

From Cooperation to Skepticism

The United States' Attitude towards the Far Eastern Commission
in the Context of Japanese Re-Armament 1946-1951

University of Oulu

History

Master's Thesis

Spring 2017

Janne Tikkanen

Abbreviations

ACJ	Allied Council for Japan
DoA	Department of Army (United States)
DoD	Department of Defence (United States)
DoS	Department of State (United States)
FEC	Far Eastern Commission
FEAC	Far Eastern Advisory Council
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
NPR	National Police Reserve
PPS	Policy Planning Staff
SCAP	Supreme Commander for Allied Powers

Contents

Introduction	4
1. FEC, Disarmament and Growing Skepticism 1946-1948	16
1.1. The United States, the FEC and the Japanese Disarmament	17
1.2. 1947: Moves towards Re-armament, Passivity in the FEC.....	21
1.3. The State Department's Skepticism towards the FEC's decisions	26
1.4. The FEC and the Japanese Constitution	33
2. A reverse course in armament policies and the FEC 1949-1951.....	39
2.1. Shift in Attitudes.....	39
2.2. Korean War, Full Reverse and State Department Reaction	44
2.3. FEC limits on the De-Purging of Imperial Army Officers	58
Conclusions	64
Sources and Bibliography.....	67

Introduction

East Asia has become an increasingly important region in modern day foreign policy, both in the United States and elsewhere. The nuclear crisis in North Korea, the rise of China and territorial disputes between Asian nations have only exemplified this change. These changes in security environment have also forced Japan to focus more on defence issues. As a part of this re-focus, Japan has been spending more money on defence, even if only slightly so. The Japanese government has also re-interpreted the constitution to allow collective self-defence in the support of the country's allies. However, Japan's actions influence US policies in the region too. Japan and the US have a long-standing alliance since 1952 in the form of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. President Donald J. Trump's controversial statements about Japan and East Asian affairs during his election campaign¹ also make the question of American security policies in Asia very important today.

The topic of Japanese re-armament and US policies in Japan is also important from a wider historical perspective. The late 1940's saw significant changes in the Soviet-US relations as the wartime partners moved towards more hostile relations culminating in the start of the Cold War and the threat of Third World War. These changes also greatly affected Japan and influenced American conception of the world during the Cold War. Earlier aims towards disarmed, pacifist Japan were replaced with the idea of Japan allied to the US and capable of defending itself. Purges of Japanese military class originally initiated after the surrender were also reversed in many cases. At the same time, the Japanese armament industries, initially planned to be destroyed, were again put to produce military equipment for both American and Japanese armed forces.

Handling of military occupations and nation-building in the crossfires of geopolitics, idealism and domestic pressures has also been an issue which has stayed relevant to this day. While the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) handled most day-to-day

¹ Donald Trump implied during his electoral campaign that Japan and South Korea acquiring nuclear weaponry might benefit the United States. He also suggested that the US should pull out its troops from the region. "Japan and South Korea hit back at Trump's nuclear comments". March 31, 2016. CNN. <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/politics/trump-view-from-south-korea-japan/> (Read November 26, 2016)

issues in Japan during the occupation, other Allied organizations were a part of occupation machinery in the country too. Far Eastern Commission (FEC), the topic of this study, was one of these. Occupations are often, at least nominally, multinational affairs. Occupation diplomacy between occupying powers might have wider regional ramifications and global events might also influence the occupation itself. Studying the FEC may also help us to understand the dynamics of modern day multinational aspects of occupations, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The aim of my paper is to study the attitudes of the American actors, mainly U.S. Department of State (DoS), regarding the Far Eastern Commission and the Japanese re-armament during the American occupation between 1946 and 1951. This period had long-lasting effects not only on Japanese domestic and foreign policies but also the United States' relations with Japan and East Asia generally.

Primary Sources and Methods

My paper is based on qualitative research and belongs to the tradition of diplomatic history. My two primary sources are *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* volumes concerning Japan during the period 1947-1951 and the *Japanese Re-Armament 1947-1952* microfilm collection. *FRUS* collections have been digitalized and are available online. *FRUS* mostly contains documents produced by the higher echelons of American foreign policy establishment in Washington and includes many of the most important documents relating to American foreign policy in the past. However, *FRUS* lacks documents produced by lower level bureaucrats. This means that it gives more attention on policy creation than the actual execution of those policies, which was done at lower levels. It is also left to the reader to evaluate how important any single document in the *FRUS* is. Some important documents might have been also left out due to the declassification laws in the US.² While studying *FRUS*, it is important to keep in mind that

² French 2014b, 29-31

the collection only represent a portion of all documents which have existed. Some documents might have been left out, still be classified or even destroyed.

My second primary source is the *Japanese Re-Armament 1947-1952* microfilm collection. It contains a wider range of documents from media and the US military and government. The collection, compiled by Masuda Hiroshi, has also some limitations concerning its width. It is Masuda who has chosen which documents to be included in the microfilm collection but also the ones to be left out. THOMAS FRENCH has also noted that the collection seems to be missing some important papers related to the NPR (National Police Reserve).³ Considering the topic of this paper, this might imply some limitations of this particular primary source when it comes its usage in this work.

It is worth pointing out that both of the collections include papers which were produced by Americans to be read by other Americans, all of who were involved in the US government. These documents were only meant for a particular target audience, not for public consumption. Documents usually mention who received them. This means that different US actors had more freedom to disagree with each other than they would have had otherwise.

Research Literature

While there are many studies of the occupation of Japan and post-war US-Japanese relations in English, the FEC hasn't been at focus in these. Usually the question of FEC's role has been seen as a part of some larger issue, but it has not been a great topic of interest among scholars. Generally, although the existence of the FEC has been recognized, most scholars have not taken it as their main interest and it has been seen usually as an organization of relatively little importance. Consequently, while the re-armament of Japan is a well-studied topic, it has rarely been touched in the context of American relations with the FEC. Usually the main interest has been either in the wider American Cold War strategy in East Asia or Japanese-American relations generally.

³ French 2014b, 34.

Much of the research done on the occupation of Japan is usually based on American sources like Foreign Relations of United States collections though papers from the British Foreign Office have been also used by many scholars. While Japanese sources have been used in research by many scholars, the reluctance of Japanese government to declassify old government documents has limited the number of available sources. Regarding the period discussed in this study, the American Occupation of Japan, this situation is better than for latter years when the occupation had already ended⁴. Memoirs written by people involved in the Occupation and political decision-making, both American and Japanese, are also frequently cited in research literature.

Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy by TAKEMAE EIJI is a comprehensive look at different aspects of American Occupation machinery in Japan. Besides other issues, Takemae also shortly discusses the role of the FEC during the occupation. Takemae argues that while the FEC wasn't voiceless and was able to contribute the creation of new occupation policies through its policy decisions, it mostly took a minor role during the Occupation. The FEC nevertheless developed into an arena which other Allied powers used to criticize the actions of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers and the leader of occupation. According to Takemae, this was mostly due to the fact that the US, with its right to issue interim directives, could override other FEC members, even if the USSR, the UK and China had also a veto rights in the commission. In addition, the commission's efficiency was severely limited by its location in Washington D.C., far away from Japan. Its dependence on US government funding and its late creation in early 1946 also weakened its efficiency. By 1946 the occupation machinery had already established itself in Japan and was already handling reforms itself limiting the role the FEC could take. The United States was also slow to inform the FEC about the SCAP's decisions leading to situations where the FEC often made decisions on matters already decided in Japan. Takemae argues that these issues meant that the commission's role shrank as the occupation progressed and by 1949 it had only a minor role to play in the occupation.⁵ Regarding the NPR, Takemae maintains that it was "an undercover army intended to serve as the

⁴ French 2014b, 28; Swenson-Wright 2005, 11-12.

⁵ Takemae 2002, 98-99.

core of the future fully equipped national military force.” Takemae sees the creation of NPR to be tightly tied to the United States’ security policies.⁶

French in his book *National Police Reserve: The Origin of Japan's Self Defense Forces* argues that the nature of NPR has been misunderstood in previous research. French criticizes much of the earlier research done on the NPR and its successors National Safety Force and Self-Defence Forces. French’s critique centres on claims that these organizations have represented “armies in disguise” by pointing out that much of these arguments are based on the scant amount of evidence. He specifically mentions Frank Kowalski’s memoirs influencing much of the thinking about the NPR.⁷

French also criticizes other historians by claiming that their works have often lacked precise definitions of terms they have been using, like the definition of the army. Instead of characterizing the NPR as the army, French argues that it represented a constabulary, “a paramilitary police occupying a middle tier between the civil police and an external security force (usually an army), tasked with an internal security mission confined to the territory of the state it serves and characterized by close and personnel transfers with the civil police, a membership subject to civil and not military law, equipped with light weapons and in possession of a number of clearly police-type characteristics, often including arrest powers”, as he defines it.⁸ According to French, the creation of NPR was more due to internal factors in Japan, mainly the threat posed by the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), than any external threat⁹. Noteworthy, French doesn’t discuss the FEC and its policy decisions’ role in the American thinking at the period.

CATHERINE R. EDWARDS’s dissertation *U.S. Policy towards Japan, 1945-1951: Rejection of Revolution* is a wide-ranging look at policies and attitudes of different American actors towards the occupation of Japan and the post-war reform program in the country. However, it was written back already in the late 1970’s. This means that the number of sources available for her might have been more limited compared to more recent scholarship on the occupation. While describing both the FEC and Allied Council for

⁶ Takemae 2002, 487-490.

⁷ French 2014b, 36.

⁸ French 2014b, 35-38.

⁹ French 2014b, 75-76.

Japan (ACJ) as “rubber stamps” and pointing out how MacArthur was able by-pass them, she nevertheless seems to take somewhat more positive view than Takemae towards the two organizations. Edwards argues that the FEC, alongside the ACJ, could have taken a more important role in the occupation than they actually did based on their Terms of References¹⁰.

Edwards also argues that the re-armament differed from other reversals of earlier occupation policies and was seen separate from earlier reversals in occupation policies. She also points out that re-armament started to become the focus of American policies only in 1950, while in other areas of reform this reversal had happened already 1947 and 1948. In addition, unlike with earlier reversals, this change had nothing to do with economy.¹¹

MICHAEL SCHALLER discusses the US-Japanese relations from a wide perspective from the end of Second World War until the 1990's in his work *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation*. Schaller ties the creation of NPR to changing American security policies in Asia caused by the start of Korean War¹². However, besides some references to Australian anger at the idea of rearmed Japan¹³ and how these fears influenced the decision to establish the ANZUS defence pact between the US, Australia and New Zealand¹⁴, he does not go in-depth when it comes to US foreign relations in the context of re-armament issue. Subsequently, Schaller doesn't discuss the FEC and its role in Japan.

Like Schaller, JOHN SWENSON-WRIGHT does not discuss the role of FEC in the Japanese re-armament in his work *Unequal Allies? : United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan 1945-1960*. Similarly to Schaller, he sees the creation of NPR as an American answer to the Korean War but also, while not going as far as French, recognizes the American worry about the capabilities of Japanese government to ensure the internal stability in the country.¹⁵ He also notes that the US State Department

¹⁰ Edwards 1977, 34.

¹¹ Edwards 1977, 212-213.

¹² Schaller 1997, 31-32.

¹³ Schaller 1997, 33

¹⁴ Schaller 1997, 37.

¹⁵ Swenson-Wright 2005, 43-44.

recognized the fact at the time that the re-armament policies went against decisions reached at the FEC, even though he does not discuss this topic in-depth¹⁶.

Taken all this together, we can make some general conclusions about the current research about the FEC and re-armament. While there has been much writing about the re-armament and its relationship with American and Japanese security policies, both external and internal, discussions about the role of FEC in this process have been lacking. When the topic has been touched upon, it has been usually done in the context of American occupation itself without the wider discussion about its importance to American foreign policy. There seems to be also a lack of attention towards the way how the FEC influenced the handling of re-armament in practice. The role of Japanese re-armament in relations between the US and its Allies might also need more research.

Research Question

The aim of this paper is to study views and opinions expressed by the American State Department officials concerning the FEC in the context of Japanese re-armament during the commission's existence between 1946 and 1951. My particular interest is to study potential changes in views on the FEC expressed by State Department Officials during this period and find potential reasons why these changes happened. This includes also the State Department relations with other American actors, departments and agencies and how and why the DoS's policies differed from those. I will also attempt to tie all these findings to a wider US foreign and security policies during the period under the study and see how they influenced each other.

The ACJ will not be a focus of this study although it was an organization closely linked to the FEC. I will also limit my research on the US side of the FEC and re-armament issues. Thus, other FEC nations' perspectives on these issues will be discussed only in the context of US views. Opinions of other American actors besides the State Department, like those of US armed forces or SCAP personnel, towards the FEC, are left out of this

¹⁶ Swenson-Wright 2005, 58.

study except in cases where they directly relate to the main topic and can be shown to have influenced thinking inside the DoS.

I will continue to use the term re-armament for the purposes of this study, even if there exists some criticism among recent scholarship towards the term “re-armament” when discussing the developments which led to the creation of National Police Reserve in 1950. This study is not meant to probe the question did the NPR represent the rearming of Japan but how the State Department viewed the FEC’s views on the re-armament. To put it simply, this study does not concentrate on the issue how the State Department viewed the NPR or its future. Instead it focuses on how the Department saw the creation of NPR to relate policy decisions made in the FEC regarding the disarmament and how this was seen to influence relations between the US and FEC.

When discussing the re-armament, I will also include issues like the establishment of Maritime Safety Agency and the de-purging of former Imperial Army officers under the umbrella of that term. I believe this definition to be proper as the de-purge and the establishment of Maritime Safety Agency are often seen closely linked in research literature and discussed under the terms of de-militarization and re-armament. I will also briefly discuss the constitutional reform in Japan. The constitutional reform to a large extent guided the way how Japanese security policies could be handled and what limits there existed for re-armament. However, the recreation of Japanese armament industries will be left out of this study.

The first chapter of this work will discuss the first years of FEC’s existence between 1946 and 1948. During this period the US was still, to a large extent committed to the disarmament of Japan and the Cold War wasn’t yet fully extended to East Asia. I will nevertheless show that the picture was actually murkier and there were already diverse views regarding both the disarmament and the FEC. The second chapter will discuss the period between 1949 and 1951. This chapter describes the period when the American position regarding the Japanese re-armament experienced a full reverse. It also shows how the US policies regarding the FEC were increasingly combined with the Cold War competition and American foreign relations with its Allies, the culmination of developments described already in the first chapter.

Historical Background

The Second World War ended in September 1945 when Japan officially surrendered to the Allied powers. Just like in Germany, the Allies had decided to occupy Japan in order to reform its society and prevent it from becoming a renewed threat to world peace. However, unlike in Germany, it was decided that in Japan the government machinery should continue to exist and the occupation officials would rule Japan through the existing Japanese bureaucracy.

General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), led the Occupation of Japan. His status was so high that the SCAP was used interchangeably to describe both MacArthur and the occupation government itself.¹⁷ Officially MacArthur represented all Allied nations in his role as the Supreme Commander but in reality the occupation was run almost solely by Americans.¹⁸ While Americans were willing to discuss issues relating to the occupation, they wanted to retain the final say on policies implemented.¹⁹

The SCAP and its personnel saw their role as reformers of the Japanese society which was to be demilitarized and democratized. New Deal policies influenced many reformers who saw the occupation as an opportunity to transform Japan to something new inspired by advances in modern social sciences. However, many reformers looked at problems involved in the occupation from a very America-centric point of view without deep understanding of Japan or its culture.²⁰ MacArthur shared these same goals.²¹

The SCAP had two different guidelines to follow when it came to the demilitarization of Japan. The first document was the Potsdam Declaration.²² The Potsdam Declaration

¹⁷ Swenson-Wright 2004, 25.

¹⁸ Bailey, J. Paul 1996, 28.

¹⁹ Blakeslee 1951, 499.

²⁰ Swenson-Wright 2004, 26-27.

²¹ MacArthur described his aims as thus: "First, destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build the structure of representative government. Modernise the constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise the women. Release the political prisoners. Liberate farmers. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression. Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalise education. Decentralize political power. Separate the church from the state." Takemae 2002, 54.

²² Edwards 1977, 22.

maintained the earlier demand for the unconditional surrender of Japan as proclaimed in the Cairo Conference in 1943²³ but went further when it came to practicalities of such an action.²⁴ Besides political demands and territorial changes, the declaration called for the disarmament of Japan and removal of those people who had led Japan to war.²⁵

The second document, *U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy*, recognized Japan as the main threat to the peace in Far East and Japan's military as an obstacle to peaceful relations between Japan and its Asian neighbors²⁶. The goal of Initial Policy was the "disarmament and demilitarization of Japan including the authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism." Thus, Japan would not have any military forces in future. This was recognized as a primary aim of the occupation.²⁷ While the occupation was described as an allied project, the US' decisions would be decisive in the event of conflicting opinions.²⁸ *The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the SCAP for the Occupation and Control of Japan* issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) supplanted the earlier Policy in November 1945.²⁹

While the United States wanted to keep the occupation of Japan under its own control, it did wish to consult its Allies about occupation policies. This led to the creation of Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) which would take other Allied nations as its members. As the FEAC's name implies, it was meant as an advisory body for nations participating in it. The FEAC's offices were to be located in Washington D.C. It would continue to exist until any of the major four Allies would ask for its termination. The FEAC's task was to be the creation of policies which would ensure the accomplishment of the Japanese terms of surrender. Countries which the United States invited to the FEAC were the Soviet Union, China and the United Kingdom, three major powers which

²³ China, the United Kingdom and the United States attended the Cairo Conference in November 1943. The nations agreed to demand the unconditional surrender of Japan during the conference. Edwards 1977, 12.

²⁴ Edwards 1977, 12.

²⁵ Edwards 1977, 23.

²⁶ Swenson-Wright 2005, 25.

²⁷ Edwards 1977, 25.

²⁸ "Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies to establish policies for the conduct of occupation and control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied Powers, in the event of any differences in opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern." Blakeslee 1951, 500.

²⁹ Edwards 1977, 38.

had fought against Japan. The United States also proposed that France, the Philippines, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and New Zealand should be also invited to join the FEAC. China, the UK and the USSR soon signaled their willingness to join the FEAC after the United States submitted its plans on August 21, 1945.³⁰

The dissatisfaction towards the FEAC started to grow very soon among other Allied nations. The United Kingdom demanded other Allied nations should have a larger role in the occupation of Japan and supported the creation of Allied Control Council in Tokyo.³¹ The Soviets also criticized the FEAC's limited role in recommending policies. They felt that their representative in Tokyo was kept out of the policy-making. Even though the Soviet Union did not deny the leading position of the United States in the occupation of Japan, it did nevertheless wanted to have a larger role in the process. Soviet foreign minister Molotov brought up the Soviet views on the issue during the meeting of Allied foreign ministers in London in September 1945. Instead of the current model of Allied cooperation in Japan, the Soviet Union wanted to create a control commission in Tokyo where all four major Allied nations could involve themselves in crafting occupation policies in equal terms. Backtracking from its previous stance, the Soviet Union said it would agree to the creation of FEAC only after the creation of control commission. American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes however disagreed with this view, pointing out that all four major Allied powers had already agreed to establish the FEAC. It would be up to the FEAC itself to decide the need for the control commission.³² During following months in October and November the Soviets and the United States continued their negotiations concerning the FEAC and the control commission. Eventually they agreed to the creation of ACJ, which would be located in Tokyo, and Far Eastern Commission, which would supplant the FEAC.³³ It should be noted that the FEAC had already started its activities in October 1945 but without the Soviet participation.³⁴

Secretary Byrnes brought American plans for the FEAC and the ACJ to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December 1945. More negotiations followed as the

³⁰ Blakeslee 1951, 499-500.

³¹ Takemae 2002, 97.

³² Blakeslee 1951, 501-502.

³³ Blakeslee 1951, 510.

³⁴ Stratton 1948, 3.

Soviet Union continued to criticize the United States' dominant position in Japan and wanted the ACJ to have a larger role in handling the occupation. After few days of negotiations, the Soviet Union accepted American drafts.³⁵ This agreement was initially negotiated between the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. China joined it later. These four nations had a veto over all decisions made in the commission.³⁶ The FEC had its first meeting on February 26, 1946.³⁷

Many people in the State Department, Byrnes included, hoped that war-time cooperation between Allied powers would continue even during the post-war era.³⁸ Byrnes also thought that by placating Soviets in Japan, they might be more agreeable in the ongoing treaty negotiations about Italy.³⁹ The ACJ was to advise and consult the SCAP in issues concerning the Terms of Surrender and the occupation of Japan but did not have any executive powers. Its members were the US, the Soviet Union, China and the Commonwealth. The ACJ was led by the Supreme Commander or his representative, who acted as its chairman.⁴⁰

The FEC had impressive powers on the paper. The SCAP had to consult with The FEC before enacting significant changes in the Japanese government, constitution or the regime of control⁴¹. It would also solve disputes between the SCAP and the ACJ.⁴² However, MacArthur still had a right to issue interim directives in urgent matters which the FEC's previous decisions didn't cover.⁴³ President Harry S. Truman also disliked the deal because Byrnes had not informed him enough about negotiations. MacArthur was also angry as he felt that the FEC would lessen his power in Japan.⁴⁴

³⁵ Blakeslee 1951, 511-513.

³⁶ Stratton 1948, 1.

³⁷ Takemae 2002, 97.

³⁸ Edwards 1977, 33-34.

³⁹ Edwards 1977 32.

⁴⁰ Stratton 1948, 3-4.

⁴¹ Edwards 1977, 31-32.

⁴² Edwards 1977, 33.

⁴³ Edwards 1977, 31-32.

⁴⁴ Edwards 1977, 34.

1. FEC, Disarmament and Growing Skepticism 1946-1948

The aim of this first chapter is to study the views of the United States concerning the Far Eastern Commission and the Japanese re-militarization before the actual re-militarization started. I believe that to understand changes in American and Japanese security policies that happened after 1948, we must first understand American thinking before this large change towards re-armament. Although military issues were not the focus of American policies in Japan during this period, we can still find the basic thinking which guided American strategy and changes it experienced.

During these first few post-war years, the focus of American foreign policy establishment was mainly concentrated on Europe, Middle East, and China. Japan rarely commanded the attention of American leadership.⁴⁵

Two documents which to the greatest extent guided American occupation policies were the Potsdam Declaration and the *U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan*.⁴⁶ In the Potsdam Declaration, the fourth term specifically described demilitarization aims in Japan: "The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes"⁴⁷. *The Initial Post-Surrender Policy* also mentioned the aim to ensure that "Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or the peace and security of the world" and adds to that "the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan including the elimination of the authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism"⁴⁸.

Edwards has claimed that there existed an underlying tension between two aims of the American occupation of Japan, democratization, and demilitarization.⁴⁹ Both the

⁴⁵ Schaller 1997, 7.

⁴⁶ Edwards 1977, 22. Takemae recognizes that there was the third main document, the United States' *Army's Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper*, adopted on November 3, 1945, which also guided occupation policies addition to the *US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* and the *Potsdam Declaration*. The *Basic Directive* however concentrated more on practical issues related to the military governance than ideological principles, unlike the other two documents. Takemae 2002, 227.

⁴⁷ Edwards 1977, 22.

⁴⁸ Edwards 1977, 25.

⁴⁹ Edwards 1977, 29.

Potsdam Declaration and the Initial Policy shared the view that democratization itself was the factor which would remove Japan as a military threat.⁵⁰

Already by early 1946 it was clear to some people that the FEC would not probably achieve aims that some of its participants had hoped for. While the USSR was mostly happy with the arrangement, the UK was not very satisfied with the FEC, even if publicly the US promoted the role of UK and Australia in the creation of the commission.⁵¹

1.1. The United States, the FEC and the Japanese Disarmament

One of the first actions of the newly organized FEC was its five-week trip to Japan between December 26, 1945 and February 13, 1946. The aim of this trip was to make FEC members familiar with Japan and the current situation in the country. This travel also allowed them to have direct discussions with the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, General MacArthur, his staff, and the Japanese themselves.⁵² Although the trip itself was the FEC's internal affair, the fact that delegates wrote reports about their findings to the Secretary of State makes it worth looking at.

The Chairman and the American delegate to the FEC, General Frank McCoy, reported findings made by American FEC members to the Secretary of State Byrnes after the trip. McCoy believed that the trip had strengthened relationship between the FEC and SCAP and had healed earlier distrust between organizations. He also had a generally high opinion regarding the FEC, the view he felt also FEC's foreign delegates shared. When McCoy described future challenges the SCAP will face, he did not mention the demilitarization of Japan or other related issues. Instead McCoy mentioned reparations, export-import program, and the status of Emperor as areas needing attention in future. He added that the FEC should concentrate on issues where there already exist well-defined and practiced policies.⁵³ McCoy probably felt that the disarmament of Japan

⁵⁰ Edwards 1977, 27.

⁵¹ Buckley 1982, 52.

⁵² Report by Dr. George E. Blakeslee on the Far Eastern Commission's Trip to Japan, December 26, 1945-February 13, 1946. FRUS 1946, VIII 163.

⁵³ Memorandum by the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Secretary of State, March 4, 1946. FRUS 1946, VIII 159-160.

belongs to the group of policies like the Potsdam Declaration and *The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the SCAP for the Occupation and Control of Japan* which already guided the SCAP in that policy area.

The focus of FEC's American delegates reports from Japan was wide-ranging covering many topics and militarism was discussed too. Colonel C. Stanton Babcock interviewed many Japanese and Americans. According to Babcock, none of them were a part the leading classes. The Japanese whom he had talked with generally did not see militarism itself a cause of Japan's problems. Instead they blamed the "oligarchic system" itself which had enabled the rise of militarism. Former Japanese soldiers nevertheless appreciated the fact that the armed forces seemed to care about poorer classes in the country, even if they disagreed with the decision to go to war. Among officers Babcock interviewed, there did not exist any quilt over the war or feeling it had been a mistake. They had thought the war was the only available option open to Japan.⁵⁴

Dr. George E. Blakeslee, one of the FEC delegates in Japan, claimed in his report that the anger the Japanese had felt towards the Allied powers had been completely turned towards their former military leaders. He also thought the occupation had been success as the Japanese armed forced had been demobilized and disarmed, its equipment destroyed. The power nationalists and militarists held had been destroyed. Even though Blakeslee saw Japanese far right as an unlikely threat, he thought that the far left might form a risk in future.⁵⁵

While the exact opinion in the State Department regarding issues pointed out in the report can not be inferred, the Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented that the report was "most interesting"⁵⁶. Thus, we can surmise at least that the report unlikely went heavily against the consensus in the State Department at the time. It is also worth noting that findings of these reports regarding militarism in Japan were in line with the contents of the Potsdam Declaration and the U.S. Initial Policy in Japan.

⁵⁴ Memorandum by Colonel C. Stanton Babcock to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (McCoy), February 7, 1946. FRUS 1946, VIII 160-162.

⁵⁵ Report by Dr. George E. Blakeslee on the Far Eastern Commission's Trip to Japan, December 26, 1945 February 13, 1946. FRUS 1946, VIII 164-168.

⁵⁶ Memorandum by the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Secretary of State, March 4, 1946. FRUS 1946, VIII 159.

While the FEC's delegation was returning from Japan and its findings were studied, other issues related to the commission's work were also discussed in Washington. Soviet chargé d'affaires Novikov met Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in Washington D.C. on March 1, 1946. Besides the Soviet proposal for the Soviet Vice Chairman in the Far Eastern Commission, Novikov also brought up the issue of the Committee No. 4 of the Far Eastern Commission which dealt with issues related to the demilitarization of Japan according to the memorandum. Novikov said the Soviet Union hoped to have a Soviet representative in the Committee. Admitting he had not talked with McCoy about this issue, he nevertheless hoped to inform the Secretary in advance about this. Replying to Novikov, Byrnes claimed that he had no previous knowledge of these committees or even how many of them were in existence. He also claimed this was the first time he had been asked to decide something concerning the FEC since its establishment and would have to hold discussions with the commission members and McCoy before he could say anything. Similarly to his recommendation concerning a potential Soviet vice-chair in the commission, he recommended Novikov to talk with McCoy, "a very agreeable gentleman", about the issue. Byrnes emphasized the independent role of the commission and its American delegate, whom he could not force to do something. He nevertheless promised to talk with McCoy and said that Novikov could meet the chairman later.⁵⁷

Some of these Byrnes's claims come to a different light when they are compared to comments made few days later by George Blakeslee in his memorandum to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs John Carter Vincent. Blakeslee seems to be familiar with the discussion between Byrnes and Novikov that he shortly described. Blakeslee wrote that Byrnes had disagreed with Soviet proposals and asked McCoy to act accordingly. He specifically mentioned that Byrnes had opposed the name Novikov had suggested for the Committee No. 4, "The Strengthening of Democratic Processes." Byrnes had disagreed with this name at the current stage.⁵⁸ This issue had not been

⁵⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, March 1, 1946. FRUS 1946, Volume VIII 156-158.

⁵⁸ Memorandum of Conversation by Dr. George Blakeslee, of the American Delegation to the Far Eastern Commission, to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent). FRUS May 5, 1946, Volume VIII 168-169.

mentioned in the memorandum written by Byrnes⁵⁹ and the exact reason why he opposed this name change is unclear. In addition, it is worth noting that unlike Byrnes wrote in his memorandum, the Fourth Committee did not actually handle demilitarization affairs but those tasks belonged to the Seventh Committee⁶⁰. Nevertheless, even with the confusion concerning the function of Fourth Committee, Byrnes seems to have misled Novikov when it came to the extent of his knowledge concerning workings of FEC or his influence on its chairman, McCoy.

The mindset of occupation authorities should be kept in mind here. Americans in Japan often considered democratization and demilitarization as a part of same process.⁶¹ The removal of harmful influences of Japanese military was seen as an integral part of efforts to create a new political system in the country.⁶²

Byrnes's attitude towards Novikov's suggestions reflect changes in the American public opinion about the US-Soviet cooperation. According to opinion polls, 54% of Americans had supported continuing cooperation with the USSR at the end of the war. By October 1945 the number had already dropped to 44% and in February 1946 it was only 35%.⁶³ Although the question how much these changes were due to US public opinion following official foreign policy or foreign policy following public opinion is out of the scope of this study, we can nevertheless recognize that Byrnes's hardening attitude towards the USSR in the FEC was a part of greater trend both among the American public and their policymakers. American diplomat George F. Kennan had suspected already during the Moscow negotiations in December 1945 thought Byrnes's main concern was the domestic public opinion⁶⁴.

February 1946 was also the time for other great change in American foreign policy caused by George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" which advocated the use of containment against the spread of Soviet influence. However, at this stage the US-Soviet competition was not seen yet in terms of military but economic and political competition. While

⁵⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, March 1, 1946. FRUS 1946, Volume VIII 156-158.

⁶⁰ Takemae 2002, 98.

⁶¹ Averill 2013, 157, 159.

⁶² Averill 2013, 158.

⁶³ Oinas-Kukkonen 2003, 61.

⁶⁴ Kennan 1967, 287-288.

there were also some Americans who thought Japan as a potential great ally to the United States, generally Japan did not get much attention and was not necessarily even seen to be a part of the grander competition between great powers.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, it is possible that this beginning shift in American foreign policy would have made Byrnes more skeptical towards Novikov's proposals.

While the FEC has been established to support continuing East-West cooperation, it was already experiencing somewhat a rocky start as suspicions between the US and the Soviet Union were increasing. However, when it came to the demilitarization of Japan, this was yet less an issue at this stage and the United States still supported policies towards the goal of totally disarmed Japan.

1.2. 1947: Moves towards Re-armament, Passivity in the FEC

By 1947 relations between the USSR and the US had become gradually worse. By this time the US government had come to a conclusion that only by getting its former enemies, Germany and Japan, back to their feet, could containment policies against the USSR succeed. Discussions still concentrated mostly on economic issues though.⁶⁶ Among those few who emphasized Japan's role in the United States' new foreign policy towards the USSR was General Charles Willoughby from the SCAP's G-2 intelligence section.⁶⁷ Truman eventually articulated his views in his speech to the Congress in March 12, 1947. Principles Truman presented became known as the Truman Doctrine. Truman attacked Moscow in his speech and argued that the USSR presents a danger for all free nations.

George Kennan, a long-time American diplomat, warned in the government's internal discussions about economic policies implement by MacArthur in Japan. According to Kennan, these reforms had made Japan vulnerable to the Communists.⁶⁸ Kennan held an opinion that Japan was one of the five regions in the world holding a potential to

⁶⁵ Swenson-Wright 2005, 28.

⁶⁶ Schaller 1997, 12-13.

⁶⁷ Swenson-Wright 28, 2005

⁶⁸ Schaller 1997, 14.

create a large military power, others being the United States, the United Kingdom, the Rhine Valley and the Soviet Union. In Kennan's opinion, the priority of the United States policy should be to prevent the USSR from capturing any of these areas it did not already hold.⁶⁹ Kennan thought that Japan and Western Germany especially, "two greatest industrial complexes of East and West", should be the main of focus of the United States in order to prevent great shifts in the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ It should be noted however that Kennan held somewhat critical views towards the Truman Doctrine, which he saw too doctrinal and committal to the United States.⁷¹

Kennan, who at the time was working as the director of Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and was formulating the United States' new Japan policy, disagreed with the earlier views that China should be at the centre of American efforts in East Asia. In Kennan's opinion, China was weak in both economic and military terms⁷². In addition, even in the event of Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, the country's nationalist tendencies would make a lasting Sino-Soviet Alliance an unlikely prospect. Japan on the other hand had greater strategic importance to the United States. In Kennan's view, Japan was under a threat of internal Communist subversion. However, he did not see Japan threatened externally to the same extent.⁷³ He noted however that considering the existence of Communist North Korea and the Soviet annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles, the disarmed Japan would be in a very threatened position. In Kennan's opinion, the issue of Japanese defence had not been considered to the extent it should have been.⁷⁴ Kennan had also voiced his opinion that Japan with the Philippines should be a part of

⁶⁹ Kennan 1967, 359

⁷⁰ Kennan 1967, 368

⁷¹ Kennan 1967, 319-321.

⁷² Kennan had already presented his views about China in his lecture at the National War College earlier in 1947. Commenting on the Truman doctrine and aid to Greece, he mentioned three points which had supported the U.S. decision to assist the country. These were: American capability to influence the result of the conflict, a lack of American aid possibly causing a result benefitting America's enemies and wider negative geopolitical repercussions caused by American non-involvement. Mentioning China, he found it unlikely that any of these points were true regarding China, especially the first one. Kennan 1967, 320.

⁷³ Swenson-Wright 2004, 29-20.

⁷⁴ Kennan 1967, 376

American security system in Western Pacific before he travelled to Japan in February 1948.⁷⁵

Edwards has noted that the United States' Reverse Course in Japan after 1947 did not actually affect demilitarization policies as the focus of the reversal was in other areas. MacArthur also opposed moves towards re-arming Japan even though there were some Americans who would have liked to see re-militarized Japan. The change concerning the fundamental security policies of Japan happened only later.⁷⁶ Secretary Byrnes still supported a 40-year disarmament agreement with Japan in June 1947 to be concluded in the peace conference.⁷⁷ Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall also said in the same year that the demilitarization of Japan was the right course of action for the United States.⁷⁸

Edwards has also argued that Japan did not really become a part of Cold War strategy of the United States during the Reverse Course, but only later.⁷⁹ During this period the United States even lacked a clear Asian strategy which was only crystallized after the Korean War started.⁸⁰ In contrast to this, Takemae claims realpolitik already was affecting American thinking on Japan, even if only subtly, from the start of the occupation. Takemae argues the United States wanted to keep other nations out of the country it saw as its own area of interest in East Asia.⁸¹

It is worth noting that there exist some level of controversy regarding the concept of "Reverse Course", like its exact starting time or even its actual existence. Schaller has claimed it was only in the latter half of 1948 that the reverse course became fully an official policy of United States⁸². In contrary to this, French has argued that the current historiography has continually de-emphasized the concept of "Reverse Course" during

⁷⁵ Kennan 1967, 381.

⁷⁶ Edwards 1977, 212.

⁷⁷ Edwards 1977, 331.

⁷⁸ Edwards 1977, 334.

⁷⁹ Edwards 1977, 339.

⁸⁰ Edwards 1977, 336.

⁸¹ Takemae 2002, 51.

⁸² Schaller 1997, 17.

last few decades to the extent that the term's adequateness in occupation studies has become questionable.⁸³

1947, the first full year of the FEC's existence, was also the year when the United States policy was starting to experience a shift from the previous emphasis on Allied cooperation towards more aggressive stance towards the USSR. This led people working with Japanese issues in the State Department also take a new look at how affairs with the FEC were handled and suspicions towards the USSR's aims heightened. However, at this stage to a large extent there still existed a consensus towards the eventual aim of de-militarized Japan and this did not yet affect the way how the United States viewed the organization. While other policies in Japan were starting to be re-considered, policies regarding its military stayed the same and the United States policy was in line with the FEC's decisions.

It is worth noting that while there exists many documents concerning the FEC and different aspects of Japanese demilitarization or potential militarization in 1946 and 1948, the year 1947 seems to lack any significant discussions about this topic among sources I have used. While it is likely there are documents from 1947 elsewhere, it nevertheless seems clear that the question of demilitarization or potential re-armament were not the focus of American policymakers during this period.

The FEC continued to act in other areas in 1947 though, and the State Department continued to show interest towards the Committee and its activities. Somewhat related to military issues was the discussion about the Japanese nuclear program. The U.S. government was interested in asking the FEC to allow Japan to have its own atomic program, similar to one Germany was allowed to have. This program would be entirely peaceful and under the SCAP's observation. The Japanese atomic policies would also follow rules set by the United Nations and earlier policies regarding the disarmament of Japan. The United States' earlier policies aiming towards totally removing Japan's capabilities towards atomic research had supposedly caused criticism though the source is unclear by whom.⁸⁴ However, it is clear that the United States did see the sensitivity

⁸³ French 2014b, 12.

⁸⁴ The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) February 4, 1947. FRUS 1947, VI 175-176.

of the issue and recognized the FEC's approval would be probably needed in order to prevent any international controversies. At the same time the fact that Americans were ready to allow such a sensitive research in Japan represented a change in the United States' attitude towards the country.

The United States showed interest also towards other topics discussed in the FEC. For example, there were fishing and whaling issues⁸⁵, better coordination between the SCAP and the FEC⁸⁶ and the status of Japanese property in Switzerland⁸⁷. The FEC also had discussed about the opening of Japanese foreign trade during 1947.⁸⁸ Even though these were important practical issues from the perspective of occupation and the future of Japan, they did not touch more military-oriented areas of occupation policies.

However, there was one decision during this period adopted which related to the disarmament issues in Japan. It was the *US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan*, which was officially adopted by the FEC in June 1947. This was 19 months after the occupation had started.⁸⁹ *Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* was based on the United States' own earlier *US Initial Post Surrender Policy* and had been supported by all 11 countries in the FEC.⁹⁰ This shows that the United States and the FEC to large extent still shared the same view about the disarmament of Japan at this point.

The silence seems to start in September 1946 after the article 9 of the Japanese constitution was discussed in the FEC and re-started after the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs John Allison had criticized the Army's comments on Kennan's report in May 1948⁹¹. It is possible that by late 1946 policies regarding Japanese

⁸⁵ For example, see The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, March 20, 1947. FRUS 1947, VI 190-191; Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division (Flory) to the Informal Interagency Committee on Japanese Fishing and Marine Industry, February 12, 1947. FRUS 1947, VI 179-182; The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, March 25, 1947. FRUS 1947, VI 195-197.

⁸⁶ For example, see The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen), March 26, 1947. FRUS 1947, VI 197; The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen), March 26, 1947; The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chairman of Far Eastern Commission (McCoy), April 15, 1947. FRUS 1947, VI 202-203.

⁸⁷ For example, see The Department of State to the Swiss Legation, May 2, 1947. FRUS 1947, VI 208-209.

⁸⁸ International Organization 1948, 395-396

⁸⁹ Takemae 2002, 99.

⁹⁰ Takemae 2002, 234.

⁹¹ Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), May 19, 1948. FRUS 1948, VI 762-763.

disarmament were yet relatively unquestioned so there was no significant need to discuss the topic yet. On the other hand, by 1948 the United States was re-evaluating its policies regarding Japan, and this also influenced the way how earlier de-militarization policies were seen. Kennan's report seems to have played a role in this process. The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs William Walton Butterworth actually cited Kennan's report as the reason why the United States is re-evaluating its earlier policies and has delayed the creation of new policy decisions in the FEC⁹².

It seems that the United States policy in Japan regarding the Japanese re-armament or disarmament was still more or less isolated from the wider Cold War at this stage. This supports observations made by other scholars, who have written that Japan was still seen separately from other Cold War Conflicts at the time. We can thus confirm that this was also the case when it came to the US-FEC relations over the question of Japanese disarmament. However, it is important to note that there were developments and personalities, who worked to move Japan to the direction they desired, elsewhere at the time.

1.3. The State Department's Skepticism towards the FEC's decisions

Japanese Foreign Minister Ashida Hiroshi created between 1947-1948 three so-called "Ashida Memoranda", which discussed the peace treaty and security issues in Japan. Although the SCAP had forbidden any direct diplomacy between Tokyo and Washington, Ashida hoped to circumvent this. George Atchenson Jr., the State Department Advisor to SCAP, was the first to receive the memorandum from Ashida on 26 July, 1947. He was followed by General Whitney, a close confidant of MacArthur and head of SCAP Government Section, few days later. Even though the memorandum discussed Japanese views toward the eventual peace treaty, it was also mentioned that "in the event of the withdrawal of occupation forces from Japan following the peace treaty, the Japanese government should be permitted to have adequate police forces at its disposal to ensure law and order." Significantly, Ashida had dropped from this paper the Japanese

⁹² General McCoy's Visit, May 26, 1948. Rearmament of Japan. Part 1. 1947-1952. 2-B 110.

government's earlier demand for the Japanese army. Ashida suggested in memorandum that the Japanese could handle domestic security by themselves while the external security would be the responsibility of United Nations. However, both Atchenson and Whitney returned their copies by claiming the time was not right for the discussion yet. Atchenson might have been carrying a copy of memorandum when he was returning to Washington few weeks later, but his plane crashed killing Atchenson.⁹³

The second memorandum was prepared in September 1947 for General Eichelberger. The memorandum emphasized the Japanese willingness to handle its own internal security. Unlike Ashida's first memorandum, the second memorandum made it to Washington. It did not receive the response the Japanese had hoped however. Many American diplomats, among them Kennan and Atcheson, felt that an early peace treaty with Japan without the USSR might jeopardize attempts toward a general security agreement with the Soviet Union. Ashida tried to give the memorandum to William Sebald, the acting political adviser in Japan, but Sebald also claimed the time was not yet ripe for the peace treaty. The third memorandum was sent to Washington with Eichelberger in 1948. Eichelberger gave many speeches where he spoke for the re-armament of Japan while in the US.⁹⁴

There exists some debate on the importance of Ashida memoranda. Some scholars think they influenced the DoS thinking while others think there was no direct link between memoranda and later changes in American security policies in Japan.⁹⁵ It should be noted that memoranda in question were not referred in source documents when discussing the FEC.

General McCoy had met the Secretary of State on May 18, 1948, and left him a memorandum describing his thoughts concerning the Far Eastern Commission and its usefulness to the United States. The Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs John Allison criticized McCoy's views in his memorandum to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs William Walton Butterworth next day. McCoy thought that the FEC was beneficial to American objectives in Japan as the commission had previously supported

⁹³ French 2014b, 66-67.

⁹⁴ French 2014b, 68-70.

⁹⁵ French 2014b, 71.

initiatives made by the US. He mentioned specifically two policy decisions, *Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* and *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment*, as examples illustrating this fact. When there is a time for the eventual peace conference, it would be much easier for the United States to achieve its objectives if the FEC has already confirmed them through the commission's own policy decisions.⁹⁶

Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment was the FEC's policy decision from February 12, 1948. It prevented the Japanese from having weapons and ammunition and forbidden importation or production of these items. It also disallowed the existence of ministry of war.⁹⁷ Only weapons used by the police and hunters were allowed. The production of airplanes and any naval vessels capable of warfare had been also disallowed. All military related organizations or clubs were also banned to prevent the creation of organizations for covert military activities. This included paramilitary organizations or clubs and associations established by former military officers.⁹⁸ The police had been already excluded from the disarmament process by MacArthur in 1945.⁹⁹

Allison strongly disagreed with McCoy's views. The United States will probably want to see changes to earlier policies, like *Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* and *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment*. However, the fact that The FEC has already accepted them will cause the United States problems during negotiations in the peace conference. Allison also said that he views the FEC mostly as a "debating forum" and direct bilateral discussions are probably a better way to maintain relations with other nations in the FEC. Some more minor issues in the FEC the United States could be more cooperative though, as they would not really matter to the United States but would help to improve relations with other nations.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), May 19, 1948. FRUS 1948, VI 762-763.

⁹⁷ International Organization 1949, 180-181.

⁹⁸ International Organization 1948, 394-395

⁹⁹ Aldous 1997, 61.

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), May 19, 1948. FRUS 1948, VI 762-763.

Butterworth seemed to have agreed with Allison's opinion. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State few days later, he said that the continuing occupation in Japan and the delay in the eventual peace treaty has forced the United States to re-evaluate its past policies in Japan and wait until Kennan's report from his recent trip to Japan has been studied in depth. Accordingly, the United States delegate in the FEC had been delaying 11 policy papers under consideration in the State Department. For Butterworth, this could not have been too soon, as the FEC had already agreed on the *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment* earlier. Only the FEC could make a decision to retract from those policies, an unlikely prospect as the Soviet representative would block any move towards that direction with his veto. These decisions have limited armaments the Japanese police forces could have and thus left the country vulnerable to the Communists.¹⁰¹

Butterworth also wrote about McCoy's view that the FEC's had an agreement on *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment* will create goodwill towards the United States and ease American efforts to achieve its aims in the area already covered by the FEC's policy decisions. Using similar language than Allison, Butterworth disagreed with this by pointing out that both of these papers had many parts which the United States would want to change. This meant that opposing these decisions would be very difficult now that they had been already agreed on in the FEC. In the opinion of Butterworth, the SCAP, as "the sole executive authority for Allied powers", should take more forceful approach. It should not let the FEC to micromanage issues from its offices 10,000 miles from Japan in policy areas which are actually under the authority of SCAP.¹⁰²

It is noteworthy that this discussion centered on these two decisions concerning demilitarization made by the FEC even though the commission had been producing many other policies too. Between July 10, 1947 and December 23, 1948, the FEC had accepted 13 new policies. Most of these did not involve military issues in any direct way, except for one policy regarding Japanese industrial war potential.¹⁰³ This tells us there

¹⁰¹ General McCoy's Visit, May 26, 1948. Rearmament of Japan. Part 1. 1947-1952. 2-B 110.

¹⁰² General McCoy's Visit, May 26, 1948. Rearmament of Japan. Part 1. 1947-1952. 2-B 110.

¹⁰³ International Organization 1949, 180-181.

was renewed interest towards military issues in Japan among some people in the State Department. Non-military policies might have been also less controversial in the DoS. At the same time, we can see priorities and aims of the State Department and the FEC moving away from each other. Although the FEC still followed the original planning for post-war Japan, which had envisioned a demilitarized country, the State Department was already more keen to keep its own options open regarding the Japanese military. This does not mean that the re-armed Japan is the Department's goal yet but it shows concerns towards militarily weak Japan.

Allison's and Butterworth's views were similar regarding the FEC, even though the latter went even further in his attacks towards the commission. Both of them viewed *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment* problematic from the point of view of eventual peace negotiations and greatly disagreed with McCoy in this regard. Allison, while belittling the FEC's actual role, at least seems to have seen its importance in the wider network of United States' relations with other countries, compared to Butterworth's disdain. Nevertheless, it is interesting that these two high level officials handling State Department's East Asian affairs shared quite similar view concerning the FEC and its disarmament decisions. This might be a sign that these skeptical views were not uncommon.

It is also easy to understand why Allison would have viewed *Basic Post-Surrender Policy* especially embarrassing from the American point of view. The paper was basically a copy of the paper prepared by Americans themselves. *Basic Post-Surrender Policy* had also formed the foundations of American policies in Japan since the occupation started. Butterworth did not discuss this policy in his memorandum, which is probably due it having been accepted already a year earlier in 1947 while *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment* was more topical at the time of his writing adopted only few months earlier.

The timing of Allison's and Butterworth's discussions were coincidentally at the same time when there were discussions about the Japanese re-armament elsewhere. Secretary of Defence James Forrestal had already asked for a feasibility study concerning the Japanese re-armament in February. Under-Secretary of Army Henry Drapper had also mentioned the idea of small Japanese armed force during his discussions with

MacArthur in March.¹⁰⁴ Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royal had also commented the issue in his recommendations to the Pentagon in May 1948. According to Royal, if regarding purely military factors, Japan having its own military force would benefit the United States due to the manpower shortages the latter was experiencing. He admitted though that the current state of Japanese economy made this unrealistic.¹⁰⁵

George Kennan's report, which Butterworth had referred in his memorandum to the Secretary of State, was also affecting the way the United States saw the situation in Asia. Kennan travelled to Japan in early 1948 to talk with MacArthur. Kennan described the meeting being like negotiations with a "hostile, foreign power." During his trip, Kennan noted the lack of any Japanese defence forces and weakness of the country's police, issues which in his opinion threatened Japan's internal security. After returning to Washington, Kennan wrote a report where he suggested new policies regarding Japan. Besides changes to general occupation policies, he also suggested that the Japanese police should be enlarged and re-armed and a new coast guard should be established. However, he did also emphasized "psychological" factors in his containment policies instead of pure military side of things. The United States could resist the Soviets better in Japan if Japan's nationalism and pride were nurtured and cultural contacts between the US and Japan strengthened. Like Royal, Kennan also recognized the economic weakness of Japan, the effects of anti-zaibatsu policies and war reparations to China and the Philippines had on the Japanese economy.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, Kennan thought Japan should stay de-militarized, even if it should have stronger police force.¹⁰⁷

Kennan's and MacArthur's discussions also touched the role of FEC. MacArthur felt that changes in occupation policies might encounter criticism from the FEC. During the discussion Kennan noted that the monitoring and advising the SCAP about the fulfilment of the terms of Japanese surrender, based on the Potsdam Declaration, was the sole role of the FEC. However, the declaration had concentrated on demilitarization and Japan surrendering some of its areas and both of these objectives had been already achieved.

¹⁰⁴ Takemae 2002, 461-462

¹⁰⁵ Sugita 2013, 90.

¹⁰⁶ Swenson-Wright 2005, 32-34.

¹⁰⁷ Kennan 1967, 396.

Kennan thus argued that the FEC had already fulfilled its role and the SCAP could act freely, as long as the Potsdam Declaration was respected.¹⁰⁸

Kennan's report led eventually to the creation of NSC-13/2 on October 9, 1948. This decision by the National Security Council represented the most significant change in the United States' policies towards Japan since the end of the war.¹⁰⁹ The NSC-13/2 had twenty proposals concerning Japan, covering such topics as war reparations, peace treaty and emphasis on export industries. It proposed the creation 150.000 men police force and ending of purge. It also mentioned that Japan could help the United States militarily, "at least to the extent of Japan's self-defence."¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, American strategy at this point still emphasized the containment of Soviet threat instead of pushing back. The direct military threat by the Soviets was not seen likely. Americans were also unwilling to commit to military alliances at the time.¹¹¹

The United States was also thinking other options to empower the Japanese defence capabilities. One of these was the idea to de-purge former Imperial Army and Navy officers. This plan, called WAR 80453, was created in November 1948. It would have called for de-purging of those who had served in "harmless positions". There would have been the re-examination of those cases where a person had been purged solely based on his position, not his personal actions. In addition there would have been a minimum age for those who are screened for public positions. This age group was suggested to be those who were under 30-years-old during the attack on Pearl Harbor. It would have also de-purged those reserve and navy officers below the rank of colonel and people who had hold positions in governmental organization and businesses. However, the plan would have excluded those who openly advocated expansionism and militarism.¹¹² WAR 80453 had been done in cooperation between the Army and State Departments and, according to Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Johnson writing two

¹⁰⁸ Kennan 1967, 385-386.

¹⁰⁹ Swenson-Wright 2005, 34.

¹¹⁰ Takemae 2002, 468.

¹¹¹ Swenson-Wright 2005, 35.

¹¹² Telegram From the Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur), November 30, 1948. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1048-1049.

and half years later, had been written in a way that didn't go against FEC policy decisions.¹¹³

The existence of this plan shows that there was some movement towards de-purging in the US government already in 1948. The fact that the DoS had approved this plan also shows some changes in the Department's thinking. It is also interesting to note that the plan had been created after Allison and Butterworth's criticisms of FEC's disarmament decisions. At the same time, the plan still adhered to the FEC policy decisions. It should be also noted that as the plan had been prepared in cooperation with the Department of Army, the thinking of the latter department had probably influenced planning.

Butterworth and Allison's discussions about the FEC and *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment* are an example of changes which had been happening in American policy towards the Japanese re-armament. By 1948 attitudes in the United States were already moving away from total demilitarization even though an actual policy was yet to crystallize. Kennan's views also point towards the fact that it was also domestic threats inside Japan which were seen by many as the main problem, not external ones. Nonetheless, it was already being recognized that the FEC might pose a potential problem if the United States even wanted to implement larger changes regarding security policies in Japan in future, even if the US did not necessarily wish to do so then.

1.4. The FEC and the Japanese Constitution

At the same time with these other discussions, the question of Japanese Constitution was also evolving. The Article IX¹¹⁴ of Japanese constitution is the main constitutional

¹¹³ The Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the United States Political Adviser to the SCAP (Sebald), May 16, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1047-1048.

¹¹⁴ "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." The Constitution of Japan, Chapter II, Article 9.

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html

factor limiting the extent of Japanese armament. The article itself is based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact¹¹⁵ of 1928. The exact meaning of the Article has been a source of controversies since its creation, like the question of Japan's right to self-defence.¹¹⁶ As the Article 9 is so fundamental from the perspective of the Japanese remilitarization, it is worth to explore discussions concerning it in the context of US-FEC relations. It is good to remind here that changes to the Japanese constitution officially belonged under the authority of the FEC based on the Moscow Agreement of 1945¹¹⁷. Despite this MacArthur wanted to limit the FEC's role in the constitutional reform¹¹⁸.

The SCAP did not have clear guidelines from the State Department when it came to the creation of new constitutional order, except a directive from October 1945 calling for responsible government, wider suffrage and executive responsibility. Many Japanese, like Prime Minister Shidehara¹¹⁹, thought that Japan's old Meiji constitution from 1887 could be a basis for the new one. According to views of these Japanese conservatives, it was not the constitution which had enabled the rise of militarism. The militarism had risen despite the constitution for which militarists had no respect. At first the Japanese attempted to create their own constitution, the so-called Matsumoto Draft, published in February 1946, but the SCAP did not think it went far enough in reforms. Motivated by this, the SCAP produced its own draft only in six days which called for much more far-reaching reforms. In order to speed up the acceptance of the draft, MacArthur threatened to involve the FEC and the Japanese public in the constitutional reform.¹²⁰ MacArthur even brought up a possibility of a referendum on the new constitution.¹²¹

¹¹⁵ The Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as the Pact of Paris, was a treaty in which attempted to end wars as a part of international politics in 1928. Named after the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and the US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, it was originally a treaty between France and the United States inspired by the latter's refusal to join the League of Nations. The Pact expanded later to include most nations in the world. The language used in the treaty however allowed different interpretations which rendered the pact mostly meaningless. *Britannica Academic*.

¹¹⁶ Samuels 2007, 45.

¹¹⁷ Edwards 1977, 32.

¹¹⁸ Saunavaara 2010, 179.

¹¹⁹ Shidehara Kijûrô served as the Prime Minister of Japan from October 1945 until May 1946. He had earlier served as the Japanese foreign minister two times, 1922-1927 and again 1929-31. Liberal in foreign policy but conservative in domestic policies, he was known for "Shidehara diplomacy", a peaceful foreign policy doctrine, during the 1920's. *Britannica Academic*.

¹²⁰ Bailey 1996, 41-42

¹²¹ Schaller 1997, 10.

The exact origin of the article 9 is unclear. MacArthur later claimed the article was originally Shidehara's suggestion but it might have also come from the SCAP's Government Section. There were also slight amendments to the article 9 later when it was discussed in the Diet, the so-called Ashida amendment¹²². This amendment left some leeway in the constitution when it came to re-armament issues. The SCAP probably accepted this interpretation already at the time. The lower house of the Diet voted for the new constitution in August 1946 and the upper house followed it in October 1946. The constitution eventually came to power in May 1947.¹²³

Some FEC members criticized the way how the constitutional reform had been handled without the involvement of commission. The DoS had also unofficially discussed the issue with the Department of War. MacArthur however claimed that the start of constitutional reform had preceded the creation of FEC. Thus the reform thus did not belong under the FEC's powers but represented cooperation between the Japanese government and the SCAP.¹²⁴

As we can see here, regardless of FEC's official authority, the SCAP did not actually let it to take part in crafting the draft constitution. However, documents do reveal that the FEC did come up discussions concerning constitutional reform process, even if relatively rarely.

The Acting Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs Hugh Borton wrote in September 1946 to John Carter Vincent about his belief that Article 9 of proposed Japanese constitution would not be discussed in near future in the FEC. The article in question concerns the Japanese demilitarization. He added that both China and Australia had suggested discussions on this topic should be held later. In Borton's opinion, it would have been much more important to the United States to concentrate on the eventual peace treaty and post-treaty international agreements, like the proposed 25-year disarmament treaty, which limit the extent Japan can rearm. Borton pointed out that

¹²² "Ashida amendments" consisted two additions to the Article 9, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order" and "In order to accomplish the aim of of the preceding paragraph". Bailey 1997, 44.

¹²³ Bailey 1996, 44.

¹²⁴ Saunavaara 2010, 180.

unlike the constitution, the Japanese could not change these international treaties by themselves alone.¹²⁵

Borton was the not only one who felt this way. The British government has been voicing since October 1945 its support for using the Meiji constitution as the basis for constitutional changes. The British government felt that using the old domestic constitution as the foundation of new one might survive longer than one forced to the Japanese by foreigners. Oscar Morland from the British Embassy had also commented the constitutional draft being too radical and specifically mentioned the potential of Article 9 causing political unrest in future. Some other FEC nations, like New Zealand and Australia, were hardliners on constitutional questions however.¹²⁶

This discussion reveals that Americans at this stage still felt that emphasis, when it comes to limits on Japanese re-armament, should be based on international treaties, not constitutional solutions. While the British opinion concerning disarmament treaties is unclear, their skepticism towards the Article 9 seems to have been somewhat similar to Borton's arguments. It is worth reminding that the United States government itself did not have any concrete policies regarding the Japanese constitution or the Article 9. The Potsdam Declaration, *U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* and various policy decisions made earlier by the FEC more or less formed the basis for American views on the Japanese constitutional reform. While Australia probably had different reasons to want to delay the discussions about the Article 9 than the United States did, the delay at least in Borton's mind would be beneficial to the US, regardless of Australia's intentions.

It is unclear how useful these constitutional discussions were in this case. As noted above, the lower house of the diet had already approved the constitution last month, in August, and the upper house would follow it next month. At this stage the discussion about one article of the constitution seems rather redundant, especially if the negotiations concerning it are delayed. It is quite clear at this point that it was the SCAP

¹²⁵ Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Borton) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) September 30, 1946. FRUS 1946, VIII 322-323.

¹²⁶ Buckley 1982, 65-66.

which was the driving factor in the constitutional issue and the FEC was reacting, even if its role was originally meant to be more active.

Borton probably realized the limited influence both State Department and FEC had on the constitutional reform. This, coupled Borton's skepticism towards the Article 9 itself and the willingness of Japanese to keep it after the Occupation had ended, probably fueled his desire to concentrate on the peace treaty and possible disarmament treaty as a way to limit the re-armament of Japan.

John Allison disagreed with the Army's additions to Kennan's report in his memorandum to Maxwell Hamilton in April 1948. Although he did not tell what the army's proposals were and available sources do not shed light on them, Allison criticized the Army's attitude being inconsiderate towards the FEC. According to Allison, this could alienate America's "natural allies in the Pacific." Allison writes that while he did agree on a personal level with the Army's views concerning inadvisability of unarmed Japan cemented in the text of the constitution, the issue should not be brought up as openly as the Army wants to be done. He also added that there exists even currently "a degree of flexibility" on the issue which the United States could exploit in future.¹²⁷

Even though the source in question does not tell what the Army's amendments exactly were, they seem to be related and concern foreign relations of the United States. Both Allison's comments criticized the Army's rash attitude and the lack of political finesse. The fact he criticized the Army's will to openly discuss about the status of Japanese military and its views towards the FEC in the same memorandum in very similar terms might mean there exists a connection.

By 1948 the United States policy towards Japan was changing and this also had effects on American attitudes towards the FEC. While in 1946 the United States and the FEC shared to large extent similar ideas when it comes to Japanese disarmament, by 1948 some Americans were already taking more flexible positions towards the issue, which was reflected in their more negative views towards the FEC and its policy decisions. This change represented a problem for the State Department as it effectively meant that the

¹²⁷ Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), to Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, April 30, 1948. FRUS 1948, VI 742-743.

US started to oppose some earlier FEC decisions done regarding the disarmament of Japan, especially *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment* and *Initial Post-Surrender Policy*. The fact that the US had itself supported these put it in a potentially embarrassing position if changes for policy decisions were ever desired. Even if there had been some tensions regarding the FEC already in 1946, by 1948 these differences in views between the FEC and the US were becoming starker. This reflected to large extent changes in overall American policies towards the occupation of Japan and the beginning of great power competition between the United States and the USSR. We can also see that the importance of the FEC from the American point of view laid mostly on its status among other nations participating in the commission. This meant the United States wanted to avoid openly hostile stance towards the commission to ensure good relations with its allies but at the same time wanted more power the SCAP in more important issues, like those related to arming Japan. Regarding the constitutional reform and the FEC, the State Department seem to have realized the commission's limited role in the affair and generally preferred to solve issues concerning the disarmament of Japan with some sort of separate international treaty instead of constitutional reform.

2. A reverse course in armament policies and the FEC 1949-1951

The goal of this chapter is to describe the period during which the United States' attitude towards the FEC and re-armament experienced its most dramatic changes. There was an increasing emphasis and intensity on re-armament issues caused by changes in international and Japanese domestic environment.

Regarding the FEC, Takemae has argued that "the influence of the FEC waned, its debates grew progressively sterile and, by 1949, the commission no longer played a significant role."¹²⁸ Although this chapter will not discuss actual workings of the FEC itself, it will attempt to show that the FEC continued to matter in the State Department discussions. Its role in the wider web of US foreign relations also grew in significance.

2.1. Shift in Attitudes

The ACJ discussed the Japanese police forces in January 1949. The Soviet delegate in the ACJ, General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, claimed that the amount of police officers, about 141,000, was larger than the official limit, 125 thousand policemen. He also claimed that these police forces were under efforts to organize them into military units with a centralized command. He also pointed out that General Eichelberger had wanted to increase the amount of police officers to 275,000. Derevyanko also claimed that there existed a secret police in Japan by referring to complaints made by labour activists.¹²⁹

William Sebald defended these allegations by claiming that the organization of Japanese police followed earlier Allied policies in Japan. Regarding Soviet claims, Sebald said these were a part of general efforts by the Soviet Union to cause problems to the Occupation, the FEC and the US government. The British member of the ACJ defended the American

¹²⁸ Takemae 2002, 99.

¹²⁹ The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Acting Secretary of State, January 7, 1949. FRUS 1949, VII, Part 2 614-615.

view by referring to the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, as approved by the FEC, but added that the activities of the Japanese police should be monitored.¹³⁰

Takemae has described Sebald as one of the “point men for MacArthur’s crusade against Soviet influence in Japan.”¹³¹ Therefore it is not surprising to see him criticizing the Soviet attitude towards the way the Occupation of Japan was handled. It should be also noted that at this stage the United States was not yet committed to the Japanese re-armament so Sebald was justified in his criticism of Soviet claims about efforts to create a new Japanese military.

All this happened while Japanese politics were experiencing significant shifts. The Japanese general elections in January 1949 ended with large victories for the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). The party got 35 seats compare to pre-election 4 seats, and its vote share increased from 3.7% to 9.8%.¹³² This was followed by the JCP’s adoption of a new, more militant program coupled with openly anti-American propaganda. Both the SCAP and Japanese government suspected the JCP was not acting independently but that these actions were actually led by the USSR.¹³³ Taking into account these events, it is easy to understand why Sebald would show much skepticism towards the USSR’s actions, both generally and specifically regarding the FEC.

In his memorandum in early April 1949, Acting Political Adviser in Japan Max Bishop made comments regarding NSC 44, *Limited Military Armament for Japan*. Bishop agreed with views that Japan should not establish a new military in near future but did see some possibilities to enhance the security in Japan. Based on earlier NSC 13/2, Japan could enlarge its police forces to ensure the country’s internal stability. He also did not see any problem if some planning regarding Japanese-American cooperation during the potential war is explored, as long as that planning stays secret. He thus recommended that options which would give Japan an ability to help the United States militarily should be studied. He added that these policies may be in conflict with American pledge to demilitarize Japan and might be opposed by “our Allies and former friends who share in

¹³⁰ The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Acting Secretary of State, January 7, 1949. FRUS 1949, VII, Part 2 615-616.

¹³¹ Takemae 2002, 150.

¹³² French 2014b, 47.

¹³³ French 2014, 49-50.

the regime of control in Japan.” Thus any planning in this regard should be done extremely covertly.¹³⁴

Takemae has argued that Bishop was conservative and hawkish in his foreign policy views and was able to influence occupation policies during the Reverse Course¹³⁵. Nevertheless, Bishop shows here some level of concern on what American actions might cause in the ACJ and the FEC if uncovered. Nevertheless, Bishop seemed to imply that Japan could have some sort of role in the American defence planning. As shown in the last chapter, there had already existed some skepticism towards the FEC policies already in 1948, especially towards *Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan and Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment*. Bishop probably shared these views to some extent but nevertheless realized what sort of troubles the rejection of these decisions would cause for American foreign relations.

American foreign policy regarding the former Axis powers of Japan and Germany was generally changing during this period. The US had experienced many foreign policy crisis during the late 1940's and this has caused some rethinking concerning America's allies. The US realized that it needed to rely more on its allies in their own defence and acting alone was not anymore an option. Japan and Germany would have a special role in this new foreign policy thinking. Japan's role was further strengthened by the fact that the collapse of Nationalists in China meant that the US could not rely on China in its Asian policy.¹³⁶

The State Department's view towards the Japanese re-armament was coloured during this period by the view that the USSR did not represent a direct military threat to Japan. As Schaller has argued when describing discussions in 1949, “most diplomats dismissed the likelihood of a Soviet assault on Japan and believed that a centralized police force, a leased naval base or two, and continued economic aid would assure its security.”¹³⁷ It is not then surprising that Bishop would emphasize the strengthening of Japanese police forces, even if he didn't fully disagree with the idea of some military planning.

¹³⁴ Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), April 1, 1949. FRUS, VII, Part 2 694-696.

¹³⁵ Takemae 2002, 151.

¹³⁶ Averill 2013, 160.

¹³⁷ Schaller 1997, 24.

In January 1950, Butterworth left the Secretary of State a memorandum, where he outlined options the United States would have regarding the peace treaty. The first option would be to let Japan to gain independence in political and economic policies while continuing existing procedures relating to security issues. The second option was to negotiate a fuller peace treaty with Japan while still allowing the continued existence of American military bases in the country. In the first option, the SCAP, the FEC and the ACJ would continue to exist, but their tasks would be limited to those relating security issues. The FEC's decisions about occupation forces and demilitarization would continue to guide policies in those areas. Earlier agreements, like the Potsdam Declaration, would also stay in force. From legal perspective, this would not end the state of war between Japan and Allied powers. The emphasis would be on an agreement between "friendly FEC countries". The Soviet Union and China would be then presented with a fait accompli which they could either accept or not. Besides other changes to occupation policies, the memorandum also recommended the strengthening of Japanese police.¹³⁸ After some discussions, Butterworth concluded that the first option would be more likely beneficial for the United States as it allows more flexibility. He also thought this option might have given the United States a chance to negotiate a more lasting security agreement in future.¹³⁹

It is interesting to note that Butterworth supported an option which would have retained the FEC and its restrictions on the Japanese re-armament. This is especially remarkable when we remember how vehemently Butterworth disagreed with McCoy about the usefulness of the FEC for the United States in 1948 and attacked the commission's policy decisions on security issues, most prominently *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment*.

The State Department's FEC policy also started to emphasize relations with countries deemed "friendly" to the US during this period, as seen in Butterworth's memorandum. While there had existed distrust towards the USSR even before in the FEC relating to

¹³⁸ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State, January 18, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI 1117-1121.

¹³⁹ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State, January 18, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI 1126.

armament issues, the State Department officials' new habit to openly divide FEC members to friends and enemies was a new development.

The legal adviser Adrian Fischer later made comments on Butterworth's proposals. He saw the absence of China or the Soviet Union from any treaty signed with Japan being problematic from the legal point of view. He added though that Butterworth's recommendation about a treaty which gives Japan sovereignty in political and economic issues while keeping security issues under the control of SCAP would be problematic and might cause troubles with other nations, even if the United States itself accepted it. Fischer advised that if the United States wanted to make a treaty with Japan without the USSR or China, the best way for that would be in the United Nations and by claiming that all aims of the Potsdam Declaration had been achieved. He nevertheless thought this might put the United States in an embarrassing position.¹⁴⁰

While China and the USSR signed a treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February 1950, Schaller argues that Americans did not believe this agreement was directed against Japan, even if the treaty language did mention the country as a potential source of threat¹⁴¹. This can be confirmed based on sources used in this work at least, as the Sino-Soviet treaty was not mentioned in discussions concerning the FEC and Japanese re-armament issues. It is however part of a wider web of events which were happening during this period and might have contributed to decisions made by the DoS officials.

NSC 68 approved in April 1950 was a new sign of stark vision of Cold War world. It clearly divided the world in two camps and put more importance on military strength in opposing the Soviet Union instead of mere economic and political competition, as envisioned by Kennan. This, as Schaller puts it, "might also have been expected to have encouraged a greater emphasis on a distinctly military contribution by Japan to US foreign policy goals." Nevertheless, the NSC 68 itself did not call for rearmed Japan, except for pointing out unviability of neutral Japan.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Fisher) to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI 1129-1131.

¹⁴¹ Schaller 1997, 25.

¹⁴² Schaller 1997, 45.

The Cold War was changing US foreign policy in the ways which was increasingly putting it against the FEC and its disarmament decisions. While the US was not yet fully committed to the Japanese re-armament, it was already recognized by the DoS that the FEC had adopted some decisions which limited the US actions regarding the Japanese re-armament. At the same time the DoS did not want to go openly against FEC policy decisions. As the FEC relations were also increasingly seen through the prism of US relations with its allies, open disrespect towards the FEC might have had negative influences on relations between the US and its allies.

2.2. Korean War, Full Reverse and State Department Reaction

The Korean War quickly led to the severe man power shortages in American forces stationed in Japan, as MacArthur had been forced to move 65,000 soldiers from Japan to South Korea. On July 8, he ordered Yoshida to create a 75,000 men strong National Police Reserve (NPR), in addition to the existing police force of 125,000, and strengthen the existing Maritime Safety Board, the Japanese coastal force, with 8,000 men. The SCAP claimed that the new NPR did not represent military potential in order to avoid constitutional issues. However, very soon Americans proposed the enlargement of NPR to the size of 300,000-350,000 men.¹⁴³ The Korean War also led the State Department's PPS to claim that the situation had changed significantly from the time the Potsdam Declaration had been signed. According to the PPS, Japan should start to strengthen its own defence.¹⁴⁴

The exact nature of NPR at its inception has been a source of debate among historians. Thomas French argues, that the NPR was a constabulary at the beginning due to its close connections with the civil police and the similarities in its procedures, in both practical and legal sense, when compared to the ordinary police.¹⁴⁵ French has also argued that many claims regarding the supposed covert militaristic role of NPR have been usually

¹⁴³ Takemae 2002, 487.

¹⁴⁴ Sugita 2013, 91.

¹⁴⁵ French 2014a, 30-32.

based on a single source.¹⁴⁶ In contrast to this, Takemae maintains that the NPR was designed to be a nucleus of future Japanese military from the beginning. He also writes that this view was widely shared by both Americans and the Japanese at the time.¹⁴⁷

Besides the nature of NPR, its creation process has been also debated. Thomas French has noted that the idea of MacArthur “ordering” Japan to create a NPR is misleading. According to French, the Japanese government had even prior to this order wanted to create some sort of force to secure the domestic situation in the country.¹⁴⁸

Marshall Green wrote about options the United States might have regarding the re-armament of Japan. Green noted that the FEC had three policy decision which limited Japan militarily. These were 1) *Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan*, 2) *Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential* and 3) *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment*. Green noted the limits these decisions put on Japan are extensive. They ban almost all armaments, except for small weapons used by the police. They forbid the creation of gendarmeries or paramilitary groups. In addition, the production of any weaponry was banned. However, the FEC’s decisions have, as Green puts it, two “important loopholes”, which gave the United States some possibilities regarding the issue. Firstly, the *Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential* allowed the Supreme Commander to re-open war production industries “to meet the needs of the occupation”, as long as the ACJ has been given an explanation about this decision. Secondly, the FEC’s terms of reference disallowed the FEC from making decisions regarding military operations.¹⁴⁹

The fact that Green openly uses the term “loophole” in his memorandum is rather interesting. It seems to imply that he understood how his proposals might go against the spirit of the FEC policy decisions, even if they did not go against its letter.

It should be noted the influence of State Department of American policy towards Japan was generally waning at this period as the Department had become blamed for the “loss

¹⁴⁶ The source in question being Frank Kowalski’s memoirs. Kowalski was one of those people from the GHQ whose task was to supervise the creation and development of NPR. French 2014b, 13-16

¹⁴⁷ Takemae 2002, 487.

¹⁴⁸ French 2014b, 18.

¹⁴⁹ Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) to the Director of the Office of Northeastern Asian Affairs (Allison), July 19, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI 1950. 1244-1245.

of China” to the Communists. This led it to adopt policies which sought to make Japan a strong American ally in Asia. This also meant that the Department of Army’s (DoA) influence on American foreign policy increased.¹⁵⁰ This was an important development as the DoA generally support the creation of Japanese army more strongly than the DoS did, though there were exception in both departments. The State Department generally opposed the re-armament because it would harm American foreign policy aims.¹⁵¹

The strengthening of the Army at the cost of weaker State Department must influenced the US-FEC relations. This probably led the DoS to take a more accommodating approach towards the Japanese re-armament. The DoS agreed to the Army’s demands in spite of problems they could cause with the FEC and American allies.

Continuing his discussion, Green speculated about a possibility of stronger police or defensive build-up in order to ensure the domestic stability of Japan. Green thought that the FEC’s decisions might possibly limit American plans in future regarding security issues in Japan. He said however that the current FEC policy decisions do not limit American plans regarding the empowering the Japanese police force or coastal guard. These plans called for a larger police force, better quality training and equipment and a more centralized organization among other things.¹⁵² Green also pointed out that “two loopholes” the FEC’s decisions could be interpreted to allow the exportation of Japanese armaments to South Korea by Supreme Commander claiming that Japan is under a threat. This action needed the FEC’s approval however.¹⁵³

In the event the United States wished to arm Japan, changes to FEC policy decisions would be needed. This could have been achieved either through amendments to existing policy decisions or by a new decision which would confer Supreme Commander with emergency powers to suspend some of earlier FEC decisions concerning demilitarization. Green mentioned allowing the Japanese to have larger weapons than rifles and pistols, training Japanese forces for defensive tasks and the Japanese coastal

¹⁵⁰ Edwards 1977, 530.

¹⁵¹ French 2014b, 87.

¹⁵² Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) to the Director of the Office of Northeastern Asian Affairs (Allison), July 19, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI 1950. 1245.

¹⁵³ Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) to the Director of the Office of Northeastern Asian Affairs (Allison), July 19, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI 1950. 1245-1946.

guard having torpedoes or depth charges as examples as such policies which might have went against decisions reached at the FEC. Due to the Soviet absence from the FEC to protest the continuing membership of Republic of China in the organ, it might have been possible for the United States to get its proposals to be accepted in the commission, especially as a significant portion of occupation forces had been moved to South Korea. However, even this might have not removed all limits which the United States wished to get rid of.¹⁵⁴

Green's concern shows that even without the USSR in the FEC to block the United States' plans in Japan, it was recognized that there were other issues which might limit the US' actions. It also shows that it was not the USSR which was preventing the United States from changing the FEC's policies regarding the Japanese re-armament but that there were also other influences at work.

John Dulles described his views on the Japanese re-armament to Paul Nitze who at the time led the PPS on a memorandum marked as Top Secret on 20 July, 1950. Dulles mentioned that he had asked John Allison to discuss with Maxwell Hamilton about the FEC's decisions and the extent that they would allow Japan to rearm. Dulles noted that Germany and Japan, due to their high populations and industrial potential, are highly important from the strategic perspective. If the USSR would have control over these two areas, its chances to win a war against the US would increase. Because of this, the Soviet attention will increasingly gravitate towards these areas, of which Dulles saw the Korean War as an example. Without Japanese help, it would be very difficult for the United States to defend Japan. Although Japan had 200,000 policemen, they were only lightly armed and the police organization itself was not very centralized. They also lacked adequate training. These factors made the defensive capabilities of Japanese police very limited. Dulles also noted the weakness of Japanese coast guard. However, The FEC's policy decisions limited the way the Japanese police or the country's coast guard could be strengthened. By changing these decisions, the Japanese police could be strengthened to the extent in which it would be able to do defensive actions. The Coast guard could also get torpedo boats and its anti-smuggling capabilities could be

¹⁵⁴ Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) to the Director of the Office of Northeastern Asian Affairs (Allison), July 19, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI. 1946.

strengthened, which would also allow it to develop capabilities to oppose amphibious landings. Dulles mentioned that there were ongoing discussions about the ways to strengthen Japanese defensive capabilities under the limits of current FEC policy decisions. Dulles emphasized that these actions should be taken very carefully as they might provoke a Soviet answer. He did also say that Japan's former enemies and the Japanese themselves might oppose these actions. However, taking account the current world situation, a defenseless Japan would form even a bigger threat to the United States and its allies.¹⁵⁵

Dulles's interest towards the re-armament of Japan extended to the period prior to the Korean War, as he had brought up the issue in his discussions with Prime Minister Yoshida on June 22 when he was in Japan as President Truman's special envoy. This was mere three days before the war began. Both Yoshida and MacArthur had opposed the idea at the time.¹⁵⁶ Dulles, like President Truman, supported efforts towards the re-armament of Japan. However, both of them also recognized issues limiting these efforts, including American foreign relations, especially those with Australia and New Zealand.¹⁵⁷ Dulles had also warned about what he saw as the "overmilitarization" of Japan. At the end, while supporting limited re-armament, Dulles was nevertheless mostly concerned about the state of Japanese economy and its domestic politics.¹⁵⁸

Allison also wrote about problems caused by the FEC to the Japanese re-armament on December 2, 1950. Referring to unpublished discussions between him and Dulles, he talks about problems caused by limits imposed by the FEC on Japan's actions. Even though there had been throughout research on the FEC and how its decisions might allow Japan to have more freedom in its own affairs, this had not resulted in much yet. In his opinion Japan should have had more independent role in its own affairs, even if there is no peace treaty. He thought that the United States should openly tell its allies that it didn't see the point following the FEC's policy decisions as the situation had changed so dramatically since 1945. Although Allison believed American allies would

¹⁵⁵ Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary of (Dulles) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, July 20, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI. 1246-1248.

¹⁵⁶ Takemae 2002, 490.

¹⁵⁷ French 2014b, 89.

¹⁵⁸ Schaller 1997, 29.

understand this position, he also thought that the United States should emphasize that it did not want Japan to become a renewed threat and it would work for that to not happen. In Allison's opinion, Japan should have ground forces while naval and aerial defence would be handled by its allies. This would also placate fears among Japan's former enemies about the resurgence of Japanese threat. The decision should be tied to United Nations agreements and possibility of a common military alliance between Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines should be studied. Returning Japanese sovereignty would also make the Japanese happy and they would more willingly ally themselves with the United States by themselves without any forcing.¹⁵⁹

Few days later Allison had again prepared a memorandum to Dulles, this time discussing issues related to the eventual peace treaty. Allison wrote it is important that Japan stays aligned with the United States. Meanwhile the United States commitments in Asia should stay limited to aerial and naval forces and supplying. Allison recommended that the nature of the Potsdam Declaration and the Basic Post-Surrender Policy must be studied. According to Allison, depending on if they are determined to be international agreements instead of the FEC's policy decisions, they might be interpreted differently. Negotiations with friendly nations in the FEC should also be held. This would allow the United States to explain its aims and gain support from its allies, either active or non-active. In addition, discussions with the Congress and the Japanese themselves should be held. After these actions had been taken, the Japanese police and the coast guard should be strengthened in order to ensure internal stability. Its industries should be also strengthened to support American and Japanese forces and the FEC should ease off limits on armament industries.¹⁶⁰

China's intervention in the Korean War in late 1950 greatly changed the calculus of American thinking regarding the Japanese re-armament. The UN forces in Korea, which had previously advanced to the Sino-Korean border, were suddenly pushed back by the Chinese force of over 400,000 men. The UN forces were forced to retreat south and the collapse of South Korea became a real possibility in the minds of many American leaders.

¹⁵⁹ Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles), December 2, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI. 1354-1356.

¹⁶⁰ Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles), December 7, 1950. FRUS 1950, VI. 1356-1358.

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) seemed to show distrust towards the NPR's capabilities in defending Japan against external threats.¹⁶¹

Alexis Johnson, the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, prepared a memorandum for the JCS on January 6, 1951, where he described actions the United States should take before the occupation could end. One of the points he wanted to discuss was the size NPR and Maritime Safety Board. In Johnson's opinion, these organization should be strengthened as quickly as possible. According to Johnson, increasing the size of NPR and Maritime Safety Board did not break any particular FEC rules. However, giving two organizations any weapons more powerful than small arms would be problematic as long as the FEC in its current form continued to exist. Johnson wrote it is very important that the Department of Defence (DoD) keeps the Department of State informed of all actions done in this regard so the latter's work to defend these changes in the FEC becomes easier.¹⁶²

Johnson's memorandum shows that the DoS was ready to support the enlargement of NPR and Maritime Safety Board as long as the FEC policy decisions were respected. Its authority to direct the policy was however questionable. It seems it was the DoD which really held the power in the Japanese re-armament question. The DoS's principal task thus became to explain the FEC actions taken by the DoD and soften the political impact the Japanese re-armament might have among FEC members. Even though the DoS did not have any particular love towards the FEC as an institution, it understood the political ramifications of the US acting too unilaterally in the re-armament question.

Dulles, who had been just named as the ambassador, met with Malik, who was the Soviet representative to the United Nations, on January 13, 1951, before his mission to Japan. Dulles wanted inform Malik about the trip and he wished only to ask the Japanese about their views regarding the peace treaty, not to negotiate. After complaining that the People's Republic of China had not been yet consulted by the United States, Malik mentioned that some American newspaper had written that Dulles went to Japan as a part of efforts to rearm Japan. Dulles denied this while also asking if the Soviet Union

¹⁶¹ French 2014b, 229-230.

¹⁶² Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson), January 6, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 784-785.

hoped to keep Japan permanently defenseless. Malik noted that the FEC had already made such a decision earlier. Dulles admitted that the FEC had directed that Japan should be demilitarized but also reminded that such an outcome had been already achieved and again asked if the Soviet Union hoped to keep Japan permanently defenseless. This led Malik to remark how Japan had attacked the Soviet Union twice in the past while Germany too had also done so numerous times. Dulles answered that the United States did not want to see militaristic Japan in future. Besides, the Japanese also opposed the idea. As an example of the inefficiency of the demilitarization treaties, he also pointed out how the Versailles Treaty had not prevented resurgence of German militarism. This was followed by a discussion about the American role in the rise of German militarism and the Japanese peace Treaty. At the end of conversation Dulles said that he would meet Malik again after the trip and even before, in the case he received any communications from Moscow. Colonel C. Stanton Babcock, who had recorded the discussion, noted that even though Malik had been friendly and polite, he had been very skeptical towards Dulles' mission. Malik had been also more cautious regarding the peace treaty than previously.¹⁶³

Dulles did not openly speak about the Japanese re-armament with Malik. This is not very surprising when taking into account hostile relations between the US and Soviet Union. Instead, Dulles attempted to de-emphasize the topic and rather claimed that the FEC's aims concerning the Japanese disarmament had been already achieved and the USSR should consider Japan's future security needs more. This implies understanding that rearming Japan might be actually acceptable and not even necessarily go against the FEC policy decisions on the matter. Dulles seems to have believed that the FEC had already lived its purpose regarding the issue. Nevertheless, there seems to have been an attempt at least to keep relations cordial, as shown by Dulles's willingness to meet Malik again. While Dulles supported the Japanese re-armament, he did probably still understand that it would not help the US to anger the USSR needlessly. This might have been motivated by peace negotiations and hope that the USSR would cause less problems in Japan.

¹⁶³ Memorandum of Conversation, by Colonel C. Stanton Babcock of the Department of Defence, January 13, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 797-799.

With the possibility of the collapse of South Korea looming in the horizon, and even the collapse of Japan, at least in the minds of American leaders, the question of giving the Japanese heavy armaments became increasingly topical.¹⁶⁴ Fears concerning Japan's inability to defend prompted MacArthur to ask the DoA to give Japan heavy armaments in early January 1951. While there was initial skepticism towards MacArthur's demands in the DoA, the Department did eventually start to move towards the position which more strongly supported the Japanese re-armament, mainly in the form of providing Japan with heavy weaponry and expanding the size of NPR.¹⁶⁵

The Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk made comments on proposals made by the JCS regarding about giving heavy arms to four Japanese NPR divisions, with the possibility to increase the size of eventually to ten divisions. These plans are fueled by the military threat under which Japan is believed to be. While the Secretary of Defence George Marshall supported this view, he had asked the opinion of Acting Secretary of State James Webb concerning the issue. Rusk pointed out the proposal's many problems in his memorandum to the Secretary of State. Besides internal Japanese politics and other treaty obligations the United States had, the FEC also could cause some troubles. He pointed out that the *Basic Post-Surrender Policy*, which the United States had previously supported like all other members in the commission, specifically called for "total disarmament" of Japan. Two decisions, *Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential* and *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment*, had further cemented the policy of disarmament in Japan.¹⁶⁶

Rusk also noted that even American allies, like Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, have a critical attitude towards the idea of rearmed Japan and might strongly oppose any change in policies in this regard. It is very likely that there would exist a strong opposition in the FEC towards any move to give the NPR heavy arms. The Soviets would be likely to use their veto in the FEC to oppose this action. This might even lead to the break-up of the FEC and straining of American relations with all FEC members. Any action by the United States should be preceded by negotiations with American allies

¹⁶⁴ French 2014b, 86.

¹⁶⁵ French 2014b, 231-232.

¹⁶⁶ Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State, February 22, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 888-889.

by emphasizing the danger of Soviet invasion, even though it is unlikely that they could be persuaded. Rusk wrote that even though the dissolution of the FEC would not in itself cause any problems for the United States, it might have negative effects on peace treaty negotiations with Japan. It might also alienate other countries from the United States' policies in Japan.¹⁶⁷

Rusk continued that unilateral action by the United States regarding the Japanese rearmament would go against the purpose of the peace treaty negotiations. The United States wanted a peace treaty because it would allow Japan to rearm without the interference of the FEC, allow Japan to develop its defence capabilities with international support and help to gather support among the Japanese towards rearming. If the re-armament is pushed too soon, these benefits brought by the peace treaty would disappear. The State Department has supported and defended efforts to give the NPR small arms, as the United States' international commitments, like FEC policy decisions, allowed this. However, allowing the NPR to have heavier weaponry would be much more difficult to defend.¹⁶⁸ The controversy inside the FEC would also benefit the Soviet Union and it could become more difficult for the United States to get support against them in other parts of the world. Rusk does not see the Soviet attack against likely. However, rearming Japan too quickly might give the Soviet Union a window of opportunity to use, if the United States' relations with its allies continue to be strained. The effectiveness of NPR in stopping the potential Soviet attack is also questionable.¹⁶⁹

Rusk's views show again how the DoS came to see the FEC in the larger context of US relations with its Allies and the wider Cold War competition with the USSR. The State Department recognized that giving heavy weaponry to the NPR would have mostly helped the USSR in its aim to cause discord and confusion among the US and its allies without really giving any benefits. Therefore it would be more beneficial for the US wait

¹⁶⁷ Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State, February 22, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 891-892.

¹⁶⁸ Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State, February 22, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 893-894.

¹⁶⁹ Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State, February 22, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 894-895.

until the peace is signed and the FEC is disbanded before pushing for the Japanese re-
armament, especially as the military threat against Japan is not imminent.

The Acting Secretary of State James Webb had clearly read Rusk's suggestions which can
be seen in his memorandum to Marshall a week later. He noted that suggestions the
JCS has made are closely linked with the US-FEC relations and peace negotiations. He
also added that the United States has itself in the past supported the FEC's strict line
concerning the armament policies of Japan and the United States is officially committed
to support them. Currently the United States was searching for support for an early
peace treaty. This was also the reason for Dulles' mission to American allies in the
regions as many of them are worried about the renewed Japanese threat. By arming the
Japanese too soon with heavy weaponry, this would have highly negative effects on
treaty negotiations. Using almost the exact same language as Rusk, Webb also raised
the threat of dissolution of FEC and problems this would cause for American foreign
relations, even if the United States was able to influence some members to be more
receptive towards the suggestion by bringing up the Soviet military threat. Like Rusk,
Webb thought that the Soviet Union could use this to its benefit, if it decided to attack
Japan. The DoS does support the idea of making heavy armament available for four
Japanese divisions to be used under emergency and recommends that the planning for
six more divisions is continued. However, this was on the provision that the DoD
negotiates with the DoS before it decides to hand heavy weaponry to the Japanese. The
timing of such an action was an essence in order to avoid long-term negative effects on
American policies in Japan. Webb also wrote that he was interested in discussing the
issue with the Department of Defence after Dulles had returned to the United States.¹⁷⁰

French has noted that it was the DoS, with the help of MacArthur, who reversed his
earlier pro-re-armament position, and who effectively opposed the DoA's attempt to
give Japan heavy weaponry at this stage. Fears of international and internal Japanese
repercussions guided the DoS's attitude in this matter, as well as the fact that the UN
forces had effectively stopped the Chinese attack in Korea.¹⁷¹ We can detect this same

¹⁷⁰ The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defence (Marshall), March 1, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI,
Part 1. 898-900.

¹⁷¹ French 2014b, 233.

attitude when it comes to the DoS's attitude towards the FEC. The rhetoric during this same period is fairly similar to that expressed earlier. The United States had earlier supported certain policies in the FEC and now opposing them would cause troubles regarding its relations, not only with the FEC as a body, but also with its individual members. The FEC policies of this period also increasingly seem to tie to the wider Cold War, as shown by the attention given to the USSR in the Committee.

The NPR's role as a force against external threats also became more important in American planning during spring 1951. *Operation Plan CINCFE No. 4-51* from spring 1951 envisaged the NPR as a temporary defensive force in Japan until the return of American troops if the USSR joined the Korean War and the front on the peninsula collapsed.¹⁷² It is interesting to notice that even as these plans existed, the DoS stubbornly kept referring FEC policy decisions on disarmament.

In his message to the American Embassy in Japan on July 9, 1951, the Acting Secretary of State discussed the issue of providing the NPR with heavy weaponry from American bases in Japan. He mentioned the President had decided in April 1951 that this weaponry should be stored in American bases and would be placed in the hands of the Japanese only with "specific prior agreement with Dept of State or approval at highest govtal level." There should be enough equipment to fit four Japanese divisions, though planning for further six divisions by July 1951 should be also started. Commenting the President's suggestion, the State Department proposed in September 28, 1951, that in order to comply with the FEC's decisions, weaponry should be kept in American bases, where NPR personnel could train with them.¹⁷³

This discussion about heavy armaments seem to show that the DoS was responding to changes in wider American policy, even if it did not do it necessarily wholeheartedly. At the least, it wanted to make a case against accusation which already existed as the US was attempting to rearm Japan. It seems the DoS was not at the helm of American Japan-policies when these decisions were made, but it nevertheless attempted to influence them to a direction less damaging for US interests.

¹⁷² French 2014b, 155.

¹⁷³ The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan, July 9, 1952. FRUS 1952-1954, XIV, Part 2. 1280-1281.

With all these discussions about heavy armaments, it should be noted that while the NPR did officially have artillery units, the heaviest weaponry the force had by the end of 1951 were actually light mortars.¹⁷⁴ These weapons were 60mm American mortars and had been taken into use by the NPR in the summer 1951. They were followed by 81mm mortars in the beginning of 1952 though even these were lighter weapons than those used by the Soviets. The NPR also had some 2.63" bazookas, even though their effectiveness against the Soviet armour was questionable as shown by the Korean conflict. The NPR also received a small amount of anti-aircraft halftracks in early 1952.¹⁷⁵ However, among the source material used in this work, there does not seem to be discussions regarding these exact weapons or their acquisition and how they relate to the FEC and its policy decisions.

The question of Japanese coastal force also continued to be of interest to Americans. In his letter to the president in 28 August, 1951, the Secretary of Defence asked him to accept a new policy put out by the JCS. The JCS had been worried that the domestic situation in Japan was becoming dangerous and that there existed threats towards occupying forces there. The recommendation itself was based on cooperation between the DoS and the DoD. This proposal authorized the SCAP "to establish a Japanese-manned coastal security force, organized and equipped along normal coast guard lines, composed of vessels with appropriate armament and speed, and under SCAP operational control, to be operated in water contiguous to the Japanese islands." At the same time the proposal admitted the FEC policy decisions disallowed the arming of Japanese vessels. This policy was meant for the period between the signing of the peace and the coming into effect of that treaty after which a new policy will be formulated. The DoS had emphasized its support for the policy but also warned that it should be only implemented in a way which will not provide any basis for claims of the force being a nucleus of revived Japanese navy. Any moves towards the latter should only be taken with an agreement between the "highest levels" of American government. If the policy is agreed on, the DoS will "inform certain friendly" FEC governments of this plan.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ French 2014b, 142.

¹⁷⁵ French 2014b, 145-147.

¹⁷⁶ Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Arming of Japanese Manned Ships, August 29, 1951. Rearmament of Japan. Part 1. 1947-1952. 1-B 266.

The Department of Defence seems to have been very much at a driving seat when it came to strengthening the Japanese coast guard, though the DoS seems to have been able to make its support conditional. It should be noted though that the DoS seems to be concentrate on the question how the coast guard might appear to America's allies, not so much what it actually is. While the DoD and the JCS were at a driving seat on this question, the State Department had been able to influence the policy to more moderate direction.

The DoS's influence was visible in a letter by Secretary of Defence Marshall to the Secretary of State few days later. This was a copy of letter he was going to send to the President. The letter noted that the Secretary of State had agreed on policies it contained and would explain them to "certain friendly members" of the FEC. The proposal called for the creation of Japanese coast guard the weaponry appropriate for such a force. The coastal force would be under the control of SCAP in order to enhance the security of Japan which was now been seen under a threat due to the decrease in the size of occupation forces in Japan. The letter also emphasized that this was not meant as the re-creation of Japanese navy. The plan had been created in cooperation between the Departments of State and Defence.¹⁷⁷ The wording of this letter shows that the DoS had been able to influence the DoD towards its viewpoint regarding the coast guard.

Even though the State Department officials had been a part of creation of this new policy and officially agreed on it, there still existed an underlying fear that the move would be taken too far towards full re-militarization, which was still banned by the FEC. This had probably prompted them to demand that any policies towards the full-scale re-armament should be only decided between "highest levels" of the US government, a combination which would most likely also include the DoS. It is noteworthy that here again, "friendly" FEC members, are a priority when it comes to the DoS's worry about the FEC's reaction. At the same time it seems that the DoS was already mentally preparing for the potential creation of new Japanese navy.

¹⁷⁷ The Secretary of Defence (Marshall) to the Secretary of State, September 4, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1330-1331.

2.3. FEC limits on the De-Purging of Imperial Army Officers

One important aspect of Reverse Course was de-purging those Japanese who had been purged during earlier phases of occupation. The de-purge was a great reversal of earlier policies concerning former militarists. The US had seen them both as an integral part of old political order in Japan and as a potential threat to the new democratic system.¹⁷⁸ During the earlier phase of the Occupation about 200,000 Japanese had been purged from the total amount of 2,5 million cases. The purge hit especially hard on the police and the military, from which over 80% of purgees came from. Compared to the military, Japanese elites from the spheres of business, politics and bureaucracy survived the purge much more intact.¹⁷⁹ There had existed some dissatisfaction with the purge even earlier, as some Americans felt that it weakened the US' military position too much. Even Max Bishop from the POLAD had remarked that the purge issue could be handled differently, even if this went against the Potsdam Declaration. The de-purge process was different for purgees depending the reason to which group they belonged. While those purgees involved in the economy were quickly de-purged, the process was much slower for military purgees.¹⁸⁰

Prime Minister Yoshida had suggested already before the Korean War started, that 32,000 rank-and-file ultra-nationalists should be de-purged due to the threat posed by Communism. It would however take until the start of war before the SCAP would act on the issue.¹⁸¹ MacArthur had de-purged 10,900 low risk personnel in October 1950, but it was only after Ridgeway became the new Supreme Commander when the large scale de-purging started. Almost immediately after becoming the SCAP in April 1951, Ridgeway pushed for the de-purges of all those career military officers, who had been commissioned after 1937.¹⁸²

Ridgeway, like his like-minded supporters in the DoA, saw the de-purging of former Imperial Army and Navy Officers and bringing them to the NPR as an important part of

¹⁷⁸ Averill 2013, 164.

¹⁷⁹ Schaller 1997, 10-11.

¹⁸⁰ Edwards 1977, 206-207.

¹⁸¹ Takemae 2002, 480.

¹⁸² Takemae 2002, 491.

their plans to strengthen the force. Many people in the US military also despised the fact that the NPR was led by civilians which they thought hampered the effectiveness of the force.¹⁸³ Ridgeway also thought that purge restrictions prevented the NPR from achieving the level of quality in training and the leadership it needed.¹⁸⁴

Director Johnson from the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs wrote a letter to William Sebald on May 16, 1951, about the issue of de-purging of all navy and army officers who had started their career after 1937. While he did not oppose the idea, he thought that the United States should act in the way that it would not seem like it was opposing the FEC's policy decisions. Johnson noted that de-purging people from the political and economic spheres was not a problem, as long as at least few people are not de-purged. This ensured that the United States does not appear to go against earlier FEC and US policies. However, with regards to military purgees, the FEC's decisions caused some limitations. He noted that *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment* forbade all such sweeping actions where all officers would be de-purged. There was however some leeway allowed by the decision. Johnson said that he thinks that the decision could be interpreted in a way which allows de-purging those officers who opposed Japanese expansionism. The decision also allowed the SCAP to de-purge reserve officers in the name of domestic security or the de-purge furthers efforts towards peace. Johnson thought that this would allow the de-purge of most reserve officers, except those holding senior ranks. He also thought that those career officers, who had left the service but joined later in the reserves should be also counted as reserve officers.¹⁸⁵

Johnson noted that the earlier plan from 1948, WAR 80453¹⁸⁶, might be useful when forming a new de-purge policy as it had been prepared by both the DoS and DoA and had been written in a way to avoid FEC restrictions while still fulfilling the aim of NSC 13/2. Johnson believed that by handling the de-purging as put out by WAR 80453, the United States would be able to avoid criticism it would otherwise encounter. Worried

¹⁸³ French 2014b, 237-238.

¹⁸⁴ French 2014b, 167.

¹⁸⁵ The Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the United States Political Adviser to the SCAP (Sebald), May 16, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1045-1047.

¹⁸⁶ See page 32.

about the peace negotiations, Johnson advised that the Japanese should follow the FEC's earlier decisions when handling the de-purging process. Any actions de-purge actions going further than allowed by the FEC should be approved by Washington. This would ensure that peace negotiations go smoothly. Johnson himself expressed happiness that Japan has more freedom to make its own decisions concerning this issue than before.¹⁸⁷

It is interesting to notice that Johnson brought up an old plan like WAR 80453 again to discussions at this stage. This seems to imply that even though the plan was not taken into action back in 1948, it did remain in the radar of State Department officials in the case it was again needed. While Johnson was being helpful here, he nevertheless wanted that there would not be further relaxations concerning the de-purge without the DoS's approval. This might hint him having fears that the occupation authorities and other departments might proceed too quickly if the DoS was not involved in the process. The US opposing the FEC too publicly might have endangered relations with its allies and caused problems with the peace negotiations with Japan.

Rusk wrote a memorandum to Earl D. Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of Army, on June 22, 1951. Rusk said that he wanted to tell prevalent views inside the DoS concerning General Ridgeway's suggestion about the de-purge. Ridgeway had suggested that all Japanese career officers who were commissioned after July 7, 1937, should be de-purged. Rusk noted that such an action would go against the current FEC policies and reminded that the commission's decisions are not "mere technical or formal" considerations. While the DOS did support efforts to strengthen the NPR and the weakening of occupation machinery, Rusk reminded Johnson that the United States did act in vacuum in Japan. The SCAP's position depended on international agreements among the Allies and by going against the FEC, the United States might hurt General Ridgeway's legitimacy and support among other countries.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ The Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the United States Political Adviser to the SCAP (Sebald), May 16, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1047-1048.

¹⁸⁸ The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Johnson), June 22, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1138-1139.

Rusk suggested two different options in order to achieve similar results towards which Ridgeway's proposal aimed. The first options called for de-purging those officers, who had been commissioned after July 7, 1937. This plan was based on the idea that those who had become officers after that date did not plan to do careers as officers but only wanted to serve their country during the war. Rusk assumed that by this definition, most officers who were commissioned after July 7, 1937 could be de-purged. There would be nevertheless a screening process to separate those who planned to become career officers from those who did not. He added that also those officers commissioned prior July 7, 1937, who could definitely prove that they did not plan to have military careers, could be de-purged, though their numbers would be "very limited". In Rusk's opinion, this plan would have followed policy decisions made in the FEC.¹⁸⁹

Rusk's second option was to de-purge all those officers who had opposed Japanese "expansionism and totalitarianism." He added that Japan's -time political system should be taken into account when screening purged officers. It is unlikely that officers could have expressed their truthful views during the war. The American occupation had changed this. However, the FEC's policy decisions made de-purging officers who seem to have changed their views since the war problematic. In practice, it would be impossible to separate pro-war officers from those who opposed the war but kept silent.

190

Rusk noted that both of these options could be combined, if needed. Rusk also added that the second option might give more freedom to de-purge also those officers who had been commissioned before July 7, 1937. At the end, Rusk wrote that he wanted to find a solution, which would ensure Ridgeway's position and good US-FEC relations.¹⁹¹

Both of these alternatives would have meant that a majority of Japanese officers could have been de-purged, especially in the case of the second option. As Rusk himself noted, it would have been impossible for occupation authorities to differentiate between those

¹⁸⁹ The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Johnson), June 22, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1140.

¹⁹⁰ The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Johnson), June 22, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1140.

¹⁹¹ The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Johnson), June 22, 1951. FRUS 1951 VI, Part 1. 1140-1141.

who had supported the war from those who had kept a façade during the period of authoritarianism. At the same time Rusk showed worry that the United States which acts too unilaterally towards the FEC might cause anger among its allies and might undermine its own legitimacy as the main occupation power in Japan.

The de-purge meant that by October 1951 359,530 people were again free to participate in politics and hold public offices. The NPR also received some of these ex-purgees as its new personnel. At the time, the Civil Affairs Section of SCAP estimated that by December 400 former military officers who had graduated from military and naval academies before 1945 would have joined the NPR.¹⁹² It is interesting to note that Sebald has later remarked there had been fears in the State Department at the time that the de-purge was advancing too rapidly.¹⁹³

The Deputy Under-Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews commented Secretary of Defence Marshall's earlier views concerning the de-purging of former junior officers by reinterpreting the term "career officer", as it is used in *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment*, in his letter to the Acting Secretary of State. Matthews noted that the DoS knew that the SCAP has been already de-purging many officers by using a claim that those officers had opposed "Japanese expansionism and imperialism", even though actually the process has been more that of "blanket de-purge" due to practical reasons. Matthews commented that it is the Department's view that it would be better to justify these de-purges by claiming that they involved only those who aren't "career officers", instead of claiming that those officers had opposed policies of pre-war regime. Because of this concern, Matthews had included a statement prepared by the Department to his letter, where the DoS explained its view on the issue. According to the statement, the DoS, by using "administrative interpretation", was in the opinion that the term career officer, like it is used in *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan*, does not include those officers commissioned after the war started in China on July 7, 1937. It was the view of DoS, that these men can be seen just doing their duty, like "a man owes to his country in time of war." In addition, their young age also meant that they did not bore responsibility on Japan's

¹⁹² Takemae 2002, 491.

¹⁹³ Edwards 1977, 206.

past actions. Based on this, these officers have been screened and de-purged, except in cases where the person might pose a danger. This was to believe to be in accordance with the “spirit and intent of FEC 017/21¹⁹⁴” which aimed to prevent renewed militarism by closing off public positions from the members of the “military clique”, who will continue to be excluded from the de-purge.¹⁹⁵

The DoS influence on the de-purge itself was very low at this stage. Because of this Matthews limits his comments on recommendations how to justify the de-purge so that it would adhere to the United States’ commitments in the FEC. The way how he described the SCAP’s handling of de-purge might also show a hint of criticism towards the occupation authorities. It should be noted that by this stage the de-purge was already in a full swing so this was mostly a case of damage control. It does however show that even at this very late period of American occupation of Japan, the State Department continued to show concern about the FEC and how American attitude towards it might affect US foreign relations.

¹⁹⁴ *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment*

¹⁹⁵ Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Depurging of Former Japanese Officers, November 14, 1951. *Rearmament of Japan*. Part 1. 1947-1952. 1-B 114.

Conclusions

The goal of this study was to discuss the US State Department's views towards the Far Eastern Commission in the context of Japanese rearmament. It argues the department's views experienced significant changes between 1946 and 1951. The State Department initially shared fairly similar views with the commission and supported many of its policy decisions. However, rather quickly outside factors started to contribute to skepticism towards the FEC and its work.

Although the deteriorating US-Soviet relations had a negative influence on American views towards the commission already in 1946, it was in 1948 when there started to happen a significant reversal in attitudes. At that time the State Department started to search for flexibility in the armament issues in Japan and its views towards FEC policy decisions limiting the Japanese re-armament became to be seen in a negative light. Although the State Department did not fully support policies towards the re-armament yet, it wanted to keep its options open and the FEC's disarmament decisions became potential obstacles. Significantly, this shift happened before the Japanese rearmament became the official policy of the United States. Most notably, *Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment and Initial Post-Surrender Policy*, decisions previously supported by the US, became to be seen in an increasingly negative light. This also contributed to the general feeling of skepticism and even hostility towards the commission.

The definite change in attitudes happened in 1949, as the reversal in Occupation policies started to extend to previous decisions made to disarm Japan. The emphasis at this stage was still on the Japanese domestic security however as the Soviet assault on Japan was seen unlikely. As I have shown, all this happened under the full realization that these new policies might go against earlier decisions made in the FEC. However, at the same time the State Department was unwilling to go openly against the FEC's policy decisions. There started to exist a new emphasis, in the minds of State Department officials, on a group of "friendly" FEC nations, whose views must be considered regarding the re-

armament. We can therefore see how US policies in the FEC and American foreign relations with its allies became more interlinked.

The late 1940's was a period when the Department of Defence increasingly took the driving seat in American policies regarding the Japanese re-armament at the cost of State Department's influence. The Korean War in 1950 accelerated these policies. This study's findings on the power balance between two departments correlates with earlier research. The State Department's role gradually developed into explaining the decisions made elsewhere and to make sure the US followed its obligations as agreed in the FEC. This did involve advising other US actors on the most effective ways to rearm Japan while at the same time following FEC policy decisions' letter, if not their spirit. This meant that while the State Department did not lead the US foreign policy, it could influence the way it was executed. The State Department's worry about the peace treaty also influenced its perception of the FEC, as those same members which made the body were needed in the peace conference.

While the FEC itself was never an effective organization in directing occupation policies in Japan, the State Department realized its importance in the wider picture. The FEC involved many of American allies, whose goodwill the United States needed if it was to compete effectively against the Soviet behemoth, making it an actor whose views the US had to consider. This meant that the FEC, through the participation of many US allies, could indirectly guide the re-armament policies in Japan.

Previous research has rarely discussed the FEC's role in American policy-making in-depth. This study shows that the FEC had a more important role in shaping American policies in Japan than had been traditionally thought. This is very much the question of optics as usually the emphasis of scholars had been on the direct influence of FEC. However, as this study shows, the FEC also had indirect influence on the US policies towards Japan, especially in the area of re-armament.

This study is a very narrow look at the US-FEC relations in one specific area, namely the re-armament question, from the point of view of American State Department. This leaves open many avenues of further research. There are many policy areas which also played an important role in the FEC-US relations, like whaling issues and war reparations.

The role of ACJ in the American policy towards its allies might be also a fruitful area of future research.

Sources and Bibliography

Primary Sources

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1946. Volume VIII. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1946.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1947. Volume VI. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1947.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1948. Volume VI. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1948.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1949. Volume VII, Part 2. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1949.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950. Volume VI. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1950.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1951. Volume VI, Part 1. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1951.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1952-1954. Volume XIV, Part 2. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1952-1954.

Hiroshi, Masuda 1998: *Rearmament of Japan Part 1: 1947-1952*. Congressional Informational Service and Maruzen, Tokyo 1998.

Encyclopedias

Britannica Academic. "Kellogg-Briand Pact".
academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/45017 (Read on January 20, 2017)

Britannica Academic. "Shidehara Kijûrô".
academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/67343 (Read on January 20, 2017)

Documents

The Constitution of Japan.

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html

(Read on January 10, 2017)

Newspaper Articles

Hancocks, Paula 2016: *Japan and South Korea hit back at Trump's nuclear comments.*

CNN. <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/politics/trump-view-from-south-korea-japan/> (Read on November 26, 2016)

Research Literature

Aldous, Christopher 1997: *The Police in Occupation Japan: Control, corruption and resistance to reform.* Routledge, London.

Averill, Stephanie 2013: "Demilitarization and Democratization in the Post-World War II World." *Demilitarization in Contemporary World*, pp. 157-184. Edited by Peter N. Stearns.

Bailey, J. Paul 1996: *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present.* Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.

Blakeslee, George H. 1951: "The Establishment of Far Eastern Commission." *International Organization*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (August 1951) pp.499-514. University of Wisconsin Press.

Buckley, Roger 1982: *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan 1945-1952.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Edwards, Catherine R. 1977: *U.S: Policy towards Japan, 1945-1951: Rejection of Revolution.* A dissertation in Political Science. University of California.

French, Thomas 2014a: "Contested 'Rearmament': The National Police Reserve and Japan's Cold War(s)". *Japanese Studies*, Vol. 34, Issue 1. 25-36.

French, Thomas 2014b: *National Police Reserve: The Origin of Japan's Self Defense Forces.* Global Oriental, Leiden.

George F. Kennan 1967: *Memoirs 1925-1950.* An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, Boston.

International Organization (Jun) 1948, Vol. 2, No. 2 "Far Eastern Commission". 394-396. University of Wisconsin Press. www.jstor.org/stable/3030316

International Organization (Feb) 1949, Vol. 3, No. 1 "Far Eastern Commission". 180-182. University of Wisconsin Press. www.jstor.org/stable/2703935

Oinas-Kukkonen, Henry 1992: *Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944-1947*. Greenwood Press, Westport.

Samuels, J. Richard: *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Cornell University Press, New York.

Saunavaara, Juha 2010: *In search of suitable political leadership: Japanese conservatives in occupation plans and policies 1942–1947*. University of Oulu, Oulu.

Schaller, Michael 1997: *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Stratton, Samuel S. 1948: "The Far Eastern Commission." *International Organization*, pp. 1-18. University of Wisconsin Press. www.jstor.org/2704198

Sugita, Yoneyuki, 2013: "Constrained Rearmament in Japan, 1945-1954: US Strategic Preference for Securing Military Bases and Impact of Japanese Financial Community." *Demilitarization in Contemporary World*, pp. 89-110. Edited by Peter N. Stearns.

Swenson-Wright, John 2005: *Unequal Allies? : United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan 1945-1960*. Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Takemae, Eiji 2002: *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*. Continuum, London.