I.

112 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: "I shall do nothing for the Armenians," says the German Ambassador  
113 Vuorinen 2012, 5.
This double standard of morality seems to be common train of thought, and seems to be part of human nature. When presumably person or country of perceived high moral standards conducts immoral deeds, the outrage and dismay seems to be much stronger, than when a person or country with already negative image perpetrates those same things. This moral feeling of superiority is also expressed in the colonialist thinking of so-called "white man's burden"\(^{114}\) in western world to educate and teach peoples of different cultures of proper western moral standards. It is also important to note that the anti-German outlook of Morgenthau's story is not present in his his letters, diary and official telegraphs as with the United States Department of State\(^{115}\). However, James L. Barton, the foreign secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in Boston, after reading Morgenthau's contemporary reports, as well as reports from German and American missionaries and consuls, noted in 1915 that these reports indicted Turkey, and that Turkish government was “backed by German endorsement”\(^ {116}\). Could Morgenthau's story's anti-German outlook be simply attributed to his motive to vilify Germany, or was his understanding of the Germany's role Turkey just changing after he had come back to the United States in 1916? This is one of the many questions that will be examined more closely in main chapters two and three.

But Barton's comment seem to indicate that Germany's decision not intervene in the massacres was clear to Morgenthau from the beginning, even if his messages did not contain any clear anti-German tone. David Ratz writes how there is a natural tendency to reject or ignore any conflicting messages, that would challenge an established image.\(^ {117}\) As has been made clear, the general image of Germany among the Americans was still quite positive before the start of the Great War. If Morgenthalu's image of his old native land was positive as well, his story's anti-German tone and clear anger against Germany and Germans can be interpreted as a “backlash” to his change image of Germany, as the messages that challenge older images are often greeted with “outrage, anger, hostility or indignation”\(^ {118}\). All this reinforces the view that Morgenthau's anti-German attitude and fictitious, propagandistic claims can be explained by his personal, moral outrage against supposedly civilized Germany he had earlier held in high esteem, and it can offer a partial explanation, or at least a possible

\(^{114}\) The task, believed by white colonizers to be incumbent upon them, of imposing Western civilization on the black inhabitants of European colonies. [https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/white_man's_burden](https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/white_man's_burden)
\(^{115}\) Cook 1957, 129.
\(^{116}\) Balakian 2002, 286.
\(^{117}\) Ratz 2007, 202-203.
\(^{118}\) Ratz 2007, 203.
answer, why the anti-German tone of his story was lacking in his earlier diaries and messages written during his stay in Turkey, as his older positive image of Germany still lingered on. Later on, after the US was at war with Germany, his image of Germany had changed to a new, much more negative one, as was suggested earlier in this thesis.

Morgenthau's disillusionment of Turkey, the Turkish regime and leadership also represents a case where a more positive image is replace by a new image. The ancestral type Morgenthau describes corresponds closely with the aforementioned idea that there are usually “latent” elements present in old images, which can be manifest into the new, in this case negative, image. This is especially true if the “latent” image has been existing for a long time in society\textsuperscript{119}, as is clear in this case. This line of thought can be applied also to Morgenthau's image of Germany. As has been noted, Morgenthau was born into a affluent Jewish family in Germany, and emigrated with his family to the US in 1870. Emigration of Morgenthau's family can be seen in the context of larger emigration of German Jews, fueled partly by growing penetration of antisemitic thoughts into German politics in 1870s and even before\textsuperscript{120}. While German antisemitism was nothing special in the wider European context, Morgenthau's remembrance of this growing antisemitism of the German society, and perhaps even his negative personal experiences as a member of a discriminated minority in his youth, can be seen as a part of the “latent” negative aspects of Morgenthau's image of Germany and Germans. In Morgenthau's case these negative latent aspects can be seen as having been more concrete and strong, than the latent negative aspect of the image of Germany among the American elites in general. This in turn would explain Morgenthau's strongly negative image of Germany, and even his story's fictitious claims to vilify Germany.

1.2.4. Vigorous Germans and feeble Austrians

Morgenthau also uses same type of stereotypical rhetoric to describe Johann Von Pallavacini, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Ottoman Empire. According to Morgenthau, Pallavacini was "a quiet, kind-hearted, delightfully mannered gentleman", and with those qualities Austrian Pallavacini\textsuperscript{121} personified his country as Wangenheim's brutal egotism

\textsuperscript{119} Ratz 2007, 202.
\textsuperscript{120} Johnson 1987, 395.
\textsuperscript{121} In this thesis term Austrian is used to refer to a citizen of Austria-Hungary, regardless of their actual ethnicity. For example, Pallavacini was originally from Northern Italian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
personified Germany\textsuperscript{122}. This kind of use of stereotypes is also one of the main tools of propaganda\textsuperscript{123}, even though racial and ethnic stereotyping was quite common in Morgenthau's time in everyday speech and thinking as well. Interesting observation here is that these two persons reflect in Morgenthau's view the image of their respective countries, so these two characters can be seen as representing Morgenthau's image of those two nations. At least it is the image of those nations he wanted to present to the readers of his memoirs.

Morgenthau only makes generalizations about persons and their respective states, when writing about representatives of enemy states, and doesn't explain his own or other allied nations' actions in similar stereotypical style, where persons character is simplified as only representing the characteristics of his native state.

All in all, Morgenthau's interests towards affairs of Austria-Hungary seem to be secondary, and his image of the Austrians seems to be much more positive than his image of Germans. This is quite understandable considering Germany's leading position in Turkey and in the Central Powers in general as well. Still, it is peculiar that Morgenthau expresses all the moral condemnation against Germany, and even the guilt of starting the war. No explanation of German part to the July crisis between Serbia and Austria is offered by Morgenthau, or to any other of the factors contributing to the start of war. Morgenthau only presents his views about German conspiracy for starting World War I, which he quite certainly knew to be not true. Morgenthau only makes some passing remarks how Austria had presumably killed “a large part of the Serbian population”, and had kidnapped Serbian children to be brought up as loyal subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the war, although he acknowledges that the exact numbers are still undetermined.\textsuperscript{124} This, however, doesn't incite Morgenthau to start to write about Austrians in the same passionate way he was describing Germans. This seems to be in line with the view that Morgenthau's passionate anti-German attitude could have been partly fueled by his changing image of Germany from a generally positive image to a negative image of an enemy.

Morgenthau's image of Germans, Turks and Austrians seems to reinforce his story's propagandistic nature as many of his views expressed in his story correspond with the general anti-German propaganda in the UK and the US during World War I. However, his

\textsuperscript{122} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XV: Djemal, a troublesome Mark Antony. The first German attempt to get a German peace.
\textsuperscript{123} Welch 2014. Part II, chapter 2. "The Hun: Constructing an image of the Enemy".
\textsuperscript{124} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: "I shall do nothing for the Armenians," says the German Ambassador.
views about German and Turkish character can partly be understood to stem from the atrocities he witnessed during his stay in Turkey. This, in addition to Morgenthau's apparently racist thinking, probably contributed to his negative image of Germans and Turks. However, as noted, in context of his era, Morgenthau's views cannot be considered exceptionally racist or xenophobic, racist views, by the standards of today's, were common among American elites in the early 20th century, and for example President Wilson's attitude towards different ethnic groups would be considered racists by today's standard as well125. But as noted, this kind of stereotyping can also be attributed to Morgenthau's will to attach certain negative attributes to enemies, as it corresponds to the aforementioned psychological phenomenon, idea of otherness. As Morgenthau's story was written during war time, it doesn't necessarily mean that Morgenthau had any overtly racist tendencies.

Also by presenting Austrians as feeble and soft, while also somewhat ruthless, Morgenthau seems to be reinforcing his point about Germany as unprecedentedly dangerous and destructive, even compared to its allies. It also doesn't seem very likely that Morgenthau would have genuinely believed or embraced the image of Germans presented in western propaganda as such, based on the critical analysis and reasoning presented in this main chapter. Morgenthau was highly educated, well informed about the true events in the war and had been born in Germany. Even though some of his comments indicate that he harbored xenophobic and racist thinking common to his age, it is quite unlikely that he would have totally succumbed to propaganda. This thesis' author's humble opinion is that, less one knows, more likely one is to embrace the simplistic stereotypes and half-truths presented in propaganda. Nevertheless, Morgenthau's image of Germany presented in his story was markedly negative, and probably fueled by his personal discomfort as his older image of Germany as a civilized country of his birth was being challenged, and eventually replaced by the new image of Germans as ruthless and cruel conquerors. In the next two main chapters, Morgenthau's image of Germany will be contextualized, and examined further by “reading between the lines” about Morgenthau's claims and descriptions of German actions in Turkey and in wider context of the First World War. At the same time, some suggestions will be offered about various Morgenthau's claims' veracity, and whether Morgenthau believed himself in those claims. This also furthers the understanding of Morgenthau's image of Germans and Germany.

2. Germany's Conspiracy to Start a World War

Germany's alleged plan for world conquest is one of Morgenthau's two self expressed reasons for him to write his story in the first place, and he writes that it is becoming clear for all Americans as well, and that everyone "should volunteer this testimony".\textsuperscript{126} How had he been convinced about the alleged German plans during his stay in Turkey? There are several events that Morgenthau describes, which according to him, made him believe in a German plan for world conquest, one of the being the supposed secret Potsdam Conference of 1914. Morgenthau's claims about German plans and actions can give further information about his underlying image of Germany.

2.1. German Plans for World Conquest

According to Morgenthau, Turkey played a vital role in Germany's plans for world conquest. Morgenthau writes about the German Ambassador to Turkey, Von Wangenheim:

\textit{Upon him, more than almost any diplomatic representative of Germany, depended the success of the Kaiser's conspiracy for world domination. This German diplomat came to Constantinople with a single purpose. For twenty years the German Government had been cultivating the Turkish Empire. All this time the Kaiser had been preparing for a world war, and in this war it was destined that Turkey should play an almost decisive part. Unless Germany should obtain the Ottoman Empire as its ally, there was little chance that she could succeed in a general European conflict.}\textsuperscript{127}

Morgenthau continues that with Turkey in its side, Germany could face the alliance of western powers and Russia by severing the connection between through the Dardanelles\textsuperscript{128}.

\textsuperscript{126} Morgenthau 1918, Preface.
\textsuperscript{127} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German Superman at Constantinople
\textsuperscript{128} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German Superman at Constantinople
Morgenthau's quotation is also interesting, as he uses terms like “conspiracy” and “world dominations”, which are quite value-laden terms. After all, every European power was preparing for a potential world war, if one should break out. Difference here, according to Morgenthau, seems to be that Germany was planning to start one, if it could win it. Ulrich Trumpener also notes in his book, that there are no evidence to be found that Germany was in any way prepared for the start of the First World War, and there was no contingency plan for Turkey if hostilities would broke out between the Great Powers of Europe. Consequently it means that Morgenthau's view about Germany's long term plans for war are wrong, even though Germany was building its empire and strengthening its position in the world, as was as every other great power.

Morgenthau's view about German plans for world domination could be also tracked to the British war propaganda against Germany. British view was also partly fueled by a book written by retired German general FRIEDRICH BERNHARDI, titled *Germany and the Next War*, published in English in 1912. Bernhardi wrote that a European war was inevitable, and Germany's only hope was to conquer or to perish. As the British public imagination was already filled with so-called “invasion literature” and general anti-German outlook, the image of Germany as a expansionist state took really hold in the British public view. It should be noted however, that Bernhardi was never a “household name” in Germany. Nevertheless, especially after start of the war, the Entente propagandists promoted the theory that German political thinking, and society in general as well, was dominated by such “prophets of war”.

Basis for the Morgenthau's claims about the German conspiracy can thus be tracked to the anti-German imaginary in the western propaganda, and Morgenthau seems to embrace this image of Germans as conspirators planning for a world conquest in his story. Morgenthau also highlights the role of the German emperor in this conspiracy, and this theme was also used in the western propaganda, as shown earlier. Morgenthau's negative image of Germany can be seen as a reasons for his view about German conspiracy to start a world war, as he had a embraced a negative image of Germany by 1918 and was interpreting the events in this light. David Ratz writes how it is “easier to address the accuracy or authority of the source of

129 Trumpener 1968, 22.
130 Welch 2014, Part II chapter 2 ”World domination”
131 Connors 1966, Chapter “Entente Propaganda”
the information than to alter the image of something on which a high value is placed”\textsuperscript{132}. On the other hand, there is one example where Morgenthau is apparently consciously writing claims about a fabulous event linked to the German conspiracy, and the aforementioned psychological reasoning seems insufficient to explain it. It the next chapter, this event and Morgenthau's evidence for it will be examined.

2.2. Fictitious Potsdam Conference of July 5, 1914

One of the most important pieces of evidence in Morgenthau's story about the German conspiracy to start the war was the secret Potsdam Conference of July 5, 1914. Morgenthau claimed that the German ambassador Wangenheim revealed to him about the supposed existence of the secret Imperial conference in Potsdam in fifth of July 1914. Morgenthau writes Wangenheim was himself personally present in the secret conference to inform Kaiser about the situation in Constantinople, which was regarded as almost the pivotal point of the impeding war. According to Morgenthau, Wangenheim claimed that also present in the conference were the most senior representatives of the German army and navy, as well as most important German bankers, railroad leaders, industrial captains and other members of the elite from all the different aspects of the German society:

\textit{In telling me who attended this conference Wangenheim used no names, though he specifically said that among them were---the facts are so important that I quote his exact words in the German which he used---"die Häupter des Generalstabs und der Marine"---(The heads of the general staff and of the navy) by which I have assumed that he meant Von Moltke and Von Tirpitz. The great bankers, railroad directors, and the captains of German industry, all of whom were as necessary to German war preparations as the army itself, also attended.}

Presumably after this, Kaiser asked then if the nation was ready for war, and everyone else said yes, but the bankers. The bankers said that they needed two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to secure loans. This caused stocks to sink as Germans sold their in the two

\textsuperscript{132} Ratz 2008, 203.
weeks period. Morgenthau offers this slump in the stock market in the two weeks period as a direct evidence to support Wangenheim's claims about a secret conference in Potsdam. This also seems to be the reason why Morgenthau claims to believe in Wangenheim's story himself. The reason why Wangenheim confided this secret to Morgenthau in private, according to Morgenthau, was partly because the German Ambassador was so proud of his nation’s ability to plan ahead, and partly because of his own personal vanity. Wangenheim supposedly was very proud because he was summoned to attend such an important gathering. German arms were also making rapid progress in the early days of the war, and many believed that Paris was doomed to fall to Germans. Somehow, according to Morgenthau, German victories made Wangenheim prone to indiscretion and the day he revealed the secret about the Potsdam Conference to Morgenthau, he was “especially exuberated”.133

However, it seems very clear now that this conference never took place at all, and that either Wangenheim, or Morgenthau himself were simply making the whole thing up. Main evidence against the existence of such conference is that the alleged attendees can be proven to be elsewhere during the date the conference was supposed to have taken place.134 Another nail in the coffin for the secret Potsdam conference is that in reality there was no such stock market slump, as described by Morgenthau, between 5th of July and the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia in 22nd of July. Von Wangenheim's vanity was examined earlier, and it could be that Morgenthau empathized it just to help explaining why Von Wangenheim made such an enormously revealment.

It seems there are two different options explaining why Morgenthau wrote about the conference in his memoirs, which in all probability never actually took place at all. First option is that Wangenheim told him about the event as described in Morgenthau's memoirs, and Morgenthau genuinely believed Wangenheim. This would mean Wangenheim was giving him misinformation about the alleged secret conference on purpose. It is possible that Wangenheim wanted to make the American Ambassador believe that Germany was more ready for a possible outbreak of war, than it really was, or maybe he simply made up the story about the secret conference to boost his own importance in the eyes of the American ambassador Second option is that Morgenthau himself made the whole thing up to promote anti-German propaganda and to make Germany seem guilty of starting World War I. Third

133 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter VI: Wangenheim tells the American Ambassador how the Kaiser started the war.  
134 Connors 1966, Chapter “American Scholars and “war guilt””.  
135 Barnes 1926, 241-247.
option, quite frankly quite unconvincing, option is that Wangenheim just happened to made one of the biggest blunders in history of diplomacy.

Morgenthau's own words seem to implicate that the second option is the most probable one. It really doesn't make any sense that Wangenheim would make such a condemning reveal to Morgenthau, especially after Morgenthau himself describes Wangenheim as an intelligent and capable person, who was wholly dedicated to Germany and German Kaiser. A confession of this kind to a representative of a barely neutral Great Power would be comparable to high treason, and would have very damaging to Germany even if the statement about the secret conference would have been essentially true. This was clear to Morgenthau as well, and he explains Wangenheim's "monstrous indiscretion" by his exuberated mood because of seemingly imminent German victory. This, in addition Wangenheim's personal vanity and need to boast about his nations prowess, are supposed to be enough to explain his amazing reveal to the readers of Morgenthau's memoirs. But if we have a thought experiment about a possible outcome of the war, where Paris fell to German arms in early years of World War I. Then there might have been a general peace conference after a notional French armistice, and wouldn't Wangenheim's indiscretion have undermined the peace talks altogether and made the rest of the Allied Powers more determined to continue war to bitter end against "an evil conspiratory Germany", even after Paris would have fallen to Germans? Wangenheim must have naturally assumed that Morgenthau would report his information about any such enormously important meeting among German high leadership directly to Washington, even though it is clear that Morgenthau made no such report136.

If Wangenheim was simply making this all up to impress Morgenthau, wouldn't his misinformation still be damaging his own career, as he would have been making up false accusations against his own nation to boast his own importance in the eyes of a representative of the United States? This makes it very difficult to believe that Wangenheim could have made such a momentous reveal about Germany's real or made up plans for starting the war. One more important thing here to consider is that the Ambassador Wangenheim died unexpectedly on October 25th137 or 24th138. This means that the German Ambassador was already dead, there was no easy way of refuting the claims Morgenthau

136 Barnes 1926, 236-237.
137 Trumpener 1968, 125.
138 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: "I shall do nothing for the Armenians," says the German Ambassador.
presented in his memoirs about Von Wangenheim's indiscretion and the content of the private discussions between these two men.

Morgenthau himself simply claims: "Why waste any time discussing the matter after that?"\textsuperscript{139} This sentence could mean that Morgenthau himself realized how awkward his claim about Wangenheim's supposed indiscretion must have seemed to anyone who scrutinized his claim with any greater thought, and tried to defend his accusations with simple rhetorical means. This also matches the simple propagandistic rhetoric used in war time press in the US and the UK. In fact, the so-called rhetorical question is a common rhetorical technique, used to disguise a claim, even if it could be written or spoken directly. Technique’s power is based on the common human psychological desire to “avoid being the target of indoctrination”. By asking a rhetorical question, readers or listeners can reach the desired conclusion on their own, thus strengthening the original claim.\textsuperscript{140} This reinforces the view that the whole story about Wangenheim telling him about Germany's secret conspiracy to start a world war seems to be a propagandistic, made up story to put the blame and guilt of starting World War I on Germany. This reinforces the view that Morgenthau was trying to change President Wilson's opinion about blaming the Germany for starting the war, as the president did not believe it to be true nor wise course of political action to take\textsuperscript{141}. As presented by Morgenthau, Wangenheim's alleged story about the secret conference is in accord with the previously mentioned propagandistic theme about the secret German plans for world domination, which features extensively in allied war propaganda before and during World War I.

Already in 1926, Harry E. Barnes came into conclusion that Morgenthau did hear about the Potsdam legend only after he returned from Turkey in 1916, and it considered it to be “inconceivable that Morgenthau would have withheld such information for nearly four years”. Barnes also writes that Morgenthau did not offer any explanation or answer any to his critical inquiries, and even that the Kaiser had personally informed him that Wangenheim did not see him in July of 1914.\textsuperscript{142} J. M. Winter's opinion is that the inaccuracies, differences between Morgenthau's written records and his story, as well as apparently invented events and untruths included in his memoirs, are there because Morgenthau wanted to settle scores with other diplomats and important persons presented in his book. According to Winter, this

\textsuperscript{139} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German Superman at Constantinople.
\textsuperscript{140} Alenius 2014, 28.
\textsuperscript{141} MacMillan 2003, 6.
\textsuperscript{142} Barnes 1926, 237-248.
kind of vengeful score settling is quite common in memoirs such as Morgenthau's story.\textsuperscript{143} This is of course one of the possible explanations for the apparent untruths in Morgenthau's story, but this thesis offers different possible reasons for Morgenthau to include many apparent untruths and fictitious events in his story.

As has been found out, Morgenthau's image of Germany correlates quite strongly with the general image of Germany presented in anti-German propaganda. And as noted in previous chapter, Morgenthau's fictitious descriptions about German conspiracies and contingency plans for war also clear propagandistic goal, and so in this context Winter's argument seems quite simplistic and shallow explanation. In light of findings of this thesis so far, more likely explanation is that Morgenthau chose deliberately to write a story which included fictitious claims about German actions, such as the story about the secret Potsdam conference, largely because of propagandistic motives in order to vilify Germany. Of course Winter's explanation can be one of the many reasons motivating Morgenthau, but no the most important one. Winter's interpretation seems even more unlikely, considering that Baron Von Wangenheim, the main diplomat for Morgenthau to settle scores with, had already passed away in 1915. One of the main reasons for Morgenthau to write clearly fictitious propaganda against Germany was in all probability his negative image of Germany, as it was presumably slowly changing during his stay in Turkey, for the various reasons already examined. Was Morgenthau telling lies about a German conspiracy to start the war, just because he had such a negative, freshly changed image of Germany and its autocratic political system, which clouded his interpretation and opinion about the situation in Turkey and Germany's role in there, or could the fictitious parts be better understood being there just for political reasons? At least the inclusion of the knowingly untruthful claims about a German conspiracy to start a world war by Morgenthau in his story strengthens the view that Morgenthau's story's, at least partial, propagandistic nature.

In the next chapter, this question will be also examined, in addition to the main assignment, in order to further examine the reasons behind Morgenthau's image of Germany, and also to further evaluate this story's nature as a credible description about the events he witnessed, and also if Morgenthau's image of Germany presented in his story can be seen as partly exaggerated by his story's propagandistic motivations. However, it is clear that these

\textsuperscript{143} Winter 2003, 302.
questions cannot be evaluated thoroughly in this thesis, based on the sources available, so any answers found remain within considerable amount of doubt.
3. Role of Germany in Armenian Genocide in Turkey, according to Morgenthau

3.1. Germany's influence in the Turkish Empire

The Turkish state had lost much of its territory in years prior to the First World War, and its internal situation was quite chaotic. Morgenthau himself comments how he had different expectations of the Turkish political system before he arrived in Turkey in 1913. He writes that he remembers reading years ago about the democratic-leaning Young Turk\textsuperscript{144} revolutionaries, who deposed a bloody tyrant from his throne. However, after many lost wars their modernizing efforts had disappeared:

_Thus the Young Turks had disappeared as a positive regenerating force, but they still existed as a political machine_” and _“Indeed, long before I had arrived, this attempt to establish a Turkish democracy had failed “._

So the democratic aspirations of the Young Turks was replaced by the Committee of Union and Progress with its new leaders Taalat, Djemal and Enver Pasha, which Morgenthau describes as being nothing but a band of criminals. Morgenthau writes “I must admit, however, that I do our corrupt American gangs a great injustice in comparing them with the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress”.\textsuperscript{145} Morgenthau adds that after the administrative blunders, Turkey “had now reached a state of decrepitude that had left it an easy prey to German diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{146} It is true that Germany was increasing its influence in Turkey and the Baghdad Railroad can be considered to be the symbol of German power in Turkey, as well as a symbol for Germany's imperial ambitions in the region\textsuperscript{147}. Recent studies suggest however, that Germany's power and influence attained through this building project over Turkey has been exaggerated. The Baghdad Railroad Project and it is better understood as joint Turkish-
German project, where Turkey was an equal partner, and German influence on the project was in fact diminishing after the rise of the Young Turks. In fact the railroad could be considered to have been more of liability, and Germans would have been unable to use the railroad without Turkish help.\textsuperscript{148}

So according to Morgenthau, Turkey had effectively become a German puppet state prior to the start of World War I, as was the German plan from the beginning\textsuperscript{149}. Morgenthau writes how Turkey's bad economy and need for foreign loans to develop the country was one of the other important factors forcing Turkey in the arms of Germany\textsuperscript{150}. According to Trumpener, French, British and Austro-Hungarians all had greater economic control of Turkey prior to the Great War\textsuperscript{151}, so Morgenthau's view seems quite flawed, especially considering how even the railroad was ultimately in Turkish control.

However, the German military missions, both naval and army, were the most important factor that assured Morgenthau that Turkey had became a German puppet. Especially the arrival of Liman Von Sanders signified the final diplomatic victory for Germany, and that the Germans controlled the Turkish Army:

\textit{The appointments signified nothing less than that the Kaiser had almost completed his plans to annex the Turkish army to his own. To show the power which Von Sanders' appointment had given him, it is only necessary to say that the first army corps practically controlled Constantinople. These changes clearly showed to what an extent Enver Pasha had become a cog in the Prussian system.}\textsuperscript{152}

However, the British military mission was almost as large as the German one, and the Germans themselves concluded that it is most inappropriate to think “Turkey as an asset for Germany”. Germany had even reserved the right to recall the mission in the event of a European war. This means that Ottoman alliance in Germany's side was not taken for granted.

\textsuperscript{148} McMurray 2001, 137-139.  
\textsuperscript{149} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German Superman at Constantinople, Chapter IV: Germany mobilizes the Turkish army.  
\textsuperscript{150} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter II: The "Boss System" in the Ottoman Empire and how it proved useful to Germany.  
\textsuperscript{151} Trumpener 1968, 6-13.  
\textsuperscript{152} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter III "The Personal representative of the Kaiser”---Wangenheim opposes the sale of American Warships to Greece.  

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in Berlin. Morgenthau image of Germans as superiorly efficient and organized people, and Turks as inefficient and disorganized can be seen as influencing his interpretation about German influence in Turkey. Apparently Morgenthau's opinion was, according to his story, that a few hundred Germans could easily control vastly superior numbers of Turks in their home territory, even against their will.

All in all, Germany's influence in Turkey was becoming much more important, but still not nearly overwhelming enough to call Turkey a mere German satellite state prior to the start of the War. Relations between Germany and Turkey were cordial, even though Turkey still had not completely abandoned its traditional policy of maintaining balance between the great European powers to further its own ends. But Germany was spearheading pro-German and anti-Entente propaganda through newspapers with Turkey's blessing, promoting alliance between Germany and Turkey. The rising influence and support of Germany in Turkey culminated in November 2, 1914, as Turkey formally joined the War against the Entente Powers alongside Germany. After attacks by German lead Turkish Navy against Russian Black Sea coast and Russian naval forces, Russia was forced to declare war against Turkey. It is true however that eventually Germany somewhat forced Turkey's hand to join the war, but no strongly as Morgenthau claimed, but this would have been impossible without the quite large support the interventionists, who thought that alliance with Germany would benefit Turkey, had in the Turkish government.

The perceived rise of German influence in Turkey was surely part of the aforementioned growing fear of Germany in the UK, as Germany seemed to be a threat to British interests in Turkey and Middle East as well. This rising Germanophobia and changing image of Germany in the UK would naturally increase the British propaganda efforts against Germany, and German people in general, which would influence American propaganda efforts against Germany as well. It becomes clear that Germany's power and influence in Turkey was in fact quite limited, and without strong support for joining an alliance in the Turkish leadership Germany's plans would not have worked. Turks seem to have thought that Germany would win the war and alliance with Germany would thus be beneficial for Turkey. This line of thought is also present in Trumpener's book, as he noted how Turkish affairs added to the

156 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XI: Germany forces Turkey into war.
distrust between the competing alliances.  

3.2. Germany and the Armenian Genocide

As has been noted, the central context of Morgenthau's story, addition to the First World War, was the Armenian genocide, as he himself proclaimed. It was preceded by the so called Armenian Question. The ailing Turkish Empire was also shook by ethnic conflict after losing the western parts of the empire in the Balkan War. There was sizable Armenian minority in eastern portions of Anatolia, and Armenian nationalistic movements had already started to increase in power and took more radical outlook especially after the 1860s. Armenian radicals tried to gain western support for their aspirations, but this proved eventually futile effort. In the middle of the 1890s, Sultan Abdul Hamid II responded to the growing radicalization among the Armenians by ordering them to be killed in their thousands, but European Powers resorted only to protest diplomatically to this massacre, even though the Armenian Question emerged as an international issue, where Armenians tried to secure reforms for their security and wellbeing. After the Young Turks rose in power, there were some hopes among Armenians that they would get political equality, but this was not to be. It is true that Armenians gained some improvement in their legal status, but in practice the traditional harassment and acts of violence towards them continued. There were even bigger atrocities, biggest one being the killing of thousands of Armenians in 1909 in Cilician Vespers, even though the new central Turkish government wasn't necessarily directly involved in this. On the other hand, Balakian writes that Turkish officials didn't do anything to stop the massacres, even if they started spontaneously at first. As been noted earlier, Morgenthau was quite certainly aware of these earlier massacres and general repression against minorities in Turkey, as the Armenian Question was a major public issue in the US even before the massacres of 1915 and onwards. This can be seen one of the reasons for Morgenthau's image of Turks, and also by extension influencing his image of Germany as well, as was reasoned in main chapter one. By analyzing Morgenthau's description about

158 Trumpener 1968, 5-6.  
159 Morgenthau 1918, Preface.  
160 Balakian 2002, 35-36  
161 Trumpener 1968, 200-201.  
German involvement in the Armenian genocide, we can perhaps reinforce or refute the earlier view.

3.2.1. Germans teach Turks how to solve the Armenian Question

The question about the German role in the Armenian genocide has been studied for long time. Contemporary view held in American public, the Times referred to the Germans as “masters of the Central Ottoman Administration”, who even encouraged the Turks to massacre Armenians in their thousands. As been noted, Morgenthau also thought that Germans were really in control in Constantinople, and therefore Germans could be held accountable for the genocide, because they chose not to interfere. This view has been contested by Trumpener, as he writes how persecution of Armenians during war-time was not instigated nor welcomed by Germany or by Austria-Hungary, but both governments were concerned in keeping the Turks in the war, and thus chose not to do anything drastic to stop the Turks. However, according to Trumpener, there were many German and Austro-Hungarian officials who tried to stop or mitigate the persecution and massacres the Armenians were facing.

Morgenthau claims in his memoirs that Germany incited and taught its ally Turkey to ”solve” the supposed threat of Armenians by using forced deportations. According to Morgenthau, “idea of deporting peoples en masse is, in modern times, exclusively Germanic. Any one who reads the literature of Pan-Germany constantly meets it.” Certain German writers had also suggested to deport the Armenians from Armenia to Mesopotamia, to populate the area with adequate number of farmers. According to Morgenthau, Germany was building the Baghdad railroad, which would run from Hamburg to Baghdad Mesopotamia under this new even Greater German Empire would need more, industrious farmers to sustain the railroad and other German projects in the area. Turks were deemed ”too lazy” to be useful in colonization of Mesopotamia, but Armenians would suit the German needs perfectly for this

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164 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: “I shall do nothing for the Armenians,” says the German Ambassador.
165 Trumpener 1968, 205.
166 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: “I shall do nothing for the Armenians,” says the German Ambassador.
167 Armenia here refers to greater region of Armenian Highlands traditionally populated by Armenians, not just to the territory of the modern Armenian Republic.
But as noted, Morgenthau incorrectly claims that the Pan-Germanic ideology was somehow the predominant force in the German state, or even that Germany as a state was behind the idea of “solving” the Armenian Question by offering help to Turkey. More interesting and important for this thesis is Morgenthau's description how deportation was “exclusively” German idea. This again reinforces Morgenthau's image of Germans as unprecedentedly ruthless and goal oriented, as he empathizes the importance of these writers in Germany. Apparently the treatment of Native Americans and forcing them to live in reservations by the US central government was not comparable to the idea of deportation. Morgenthau's rhetoric and reasoning closely resembles the concept of the “enemy image”.

Morgenthau also used the aforementioned rhetorical question in order to strengthen his argumentation about Germany’s responsibility concerning the Armenian genocide, which further strengthens his story’s propagandistic tone. Few examples of Morgenthau’s use of the rhetorical question:

“Germany, in the last four years, has become responsible for many of the blackest pages in history; is she responsible for this, unquestionably the blackest of all?” and “To what extent was the Kaiser responsible for the wholesale slaughter of this nation?”

It is true however, that German high-command was aware of the massacres of Armenians and decided not to interfere, and some of them saw the killing as necessary to strengthen Turkey and its war effort. This fact could have made Germany at least partially morally responsible for the genocide in Morgenthau's view, because he apparently thought, or at least claimed, that Germany had the power to stop it because Turkey was a German puppet. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the view that Turkey was a German puppet was already present in the American press in 1915, as mentioned earlier, so Morgenthau's claim that Turkey was a German puppet was not a new revelation in 1918, but reinforced the existing view about the Turkish-German relationship in the American public. But there were practically no German troops in Turkey, and no German officers in the eastern provinces had a command function in the Ottoman Army. This means that Germans had no concrete way to protect Armenians even if they had wanted to.

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168 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: “I shall do nothing for the Armenians,” says the German Ambassador.
169 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: “I shall do nothing for the Armenians,” says the German Ambassador.
170 Trumpener 1968, 268-269.
172 Trumpener 1968, 269.
So according to Morgenthau, most important of these new "modern" methods against adopted from Germans was the use of deportation as a way to handle the Armenian "problem" once and for all. In Morgenthau's view, Germans had been using deportations against Belgians, French and Poles; Austro-Hungarians were also using these same methods against Serbians in the Balkans. According to Morgenthau, it was German admiral Usedom who had, just before the start of World War I, suggested the Turks to deport Greek population from Asiatic Littoral islands to Aegean islands. However, these claims about how Germans instructed Turks to seem to be in contradiction with grand-scale Turkish massacres against Armenians and other Christian minorities, which had started already in the 19th century. It is unclear if Morgenthau had any knowledge about German atrocities against the Herero people in modern Namibia in 1904, but it can be assumed that he was not as he makes no mention of it in his story, and because Germany's actions against the Herero people would have been much stronger argument in Morgenthau's case. But as was noted earlier, Morgenthau did not mention the far more famous atrocities by Belgians in Congo either, perhaps because he had sympathies for colonialism. But the difference here is that Belgium was an allied state to the US, and while the Herero people were under German rule. Perhaps Morgenthau's aforementioned view how American missionaries in Turkey were “advance agents of civilization” caused him not to want draw attention to the darker side of colonialism, as he saw that colonialism also had positive consequences?

However, as mentioned before, it seems that Turkey under the CUP had efficient administration, and did not really need German help to complete their nefarious goals. For example, American consul Nathan in Adana vilayet in southern Anatolian coast, noted in his report to Morgenthau how effective the Turkish infrastructure was in deporting thousands of Armenians in short time. If Morgenthau had genuinely overestimated the German influence in Turkey, he could have thought that the apparent efficiency of Turkey in massacring the Armenians was achieved by German aid, or perhaps Morgenthau thought that Turks could not have achieved such efficiency on their own, considering his image of the Turks as inefficient barbarians. On the other hand, most likely option in light of information revealed in this study, is that Morgenthau reinforced the old images of inefficient Turks and

173 Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: I shall do nothing for the Armenians,” says the German Ambassador.
175 A major administrative district or province in Turkey, and formerly in the Ottoman Empire, with its own governor. Oxford living dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/vilayet
well organized Germans who had Turkey under their sway insincerely on purpose, to put the guilt of the Armenian genocide on Germany.

For example, Peter Balakian writes in his novel *The Burning Tigris* how Abdul Hamid II's decision to eliminate the Armenians, which culminated in 1894-1896, marked the start of mass-murders as a political tool in the modern age. Sultan Hamid's campaign against Armenians resulted in death of approximately two hundred thousand people, half of which had been killed in direct massacres.\textsuperscript{177} German atrocities against civilian populations in World War I or earlier were in much smaller scale, and it should be noted that the Hamidian massacres were implemented during peace and not in times of war, where atrocities against civilians have more or less been always present. The Armenian genocide of 1915 took the lives of at least one million people\textsuperscript{178}, and in this light the Armenian genocide could be better understood as being continuation to the massacres of 1894-96, and not as new, German influenced design to deal with the Armenian Question as Morgenthau claims his memoirs\textsuperscript{179}. The apparent increased efficiency of killings during the genocide of 1915 compared to the earlier massacre, could be explained by the state of war in Turkey during 1915, which would have made such atrocities easier to implement in practical and in "moral" terms as well.

Germany's responsibility for the Armenian massacres in Turkey had been widely debated in the American press and the State Department in years 1915-1918. Ambassador Wangenheim's official proclamation that, "I do not blame the Turks what they are doing to the Armenians. They are entirely justified." caused an outrage in the US, as the suffering of Armenians was very important topic in the US that time. The German Ambassador to the United States, Von Bernstorff comments also had similar impact, when he said that the Armenian atrocities were "greatly exaggerated" and had been provoked by the Armenian side.\textsuperscript{180} According to Morgenthau, Wangenheim made similar comments about the plight of the Armenians to him in their conversations when Morgenthau tried to persuade Wangenheim to try to make the Turks to stop the massacres.\textsuperscript{181} German strategical situation during the war and not alienating the Turkish government was deemed more important than helping the Armenians, despite the damage this caused to German reputation. This means that Germany could not have stopped the Armenian genocide without damaging its own war effort. This

\textsuperscript{177} Balakian 2002, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{178} Balakian 2002, xxiii.
\textsuperscript{179} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter XXVII: "I shall do nothing for the Armenians," says the German Ambassador.
\textsuperscript{180} Balakian 2002, 285.
\textsuperscript{181} Morgenthau 1918, chapter XXVII, "I shall do nothing for the Armenians", says the German Ambassador.
common theme has been repeated in geopolitics many times before and after, and Machiavellian view about international politics seems to have been right in this regard. Altruistic morality seems to be far away from “the Great Game”, and geopolitical necessities and power struggles seem to always prevail over them. Even president Obama was constrained by the political reality, as he refused to refer to the deaths of over one million of Armenians as a genocide, despite his promises prior to his presidency\textsuperscript{182}.

What could be Morgenthau's motives for blaming Germany for the Armenian genocide? It is true that the German inaction during the Armenian genocide must have been very infuriating thing for Morgenthau to witness, and could have been one of the reasons for Morgenthau to untruthfully calumniate Germany. After all, having no diplomatic or political background, Morgenthau was not used to intricacies of realpolitik, and his background as a lawyer could have made German inaction event more condemnable to him. The German inaction as well as during the Armenian genocide could have really changed Morgenthau's image of Germans and Germany in general, particularly if his view about Turkey being a German puppet was really his genuine view. Morgenthau thought, according to his memoirs, that Germany as a state, and Germans in general as well, to certain extent, were “fundamentally ruthless, shameless, and cruel”\textsuperscript{183}, as was established in the main chapter one.

So this reasoning further reinforces the view presented earlier that Morgenthau's negative image of Germany could also partially explain his story's fictitious claims about German actions in Turkey, and perhaps in Morgenthau's view, end could have justified the means when writing his memoirs fictitious parts. Even a man with a strong moral background can resort to partial truths or even lies in the face of witnessing a genocide of a people. As it is apparent in light of modern research on this subject, Turkey was not a German puppet, and if Morgenthau really knew this, it partially undermines the story's principal claim about German guiltiness for the Armenian genocide. Morgenthau was in the heart of Turkish capital for years and talked with the leading figures of the Ottoman administration almost weekly and he was also extensively informed by the many Americans working in Turkey in different positions. And despite his lack of experience in diplomacy and politics, as an apparently capable man he must have had quite clear understanding about how much power Germans really had and how much the German power in Turkey depended on the Turkey's shared


\textsuperscript{183} Morgenthau 1918, Chapter I: A German superman at Constantinople.
goals with Germany. This in turn would make the claim about Germany's guiltiness for starting the war, as expressed in his story, a conscious choice to vilify the Germans and to produce propaganda against to influence the president, the public and members of the administration back home. Morgenthau's image of then modern Germany might played a role as well in Morgenthau's inclination to see Germans guilty in starting. The causal link, however, between these factors can be hard to determine.

Morgenthau was also well informed about the then contemporary massacres of Armenians. Much of Morgenthau's direct information about the Armenian genocide came from western or German, but mainly American, consuls, missionaries and other officials stationed in various parts of Turkey. Missionaries' humanitarian efforts as well focused in helping the persecuted Christian minorities in Turkey, and the Armenian Question rose to be the most important human right topic in the public life of the USA from the late 19th century onwards. The Armenian massacres of 1890s were even shaking the Monroe Doctrine, as there were calls for direct involvement against Turkey to protect the Armenians, although congress chose to maintain its neutral stance. The American presence in Turkey was mainly philanthropic and educational, and the Secretary of the State William Jennings Bryan wrote to Morgenthau that he hoped that with American education, Turks might learn how to tolerate Armenians and other minorities in their empire. Later on, the Wilson administration tried to persuade, acting “in the interest of humanity and no political considerations”, Turkey to stay neutral in the Great War.

Armenians' special place in American consciousness was also one of the reasons for strong American presence in the eastern provinces where Armenians lived, and therefore Morgenthau was very well informed about the massacres, and Morgenthau was also informed about the true German involvement in the atrocities against Armenians. There were also many American businessmen in Turkey which added to the American presence as the US was also an important trading partner of Turkey, and trading between the two countries had been rising steadily in the years before the First World War. However, the strong American presence in Turkey means that Morgenthau was well informed by people who were there in

184 The US was still officially a neutral country during Morgenthau's stay in Turkey as the Ambassador. British and French diplomats had been expelled.
187 Oren 2007, 327.
188 DeNovo 1963, 38-40.
first place partly because of the mistreatment of Armenians, and who can therefore be assumed to be good sources of information for Morgenthau. The most important sources of the Armenian massacres for Morgenthau include Leslie Davis, who was heading the American consulate in Harput, in central Anatolia where many Armenian lived. He reported regularly to Morgenthau about the horrible treatment the Armenians were facing in Harput and elsewhere in the region. Jesse Jackson, the American consul in Aleppo, also reported to Morgenthau. As Turkey was in war, all official reports were inspected by a censor, but Jackson arranged a private courier with a special code to deliver the messages about the massacres and deportations to Morgenthau. This means that Morgenthau was getting uncensored information from educated and knowledgeable source. However, as many people who informed Morgenthau were already there because of mistreatment of Armenians, it is possible that they had become “sensitized” to the issue, and were quicker and more eager to report any further wrongdoings. This, however, doesn’t change the bigger picture concerning the testimonials’ credibility.

3.2.2. Silence about Disagreeing Messages

However, none of these reports by mainly American consuls, missionaries and diplomats include anything that would make Germany or Germans directly responsible for the atrocities, and in fact individual Germans were trying to help the Armenians, even if Germany officially refused to intervene or help the Armenians. However the foreign secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in Boston, James L. Barton, noted that after reading Morgenthau's contemporary reports, as well as reports from German and American missionaries and consuls, that these reports indicted Turkey, and that Turkish government was “backed by German endorsement”. One example is a German lieutenant in Field Marshall Von Der Goltz retinue, Armin T. Wegner, who took hundreds of photographs, took notes and letters from deported Armenians, and delivered part them to Morgenthau in Constantinople to be send to the US. Wegner's photographs comprise the core photographic evidence today about the Genocide, and Wegner, and he risked his life when he smuggled the negatives of the photos he and other Germans had taken back to Germany.  

190 Aleppo belonged to the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Fig 1.  
191 Balakian 2003, 251-252.  
192 Balakian 2002, 286.  
As a side note, it doesn't mean that even that there is many untruthful claims to be found Morgenthau's memoirs, that it would prove that the Armenian genocide did not took place at all in the first place, as has been claimed by the Armenian genocide denialists\(^{194}\). There seems to be ample evidence from many different sources apart from the memoirs that prove the genocide did happen, and any evidence that Morgenthau's memoirs contain certain untrue propagandistic elements and other made-up descriptions of events doesn't change the fact that there were massacres and forcible removals of Christian population in Turkey during the years of World War I, as J. M. Winter writes in his book *America and the Armenian Genocide*. Winter also writes that Lowry could not find any made up things about Morgenthau's description about the mass killings.\(^{195}\) Conscious choice will be made here, and the Lowry's book will not be used as a direct reference to asses Morgenthau's claims about in this thesis, because of the obvious political bias and lack of objectivity expressed in Lowry's writings on this subject, although references made by other, more objective scholars to Lowry's books will be used. This decision not to use Lowry's research is supported by fact, that that notable scholar of genocide denialists Professor Deborah Lipstad's opinion is that scholars who are denying the Armenian genocide are supported by modern Turkish government with financial and other resources, and cannot thus be considered to be genuine legitimate scholars at all. Modern Turkish government still denies the Armenian genocide, and runs a campaign to promote the view that there are two sides to the Armenian genocide, neither of which are objective views.\(^{196}\)

Later on in march 1919, after Morgenthau's story had been already published, Armin T. Wegner even wrote an open letter to Woodrow Wilson about the events he witnessed in Turkey. In his letter he refers to Wilson's demand to American congress for the liberation of all non-Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire, and tells the president how he is writing on behalf of one these, the Armenians. Letter consists of Wegner's description of horrible crimes against the Armenians conducted by the Turkish government, but he doesn't blame the ordinary Turks or other Muslims for these atrocities. Nevertheless, Armenians should be liberated from the Turkish rule. Wegner also stresses how Germany has been unjustly accused of these atrocities against Armenians because of their alliance with Turkey, despite

\(^{194}\) Armenian Genocide Debate, Article ”*Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*”. http://www.armeniangenocidedebate.com/ambassador-morgenthau-story

\(^{195}\) Winter 2003, 302.

\(^{196}\) Balakian 2003, Xxii-xxiii.
"German people know nothing of these crimes”. Instead, he claims that all six European Great powers, who signed the Berlin treaty of 1878 July and thus gave guarantee to protect Armenians, as well as the US, should be held equally responsible for not protecting Armenian people against the Turkish state.  

Wegner's letter can be seen partly as a response to Morgenthau's story, discrediting Morgenthau's view that the Germans were responsible for the Armenian genocide. It can also be seen in context of peace negotiations between Germany and the Entente Powers culminating in the peace treaty of Versailles, which was signed in 28th of June in 1919. Morgenthau's story can be assumed to have contributed to and reinforced the view to some extent that Germany had planned and started the Great War, as well as it helped Turkey to massacre over one million Armenians.

Why doesn't Morgenthau mention Wegner in his story? Even if he acted against Turkish (and German) orders, wouldn't it be important to mention this courageous German's deed if his story was objective and not tendentious? Morgenthau's opinion about the German quilt for the genocide seems to be grounded on the inaction of German state during the massacres, and because Turkey was supposedly just a German puppet state. Actions by benign Germans seem not to be worth of mentioning, and omitting facts that would undermine his story's primary support the aforementioned propagandistic motives for Morgenthau to write his story the way he did. Morgenthau's reluctance to write about, in his view, morally decent Germans is line with the aforementioned fact that presence of inconsistencies with the present image often leads to ignoring them, as Morgenthau's image of Germany and Germans had changed to a much more negative image of an enemy state and people.

There were also other reports reaching Morgenthau, which would seem to indicate that at least some of the Germans stationed in Turkey were in fact trying to prevent the killings. American consular agent Charles E. Allen, stationed in Adrianople, wrote to Morgenthau in March 1916, describing the ethnic cleansing taking place in Thrace. Greeks were the biggest Christian minority there, and had been deported to Greece in large numbers. Unlike elsewhere in Turkey, local Armenians had converted to Islam and were "required to intermarry with the Turks", thus avoiding death. Allen's opinion was that this method was promoted by the Germans in order to prevent the similar massacres that took place elsewhere.

197 Wegner 1919.
198 Treaty of Versailles.
in Turkey in 1915. Morgenthau doesn't mention this piece of information either in his story at all, which would mean that the Germans, even in official positions, tried sometimes to prevent the killings when they could. However, Morgenthau does write briefly about a few Germans who were speaking against the official German policy, but who could not make a difference in the end. However, some psychological considerations should be brought up. Images are always simplifications, and the formation of new images can be “psychologically discomforting”. Morgenthau's image of Germans presumably changed, at least some extent genuinely, during his stay in Turkey. Witnessing the German inaction regarding the Armenian genocide, especially considering that Morgenthau was not used to the immorality of the world politics, can be seen as one of the contributing factor. The German inaction could have shocked him even more because President Wilson's strive to change how the world of geopolitics worked, and motivated Morgenthau to write his story and to speak up in a persuasive, even propagandistic tone. In addition, the presence of inconstancies between Morgenthau's new image of Germany as ruthless and merciless, and the messages about Germans trying to help Armenians, could have caused Morgenthau to dismiss those instances as mere anomalies of the bigger picture.

All in all, based on the information examined, it would seem that Morgenthau was well informed about the Armenian genocide, and possibly knew that Germany was not directly involved and could not even protect the Armenians if it had wanted to without great sacrifices to its war effort. Of course, it is understandable that Morgenthau would have been rightly furious about the German inaction in the face of a genocide for the psychological reasons presented earlier, and this could have cause him to write his story with the made up claims about special German wickedness, and also contributed to his changing image of Germans.

3.3. President Wilson's vision

As told in the introduction chapter, Wilson's Presidency began a new era in American foreign policy as he became president in 1913, and the already crumbling isolationist policy of the

200 Balakian 2002, 269-270.
201 Morgenthau 1918, chapter XXVII: "I shall do nothing for the Armenians," says the German Ambassador.
US began to unravel quickly as World War I broke out in Europe, though he tried to maintain the traditional American isolationism in the early years of the war. Wilson has also been described an idealist and a moralist while still being characterized by his time. He strongly believed that American foreign policy should serve human issues, not narrow American self-interests. Wilson though that interests of The United States would be best served with doing good things to others, but knew little of other countries beside Britain. Politically Wilson was a firm believer in liberal democracy, as was Morgenthau. What is interesting for this thesis, Wilson was reportedly an admirer of conservative Philosopher Edmund Burke, and feared disorder and violent change. This, and his belief in humanitarian work and strong moral character, might explain why Wilson was at the start disinclined to blame Germany for starting the war, and was seeking a "peace without victory" with Germany, despite his strong belief in democracy and dislike of autocracy.

Finally, Wilson agreed in 1917 that Germany should be defeated, and after removal of some of the autocratic characteristics, Germany could be brought back to the community of nations, but Wilson nevertheless wanted to have a fair and honest peace with Germany. Wilson's vision with the League of Nations acting to keep the world in peace after the war, as well as other lofty goals were written down in his Fourteen Points address, and Germans even tried to secure an armistice with Wilson in October 1918, based on the Fourteen points, as the new German parliamentary government tried to avoid the punitive terms demanded by the UK and France. When examining Morgenthau's story in this context, it gives a political motive for Morgenthau to vilify Germans. With his story he must have at least tried to reinforce Wilson's decision that Germany must be defeated and somewhat reformed, and it is also possible that Morgenthau wanted to influence Wilson to go even further so that he would agree to punitive measures against Germany in the coming peace negotiations. This seems even more plausible line of thinking, considering how strong Morgenthau's strive was to vilify Germany even with falsehoods, as we have found out. In addition, Morgenthau's image of Germans presented in his story is almost a direct opposite to Wilson's ideals perhaps on purpose, but more likely just unconsciously, closely corresponding to the idea of otherness. Morgenthau's own basic ideals were presumably quite close to Wilson's, even though they apparently had different views how Germany should be treated after the war.

204 Herring 2008, 380.
205 Herring 2008, 413.
But Wilson also had strong domestic opposition who demanded a more hard line against Germany, particularly his republican rivals, and was told he would be destroyed politically if he was acting too conciliatory with Germany. Wilson answered that he was thinking “a hundred years” in advance, and that he was willing to sacrifice his political career if it would serve his country. And as has been noted, Wilson though that the best way to serve the US was to act in selfless and noble manner. This means that Morgenthau could have also tried to stop Wilson from sacrificing himself politically in the coming peace negotiations by persuading him to agree the punitive stance favored by the UK and France against Germany in the coming peace talks.

This brings us to interesting questions. We could ask ourselves would a similar book have been released and would it have gathered as much attention in the US if the Turkey had been allied to for example Britain and would conducted similar atrocities against Armenians? Even the choice of what to publish and write is a conscious act, and if general public chooses to write about some atrocities and not about others, that is also use of propaganda. The moral integrity of Henry Morgenthau concerning Armenians should not be questioned, but the reason for the book to be published was not only to do justice for the victims of the genocide, but to influence how Germany should be treated after the war. In this light the memoirs' focus on blaming the Germans, and not the Turks, is very reasonable, as Germany was the main rival and enemy of the United States. Turkey's future in the larger geopolitical sphere after the war still ambiguous, as a potential neighbor of the emerging Soviet Russia. But if a refusal to stop serious crimes against humanity, when one is able to do it with great sacrifices, could be considered to be as bad morally as conducting a genocide first handedly, then Americans and European Powers (including Germany) could be held partially responsible for the massacres of 1909 in Armenian Cilicia as well. This is clear as the Great Powers had extensive naval presence and ability to force Turkey stop those massacres.

The famous British philosopher and social commentator Bertrand Russel also had an opinion about the alleged German responsibility for the Armenian genocide, and about the general relationship between geopolitics, morality and human rights as well. His view correspond

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closely with the view expressed by Ulrich Trumpener earlier in this chapter. Russel wrote in 1917:

_The fact that the Turks had for ages displayed supremacy in cruelty and barbarism by torturing and degrading the Christians under their rule was no reason why Germany should not, like England in former times, support their tottering despotism by military and financial assistance. All considerations of humanity and liberty were subordinated to the great game._

Thus in Russel's view, the official German policy of inaction in the face of the Armenian genocide was nothing unprecedented. Germany put its strategical interests in war time first, and chose not to help Armenians in any concrete manner in fear of losing its important ally in the war, just as the UK and other world powers had done in previous decades and centuries.

Also, what is a fact or what is true or not, is often quite difficult thing to evaluate. In hindsight we have much more information to analyze and contextualize, and thus Morgenthau's view about the German role in the Armenian genocide can be seen not only necessarily only propagandistic, but possibly partly his true view about the relationship. After all, it is hard to quantify or measure exactly how much influence Germans had on the Turkish decision to deport the Armenian, and even what it really means when we say that a state consisting of millions of people with varying motivations “did” something? David Ratz quotes Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln210, who state that the “question of foreign policy is often not ‘What is reality?’ , but rather ‘Whose image of reality will prevail? ’”211. Ratz also writes how it is impossible to “compare an image to reality, since the ‘reality’ used, is in fact, simply the image of that ‘reality’ held by the outside observer”.

In this light, Morgenthau's claims seem a little less propagandistic in the sense that they would have been consciously exaggerated, or misinterpreted, but it doesn't change the fact that it is clear that Morgenthau wrote his story in order to influence people. Morgenthau's negative image of Germany can be thus seen the primary reason for Morgenthau's story's anti-German attitude, and his negative image would have been the reason for him to write his

210 Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln. _The Dynamics of International Politics_. Mcmillan 1962.
211 Ratz 2007, 213.
212 Ratz 2007, 208.
story's obviously fictitious parts about the German conspiracy to start a world war. Morgenthau's negative image of Germany would have also been the reason for him to claim that Germans taught Turks how to solve the Armenian Question in a “modern” way, namely by deportation, starvation and widespread massacres. His interpretation of the situation in Turkey would have been based on his negative image of Germany. The question whether Morgenthau's image of Germany presented in his story is truly his genuine image of Germany remains unanswered, but it is possible, and in fact quite probable considering the evidence put forth in this study, that he exaggerated his story's anti-German aspects for political and propagandistic purposes, as has been put forth earlier. This would also be the reason why Morgenthau's image of Germans matches quite closely with the image of Germans in the American and British propaganda.
Summary and Conclusions

Findings of this thesis are summarized here for better clarity. First of all, Morgenthau's story's anti-German tone was verified, as had been done already by earlier researchers. Morgenthau's image of Germany and Germans presented in his story is remarkably negative, and he describes Germans as ruthless, cruel conquerors, willing to sacrifice every moral principle to achieve their nefarious goals. Morgenthau's image of Germany and Germans was also found to be closely corresponding to the general propagandistic image presented in Allied propaganda during the war, and thus being in effect being an image of an enemy. But there were some interesting differences which were discovered between the image of Germans in western propaganda and Morgenthau's image of Germans. The association of Germans with the image of rapacious, but inefficient eastern barbarians was not used by Morgenthau, but he empathized how modern and well organized Germans were, and thus threatening as a convincing image of enemy should be. This can be contrasted how in western propaganda during the First World War, Germans were described as being well organized, and at the same time associated with barbarous eastern savages by using the term Hun when referring to them. Maybe Morgenthau didn't want to go that far in his propagandistic leanings, or more probable is that he wanted to portray Germans as very modern, ruthless and organized to empathize how dangerous Germany as a state was to American interests. In any case, it would have been quite hard to associate Germans as eastern barbarians in Turkey, as the Turks themselves were actually the stereotypical “eastern barbarians” in the ages-old western imaginary. Morgenthau confirms this when describes how Turks reverted to their ancestral type, and in his image Turks were nothing but inefficient barbarians. Germans supposedly even had to teach them how to deport and massacre Armenians in greater numbers.

This has been found not be true, as the administration set up by the Young Turks has been found to had been quite efficient. Turks were quite capable in handling massacres and mass deportations on their own. Morgenthau's judgment might have been clouded by his image of Turks as inefficient barbarians, and thus in his view Germans had to have taught them.
Morgenthau's description of Austrians also empathizes his warning that Germans were “unprecedentedly cruel” and dangerous, possibly in order to influence American administration and public. At least it is apparent that in Morgenthau's story, Germany is presented as the main villain, not Turkey or Austria. Germany was the leader of the Central Powers, and Morgenthau's focus on blaming Germany instead of Turkey can also be seen as a piece of evidence for the view about Morgenthau's story's fundamentally propagandistic purposes.

All in all, these finds would suggest that some Morgenthau's anti-German claims in his story are later interpretations and not his contemporary descriptions of the situation in Turkey during his stay in there. This view is also supported by the fact that the anti-German outlook of Morgenthau's story was missing from Morgenthau's letters, diary and official telegraphs as with the United States Department of State. It is possible that his earlier, presumably positive, image of Germany changed only gradually, and his new image of Germany he had embraced caused him to interpret the situation differently in 1918, when he wrote his story, explaining the aforementioned differences. One quite probable reason behind Morgenthau's remarkably negative image of Germany and Germans in his story is the anger, “backlash” caused by his changing image of Germany from a country of his birth he probably held in high esteem, to an enemy state in a world war which was closely allied to a barbarous state conducting mass killings against a religious minority.

However, Morgenthau's story's image of Germany corresponds with German image in the western propaganda, but it also seems unlikely that Morgenthau would have genuinely embraced the propagandistic presentation of Germany as such as his own “true” image of Germany. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to establish with certainty why someone had a certain image about something, as was noted in the introduction and later on in this study, and this question remains outside the scope of this thesis. However, it is conceivable to undercover potential reasons, and then attempt to evaluate their plausibility, while admitting that it is very difficult to evaluate the probability of those different options with any kind of accuracy based on the sources used in this thesis.

It has also been established that in all probability Morgenthau, or his ghostwriter made up several things that would place the guilt of starting the war on Germany. The Potsdam legend, German contingency plans in Turkey or other such claims about German conspiracy
to start a world war are simply not true as described in the book. It has been also shown that it is not reasonable to think either that Morgenthau was mislead by Wangenheim or other Germans on purpose, as it is inconceivable that he could have withheld such evidence about Germany's plans for so many years. Nor it is reasonable to think that Wangenheim, who conveniently died before Morgenthau published his story, would have shared secret information about a secret conference with Morgenthau in the first place. This further strengthens the view that Morgenthau's negative image of Germany clouding his interpretation of the events cannot alone explain his story's anti-German tone, but that he consciously included fictitious propagandistic anti-German claims in his story.

Morgenthau's view that the Germany helped Turkey to massacre Armenians is not accurate either. Turkey was not a German puppet, and Germans could not had actually stopped the genocide even if they had wanted to, because there were no German troops in eastern Anatolia. Also, the the Baghdad railroad, which has been seen as a symbol of German influence and power in the Ottoman Empire, was ultimately in Turkish control if Germans were to alienate their Turkish allies. It is true however, that Germany decided not to interfere with the genocide, but Morgenthau's moralist condemnation of Germany's inaction seems not to be justified, as many scholars agree that this it would been unprecedented if Germany would have alienated Turkey during wartime because of that. However, as Morgenthau was “highly moral person”, and he was not used to the cruel and calculating world of diplomacy and international politics, it seems that Germany's inaction could have seemed especially aggravating to him, despite the remark that German inaction in Turkey was nothing unusual in world politics This is further highlighted by the fact that President Wilson himself was striving to change how the “Great Game” worked. Also, Morgenthau's was a firm believer in liberal democracy, and his apparent contempt for autocratic Germany as a state could have caused even more anger.

So Morgenthau's negative image of Germans and Turks could be one of the reasons he felt that Germany should be punished for starting the war, even if it was not strictly true, perhaps not even in his own opinion. By Analyzing Morgenthau's image of Germans and Turks by methods of historical image research, as well as comparing his image of Germans and Turks to the general propaganda image of them in the west during and before the war, it was shown that Morgenthau's remarkably negative image of Germany was possibly one of the main reasons for him to write his made up claims. However, it is reasonable to think that
Morgenthau's real opinion about German character would not have been as negative as he expressed it in his story, and reinforcing the negative aspects would have been made because of propagandistic reasons. But was he also promoting negative view of Germany partly because Morgenthau though he was just pursuing American and democratic interests by doing so? This is quite probable as well. As noted, Morgenthau was firm believer in liberal democracy and with strong moral background. Of course it is understandable that Morgenthau would have been rightly furious about the German inaction in the face of a genocide, and this could have cause him to write his story with the fabulous claims about special German wickedness, in order to try to ensure that Germany would get punished after the war. The motive behind this would have been to influence President Wilson's opinion, as he had been quite conciliatory towards Germany.

It has also been shown that it is doesn't seem plausible that Morgenthau would have himself genuinely believed in all claims about German actions described in his story, but that he, or his ghostwriter, apparently made up those claims to further the story propagandistic purpose of showing the world how Germany was uniquely guilty for conspiring to start World War I. So, Morgenthau's book can be considered to contain propagandistic elements. This doesn't mean that the whole story could be considered false. Morgenthau's descriptions about the Armenian genocide have been found to be accurate, and he was widely reported about it from many consuls in various locations in the Turkish state.

It is shown that Morgenthau had clear mission to influence other people by his story, as he himself admitted, but also more importantly, that the story contained untruthful propaganda to vilify Germany. He chose not to mention too many events and persons that would have put Germany in positive light, and strongly focused on the negative facts about Germany. This lack of objectivity and strive for certain goal while refraining from mentioning things that would compromise this goal are all attributes of propaganda. Also the fact that Morgenthau intentionally used falsehoods to drive his point makes his story seem even more just a piece of propaganda against an enemy state. These all are at least later interpretation, or most probably just additions to influence his readership, as evident by the fact that his contemporary writings lacked the anti-German attitude present in his story. Morgenthau also fails to mention the Belgian atrocities in Congo, which should have been mentioned in the context of the Armenian genocide. This also reinforces the story's propagandistic tone, as Morgenthau clearly doesn't want mention things that would undermine reputation of an allied
nation. Partial reason for this omission can also be seen stemming from this ages prevalent racism, and grave crimes against Congolese people would easily had been seen not as important or relevant.

The truth is usually the loser in this kind of situation, and political needs often supersede it. On the other hand, it seems when geopolitical needs call for it, moral condemnation and human right breeches are used in full force to further those ends. However, this kind of duplicity by making truth subjective is only helping populists and demagogues, as this in part causes the people to lose their faith in the established political system. These kind of issues should not be put into limelight only when it is convenient for some greater objective. Findings in this thesis show how simplified tendentious story and untruthful claims can undermine one's whole undertaking, despite the general respectable motives behind it. Geopolitical realities influence what topics are brought up into general discussion, which facts are highlighted and which are overlooked. Objectivity and facts are often drown in political quagmires when major powers are concerned.

All in all, it seems that Morgenthau just wanted to use this horrible background of the Armenian genocide to cast a slur on Germany and same time erroneously and on purpose claiming that Germany conspired to start the war. Morgenthau probably had political motives to vilify Germany, as well as personal motives as he witnessed the German inaction in the face of a genocide. Same time by doing he compromised his whole story's message about the horrible crime of the Armenian genocide, and helped, in some inestimable amount, to reinforce the view that Germany should be punished after the war. In hindsight, the peace treaty of Versailles can't be considered a great success in the grand scheme of things, and later on the Armenian genocide denialists have been able to use his story's fictitious claims in denying the Armenian genocide. Morgenthau thus undermined his story's main point by including propagandistic, fictitious claims about German conspiracy to start a world war. However, it is important to note the mere presence propagandistic elements included in Morgenthau's story would not have undermined his story's veracity in the long run, as propaganda, as defined in this thesis, is not in itself necessarily untruthful or morally “condemnable”, but did it by using overtly propagandistic tone and by resorting to lies.

Finding in this thesis also demonstrate how problematic historical sources can be, especially when not analyzed and examined thoroughly with multiple points of view. When focusing on
Morgenthau's story's claims about Germany and Germans, the story would seem quite unreliable source about the events described in it. On the other hand, when it has been used to study the Armenian genocide, Morgenthau's story has been found to been quite accurate source. This thesis shows how even propagandistic source material can include valuable and reliable information about historical events, but in order to distinguish the fictitious and exaggerated parts from accurate parts, the source must be contextualized and the writers motives must be clear. In this case, methods of historical image research made it possible to understand Morgenthau's story better in the context of propaganda efforts against Germany in order to influence President Wilson and the American public in the coming peace talks with Germany.
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Fig. 1. Map of Ottoman empire in 1914
Map itself produced by Geographx ltd, with research assistance from Damien Fenton and Caroline Lord.

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Appendixes

Fig. 1. Map of Ottoman empire 1914
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/map-ottoman-empire-1914
Map produced by Geographx with research assistance from Damien Fenton and Caroline Lord.
Fig 2. Beat back the hun with liberty bonds.

Source: WWI Propaganda Posters
Fig 3. The Hun - His mark - Blot it out with Liberty Bonds.
Source: WWI Propaganda Posters
Fig 4. "Times are hard your Majesty - you leave us nothing to do".
Source: WWI Propaganda Posters
Fig 5. Chums "When I really began to admire you, my friend, was when you pulled that Lusitania job: When you did that, I said to myself - 'There's a man after my own heart!'".

Source: WWI Propaganda Posters
Fig 6. British Empire Union. "Once a German, always a German."

Source: WWI Propaganda Posters
Fig 7. Your Liberty Bond will help stop this - Sus bonos de la libertad ayudarán á dar fin con esto.

Source: WWI Propaganda Posters
Fig 8. Remember!

Source: WWI Propaganda Posters